.R. No.

212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship
occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24,
20143 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal
Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information5 which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish
by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his
purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning
about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited
law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced
two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in
Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were
married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in
Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support,
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs
to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters
worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok
with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with
their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied
forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing
AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also
able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of
arrest. Consequently, the case was archived.10
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus
Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of
Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case
and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent
clear showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case
is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering
from mental and emotional anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches
to this Court notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the
Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on
this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had
caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial
limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the
emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing
about or into existence of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a
woman must have been brought about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically
have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to
it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our
criminal laws - territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it
becomes clear that there must be an act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such act was
the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" - which has been
conceded to have been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the
Information must still be ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts
must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the
arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
case, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law.
AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and
worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have
been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as
they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an
essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she
goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of
Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. (Emphasis ours)
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash
is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the
private offended party; and. that this petition should be dismissed outright for having been
brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel
for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly
filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition
was belatedly filed. The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for
Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court
and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact filed
on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the
intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a
Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until
June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's
response to her Letter16dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was
unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present
petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25,
2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by
entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo
v. People of the Philippines, et al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised
only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's
participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial
justice so requires.18

Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in
which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for
the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality
an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.20(Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited
instances may only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave
abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when
the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of
the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions
of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in
relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the
penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case
involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of
courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly
brought to this Court under Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB,
much less weigh the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown
trial on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived
of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when
committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the
Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet
no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its
earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of
Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of the
assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee
on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights.28

The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a
great number of Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to
September 2016, the number of overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at
2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those with
existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract.29 It is thus necessary
to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case
of psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital
infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No.
9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that
may be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262
is crucial. In Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of
psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements
of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman
with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
and
 (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the children or similar· such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are
inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well
as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of
Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as
such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to
outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological
violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a
myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
1âw phi 1

courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out
by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means
employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused,
as shown in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the
institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit
and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be a
transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is
that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense
is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any
of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even
be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the
alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed
abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the
reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24,
2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case
No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004) requires the confidentiality of all records pertaining to cases of violence
against women and their children. Per said section, all public officers and employees are
prohibited from publishing or causing to be published in any format the name and other
identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member. The penalty of one (I)
year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon those who violate the provision. Pursuant thereto,
in the courts' promulgation of decisions, final resolutions and/or final orders, the names of
women and children victims shall be replaced by fictitious initials, and their personal
circumstances or any information, which tend to identify them, shall likewise not be
disclosed.

1
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL
TIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on March 8, 2004.

2
Rollo, pp. 19-45.

3
Rendered by Presiding Judge Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro; id. at 49-52.

4
Id. at 53.

5
Id. at 4 and 26.

6
Id. at 57.

7
Id. at 57-58.

8
Id. at 58-59.

9
Id. at 26.

10
Id. at 27.

11
Id. at 49.

12
Id. at 50-51.
 13
Id. at 154-160.

14
Id. at 3-6.

15
Id. at 17-A.

16
Id. at 15-17.

17
775 Phil. 192 (2015).

18
ld. at 215-216.

19
Morillo v. People, et al., supra.

20
Id. at 212, citing People v. Salico, 84 Phi I. 722, 732-733 (1949).

21
Id. at 211.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823, 832 (2014), citing Rep. of the Phils., et al. v.
22

Sunvar Realty Development Corp., 688 Phil. 616, 630(2012).

23
Id. at 832.

24
Morillo v. People, et al., supra.

Id. at 214.
25

31
761 Phil. 356 (2015).

32
Id. at 372-376.

33
680 Phil. 368 (2012).

34
id. at 380, citing Isip v. People, 552 Phil. 786, 801-802 (2007).

35
Tuzon v. Judge Cruz, 160 Phil. 925, 929 (1975).

36
Morillo v. People, supra note 17, at 206.

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse
and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to
a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he
is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do
so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this
Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the
instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated
that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support

his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s
son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is
a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based
on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per

Special Order No. 1896 dated November 28, 2014

1
Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and "B" to Petition,
respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.

2
Rollo, p. 6.

3
Id.

4
Id. at 7.

5
Annex "F" to Petition, rollo, p. 31.

6
Id. at 32.

7
Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.

8
Id. at 24.

9
Id.at 32.
10
Id.

11
Supra note 7, at 23-24.

12
Supra note 5, at 32.

13
Rollo, p. 7.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 22.

16
Id.

17
Id. at 24.

18
Id. at 8.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Supra note 7.

22
Id.at 24.

23
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged
to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

24
Annex "R" to Petition, rollo, p. 102.

25
Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 25.

26
Id.

27
Rollo, p. 10.

28
G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.

29
Id.at 332-333.
30
Supra note 23.

31
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there assuch, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

32
Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.

33
Id. at 122.

34
Supra note 23.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
35

capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

36
Supra note 7, at 24.

37
Id.

38
G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.

39
Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)

40
EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).

41
Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, p. 84.

42
399 Phil. 342 (2000).

43
Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)

44
Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296
(1999).

45
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

46
Rollo, p. 18.

47
Supra note 44.

48
Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied)

49
543 Phil. 275 (2007).

50
Id.at 290.

51
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)
 52
Rollo, p. 15.

53
In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime,

consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although
there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one
penalty shall be imposed.

ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 156013

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

HERNANDO B. PEREZ, in his

capacity as Secretary of Justice,
and SHIRLEY F. ABERDE,
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 25, 2006

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his
child the education his station in life and financial condition
permit, be charged for neglect of child under Article 59(4)[1] of PD
603?[2]

In this petition for certiorari,[3] petitioner Roberto P. de

Guzman assails the January 3, 2002 resolution of public
respondent, then Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, dismissing
de Guzmans petition for review of the City Prosecutor of Lipa Citys
resolution in I.S. No. 2000-2111. Likewise questioned is public
respondents September 24, 2002 resolution denying
reconsideration.

Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became

sweethearts while studying law in the University
of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private
respondent became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioners child,
Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.

Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991,

petitioner married another woman with whom he begot two
children.

Petitioner sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in
1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously
ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the
cost of the childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than
these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial
support for his son.

In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for

Robbys needs, private respondent accepted a job as a factory
worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only
because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support
Robby and send him to school. However, she reached the point
where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her
and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became
uncertain.

On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family

corporations. He apparently did well as he led a luxurious lifestyle.
He owned at least five luxury cars, lived in a palatial home in the
exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City, built
a bigger and more extravagant house in the same private
community, and sent his children (by his wife) to expensive schools
in Metro Manila. He also regularly traveled abroad with his family.
Despite his fabulous wealth, however, petitioner failed to provide
support to Robby.

In a letter dated February 21, 2000, private respondent demanded

support for Robby who was entering high school that
coming schoolyear (June 2000). She explained that, given her
financial problems, it was extremely difficult for her to send him to
a good school.
Petitioner ignored private respondents demand. The latter was
thus forced to rely on the charity of her relatives so that she could
enroll her son in De La Salle high school in Lipa City.

On June 15, 2000, private respondent filed a criminal

complaint[4] for abandonment and neglect of child under Article
59(2) and (4) of PD 603 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Lipa City. It was docketed as I.S. No. 2000-2111.

In his counter-affidavit,[5] petitioner averred that he never

abandoned nor intended to abandon Robby whom he readily
acknowledged as his son. He claimed that he discharged his
responsibilities as a father and said that he paid P7,000 for his
sons hospitalization and medical needs.He also shouldered the
expenses of Robbys birth and sent money to help out when Robby
was sick or was in need of money. Claiming financial incapacity,
he insisted that the acts attributed to him did not constitute
abandonment or neglect.

Petitioner pointed out that private respondent was the financially

capable parent while he had no fixed job and merely depended on
the charity of his father. He asserted that the five luxury cars
belonged not to him but to Balintawak Cloverleaf Market
Corporation. He denied ownership of the big house in Ayala
Heights Subdivision, Quezon City. He lived there with his family
only by tolerance of his father. He also disclaimed ownership of the
newly constructed house and again pointed to his father as the
owner. Even the schooling of his two children (by his wife) was
shouldered by his father.

On August 1, 2000, private respondent submitted her reply-

affidavit.[6] To prove petitioners financial capacity to support
Robbys education, she attached a notarized copy of the General
Information Sheet (GIS) of the RNCD Development Corporation. It
showed that petitioner owned P750,000 worth of paid-up
corporate shares.

In his rejoinder-affidavit,[7] petitioner maintained that his equity in

the RNCD Development Corporation belonged in reality to his
father. The shares were placed in his name only because he had
no means to invest in the corporation. He could not use, withdraw,
assign or alienate his shares. Moreover, the corporation was
virtually dormant and petitioner did not receive any compensation
as its secretary.

On August 15, 2000, the City Prosecutor of Lipa City issued

his resolution[8] dismissing the complaint for abandonment but
finding probable cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child
punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section
10(a)[9] of RA 7610.[10]

On August 25, 2000, an information was filed before Branch 85 of

the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City for the crime of neglecting a
minor child. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 0431-00.
Before petitioner could be arraigned, however, he filed a petition
for review of the City Prosecutors resolution with the Secretary of
Justice.

On January 3, 2002, public respondent dismissed the

petition for review and affirmed the City Prosecutors
resolution.[11] He found that petitioners ostentatious and luxurious
lifestyle constituted circumstantial evidence of his ample financial
resources and high station in life. Petitioner did not deny
allegations that he failed to send a single centavo for the education
of his son. All the elements of the offense were therefore sufficiently
established. Petitioners claim that everything he had belonged to
his father was a defense which should properly be raised only
during trial.[12]

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was

denied.[13] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that public respondent acted with grave abuse

of discretion in sustaining the City Prosecutors resolution. He
insists that there is no probable cause to justify his prosecution
for neglect of a minor child. First, he is financially incapable to give
support. One can only be charged with neglect if he has the means
but refuses to give it. Second, Robby is not a neglected child. He
has been given, albeit by private respondent who is the financially
capable parent, the requisite education he is entitled to.
 The petition is without merit.

The rule is that judicial review of the resolution of the

Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.[14] Courts are without power to substitute their
judgment for that of the executive branch.[15] They may only look
into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion.[16]

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment which amounts to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.[17]Where it is not shown that the findings complained
of are wholly devoid of evidentiary support or that they are patently
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, the findings
must be sustained.[18]

The assailed resolutions of public respondent were supported

by evidence on record and grounded in law. They were not issued
in a capricious, whimsical or arbitrary manner. There is therefore
no reason to countermand them.

Petitioner is charged with neglect of child punishable under Article

59(4) of PD 603 which provides that:

Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:

xxx xxx xxx

 (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station
in life and financial conditions permit.

xxx xxx xxx

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a parent;

(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;

(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child

and

(4) the offenders station in life and financial condition permit

him to give an appropriate education to the child.

Here, petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He has not

denied that he never contributed for his education except in two
instances (1992 and 1993). He admitted that the boys education
was being financed by private respondent and her relatives. He
stated under oath that the last time he sent material support to
his son was in 1994 when he gave P7,000 for the latters
hospitalization and medical expenses.

There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is

in fact financially capable of supporting Robbys education. The
notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates
that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the
company.

Petitioners assertion that the GIS is not evidence of his

financial capability (since the shares are allegedly owned by his
father) is of no moment. The claim is factual and evidentiary, and
therefore a defense which should be interposed during the trial.

The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under

Article 59(4) of PD 603 attaches only if both parents are guilty of
neglecting the childs education does not hold water.

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent.

Liability for the crime does not depend on whether the other parent
is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of
any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the
child the education which the familys station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate
himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other
parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.

Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To

allow the neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability
defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.[19]
 However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of
Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be made in
relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:

SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and

Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other

acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 but
not covered by the Revised Penal Code.

The neglect of child punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603

is also a crime (known as indifference of parents) penalized under
the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal
Code.[20] Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

We make no determination of petitioners guilt or innocence

of the crime charged. The presumption of innocence in his favor
still stands. What has been ascertained is simply the existence of
probable cause for petitioners indictment for the charge against
him, that is, whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that petitioner
is probably guilty thereof, and should thus be held for trial.
Petitioners guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 0431-00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
It attaches criminal liability to any parent who neglects his child by not giving the latter the education which
the familys station in life and financial condition permit.
[2]
Child and Youth Welfare Code.
[3]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[4]
Complaint-affidavit dated June 15, 2000; rollo, pp. 37-39.
[5]
Dated July 27, 2000; id., pp. 40-46.
[6]
Id., pp. 47-56.
[7]
Dated August 9, 2000; id., pp. 57-61.
[8]
Id., pp. 62-66.
[9]
It penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code.
[10]
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
[11]
Resolution dated January 3, 2002; rollo, pp. 23-26.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Resolution dated September 24, 2002; id., pp. 27-28.
[14]
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tonda, 392 Phil. 797 (2000).
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294.
[18]
Estrella Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 261 (1999).
[19]
Article 8, PD 603.
[20]
The crime of indifference of parents, the essence of which is the failure to provide the child with education, is
punished under Article 277 and is also penalized by Article 59(4) of PD 603. (Regalado, CRIMINAL
LAW CONSPECTUS, 1stEdition [2000], National Bookstore, Inc., p. 502)