EVIDENCE TOPIC: Offer of Evidence

TITLE ATLAS GR NUMBER: 159490

CONSOLIDATED MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
DATE: February 18, 2008
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
PETITIONER: ATLAS RESPONDENTS: COMMISSIONER
CONSOLIDATED MINING AND OF INTERNAL REVENUE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

No evidence which has not been formally offered shall be

considered ​ ​ ​
FACTS
Atlas, a corporation engaged in the production of copper concentrates for export registered as
a VAT entity and was issued VAT Registration Certificate. For the first quarter of 1993, its
proceeds were received in acceptable foreign currency and inwardly remitted in accordance
with Central Bank regulations. For the same period, Atlas paid PhP 7,907,662.53 for input
taxes. Thereafter, Atlas filed a VAT return for the first quarter of 1993 with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and also filed an amended VAT return. Atlas then applied with the
BIR for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code.
The certificate would represent the VAT it paid for the first quarter of 1993 in the amount of
PhP 7,907,662.53, which corresponded
. to the input taxes not applied against any output VAT.
Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA on February 22, 1995 to prevent the
running of the prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code. The CTA denied the
Petition for Review for insufficiency of evidence.

In denying Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund, the CTA held that Atlas failed to present
sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of tax credit or refund for the alleged input taxes paid
by Atlas. Relying on Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 3-88 which was issued to implement the
then VAT law and list the documents to be submitted in actions for refunds or tax credits of
input taxes in export sales, it found that the documents submitted by Atlas did not comply with
said regulation. It pointed out that Atlas failed to submit photocopies of export documents,
invoices, or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and others. Moreover, the Certification by
Atlas’ bank, Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation, did not indicate any conversion rate
for US dollars to pesos. Thus, the CTA could not ascertain the veracity of the contents
indicated in Atlas’ VAT return as export sales and creditable or refundable input VAT.

Atlas timely filed MR contending that it relied on Sec. 106 of the Tax Code which merely
required proof that the foreign exchange proceeds has been accounted for in accordance with
the regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Consequently, Atlas asserted that the
documents it presented, coupled with the testimony of its Accounting and Finance Manager,
Isabel Espeno, sufficiently proved its case. Atlas’ motion for reconsideration was rejected by
the CTA through its Resolution, ruling that it is within its discretion to ascertain the veracity of
the claims for refund which must be strictly construed against Atlas.

On Atlas’ appeal, the CA denied and dismissed Atlas’ petition on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence to support Atlas’ action for tax credit or refund. Thus, the CA sustained the CTA;
and consequently denied Atlas’ motion for reconsideration. The CA ratiocinated that the CTA
cannot be faulted in denying Atlas’ action for tax credit or refund, and in denying Atlas’ prayer
for a new trial. The CA concurred with the CTA in the finding that Atlas’ failure to submit the
required documents in accordance with RR 3-88 is fatal to Atlas’ action, for, without these
documents, Atlas’ VAT export sales indicated in its amended VAT return and the creditable or
refundable input VAT could not be ascertained. The CA struck down Atlas’ contention that it
has sufficiently established the existence of its export sales through the testimony of its
Accounting and Finance Manager, as her testimony is not required under RR 3-88 and is self-
serving. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
ISSUE/S
Whether Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund
RULING
No. the Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly Sec.
34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not been
formally offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts
purportedly evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a
quo evidently could not determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid.
Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to submit pertinent export documents to prove

1
actual export sales with due certification from accredited banks on the export proceeds
in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion rate into Philippine currency, the
courts a quo likewise could not determine the veracity of the export sales as indicated in
Atlas’ amended VAT return.
It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to prove the
allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best
evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the
pertinent documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
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EVIDENCE OFFER OF EVIDENCE
TITLE GR NUMBER: G.R. No. 140944
DIZON vs. CA

DATE: April 30, 2008

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
Rafael Arsenio Dizon, in his capacity as the Judicial Court of Tax Appeals and Bureau of Internal
Administrator of the Estate of the deceased Jose P. Revenue
Fernandez
​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
FACTS
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of his will was filed. The probate court
then appointed retired. Justice Dizon and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon as Special and Assistant
Special Administrator. Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required
estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the claims against it, had
yet to be identified. Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of the Estate the
required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance. Atty.
Gonzales wrote a letter addressed to the BIR Regional Director and filed the estate tax return with the same
BIR Regional Office, showing therein a NIL estate tax liability. BIR Regional Director issued Certification
stating that the taxes due on the transfer of real and personal properties of Jose had been fully paid and said
properties may be transferred to his heirs.

Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of the Estate, for the
purpose of paying its creditors. However, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection of the BIR, issued
Estate Tax Assessment Notice demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. Atty.
Gonzales moved for the reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment but the BIR Commissioner denied
the request. So petitioner filed a petition for review before the CTA. During the hearings conducted,
petitioner did not present testimonial evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the following:

a. Letter to CIR informing them of the probate proceedings

b. Petition for probate of will and issuance of letter of administration
c. Inventory
d. Several claims against the estate
e. Estate tax return
f. Certification of Payment of Taxes

The CTA denied the petition for review Citing this Court's ruling in Vda. de Oñate v. Court of Appeals. It
opined that the pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence. Although the above-
mentioned documents were not formally offered as evidence for respondent, considering that respondent has
been declared to have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20, 1996, still they could
be considered as evidence for respondent since they were properly identified during the presentation of
respondent's witness, whose testimony was duly recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the
documents marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records of the case. The CTA did not
fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate
tax.= P 37,419,493.7

CA affirmed CTA. The petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with the BIR and the issuance of BIR
Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or
re-assess the said return filed on behalf of the Estate. MR denied

​ ​ ​ ​ ​
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which
were not formally offered by the BIR
RULING
Yes. While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends

}
in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the
BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only
means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. The BIR's
failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled
that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable
period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order
which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."

Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient,
effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice
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 EVIDENCE Tender of Excluded Evidence

Cruz-Arevalo v Layosa GR NUMBER: A.M. RTJ-06-2005

DATE: July 14,2006

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
Josephina Cruz-Arevalo JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN-LAYOSA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 217, Quezon City

FACTS

}
This administrative Complaint filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa with manifest
bias and partiality and ignorance of the law. Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization
letter and a special power of attorney (SPA) in her favor to represent him while he undergoes medical treatment in the
United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during the pre-
trial, respondent judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence. Complainant also assails the order of respondent
judge to exclude several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without
giving her counsel a chance to comment on the objections raised by the defendants.

}
Due to the filing of the administrative case, Respondent inhibited himself from the case. In his defense, the judge
stated that defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She likewise found the SPA defective as it
pertains to complainant's authority to receive Cruz's contribution to the PAG-IBIG Provident Fund and not to represent
him in the pre-trial of the civil case. Thus, finding the absence of Cruz during the pre-trial inexcusable and without any
proper representation in his behalf, respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as he is concerned.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the act of Respondent Judge erred in excluding some of the paragraphs in the Complaint of petitioner

RULING

}
No, Respondent was correct when it excluded some of the paragraphs. the rule is that evidence formally offered by a
party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he
may move or request that it be attached to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of
appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the
rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the assignment of error if
the evidence involved is included in the record of the case.

- On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately after an objection is made, as what
respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but
the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an
opportunity to meet the situations presented by the ruling.
, Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of
portions in Atty. Arevalo's affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. Objections based on
EVIDENCE AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NUMBER: 164457
DATE: April 11, 2012
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
ANNA LERIMA PATULA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS
The petitioner Anna Lerima Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC of Dumaguete
which averred that on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997, the petitioner, being then a
saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from
several customers of said company failed to deliver the said collection to the company but instead, misappropriated
the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the company.

The Prosecutions first witness Lamberto Go, testified that he was the branch manager of Footluckers; that at first
Patula’s volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some
collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned
from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that
balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store auditor.
She declared that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of
receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the
receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report
denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit
Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated
the total amount of P131,286.92.

During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers allegedly
with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives.

In the course of Guivencans direct-examination, petitioners counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground
that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who
had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa. Petitioner appealed contending among others that said judgment blatantly
ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted
by the trial court were all private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence
of petitioner’s guilt for estafas charged despite their not being duly authenticated.

RULING

NO. The petition is meritorious. There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and
admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various receipts. It is true that the
original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 was subsequently presented as Exhibit B through
Guivencan. However, the Prosecution did not establish that the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same
signature that Go had earlier sought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy
(Exhibit A). Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either because
she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the
receipts.
The SC also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to
prove the discrepancies between the amounts petitioner had allegedly received from the customers and the
amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries of the
unauthenticated ledgers to support her audit report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion,
revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries.
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the
RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as with Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as
follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents, the
Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted
rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.

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irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of
logic, since it is determined simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in the case.

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