M A H AR AS H TR A N A TI O NA L LA W U N I VE R S I TY ,

A U R AN G AB A D
~the cradle of future jurists~

FAMI LY LAW – II PROJECT

Topic – BHARATHA MATHA v. R. VIJAYA

RENAGANATHAN

SUBMITTED BY:

MANASVI SHARMA,

Roll No. 30
B.A.LLB(Hons.) Semester IV
BATCH: 2017 – 2022

SUBMITTED TO:

Prof. (Dr.) Ashok Wadje

Assistant Professor of Law

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE TEACHER’S
S. No. TITLE
NO. SIGN

1. Table of Abbreviations 3

2. Introduction 4

3. Facts & Contentions 5

4. Issues Raised 7

5. Judgement 8

6. Critical Analysis 11

7. Bibliography 13

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 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

And
&

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

DW Defense Witness

Hon’ble Honourable

No. Number

O.S. Original Suit

Ors. Others

PC Privy Council

PW Prosecution Witness

S. Section

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

v. Versus

vs. Versus

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 INTRODUCTION

(2010) 11 Supreme Court Cases 483

(BEFORE DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWANTANTER KUMAR, JJ.)

BHARATHA MATHA AND ANOTHER … Appellants;

Versus

R. VIJAYA RENAGANATHAN AND OTHERS … Respondents.

Civil Appeal No. 7108 0f 2003, decided on May 17, 2010

Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya Renaganathan & Ors. is a case that brought to light certain
important contemporary issues before the Supreme Court. The pertinent questions and issues
discussed in this case were:

1. Right to inheritance in context of children born of unions other than marriage.

2. Categorisation of property rights of children on the basis of their status on the grounds
of their birth out of - a) void or voidable marriage and b) live-in relationships.
3. Presumption of marriage and presumption of legitimacy of children w.r.t. S. 112 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter, IEA).
4. Object of S. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter, HMA) and its intention
to bring changes in Hindu law.
5. Importance and application of S. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter,
CPC) and the identification of substantial question of law.

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 FACTS & CONTENTIONS

The facts and circumstances that gave rise to this case & the contention therein are as follows:

1. Peria Mariammal instituted a suit, being O.S. No. 269 of 1975 against the respondents
and their predecessor-in- interest claiming the share of her brother Muthu Reddiar, on
the ground that he died unmarried and intestate and that Smt. Rengammal, the defendant
No. 1 in the suit was a legally wedded wife of one Alagarsami Reddiar, who was still
alive, therefore, her claim that she had live-in-relationship with plaintiff's brother
Muthu Reddiar and had two children from him, had to be ignored.
2. The defendants/respondents contested the suit denying the marriage between defendant
No. 1 and the said Alagarsami Reddiar.
3. The Trial Court decreed the suit vide Judgment and decree dated 7th March, 1977
recording the finding that Rengammal, defendant No.1 in the suit was wife of
Alagarsami Reddiar who was alive at the time of filing the suit. There had been no legal
separation between them. Therefore, the question of live-in-relationship of Smt.
Rengammal with Muthu Reddiar could not arise.
4. Being aggrieved, the defendants therein filed the First Appeal.
5. The respondent No. 1 herein, Vijaya Renganathan, purchased the suit property in 1978
i.e. during the pendency of the First Appeal for a sum of about Rs. 10,000/- and got
himself impleaded in the appeal as a party. The First Appeal was dismissed by the
Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 17th September, 1986. The said
purchaser, respondent No.1, alone filed the Second Appeal under S. 100 of CPC before
the High Court which has been allowed. Hence, this appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that Smt. Rengammal, original
defendant No.1 was legally wedded wife of Alagarsami and he was still alive.
Therefore, the question of presumption of marriage for having live-in- relationship with
Muthu Reddiar could not arise. In such eventuality, Muthu Reddiar could be liable for
offence of Adultery under S. 497 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as
“IPC”).
7. More so, even if live-in-relationship is admitted and it is further admitted that the two
children were born due to that live-in-relationship, the said children could not inherit

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 the coparcenery property and in absence of any finding recorded by any Court below
that the suit land was self-acquired property of Muthu Reddiar, the judgment of the
High Court is liable to be set aside.
8. At the most, the respondent No. 1 herein can claim recovery of the sale consideration
from his vendors as the possession is still with the present appellants.
9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has vehemently opposed the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, contending that the High Court
after re-appreciating the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the factum of
marriage of Smt. Rengammal with Alagarsami Reddiar could not be proved by the
appellants herein and because of their live-in-relationship, a presumption of marriage
between Muthu Reddiar and Smt. Rengammal could be drawn and, therefore, in view
of the provisions of S. 16 of the HMA, the two children born out of that live-in-
relationship were entitled to inherit the property of Muthu Reddiar and thus, the appeal
is liable to be dismissed.

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 ISSUES RAISED

• The High Court framed two substantial questions of law, namely:

a. Whether on the admitted long cohabitation of the First defendant and Muthu Reddiar,
a legal presumption of a lawful wedlock is not established; and
b. Whether the specific case of prior and subsisting marriage between defendant and
Alagarsami Reddiar set up by Plaintiff is established as required by law and she could
have a preferential claim over defendants 1 to 3?

• While determining the substantial Question b. the High Court had relied only on the
statements of DW and did not consider the evidence of PW and reappreciated the
documentary evidence, thus, giving rise to the question whether such a course is
permissible while deciding the second appeal under S. 100 of CPC.

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 JUDGEMENT

• In this case, the Courts below had appreciated the entire evidence and came to the
conclusion that Smt. Rengammal, defendant no.1 was legally wedded wife of
Alagarsami Reddiar and thus did not presume her marriage with Muthu Reddiar. The
High Court without making any reference to the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses,
particularly, Kumarasamy - PW2 and Kandasamy - PW5 reversed the finding of fact
and reached the conclusion that merely live-in-relationship between the said two parties
would lead the presumption of marriage between them.
• The Supreme Court made this observation by taking into account the judgements of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Sheel Chand Vs. Prakash Chand,1 Rajappa Hanamantha
Ranoji Vs. Mahadev Channabasappa & Ors.,2 Kulwant Kaur Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh
Mann,3 Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons,4
M/s. Triveni Rubber & Plastics Vs. Collector of Central Excise, 5 Kuldeep Singh v.
Commissioner of Police,6 Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad7 and Rajinder Kumar Kindra
v. Delhi Administartion.8
• The High Court erred in not appreciating that the judgments of the Courts below could
be based on another presumption provided under S. 112 of the IEA.
• S. 112 of the IEA provides for a presumption of a child being legitimate and such a
presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance of evidence. Since the
proof of non-access between Rengammal and Alagarsami had never been pleaded, the

1
AIR 1998 SC 3063.
2
AIR 2000 SC 2108.
3
AIR 2001 SC 1273.
4
1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; “… if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in law.”
5
AIR 1994 SC 1341.
6
(1992) 2 SCC 10.
7
(2001) 1 SCC 501.
8
AIR 1984 SC 1805.

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 matter has not been examined by the High Court in correct perspective. It is a settled
legal proposition that proof of non-access between the parties to marriage during the
relevant period is the only way to rebut that presumption.9
• In view of the fact that the High Court did not even take note of the deposition of the
plaintiff's witnesses, findings recorded by the High Court itself become perverse and
thus liable to be set aside.
• S. 5(1) of the Act lays down conditions for a Hindu marriage. It provides that marriage
may be solemnized between any two Hindus if neither of them is a spouse living at the
time of marriage. Section 11 provides that any marriage which is in contravention of
Section 5(1) of the Act, would be void.
• S. 16 of the Act states :

Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages - (1) Notwithstanding that a

marriage is null and void under section 11, any child of such marriage who would have
been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate...
(2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage under section
12, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who would have been
the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been
dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate child
notwithstanding the decree of nullity.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) shall be construed as
conferring upon any child of a marriage which is null and void or which is annulled by
a decree of nullity under section 12, any rights in or to the property of any person, other
than the parents, in any case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would
have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not
being the legitimate child of his parents.”
Thus, it is evident that Section 16 of the Act intends to bring about social reforms,
conferment of social status of legitimacy on a group of children, otherwise treated as
illegitimate, as its prime object.

9
Mohabbat Ali Khan Vs. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan & Ors. AIR 1929 PC 135; Chilukuri Venkateswarlu
Vs. Chilukuri Venkatanarayana AIR 1954 SC 176; Mahendra Manilal Nanavati Vs. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati
AIR 1965 SC 364; Perumal Nadar (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Ponnuswami Nadar (minor) AIR 1971 SC 2352; Amarjit
Kaur Vs. Harbhajan Singh and Anr. (2003) 10 SCC 228; Sobha Hymavathi Devi Vs. Setti Gangadhara Swamy
and Ors. AIR 2005 SC 800; and Shri Banarsi Dass Vs. Teeku Dutta (Mrs.) and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 449.

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• It is evident from the judicial precedents that in a fact-situation, a child born of void or
voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral co-parcenery property
but is entitled only to claim share in self acquired properties, if any.
In the case, respondents had not pleaded at any stage that the Suit land was a self-
acquired property of Muthu Reddiar. It is evident from the record that Muthu Reddiar
did not partition his joint family properties and died issueless and intestate in 1974.
Therefore, the question of inheritance of coparcenery property by the illegitimate
children, who were born out of the live-in-relationship, could not arise. Thus, the
judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside only on this sole ground.
• Respondent 5 can resort to legal proceedings, permissible in law for recovery of the
sale consideration from his vendors as he has purchased the property in lis pendis and
the appellants are still in possession of the suit property.

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 CRITICAL ANALYSIS

“Law takes its own time to articulate such social changes through a process of amendment.
That is why in a changing society law cannot afford to remain static. If one looks at the
history of development of Hindu Law, it will be clear that it was never static and has changed
from time to time to meet the challenges of the changing social pattern in different time.”

- Hon‘ble Justice A.K.Ganguly & G.S. Singhvi in Revanasiddappa vs Mallikarjun10

The live-in-relationship is no longer a novelty to Indian society.11 It has come to stay. Live-in
relationship couples are multiplying in number; at the same time institution of marriages stays
unaffected. Institution of marriage is no more a sine qua non of Indian society. Thus, a special
legislation is needed to give rights to such parties. Guidelines in various cases are not only a
bit tedious and ambiguous but also leave a large for discretion. Therefore, a special legislation
wherein factors like the minimum time period required, the quantum of evidence needed etc.
are duly specified.

In this case, the Court held that an off spring born out of live in relationships is deemed
legitimate due to the legal fiction created by the law but such fictional legitimacy must only be
extended as far as succession rights are concerned, till the self-acquired property of the
biological parents only and not their ancestral property. The rights of a child born out of the
relationship in the nature of marriage (hereinafter, RINM) were not discussed in this case. They
should also be entitled to claim its share in ancestral coparcenaries property of its parents in
addition to their self-acquired property. It is as plain and clear as sunshine that a child born out
of such relationship is innocent and is entitled to all the rights and privileges available to
children born out of valid marriages. This is the crux of S. 16(3) of the amended HMA, 1955,
which needs to be put on the canvass of reality.

10
Civil Appeal No. of 2011, Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.12639/09, 2011(2) UJ 1342(S.C.), 31st
March 31, 2011, Para 27.
11
Sonali Abhang, Judicial Approach to “Live- In-Relationship” In India- Its Impact on Other Related Statutes, 19
IOSR-JHSS 28, 37 (2014).

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The unequal treatment of children of live in relationships and marital relationships even though
both are perceived as legitimate in the eyes of law can amount to violation of Article 1412 which
promises equality before law. The rights concerning such maintenance give effect to
fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when
they are unable to maintain themselves as discussed in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v State of
Gujarat.13 Thus, maintenance rights continue to be a sensitive issue for children with respect to
live in relationships.

The judgement of this case was highly criticised by Justice Ganguly in the Supreme Court.
Justice Ganguly deliberated on the issue of live in relationships and child property rights stating
that the legislature has used the word "property" in S. 16(3) of the HMA 1955 and is silent on
whether such property is meant to be ancestral or self-acquired and in light of such ambiguity,
the concerned child’s property rights cannot be arbitrarily denied. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section
16 expressly declare that such children shall be deemed to be legitimate in the eyes of law.
Thus, subsequent discrimination against them and unequal treatment with respect to other
legitimate children who are entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-
acquired and ancestral will amount to the amendment made to this section losing its value.
Consequently, the Judge stated Parayan Kandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt.)
& Ors. vs K. Devi and Ors14 wherein it was held that the HMA 1955, a beneficial legislation,
has to be interpreted in a manner which advances the object of the legislation.

12
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India.

13
Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2005), A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 1809.

14
Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma and Ors. vs. K. Devi and Ors. (1996), A.I.R. 1996 S.C.
1963.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

▪ http://ijlljs.in
▪ http://iosrjournals.org
▪ https://blog.ipleaders.in
▪ www.casemine.com
▪ www.manupatra.in
▪ www.scconline.com

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