JOSE RIVERA petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.

Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.

Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On
July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No.
1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the
decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.1

On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a
petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn
opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed
special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the
son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The
Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent
was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its
decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.

In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show
that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this
purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate
where the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who
testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together
several times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother and kissed his
hand as a sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters
were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6

Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio Rivera
and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he
could not present his parents' marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in
Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He
also submitted his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who
were each described therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty.
Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents,
Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the Japanese occupation that
Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons
by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate
showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the
marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was
the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also denied kissing Jose's hand or
recognizing him as a brother. 12

We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.

It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it,
the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so,
he could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and
Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in all
during that time.

According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:

In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, ... .

The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described
therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera described
in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such
baptismal certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it
may nonetheless be considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio
are one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called by different
names. The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either
Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and
bear the same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases
at bar.

What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of
Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own
account, Jose supported himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline
attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town — and
obviously prospering — and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another
woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest, taking
no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial
terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself
as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such
paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered — assuming the claims
to be true — that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio
Rivera.

And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate
wife — if indeed she was — she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and
founded another family by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of
Maria Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and neglected,
she nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate
father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of another woman and
for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is
that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a
complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged
partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.

Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to
support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done
because she was already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of her
deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to
the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does
not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose
had the burden of proving that serious allegation.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the
Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria
Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation
whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and
prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking
the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to
have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under
Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in
SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for
probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido
Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court
should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will
and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the
three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as
having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made
on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made,
the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the
death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale
of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that
the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang
as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.

From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey
of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by
Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to
inherit said land.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the
properties left by Saturnino upon his death — the date of which does not clearly appear of record —
were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton,
Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of
the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in
the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter
said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-
sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he
may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso
in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this
event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a
position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not
appeal therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.