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Citation: Scopelliti, I., Morewedge, C. K., McCormick, E., Min, L., LeBrecht, S. and
Kassam, K. (2015). Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences.
Management Science, 61(10), pp. 2468-2486. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2096
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Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and

Consequences
Irene Scopelliti, Carey K. Morewedge, Erin McCormick, H. Lauren Min, Sophie Lebrecht,
Karim S. Kassam
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Irene Scopelliti, Carey K. Morewedge, Erin McCormick, H. Lauren Min, Sophie Lebrecht, Karim S. Kassam (2015) Bias Blind
Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences. Management Science 61(10):2468-2486. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2014.2096
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MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 61, No. 10, October 2015, pp. 2468–2486
ISSN 0025-1909 (print) ISSN 1526-5501 (online) http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2096
© 2015 INFORMS
Bias Blind Spot: Structure,

Measurement, and Consequences
Downloaded from informs.org by [138.40.68.78] on 21 October 2015, at 07:31 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Irene Scopelliti
Cass Business School, City University London, London EC1Y 8TZ, United Kingdom, irene.scopelliti@city.ac.uk
Carey K. Morewedge
Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215, morewedg@bu.edu
Erin McCormick
Dietrich School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213,
enmccorm@andrew.cmu.edu
H. Lauren Min
Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309, lauren.min@colorado.edu
Sophie Lebrecht, Karim S. Kassam

Dietrich School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
{sophielebrecht@cmu.edu, kskassam@andrew.cmu.edu}
P eople exhibit a bias blind spot: they are less likely to detect bias in themselves than in others. We report
the development and validation of an instrument to measure individual differences in the propensity to
exhibit the bias blind spot that is unidimensional, internally consistent, has high test-retest reliability, and is
discriminated from measures of intelligence, decision-making ability, and personality traits related to self-esteem,
self-enhancement, and self-presentation. The scale is predictive of the extent to which people judge their abilities
to be better than average for easy tasks and worse than average for difficult tasks, ignore the advice of others,
and are responsive to an intervention designed to mitigate a different judgmental bias. These results suggest
that the bias blind spot is a distinct metabias resulting from naïve realism rather than other forms of egocentric
cognition, and has unique effects on judgment and behavior.
Keywords: bias blind spot; judgment and decision making; metacognition; self-awareness; advice taking;
debiasing
History: Received December 5, 2013; accepted September 13, 2014, by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and
decision making. Published online in Articles in Advance April 24, 2015.
Introduction We show that people differ in their propensity

People exhibit numerous systematic biases in judg- to exhibit the bias blind spot, and develop a reli-
ment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman et al. able and valid instrument to measure this individ-
1982, Nisbett and Ross 1980), many of which are due ual difference. Bias blind spot appears to be a unique
construct independent of intelligence and personal-
to unconscious processes (Morewedge and Kahneman
ity traits related to self-esteem, self-enhancement, and
2010, Wilson and Brekke 1994). A lack of conscious
self-presentation. Bias blind spot appears to be inde-
access to judgment-forming processes means that pendent of general decision-making competence. In
people are often unaware of their own biases (Nisbett other words, the belief that one is less biased than
and Wilson 1977) even though they can readily spot one’s peers appears to reflect a biased perception of
the same biases in the judgments of others. Conse- the self rather than a more general inferior decision-
quently, most people tend to believe that, on average, making ability, or an accurate reflection of one’s supe-
they are less biased in their judgment and behavior rior judgment and decision-making ability. We find
than are their peers. Most people recognize that other that the propensity to believe that one is less biased
people are likely to be biased when judging an attrac- than one’s peers has detrimental consequences on
tive person, for example, but think that their own judgments and behaviors that rely on self–other accu-
judgment of an attractive person is unaffected by this racy comparisons, including decreasing receptivity to
useful (i.e., debiasing) advice.
type of halo effect. Because the majority of people
cannot be less biased their peers, this phenomenon is Bias Blind Spot
referred to as the bias blind spot (Pronin 2007; Pronin People exhibit a tendency to believe they are less
et al. 2002, 2004). biased than their peers. College students believe
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Scopelliti et al.: Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences
Management Science 61(10), pp. 2468–2486, © 2015 INFORMS 2469
they are less biased than their classmates, airline Klayman et al. 1999; Stankov and Crawford 1996,
passengers believe they are less biased than other pas- 1997; Stanovich and West 2000). Bruine de Bruin
sengers, and Americans believe they are less biased et al. (2007) demonstrated that decision-making com-
than their fellow citizens (Pronin et al. 2002). This competence, measured as composite performance on mul-
mon asymmetry in the assessment of bias in the self tiple decision-making tasks, reflects the outcome of
and in others has been observed across a variety of reliable individual differences and predicts real-world
social and cognitive biases. This bias blind spot occurs decision-making ability.
whether people explicitly rate the extent of their bias In addition to clarifying the robustness and unique-
relative to their peers, or rate the absolute extent of ness of the bias blind spot, a major goal of the present
their bias and separately rate the extent of bias exhib- research was to examine its relationship with gen-
ited by their peers (Pronin et al. 2002, 2004; Pronin eral decision-making ability. If a single higher-order
and Kugler 2007; Epley and Dunning 2000; West et al. construct determines the extent to which people rec-
2012, Van Boven et al. 2000; Wilson et al. 1996). ognize their own bias, three possible relationships
The bias blind spot has been attributed to the inter- between the bias blind spot and general decision-
play of two phenomena: the introspection illusion and making ability emerge.
naïve realism (Pronin et al. 2004, Pronin and Kugler First, people who are lowest in decision-making
2007). The introspection illusion results from differ- ability may be least aware of their own bias, and
ences in the availability and perceived diagnostic hence may be most likely to exhibit the bias blind
value of introspection when assessing oneself and spot. Indeed, the least skilled are often least able to
other people. When people evaluate the extent of assess their level of skill (Kruger and Dunning 1999,
bias in their own behavior, they base their evalua- Dunning et al. 2003). If bias blind spot is simply one
tions on introspection (e.g., “I find Rodger attractive, component of general decision-making ability, suscep-
but I have no memory of that fact influencing how tibility to the bias blind spot should be negatively
I judge his speaking ability”). Because introspection correlated with decision-making competence.
is unlikely to reveal biased thought processes, people Second, people may accurately assess their degree
conclude that their judgment and behavior are unbi- of bias relative to their peers. In other words, peo-
ple who believe they are less biased than their peers
ased. Naïve realism, the belief that one’s perception
(those high in bias blind spot) may be correct. In this
reflects the true state of the world, then generates a
case, bias blind spot may not really reflect suscep-
false sense that these charitable self-assessments are
tibility to a blind spot at all, and there should be
genuine rather than positively biased (Pronin et al.
a positive correlation between bias blind spot and
2004; Ross and Ward 1995, 1996).
decision-making competence.
When people evaluate the extent of bias in others,
Third, susceptibility to the bias blind spot may be
their assessments rely on behavior rather than on pri-
unrelated to general decision-making ability. People
vate thoughts, because the private thoughts of others
who have not been trained in decision making, and
are not accessible. Consequently, the biased behav-
are therefore unaware of common biases in reason-
ior of others is not excused by an ostensibly unbi-
ing and judgment, show considerable variation in
ased thought process (e.g., “Joan might not realize their decision-making competence (Bruine de Bruin
it, but she probably thinks Rodger speaks eloquently et al. 2007). This suggests that superior decision mak-
because she is attracted to him”). Because people use ing is a function of calibrated intuitions rather than
different types of evidence when assessing bias in the awareness of appropriate decision-making strategies.
self and in other people, less bias is perceived in the Indeed, research on the limitations of introspection
self than in others. The variety of social and cogni- shows that people have limited insight into the pro-
tive biases for which this bias blind spot has been cesses by which their judgments and decisions are
observed (Pronin et al. 2004, West et al. 2012) sug- made (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, Wilson and Dunn
gests that susceptibility to the bias blind spot may be 2004). Furthermore, tests comparing bias blind spot
a higher-order latent factor underlying the belief that for several specific biases and the commission of
one is less likely to exhibit a variety of specific biases those specific biases have revealed little to no rela-
than are one’s peers. tion between recognition of bias and its commission
(Stanovich and West 2008, West et al. 2012).
Bias Blind Spot and Decision Making
The propensity to exhibit decision-making biases Predictive Value of the Bias Blind Spot Scale
appears to vary systematically (Levin et al. 2002, We suggest that the bias blind spot is weakly, if at
Stanovich 1999, West and Stanovich 1997). Several all, related to general decision-making ability. More
studies have shown that performance across decision- specifically, that the bias blind spot is a metabias—
making tasks tends to have high internal consistency a bias in the recognition of other biases—that sys-
(Blais et al. 2005; Bornstein and Zickafoose 1999; tematically biases judgment and behavior in unique
2470 Management Science 61(10), pp. 2468–2486, © 2015 INFORMS
and predictable ways. Rather than indicate an overly report the development of our individual-difference
positive view of the self, it reflects the tendency to measure to assess the extent to which a person
consider different evidence when making self–other believes she is less biased than her peers, the evalu-
accuracy comparisons. Thus, we predict that it should ation of its reliability, the verification of its factorial
(a) serve as an index of bias for self–other com- structure, and the analysis of its discriminant valid-
parisons that rely on similar cognitive mechanisms, ity in relationship with potentially related constructs
whether those comparisons are favorable or unfavor- such as intelligence, cognitive reflection, decision-
able to the self. As an index of self–other accuracy making ability, and personality traits related to self-
comparisons, we suggest that bias blind spot should esteem, self-enhancement, and self-presentation. Our
also influence judgments informed by these (social) last three studies report tests of our three judgmental
comparisons such as (b) the weight placed on advice and behavioral predictions.
from others and (c) receptivity to debiasing training.
Next, we unpack each of these predictions in turn.
A first prediction is that when evaluating their Study 1
own abilities, people exhibiting more bias blind spot In Study 1, we generated 27 scale items and then
should exhibit more naïve realism in their initial submitted them to a purification process resulting in
assessments of their self (e.g., “I’m great at using a 14-item bias blind spot scale with good reliabil-
a computer mouse but terrible at juggling”) and ity and stability. We used an item-generation process
less often correct those assessment for relevant infor- aimed at capturing a broad sense of the construct to
mation about others’ abilities (e.g., “0 0 0 as are most develop the scale. In accordance with the underly-
people”). Rather than simply view the self more pos- ing theory (Pronin 2008), we reasoned that the bias
itively, they should be more likely to exhibit biases blind spot is a metabias that is exhibited across mul-
reliant on similar cognitive mechanisms. For exam- tiple self-assessments. Therefore, we treated the bias
ple, they should be more likely to exhibit a better- blind spot as a latent variable that causes an asymme-
than-average effect when evaluating their ability to try in the assessment of bias in the self and in others
perform easy tasks, and a worse-than-average effect with respect to several biases, both in the social and
when evaluating their ability to perform difficult cognitive domains. Accordingly, we approached the
tasks (Kruger 1999). conceptualization and the operationalization of sus-
A second prediction is that commission of bias ceptibility to the bias blind spot as a reflective mea-
blind spot should predict bias in judgments informed surement model (Bollen and Lennox 1991, Edwards
by self–other accuracy comparisons. People who think and Bagozzi 2000). That is, a model in which the
they are less vulnerable to bias than their peers, for direction of causality is from the construct to the
example, may attend less to the opinions of others indicators, and in which changes in the underlying
because they believe that others have a more biased construct are hypothesized to cause changes in the
perception of the world, consistent with the operation indicators. According to the proposed conceptualiza-
of naïve realism (Ross and Ward 1996, Pronin et al. tion, changes in individual susceptibility to the bias
2004, Liberman et al. 2012). This should lead them to blind spot (i.e., a latent variable), will cause changes
place less weight on the advice of others when given in the extent to the bias blind spot is observed for
the opportunity to incorporate that advice into their specific biases in judgment and behavior.
own judgments.
As another example, people who think they are Method
less vulnerable to bias than their peers should believe
that their judgment and decision making is in less Participants. Initial Sample0 A total of 172 Ama-
need of correction (Wilson and Brekke 1994). Analo- zon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers (86 women;
gous to interventions aiming to curb addiction, where Mage = 3204 years, SD = 1005) accessed and completed
awareness of the problem is a necessary first step a survey on the Internet and received $4 as com-
in facilitating corrective action, awareness of bias pensation. In all studies we restricted participation
may be an important precursor to bias mitigation to residents of the United States. Participation in any
(Kruger and Dunning 1999, Wilson and Brekke 1994). study reported here resulted in ineligibility for par-
Consequently, greater commission of bias blind spot ticipation in subsequent studies (i.e., no person parti-
should reduce the likelihood of benefitting from bias- cipated in more than one study). Participants were
reducing interventions. 79.7% White, 7% Black, 5.2% multiracial, 4.1% Asian,
and 1.2% Native American; 2.9% did not indicate their
Overview of the Studies ethnicity. AMT workers have been shown to exhibit
We adopted a psychometric approach to the anal- susceptibility to biases in judgment and decision mak-
ysis of the bias blind spot. Our first two studies ing similar to traditional college samples with respect
to common tasks such as the Asian disease problem, Results

the conjunction fallacy and outcome bias; to exhibit Purification0 We first reduced the number of items
similar levels of risk aversion; and to exhibit similar to improve the psychometric properties of the instru-
levels of cooperation in behavioral economics games ment. We removed items that assessed bias blind
such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Berinsky et al. 2012, spot by describing different occurrences of the same
Horton et al. 2011, Paolacci et al. 2010). underlying judgmental bias. We then computed the
Follow-Up Sample0 A total of 83 participants in the correlations between each item and the rest of the
initial sample completed a follow-up survey consist- scale, and removed items with item-to-total correla-
ing of the items in the purified scale for an additional tions lower than 0.40. This purification process led to
$4 in compensation (43 women; Mage = 3207 years, a final instrument containing 14 items (see Table 1 for
SD = 1000) yielding a 52% retention rate. Participants the full list of items).
in this subsample were 75.9% White, 9.6% Black, Reliability0 The 14-item scale shows high reliabil-
7.2% Asian, 4.8% multiracial, and 1.2% Native Amer- ity ( = 0086), well above the acceptable threshold
ican; 1.2% did not indicate their ethnicity. There were of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978). All items appeared to be
no differences between the initial sample and the worth retention. No question eliminations would yield
follow-up sample in terms of age (F = 0005, p > 0080), a higher value of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
gender ( 2 = 1000, p > 0060), or ethnicity ( 2 = 2041, (-if-item-deletedi < ). Of the 91 pairwise correla-
p > 0070). tions between the items (M = 0030), 85 were positive
and significant, 3 were positive and marginally signifi-
Materials. Item Generation0 We began developing cant, and 3 were positive but not significant (ps < 0042;
scale items by identifying existing indicators of the see Table 2). Each item correlated well with the scale,
construct in the literature. We drew some questions as signaled by an average item-to-total correlation
from Pronin et al. (2002) verbatim, modified questions equal to 0.52. All further analyses, in this and subse-
from this source, and wrote new questions with the quent studies, use this 14-item scale. For all 14 biases,
same structure. Each question was structured so that the majority of participants rated the average Amer-
it described a bias and asked respondents to indi- ican as more susceptible to bias than themselves; all
cate the incidence of the bias for two different tar- ts ≥ 6026, all ps < 00001 (for all means, see Table 3).
gets: the self and the average American (for examples, Exploratory Factor Analysis0 We submitted the
see Table 1). Each bias was described as a psycho- 14 bias blind spot items to a principal-components
logical tendency or effect, avoiding (when possible) factor analysis (PCA) followed by a parallel anal-
ysis (Horn 1965). The parallel analysis suggests an
the use of positively connoted words or negatively
underlying single-factor structure, with only the first
connoted words such as bias or error. After read-
eigenvalue observed in the data being higher than
ing a description of each bias, participants rated the
a parallel average random eigenvalue based on the
extent to which they exhibit that bias and the extent
same sample size and number of variables. In the
to which the average American exhibits that bias on
single-factor model, all 14 items load onto a single
7-point scales with endpoints, not at all (1) and very
factor accounting for 35% of the total variance, and
much (7).
each item has a high correlation with that factor (all
Item Scoring0 Bias blind spot scores were calculated s > 0048; see Table 3).
by subtracting the perceived self-susceptibility to each Test-Retest Reliability0 An analysis of the second ad-
bias from the perceived susceptibility of the average ministration of the scale indicated that the instrument
American to that bias, for each bias, and then by aver- has consistently high reliability ( = 0088), and high
aging those relative differences. For each participant, test-retest reliability (r4815 = 0080, p < 00001), signaling
the size of the average difference between self and stability of the bias blind spot scale over time.
average American bias ratings was used as a measure
of the magnitude of her bias blind spot. Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence for individual differences
Procedure. Participants rated their vulnerability in susceptibility to the bias blind spot. High inter-
and the vulnerability of the average American to item correlations and factors loadings suggest that
commit biases on 27 unique items. Item order was some people have a higher susceptibility to the bias
random. After completing all 27 items, participants blind spot than do others across a variety of judg-
reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. To assess mental biases. The results from this first study sug-
the test-retest reliability of the instrument, all partic- gest that our instrument reliably assessed individual
ipants in the initial sample were invited by means differences in susceptibility to the bias blind spot. In
of the AMT messaging system to complete the puri- addition, the instrument captures a single latent vari-
fied version of the scale eight days after the initial able as proposed by our construct operationalization.
administration. Furthermore, the high test-retest reliability observed
Table 1 Scale Items and Corresponding Biases
Item Description Bias
1 Some people show a tendency to judge a harmful action as worse than an equally harmful inaction. For example, Action-inaction bias
this tendency leads to thinking it is worse to falsely testify in court that someone is guilty, than not to testify
that someone is innocent.
2 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a tendency to do or believe a thing only because many other Bandwagon effect
people believe or do that thing, to feel safer or to avoid conflict.
3 Many psychological studies have shown that people react to counterevidence by actually strengthening their Confirmation bias
beliefs. For example, when exposed to negative evidence about their favorite political candidate, people tend to
implicitly counterargue against that evidence, therefore strengthening their favorable feelings toward the
candidate.
4 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “disconfirmation” tendency in the way they evaluate Disconfirmation bias
research about potentially dangerous habits. That is, they are more critical and skeptical in evaluating evidence
that an activity is dangerous when they engage in that activity than when they do not.
5 Psychologists have identified an effect called “diffusion of responsibility,” where people tend not to help in an Diffusion of responsibility
emergency situation when other people are present. This happens because as the number of bystanders
increases, a bystander who sees other people standing around is less likely to interpret the incident as a
problem, and also is less likely to feel individually responsible for taking action.
6 Research has found that people will make irrational decisions to justify actions they have already taken. For Escalation of commitment
example, when two people engage in a bidding war for an object, they can end up paying much more than the
object is worth to justify the initial expenses associated with bidding.
7 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a tendency to make “overly dispositional inferences” in the Fundamental attribution error
way they view victims of assault crimes. That is, they are overly inclined to view the victim’s plight as one he or
she brought on by carelessness, foolishness, misbehavior, or naivetë.
8 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “halo” effect in the way they form impressions of attractive Halo effect
people. For instance, when it comes to assessing how nice, interesting, or able someone is, people tend to
judge an attractive person more positively than he or she deserves.
9 Extensive psychological research has shown that people possess an unconscious, automatic tendency to be less Ingroup favoritism
generous to people of a different race than to people of their race. This tendency has been shown to affect the
behavior of everyone from doctors to taxi drivers.
10 Psychologists have identified a tendency called the “ostrich effect,” an aversion to learning about potential losses. Ostrich effect
For example, people may try to avoid bad news by ignoring it. The name comes from the common (but false)
legend that ostriches bury their heads in the sand to avoid danger.
11 Many psychological studies have found that people have the tendency to underestimate the impact or the strength Projection bias
of another person’s feelings. For example, people who have not been victims of discrimination do not really
understand a victim’s social suffering and the emotional effects of discrimination.
12 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “self-interest” effect in the way they view political Self-interest bias
candidates. That is, people’s assessments of qualifications, and their judgments about the extent to which
particular candidates would pursue policies good for the American people as a whole, are influenced by their
feelings about whether the candidates’ policies would serve their own particular interests.
13 Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “self-serving” tendency in the way they view their academic Self-serving bias
or job performance. That is, they tend to take credit for success but deny responsibility for failure. They see
their successes as the result of personal qualities, like drive or ability, but their failures as the result of external
factors, like unreasonable work requirements or inadequate instructions.
14 Psychologists have argued that gender biases lead people to associate men with technology and women with Stereotyping
housework.
indicates that the individual difference tapped by our assessing potentially related psychological constructs.
scale is stable over time. Such comparisons determine whether individual dif-
ferences in bias blind spot reflect individual differ-
ences in more basic or established personality traits.
Study 2 Specifically, by using five different samples of re-
In Study 2, we verified the factorial structure of the spondents, we examined the correlations between the
bias blind spot scale that emerged in Study 1 by sub- bias blind spot scale and measures of intelligence,
mitting the 14 items to a confirmatory factor analysis. inclination toward cognitive activities, and decision-
Since the development of a valid and reliable measure- making ability (i.e., SAT scores, Need for cognition,
ment scale introduces the possibility to clarify the rela- performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test, and
tionship between susceptibility to the bias blind spot decision-making competence), measures of personal-
and related constructs that compose its nomological ity traits related to self-esteem and self-enhancement
network (Cronbach and Meehl 1955), we also tested (i.e., self-esteem, superiority, need for uniqueness,
the discriminant validity of the bias blind spot scale narcissism, and over-claiming tendency), self-presen-
in relation to a set of established scales and measures tation (i.e., self-monitoring, self-consciousness, and
Table 2 Correlations Between the 14 Selected Scale Items
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Action-inaction bias
2 Bandwagon effect 00287∗∗
3 Confirmation bias 00326∗∗ 00478∗∗
4 Diffusion of responsibility 00440∗∗ 00347∗∗ 00331∗∗
5 Disconfirmation bias 00189∗ 00236∗∗ 00347∗∗ 00240∗∗
6 Escalation of commitment 00317∗∗ 00413∗∗ 00253∗∗ 00309∗∗ 00267∗∗

7 Fundamental attribution error 00268∗∗ 00222∗∗ 00271∗∗ 00304∗∗ 00061 00216∗∗
8 Halo effect 00356∗∗ 00469∗∗ 00328∗∗ 00273∗∗ 00250∗∗ 00379∗∗ 00331∗∗
9 Ingroup favoritism 00217∗∗ 00321∗∗ 00371∗∗ 00329∗∗ 00245∗∗ 00286∗∗ 00352∗∗ 00398∗∗
10 Ostrich effect 00256∗∗ 00368∗∗ 00313∗∗ 00359∗∗ 00390∗∗ 00329∗∗ 00134 00270∗∗ 00238∗∗
11 Projection bias 00397∗∗ 00244∗∗ 00237∗∗ 00218∗∗ 00136 00082 00198∗∗ 00362∗∗ 00281∗∗ 00147
12 Self-interest bias 00336∗∗ 00272∗∗ 00358∗∗ 00323∗∗ 00296∗∗ 00281∗∗ 00249∗∗ 00197∗∗ 00302∗∗ 00261∗∗ 00228∗∗
13 Self-serving bias 00383∗∗ 00403∗∗ 00399∗∗ 00418∗∗ 00357∗∗ 00295∗∗ 00250∗∗ 00447∗∗ 00300∗∗ 00412∗∗ 00172∗ 00334∗∗
14 Stereotyping 00280∗∗ 00386∗∗ 00233∗∗ 00253∗∗ 00085 00305∗∗ 00340∗∗ 00426∗∗ 00313∗∗ 00150 00378∗∗ 00311∗∗ 00256∗∗
Note. Asterisks indicate significant correlations: ∗∗ p < 0001; ∗ p < 0005; p < 0010.
social desirability), and more general personality traits Materials and Procedure. Sample 1. Participants
(i.e., the Big Five Inventory (BFI)). (n = 260) first completed all 14 items of the bias
blind spot scale in a random order. Participants then
Method completed a series of personality scales measuring
extant psychological constructs potentially related to
Participants. Study 2 made use of five unique sam- the bias blind spot: the 10-item Rosenberg self-esteem
ples that totaled to 661 respondents (344 women; scale (Rosenberg 1965), the need for uniqueness
Mage = 3206 years, SD = 1102). For each sample, the scale (32 items; Snyder and Fromkin 1977), the self-
content of the questionnaire varied as described next. consciousness scale (22 items; Feingstein et al. 1975),
All participants were AMT workers residing in the the need for cognition scale (NFC; 18 items; Cacioppo
United States who accessed and completed a survey et al. 1984), the self-monitoring scale (25 items; Snyder
on the Internet in exchange for compensation vary- 1974), the superiority scale (10 items; Robbins and
ing based on the length of the study (Sample 1: $5; Patton 1985), the NPI-16 short measure of narcissism
Sample 2: $4; Sample 3: $6; Sample 4: $2; Sample 5: (16 items; Ames et al. 2006), and the social desir-
$4). Participants were 77.0% White, 7.0% Black, 7.0% ability scale (33 items; Crowne and Marlowe 1960).
Asian, 5.1% multiracial, 1.6% Native American, and Each scale was administered using its original answer
2.4% did not indicate their ethnicity. The five samples format and coding scheme. Both the order of the
did not differ in terms of bias blind spot scores F < 1. scales and the order of the items were randomized,
Table 3 Bias Blind Spot by Scale Item, Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis, and Completely Standardized Parameters from
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Average American Self Factor Completely

loading standardized
Bias M SD M SD t(171) (EFA) parameter (CFA)
1 Action-inaction bias 5012 1033 3096 1069 9086∗∗∗ 00613 00660

2 Bandwagon effect 5073 1006 3060 1068 15007∗∗∗ 00675 00504
3 Confirmation bias 5055 1027 3098 1060 11090∗∗∗ 00642 00552
4 Diffusion of responsibility 5051 1027 4011 1077 10005∗∗∗ 00613 00564
5 Disconfirmation bias 5031 1017 4048 1052 7031∗∗∗ 00482 00552
6 Escalation of commitment 5036 1013 3057 1067 14028∗∗∗ 00575 00583
7 Fundamental attribution error 4063 1024 3016 1054 12016∗∗∗ 00496 00476
8 Halo effect 5089 1002 4016 1069 12013∗∗∗ 00674 00511
9 Ingroup favoritism 5001 1029 3045 1069 11097∗∗∗ 00598 00599
10 Ostrich effect 5020 1015 4035 1074 6026∗∗∗ 00558 00520
11 Projection bias 5032 1033 4019 1065 7083∗∗∗ 00477 00476
12 Self-interest bias 5075 1024 4075 1062 8010∗∗∗ 00568 00355
13 Self-serving bias 5069 1008 4014 1059 13028∗∗∗ 00681 00677
14 Stereotyping 5046 1015 3062 1081 13032∗∗∗ 00579 00490
Notes. EFA, exploratory factor analysis; CFA, confirmatory factor analysis. Asterisks indicate significant results: ∗∗∗ p < 00001.
with scale items nested within scale. Participants also Sample 4. Participants (n = 102) first completed all
reported their scores on the math and verbal sections 14 items of the bias blind spot scale in a random
of the SAT (if they had taken the SAT). To facilitate order. They then completed 11 Over-Claiming Ques-
the accuracy of participants who might have taken tionnaire (OCQ) batteries. In these batteries, respon-
the test several years before, participants reported dents indicate their familiarity with a list of items,
approximate SAT scores on a 12-point scale increasing some of which exist (e.g., plate tectonics) and some
in 50-point increments from 200 to 800. Last, partici- of which do not actually exist (e.g., plates of paral-
pants reported their age, gender, ethnicity, and high- lax). These familiarity ratings serve as the basis for
est level of education completed. a claiming response bias index (OCQ bias) measur-
Sample 2. Participants (n = 101) first completed all ing self-enhancing tendencies: a statistical estimate of
14 items of the bias blind spot scale in a random order. how strong familiarity with an item has to be for a
They then completed the original three-item Cogni- respondent to express familiarity with it (Macmillan
tive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick 2005) in open- and Creelman 1991). The 11 batteries covered topics
ended format. Given the diffusion of the three original including rap artists, rock artists, country artists, hor-
CRT on AMT and the ease of retrieving the solution to ror movies, comedies, dramas, foreign movies, soap
those three questions, participants were also admin- operas, football, world leaders, and fashion design-
istered nine additional and less common CRT ques- ers (Paulhus et al. 2003). Each battery included seven
tions (Frederick, personal communication) resulting real items and three bogus items. Participants were
in a total of 12 CRT items. Next, participants reported asked to rate their familiarity with each item on a 7-
their scores on the math and verbal sections of the point scale with endpoints, not at all familiar (0) and
SAT if they had taken the test (as did Sample 1). very familiar (6). Both the order of the batteries and
Finally, participants reported their age, gender, eth- the order of the items were randomized, with items
nicity, and highest level of education completed. nested within battery. Finally, participants reported
Sample 3. Participants (n = 100) first completed their age, gender, ethnicity, and highest level of edu-
all 14 items of the bias blind spot scale in a ran- cation completed.
dom order. Then they completed the Adult Decision- Sample 5. Participants (n = 98) first completed all
Making Competence inventory (A-DMC; Bruine de 14 items of the bias blind spot scale in a random order.
Next, participants completed a short-form (44-item)
Bruin et al. 2007), a comprehensive instrument assess-
version of McCrae and Costa’s (1987) BFI (John and
ing general judgment and decision-making ability.
Srivastava 1999). Participants reported their scores on
Participants completed the six behavioral decision-
the math and verbal sections of the SAT if they had
making batteries of measures composing the A-DMC:
taken the test (as did Sample 1). Finally, participants
resistance to framing (14 paired items), which measures
reported their age, gender, ethnicity, and highest level
whether value assessment is affected by irrelevant
of education completed.
variations in problem descriptions; recognizing social
norms, which measures how well people assess peer Results
social norms (16 items); under/overconfidence, which Confirmatory Factor Analysis0 To test the factorial
measures how well participants recognize the extent structure that emerged in the exploratory factor anal-
of their own knowledge (34 items); applying decision ysis in Study 1, we conducted a confirmatory fac-
rules, which asks participants to indicate, for hypo- tor analysis on the data collected from Sample 1. We
thetical individual consumers using different decision first evaluated the assumption of multivariate nor-
rules, which products they would buy out of a choice mality of the data that is a necessary condition for the
set (10 items); consistency in risk perception, which mea- use of maximum likelihood estimation. Toward this
sures the ability to follow probability rules (16 paired end, we computed Mardia’s (1980) test of multivari-
items); and resistance to sunk costs, which measures the ate skewness and kurtosis. The test was significant
ability to ignore prior investments when making deci- ( 2 = 299051, p < 00001), signaling that the assumption
sions (10 items). These tasks measure different aspects of multivariate normality of the data was violated. As
of the decision-making process and decision-making a consequence we opted for a robust maximum like-
skills, such as the ability to assess value and the abil- lihood estimation.
ity to integrate information. Both the order of the bat- The confirmatory factor analysis suggested that the
teries and the order of the items were randomized, single-factor model emerged in the exploratory fac-
with scale items nested within battery. Participants tor analysis from Study 1 fit the data in Study 2
reported their scores on the math and verbal sections well, with a goodness-of-fit index of 0.93, a Bentler’s
of the SAT if they had taken the test (as did Sam- comparative fit index of 0.98, a non-normed fit index
ple 1). Finally, participants reported their age, gender, of 0.97, and a root mean square error of approxima-
ethnicity, and highest level of education completed. tion (RMSEA) of 0.05, suggesting a good fit between
Figure 1 Distribution of Bias Blind Spot Scores in Study 2

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Notes. Scale ranges from 7 to −7. Scores greater than zero indicate bias blind spot. Median column is indicated by gray bar.
the model and the observed data. The factor-loading constructs: (i) measures of intelligence, inclination
estimates are reported in Table 3 and were all signifi- toward cognitive activities, and decision-making abil-
cant; all ts > 5049, all ps < 00001. ity (i.e., SAT scores, NFC, CRT, A-DMC); (ii) personal-
Descriptive Statistics0 To examine the distribution of ity traits related to self-esteem and self-enhancement
susceptibility to the bias blind spot, we computed bias tendencies (i.e., self-esteem, superiority, need for
blind spot scores on the five samples following the uniqueness, narcissism, over-claiming tendency);
same procedure as in Study 1 ( = 0084). Across the (iii) personality traits related to self-presentation
five samples, the distribution of the scores appeared (i.e., self-monitoring, self-consciousness, and social
to be positively skewed with an observed range from desirability); and (iv) and general personality traits
−1050 to 5.14 (see Figure 1). On average, participants (i.e., BFI).
exhibited a significant bias blind spot (M = 1048, SD = For each of the samples we computed bias blind
0095; significantly different from 0; t46605 = 40029, p < spot scores (Alphas ranging between 0.82 and 0.85).
00001). Furthermore, for each of the 14 biases that For each of the constructs that were measured
composed the bias blind spot scale, participants rated using multi-item scales, we computed overall aver-
the average American as more susceptible to that bias age scores after reverse scoring appropriate items, and
than themselves; all Ms > 0090, all ts(659) > 16085, we examined the correlation of these scores with bias
all ps < 00001. At the individual level, a large major- blind spot scores. Table 4 presents these scales and
ity (85.2%) of participants exhibited a significant bias measures, their Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, means,
blind spot across the 14 items, with the averages of standard deviations, and their zero-order correlations
their scores being marginally or significantly greater with the bias blind spot scale.
than 0; all ts(13) > 1079, all ps < 0010. Only one par- Intelligence, Inclination Toward Cognitive Activi-
ticipant (0.1%) had an average bias blind spot score ties, and Decision-Making Ability0 We first examined
that was significantly lower than 0 (t4135 = −2046, whether bias blind spot is merely a manifestation of
p = 0003). intelligence and cognitive ability in four ways. First,
We then examined whether demographic variables we examined SAT scores, as both the verbal and math
accounted for some differences in bias blind spot scores load highly on psychometric g or general intel-
scores. Gender appeared unrelated to bias blind spot, ligence (Brodnick and Ree 1995, Frey and Detterman
as the scores of male (M = 1045, SD = 0095) and 2004, Unsworth and Engle 2007). Of the 559 partic-
female participants (M = 1051, SD = 0095) were not ipants in Samples 1, 2, 3, and 5, 248 reported their
significantly different; F < 1. Similarly, the correlation SAT test scores. The correlation between bias blind
between age and bias blind spot scores was not sig- spot scores and the verbal SAT scores was not sig-
nificant, r = −0004, p = 0030. Bias blind spot scores nificant (r42475 = 0010, p = 0013), whereas the corre-
were significantly and negatively affected by level of lation between bias blind spot scores and the math
education, following approximately a linear pattern SAT scores (r42475 = −0013, p = 0005), was significant,
(linear contrast: F 411 6535 = 11042, p = 00001). albeit very small.
Discriminant Validity0 We next examined whether Second, we examined the correlation between bias
the bias blind spot scale is distinct from related blind spot and NFC, which refers to the extent to
Table 4 Scale Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Correlations with Bias Blind Spot (Study 2)
Construct Sample M SD N r
Intelligence 1–3, 5
SAT math 605004 111055 — 248 −0013∗
SAT verbal 640032 93022 — 248 0010
Need for cognition 1 63065 13021 0093 260 0016∗
Cognitive Reflection Test 2
12 items 3067 3000 0082 101 −0023∗

3 original items 1030 1025 0079 101 −0019
9 new items 2038 2002 0071 101 −0022∗
Decision-making competence 3
Resistance to framing 1045 0054 0058 100 0014
Recognizing social norms 0051 0026 0089 100 0007
Under/overconfidence 0091 0007 0089 100 0006
Applying decision rules 0077 0016 0050 100 0002
Consistency in risk perception 0075 0015 0071 100 0009
Resistance to sunk costs 4040 0062 0040 100 0008
Big Five personality traits 5
Neuroticism 24030 5065 0087 98 0006
Extraversion 22084 7042 0088 98 0003
Openness 36062 6081 0085 98 0033∗∗
Agreeableness 31076 5030 0083 98 0010
Conscientiousness 33002 6042 0083 98 0007
Self-esteem 1 19096 6026 0092 260 0015∗
Superiority 1 35013 7039 0075 260 −0002
Need for uniqueness 1 101023 17034 0089 260 0016∗∗
Narcissism 1 20040 3065 0082 260 0004
Over-claiming 4 0050 0026 0095 102 −0025∗
Self-consciousness 1
Public 18062 4058 0082 260 −0005
Private 25045 4057 0073 260 0007
Social anxiety 16010 5001 0087 260 −0010
Self-monitoring 1 11018 4043 0074 260 0005
Social desirability 1 3030 6080 0097 260 −0005

p < 0010; ∗ p < 0005; ∗∗ p < 0001.
which people “engage in and enjoy effortful cogni- spot scores were significantly and negatively corre-
tive activities” (Cacioppo and Petty 1982, p. 1). People lated with CRT scores (r4995 = −0022, p = 0002). This
who are high in NFC expend more effort processing pattern of correlations was consistent irrespective of
information, and perform better on arithmetic prob- which CRT items were considered: all 12 items: r =
lems, anagrams, trivia tests, and college coursework −0023, p = 0002; the three “original” items: r = −0019,
(Cacioppo et al. 1996). In line with the results of p = 0006; or the nine “new” items: r = −0022, p = 0003.
West et al. (2012), we observed a small but signifi- Participants who believed themselves to be less vul-
cant and positive correlation between bias blind spot nerable to bias than others were more likely to rely on
scores and need for cognition (r42585 = 0016, p = 0001). their intuition and less likely to engage in cognitive
This significant correlation suggests that people with reflection and deliberation (i.e., were less accurate).
a high NFC tend to believe that they are less suscep- Finally, we computed scores for each A-DMC bat-
tery as recommended by Bruine de Bruin et al.1
tible to biases than their peers.
(2007). Bias blind spot scores were uncorrelated with
Third, we examined whether participants with
performance on all of the A-DMC batteries; all rs <
higher bias blind spot scores make more use of intu-
0014, all ps > 0018, average r = 0008.
ition than of deliberate reasoning by examining the
Self-Esteem and Self-Enhancement0 We next examined
correlation between bias blind spot scores and the the possibility that the bias blind spot is the manifes-
CRT (Frederick 2005), a set of questions that each have tation of more basic perceptions of being superior to
an incorrect intuitive response and a correct response others or being different from others (e.g., Taylor and
that can be reached through deliberate reasoning. We Brown 1988, Snyder and Fromkin 1980) by examining
computed a composite measure of performance on
the CRT by assigning a score of one to each correct 1
The levels of reliability for each battery reported in Table 4
answer, a score of zero to each incorrect answer, and are generally consistent with those reported by Bruine de Bruin
summing all items (M = 3067, SD = 3000). Bias blind et al. (2007).
the correlations between bias blind spot and superior- sense of familiarity needs to be experienced in order
ity, self-esteem, need for uniqueness, narcissism, and for a respondent to claim familiarity with an item. The
over-claiming. If the domain of these constructs sig- correlation between bias blind spot scores and OCQ
nificantly overlaps with that of the bias blind spot, we bias was negative and significant, r41015 = −0025, p =
should observe high correlations between those traits 0001, suggesting that higher bias blind spot scores
and bias blind spot scores. are associated with higher self-enhancing tendencies
The superiority scale (Robbins and Patton 1985) as measured by over-claiming, but that the two con-
measures whether people believe that they are supe- structs are sufficiently discriminated.
rior to others. People who believe they are superior Self-Presentation0 We examined whether the bias
to others may believe that they are less susceptible to blind spot is the manifestation of other personality
cognitive and social biases than inferior others. How- traits related to self-presentation. Self-consciousness
ever, perceived self-superiority did not correlate with is an acute sense of self-awareness, articulated in
bias blind spot scores (r42585 = −0002, p = 0072). three dimensions: private self-awareness (i.e., a ten-
We then examined the correlation between bias dency to introspect and examine one’s inner self and
blind spot and self-esteem (Rosenberg 1965), since feelings), public self-consciousness (i.e., a tendency
people holding high levels of self-esteem may be to think about how the self is viewed by others),
more likely to see themselves as immune from bias and social anxiety (i.e., a sense of apprehensiveness
and therefore show higher susceptibility to the bias over being evaluated by others in a social context;
blind spot. We found evidence for a significant and Feingstein et al. 1975). We did not observe a signif-
positive correlation between bias blind spot scores icant correlation between bias blind spot scores and
and self-esteem (r42585 = 0015, p = 0002), suggesting private self-awareness (r42585 = 0007, p = 0024), public
that people who believe they are less vulnerable to self-consciousness (r42585 = −0005, p = 0046), or social
bias than their peers tend to have higher levels of anxiety (r42585 = −0010, p = 0011). Self-monitoring mea-
self-esteem. The small size of the correlation, how- sures the extent to which one consciously employs
ever, suggests that the two constructs are theoretically impression management strategies in social interac-
distinct. tions (Snyder 1974). We did not observe a significant
We also examined the possibility that the belief that correlation between bias blind spot scores and self-
one is less vulnerable to bias than one’s peers is a monitoring (r42585 = 0005, p = 0040). Lastly, we sought
manifestation of a need for uniqueness (Snyder and to test whether there was a negative correlation
Fromkin 1977), the desire to be dissimilar from oth- between bias blind spot and the tendency to answer
ers. The correlation between bias blind spot scores in a way that would be viewed favorably by others
(Crowne and Marlowe 1960). The correlation was neg-
and need for uniqueness was positive and significant
ative but not significant (r42585 = −0005, p = 0041).
(r42585 = 0016, p < 0001). This small significant correla-
Big Five Personality Traits0 Finally, we examined
tion suggests that people high in bias blind spot have
the correlations between bias blind spot and the
a higher desire to distinguish themselves from others,
Big Five personality traits (McCrae and Costa 1987).
but that the two constructs are theoretically distinct.
Bias blind spot scores appeared to be uncorrelated
Finally, we examined the relationship between the
with agreeableness (r4965 = 0010, p = 0032), extraver-
bias blind spot and two different operationalizations
sion (r4965 = 0003, p = 0080), neuroticism (r4965 = 0006,
of self-enhancement, a narcissism scale (Ames et al.
p = 0057), and conscientiousness (r4965 = 0007, p = 0049),
2006), and over-claiming (Paulhus 1998). Narcissism,
but moderately correlated with openness to experi-
a personality trait that involves a pervasive pattern
ence (r4965 = 0033, p < 0001). Participants who reported
of grandiosity, self-focus, and self-importance accom-
significantly higher openness to experience had higher
panied by preoccupation with success and demands
bias blind spot scores, although the moderate size of
for admiration (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001), has been the coefficient suggests that the two constructs are suf-
used as a measure of trait self-enhancement (Paulhus ficiently discriminated. This result was not predicted.
1998). The narcissism scale did not correlate with Because open-minded thinking has been shown to cor-
bias blind spot scores (r42585 = 0004, p = 0049). Over- relate with superior cognitive ability in a number of
claiming, a measure that can discriminate accuracy domains (Stanovich and West 2007, West et al. 2008),
from self-enhancement in response patterns, was it is possible that if people high in openness to expe-
assessed by using the OCQ (Paulhus et al. 2003). rience have both superior cognitive ability and some
We computed OCQ bias indexes, corresponding to awareness of that ability, they might accurately report
the mean of the hit rate and the false-alarm rate for that they are less susceptible to bias than their peers.
real and false OCQ items (Paulhus et al. 2003), for
each battery of items, and averaged across batter- Discussion
ies. Higher values of OCQ bias indicate lower self- Bias blind spot appears to be a latent unidimensional
enhancing tendencies, as they indicate that a higher construct that induces people to see themselves as less
biased than other people across multiple judgmental If the bias blind spot is simply due to overly pos-
biases (i.e., a meta bias). Bias blind spot scores did itive self-perceptions, then people high in bias blind
not appear to be correlated with demographic vari- spot should be more susceptible to the better-than-
ables such as gender and age, although bias blind average effect, but not to the worse-than-average
spot decreased significantly as level of education effect. That is, they should rate themselves as bet-
increased. The results of Study 2 support the dis- ter than average for both easy and difficult activi-
criminant validity of the bias blind spot by showing ties. If susceptibility to the bias blind spot is due to
that the construct is not a derivative of several poten- greater naïve realism and confidence in initial self-
tially related constructs such as measures of intelli- assessments (e.g., “I’m great at using a computer
gence and cognitive ability, decision-making ability, mouse but terrible at juggling”), coupled with a fail-
self-esteem and self-enhancement, self-presentation, ure to correct those assessment to account for other’s
and general personality traits. Many of the correla- abilities (e.g., “0 0 0 as are most people”), people high in
tions between these traits and bias blind spot were susceptibility to the bias blind spot should be more
not significant. Other correlations were in the low to susceptible to both the better-than-average effect and
moderate range (0.17 to 0.33; Cohen 1988), suggesting the worse-than-average effect.
that the bias blind spot scale is assessing a distinct
construct.
Most importantly, the perception that one is less Method
vulnerable to bias than one’s peers truly appears to Pretest. In a pretest, 100 AMT workers (47 women;
constitute a blind spot in self-awareness. The lack of Mage = 2806 years, SD = 1004) were presented with a
correlation with general decision-making competence list of 34 activities in an online survey and com-
suggests that susceptibility to bias blind spot (a) does pensated $1 for participating. Included in that list
not reflect generally poorer decision-making ability, were the activities used by Kruger (1999, Study 2).
and (b) does not reflect an accurate self-assessment Participants rated the difficulty of each activity on
of decision-making ability. The negative correlation
a 9-point scale (1 = not difficult at all; 9 = very diffi-
observed between susceptibility to bias blind spot and
cult). We selected the two activities rated least difficult
CRT scores could be interpreted as supporting a posi-
and the two activities rated most difficult: operating a
tive relation to more general cognitive ability, but also
computer mouse (Mdifficulty = 1034, SD = 0084), copying and
lends support our suggestion that the bias blind spot
pasting text (Mdifficulty = 1043, SD = 1013), programming
is a distinct meta-bias reflected in the different con-
a computer (Mdifficulty = 7058, SD = 2058), and juggling
sideration of evidence when making self and other
(Mdifficulty = 7068, SD = 2028). A one-way repeated mea-
assessments. In other words, people who are more
likely to rely on their intuition may more biased, but sures ANOVA accompanied by planned comparisons
also be less likely to correct their initial introspec- revealed that the two difficult activities were perceived
tive self-assessments by considering additional evi- as significantly more difficult than the two easy activ-
dence, such as their behavior. A more direct test of ities (F 411995 = 11105052, p < 00001), that the two easy
this assumption was performed in Study 3. activities were perceived as equally easy, and that the
two difficult activities were perceived as equally diffi-
cult (Fs < 1).
Study 3: Bias Blind Spot and
Self-Assessment Participants. A new sample of 156 AMT workers
In Study 3, we further elucidated the cognitive mech- (90 women; Mage = 3200 years, SD = 1200) received
anisms underlying the bias blind spot by examin- $2.50 for participating in Study 3. Participants were
ing the relationship between susceptibility to the bias 79.5% White, 8.3% Black, 4.5% Asian, 3.2% multira-
blind spot and the asymmetric use of evidence in cial, and 0.6% Native American; 3.8% did not indicate
another set of self–other comparisons: relative perfor- their ethnicity.
mance assessments. When evaluating their own skills
and abilities relative to their peers, people tend to Materials and Procedure. Participants completed
focus on their own capabilities and neglect the capa- the 14-item bias blind spot scale in a random order.
bilities of others. Because they neglect the fact that Then they rated their comparative ability on the two
easy activities are easy for most people and difficult easy (operating a computer mouse and copying and past-
activities are difficult for most people, they rate them- ing text) and on the two difficult activities (program-
selves as better than the average person when assess- ming a computer and juggling) on 100-point scales
ing their ability at easy activities, but as worse than (0 = I’m at the very bottom; 100 = I’m at the very top).
the average person when assessing their ability at dif- Activity rating order was random. Last, participants
ficult activities (Kruger 1999). reported their age, gender, and ethnicity.
Results and Discussion t = −3051, p < 00001). These results suggest that people
Bias blind spot scores were computed following the high in susceptibility to the bias blind spot are more
procedure described in Study 1 ( = 0083). A mixed susceptible to both the better-than-average effect and
model analysis was used to estimate the effect of sus- the worse-than-average effect. These results provide
ceptibility to the bias blind spot, type of activity (easy further evidence that the bias blind spot is a form of
versus difficult), and their interaction on compara- egocentric cognition driven by an asymmetric consid-
tive ability ratings. Since each participant assessed her eration of evidence when evaluating the self and oth-
ability on both the easy and the difficult activities, we ers, rather than by a general self-enhancement motive
let the intercept vary randomly to take into account that induces a person to see herself as superior to
the lack of independence between the observations. her peers.
We estimated the following model:
CAij = 0 + 1 BBSi + 2 TAj + 3 BBSi × TAj + Ui + ij Study 4: Bias Blind Spot and
where CA refers to comparative ability, index i refers
Advice Taking
In Study 4, we began to examine our last set of predic-
to participants and index j refers to the type of
tions, that bias blind spot affects judgments informed
activity (easy versus difficult). The dependent vari-
able was thus the average comparative ability rat- by self–other accuracy comparisons. Specifically, we
ing expressed by each participant on easy or difficult examined the effect of the bias blind spot on the
activities. The explanatory variables were each partic- weight given to advice from other people (Yaniv and
ipant’s bias blind spot score (BBSi 5, the type of activ- Kleinberger 2000). If bias blind spot does influence
ity (TAj , dummy coded, with 0 = easy, 1 = difficult) bias in judgments reliant on self–other accuracy com-
and the interaction between these two variables, and parisons, people who are more susceptible to the
Ui indicated each participant’s random effect. Both bias blind spot should view their judgments to be
bias blind spot scores and comparative ability ratings more accurate than the judgments of other people,
were standardized. Results are based on a total of because they believe their judgments are based on
624 observations, where each observation is a compar- more objective perceptions of the world (Pronin et al.
ative ability rating on an activity provided by a par- 2004). Consequently, people high in bias blind spot
ticipant. The results revealed a significant interaction should give less weight to advice received from oth-
between susceptibility to the bias blind spot and type ers. They should be less likely to correct their initial
of activity (easy vs. difficult) on comparative ability (self-informed) judgments when subsequently given
assessments (b = 0027, SE = 0006, t = −4084, p < 00001). the opportunity to incorporate others’ judgments into
Table 5 reports the results of this estimation and the their own.
comparison of this factorial model with an alternative
Method
model that includes only the main effects.
The interaction between bias blind spot and the Participants. A total of 178 AMT workers (109
type of activity was further explored by conducting a women; Mage = 3308 years, SD = 1202) received $8 for
simple slope analysis. Bias blind spot was associated completing Study 4. Participants were 75.3% White,
with higher comparative ability ratings on easy activ- 6.7% Black, 6.7% multiracial, 6.2% Asian, and
ities ( = 0013, t = 3019, p = 00002), and lower compar- 1.7% Native American; 3.4% did not indicate their
ative ability ratings on difficult activities ( = −0014, ethnicity.
Table 5 Regression Results for the Effects of Bias Blind Spot and Type of Activity (Easy vs. Difficult) on (Standardized) Comparative Ability
Ratings (Study 3)
Main effect model Factorial model
Variable ba SE t p ba SE t p
Intercept 0072 0004 19067 <00001 0072 0004 19053 <00001

Type Activity b −1044 0006 −24021 <00001 −1044 0006 −25035 <00001
BBS c 0004 0003 1022 0022 0013 0004 3055 <00001
Type Activity b × BBS c −0027 0006 −4084 <00001
−2 Log-likelihood 1,286.19 1,263.85
Degrees of freedom 6 7
Akaike information criterion 1,298.19 1,277.85
Bayesian information criterion 1,324.81 1,308.90
Likelihood ratio test 22.34 (1), p < 00001
a
Unstandardized coefficients.
b
Dummy coded.
c
Standardized.
Materials and Procedure. Participants completed WOA score value was more than five standard devia-
the 14-item bias blind spot scale in a random order. tions above the mean WOA score was excluded from
Next, they estimated the weight of 30 household all subsequent analyses. No other participants were
objects (e.g., a trash can, a statue, a doll house), one at excluded. Results are based on a total of 5,049 obser-
a time. For each object they were shown a color pic- vations, each observation being the weight of an
ture and were provided with the object’s dimensions object estimated by a participant.
(length, height, and width). After making each initial A mixed model analysis was used to estimate the
weight estimate, participants were given advice in the effect of susceptibility to the bias blind spot on WOA.
form of the guess of another “randomly selected par- Because each participant evaluated the weight of mul-
ticipant” in the study (i.e., the average estimate of two tiple objects, we let the intercept vary randomly to
pilot participants), and were then given the opportu- take into account the lack of independence between
nity to estimate the weight of the object again. Thus, the observations. We estimated the following model,
participants had the option to revise their original
estimate based on the advice that they received from WOAij = 0 + b1 BBSi + Ui + ij 1
the other participant. The order in which objects were
judged was random. Finally, participants reported where index i referred to participants and index j
their age, gender, and ethnicity. refers to objects. The dependent variable was thus
the value for WOA for each participant and for each
Results and Discussion object. The explanatory variable was each partici-
We computed bias blind spot scores following the pro- pant’s bias blind spot score (BBSi 5, and Ui indicated
cedure described in Study 1 ( = 0082). We computed each participant’s random effect. The results revealed
the weight on advice (WOA) relative to each object, a significant and negative effect of susceptibility to
by computing the difference between the original esti- the bias blind spot on WOA (b1 = −0003, SE = 0001, t =
mate and the estimate made after receiving the advice −3023, p = 00001). On average, participants with bias
of the other participant (as in Gino and Moore 2007, blind spot scores one standard deviation below the
Gino 2008, Harvey and Fischer 1997, Yaniv 2004). mean placed six percent more weight on the advice
WOA reflects how much a participant uses the advice of others than participants with bias blind spot scores
she receives (Yaniv 2004) and is defined as one standard deviation above the mean (WOA = 00223
final estimate − initial estimate vs. WOA = 00164).
WOA = 0 This analysis was complemented by the estimation
advice − initial estimate
WOA is equal to 0 when participants entirely dis- of a logit mixed model that examined the relationship
count the advice. In such a case, final estimates between bias blind spot scores and the rate at which
are equal to initial estimates, meaning that partici- participants completely ignored advice (WOA = 0).
pants did not revise their estimates after receiving We estimated the following model:
the advice. WOA is equal to 1 when participants’
NO_WOAij = 0 + b1 BBSi + Ui + ij 1
final estimate is equal to the advice received. In
this case participants give maximum weight to the where index i referred to participants and index j
advice received. Finally, WOA equals a value between refers to objects. The dependent variable was a
0 and 1, when participants weigh both their initial dummy variable that indicates the complete igno-
estimate and the received advice positively. Follow- rance of advice (i.e., D = 1 when WOA = 0; D = 0 oth-
ing the procedure used in prior research (Gino and erwise) for each participant and for each object. The
Moore 2007, Gino 2008, Yaniv 2004), cases in which explanatory variable was each participant’s bias blind
the advice equaled the initial estimate were excluded spot score (BBSi ), and Ui indicated each participant’s
from the analysis, since WOA in those cases equaled a random effect. Consistent with the previous model,
number divided by 0, making it impossible to quan-
the results revealed a significant and positive effect of
tify how much a participant did or did not use the
susceptibility to the bias blind spot on the likelihood
advice. For cases in which the final estimate did not
of completely ignoring advice (b1 = 00104, SE = 00044,
fall between the initial estimate and the advice (e.g.,
z = 2034, p = 0002). Susceptibility to the bias blind spot
participants provide revised estimates that are fur-
increased participants’ likelihood of confirming their
ther away from the advice than initial estimates),
initial estimate and completely neglecting advice.
and WOA was thus greater than 1, values above 1
In short, participants who exhibited high levels of
were adjusted to 1.2 One participant whose aggregate
bias blind spot were more likely to ignore the advice
2
provided, whereas participants who exhibited low
We estimated the same model on WOA scores that were not sub-
ject to this recommended adjustment, and the effect of susceptibil-
levels of bias blind spot weighed the advice more
ity to the bias blind spot is even stronger: b1 = −0005, SE = 0001, heavily. These results are consistent with the results
t = 3065, p < 00001. of Liberman et al. (2012), who showed that naïve
realism, by making people believe that their own behaviors whereas underestimating the impact of sit-
perceptions of the world are objective, leads them uational variables (Jones and Harris 1967). The article
to underweight the input of their peers. Our results described the existence of the FAE, provided exam-
extend those by Liberman et al. (2012) by showing ples of its occurrence, and explained how one might
how individual differences in susceptibility to the bias correct the bias (see the section “debiasing training”
blind spot significantly affect the extent to which peo- in the appendix). Participants assigned to the con-
ple incorporate others’ advice in their judgments. Fur- trol condition read an article of equal length report-
thermore, our results provide additional evidence in ing the results of a research study on trust (see the
support of the role of naïve realism as the process section “control training” in the appendix). All par-
underlying the bias blind spot (Pronin et al. 2004). ticipants then answered nine questions designed to
test the occurrence of the FAE in judgments inspired
Study 5: Bias Blind Spot and Bias by existing paradigms, in a random order (Jones and
Harris 1967, Snyder and Frankel 1976, Scopelliti et al.
Reduction 2015). Finally, participants reported their age, gender,
In Study 5, we expanded our analysis of bias blind
and ethnicity.
spot to see whether people characterized by higher
susceptibility to the bias blind spot are more resis- Results and Discussion
tant to debiasing procedures. There is little evidence Bias blind spot scores were computed following the
that people who are more aware of their own biases procedure described in Study 1 ( = 0080). Answers
are better able to overcome them. West et al. (2012) to the nine FAE questions were highly correlated with
examined the effect of the bias blind spot on the inci- one another ( = 0080). We summed the number of
dence of six cognitive biases, and observed no evi- questions in which participants exhibited the FAE that
dence that people characterized by lower bias blind served as our primary dependent variable (M = 4017,
spot scores were less likely to commit bias. A rela- SD = 2073). The FAE scores were neither normally
tionship between bias blind spot and decision-making distributed, nor could be normalized by log transfor-
ability might emerge, however, after an intervention mation. Therefore we estimated a Poisson regression,
aimed at reducing bias.
appropriate to model count dependent variables that
We predicted that the perception that one is less
have only non-negative integer values.
vulnerable to bias than others may constitute a bar-
We predicted that the debiasing training would
rier to the activation of corrective strategies aimed at
reduce the incidence of bias more for participants
avoiding bias (Wilson and Brekke 1994). This barrier
who were less susceptible to the bias blind spot. This
may prevent people who believe that others are more
prediction was tested using the procedures outlined
susceptible to bias from actively responding to train-
by Aiken and West (1991) to decompose the pre-
ing procedures designed to correct biased judgments.
dicted interaction using regression analysis. First, bias
In order to test this prediction, we had participants
blind spot scores were mean-centered by subtract-
read an article designed to increase awareness of the
ing the mean bias blind spot score from all obser-
occurrence of a specific bias, the fundamental attribu-
vations. Second, we created the interaction term of
tion error (FAE) that also suggested how to mitigate
(dummy-coded) training factor (debiasing vs. control)
that bias. We predicted that susceptibility to the bias
by (mean-centered) bias blind spot score. Next, the
blind spot would moderate the effect of this debiasing
FAE scores were regressed on the training factor (debi-
training on subsequent commission of the FAE.
asing vs. control), bias blind spot scores, and the inter-
Method action between these two variables.
The analysis revealed a significant interaction
Participants. A total of 297 AMT workers (170 between training and susceptibility to the bias blind
women; Mage = 3107 years, SD = 1007) completed an spot ( 2 415 = 4073, p = 0003). To shed light on the
online survey and received $2 for their participa- nature of this interaction, we conducted a floodlight
tion. Participants were 76.4% White, 7.4% multiracial, analysis (Spiller et al. 2013) estimating the marginal
6.4% Black, 5.7% Asian, and 1.0% Native American; effect of training on commission of the FAE at all levels
3.0% did not indicate their ethnicity. of susceptibility to the bias blind spot. Table 6 reports
Procedure. Participants completed the 14-item bias the results of this estimation and the comparison of
blind spot scale with items in random order. Next, this factorial model with an alternative model that
participants were randomly assigned to one of two includes only the main effects. We used the Johnson-
conditions: debiasing training or control. Participants Neyman technique to identify the range of bias blind
assigned to the debiasing training condition read an spot scores for which the effect of the debiasing train-
explanatory article about the FAE, a tendency to over- ing was significant. This analysis revealed that there
estimate the impact of individual dispositions on was a significant positive effect of debiasing training
Table 6 Poisson Regression Results for the Effects of Bias Blind Spot and Type of Training on Fundamental Attribution Error Commission (Study 5)
Main effect model Factorial model

a 2 a
Variable b SE Wald p b SE Wald 2 p
Intercept 1071 0006 819041 <00001 1081 0007 605062 <00001

Type of Training b −0036 0006 39027 <00001 −0057 0011 26020 <00001
BBS c −0008 0003 5087 0002 −0015 0005 10048 <00001
Type Training b × BBS c 0015 0007 4073 0003

−2 Log-likelihood 1,471.535 1,466.813
Degrees of freedom 4.000 3
Akaike information criterion 1,477.535 1,474.813
Bayesian information criterion 1,488.617 1,489.588
Likelihood ratio test 4.72 (1), p = 0003
a
Unstandardized coefficients.
b
Dummy coded.
c
Mean centered.
on reducing FAE commission for bias blind spot scores abilities of others when judging their own abilities,
lower than 2.55 (original scale) ( 2 415 = 3087, p = 0005), resulting in a greater propensity to believe that they
but not for bias blind spot scores higher than 2.55. were better than average on easy tasks and worse than
The effect of a training procedure designed to average on difficult tasks than their peers (Study 3).
reduce commission of the FAE was stronger for par- Second, bias blind spot predicts bias in judgments
ticipants with a lower susceptibility to the bias blind reliant on self–other accuracy comparisons. It pre-
spot than for participants with a higher susceptibility dicted the extent to which people ignored the advice
to the bias blind spot. The results suggest that high of others, as participants high in bias blind spot placed
susceptibility to the bias blind spot may constitute a less weight on advice than did participants low in bias
barrier to bias reduction. blind spot (Study 4). Susceptibility to the bias blind
spot was also associated with reduced responsiveness
to training designed to reduce the incidence of a dif-
General Discussion ferent judgmental bias (Study 5).
The foregoing studies provide an in-depth portrait of
the bias blind spot. We found that the tendency for Consequences and Implications of the Bias
people to be better able to identify bias in the judg- Blind Spot
ments and behaviors of others than in their own judg- The identification of individual differences in suscepti-
ment and behavior is captured by a single latent fac- bility to the bias blind spot has important implications
tor, and that there is substantial individual variation in for the incidence of bias and the improvement of judg-
susceptibility to this meta-bias. Using a psychometric ment and decision making. As we have demonstrated,
approach, we developed and validated an instrument awareness of one’s vulnerability to bias is an impor-
to measure individual differences in susceptibility to tant antecedent of openness to advice that in turn
the bias blind spot. We found that the bias blind spot affects decision quality. Research maintains that inte-
is discriminated from intelligence, cognitive ability, grating advice from external sources improves deci-
cognitive reflection, and personality traits related to sion making (Larrick and Soll 2006, Johnson et al. 2001,
self-esteem, self-enhancement, and self-presentation. Budescu and Rantilla 2000, Yaniv 2004; see Bonaccio
Moreover, the bias blind spot does not appear to be a and Dalal 2006 for a review). People high in bias blind
facet of general decision-making ability or an accurate spot, for example, may be particularly likely to ignore
perception of the extent to which one is biased. Rather, the advice of peers or experts when engaging in finan-
susceptibility to the bias blind spot appears to be a cial or medical decision making and require alterna-
true blind spot in self-awareness, because of asymmet- tive forms of guidance to improve the quality of their
ric consideration of evidence when assessing the self decisions.
and other people. Second, awareness of one’s susceptibility to bias
Susceptibility to bias blind spot appears to predict blind spot appears to be an important indicator of
at least two kinds of bias in social judgment. First, receptivity to efforts to improve one’s decision mak-
bias blind spot predicts the extent to which people ing. Indeed, Wilson and Brekke (1994) suggest that a
exhibit biases reliant on similar cognitive mechanisms, critical impediment to the correction of the contami-
namely the consideration of different evidence in self– nating influence of biases on judgment is people’s lack
other comparisons. Participants higher in susceptibil- of humility about their vulnerability to bias. When
ity to bias blind spot were more likely to ignore the people are unaware of their bias, they are unlikely
to adopt corrective strategies to avoid the sources of exacerbate the perception of the gap between antago-
bias that influence their judgment. Consequently, peo- nists in a controversy (i.e., false polarization, Robinson
ple who are more susceptible to bias blind spot are et al. 1995, Pronin et al. 2002). People high in bias blind
less prone to improve their decision making by engag- spot, being more likely to believe that their view is
ing in bias reduction strategies, responding to training, correct, may be less likely to take the necessary steps
and taking advice. Consequently they may need more to arrive at an agreement. More generally, susceptibil-
persuasion or evidence that their decision making is ity to the bias blind spot is likely to predict problem-
subject to error to acknowledge their potential for bias. atic interpersonal interactions when those interactions
Our results corroborate this view by showing that require one to acknowledge the potential for bias or
people who believe that they are relatively immune to error in one’s own thinking and reasoning.
bias are less likely to enact corrective strategies, even
when correcting strategies are explained and explic- Limitations and Directions for Future Research
itly suggested. In the work place, the results suggest Of course, the present research is not without its own
that employees high in bias blind spot may be less limitations. We relied upon samples drawn from AMT
receptive to training designed to improve their deci- that are not representative samples. Fortunately, AMT
sion making, and may need more or different kinds of samples have been shown to exhibit vulnerability to
training. At home, the results suggest that people high biases in judgment and decision making similar to tra-
in bias blind spot may need more or different forms ditional college samples (Berinsky et al. 2012, Horton
of guidance to improve their ability to make conse- et al. 2011, Paolacci et al. 2010). We thus expect that
quential decisions affecting their personal life. It has the results should generalize to other samples.
been proposed that decision making may be a teach- In the discriminant validity testing conducted in
able skill (Baron and Brown 1991, Bruine de Bruin et al. Study 2, we collected measures to test multiple rela-
2007, Fischhoff 1982, Larrick 2004), and correlational tionships within the same sample (Sample 1). Most of
evidence has suggested that people who have received the correlation coefficients computed on this sample
formal training in decision making may obtain bet- were not significant, but we did observe three small
ter life outcomes (Larrick et al. 1993). If so, then the significant correlations. Considering the fact that these
bias blind spot represents an obstacle to improving significant correlations were obtained within a larger
the quality of both work and life because it bolsters set of multiple comparisons, it is possible that their
resistance to debiasing training aimed at improving significance level is inflated. We have refrained from
decision-making ability. This influence is not irrevo- drawing strong inferences from those results.
cable. We have found that propensity to exhibit bias Although our discriminant validity test shows how
blind spot can be reduced by as much as 39% in a the bias blind spot is distinct from and independent
related research program consisting of scenarios in of several other constructs, in Studies 3–5 we did not
which participants could exhibit bias blind spot and pit our scale against other potential predictors of the
were then provided with critical feedback and training judgments and behaviors investigated. Our choice not
(Symborski et al. 2014). to include measures for which we would expect to
Third, some have argued that the bias blind spot is find null results was driven by the tradeoff between
a critical determinant of misunderstanding, mistrust, ruling out a potential alternative and using a length-
and pessimism when attempting to reach agreements ier study likely to induce participant fatigue and at an
in interpersonal, political and professional relation- additional cost. Future research may compare the pre-
ships as it obstructs the resolution of conflicts (Pronin dictive power of the bias blind spot scale with that of
et al. 2004), and have highlighted the importance of other traits and biases.
mitigating bias blind spot to promote dialogue, diplo-
macy, and peace processes (Pronin et al. 2004). Pronin Conclusion
et al. (2006), for example, elucidated the consequences We find that bias blind spot is a latent factor in
of perceiving others as more biased than oneself in the self-assessments of relative vulnerability to bias. This
context of terrorism. When terrorists were depicted as meta-bias affected the majority of participants in our
biased and irrational rather than objective and ratio- samples, but exhibited considerable variance across
nal, people indicated a greater preference for a mili- participants. We present a concise, reliable, and valid
tary over a diplomatic resolution to a conflict, which is measure of individual differences in bias blind spot
likely to result in a spiral of conflict escalation. Assess- that has the ability to predict related biases in self-
ing individual differences in bias blind spot may help assessment, advice taking, and responsiveness to bias
predict the likelihood of interpersonal conflict, misun- reduction training. Given the influence of bias blind
derstanding, and the need for dispute resolution. For spot on consequential judgments and decisions, as
example, high susceptibility to the bias blind spot may well as receptivity to training, this measure may prove
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and Individual Differences 38:1701–1713.
Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via the Air Force

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Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and

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Bias Blind Spot: Structure,

Sophie Lebrecht, Karim S. Kassam

Introduction We show that people differ in their propensity

to common tasks such as the Asian disease problem, Results

Table 1 Scale Items and Corresponding Biases

Item Description Bias

Table 2 Correlations Between the 14 Selected Scale Items

6 Escalation of commitment 00317∗∗ 00413∗∗ 00253∗∗ 00309∗∗ 00267∗∗

Average American Self Factor Completely

1 Action-inaction bias 5012 1033 3096 1069 9086∗∗∗ 00613 00660

Figure 1 Distribution of Bias Blind Spot Scores in Study 2

12 items 3067 3000 0082 101 −0023∗

Main effect model Factorial model

Intercept 0072 0004 19067 <00001 0072 0004 19053 <00001

Main effect model Factorial model

Intercept 1071 0006 819041 <00001 1081 0007 605062 <00001

Type Training b × BBS c 0015 0007 4073 0003

Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via the Air Force

Experiment. Soc. Psych. 43:565–578.

endowment effect. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 79:66–76.

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