Gemma vs Jacinto the theft.
the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime
of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1)
the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not
remit the customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said
property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases
she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and
further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law;
(4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment
from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things the check was voluntarily
handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was
done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments
from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is
to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that
the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing
since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against
property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant
for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was
only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought
was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only
after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing
offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included
or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme
could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma
T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
Wilma Tabaniag vs PP
The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[30]
Anent the first error raised by petitioner, this Court finds that, given the facts of the case and the evidence
on record, the evidence is wanting to prove that petitioner had misappropriated or converted the pieces
of jewelry entrusted to her by Victoria.
In his Complaint-Affidavit,[31] Dennis alleged that petitioner gave the pieces of jewelry to her sub-agent
Bisquera for the latter to sell the same. Furthermore, Dennis alleged that the checks issued as payment
were dishonored, the reason being that the accounts were closed.
Petitioner does not deny entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera. The records of the case reveal that
petitioner had in fact entrusted the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera as evidenced by two
receipts[32] dated February 16, 1992. The same is bolstered by the testimony of Tapang, who testified that
he witnessed petitioner give the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera.[33] Thus, since the pieces of jewelry were
transferred to Bisquera, petitioner argues that she could not be guilty of misappropriation or conversion
as contemplated by Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner. The words convert and misappropriate connote an act of using or
disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only conversion to ones personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.[34]
The factual milieu of the case at bar is similar to Serona v. Court of Appeals[35](Serona) where pieces of
jewelry were also transferred to a sub-agent. The Solicitor General, however, contends that the doctrine
laid down in Serona is inapplicable as the agreement between complainants and petitioner provide a clear
prohibition against sub-agency.[36]
Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the aforementioned conditions do not, in any way,
categorically state that petitioner cannot employ a sub-agent. A plain reading of the conditions clearly
shows that the restrictions only pertain to the manner in which petitioner may dispose of the property:
(1) to sell the jewelry on credit; (2) to sell the jewelry by installment; (3) to give the jewelry for safekeeping;
(4) to lend the jewelry; (5) to pledge the jewelry; (6) to give the jewelry as security; and (7) to give the
jewelry as guarantee. To this Court's mind, to maintain the position that the said conditions also prohibit
the employment of a sub-agent would be stretching the plain meaning of the words too thinly.
Petitioner thus cannot be criminally held liable for estafa. Although it cannot be denied that she received
the pieces of jewelry from complainants, evidence is wanting in proving that she misappropriated or
converted the amount of the pieces of jewelry for her own personal use. Likewise, the prosecution failed
to present evidence to show that petitioner had conspired or connived with Bisquera. The mere fact that
petitioner failed to return the pieces of jewelry upon demand is not proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of
misappropriation or conversion.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had in fact transferred the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera. Thus, contrary to the finding of the CA, petitioner could not have converted the same for her
own benefit, especially since the pieces of jewelry were not with her, and there was no evidence of
conspiracy or connivance between petitioner and Bisquera.
Lastly, although petitioner may have admitted that the cases she filed against Bisquera do not involve the
same checks, which are the subject matter of the case at bar, the same does not necessarily manifest a
criminal intent on her part. On the contrary, what it shows is that petitioner too may be an unwilling
victim of this day-to-day malady of bouncing checks, common in our business field. Certainly, petitioner
may have been negligent in entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera, but in no way can such
constitute estafa as defined in the RPC.
As a final note, a reading of the records and transcript of the case seemingly shows an unintentional
reference by the parties in describing the transaction as one of sale.[41] The foregoing notwithstanding, if
this Court were to consider the transaction as one of sale and not one of sub-agency, the same conclusion
would nevertheless be reached, as the critical elements of misappropriation or conversion, as previously
discussed, are absent in the case at bar.
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.[42] What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty.[43] In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden. Based on the foregoing, it would then be unnecessary to discuss the other assigned
errors.
Notwithstanding the above, however, petitioner is not entirely free from any liability towards
complainants. The rule is that an accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where
the facts established by the evidence so warrant.[44] However, since there is a separate civil action
instituted by complainants, this Court deems it proper for the civil aspect of the case at bar to be resolved
therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 24906, dated February 27, 2004, and its Resolution dated September 22, 2004
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Wilma Tabaniag is ACQUITTED of the crime charged,
without prejudice, however, to the recovery of civil liability in Civil Case No. 63131, before the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 268, Pasig City.
People vs Nelmida (Complex Crime)
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes
of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly states
that:79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in
the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There
are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a
single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case do
not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were not
the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and
their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims
sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more
than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims.
As held in People v. Valdez,81 each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot
give rise to a complex crime.82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and
distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply
for it speaks only of a "single act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact
that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death
and/or injuries to their victims.
In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas, simultaneously
and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing was
the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every
victim separately and distinctly from each other.
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense.
However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number
of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective
criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the
number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only
one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths.84
People vs Dillatan (Special Complex Crime, Sept 2018)
At this stage, the Court notes that, on the occasion of the robbery, aside from Homer being killed, the
Spouses Acob also sustained injuries by reason of the gunshots fired by Garcia. It bears to reiterate at this
point that the component crimes in a special complex crime have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to 'commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process
of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. 39 "Homicide," in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and forms part of the essential element of
robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything.40 Stated differently, all the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide.41 Thus, as in the present case where, aside from the killing of Homer,
the Spouses Acob, on the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the severity,
the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the Spouses Acob are
subsumed under the generic term "homicide" and, thus, become part and parcel of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.

Effects of Probation

Probation is a disposition under which an accused, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to
conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. It is a privilege granted by
the court; it cannot be availed of as a matter of right by a person convicted of a crime. To be able to
enjoy the benefits of probation, it must first be shown that an applicant has none of the disqualifications
imposed by law. (Sec. 3 [a], P.D. No. 968)

The mandatory conditions require that the probationer shall:

a. present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at

each place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said
order, (par. 1, Sec. 10[a], P.D. No. 968)
and

b. report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. (par. 1, Sec. 10[b], P.D. No. 968)