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CIVIL PROCEDURE 2019: DIGESTED CASES
Title of the Case 5 PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner, vs. RAMON C.

JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents.
(G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012)
Doctrine Denial of motion for reconsideration is not an
interlocutory order; Neypes rule or “Fresh Period Rule”
Petition When CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Priscilla Alma Jose (Jose), stating that it decided to give
due course to the appeal even if filed out of time
because Ramon Javellana (Javellana) had no intention
to delay the proceedings and that current jurisprudence
afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their
cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that
even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate
court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the
appeal for justifiable reasons. Hence, the current petition
then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby
erred in not outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal.
Facts  Jose’s mother, Margarita Alma Jose, and Javellana
executed a conditional deed of sale. When the
mother died, Jose refused to execute a deed of sale
and started dumping filling materials on the property
 Javellana filed a complaint for specific performance
but the lower court granted Jose’s motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action. But on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal after Javellana filed a
motion for reconsideration. Jose assails the CA’s
decision contending that the denial of the MR is not
appealable and the appeal was filed out of time
 Jose insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out
of time. She points out that he received a copy of the
June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion
for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse
of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for
reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a
copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he
had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16,
2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that
having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his
appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by
three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary
period.
Petitioner’s Contention  Joseaverring that the CA thereby erred in not
outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal because: (a)
the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b)
the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three
days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping
for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the
orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his
appeal pending in the CA.
Respondent’s Contention  Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by

Jose involved questions of fact not proper for the Court
to review through petition for review on certiorari; that
the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final order, was
appealable;
By: DIGESTERS 2019: CIVPRO

 That his appeal was perfected on time;
 And that he was not guilty of forum shopping because
at the time he filed thepetition for certiorari the CA had
not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.CV No. 68259,
and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave
abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling  The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on
& other motions February 4, 1998. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24,
1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that
Javellana had no cause of action against her due to
her not being bound to comply with the terms of the
deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto;
that there was no evidence showing the payment of
the balance; that he had never demanded the
registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or
brought a suit for specific performance against
Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the
balance was not credible.
 Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that
the presentation of evidence of full payment was not
necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that
in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the
complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the
allegations in the complaint should be considered in
resolving the motion.But RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the
order of June 24, 1999.
CA Ruling & other motions  On November 20, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside
the dismissal and remanding the records to the RTC "for
further proceedings in accordance with law."The CA
explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a
cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded
to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect
to the parcels of land; that Margarita’s undertaking
under the contract was not a purely personal
obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was
consequently bound to comply with the obligation.
Issue 1. Whether or not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal was appealable and
if the appeal was filed on time.
2. Whether or not Javellana is guilty of forum shopping
Ruling 1. The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order
granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not
an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an
end to the particular matter involved, or settles
definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute
the order.Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh
period (Neypes Fresh Period Rule) of 15 days from
notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial.
 The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing

more to be done except to enforce by execution
what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters
and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or
not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
 And, secondly, whether an order is final or
interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable,
to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated
in Section1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from
an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari.
2. There is no Forum Shopping. Forum shopping is the
act of a party litigant against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking
and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens
when, in the two or more pending cases, there is
identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of
action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the
elements of litispendentia are present, and where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in the other, there is forum shopping. For litispendentia
to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as
to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve

the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and
two objectives were sought.
 In this case, the appeal and the petition for certiorari

actually sought different objectives. In his appeal in

C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo
the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-
97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for
specific performance to be tried and determined in
due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari
had the ostensible objective “to prevent (Priscilla)
from developing the subject property and from
proceeding with the ejectment case until his
appeal is finally resolved,” as the CA explicitly
determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
SC Decision  WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
Title of the Case 6 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT

(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), Petitioner, vs.HOTEL ENTERPRISES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
(G.R. No. 172303, June 6, 2011)
Doctrine Rule 43 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities, including voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.
Petition  These are two consolidated petitions filed by petitioner
Samahan ng mgaManggagawasa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-
APL under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which dismissed petitioner’s petition for
review at the CA for being the wrong remedyand the
second petition assails the CA’s deletion of the
financial assistance awarded by the VA.
Facts  Petitioner Samahan ng mgaManggagawasa Hyatt-

NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and the
certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star hotel
owned and operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises
of the Philippines, Inc. On January 31, 2001, Hyatt’s
General Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a
Memorandum informing all hotel employees that hotel
security have been instructed to conduct a thorough
bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance
and exit of the hotel
 A union officer, Caragdag, was dismissed by the hotel
for serious misconduct after committing 3 different acts
of misconduct within a 12 month period. The VA held
the dismissal was valid and ordered the hotel to pay

financial assistance of 100K to the dismissed employee.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal but deleted
the award of financial assistance because the grant of
separation pay or other financial assistance to an
employee dismissed for just cause is based on equity
and is a measure of social justice, awarded to an
employee who has been validly dismissed if the
dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or causes
that reflected adversely on the moral character of the
employee.
Petitioner’s Contention  The petitioner argues that because decisions rendered

by voluntary arbitrators are issued under Title VII-A of
the Labor Code, they are not covered by Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, by
express provision of Section 2 thereof. Section 2,
petitioner points out, expressly provides that Rule 43
“shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.” Hence, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy for questioning the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, and petitioner having availed of such
remedy, the CA erred in declaring that the petition
was filed out of time since the petition was filed within
the sixty (60)-day reglementary period.
Respondent’s Contention  The respondent maintains that the CA acted correctly
in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the
wrong mode of appeal. It stresses that Section 1 of Rule
43 clearly states that it is the governing rule with regard
to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of voluntary arbitrators. Respondent
contends that the voluntary arbitrators authorized by
law include the voluntary arbitrators appointed and
accredited under the Labor Code, as they are
considered as included in the term “quasi-judicial
instrumentalities.”
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling  The Voluntary Arbiter rules that the three separate
& other motions suspensions of Mr. Caragdag are valid, his dismissal is
legal and OSDA 4.32 of Hyatt’s Code of Discipline is
reasonable.
 However, for humanitarian considerations, Hyatt is
hereby ordered to grant financial assistance to Mr.
Caragdag in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PhP100,000.00).
CA Ruling & other motions  Petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for certiorari
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78364. As
mentioned at the outset, the CA dismissed the petition
outright for being the wrong remedy. The CA
explained:
Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure explicitly provides that the proper
mode of appeal from judgments, final orders or
resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a
Petition for Review which should be filed within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of

judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary
arbitrator.
Issue  Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition
for certiorari filed before it on the ground that the same
is an improper mode of appeal; and second;
 Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of
financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to
Caragdag.
Ruling 1. In the case of Samahan ng mgaManggagawasa
Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan,[26] we repeated
the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via
petition for review under Rule 43. We held that:
The question on the proper recourse to assail a

decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been
settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the
Court held that the decision or award of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in
line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein, and consistent
with the original purpose to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications
of all quasi-judicial entities.
 The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it
is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is
nothing more but a reiteration of the exception to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees’ Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
 “The Court took into account this exception in Luzon
Development Bank but, nevertheless, held that the
decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant to the
Labor Code do not come within its ambit x xx”
 Furthermore, Sections 1, 3 and 4, Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
 SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals
from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax

Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the x xx, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
 xxxx
 SEC. 3. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this
Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within
the period and in the manner therein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
 SEC. 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from
the date of its last publication, if publication is
required bylaw for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed in accordance with the governing law
of the court or agency a quo. x xx. (Emphasis
supplied.)
 Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules
but we find no cogent reason in this case to deviate
from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for
a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the
guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as
mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through
the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules
are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of
justice where suitors may be heard following judicial
procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and
our system of justice are well served by a conscientious
observance by the parties of the procedural rules.
2. The grant of separation pay or some other financial
assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is
based on equity.[29] In Phil. Long Distance Telephone
Co. v. NLRC,[30] we ruled that severance
compensation, or whatever name it is called, on the
ground of social justice shall be allowed only when
the cause of the dismissal is other than serious
misconduct or for causes which reflect adversely on
the employee’s moral character. The Court
succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of
separation pay in this wise:
 We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication
or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may
not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

SC Decision  WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are
DENIED. THE Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 78364, as well as the Court of Appeals
December 16, 2005 Decision and April 12, 2006
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 77478, are AFFIRMED and
UPHELD
Title of the Case 7 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its

Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014
Doctrine An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil
Service Commission's (CSC) repeal or modification of its
original decision.
With respect to the promulgation of the Revised Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS during the
pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the CSC
modified the definition of a “party adversely affected” for
purposes of appeal, which does not only refer to the
respondent against whom a decision in an administrative
case has been rendered but also to the disciplining authority
in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the
original decision.
Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in

nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the
RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right
to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that
modified its original decision of dismissal.
Petition This is a petition for review filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA), a government-owned and -controlled corporation, to
modify the Civil Service Commission’s finding that respondent
was guilty only of simple dishonesty.

Facts  On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit
Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order No. 119,
series of 2006 which effectively revoked Atty. Aurora A.
Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to
handle special projects and perform such other duties and
functions as may be assigned to her"by the Administrator.
 Atty. Salvaña was directed to comply with this office order
through a memorandum issued on May 22, 2006 by Atty.
Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the
administrative department. Instead of complying, Salvaña
questioned the order with the Office of the President.
 In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence
on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006.In
support of her application, she submitted a medical
certificateissued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC). However,
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical
certificate and the same was falsified by Atty. Salvaña.
 Atty. Salvañaexplained that as a member of the BAC
Committee, she refused to sign a resolution favoring a
particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No. 119
was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and
vindictiveness"over her refusal to sign.
 The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee found her explanation
unsatisfactory. It issued a formal charge against her for
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
 Thereafter, Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation.
 The Fact-finding Committee found Salvaña guilty of all the
charges against her and imposer on her the penalty of
dismissal from service with all the accessory penalties.
 Salvaña appealed to the CSC claiming that she was
denied due process and that there was no substantial
evidence to support the charges against her.
Petitioner’s Contention Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the
decision of the Civil Service Commission before the Court of
Appeals.It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garciaas basis for
its argument that it can be considered a "person adversely
affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the
appeal of administrative cases.It also argues that
respondent’s falsification of the medical certificate
accompanying her application for sick leave was not merely
simple but serious dishonesty.
Respondent’s Contention Petitioner had no legal personality to file the appeal since it
was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She
counters that Administrator Robles had no authority to file the
appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the
Board of Directors authorizing him to do so.
CSC Ruling The CSC modified the decision and found that Salvaña was
guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of
suspension for three months.
LRTA moved for reconsideration of the resolution which was

denied. LRTA then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.

CA Ruling The CA dismissed the petition andaffirmed the Civil Service
Commission’s finding that Salvaña was only guilty of simple
dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator
Robles had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration
before the Civil Service Commission because that right only
belonged to respondent in an administrative case.LRTA
moved for reconsiderationof this decision but was denied.
Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

Issues (1) WON the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the
standing to appeal the modification by the CSC of its
decision – YES
(2) WON Atty. Salvaña was correctly found guilty of simple
dishonesty only – NO
Ruling 1st Issue: The LRTA has the right to appeal the modification by
the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy
employees." When the government office disciplines an
employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law,
it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the
constitutional principle that "public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."This is a
principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the
government office employing the public officer. To bar a
government office from appealing a decision that lowers the
penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring
its mandate that the civil service employs only those with the
utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18,

2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service
Commission modified the definition of a "party adversely
affected" for purposes of appeal.
PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against

whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered
or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision
reversing or modifying the original decision. (Emphasis
supplied)
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there

are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are
remedial or procedural in nature. Remedial rights are those
rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights
that only operate to further the rules of procedure or to
confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of
remedial rights will not adversely affect the vested rights of any
person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial
in nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the
RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right
to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that
modified its original decision of dismissal.

*Note: Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of
this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal was
not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed
by government agencies before the promulgation of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
2nd Issue: It would be wrong to classify this offense as simple

dishonesty. The offense by Atty. Salvañacan be properly
identified as less serious dishonesty.Respondent knew that she
was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificate’s
signatory. She knew that she would not be able to fully attest
to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite
this, she still submitted the certificate in support of her
application for leave.
The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the

medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco repudiated the
certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to
defend its validity. Her application for sick leave, therefore,
should not have been granted since it was unaccompanied
by the proper documents.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Title of the Case 8 PANAY RAILWAYS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HEVA MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, AND SPOUSES
CANDELARIA DAYOT AND EDMUNDO DAYOT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154061 January 25, 2012
Doctrine Procedural rules applicable to actions pending at the time of
promulgation
Petition The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for
petitioner's failure to pay the corresponding docket fees.
Facts  On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a
government-owned and controlled corporation,
executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering
several parcels of lands, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB)
to secure ₱20 million worth of loan and credit
accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of
Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc.
 Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the
bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of the bank as the highest bidder and
purchaser. Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the
title in its name on the basis of a Deed of Sale and an
Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise
the right to redeem the properties.
 It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the
extrajudicial foreclosure included some excluded
properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August
1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract

to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum, and
Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages.
 On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents.
 On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately
thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
 On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order dismissing
the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court.Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of
the Order, but was denied by the RTC.
 On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly
applied procedural rules. The CA denied the petition.
 It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs
Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No.
00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending
Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court. By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the
CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial court by
issuing the assailed Amended Decision in the present
Petition granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
 The CA’s action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000
should not be given retroactive effect.
Petitioner’s Contention Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's
dismissal of the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the
CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal
at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while
the appeal was dismissible for failure to pay docket fees,
substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed
in this case.
Issues (1) WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of the
Notice of Appeal – NO
(2) WON the CA has exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice
of Appeal at the time of filing– NO
Ruling 1st Issue: The CA did not err in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of
the Notice of Appeal.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are

considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of
procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person
adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been
held that a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure. More so when, as in this case,

petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees
on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of
when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
2nd Issue: The argument that CA has exclusive jurisdiction to

dismiss the appeal has no merit.
When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41

through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action
may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court.
Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it sustained
the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the
matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the

payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees. Moreover, the right to appeal is
not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.
We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice"

is not a magic wand that would automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to
be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for
the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with

the Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence
of counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule
that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of their
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of
petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against it.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

TITLE OF THE CASE 9 JAIME TAN, JR., as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C.
Tan, vs. CA (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and
ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL,
DOCTRINE EXCEPTION TO THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL
LAW
PETITION This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 15, 1998 and its Resolution dated November 9, 1998
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
FACTS
1. Involved in this case is a parcel of land, designated as Lot
No. 645-C, with an area of 34,829 square meters, more or
less, situated in Bunawan, Davao City. The lot was once
covered by TCT No. T-72067 of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao City in the name of the late Jaime C. Tan (Tan, for
short) married to Praxedes V. Tan.
2. On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200

executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in
question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed,
the same contracting parties entered into another
agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within
which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to
redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.
3. On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao

City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of
instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale,
their real intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.
4. RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which

reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the

true intention of the parties, hereby declared and
reformed an equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120

days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date
the complaint was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.
.
5. On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate
court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court
of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding
Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said
decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

6. Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation
and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of
redemption of the petitioner has expired.
7. On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to

redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of
Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The
redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.
PETITIONER’S Rule 51 Sections 10 and 11 should govern. The petitioner was able
CONTENTION to redeem the subject property within the 120-day period of
redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of
judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old
rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it
applied the new rule retroactively and we hold that given the
facts of the case at bar this is an error.
RESPONDENTS The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied. They alleged
CONTENTION that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has
expired. They reckoned that the said period began 15 days after
October 5, 1995, the date when the finality of the judgment of the
trial court as affirmed by the appellate court commenced to run.
RTC RULING The Regional Trial Court of Davao ruled in favour with the
Petitioner Tan finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale is, in
accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby
declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
CA RULING & The Court of Appeals decided in favour with the respondents
OTHER MOTIONS Magdangal and denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Petitioner herein.
ISSUE(S) Whether or Not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should be given
a retroactive application in this case.
RULING No, it should not be given a retroactive application.
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule
that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or

motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has become final and
executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or

final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the

rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as
follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution.
(IMPT) SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of

Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it
would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed
the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the
subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of
this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when
he made the redemption
SC DECISION IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
15, 1998 and its Resolution dated November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-
41738 are annulled and set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996
and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region,
Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated. No costs.

TITLE OF THE CASE 10 JUDITH YU, vs.HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE FRESH PERIOD RULE
PETITION This a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to
enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al."
FACTS 1. An Information for Estafa against the petitioner was filed
with the RTC.
2. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the
petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a penalty of
three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine
of ₱3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the
payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in
the same amount as the fine.
3. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner
filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she
discovered new and material evidence that would
exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
4. In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied
the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.
5. On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a "fresh period" of
15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial
of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005,
within which to file a notice of appeal.
6. On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered
the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his
guidance.
7. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing
that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
8. On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for
execution of the decision.
9. On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin
motions submitted for resolution.
10. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present
petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision.
PETITIONER’S The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging
CONTENTION that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she
had a “fresh period” of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of
her motion for new trial within which to file a notice of appeal.
RESPONDENTS The respondents averred that the petitioner cannot seek refuge
CONTENTION in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases

because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement
of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred
to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e.,
Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in
criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, mentioned.
RTC RULING The RTC convicted the Petitioner for a crime of estafa. It
imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment
(arresto mayor), a fine of ₱3,800,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses
Casaclang in the same amount as the fine
CA RULING & OTHER No events transpired herein.
MOTIONS
ISSUE(S) Whether or Not the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes
Case applies to appeals in criminal cases.
RULING Yes, it is also applicable to criminal cases.
The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period

for appeal in criminal cases.
The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the

Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the

filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration,
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period
is now counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
SC DECISION WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE
and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of
the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due
course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.

Title of the Case 11 [G.R. No. 194702. April 20, 2015.]
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP,
INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioners, vs. MA. CRISTINA
F. BAYANG, respondent.
Doctrine Fresh period rule
Petition This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July
23, 2010 decision and the December 2, 2010 resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.
The CA affirmed the resolutions dated November 17, 2006

and July 26, 2007 of the Office of President in O.P. Case
No. 06-D-160, which dismissed the appeal of petitioners
San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. (SLR
Builders) and Oscar Violago for having been filed out of
time.
Facts On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as
Violago Builders, Inc.), as seller, and respondent Ma.
Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a
"contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago
Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay
Payatas, Quezon City.
Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the

purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders the
execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's
certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver,
prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages against SLR Builders and its
President, Oscar Violago (petitioners) before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In a decision dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land

Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina's
favor.
The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to

the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board dismissed
and denied, respectively, the petitioners' appeal and
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners
then brought their case to the Office of the President
(OP), which was docketed as O.P. Case No. 06-D-160.
In a resolution dated November 17, 2006, the OP

dismissed the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out
of time.
A review of the records shows that the HLURB Decision

affirming the Arbiter's decision was received by the
respondents/appellants (referring to the petitioners) on
July 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period
within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of
preparing an appeal, respondents-appellants opted to
file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their

filing of the said motion interrupted the period of appeal
by that time, however, fourteen (14) days had already
elapsed.
On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the

Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
Following the above rules, respondents-appellants have
only one (1) day left, or until April 18, 2006, within which
to file their notice of appeal to this Office. Unfortunately,
they were able to do so only on April 27, 2006, or nine (9)
days late. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the

"fresh period rule" enunciated in the case of Domingo
Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be
applied to their case.
The OP, in a resolution dated July 26, 2007, denied the

petitioners' motion with finality, stating that the "fresh
period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals, such as in petitioners' case.
The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s Contention The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the
"fresh period rule" enunciated in the case of Domingo
Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be
applied to their case.
Respondent’s Contention
CA Ruling & other motions CA denied the petitioners' petition for review. The CA,
(please specify whether likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
such motions were granted reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition
or denied) for review on certiorari with this Court.
Issue Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to

administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
Office to the President
Ruling No.
It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies

only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala, the Court was confronted with a

similar issue of whether the "fresh period rule" applies to
an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is
administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the
"fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a

decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP,
is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh
period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB
Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph
2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series

of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing
appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to
the Office of the President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. — Any party may, upon notice to the

Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered
by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of
1987.
The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall

suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office
of the President.
Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of

Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that
in case the aggrieved party files a motion for
reconsideration from an adverse decision of any
agency/office, the said party has the only remaining
balance of the prescriptive period within which to
appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision
denying his/her motion for reconsideration.(Emphasis
supplied.)
SC Decision DENIED the present petition for review on certiorari and
AFFIRM the decision dated July 23, 2010 and resolution
dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100332.
Title of the Case 12 [G.R. No. 213525. January 27, 2015.]

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), PROPER; COA REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B,
PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OF ANTIQUE, respondents.
Doctrine Fresh period rule
Petition Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the
reconsideration of the resolution promulgated on August
19, 2014, whereby the Court dismissed its petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court due to its non-compliance with the provisions of
Rule 64, particularly for: (a) the late filing of the petition;
(b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents.

Facts Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU)
and the petitioner executed a memorandum of
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of
qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the
former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium
payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique
for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for
lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its
appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money

claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued
its decision denying the petition, holding that under
Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government
Code only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance
coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU's
failure to comply with the requirement of publication
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on

December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA
denied the motion, the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on

August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was
dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution
promulgated on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of
the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
Petitioner’s Contention The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies
because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review
brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence,
conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file
a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the
receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration or the motion for new trial.
CA Ruling & other motions The petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated
(please specify whether through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014
such motions were granted for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission
or denied) of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c)
the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents.
Issue Whether or not the Fresh Period rule can be applied

Ruling No.
The petitioner's position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under
Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an

appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law,
or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due
course only upon a prima facie showing that the
Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law
warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged
judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final
order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the
Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised except to
determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are

different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15
days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the
latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence,
should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, which shall
not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
the notice of denial.
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on

January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from
receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to
file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of
the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014
to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August
13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
The Supreme Court ruled in Pates v. Commission on

Elections that the belated filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period
rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the
petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having
wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes
applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to
relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for
liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

SC Decision DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration.
Title of the Case 13 MILAGROSA JOCSON, Petitioner, v. NELSON SAN

MIGUEL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206941, March 09, 2016

Doctrine Fresh Period Rule
Petition Petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated
October 29, 2012 and Resolution3 dated April 16, 2013 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122007, which
allowed the application of the "fresh-period rule" in the filing of
a Notice of Appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).
Facts  On September 10, 2008, Milagrosa C. Jocson (Jocson)

filed with the DARAB-PARAD, Region III of San Fernando
City, Pampanga, a Complaint4 for ejectment with
damages against respondent Nelson San Miguel (San
Miguel) and all persons claiming rights under him. The
case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 6291-P'08.
 In the Complaint, Jocson alleged that she is the

registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an
area of 60,241 square meters, located in Magalang,
Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
473856-R. She asserted that 56,000 sq m thereof became
the subject of an Agricultural Leasehold Contract
(Contract) between her and San Miguel, with the latter
as tenant-lessee. As part of the contract, they agreed
that the subject landholding shall be devoted to sugar
and rice production.
 According to Jocson, San Miguel, however, occupied

the entire landholding and refused to vacate the portion
not covered by their Contract despite repeated
demands.
 On December 15, 2009, Jocson filed a Supplemental
Complaint8 alleging that, during the pendency of the
present suit, San Miguel commenced to plant corn on
the subject landholding which violated their Contract.9
 In his Answer, San Miguel maintained that he had

religiously complied with all the terms and conditions of

their Contract and that Jocson has no valid ground to
eject him from the disputed landholding.
Petitioner’s Jocson argued that the CA committed grave abuse of

Contention discretion when the court applied the Neypes rule.
Respondent’s  San Miguel argued that the 2009 DARAB Rules of
Contention Procedure adopted the "fresh period rule" enunciated
by this Court in Neypes v. CA to the effect that it allows
litigants a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a
notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration as provided for under Section 1, Rule IV
of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
PARAD Ruling & other  The PARAD held that under Section 12, Rule X of the 2003
motions DARAB Rules of Procedure, "[t]he filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an
appeal. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party shall
have the remaining period within which to perfect his
appeal. Said period shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice of denial."
 The PARAD found that San Miguel, through his counsel,

received his copy of Decision dated January 26, 2011 on
February 3, 2011 and thereafter filed his MR on February 15,
2011, thus, he could have only three (3) days within which to
file his Notice of Appeal upon its denial. The MR was denied
on May 31, 2011 and San Miguel, through his counsel,
received his copy of the Order on June 2, 2011 and he filed
his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2011 or after twelve (12)
days, which, following the rules abovementioned, is already
beyond the period allowed.
 San Miguel filed his MR but the same was denied in an

Order dated October 18, 2011, which likewise directed the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision
rendered by the PARAD.
CA Ruling & other  The CA granted San Miguel's petition and remanded the
motions case to the DARAB-PARAD for further proceedings. The
CA held that the "fresh period rule" enunciated
in Neypes should be applied in the instant case. The CA
decision reads in part:
 The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes

a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may
be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following
the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh
period rule” should be applied to pending actions, such
as the case at bar. The raison d’etre for the “fresh period
rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the

Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
 Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer

interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order
or resolution.
Issue
WON The Neypes ruling applies to administrative cases
Ruling 1. Court held that the "fresh period rule" only covers judicial
proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to
wit:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an

appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office
to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As
earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal
"during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision
is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to
In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided for under
Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not
judicial but administrative in nature. As such, the "fresh period
rule" in Neypes finds no application therein.
As correctly observed by PA Sicat, San Miguel should perfect

his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, but
not less than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the
resolution of denial of his MR or until June 7, 2011.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the

petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29,
2012 and Resolution dated April 16, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122007 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated July 27, 2011 and October 18, 2011 of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator are
hereby REINSTATED.
Title of the Case 14 PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC

CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM
AND MR. DAVID LIM, Petitioners, v. IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,
PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADAYOS, GRACE B. MARCOS, ROGELIO
C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ AND CYNTHIA
L. COMANDAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013

Doctrine Nature of Philippine Courts; Laches
Petition This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated July
7, 2009 and Resolution dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
105236. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is
hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners with full backwages
less the amounts they received as separation pays. In case
reinstatement would no longer be feasible because the
positions previously held no longer exist, the private respondent
shall pay them backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
addition, the private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
petitioners moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.
Facts  Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation

(PCMC) is a corporation registered in the Philippines
engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn
carpets and rugs. Respondents were its regular and
permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner's
retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs.
 On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela

Cruz, and Comandaoreceived a uniformly worded
Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:
“This is to inform you that in view of a slump in the market

demand for our products due to the un-competitiveness
of our price, the company is constrained to reduce the
number of its workforce. The long-term effects of
September 11 and the war in the Middle East have
greatly affected the viability of our business and we are
left with no recourse but to reorganize and downsize our
organizational structure.

We wish to inform you that we are implementing a
retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations.
In this connection, we regret to advise you that you are

one of those affected by the said exercise, and your
employment shall be terminated effective at the close of
working hours on April 15, 2004.
Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation pay as

mandated by law. You will no longer be required to
report for work during the 30-day notice period in order to
give you more time to look for alternative employment.
However, you will be paid the salary corresponding to the
said period. We shall process your clearance and other
documents and you may claim the payables due you on
March 31, 2004.
Thank you for your services and good luck to your future
endeavors.”
 Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC's decision

to terminate their employment, respondents filed
separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC,
Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio
Lim and Mr. David Lim.
 PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the

services of respondents being a necessary management
prerogative. It pointed out that as an employer, it had no
obligation to keep in its employ more workers than are
necessary for the operation of his business. Thus, there was
an authorized cause for dismissal.
 Citing the Court's decision in the Philcea case, the CA

applied the doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the similar
factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and
Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary resignation,
the CA found the same not a bar to the illegal dismissal
case because they did so on the mistaken belief that
PCMC was losing money. With the foregoing findings, the
CA ordered that respondents be reinstated with full
backwages less the amounts they received as separation
pay. In case of impossibility of reinstatement, the CA
ordered PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one month
pay or 1⁄2 month pay for every year of service whichever
is higher, plus moral damages.
Petitioner’s Retrenchment was a necessary management prerogative.

Contention Petitioners also stressed that respondents belatedly filed their
complaint as they allowed almost three years to pass making
the principle of laches applicable. Considering that respondents

accepted their separation pay and voluntarily executed deeds
of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of
estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation
from the service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC
emphasized that they were not dismissed from employment, but
in fact they voluntarily retired from employment to take
advantage of the company’s program
Labor Arbiter and  LA: DISMISSED. Respondents voluntarily opted to retire, were
NLRC Ruling subsequently hired on a contractual basis, terminated, and
were paid separation benefits. The filing of the illegal dismissal
case was a mere afterthought designed primarily for
respondents to collect more money, taking advantage of the
2006 Supreme Court decision.
 NLRC: AFFIRMED LA. It emphasized the application of the

principle of laches for respondents’ inaction for an
unreasonable period.
CA Ruling & other 
In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC,
motions the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because
the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the
prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It
stressed that said principle cannot be invoked earlier than
the expiration of the prescriptive period.
 The CA applied the doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the

similar factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao,
Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary
resignation, the CA found the same not a bar to the illegal
dismissal case because they did so on the mistaken belief
that PCMC was losing money.With the foregoing findings,
the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated with full
backwages less the amounts they received as separation
pay. In case of impossibility of reinstatement, the CA
ordered PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one month
pay or ½ month pay for every year of service whichever
is higher, plus moral damages.
Issue WON laches has barred the action?

Ruling Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has
been repeatedly held by the Court that:
x xx Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on
law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of
equity.(Nature of Phil Court) Thus, laches cannot be invoked to
resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x xx Courts
exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have
no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of
Appeals x xx, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the
rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a “justice
outside legality,” this is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetasnunguamcontravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory
period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts
should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at
law.”
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one
based on an injury to the complainants’ rights which should be
brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant
to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed
almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be
invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the
most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights
of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of
the Constitution and under the Civil Code.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution
dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 105236 are AFFIRMED.
Title of the Case 15 G.R. No. 196063 December 14, 2011
ORLANDO A. RAYOS, FE A. RAYOS-DELA PAZ,

represented by DR. ANTONIO A. RAYOS, and ENGR.
MANUEL A. RAYOS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondent.
Doctrine Hierarchy of Courts
Petition petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief,
Facts  The present case originated from a complaint for
eminent domain filed by respondent City of Manila
against Remedios V. De Caronongan, Patria R.
Serrano, Laureano M. Reyes, Paz B. Sison, Teofila B.
Sison, Leticia R. Ventanilla, Rosalinda R. Barrozo
(defendants),
 City of Manila alleged that it passed Ordinance No.
7949 authorizing the City Mayor to acquire "by
expropriation, negotiation or by any other legal
means" the parcel of land co-owned by defendants,

the City of Manila offered to purchase the property
at ₱1,000.00 per square meter.
 On 7 December 2009, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos,
Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1)
Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and (2) the
cases of Lagcao v. Labra7 and Jesus Is Lord Christian
School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of
Pasig, Metro Manila8 apply squarely to the present
case.
Petitioner’s contention
Respondent’s contention
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court
& other motions ruled that the motion to dismiss did not show any
compelling reason to convince the court that the
doctrine of stare decisis applies. Petitioners failed to
demonstrate how or why the facts in this case are similar
with the cited cases in order that the issue in this case be
resolved in the same manner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
later on denied.
The petitioner appealed the trial court decision in the

Supreme Court.
CA Ruling & other motions
Issue Whether or Not the sudden appeal to supreme court
violates the hierarchy of courts.
Ruling Yes. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners
should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the

Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.14 However,
such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give
petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court
forum.15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16 citing
People v. Cuaresma,17 the Court held:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari

is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important

reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
(Emphasis supplied)
SC Decision WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
Title of the Case 16 G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN),

Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA),
NEA BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS (NEA BOARD),
Respondents.

Petition This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or
prevent the implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and
59, dated July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003,
respectively, otherwise known as the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay
Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of Administrators
(NEA Board).
Facts  Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions.
 Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation created in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6,
1973. Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board
is empowered to organize or reorganize NEA’s
staffing structure,
Petitioner’s contention
Respondent’s contention Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated
the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which
the instant petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court
directly
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling
& other motions
CA Ruling & other motions
Issue Whether or Not the original action filed by the petitioner
to supreme court violates the hierarchy of courts.
Ruling In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v.
Cuaresma, this Court made the following
pronouncements:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari

is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an

absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed

with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general
rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason
exists in the instant case involving as it does the
employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than
700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed
from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of
the Court entails its attention.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and
September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the NEA
Board of Directors are hereby UPHELD (As per the other
issue of the case but not on the issue of hierarchy or
Courts)
ERNESTO DY, Petitioner,

Title of the Case 17 vs.
HON. GINA M. BIBAT- PALAMOS, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City,
and ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196200 September 11, 2013
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure questions the December 13, 2010
Petition and March 7, 2011Orders1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 64 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 92-2311, granting
the motion for execution of petitioner, but denying his
prayer for the return of his cargo vessel in the condition
when the possession thereof was seized from him.

Facts  Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife,
Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of
Limchia Enterprises which was engaged in the
shipping business
 In 1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-
maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing
and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its
acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As
additional security for the loan, Limchia
Enterprises executed the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.
 Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I
was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to
make the scheduled payments as required in
their promissory note.
 After receiving several demand letters from
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the
restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes
issued several checks to cover the remainder of
their loan but the same were dishonored by the
bank, prompting respondent to institute a
criminal complaint for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law. Lourdes appealed to respondent
with a new proposal to update their outstanding
loan obligations.
 On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the

Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage under
Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer
for Attachment with the RTC. Following the filing
of an affidavit of merit and the posting of bond
by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure of
M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to
respondent
 On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in

favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet
defaulted on their loan because respondent
agreed to a restructured schedule of payment.
There being no default, the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature.
The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned to
Spouses Dy.
 Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed

a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC.
In the intervening period, Colorado filed its
Manifestation/Motion, dated July 29, 2010,
informing the RTC that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its
possession, had sustained severe damage and
deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard
because of its exposure to the elements. For this
reason, it sought permission from the court to cut
the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and
deposit the proceeds in escrow
 Petitioner insisted that he had the right to require

that the vessel be returned to him in the same
condition that it had been at the time it was

wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no
longer be possible, that another vessel of the
same tonnage, length and beam similar to that
of M/V Pilar-I be delivered
 The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010

Order granting the motion for execution but
denying petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V
Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by
respondent.
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct

Petitioner’s Contention invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the interest of justice.
Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is involved is a
judgment of the Court which the lower courts cannot
modify
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition

should have been filed with the CA, following the doctrine
Respondent’s Contention of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to
state any special or important reason or any exceptional
and compelling circumstance which would warrant a
direct recourse to this Court.
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order
& other motions granting the motion for execution but denying petitioner’s
(please specify whether prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which
such motions were granted it was taken by respondent. RTC ratiocinated:
or denied)
First, judgment has now become final and it is axiomatic
that after judgment has become executory, the court
cannot amend the same, except: x xx None of the three
circumstances where a final and executory judgment may
be amended is present in this case. And, the present
deplorable state of M/V Pilar certainly did not happen
overnight, thus, defendants should have brought it to the
attention of this Court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court after it became apparent. Their inaction until after the
judgment has become final, executory and immutable
rendered whatever right they may have to remedy the
situation to be nugatory
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied by the RTC
CA Ruling & other motions No appeal was filed in the CA, rather a petition for Certiorari
(please specify whether was directly filed in the Supreme Court
such motions were granted
or denied) Hence this petition.
Whether petitioner was justified in resorting directly to this

Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
Issue
The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort to The Supreme Court
Ruling Justified
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to

this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court
of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to
satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby
allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of
its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in

certain instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1) when
dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities;
or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate and
direct handling of the case.17
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of

hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court take
cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and
resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more
than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that
what is involved is a final judgment promulgated by this
Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original
jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
SC Ruling
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent
is ordered to pay petitioner the value of M/V Pilar- I at the
time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati
City, for the proper determination of the value of the vessel
at said time.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.

BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
Title of the Case 18 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
Petition This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials2 dated February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on
February 27, 2013.

Facts  On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. . They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates
as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5
 On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra
 The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s
removal within three (3) days from receipt for
being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’)
by three feet (3’).
 On February 25, 2013, petitioners
replied10 requesting, among others, that (1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the
tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be
allowed to remain
 On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law
Department issued a letter12 ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it
will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law
Department was silenton the remedies available
to petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for

their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case
through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order
 Petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this court’s

Petitioner’s Contention discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly to it if warranted by
"compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and
importance of the issues raised. . . ."61 Petitioners
submit that there are "exceptional and
compelling reasons to justify a direct resort [with]
this Court
Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the

proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. And that
the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for
being oversized are valid and constitutional.18

RTC/Sandiganbayan
Ruling & other motions Not filed in lower court, hence this petition
(please specify whether
or denied)
CA Ruling & other motions Not filed in lower court, hence this petition
(please specify whether
or denied)
Issue WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING
APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
No, petitioners did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of

Ruling courts
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad

rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition."70
As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided

exceptions to this doctrine (hierarchy of courts):
FIRST, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are

genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes
availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail
the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice

not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the
present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The
case before this court involves an active effort on the part of
the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has
become a rare occasion when private citizens actively
engage the public in political discourse.
A SECONDexception is when the issuesinvolved are of

transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating
to constitutional issues of transcendental importance
prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties
when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.In the case before this court, there is a clear threat
to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom
of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this

court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections
THIRD, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this

court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on this matter
FOURTH, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by

this court
FIFTH, the time element presented in this case cannot be

ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period.
Although the elections have already been concluded,
future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its
resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an
exception for direct resort to this court.
SIXTH, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional

organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In this case, if
petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through
pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their
part would not have been binding for other citizens whom
respondents may place in the same situation. Besides,
thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and the
powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling
by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in
order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the
future.
SEVENTH, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression.In this case, the repercussions of the assailed
issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The
lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is
sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
EIGHTH, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by

public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate
remedy."82 In the past, questions similar to these which this
court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts included citizens’ right to bear arms,83 government
contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration
lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import.

Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must
occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court.
While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the
present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as
such, may be resolved by this court directly.
SC Ruling
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made
permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed
notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27,
2013 is declared unconstitutional.
Title of the Case 19 HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
R-II BUILDERS INC., and NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192649 March 9, 2011

Doctrine Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and
determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition
to being conferred by the Constitution and the law,the rule
is settled that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
is determined by the relevant allegations in the
complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed,and
the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
Petition Primarily assailed in this petition for review filed pursuant to
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the Decision
dated 21 January 2010 rendered by the Former Fifteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals.
Facts On 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was
entered into between respondents National Housing
Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the
implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). The JVA was aimed at
implementing a two-phase conversion of the Smokey
Mountain Dumpsite "into a habitable housing project
inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial
Road 10 (R-10)".
On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside

petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as
guarantor and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as
trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust
Agreement which provided the mechanics for the
implementation of the project.
On the same date, the parties likewise executed a

Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made
by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to
redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to pay the
simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.
Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of ₱300 Million into the

project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of

PNB’s services on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and
HGC agreed on the institution of Planters Development
Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29 January 2001. By 24 October
2002, however, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had
reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted
to an aggregate face value of ₱2.513 Billion. The lack of
liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular
SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC’s guaranty
and to execute in the latter’s favor a Deed of Assignment
and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.
On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint

against HGC and NHA before Branch 24 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court, a Special Commercial Court (SCC).
Contending that HGC’s failure to redeem the outstanding
regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset
Pool ballooned the stipulated interests and materially
prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool,
R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC
should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in
executing the same prior to HGC’s redemption and
payment of the guaranteed SMPPCs; that while the
estimated value of Asset Pool amounted to
₱5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was
estimated at ₱2,796,019,890.41; and, that with the
cessation of PDB’s functions as a trustee and HGC’s
intention to use the Asset Pool to settle its obligations to the
Social Security System (SSS), it was best qualified to be
appointed as new trustee in the event of the resolution of
the DAC.
On 26 October 2005, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued

the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders
which, upon the challenge thereto interposed by HGC,
was later affirmed by the CA in the 17 December 2007
decision.
Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008 which

held that R-II Builders’ complaint was an ordinary civil
action and not an intra-corporate controversy, Branch 24
of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order dated 1
February 2008 to the effect, among other matters, that it
did not have the authority to hear the case. As a
consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent
Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent RTC) which
subsequently issued the 19 May 2008 order which, having
determined that the case is a real action, admitted the
Amended and Supplemental Complaint, subject to R-II
Builders’ payment of the "correct and appropriate" docket
fees.
Petitioner’s Contention The CA seriously erred when it failed to rule that the RTC a
quo had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case
considering that the original court was without authority to
hear the case.
RTC/Sandiganbayan On 15 August 2008, however, R-II Builders filed a motion to
Ruling & Other Motions admit its Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that
its previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had

not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the
correct docket fees therefor.Said Second Amended
Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders’ cause of
action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of
action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced the claim for
attorney’s fees to ₱500,000.00, sought its appointment as
Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and,
after an inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of
the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool in
accordance with the parties’ agreements.
On 2 September 2008, HGC filed its opposition to the

admission of R-II Builders’ Second Amended Complaint on
the ground that respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act
on the case until payment of the correct docket fees and
that said pleading was intended for delay and introduced
a new theory inconsistent with the original complaint and
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. Claiming
that R-II Builders had defied respondent court’s 19 May
2008 order by refusing to pay the correct docket fees, HGC
additionally moved for the dismissal of the case pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
CA Ruling & Other The CA rendered the decision thatthe action commenced
Motions by R-II Builders indubitably falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of respondent RTC
Issues 1. Whether or not Branch 24 of Manila RTC has jurisdiction
over the case;
2. Whether a branch of the RTC which has no jurisdiction

to try and decide a case has authority to remand the
same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the
defects on venue and jurisdiction.
Ruling 1. No. The said court significantly took cognizance of its
lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a

designated Special Commercial Court tasked to try and
hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the
exclusion of ordinary civil cases.
When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was

classified as an intra-corporate case. However, in the
ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defenses
raised by defendants, even the plaintiff conceded that
the case is not an intra-corporate controversy or even if it
is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the
parties are all housed in Quezon City.
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to
declare that it does not have the authority to hear the
complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether it
is personal or civil, this Court would rather leave the
resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court.
Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial

Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in

nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be
threshed out in a regular court.
2. No. The only action that the RTC could take on the
matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The
said RTC did not have the requisite authority or power to
order the transfer of the case to another branch of the
RTC.A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves
courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot
involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive
of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a cause
cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.
Title of the Case 20 DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M.
BELLAFLOR, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, RTC-Cebu and
FRANCISCO TESORERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 111685 August 20, 2001

Doctrine Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters.
Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent
of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought
his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure
of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either
case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement
of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against
their alteration.
Petition Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated August 31, 1993 rendered by the Sixteenth
Divisionof the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29996
Facts On April 10, 1992, petitioner Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
filed a complaint for damagesagainst private respondent
Francisco Tesorero before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 11. Docketed as CEB-11578, the complaint
prayed for damages in the amount of P11,000,000.00.
In lieu of an answer, private respondent filed a motion to

dismissclaiming that: (a) the complaint did not state a
cause of action; (b) the plaintiff's claim has been
extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and academic;
(c) there was non-joinder of indispensable parties; and (d)
venue was improperly laid. Of these four (4) grounds, the
last mentioned is most material in this case at bar.
On August 3, 1992, the trial court issued a

Resolutiondismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
Petitioner's motion for reconsiderationwas denied in an

Orderdated October 1, 1992.

From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner
originally filed before the Supreme Court on November 20,
1992 a petition for review on certiorari.The Court declined
to take immediate cognizance of the case, and in a
Resolution dated January 11, 1993,referred the same to
the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On August 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed judgmentdenying due course and dismissing the
petition. Counsel for petitioner received a copy of the
decision on September 6, 1993.Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition,
assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s Contention The venue in Cebu City where the case was filed was
proper.
Respondent’s Contention It is private respondent's contention that the proper venue
is Davao City, and not Cebu City where petitioner filed the
case. Private respondent argues that petitioner is
estopped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City,
in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner
prior to the filing of the action for damages. First, private
respondent adverts to several contractsentered into by
petitioner with the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) where in the description of personal
circumstances, the former states that its principal office is
at "163-165 P. Reyes St., Davao City." According to private
respondent the petitioner's address in Davao City, as given
in the contracts, is an admission which should bind
petitioner.In addition, private respondent points out that
petitioner made several judicial admissions as to its
principal office in Davao City consisting principally of
allegations in pleadings filed by petitioner in a number of
civil cases pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao in which it was either a plaintiff or a defendant.
RTC/Sandiganbayan The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.
Ruling & Other Motions
CA & Other Motions The CA likewise dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.
Issues Whether or not there was proper venue
Ruling The venue was proper.
It cannot be disputed that petitioner's principal office is in

Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporationand
by-laws. An action for damages being a personal
action,venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may

be commenced and tied where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts

presented before us. He is a complete stranger to the
covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR,
despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the

rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for
whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject
of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise
not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or
representation made by petitioner in either the complaints
or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is
in Davao City should estop it from filing the damage suit
before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that
private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that
he relied on such representation by petitioner.
Title of the Case 21 Nocum v. Lucio Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005
Doctrine Jurisdiction vs. Venue

Petition Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 that affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 56, in Civil Case No. 98-2288, dated 19 April 1999,
admitting respondent Lucio Tan's Amended Complaint
for Damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations against him in two (2) articles of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution dated 15 September
2000 denying petitioners Armand Nocum and The
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.s' motion for reconsideration.
Facts  On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint
against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo
Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
contained in a news article.
 It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first
published. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing
the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue.
 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint,
respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion dated
February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint.
In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged
that 'This article was printed and first published in the
City of Makati, and in par. 2.04.1, that 'This caricature
was printed and first published in the City of Makati.
 The RTC admitted the amended complaint and
deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
Petitioner’s Contention  The petitioner argued that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action, venue was improperly laid, and the

defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were
general conclusions without factual premises.
Respondent’s Contention  Tan amended the complaint and alleged that the
article was printed and first published in the City
of Makati.
RTC Ruling & other motions  The RTC dismissed the original complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
 The RTC admitted the amended complaint and

deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
 Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed the RTC decision to

the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling & other motions  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition for review on the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Issue Whether or not the lower court (RTC) acquire jurisdiction
over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint
for damages?
Ruling YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based
on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at
bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the
case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,
respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from
libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court
of First Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel
case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former
colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated
jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the
place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b)
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation
between the court and the subject matter; venue, a
relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner
and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and
cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the
Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature
were printed and first published in the City
of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither
confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's
failure to include the same in the original complaint divest
the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent's failure to allege these allegations gave the
lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly
laid.
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS
arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve

a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the
subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter.
It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought and
not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their
access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue
is jurisdictional it being an essential element of
jurisdiction.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
Title of the Case 22 Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
Doctrine Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint
Petition This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, and the Resolution dated
October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Facts  Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-105602, with an aggregate area of
82,972 square meters. While on board a jeepney,
Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a
conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura)
regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that
Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the
owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to
Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into
several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under
the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo
Dinglasan (Felicisimo).
 Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged
signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On
April 26, 1990, Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna
Ong (Lorna), who later caused the issuance of TCT No.
134932 for the subject property under her name. A
few months later, or sometime in August 1990, Lorna
sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00.

Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No.
137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.
 Respondents demanded petitioner to surrender
possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused.
Respondents were then forced to file a case before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for
the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
137466, docketed as Civil Case No. 438-ML. Summons
was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her
mother, Anita Padlan.
Petitioner’s Contention  Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not
validly served upon her person since she was residing
in Japan, but only by means of substituted service
through her mother.
 Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of
the subject matter, considering that from the
complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the
property was only P4,000.00, which was the amount
alleged by respondents that the property was sold to
petitioner by Lorna.
Respondent’s Contention 
RTC Ruling & other motions  The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a
buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the
complaint.
 Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the

CA
CA Ruling & other motions  The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC
and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued in the
name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of
respondents' own title.
Issue (1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case?
Ruling NO. Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property
or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots.
However, in order to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the
complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is

conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested
by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature
of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs
is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof. Since the amount
alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed
lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in
the RTC are null and void.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June
29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, dated July I, 2005, is declared NULL and VOID.
Title of the Case 23 AUGUSTUS GONZALES AND SPOUSES NESTOR VICTOR AND MA.
LOURDES RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, VS. QUIRICO PE, Respondent.
(G.R. No. 167398, August 09, 2011)
Doctrine Residual power/jurisdiction
 Doctrine of residual power – powers which the trial court
retains even after perfection of the appeal.
Petition This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge Rene
Hortillo which granted the petition of respondent Quirico Pe. The
CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order of the Regional Trial
Court which dismissed respondent's appeal for non-payment of
docket and other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of the writ
of execution for the implementation of its Decision dated June 28,
2002 in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent.
Facts  Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of
construction materials, and had been transacting business with
petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes
Rodriguez. The DPWH awarded two contracts in favor of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the construction of "Lanot-Banga

Road (Kalibo Highway)and concreting of "Laua-an Pandan
Road (Tibial-Culasi Section).
 In 1998, respondent Pe agreed to supply cement for the
aforementioned projects. Petitioner Rodriguez availed of the
DPWH's pre-payment program for cement requirement
regarding the Kalibo project, wherein the DPWH would give an
advance payment even before project completion upon his
presentment, among others, of an official receipt for the amount
advanced.
 Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank Check No. 6563066
to respondent Pe but leaving the amount and date in blank to
guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement
valued at P1,507,008.00. However, a year later, respondent filled
up the blank check by placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999,
corresponding to the amount and date.
 On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint
for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of Documents and
Damages against respondent with the RTC Branch 31 of Iloilo
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 25945. They alleged that they
entrusted the blank LBP Check to respondent so as to facilitate
the approval of the pre-payment application of petitioner Nestor
Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated that the blank LBP check
would "serve as collateral" to guarantee the payment for 15,698
bags to be used for the Kalibo project, amounting to
P1,507,008.00, and that after payment of the said amount,
respondent would return the LBP check. According to them, after
having paid respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is
P139,160.00 more than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing
the value for 23,360 bags of cement taken for the Kalibo project),
they were cleared of any liability.
 On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer averring that he
had so far delivered 40,360 bags of cement to petitioners who
remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby leaving an outstanding amount
of P2,062,000.00. He countered that when petitioners stopped
the bank-to-bank online payments to him, he filled up the
amount of P2,062,000.00 and made the LBP check payable on
June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being "drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF)." By way of compulsory
counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of
P2,062,000.00, with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully
paid as actual damages.
 In its Decision, the trial court, applying Section 14 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, found that respondent's subsequent
filling up of the check in the amount of P2,062,000.00 was not
made strictly in accordance with the authority given to him by
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez, and that since one year had already
lapsed, the same was not done within a reasonable time. As to
the 23,360 bags of cement for the Kalibo project, valued at
P2,167,340.00 which was subject of previous transactions, the trial
court ruled that the same had been fully paid and considered a
settled issue. Hence, respondent filed an appeal with the RTC.
RTC/Sandiganbay  The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and
an Ruling & other against the respondent. It dismissed the defendant’s
motions counterclaim and declared plaintiffs' obligation as already and
(please specify fully paid. It also declared Land Bank Check as null and void and
whether such ordered defendant to pay each plaintiff damages.
motions were
granted or denied)

 After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002,
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due
course.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal,
and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that respondent's
appeal should be dismissed as the same was not perfected due
to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required
under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
CA Ruling & other  In the Order dated September 23, 2002, the trial court dismissed
motions (please respondent's appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of
specify whether execution to implement the RTC Decision which was then issued.
such motions were  On October 7, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
granted or denied) Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to set aside the
RTC Order dated September 23, 2002.
 The CA then granted such and rendered a Decision in favor of
the respondent as it set aside the assailed order and writ of
execution of the Regional Trial Court.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the CA.
 Hence, petitioner filed this present petition.
Petitioner’s  Petitioners claimed that since the respondent's appeal was not
Contention perfected, as a consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28,
2002 became final and executor.
 Petitioners alleged that since respondent failed to pay the
docket and other legal fees at the time he filed the Notice of
Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in contemplation
of the law. Thus, petitioners pray that the CA decision be set
aside and a new one be rendered dismissing the respondent's
appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC Decision dated
June 28, 2002.
Respondent’s  Respondent, citing Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
Contention maintains that his appeal has been perfected by the mere filing
of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with the
perfection of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of
jurisdiction to dismiss his appeal and, therefore, only the CA has
jurisdiction to determine and rule on the propriety of his
appeal. He raises the defense that his failure to pay the
required docket and other legal fees was because the RTC
Branch Clerk of Court did not make an assessment of the
appeal fees to be paid when he filed the notice of appeal.
Issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals patently erred in reversing
the decision of the lower court and allowing respondent to
belatedly pay the required appellate docket and other legal fees?
Ruling YES.
In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

provides that the appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the RTC and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of
appeal is the payment of the required appeal fees within the 15-
day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the

period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to
the appellate court together with the original record or the record
on appeal.
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v.

Court of Appeals as justification for giving due course to
respondent's petition and ordering the belated payment of docket
and other legal fees. However, the SC held that the ruling
in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein
respondent never made any payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing
of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a
timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and
other legal fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did not
issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the
respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and,
therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and
executory.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, the Court explained that the

procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely
directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. The
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory
for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further,
under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the
CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of
the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate
cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Respondent's claim that his non-payment of docket and other

lawful fees should be treated as mistake and excusable
negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too
superficial to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of
respondent's counsel, which is not excusable.
The CA took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong

premise that when the RTC issued the Order dated August 5, 2002
giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and directing
the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case
to the CA, it ipso facto lost jurisdiction over the case. Section 9, Rule
41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses jurisdiction over
the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time
by the appellant and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may
dismiss an appeal taken from the RTC on the ground of non-

payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period.
Since respondent's appeal was not perfected within the 15-day

reglementary period, it was as if no appeal was actually taken.
Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents
lodged before it. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent
thing that the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondent's
appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the RTC
Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and
executory.
Since the CA erroneously took cognizance over the case, its

Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23,
2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC
Decision dated June 28, 2002 is reinstated and, as the said decision
having become final and executory, the case is remanded for its
prompt execution.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23,
2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court of Appeals on
August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.
The Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, Iloilo City is REINSTATED and, in view of its finality, the case
is REMANDED for its prompt execution.
Title of the Case 24 ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO
& ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011)

Doctrine Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
Petition This is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the
April 13, 2009 resolution of the Supreme Court denying his
petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed CA Decision. The motion is confined to the issue of
jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.
Facts  Marcos Binag sold a parcel of land located in Caniogan, Sto.
Tomas, Isabela to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). Bautista, in
turn, sold the subject land to Atty. Samson Binag.
 Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land
with the Bureau of Lands. He then sold the subject land to
petitioner Bagunu, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free
patent applicant. The parties’ deed of sale stated that the
land sold to Bagunu is the same lot subject of Atty. Binag’s
pending free patent application.

 The deeds of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands’ survey,
and the free patent applications uniformly identified the
subject land as Lot 322.
 On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest
against the petitioner’s free patent application. The
respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the
Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23,
1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of
one Rafael Bautista.
 The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
conducted an investigation and found that the petitioner
Bagunu actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute
including the area purchased by the respondents." On July
10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner
wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application
since this lot belongs to the respondents.
 The petitioner Bagunu moved for reconsideration which was
however denied. The DENR ruled that in determining the
identity of a lot, the boundaries – and not the lot number
assigned to it - are controlling. Since the boundaries indicated
in the deed of sale in the petitioner’s favor correspond to the
boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot
258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold
as Lot 322. Thus, petitioner appealed to the DENR Secretary.
 On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the
DENR Regional Office. He concluded that the land claimed
by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that the designation
of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioner’s favor is
erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258
and not Lot 322. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
Civil Case No. 751

 In the meantime, during the pendency of the respondents’
protest, Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of
instruments, covering the second and third sale, against
Bautista and the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the
successive sale of the subject land correctly identified
the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless,
erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead
of Lot 258.
 On December 9, 1994, the petitioner Bagunu and Bautista
filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of
the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in
abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.
 After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional
Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by
filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner.
 After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary’s favorable
resolution on the respondents’ protest, the respondents asked
the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt
the DENR Secretary’s ruling.
Petitioner’s  The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of

Contention primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right
over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical

expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves
interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are
matters within the competence of the courts.
Respondent’s  The respondents alleged that the petitioner’s claim over Lot
Contention 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The
respondents also argued that they were in peaceful,
continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from
the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August
of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy,
ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession
from Lot 258.
CA Ruling & other  The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying
motions the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since
questions on the identity of a land require a technical
determination by the appropriate administrative body, the
findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by
the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not
finality.
 The petitioner assailed this ruling before the Supreme Court.

SC First Ruling
 In the April 13, 2009 Resolution, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in
the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual
issues.
 The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his

arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent
applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
Issue Whether or not the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction in the case?
Ruling NO.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain

from determining a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its
resolution by the latter, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,

specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts
are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view."

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however,
does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the
Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined.
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served.
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real

property is within the regular courts’ area of competence and,
concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular
courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of
ownership given the public character of the land, since under
C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,” the
disposition and management of public lands fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review
by the DENR Secretary.
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of

Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions
and occupations), the respondents’ complaint-in-intervention
does not simply raise the issue of possession – whether de
jure or de facto – but likewise raised the issue of ownership as
basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed
for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.1avvphi1 Ineluctably, the
RTC would have to defer its ruling on the
respondents’ reivindicatory action pending final determination
by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the
respondents’ entitlement to a free patent, following the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the

petitioner’s free patent application and his consequent
directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within
the DENR Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative
discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et
al, which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the
then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale
underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to
questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this
matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the
courts must stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration.
Title of the Case 29 THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,Petitioner,v. JODY KING

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262 : November 27, 2013

Doctrine Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Petition These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek to
reverse and set aside the following: (1) Decision1 dated
October 18, 2010 and Resolution2 dated July 5, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754; and (2)
Decision3 dated August 31, 2011 and Resolution4 dated
June 27, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.
Facts  On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner)
and Jody King Construction and Development Corp.
(respondent) entered into a contract for the design and
-construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal
(Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost
isP38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and
construction of passenger terminal, andP20,200,000 for
the design and construction of the jetty port facility.In
the course of construction, petitioner issued
variation/change orders for additional works. The scope
of work under these change orders were agreed upon
by petitioner and respondent.
 On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated

contract with respondent for the construction of
Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan
Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for Phase II
isP2,475,345.54.
 On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for

the total amount ofP22,419,112.96 covering unpaid
accomplishments on works undertaken, tax refunds,
price escalation, labor costs, overhead costs, and
interest.
 On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the

Regional Trial Court to collect the aforesaid amounts.On
August 17, 2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment.
 After trial, the court rendered its Decision in favor of

plaintiff Jody King Construction And Development
Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan.
 Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. On

November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of
execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to
demand from petitioner the immediate payment
ofP67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the
respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served
notices of garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines,
Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the
satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds
deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks,
however, refused to give due course to the court order,
citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and
jurisprudence on the determination of government
monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.

 Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution
dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
111754, which was dismissed as it found no grave abuse
of discretion in the lower courts issuance of the writ of
execution.
 The trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal and

motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner filed another
petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid
orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, which
was likewise dismissed because petitioner failed to
provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely
motion for reconsideration.
Issue (1) 1. Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is

applicable to this case?
Ruling (1) YES.
COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents

money claims. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the
issue of jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is

such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by
the courts even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative
agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to

guide the court in determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim

for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local
government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,as amended by

Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities.

SC Decision WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R. Nos. 197592 and 202623
are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 18, 2010 and
Resolution dated July 5 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 111754, and Decision dated August 31, 2011
and Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in CA- G.R. SP No.
114073 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated August 14 2009, Writ of Execution and subsequent
issuances implementing the said decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina City in Civil Case No. 06-1122-MK are
all SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
Title of the Case 30 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and
ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

Doctrine Adherence of Jurisdiction
Petition Case filed by therein petitioners for compulsory
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was
filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
which granted them their equal share in the succional
rights of all the heirs.
Facts  On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights
was filed before RTC Manila by the
minors Antonia Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian.
 The complaint was opposed by the

legitimate children of Jose Aruego, who died on
March 30, 1982. They claimed that there was open and
continuous possession of status of
illegitimate children of Jose who had
an amorous relationship with their mother Luz Fabian
until the time of his death.
 The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an

illegitimate daughter of the deceased with Luz Fabian
while Evelyn is not.
 Antonia Aruego was declared entitled to a share

equal to 1/2 portion of share of the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego.
 Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with

the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988,
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of prescription,
considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2,
in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is
provided that an action for compulsory recognition of

illegitimate filiation, if based on the “open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child,” must be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent without any exception,
otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.

Issue (1) 1. Whether or not the Court has lost its jurisdiction by the
passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Ruling (2) NO.
The Court reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a

court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego

for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to
the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar

as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have
her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her
action under the regime of the Civil Code.
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that

the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact
that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then still
a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule
provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the

case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also
known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution
dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.

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Respondent’s Contention  Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by

By: DIGESTERS 2019: CIVPRO

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For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve

 In this case, the appeal and the petition for certiorari

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Title of the Case 6 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT

Facts  Petitioner Samahan ng mgaManggagawasa Hyatt-

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Petitioner’s Contention  The petitioner argues that because decisions rendered

Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

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The question on the proper recourse to assail a

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By: DIGESTERS 2019: CIVPRO

Title of the Case 7 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its

With respect to the promulgation of the Revised Rules on

Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in

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LRTA moved for reconsideration of the resolution which was

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Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18,

PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there

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2nd Issue: It would be wrong to classify this offense as simple

The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the

Title of the Case 8 PANAY RAILWAYS, INC., Petitioner,

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Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are

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2nd Issue: The argument that CA has exclusive jurisdiction to

When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the

We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice"

We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with

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2. On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200

3. On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao

4. RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120

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7. On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the

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(IMPT) SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of

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The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the

Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the

SC DECISION WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

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The CA affirmed the resolutions dated November 17, 2006

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the

In a decision dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land

The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to