CONSTI CASES #9 (CITIZENSHIP)
section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,3
1. Commonwealth Act No. 63
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest
himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any
country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if
either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states
that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That
any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service
to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of
the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time
of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.1
The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino
citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries or from the
United Kingdom shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that
country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between
the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired.2
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions
of this Act after the termination of the marital status;4 and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. – The procedure prescribed for
naturalization under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply
to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding
section: Provided, That the qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in section three and
four of said Act shall not be required: And provided, further,
(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before he applies for naturalization;
(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living; and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all
faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth6of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.
Section 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of
this Act. Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this Act
shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor General, subject to approval of the Secretary of
Justice.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 21, 1936.
2. Commonwealth Act No. 473
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO
REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED
AND FORTY-EIGHT.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
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entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:
Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
Being married to a Filipino woman;
Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in
any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions,
and ideals of the Filipinos;
Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to
Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice4 a
declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such
declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he
came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The
declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may
be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the
other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the
applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same
shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has
declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually
naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with
the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the
place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of
the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying
the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has
complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their
opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The
certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty
of the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the
hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is
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located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date
and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes
to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall
not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as
soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other
pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of Justice,8 the Provincial Inspector9 of
the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace10 of the municipality wherein
the petitioner resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any
election. The hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either himself or through his delegate
or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the Philippines
at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view of the
evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall
order the proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand
seven hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to
the Supreme Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from and
after the date on which the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon
appeal, the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court,14 and the said decision
has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a
naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The file number of the
petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed
in the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstances of the person naturalized, the
dates on which his declaration of intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting
the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the petitioner
with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be affixed to the
certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following
oath:
"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth15of the Philippines; [and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;16 and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall keep two books; one in which the petition and
declarations of intention shall be recorded in chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof from
the filing of the petition to the final issuance of the naturalization certificate; and another, which shall
be a record of naturalization certificates each page of which shall have a duplicate which shall be duly
attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.
Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First Instance shall charge as fees for recording a petition
for naturalization and for the proceedings in connection therewith, including the issuance of the
certificate, the sum of thirty pesos.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each appeal and for the services rendered by him in
connection therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in
the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during
his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the
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the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department of the Interior20 and the Bureau of Justice.21
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.
Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge,
change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in
falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate for the purpose of
making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or persons, and any
person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization certificate in violation
of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case that the person convicted is a
naturalized citizen his certificate of naturalization and the registration of the same in the proper civil
registry shall be ordered cancelled.
Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense
implying a violation of the provisions of this Act, unless the information or complaint is filed within
five years from the detection or discovery of the commission of said offense.
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for
the proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate blanks and other blanks required for
carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor-General,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by
Act Numbered Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled "The Naturalization Law", is
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repealed: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any prosecution, suit, action,
or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing before the
taking effect of this Act, but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts, things, or
matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and effect.
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This Act shall take effect on its approval.
3. Republic Act No. 2630
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN,
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4. Presidential Decree No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to
aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced
her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women
who had married aliens before said Constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who
lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: 1) Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications
are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which
they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and
prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this
Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-five.
5. Republic Act No. 8171
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
associatEon for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau
of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Signed: October 23, 1995
6. Republic Act No. 9139
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and integration of
aliens into its territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end,
aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative
proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and interest.
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Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to
avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her
petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should
he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which
he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents,
also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by
reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the
Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens
under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition
of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's
passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is
known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and their
residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her
spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner
shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship
and residence of his/her spouse; and if his marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of
marriage and the court which granted the same;
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under this Act;
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship
and to renounce absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the
country of which the applicant is a citizen or subject.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate;
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native
born certificate of residence;
(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the
death certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court decree annulling his marriage, if such was the
fact;
(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien certificate of registration or
native born certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's minor children, wherever applicable;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and sworn statements on the good moral character
of the petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good reputation in his/her place of residence
stating that they have personally known the petitioner for at least a period of ten (10) years and that
said petitioner has in their own opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug
dependent and that he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the schools he attended in the
Philippines. Should the petitioner have minor children, a certification that his children are enrolled in
a school where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and are part of the curriculum;
and
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(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past three (3) years. shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required
naturalization processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to take the
Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There shall be constituted a Special Committee on
abovementioned oath of allegiance within said period of time, the approval of the petition shall be
Naturalization herein referred to as the "Committee", with the Solicitor General as chairman, the
deemed abandoned.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his representative, and the National Security Adviser, as members,
with the power to approve, deny or reject applications for naturalization as provided in this Act. Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his
oath of allegiance as required in the preceding section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's
The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to consider applications for naturalization. For this
oath to the proper local civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien certificates of
purpose, the chairman and members shall receive an honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00)
registration of the applicant.
and One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting attended.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that
administrative naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's
he has all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may file an application for
alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of
naturalization with the secretariat of the Special Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of
registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos
Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped to indicate the date of
(P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows: Twenty
filing and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the petition,
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos
the Committee shall determine whether the petition is complete in substance and in form. If such
(P20,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
petition is complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition
indicating the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week for Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the petition approval of her petition for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her
posted in any public or conspicuous area. The Committee shall immediately furnish the Department minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the BI
of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the petitioner's place of subject to the requirements of existing laws.
residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and its supporting
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel
documents. These agencies shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area
certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:
in their buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
petition, submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory (a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false
record on file or any such relevant and material information which might be adverse to petitioner's statement or misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in
application for citizenship. connection with the petition for naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship
fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be
dismissed without prejudice. (b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship
by virtue of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the grant of Philippine
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of
citizenship, establish permanent residence in a foreign country, that individual's certificate of
the agencies which were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication of the
naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked: Provided, That the fact of such
petition, whichever comes in later, the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material
person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2) years in any foreign
information it has received pertaining to the petition, and may, for the purpose call the petitioner for
country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside therein;
interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its annexes, and to
determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes. (c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to
be used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship
If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall
as a condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the certificate of
allow the petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information.
naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked; and
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it
national security, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify the petitioner of the fact of such approval.
Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same. In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall
make an express renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Special
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from
Committee or its duly authorized representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the
the receipt of the notice of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the Committee
records of his application for citizenship.
a naturalization fee of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause
taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging,
naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for the

6
purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or persons,
and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization certificate in
violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that the person
convicted is a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier cancelled by the
Special Committee, be ordered cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar may, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the acquisition of
the Philippine citizenship: Provided, That the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under this Act and subject to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%)
of the filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University
of the Philippines Law Center and another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for the
publication of the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said amount shall be treated as receipts
automatically appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be needed for the proper
implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and
effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
7. Republic Act No. 9225
August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
7
8. Reyes vs. COMELEC, et al. [G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October
31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC
contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of
birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on
the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC
en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume
office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative.
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Discussion:
Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with
the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the
oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the
ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons
his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to
establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the
petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the
petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency
for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen.
No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates
for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections
held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in
his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what
was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had
been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA,
the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for
public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No.
9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on
8
2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T.
Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for
a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he
was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and
signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he
stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5)
thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating
therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty
executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had
been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No.
07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225.
Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was
naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was
a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before
the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines
when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution
denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very
same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the
one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his
American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and
annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground
that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was
a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified
under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only
logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously
ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also
notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14
May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the
fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the
instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could
9
run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court
already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little
over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of
the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
10. Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al. [G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013]
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1
09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44
of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011
is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of
a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s
US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April
2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and
Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and
10
that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June
2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United
States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964
to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that
he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03
April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as
an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First
Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case;
and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should
have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
11
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3)
months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already
used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of
a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following
dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4,
2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63
through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of
a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the
twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running
for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen
at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty
post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply
it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as
the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks
to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
12
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed
in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation
of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled
upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua
against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and
again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
13
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate
for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he
failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport
less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on
24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring
of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
14
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045
having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the
correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding
power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it
be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in
an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of
the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional
issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to
the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of
the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to
his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
15
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that
the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x
x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We
say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To
state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election
victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula
to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible
as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
16
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane
dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010
elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In
1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming
that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
17
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
TABASA VS COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 125793, AUGUST 29, 2006 (CASE DIGEST)
Facts:
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was 7 years old, his
father Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization,
Joevani Tabasa acquired the citizenship of his father. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in August
1995 and was admitted as “balikbayan” for one year. Petitioner was arrested and detained by agent
Wilson Soluren of BID on May 23, 1996 in Aklan and was brought to BID Detention Center, Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Donato and on the same day, petitioner was
accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner’s
passport was revoked by the US Department of State. Hence, respondent (petitioner Tabasa) is now
an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and
Intelligence Instructions No. 53.
Petitioner’s passport was revoked due to federal charges filed against him. Federal charges are as
follows:
In possession of a firearm and one count of sexual battery (all in violation of the California Penal Code)
Upon revocation of petitioner’s passport, he loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus. That he was not afforded due process; that
no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of
deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy;
that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant
because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo
Tabasa, in 1968. At the time Tabasa filed the petition, he was 35 years old.
Tabasa then filed a supplementary petition alleging that he has acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and because he is now a Filipino citizen, he can no longer be
deported.
CA denied the petition on the grounds that he had only acquired citizenship to escape from the
federal charges filed against him by the US and that he has not successfully acquired citizenship
because he does not fall under any of the requirements under RA 8171.
Issue:
WON petitioner has the privilege reacquire Filipino citizenship through RA 8171.
Ruling:
Petition is not meritorious.
RA 8171 provides repatriation to two classes of persons:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity.
Petitioner does not fall under RA 8171 because what is referred in the second class of persons
privileged with repatriation refers to his father.Even if the Court would concede that petitioner can
avail the benefit of RA 8171, he failed to follow procedure for reacquisition.
Procedure for reacquisition through repatriation is as follows:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as
members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are
approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required
fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity . — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
Petitioner only took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines then executed
an affidavit of repatriation which he registered together with his birth certificate with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office issued him a certificate of such
registration.
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage
under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow
petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the
requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year
residency.
Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise
their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
18
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in
Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a
system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines
are empowered to vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
FACTS:
Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, which
accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national
and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” only
to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their
campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect
merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise absentee
voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled.
HELD:
RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism.
However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in
another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is “recognized as such in the
host country” because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation
of one’s residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for
as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage,
pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as
much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of
that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the
right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines
the terms adverted to in the following wise:
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise
their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote
under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.
Valles vs. COMELEC
CITIZENSHIP: Jus Sanguinis - a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where
she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition
for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis
as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
19
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth
to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On
10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other
petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President
of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen
of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947),
jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe;
and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Cabiling vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother. They were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During their age
of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having
taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers persons
to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It
was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship
has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such
election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners,
is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
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Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra Batu(i)gas
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization, Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that
granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del
Sur. She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under
the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed
Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the
country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in
education, she then practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino
citizen. They have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena
submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005.
During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog,
Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
factoPhilippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of
Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a
Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As the
records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under
judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents
are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all
of which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to
an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to
compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to
the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe
then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
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On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en
banccancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified
as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently
providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural
born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.

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