Å Pakistan - A Study in National Integration PDF

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Pakistan
A study in national
integration
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M. Nazrul Islam
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VANGUAllD
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Copyright M. Nazrul Islam, 199ff
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First published in Pakistan by
Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd
Lahore Karachi Islamabad Peshawar
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication

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may be reproduced or transmitted in any form

or by any means without prior permission in
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writing from the author and publisher

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Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd

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Head Office: 45 The Mall Lahore Pakistan

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Ph: 57783, 311064, Tix: 44907 SGWIL Pk

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Branch Office: D-212, KDA 1 A, Stadium Road, Karachi

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Ph:423571,421564
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Branch Office: Jinnah Super Market, Islamabad

Ph:822443,814452
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Branch Office: Spinzer Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Printed at Khalid Imran Printers

Dil Mohd Road,
Lahore Pakistan
Title designed by Ashraf Kamal

PREFACE
The task of nation building or national integration always appears
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to be a complex and arduous process. The difficulties of this process are
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more conspicuous in the context of the new states of Asia, Africa and
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Latin America where very few nations have achieved the status of .
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nation-states in the modern sense of the tenn. The present study is an
attempt at examining the nation building experiences of two such
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states-Pakistan and Malaysia-during the period of 1947- 1970.
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Pakistan failed in her attempt to build an integrated nation while
Malaysia, though has attained considerable success in this regard, is still
struggling with difficulties. #
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In this study, instead of constructing a systematic general theory, a
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number of the components of national integration identified by theorists

are selected as the basis of analysis and have been applied to the
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situation of Pakistan and Malaysia. For Pakistan, problems of ethnic,

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linguistic and cultural diversity together with political and economic

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imbalances, further cOQJpounded by geographical separation, are

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identified. Against these factors, the operation of three potentially

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integrative institutions-ruling political party, civil service and the

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federal structure--are also examined. Malaysia's problems are stated as

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a diversity of cultures, religions, languages, economi.c interests, races

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and communities. The function of three potentially integrative

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institutions of Malaysis-the ruling coalition type party UMNO, the

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civil service and the federal system-have also been examined. It is

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also pointed out that Pakistan 's failure to achieve national integration
was brought about by her gradual abandonment of democratic
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principles in favour of authoritarian and. military rule and Malaysia's

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success or failure in achieving national integration is also directly

dependent on her adherence to democratic principles.
The study originated as a Ph.D. dissertation at the School of
Modem Asian Studies, Griffith University, Australia in 1980. The
resources for the present study have largely been acquired through an
extensive perusal of document:;, papers, journals and books in· several
libraries in Bangladesh, Australia (Brisbane, Sydney and Canberra) and
vi Pakistan and Malaysia
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur and Penang). As a lecturer in Political S cience

at Dhaka l.]niversity, I had begun to collect a considerable part of my
material on Pakistan before coming to Australia to undertake the Ph.D.
programme. In Brisbane, I have been largely dependent on the
resources of the libraries of Griffith and Queensland Universities. In
Sydney and Canberra, I was able to make use of university, state and
national libraries for stiort periods. During my field trip to Malaysia in
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August 1980, I interviewed prominent political leaders as well as
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academics interested in similar areas of research.
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I am grateful to all those who have made my task possible. My
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particular indebtedness goes to my supervisor Dr. P. Arudsothy for his
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kind suggestions and guidance. He had been a constant source of
guid �ce and assistance to me.
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On my arrival at Griffith University, I found that I was quickly able
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to settle down because of the friendly atmosphere of the School of
Modem Asian Studies and the support and understanding I received
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from the late Professor James Jackson and the School Administrator,
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Mr. Phil Rowan. Although I have quite impartially called on all staff,
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both general and academic, for advice and assistance, I must admit to
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having been particularly appreciative of Ms. Patience Thoms' time.

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In particular I wish to acknowledge the kind personal attention that

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Professor Colin Mackerras, Chairman of the School , has given me. I

was at all times most generously helped by the staff of Griffith
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University Library as well as by _the Library staff of Queensland

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University, who did their utmost to trace as well as provide access to

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some elusive documents and publications: During my stay at Griffith I

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have benefited by participating in several international conferences

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both in Australia and overseas. I wish to record my thanks lo the School

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for providing me financial assistance without which I could not have

gained such useful experience.
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I am indebted to my alma mater, Dhaka University, and m y

esteemed colleagues for providing me the initial support and facilities
as well as encouragement for my higher studies in Australia. My family
and I are especially grateful to Griffith University for granting me a
Post-graduate Research Scholarship in January 1980. It would not have
been possible to maintain my family in Brisbane without this generous
assistance .
Preface vii
I wish to express my gratitude to Professor S erajul Islam, Secretary

General of Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, for his encouragement and
kind initiative in publishing this book. I am greatly thankful to Mr. S.K.
Ghai, Managing Director, Sterling Publishers Ltd. New Delhi, for
agreeing to publish it.
My wife Feroza Islam , my son Kamrul and my daughter Poppy
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have shared all along the burdens and satisfactions of this study.
Without their help and sacrifice it would not have been possible to
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complete this work. My thanks arc also due to Mrs. Karen Bclofevu for
her patient and meticulous typing.
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Finally, all errors found in this book arc solely m ine.
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LIST OF TABLES
II 1 Land utilization in Pakistan, 1967-68 5
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II 2 Air communication between East and
West Pakistan 1955-1965 6
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II 3 Frequency of languages commonly spoken
in Pakistan (as mother tongue) 8
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JI 4 Frequency of major languages spoken
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(as additional tongues) 9
II 5 Distribution of land-ownership in East Pakistan,
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1959 10
II 6 Distribution of land-ownership in West
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Pakis.tan, 1959 10
II 7 Demographic differences between East and
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West Pakistan, 1961 11

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II 8 Population density in East Pakistan 12

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II 9 Displaced persons as percentage of total

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population in Pakistan 14
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II 10 Ratio of different communities 17

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II 11 Racial composition (Federation of Malaya)

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1921-1957 20
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II 12 The number and raeial composition of the

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population in the Peninsula in 194 1 23

II 13 Area and number o f people within the
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western-belt of the Peninsula, 1957 24

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II 14 Distribution of the urban population,

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Malaya, 1957 25
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II 15 The racial composition o f the major towns

of the Peninsula, 1957 27
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II 16 Economically active population by race and

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industry with selected sub-divisions, 1957 28

II 17 The Chinese community by dialect groups, 1957 29
JI 18 The lndi.an community by dialect groups,
1947- 1957 30
III GNPs of East and West Pakistan at 1959-60
constant factor cost 41
III 2 Per capita incomes in East and West Pakistan
at 1959"60 constant factor cost 41
x Pakistan and Malaysia
III 3 GNP of East Pakistan. by origin in selected

years at 1959-60 factor cost 42
III 4 GNP of West Pakistan by origin in selected
years at 1959-60 factor cost 43
III 5 Regional development of selected economic
and social overheads: East and West Pakistan 44
III 6 Per capita disparity between East and West
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Pakistan at 1959-60 constant factor cost 44
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III 7 Revenue and development expend iture in East
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and West Pakistan 48
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III 8 Commercial import licences issued by
region of licences
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III 9 Industrial import licences issued by
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region of l icences 52
III 10 Export earnings of Pakistan 53
III 11 #
Utilization of foreign economic assistance
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in Pakistan, 1947-70 55
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III 12 Distribution o f commitment of foreign

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economic assistance: 1947 to June 1970 56

III Interwing trade in Pakistan
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III 14 Balance of payments of East and West Pakistan 60
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III 15 Various monetary indicators of the standard of

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living for selected Asian countries, 1 967 68

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III 16 Principal non-monetary indicators of the

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standard of living for selected Asian countries

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in 1960-1968 69
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III 17 Trade balance, 194 7-1969 70

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III 18 Composition of imports i n 1950 and 1965 71

III 19 Percentage distribution of real GDP by sector
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in 1957 and 1966

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III 20 Household income distribution, Peninsular
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Malaysia, 1957/58, 1967/68 and 1970 73

III 21 Urban-rural differences i n income distribution 73
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III 22 Ethnic composition of the rural and urban

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population of West Malaysia, 1947 and 1957 74

III 23 Income distribution of ethnic groups· 75
III 24 Households in poverty by race in Peninsular
Malaysia, 1970 76
III 25 Labour force and unemployment 77
III 26 Age distribution of population 78
III 27 Percentages of the occupational distribution
by community, Fetleration of Malaya, 1 957 78
List of Tables XI
III 28 Employment by race and sector, Peninsular

Malaysia, 1970 79
III 29 Malay participation in mining 87
III 30 Asset ownership by race, Peninsular
Malaysia, 1970 92
IV Distribution of seats among the nine units
of Pakistan, 1947 1 17
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IV 2 Constitutional proposals and provisions
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presented by the Premiers/President, 1950-1 962 1 19
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IV 3 The allocation of seats in the 309-member single
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chamber of the East Bengal Legislative
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Assembly, 1954 1 24
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IV 4 Party alignment of the second constituent
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assembly (legislature of Pakistan, 1955- 1 956) 1 30
IV 5 Central political elite in Pakistan, 1 94 7-1 958 139
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Mil itary elite in Pakistan, July 1 955-56 1 39
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IV 7 East Pakistan ' s representation in the
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military establishment, 1963 140

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IV 8 Interwing representation in the civil service

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of Pakistan, 1948- 1958 140

IV 9 Interwing representation in the higher ranks
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of the Central Secretariat, 1955-56 141

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IV 10 National Assembly of Pakistan , 1970 1 60

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IV Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan, 1970

IV 12 Pakistan National Assembly Elections, 1970-7 1 1 62
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IV 13 Pakistan Provincial Assembly Elections, 1970-7 1 1 63

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IV 14 The 1955 general elections: communal

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breakdown of the electorate 1 82

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IV 15 The 1955 general elections: party performances 1 84

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IV 16 Party distribution i n S ingapore legislative

assembly 1 96
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IV 17 Malayan Elections o f 1 959: communal

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breakdown of the electomte 201

18 1955, 1959, 1964 and 1969 elections:
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communal breakdown of the population,
electorate and parliamentary candidates 202
IV 19 Communal representation i n the Malayan
civil service, 1957-62 204
IV 20 B ranches of the Malaysian Armed Forces
manpower: 1973-74 205
IV 21 Ethnic composition o f Division I o f the
Police Service in West Malaysia 206
IV 22 Federal parliamentary and state elections
in Malaysia, 1959, 1 964 and 1 969 209
ABBREVIATIONS
Pakistan
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AL A warn i League
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BD Basic Democrats
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BPC Basic Principles Commiltee
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COP Combined Opposition Party
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DAC Democratic Action Committee
Ind. Independents
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JI Jamaat�e-Islami
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KSP Krishak Sramik Party (Peasants and Workers Party)

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LFO Legal Framework Order

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Mru Markazi Jamiat-e-Ulama

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NAP(B) National Awami Party (Bhashani Group)

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NSP(W) National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group)

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NSC
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National Shipping Corporation

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PDM Pakistan Democratic Movement

PDP
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Pakistan Democratic Party

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PIA Pakistan International Airlines

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PML Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)

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(Convention)
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PML(C) Pakistan Muslim League (Council)

PML(Q) Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group)
PPP Pakistan People's Party
PRODA Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification)
Act, 1949.
RTC Round Table Conference
SAC Students' Action Commiuee
xiv Pakistan and Malaysia
Malaysia
AMCJA All-Malaya Council of Joint Action
BMA BriLish MiliLary AdminisLraLion
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CJA Council of Joint AcLion
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DAP DemocraLic Action Party
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FLDA Federal Land Development AuLhoriLy (since April
1972 Lhe official abbreviaLion has been FELDA)
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GRM Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
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IMP Independence of Malaya Party
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Maj I is Amanah RaayaL (Council of Trust for the In
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digenous People)
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MCA Malayan Chinese Association

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MCP Malayan Communist Party

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MDU Malayan Democratic Union

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MIC Malayan Indian Cong�ess

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MPAJA Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army

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MSC Malaysian Solidarity Convention

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MSCC Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee

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NCC National Consultative Council

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NEP New Economic Policy

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NOC National Operations Council

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PAP People's Action Party

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PMCJA Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action

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PMIP Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (or PAS Persatuan Islam

Sa-Tanah Melayu/Parti Islam sa-Malaya/Party Islam)
PPP People's Progressive Party
RIDA Rural and Industrial Development Authority
UDA Urban Development Authority
UMNO United Malays National Organization
C ONTENTS
Preface v
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List of Tables ix
List ofAbbreviations xiii
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1. INTRODUCTION
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2. GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS 3
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A: .Pakistan
I. Geographical Location #
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II. Ethnic, Linguistic, Societal and Cultural Variations
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III. Demographic Differences

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IV. Settlement Pattern of the Rufugees

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V. Religious Problem ·
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B: Malaysia
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VI. Geographical Location, Demographic and Racial

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Composition
VII. Settlement Pattern of the Immigrants
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VIII. Ethnic, Linguistic, Societal and Cultural Differences

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3. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 37
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A: Pakistan
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I. The Economic Situation in 1947

II. Economic Development since Independence
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III. Economic Policies Pursued

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IV. The Transfer of Real Resources from East to West Pakistan

V. The Two-Economy Thesis
B: Malaysia
VI. The Pattern of Development since Independence
VII. The Pattern and Extent of Income Disparity, Poverty,
Unemployment and Underemployment
XVl Pakistan and Malaysia
VIII. The Types of Economic Policies Pursued by the

Federal Government
4. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 97
A:Pakistan
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C'olonial Heritage
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The Interim Constitution of Pakistan (1947-1956)
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The Constitution of 1956
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IV.The Martial Law Administration I (1958-1969)
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and the Constitution of 1962
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V. The Martial Law Administration II (1969-1971) and
the Breakup of Pakistan
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B: Malaysia
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VI. Political and Constitutional Developments (1945-1960)
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VII. Formation of the Federation of Malaysia and

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the Expulsion of Singapore (1960-1965)

VIII. Racial Violence and the Breakdown of the Racial
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Integration in Malaysia (1965-1970)

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5. CONCLUSION 233
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Appendices 237
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Bibliography 242
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1
INTRODUCTION
The nat.ion-building or national integration and disintegration in the

newly independent states of Asia and Africa is a common interesting
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phenomenon. The integrative crisis that confronted several of the new
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states of these regions should be viewed as part of an histcrical process
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of political development, father than in static tenns of political
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disagreements between different political parties, or as the breakdown of
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newly established democratic institutions. The process of integration or
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disintegration is always present in both new and old states, in both
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developing and developed parts of the world. There. are no absolute
measures to determine whether integration is complete even in the most
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politically stable countries. In Britain, which appeared to have achieved
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national integration to a high degree, the growing strength of the Scottish
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and Welsh nationalist groups in pressing their demand for greater

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autonomy in their respective regions, suggests that historically national

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integration does not necessarily rr:iove in one direction. Inevitably, the,

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process or national integration is slower and occupies a longer time frame;

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but the very length of the process tends to give a false impression of
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stability and successful integration.

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The case of Pakistan provides a striking example of a new state that

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appeared to have achieved a high degree of national integration,

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especially since political awareness had been focused on the external

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differences with neighbouring India and the traumatic cost of separation.

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A high level of political consensus also appeared to have been achieved

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in Pakistan through an overwhelmingly popular adherence to Islamic

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ideals. The eventual breakup of Pakistan therefore came as a surprise not

only because 6f its finality but also because the disintegration was
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completed within a relatively short period.

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Pakistan however, was not unique in undergoing this disintegration

crisis. The Federation of Malaysia formed in August 1963 to facilitate the
decolonisation of Britain's remaining colonies, viz. Singapore, Sabah
2 Pakistan and Malaysia
and Sarawak, saw the enlargement of the former Federation of Malaya to

absorb the former colonies within its political framework. However,
pplitical differences within the Federation, particularly between
Singapore and the States of Malaya soon led to the ceding of Singapore
from the new Federation in 1965. The cession of Singapore from
Malaysia, although accompanied by much political recrimination, was
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mutually agreed upon and peacefully settled. This was in contrast to
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Nigeria where the Yoruba claim for separation led to a bloody civil war,
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and disintegration of the new state was only averted by overwhelming
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force of armi. es. The differences between the majority Singhalese and the
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minority Tamils in Sri Lanka have already resulted in bloody
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clashes.even as ethnic differences have plunged Uganda into a virtual
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civil war. These and other examples of the disintegrative process might
appear to suggest that there are fundamental weaknesses in the politieal
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institutions of the new states that would impel them towards such
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integrative crises. But the fact that the vast majority of the new states,
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since Independence, have managed to retain their original identities, also

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provides convincing proof that such disintegrative tendencies are being

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checked by political processes that work towards nation-building.

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The purpose of the present investigation is to examine in greater

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detail the political processes in new states with special emphasis on those
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aspects which enhance national integration and others that aggravate

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disintegrative tendencies. A wealth of theoretical literature on questions

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of national integration/disintegration now exists. The problem with much

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of this literature in political science is that it tends to be polarized between

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a high level of abstraction and therefore generalization, on the one hand,

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and specific country studies, which emphasize particular incidents that

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have highlighted disintegration as in Pakistan, on the other hand.

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The present exercise, howeve.r, will attempt to steer off extremes and
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take the middle course by examining the theoretical literature in relation

to the political d evelopments in two countries, namely Pakistan and
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Malaysia. Thus, by adopting a comparative approach to the questions of

national integration and disintegration, the wealth of published material
on Pakistan and Malaysia has been utilised in the study; this helps to
illuminate theoretical problems by drawing on social, political ;and
economic similarities and the differences between the two countries.
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GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC
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DIMENSIONS
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Introduction
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The most pressing problem of the twentieth century Afro-Asian
countries is the problem of integration of the multi-racial peoples into a
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harmonious nation-sharip.g common hopes and aspirations, and
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common loyalty and love for.the country. It is the problem of sharing a
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common future with all the unforeseen hazards and promises but still
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practising and retaining different religions, customs, and languages. In

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this context, problems of national integration facing both Pakistan and

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Malaysia seem to be insuperable. Malaysia is the first multi-racial

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country of the new states of Asia and Africa that experienced the threat
of disintegration when in 1965, Singapore, one of the component states
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was allowed to claim its separate identity and independence. On the

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disintegration-line Pakistan stands second. Although chronologically

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second, the breakup of Pakistan was more momentous an experience not

only because it involved a larger population but also because of the scale
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of violence it produced and the thr�t of international escalation of the

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civil war.
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PAKISTAN
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For Pakistan, the root causes lay rather in the very unusual geographi
cal division into the two wings of Pakistan which was the creation of the
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partition of India in 1947. The two wings were not only divided by more
than one thousand miles of Indian land, but communication by sea
involved a journey of several thousand m,iles as well (see Map .)
The question of the viability of a separate state within India for her
significant Muslim minority population concerned several scholars at
home and abroad long before the creation of Pakistan. As early as in 1936,
Nehru, who became the first Prime Minister of India, observed in his
autobiography:
The Muslim nation in India-a nation within a nation, and not even
compact, but vague, spread out, indeterminate. Politically, the idea
is absurd, economically it is fantastic; it is hardly worth
considering.1
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Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad were among the eminent India.n leaders who
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denounced the idea of the partition of India. Foreign journalists like K.
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Mitchell and R. Sorensen, able commentators like H.N. Brailsford, R.
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Coupland and P. Dutt, responsible officials like L.C.M.S. Amery, the
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Secretary of State for India, and geographers like O.H.K. Spate and S. van
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Valkenburg, have been critical of the partition of India.2 The first geo
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grapher who studied very closely the geographical viability of the
creation of a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims was Spate. He
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observed: "The greater the weight we attach to [these] geographical
factors, the more difficult does it become to accept the racial and
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ideological aspects of theTwo-Nation Theory."3 Even after, the Partition

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oflndia in 1947, another geographer, van Valkenburg, hesitated to accept

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the feasibility of the new state, Pakistan. He said: "The present separation
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of India and Pakistan is so illogical from a geographical point of view,

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especially because of the two widely separated parts of Pakistan, that one
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wonders how long these conditions will continue."4 Pakistan's two

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geographically separated units led to her being aptly described as a

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"double country."
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I Geographical Location
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The total area of the two units of Pakistan was 365,529 square miles,
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of which the Eastern unit (East Pakistan) was only one-sixth of the area
of the Western unit(WestPakistan), that is, only 55,126square miles. The
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Western unit (310,403 square miles) was larger than any European state
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except the USSR. East and West Pakistan are located at the opposite ends
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of the extensive alluvial plains of northern India. The southern margins

of each wing lie in the vicinity of the TropiC of Cancer, but their location
in longitude and difference in latitudes and elevation combine to produce
very different climates in each wing.
The East and West wings of Pakistan, in the first instance, lie at the
opposite ends of the monsoonal pathway. While the East is considered the
gateway of the Bay of Bengal branch of the monsoon winds, receiving
from 75 to 160 inches of rainfall {>er year, the West at the far end receives
Geographic and Demographic Dimensions 5
only remnant rains which vary throughout the year from 9.4 to20.5 inches
per month. Owing to the paucity of water, the irrigation systems of the
West wing were among the most ex tensive in the world, whereas the East
wing, being host to numerous rivers was regularly flooded in the monsoon
season yet lacked water during winter (November to April) following the
monsoons. Thus water was a common problem to both the wings: in the
West, it was a problem of deficiency and variability, in the East, of excess·
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and consequent flooding. Again , the average temperatures of the East and
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West wings vary greatly from 45 to 1 02 degrees fahrenheit; and from 2 8
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to a maximal 1 20 degrees respectively. Topographic differences between
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them are also remarkable. While the East wing is mainly a flat alluvial
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plain with many rivers and tributaries, the West wing presents high
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mountains in the north, deserts and plains in the area of S ind, and large
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rivers and canals in the central areas. A recent survey shows that about
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75 percentof the land of East Pakistan was used for agricultural products,
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whereas only about 17 per centof West Pakistan 's land was agriculturally
productive (see Table II : I)
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TABLE 11 : 1
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Land utili ation in Pakistan, 1967-68•
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(All figures in thous�nd acres)

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CATEGORY EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKJSTAN TOTAL

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Total Area 35.3 198.6 233.9

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Area not reponed 0.7 82.6 83.3

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Waste 7.6 73.6 8 1 .2

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Forests 5.5 3.2 8.7

Current fallow 1 .2 7.9 9.1
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Net area sown 20.5 3 1 .9 52.4

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Total area cultivated 21 .6 39.0 60.6

Area sown more than once 5.5 3.9 9.4
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Total cropped area 26.0 35.0 6 1 .0

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Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Basic Facts 1969-70, (9th edn.) Islamabad:
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Ministry of Finance, 1 97 1 , p. 2 1 .
• The province-wise figures of land utilization are available ony u p to 1 967-68.
Finally, climatic variations, topographic differences and geographic

separation between East and West had resulted in different crops, (East
Pakistan mainly produces rice and jute; West Pakistan mainly wheat and
cotton.) patterns of housing settlement, food and dress, all of which had
given rise to different life stylos in the two wings. Again, the physical
separation made inter-wing commun ication and travel difficult and even
expensive. This had led to divergent economic problems. Since no
overland transport corridor was allowed between the East and the West
wings of Pakistan, they were connected to each other almost entirely
either by sea in the south or by air across the Indian territory. Since
relations between India and Pakistan, following the Kashmir dispute in
194 8 , deteriorated, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) could not guar
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antee regular direct air services between the two Pakistani wings without
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the acquiescence of her neighbour, India. Even during normal relations
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between the two countries, few people could afford to have inter-wing
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contact by air, which meant social mobility between the two wings was
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very low (see Table II : 2).
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TABLE 11:2
Air communication between East and West Pakistan: 1955-65
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Number of Passengers Number of Passengers
Year East to West to Year East to West to
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West East West East

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1955-56 15,226 14,676 1960-61 40,075 40,708

up
1956-57 20,825 20, 1 82 1961-62 51,893 48,421

ro
1957-58 26,264 24,880 1 962-63 55,494 55,668

G
1958-59 20,299 28,338 1 963-64 73,330 67, 1 47

1 959-60 34,565 33,897 1 964-65 39,471 ·37,933 •
p
ap
Source: East Pakistan, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Digest of East Paldstan, 1966,
ts
Dacca: Government Press, 1966, p. 153.

•
ha
The figures are for six-month periods only.

W
The inherent transport problem between and within the units of Pakistan
si
was further deepened by the discriminatory policies pursued by the ruling

ba
elite in the first decade of Pakistan's existence. The Government of

Ab
Pakistan spent more money on the development of the West wing's

transport networks than that of the East wing. For example, during the
Q
First Five -Year Plan ( 1 955 - 1 960), the Government spent Rs. 500million ,
A.
for the extension of 1 ,0 25 miles of new roads and the improvement of

1 ,7 00 miles of old roads of the West wing. In the corresponding year, the
Government spent only Rs. 1 1 9 million for constructing 7,000 miles of
roads of all categories-<:onnecting all the district headquarter towns of
the East wing which was far below the money,spent for the West wing.
Again, the disparity in the allocation of funds for transport facilities

between the East and West wings was further widened by the allocation
r
of huge funds for the overall transportdevelopment of WestPakistan. The

Second Five-Year Plan ( 1960- 1965) allocated a sum of nearI y one bilI ion
rupees for further transport development in the West wing alone whereas
it stipulated for the East wing only Rs. 655 million, of which Rs. 95
million was to be spent on waterways and ports and Rs. 560 million on
raily,iay and road construction. Since the communication networks are
important for basic economic development of the state, the lack of such
62
facilities held the East wing back.
7
83
II Ethnic, Linguistic, Societa i and Cultural Variations
23
This disparity in the allocati�n of funds for transport facilities within
-
01
the wings on the one hand and .the lack of communication between the
peoples of the two wings of Pakistan on the other, were further accentu
03
ated by ethnic, linguistic, societal an� cultural differences. If culture be
#
defined as the manifest aggregate of a people's language, religion,
us
customs, manners, dress, art, economy and outlook, it is obvious that
in
Paki�tan was a multi-cultural state. It was a multi-cultural state in the·

jo
sense that the people of Pakistan spoke in as many as six different

languages-Bengali, Punjabi, Pushtu, Sindhi, Urdu and Baluchi; and
up
each of the languages was roughly identifiep with one of the geographic
ro
areas of the state-each showing a proper and natural pride in her own
G
history and accomplishment. East and West Pakistan were also different
p
in tfie sense that the former had considerable cultural homogeneity, while
ap
the latter was culturally heterogeneous. The people of East Pakistan

ts
(except some 496,000 of the tribal population of the Hill Tracts of the
ha
districts of Chittagong, Sylhet, Comilla and Mymensingh) were ethni

W
cally, linguistically and historically one. There were no problems of

si
regional cultures or of regional languages: most people spoke in their

ba
common mother tongue, Bengali, most of them ate similar foods; they
Ab
dressed alike and also followed the same social habits, which was quite
a different situation from the rest of Pakistan.
Q
The culturaldiversityof WestPakistanwasapparent aslocalized into

A.
four different territorial units-the Punjab, North-West Frontier Prov

ince, Sind, and Baluchistan. Though her four regions were physically
compact, each had their own regiOnal languages-Punjabi, Pushtu,
Sindhi, and Baluchi. No single language had general acceptance either in
East and West Pakistan or within West Pakistan itself (see Table II : 3).
TABLE 11:3
Frequency of languages common ly spoken as mother tongue in
Pakistan
(Percentage of Population)
62
East Pakistan West Paki stan Pakistan
• Language 1951 1 961 1951 1 961 1951 1961
7
83
Bengali 98. 1 6 98.42 0.02 0. 1 1 56.40 55.48
23
Punjabi 0.02 0.02 67.08 66.39 28.55 29.02
Pushtu 0.01 8.16 8.47 3.48 3.70
-
01
Sindhi 0.01 0.01 1 2.85 12.59 5.47 5.51
Urdu 0.64 0.61 7.05 7.57 3.37 3.65
03
English 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Baluchi 3.04 2.49 1.29 1.09
r
#
us
Source: Population Census of Pakistan 1961, Vol. 1, Statement 5.3, pt. iv.
in
.Though Urdu was considered as the lingua franca, Table n : 3 clearly

jo
shows that a very small section of the people of Pakistan, i.e., only 3.37
up
percent in 1951 could speak Urdu. (Urdu was the language which was first
ro
developed as a l ingua franca in North India, and mainly spoken by the

G
immigrants from India.) Thus, the development of a common lingua

p
franca in Pakistan was a really difficult task (see TableII:4). The linguistic
ap
differences intensified by the geographical separation complicated the

ts
problem of nation-building in Pakistan. It is apparent that the average

ha
citizen in either wing of Pakistan had little knowledge of the way of life
W
of the people in the other half of Pakistan. In fact, "whether we take

language, or race or any other features of what goes to make up a culture,
si
ba
we do not know where to begin and where to end in West Pakistan" 5 .
These cultural differences made social contact difficult which was forther
Ab
heightened by the prevailing pattern of society of Pakistan.

Q
As stated earlier, East Pakistanis formed in the main, a homogene

A.
ous ethnic unit .. (Except for some tribal populations and some Urdu
speaking imm igrants from the Blhar province oflndia, the majority of the
population had the same ethnic identity: they were Bengalis.) Though the
tribal and immigrant populations had had little impact on the problem of
national integration, the Muslim immigrants migrating from Urdu
speaking areas of India settled in East Pakistan and remained a suspect
minority.
TABLE II: 4
Frequency
, or major languages spoken as additional tongues
(Percentage of Population)
East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan

Language 1 95 1 1 96 1 1951 196 1 1951 196 1
0.29 0.55 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.32
62
Bengali
Punjabi 0.01 1 .98 1.18 0.84 0.52
7
Pushtu 0.96 0.47 0.4 1 0.21
83
Sindhi 0.01 0.01 1 . 16 1 .57 0.50 0.69
23
Urdu 0.46 0.72 8.85 7.28 4.03 3.59
English 1.31 0.83 2.63 2.07 1 .87 1 .38
-
01
Source: Population Census of Pakistan 1961, ibid.
03
In contrast, West Pakistan's population was ethnically divided.
#
B esides the turbulent tribal populations of the N-W.F. Province and
us
Baluchistan, there were also the different distinct ethnic groups like
in
Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi. They not only spoke in their regional
jo
dialects, they owed allegiance to their respective distinct histories and

up
traditions. The feeling of subregionalism was so strong among them that

even after the merger of the four units of West Pakistan into one unit in
ro
I 956, they could hardly tolerate any outside interference; and particularly
G
because of the civil-military supremacy of the Punjab which dated from

p
ap
the colonial administration, anti-Punjabi feeling became more intense

among the Palhans, Baluchis, and S indhis.
ts
ha
Apart from the ethno-cultural differences between and within the

W
units of Pakistan, the socio-economic differentiation of the population

further complicated the growth of nationalism in the country. There had
si
ba
been a sharp discrepancy between the land-own ing classes of East and
West Pakistan.
Ab
In the East, the "Permanent Setdement of 1793" requited the land

Q
owning classes to pay high taxes on their produce annually, failing which
A.
their holdings were to be foifeited to the British Raj for one rupee. Under
this system, the Bengali Muslim landowning class gradually had to give
up their holdings and finally the British Raj had to make use of the Hindu
zamindars (landlords) for the collection of their revenues, who in tum
became one of the wealthiest classes in British India. As a result of the
"Permanent Settlement" nearly 75 per cent of the land came under the
control of the Hindu zamindars. However, after the creation of Pakistan,
landownership in Bengal (East Pakistan) substantially changed and

dispersed (see Table II : 5).
TABLE II: 5
Distribution of Land:Ownership in East Pakistan, 1959
Percentage of Percentage of
Size of holding (Acres) owners land owned
762
83
0 to 0.04 13 . 1
0.5 to 0.9 11 2
23
1 .0 to 2.4 27 13
-
2.s to. 4.9 26 26
01
5.0 to 7.4 12 19
03
7.5 to 12.4 7 19
12.5 to 24.9 3 14
25.0 to 39.9
# 3
us
40.0 or over 2
in
Source:-. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Census

jo
Organization, Pakistan Census of Agriculture, East Pakistan, Vol. /, 1962,

Karachi: Government Press, 1962, Table 3, p. 33.
up
This was for two reasons: firstly, the Partition of India heightened the
ro
communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims and the former, particu
G
larly the Hindu zamindars, had to leave East Bengal and secondly, the
p
ap
East Bengal Estates Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 abolished the
existing zamindari(landlordism) system and also limited the maximum
ts
ha
area of holdings to 33 acres per head.

W
TABLE II: 6
si
Distribution of lan_downership in West Pakistan, 1959

ba
Percentage Percentage of
Ab
Size of holding (Acres) of owners land owned

Q
5 or less 64.5 1 5.0

A.
5 to 25 28.5 3 1 .7
25 to 1 00 5.7 22.4
1 00 to 500 1.1 1 5.9
500 or above 0. 1 1 5.0
Source: Land Reforms Commission Report, West Pakistan, 1959, Karachi: Government
Press, 1 959, Appendill 1 .
On the other hand, Table II : 6 shows a different picture for West

Pakistan's distribution of landholdings. Feudalism was widely prevalent
in West Pakistan. Landownership was concentrated in a few hands,

especially in Sind. Again the caste system among the Muslims in West
Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab, was significantly responsible for the
prevailing pattern of land distribution in that region.
ill Demographic Differences
Apart from these diverse factors, the demographic differences
62
between the two wings of Pakistan further complicated the process of
7
83
nation-building in Pakistan. By almost any standard definition , Pakistan
was a country of huge, high-density population. While by size, Pakistan
23
was the twenty - fourth largest country of the world, she was the second
-
01
most populous member of the British Commonwealth, as well as of the
03
Muslim countries, and the fifth most populous in the world taken as a
whole.
#
us
TABLE II: 7
Demographic differences between East and West Pakistan, 1961
in
jo
Tota l Population Urbanization Literacy

up
popu lation Density (Percentage) (Percentage)

(millions) {Persons/
ro
sq. ml.)
G
1951 1 96 1 1951 1 961 1951 1961 1 95 1 1961

p
ap
East Pakistan 4 1 .9 50.8 701 922 4.3 5.2 21.1 2 1 .5

West Pakistan 33.7 42.9 109 138 17.8 22.5 1 6 .4 1 6.3
ts
ha
Source: Population Census ofPakistan, 1961, Vol. I, pt. ii, Statements 2.3, 2. 1 1 , 2. 14; pt.
iv, Statements 4 . 1 , 4.4.
W
Pakistan's 93. 7 million people accounted for as many as in almost the

si
ba
whole of the Near East (from Egypt and Turkey to Afghanistan) and more
than in any European country, excluding the USSR. But in demographic
Ab
features also, Pakistan's East and West wings differed greatly. While the
Q
West wing comprised almost 80 per cent of Pakistan's total surface, it had
A.
only 44 per cent of its population. On the other hand, East Pakistan
acquiring comparatively less land of Pakistan had to bear the pressure of
more than 50 per cent of its population . According to the 1961 census of
Pakistan, the overall population density amounted to 256 persons per
square mile which was one of the highest population densities found in
the world. The population density for each region reveals an alarming
picture, mainly for the Eastern wing. This was one of the most densely
populated areas of the world with 9 22 persons per square mile
(Table II: 7). The population density for West Pakistan was 138 persons
per square mile-which seems to be quite low. But if we take an account
of the total cropped area of West Pakistan which was sixty-one million
acres (Table II: I, Land Utilization), in 1967-68 the population density
of this area would have been about 970 persons per square mile which,
in fact, is relatively high. But the situation in East Pakistan was even
worse when one realises that the bulk of its 52 million people had to
62
depend on only twenty-six million acres of cropped land which gives a
7
83
23
TABLE II: 8
-
Polulation density in East Pakistan
01
03
Population Density
(millions) (persons/acre)
On total
#
(thousands) On gross
us
1961 land on net cropped
District census are� sown area area
in
jo
Chittagong 2.98 l . 80 5.65 2.90

Com ilia 4.39 2.80 4.60 2.30
up
Dacca 5. 10 3.00 4.30 3 . 10

ro
Noakhali 2.38 2.30 4.15 2.30

Faridpur 3.18 2.05 2.95 l.80
G
Sylhet 3.49 1 . 15 2.60 l.70

p
Pabna l .96 l .80 2.55 l .75

ap
Baris al
4.26 l .85 2.55 l.70
ts
(Baikaganj)
Myrnensingh 7.CJ2 l .80 2.50 l.70
ha
Khulna 2.45 0.95 2.40 1.95

W
Chittagong
Hill Tracts 0.38 0. 10 2.35 2.05
si
Bogra 1:57 1.70 2.30 1.70

ba
Rangpur 3.80 l.75 2. 20 l.70

Ab
Kushtia 1 . 17 1 .40 2.20 1.50

Jessore 2.19 1.35 1.80 1 . 65
2.81 1 .25 l.75 1.45
Q
Rajshahi
Dinajpur 1.71 1.05 1.65 1.40
A.
Total 50.84 1 .55 2.70 1.85
Source: Adapted from Roger Revelle and H.A. Thomas, Jr., Population and Food in East
Pa/cistan, Cambridge: Harvard Center for Population Studies, Harvard Univer
sity, 1970, pp. 2, 4-5.
higher density of nearly 1,300 persons per square mile. Even these
densities were exceeded, being over 2000 persons per square mile in the
districts of Dacca, Mymensingh, Chittagong , Noakhali, Camilla and

Faridpur (Table II : 8) where soil and water configurations were more
favourable.
These districts, which comprised about 35 per cen t of the East wing's
total population, were also the food deficit areas. From 1960 to 1965 about
50 per cent of their cereal consumption was imported.
7 62
Though East Pakistan was the most densely populated part of
83
Pakistan, its urbanization rate was much lower than that of WestPakistan.
23
Its urban population formed only 5.2 per cent whereas in West P*istan
22.5 per centof people were urban dwellers (see Table II: 7). Though the
-
01
majority of the population of East and West (i.e. about 95 and 80 per cent
03
respectively) lived in rural areas, the economic prospects for West Paki
stanis were far better than for their counterparts in East Pakistan.
#
Although the economic sufferings of the people of East Pakistan were
us
partly due to the regular hazard of flooding and the scarcity of mineral
in
resources in this part of Pakistan, the discriminatory policies of the

jo
Government were largely responsible for the low level of economic

up
development and small urbanization pattern in East Pakistan. Firstly in

ro
West Pakistan, a large number of old urban centres were expanded and
G
a substantial number of new ones were established which were emerging

in response to a more rapid expansion of industries than was true of East
p
ap
Pakistan. Secondly, unlike the delta dis tributaries of East Pakistan which
ts
tended to centralize population pressures in the region, the canals of West

ha
Pakistan fanned out across the interfluves and produced a more diffusive
population pattern.
W
si
IV Settlement Pattern of the Refugees

ba
And finally, because of extensive irrigation facilities in West Paki

Ab
stari, it had a larger area of stand�rd agricultural land which could ea5ily
Q
accommodate increases in, as well as a shift in population from the

crowded older areas. This imbalance in urbanization also reflected a
A.
sharp economic disparity which was further increased by the settlement

pattern of the refugees between East and WestPakistan. Though there had
been a great deal of controversy over the total number of refugees, the
survey conducted under the auspices of the International Labour Organi
zation (ILO) finally settled the dispute. The total number of displaced
Muslims now estimated by the ILO was 7.2 million for Pakistan, but the
number of non-Muslims from Pakistan to India was still higher th.an
Pakistan, that is, 7.4 m illion, at the time of Partition.
The figures in the following Table II : 9 indicate the pressure and
plight of displaced persons (commonly called the Muhajirs in Pakistan)
within the different parts of Pakistan.
TABLE II: 9
Displaced persons as percentage of total population in Pakistan
7 62
Total Displaced Displaced persons
83
Population Persons as percentage of
23
Locale in OOO's in OOO's total population
-
01
Rajshahi division 14,078 501 3.55
Dacca division 16,258 1 53 9.41
03
Chittagong division 1 1,783 47 0.39
Total, East Pakistan 42, 1 19

#
701 1 .75
us
Labore division 5,340 1 ,701 3 1 .85
in
Mullan division 8,340 2,615 3 1 .35

jo
Rawalpindi division 5 , 1 34 566 1 1 .02

Bahawalpur stale 1 ,820 371 20.38
up
N-W.F.P. districts 3,239 51 1 .60

ro
Tribal areas 2,460

4,619 561 12.14
G
Sind
Khairpur stale 320 11 3 .44
p
Baluchistan districts 622 29 4.66

ap
Baluchistan states 556 0.5 0.01

ts
Karachi Area 1 , 1 18 543 48.56

ha
Total, West Pakistan 33,568 6,714 20.00

W
Grand Total Pakistan 75,687 7,4 15 9.70

si
ba
Sowce : Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1951, Bulletin No. 1 , Series 29,
Ab
1
Karachi: Government Press, 195 1 , cited in A. Tayyeb, op. cit., p. 171.
Q
Though according to the figures the refugees in Pakistan formed

A.
about 10 per cent of the total population, and West Pakistan alone had to
bear 90 per cent of the burden of the influx (while East Pakistan had only
10 per cent), paradoxically this huge burden of refugees did not bring any
hardship for West Pakistan nor did the smaller number favour East
Pakistan's position. Rather, the socio-economic background of the
refugees had had a direct impact upon the demographic, economic and
social conditions of each wing of Pakistan.
Of course, the economic backwardness of East Bengal may not be a

direct result of the British colonial policies, it had its roots in the partition
of the subcontinentalong religious lines. In the pre-partition days oflndia,
Bengal had been mostly an agricultural region. The raw materials which
it produced were utilized by the industrial interests of industries based in
Calcutta (now the capital city of West Bengal, India). B oth the land and
the business interests which controlled the industries were owned by
62
wealthy �indus in Calcutta. With the Partition of India in 1947, these
7
83
industrialists, agricultural landlords and business magnates quickly
liquidated their assets and property and left for India. Thus; the East was
23
l eft largely with only the land and virtually no real capital or business
-
01
skills.
03
The situation was almost exactly opposite in West Pakistan. As
#
discussed earlier, West Pakistan was neither over-populated nor was i t
us
over-exploited by the British Raj; it held therefore, greater promise for
future development. The Muslim businessmen and entrepreneurial
in
classes of pre-Partition'India noted these facts and with the Partition, the
jo
majority of them migrated to West Pakistan and invested their huge

up
capital and skills there. Therefore, the influx of immigrants to West

ro
Pakistan facilitated her higher rate of urbanization, and helped to develop

G
her economy at a faster rate. East Pakistan's economic loss, on the other
p
hand, due . to the Partition was great and was not compensated by the
ap
immigrants from India. The bulk of the refugees into the Eastern part of
ts
Pakistan were poor peasants, uneducated and unskilled labourers from

ha
the low-income level who, instead of helping the flagging economy of

W
East Pakistan to grow, became a liability for it. Again i t is alleged, that
in many cases, the Muslim officials whose services were transferred to the
si
ba
Government of Pakistan after the Partition, improved their rank and

seniority simply because they had come to departments which were small
Ab
and under-staffed. Furthermore, as the demand for various services was

Q
great at the time, new departments were being established, and a

A.
considerable number of the Muslim graduates from among the refugees

found ready employment at the cost of the native Bengalis. Often some
more serious allegations against the few Muslim immigrant landlords
were heard. It was alleged that these people often succeeded in acquiring
properties sometimes equal to or even exceeding the ones they had lost
in India by manipulating the officials responsible for allotment and
rehabilitation of the refugees. The continued political influences of the
refugees p lus the distressed economic condition of the East wing
increased the social conflict and mutual resentment between the refugees
and the natives on one side, and between the two wings of Pakistan on the
other.
The conflicting situation prevailing within and between the two

wings of Pakistan was, therefore, the result of the geographic, demo
graphic, socio-cultural and linguistic differences. It was these which
62
exacerbated the situation, coupled with Pakistan ' s weak national cohe- '
7
sion, that prevented the country from becoming a unified nation.
83
23
V Religious Problem
-
01
It has been observed from the foregoing discussion that the two wings
of Pakistan had very little in common in geography, demography or
03
topography, or even in culture. The only common bond between them was
#
that of their common religion-Islam, the raison d'etre for the creation
us
of Pakistan. Abu! Man_sur Ahmad, a parliamentarian from East Pakistan,
speaking in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan said:
in
jo
These two wings differ in all matters, excepting two things, namely,
up
that they have a common religion, barring a section of the people in

ro
East Pakistan, and that we achieved our independence by a common

G
struggle. These are the two points which aie common to both the
p
wings of Pakistan. With the exception of these two things, all other
ap
factors, viz., the language, the tradition, the culture, the costume, the
ts
custom, the dietary, the calentlar, the standard time, practically

ha
everything, is different. 7
W
In fact, Pakistan was overwhelmingly a Muslim majority state (see

si
Table II : 1 0). Paradoxically, there were contradictions even in the precise

ba
,nature of their religion, Islam-the so-called 'common bond' between

Ab
the two wings of Pakistan.

Q
Since East Pakistani Muslims historically are closer to East Pakistani

A.
Hindus especially in matters of language, dress and manners, and also

"very similar to the peoples of South East Asia, where too, Islam has not
altogether replaced the pre-Islami � culture of the area",8 their type of
Islam was looked down upon as one " mixed with Hindu, Buddhist, and
animistic practices," and was therefore far more "lukewarm and accom
m odating" than the West Pakistani type of Islam "which has almost a
tradition of religious orthodoxy and conflict apparent in most periods of
·
its history . "9

..
TABLE II: 10
Ratio of different communities
Number Percentage of total
Muslims 82,54 1 ,357 88. 1

Hindus: Caste Hindus 4,590,4 17
Scheduled Castes 5,4 1 1 ,057
62
Total (Hindus) 10,001,474 10.7
7
Christians 700,000 1 .0 approx
83
Buddhists 376,3 1 2 0.2
23
Others 7 1 ,2 17
Total Population 93,690,360 100.0
-
01
Non-Paki stani residents 1 1 1 ,026
03
Source: Population Census ofPakistan, 1961, Vol. I , pl. I , Statement 2. 1 8, Table 5.
#
This religious difference between the units was further accentuated
us
by the action of the West Pakistani civil-military elites who, after the
failure of their negotiation with the East Pakistani counter-elites, started
in
jo
persecution and indiscriminate firing on the unarmed Bengalis, irrespec

tive of religion, caste and creed on the night of March 25, 1971. My
up
personal interviews with some of the military personnel of West Pakistan

ro
in mid-October 1971, reveal that the ki 1 1 ing of the East Pakistani Muslims
G
(who were, according to them, mixed with Hindus) was almost a religious
p
duty for them. In fact, this type of attitude held by the Muslims of one unit
ap
against their fellow brethren which has no sanction even in the Holy
ts
Qur'an, 10 eventually intensified bitter feelings between the peoples of the

ha
two wings.
W
The religious differences between the two wings were further

si
ba
aggravated by the presence of several extreme religious sects within the

Muslim population of West Pakistan. Apart from the rigid dogma of the
Ab
Punjab Muslim and the religious fanaticism of the Muslim Pathan, there
Q
was a reformist Muslim sect known as Qadiyanies. The Qadiyanies

A.
claimed Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as their prophet of God (after the Prophet
Muhammad, S.M.) and declared that all those Muslims were Kafirs(non
Muslims) who did not accept him as a Nabi (Prophet). Though Qadian
the birthplace of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is in Indian territory, after the
Partition of India in 1947, the Qadiyanies shifted their headquarters to
· Pakistan. Quantitatively, they were a very small group-but they had
penetrated deeply all walks of life and had become one of the most
significant groups within Pakistan's body politic.
The following facts may give some idea about their influence and
strength in Pakistan:
1. Rabwah: A closed city exclusively for Qadiyanies located in the

province of Punjab. The Qadiyanies managed to get theirown police,
administration and even courts of law. Any person other than
Qadiyanies was restricted from purchasing any land or even renting
62
a house in the city of Rabwah without p�rmission. All services, gov
7
ernmental or otherwise, were manned only by Qadiyanies. They es
83
tablished a huge secretariat in Rabwah equipped with modem
23
devices which was used also as a centre for the propagation of
-
Qadiyaniat doctrines in and outside Pakistan. It had almost assumed
01
the status of a state within a state.
03
2. Penetration in Services: Sir Zafrullah Khan, a staunch Qadiyani, as
#
the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan installed Qadiyanies who
us
proceeded to misuse their official capacity in various positions, both
in
civil and military.

jo
3. Schools, Colleges and Hospitals: Qadiyanies, with their own re

up
sources, established educational institutions and well-equipped hos

ro
pitals.
G
The non Qadiyanies were also allowed to make use of these

p
ap
facilities so that they may be easily proselytized.

ts
4. Financial Support.: Qadiyanies used to give monetary support to

ha
poor students, unemployed or needy persons of other sects on the

W
condition they became Qadiyanies.

si
5. Resources of the Qadiyanies: Qadiyanies had their own industry,

ba
commerce and agriculture where normally they also had the monop
Ab
oly of employment. Of course, non-Qadiy,anies were given jobs

Q
subject to their willingness to become Qadiyanies.

A.
6. Literature: Qadiyanies owned huge machinery for circulating their

literature throughout the world. It was alleged that Qadiyani litera
ture helped, to some extent, in creating confusion in the minds of the
Muslims (followers of the Prophet Muham m ad, S.M.) and diverting
them from the path of the Prophet and Islam.
Muslims of Pakistan (especially of West Pakistan) had always been

greatly concerned about the gro�ing influence of th� Qadiyanies and
demanded Lhal they should be declared as non-Muslims and they should

not be allowed lo be included,in the definition of what constituted Islam.
The religious friction between them came to ils peak in 1953 when
there Were demonstrations all over West Pakistan against the Qadiyanies
and, ultimately, violent riots broke out between the Qadiyanies and non
Qadiyanies which took about ten thousand li.ves of both groups. Then, the
62
Government of Pakistan imposed martial law in the province of Punjab,
7
the worst affected area. Thousands of Muslims were arrested including
83
Al-Sayyid Abu!' Ala Maududi, the Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, who was
23
sentenced to death by the Court Martial, but later his sentence was
-
commuted to life imprisonment. Since the creation of Pakistan, until
01
Qadiyanies were declared as non-Muslims in September 19741 1 (by the
03
Parliament ofPakisl.an), they had been a strong provocative religious sect
#
of the Muslims of West Pakistan in particular, and in Pakistan as a whole.
us
Paradoxically, the religious difference between the Bengali Hindu
in
and Bengali Muslims had never been a problem for their integration, but
jo
religious differences between the different sects of the Muslim popula

up
tion of West Pakistan had always been a serious block to their mutual
ro
integration on one hand and to their integration with the Bengali Muslims
G
on the other.
p
.
Hence Pakistan's ideology which was based on Islam and which
ap
could have been one of the forces to keep the nation united was
ts
misunderstood and even used by the West Pakistani civil-military ruling

ha
elites tofulfil their political ends. Soon the so-called common religious
W
bonds between and within Pakistan weakened and were succeeded by the
si
regional sentiments which gradually proved to be too great a strain for the
ba
fragile national structure of Pakistan to withstand.

Ab
MALAYSIA
Q
Primarily, the problem of national integration in peninsular Malaysia

A.
(West Malaysia), unlike Pakistan is not one of geographical configura

tions of her eleven states. Malaysia, like the United States or Great
Britain, is amulti-racial country. She claims the unique distinction among
multi-racial countries of the wor Id in the sense that she has to contain three
main racial groups of whom about half are immigrant and recent settlers,
namely, Chinese and Indians. Malays, who claim Malaya12 as their
traditional homeland, have considerable cultural homogeneity, while the
immigrants are culturally heterogeneous. The immediate problem for
MalaY.sia is how to develop a national feeling among the discrete natiomrl

groups comprising diverse social, cultural and racial elements.
VI Geographical Location, Demographic and Racial Composition
Peninsular Malaysia comprises the states of Perlis, Kedah, Penang,

Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca, Johore, Kelantan, Trengganu
62
and Pahang. These form geographically a more or less compact body.
7
From a physical point of view, Peninsular Malaysia is smaller than even
83
the Eastern wing of Pakistan, encompassing only 50,915 square miles
23
(Map 2). Demographically, it also contains a much lower population than
either of the wings of Pakistan. In 1957, the year of Malaysian Independ
-
01
ence, it had a population of only 6,279,000 of which the immigrants
03
slightly outnumbered the indigenous Malays (Table II : 1 1).
TABLE II: 1 1
#
us
Racial composition 1921 to 1957
-
in
Population in thousands Percentages

jo
Census year Census year

up
Race 1921 , 1931 1947 1957 1921 1 9 3 1 1 947 1957

ro
Total 2,9rr7 3,788 4,908 6,279 1 00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

G
Malays• 1 ,569 1 ,864 2,428 3 , 1 25 54.0 49.2 49.5 49.8

p
Chinese 856 1 ,285 1 ,885 2,324 29.4 33.9 38.4 37.2

ap
Indians•• 439 57 1 53 1 707 15.1 15. l 10.8 1 1 .3

Others 43 68 65 1 12 1 .5 1.8 1 .3 1.8
ts
ha
(All figures are rounded)

W
Notes: • Includes nomadic aborigines. •• Includes Pakistanis

si
Source: Federation ofMalaya Official Year Book, 1962, Vol. 2, Kuala Lumpur: Govern
ba
ment Press, 1962, p. 40.

Ab
In 192 1 indigenous Malays formed more than fifty percent and their
proportion dropped dramatically over a gap of ten years because of the
Q
immigration of other races into the peninsula between 1921 and 1931.
A.
Though the immigrants, especially the Chinese and Indians, started

contact with the peninsula as early as the fifth and sixth centuries
respectively, a substantial number of them were recent selllers. Conse
quently, they affected the population pattern significantly and created a
serious ethnic imbalance in the peninsula. More than any other factor, this
had promoted fundamental, social, religious, political and economic
cleavages between the Malays and the immigrants, commonly known as
non-Malays.
VII Settlement Pattern of the Immigrants
UnlikePakistan, immigrants in Malaysia were not displaced persons.

They were mainly labourers ' imported' b y the British for the extraction
of raw materials, particularly tin and rubber for use in industries based in
Britain. Initially, the British industrial development had been supported
by the resources of her European neighbours. Europe also in her economic
infancy provided an excellent market for British produce. However, by
62
the second half of the n ineteenth century, European industrialization had
7
83
created a protected economy ,capable of consuming her raw materials and
feeding her markets. Ultimately, Britain was forced to consider finding
23
her markets and essential raw · materials outside of the European
-
01
continent . The eventual result was the establishment of the B ritish sphere
03
of influence in Malaya; and with their founding of Penang in 1786, the
Malays saw an influx of immigrants mainly from China and India into
#
their little known country inhabited by a few hundred thousand Malays
us
and some aborigines. A number of other factors might have stimulated the
in
immigrants coming to Malaya: most of the Chinese immigrants came

jo
from South-Eastern China, the provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung and

up
Kwangsi, and also from the island of Hainan. The Indians came mostly
from South India. The natural resources of these regions of China and
ro
India were extremely limited. There was widespread unemployment and

G
underemployment due to the heavy pressure of population on the very

p
limited cultivable land of these regions. Paucity of resources even to

ap
provide for everyday needs with adverse conditions in their country of

ts
origin eventually forced them to seek a better livelihood overseas. On the

ha
other hand, the rapidly growing number of rubber estates and tin m ines
W
in Malaya created an unprecedented demand for workers relat ive to the

si
supply from the indigenous Malay population. The latter were not only
ba
few in number but also were too attached to their own self-subsistence
Ab
economy. Even wage employment was not attractive for them . Hence,
alternative sources of labour were necessary and were provided by the
Q
immigrant Chinese and Indians.

A.
While the Chinese immigration was originally associated with the

exploitation of tin, Ind ian immigration was closely linked with the
agricultural development of Malaya. �n particular with the rise of rubber
industrie� in the twentieth century.13 Large numbers of Indians were
encouraged, assisted and even forced to migrate from their homeland to
work as coolies. They also worked as manual labourers on such projects
as road and railway construction in the various government departments.
During the decade 191 1 to 1921, and especially with the first three years,
Indian population grew at an annual rate of 8.4 per cent (through
migratory surplus mainly) and by 1921, the Indians constituted 15 per ·
cent of the total Malayan population (Table II: 1 1). They came initially
to work in the tin mines which were located in the West coast states of
Peninsular Malaysia from Penang downwards. Before the imposition of
62
the Immigration Restriction Ordinance of August 1930, immigration was
7
unrestricted and large numbers of them were recruited under the inden
83
ture system and many others came voluntarily as "free" immigrants.
23
During this period, Chinese immigrant traffic was heaviest in the years
-
1911 to 1913, and also between the years 1925-1929.
01
03
The striking feature of immigration to the Peninsula was that
primarily it was entirely commercially motivated. Few of them had any
#
intention of settling there permanently. Unfortunately, the general world
us
economic depression of the 1930's affected the export-oriented economy
in
of Malaya causfog sudden falls in the prices of the Malayan primary

jo
commodities, mainly rubber and tin. This resulted in mass-unemp loy

up
ment and underemployment. Bo.th Chinese and Indians, being concen

trated in these export industries and in economic activities centred round
ro
them, were naturally the first and most adversely affected. Consequently,
G
thousands of them were either repatriated or voluntarily emigrated back

p
to their own countries. Steps were further taken by the government to re
ap
strict immigrant flows into the Peninsula. This was achieved by the
ts
passing of the Aliens Ordinance of 1933 which put a quota on the entry
ha
of all adult males of all classes with the object of regulating the admission
W
of aliens.
si
ba
S hortly before the start of the Second World War, especially in 1938
when the restrictive policy was extended to alien females as well, Chinese
Ab
immigration into the Peninsula again dropped sharp ly. The Second World
Q
War and subsequent Japanese occupation between 1942-1945 put a stop

(temporarily) to all immigration and emigration. Large-scale emigration
A.
of Chinese males as a result of the " 1948 Emergency" reinforced tenden

cies towards demographic stabilization in the Malayan population and
particularly the Chinese community. The 1 933 and 1938 restrictive
policies had not affected the Indians as they were British subjects. Hence,
the Indians continued to flow in after the Second World War and their
numbers were further increased during the boom generated in the
Malayan economy, particularly in the export sector as a result of the
Korean War. The government felt a need Lo restrict further imm igration
into Malaya by talcing more stringent measures. A new law called the
"Immigration Ordinance 1952" was passed which prohibited the entry of
new immigran ts into the Peninsula from any country, including any part
of the British Common wealth, except under very special circumstances.14
This was done because by the beginning of the Second World War the
influx of immigrants had completely altered the structure and character
62
of the population of the peninsula (see Table II : 12).
7
83
TABLE II: 1 2
23
The number and racial c om p os itio n o f the population
in the Pen in sula in 1941
-
01
Race Number Percentage of
03
the Total
Chinese 2,4 1 8,615 44

#
us
Malays• 2,248,579 40.5
Indians°- 767,693 14
in
Europeans 30,251 0.5

jo
Eurasians
up
and others 80,0J5

ro
Total 5,545, 173 100

G
• Malays here include aborigines, indigenous Malays and immigrants from Java,
p
ap
Sumatra and other parts of Indonesia.

u Pakistanis and \..eylonese are counted with 'Indians'.
ts
Source: The estimate of the population for 194 1 is taken from the Federation of Malaya,
ha
Official Year Boole, 1962, Vol. XI, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1962, p. 40.
W
This table shows that the Chinese had entered and settled on the
si
Malay Peninsula in such large numbers that within less than a century,
ba
they (at 44 per cent of the total population) outnumbered the Malays (at
Ab
40.5 per cent) in 194 1 , while the Indian contribution to the m ulti-racial
society of Malaya was also a substantial group making up .14 per cent of
Q
the total population. This growth pattern of the immigrants created a

A.
serious ethnic imbalance in the Malay Peninsula. It was further compli

cated by the pattern ofpopulation distribution. From the economic as well
as · demographic viewpoint, there are two zones of high population
density, that is, the Western and the North-eastern parts of the Peninsula.
The Western zone comprises the area from Perlis in the north to Johore
in the south including the crowded island of Penang; whilst the North
eastern zone is centred around the Kelantan and Trengganu deltas. The
remaining parts of the Peninsula were sparsely inhabited.
There are thirty-six districts in the Western belt of the Peninsula
. with
1-
more than 100 persons per square mile. By 1957, three-quarters of the
total population of the Peninsula was concentrated in this Western belt
covering 30 percent of the total land area oflhe Federation of Malaya (see
Tab.le II : 13).
TABLE II: 13
62
Area and number of people within the western-belt
7
of the Peninsula 1957 -
83
State Area Number of people
23
(sq. miles)
-
01
Perlis 310 90,885
03
Kedah (districts of Kota Star, Kubang Pasu,
Yen, Kuala Muda, Baling, Kulim, Bandar Bahru
and municipality of Alor Star only)
#
1,797 651 ,249
us
Penang and Province Wellesley 398 572,100
Perak (districts of Krian, Larul & Matang,
in
Selama, Kuala Kangsar, Dindings, Kinta,

jo
Lower Perak and municipalities of Jpoh

and Kampar only) 4,399 1 ,079,056
up
Selangor 3,166 1 ,012,929

ro
Negri Sembilan (districts of Seremban,

Kuala Pilah, Rembau, Pon Dickson and
G
municipal ity of Seremban only) 1 ,698 3 13 ,420

p
Malacca 640 29 1 ,21 1

ap
Johore (districts of Johore Bahru, Muar,

ts
Batu Pah�t. Pontian and municipality of

Johore Bahru only) 2,681 674,660
ha
W
Total 15,089 4,685,510

si
Source: Official Year Book, 1962, Vol. 2, op. cit.,p. 33. The estimated area of the states of
ba
the Western belt of the Peninsula is taken from Ooi Jin-Bee, op. cit., Table 1 5, p. 128
Ab
Twelve per cent of the total population were found in the Kelantan
and Tr�ngganu deltas which together covered 3 per cent of the total land
Q
area of the Peninsula. In contrast, only 1 3 per cent of the total population
A.
were in the remaining two-thirds land area of that country. The average ·
density along this Western belt was 3 10 persons per square mile which
was two and a half times the average for the whole of Malaya. The areas
of the Western belt of the peninsula also determ ined the index of maxi
mum economic growth. Both the high degree of economic growth and
high population densities were the result of a conjunction of circum
stances that had made the Western belt of the Peninsula favourable to
Geographic and Demo graphic Dimensions 25
settlement. Better environmental conditions also contributed to the high

population densities along this belt. The Eastern belt of the Peninsula had
densities of between 25 to 50 persons per square m ile. This included the
coastal districts of Dungun and Kemaman in Trengganu, the adjoining
district of Kuantan in Pahang and the district of Kota Tinggi in Johore.
TABLE II: 14
62
Distributi.on of the urban population, Malaya, 1957
7
83
Total Number Total Percentage
23
Population of urban urban of urban to
State
-
centres population total
01
population
03
Penang and Prov.
Wellesley 572,132 6 336,026 59
Selangor 1 ,012,891 16 #
505,038 50
us
Perak 1 ,221,390 25 407,552 33
Joh ore 927,565 13 263,899 28
in
Pahang 3 1 2,949 6 84,883 27

jo
Malacca 291 ,246 1 69,851 24

up
Negri Sembilan 364,331 3 69,443 19

Trengganu 278,165 3 52,834 19
ro
Kelantan . 505,585 6 82,935 16

G
Kedah 701 ,643 4 98,654 14

Perlis 90,866 6,065 7
p
1
ap
Malaya 6,278,763 84 1 ,977,1 80 31

ts
ha
Sourcti: 1 957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, Report Nos. l-12, Kuala
Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1958-1959, and OjficiJJI Year �oo/c, )962,
W
Vol.2, op. cit., p. 37.

si
ba
Though the Peninsula is primarily an agricultural country, it still

presents a high degree of urbanization. The census of 1 957 enumerated
Ab
84 urban centres (using the 5 ,000 statistical criterion as the basis for
Q
determining the ' urban ') having 31 per cent of the total population of
Malaya (see Table II : 14).
A.
Again , 62 out of 84 urban centres of Malaya containing 85 per cent

of the total urban population fell within the Western belt of the Peninsula.
The growth of towns in the Western bet t, or for that matter, in other parts
of the Peninsula, was not essentially associated, unlike the Western part
of Pakistan, with the process of industrialization. The towns of the
'
Western Peninsula had originated as commercial, trading and
distributing centres whose growth had been largely influenced by the
success of tin and rubber industries. The establishment of this important
export economy meant that an increasing number of people were needed
to handle the transport, financing and distribution of the export products
as well as essent.ial imports. The overwhelming majority of such people
were imm igrants, both Asians and Europeans. Thus, of the total urban
population of the Peninsula in 1957, the indigenous Malays comprised
62
only 21 per cent, Chinese 63 per cent, Indians 12 per cent and Europeans
7
including others 4 per cent. Of the 84 urban cen tres only 10 had a Malay
83
majority including all six in Kelantan, all three in Trengganu and the
23
remaining one in Kedah. With the exception of Kata Bharu and Kuala
-
Trengganu, all these Malay towns had populations of less than 20,000
01
each, and they all fell in the Eastern belt of the Peninsula. All the other
03
urban centres had immigrant, mainly Chinese, majorities and all of these
fell in the Western· belt of the peninsula.
#
us
Clearly, the Malays were predom inantly rural people. In 1 957, 87 per
in
cent of the total Malay population l ived in the countryside and in villages
jo
of less. than 5 ,000 people. Again, the rural character of the Malays was
up
also reflected in their choice of occupation. Of the 1 ,023 (in thousands,

ro
see Table II : 1 6) economically active Malays in 1 957, about 76 per cent

G
were employed in the primary industries of agriculture, fishing', mining

and forestry. Of this, half were engaged in rice cultivation, one-third in
p
ap
rubber cultivation, and the remainder in others forms of agriculture, and

ts
in fishing, mining and forestry. S ince the majority of the rice growers .
ha
were Malays, there was thus a close correlation between the distribution
of rice areas and the areas of high Malay densities. Of course, the Western
W
part of Johore was exceptional where rice growing was not important.
si
Even in the Western belt of the peninsula where the Malays formed a
ba
small segment of the total population, they were again distributed in the
Ab
rural areas, whereas the immigrant people largely occupied the urban
centres. Moreover, in the areas where Malays formed a substantial
Q
majority, their proportion of the urban population was less than half. A
A.
surprising and i l lustrative fact is that there had been no Malay population
in Kampon Koh, a town of the state of Perak, in 1 957. Of the twenty-one
major towns of the Peninsula with populations of at lea<;t 20,000 , only two
had a Malay majority (Table II : 15).
Geographic and Demographic Dimensfons 27
TABLE II: 15
The racial composition of the major towns
of th_e Peninsula, 1957
Town Number of Percentage

Persons Chinese Malays Indians Others
62
Kuala Lumpur . 3 16,230 62 15 17 6
Georgetown 234,930 73 11 13 9
7
lpoh 125,776 67 16 13 4
83
Klang 75,649 61 16 19 4
23
Jahore Bahru 75,080 44 38 9 9
Malacca 69,851 73 13 7 7
-
11
01
Ator Star 52,929 48 38 3
Seremban 52,020 66 12 15 7
03
Taiping 48, 1 83 59 19 18 4
Butterworth 42,506 51 24 22 3
Bandar, Penggaram
#
us
(Batu Pahat) 40,016 66 23 5 6
Bandar Maharani
in
(Muar) 39,050 64 29 5 2
jo
Kota Bharu 38,096 29 67 3 I

Telok Anson 37,040 63 19 16 2
up
Kluang 3 1 , 1 83 65 23 8 4
ro
Kuala Trengganu 29,436 19 77 3 1

Bukit Menajam 24,658 77 10 12 1
G
Kampar 24,61 1 84 6 9 1
p
Kuan tan 23, 122 55 35 7 3

ap
Sungei Patani 22,886 58 27 15 0

ts
Ayer Itam 22,369 82 8 9 I

ha
W
So11rce:· Official Year Book, 1962, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 39.

si
Both of these were in the traditional Malay areas of the North-eastern

ba
belt of the Peninsula. None of the immigrants, Chinese or Indians, were

interested in subsistence agriculture like rice which was comparatively
Ab
less remunerative.
Q
Again , it is obvious that there has been a close correlation between

A.
the occupation of the immigrants and their distribution. In 1957, of the

77 1 ,000 economically active Chinese immigran ts, 46.7 per cent were
engaged in the primary industries, 17.4 per cent in the secondary
industries, and the remaining 35. 9 percent in the tertiary industries. In the
same year, of the 3 12,000 Indian immigrants, 59.5, 7.3, and.33.2 per cent
were engaged in the primary, secondary and tertiary industries respec
tively. These immigrants provided nearly two-thirrls of the labour force
employed in the secondary industries. In comparison, less than a quarter
of the gainfully employed Malays were engaged in non-primary occupa
tion (see Table II : 16).
TABLE II: 16
Economically active population by race and industry
62
with selected subdivisions, 1957
7
83
In thousands
Industry Malays Chinese Indians Others
23
174 10
-
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 749 310
01
rice 381 9 0.5 6
23 54 1 0.1
03
market gardening
rubber 260 200 1 50 2
26 4 9 0. 1
#
coconut
Mining, manufacturing 36 , 1 36 16 2'
us
Commerce 32 127 32 3
Other Industries and Services 1 80 174 RO 38
in
government serv.ices 17 5 8 2
jo
police, homeguard 43 4 2 1
up
armed forces (Malay an and

other governments) 15 2 3 23
ro
Total economically active

G
population 1 ,023 77 1 312 56

p
ap
Source: H.Fell, 1957, Popu/alion Census of the Feduation of Malaya, Report No. 1 4 ,
Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, Government Press, January 1960, Table
ts
1 4 , pp. 128-1 37.

ha
S ince these industries were town-based, there has been a remarkable

W
coincidence between the percentage of the gainfully employed immi

si
grants engaged in these typically urban occupations and the percentage

ba
of me immigrant population living in towns in 1957. Hence, the majority

Ab
of the urban population was made up by the immigrants and among them
the Chinese comprised half or more of the population of 70 out of the 84
Q
urban centres in the Peninsula in 1 957. Of the 2 1 major urban centres with
A.
a population of over 20,000, seventeen had a Chinese majority. The

Indians, on the other hand, were numerically the smallest of the three
main racial groups in the Peninsula, and in no urban centre except
Butterworth did they form more than one-fifth of the total urban popula
tion (see Table II : 15).
This pattern of urbanization is an index of both physical separation

and differing standards of living between the indigenous Malays and the
,
immigrants which made their integration a problem of the first

magnitude.
VITI Ethnic, Linguistic, Societal and Cultural Differences
It is evident that the indigenous Malays, engaged in subsistence

economy, remained the poorest of the 'three ethnic communities of the
62
Peninsula. Since the urbanization pattern reflected a sharp economic
imbalance between the indigenous Malays and the non-Malays (the
7
83
immigrants)-these cleavages were further widened like in the Bengali
23
and non-Bengali population of Pakistan, by their ethnic, linguistic, social
and cultural differences. While the immigrants were mostly economi
-
01
cally better-off, unlike the immigrants in Pakistan-they were not cultur
03
ally homogeneous. Among the immigrants, the Chinese were the most
heterogeneous element. For example, there were about ten dialect groups
#
(sec Table II : 17) among the Chinese imm igrants and each of them had
us
different customs, traditions and occupations ,that were completely
in
different and distinct from the indigenous Malays. ,

jo
TABLE II: 17
up
The Chinese community by dialect groups, 1957

ro
G
In thousands Percentage
p
740.6 3 1.7
ap
Hokkien
Hakka 508.6 21.8
ts
Cantonese 505.2 21.7

ha
Tiechieu 283 . I 12.1

Hainancse 123.0 5.3
W
Kwongsai 69.1 3.0

si
Hockchiu 46.I 2.0

ba
Hengkwa 1 1 .9 0.5
Hokchia 9.8 0.4
Ab
Others 34.3 1 .5
Q
So111ce: 1957 Population Census, Report No. .14, op. cit, Table 3.3, p. 14
A.
Although after the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the Chinese

intended to unify their different dialect groups by introducing Kuo Yu,
the Chinese national language both as spoken as well as a common
medium of instruction for all Chinese schools in the peninsula, they wer:e
still divided into groups of Malay-born and China-born Chinese, and the
English-speaking and the non-English-speaking Chinese. Again from the
religious point of view the Chinese, unlike the indigenous Malays, were
further divided by many faiths. Since no attempt has been made to collect
data on the Chinese religious affiliation since the 193 1 census, it has been
observed that most of the Chinese confess to one or more of the three great
religions of mainland China-Buddhism, Taoism or Confucianism.
Also, nearly all Chinese, whatever tlleir religion , participate in the

major festivals and holidays observed in China. Likewise, the Indians
were divided by linguistic differences which were determined mainly by
62
their places of origin in India (see Table II : 18).
7
83
Table II :18
23
The Indian community by dialect groups 1947-1957
-
01
1947 1957
In thousands
03
Percentage Inthousands Percent �ge
#
Indian Tamil 4 1 8.7 78.9 556.5 78.7
Malaya Ii 34.6 6.5 5 1 .2 7.2
us
Telegu 23.7 4.5 27.l 3.8
Othen 53.5 10. l 72.4 10.2
in
jo
Total 5 30.6 100.0 707 . l 99.9

up
Source: 1957 Population Census of the Fetkration of Malaya, Report No. 14, op.cit.,
ro
Table 3.4, p. 16.

G
The 1947 census gives the following figures (in thousands) for other Indian sub
groups: Sikh, 10.2; Punjabi, '20.5; Pathan, 3 . 1 ; Bengali, 3.8; Gujarati, 1 .3; and
p
ap
Marwari, 1 .4. Similar figures for 1957 are not available.

The estimate for 1947 is taken from Federation of Malaya Official Year Book,
ts
1962, Vol.XI, op, cit., p.40.

ha
And for a detailed account of the population growth in Malaya, see T.E. Smith,
Population Growth in Malaya, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
W
1 952, p.86.
si
The above Table indicates that the Tamils were the largest element
ba
of the Indian community on the Peninsula. Again, the 1947 population

Ab
census shows that the Punjabis and Sikhs were the next largest elements
of the Indian sub-communities. Like the people of West Pakistan, the
Q
Indians in the Peninsula were culturally divided and their cultural

A.
diversity may be identified with their places of origin. They spoke in their
respective regional dialects, but since the Indian Tamils fonned the
largest number of the economically active population of the Indian
immigrants, only the Tamil - medium Primary and Secondary Schools
both private and fully assisted by the government have been functioning
in the Peninsula.15 Like the Chinese, the Indians were alsp divided into
Tamil-educated Indians and English-educated Indians. This is fairly true
Geographic an(i Demographic Dimensions 31
of those Indian immigrants who were government employees or those

who were engaged in the trade and. commerce of the Peninsula. They
preferred sending their children to English-medium schools rather than
to Tamil-medium schools. Thus a socio-economic division within the
Indian comm unity, primarily between the rural labouring and lower caste
Indians who received vernacular Tamil education, and the urban based
business, professional and w hite-collar workers who received an English
62
medium education, was inevitable. Unlike the indigenous Malays, the
7
83
Indians were divided by many but mainly two religious faiths-Hinduism
and Islam. Since Hinduism is the dominant religion of South India, the
23
overwhelming number of immigrants to Malaya were Hindus. The
-
01
assimilation of an Indian Hindu, mainly because of his religion, with a
03
Malay (Muslim) or for that matter with a Chinese (Buddhist, Taoist, or
Confucian) was an impossible proposition. Again, since the Indian
#
immigrants, especially those who were rubber planters and railway
us
workers, lived in an isolated area of "labour lines" under the supervision
in
of an Indian foreman, they had little contact with other racial groups. And
jo
more surprisin�ly, they had little social contact with the otherlndian sub
up
communities who are classified as "elites." Even the elites among the
Indians, engaged in commerce and government offices of the Peninsula,
ro
should have integrated well into the urban life of the country, but they had
G
no more than superficial contact either with their co-partners, the

p
ap
Chinese, or with the native people of the Peninsula. Initially, few of them
had any intention of becoming permanent residents of the Peninsula. In
ts
particular, the Indian peasant, working in rubber estates and railway

ha
construction, was not inclined to emigrate, and in fact, the migratory

W
instinct was practically absent in him.

si
ba
Even in the most desperate circumstances, he would leave his native

Ab
land convinced of his ulliinate return. This sort of attitude is further

p
reflected, for example, in the data for the ten years receding 1 898- 1 899
Q
where an estimated 84 per cent of emigrants from the Madras Presidency

A.
of India returned home. Like the Chinese, they wanted to retain, whilst
in the Peninsula, their culture, language, tradition and finally, loyalty to
their motherland. Hence, the Chinese and Indian im migrants who turned
the Peninsula into a 'plural society' lived for many years, side by side
without intermarrying and with different standards of living as the
products of the British colonial legacy. In fact, both the Chinese and
Indian immigrants to the Peninsula were deliberately imported by the
British as a necessary means to the-economic development of Malaya, but
the only motive for this development was the profit of the investors. No
effort had been made by the colonial masters either to integrate these im
m igrants into the life and blood of the Peninsula by adopting any uniform
policy of education, law or order. Rather the colonial powers, in their
search for raw materials, markets and the resulting need for cheap labour,
transported large numbers of Chinese and Indians to work on tin mining
62
and rubber plantations by a system which was referred to as indentured
labour. By adopting a policy of segregation, the colonial powers em
7
83
ployed the Indians in the rubber estates, railway constructions and in the
various offices of the government; the Chinese were left with the tin
23
mining, trade and commerce ; and the indigenous Malays with their poor
-
01
subsistence economy. It was a result of this Imperial policy that the
03
Chinese and Indian immigrants were distinct from each other, and
thereby they continued to remain distinct from the indigenous Malays, the
bhumiputras of the post-Independence times. #
us
Like the immigrant Chinese and Indians, the indigenous- Malays
in
were not the first inhabitants of the Peninsula. There was a small group
jo
namely, the aboriginal tribes who had a better claim than the indigenous
up
Malays to be considered the original inhabitants of the Peninsula. Accord

ro
ing to the 1957 census, 4 1 ,360 persons of aboriginal stock were counted,
G
as compared with 34,737 in 1 947 and 3 1 ,3 82 in 193 1 . Though the indige

p
nous Malays had intermarried with the aborigines and showed many
ap
traces of mixed blood, they had failed to absorb them completely.

ts
ha
The census report of 194 7 shows that of the total enumerated, 29 ,648
were nomads and only 5,089 had adopted the life of the indigenous
W
Malays. The majority of them not only found their shelter in the' hills,
si
swamps and deep jungles, they had retained their own language and their
ba
primitive culture-distinct from the Malays. Since their number was so

Ab
small like the Hill Tracts people of East Pakistan, they did not pose any
Q
serious obstacle to nation-building in Malaysia. Apart from those

nomadic aborigines, the indigenous Malays were initially also culturally
A.
heterogeneous. They were of mixed ethnic background, some having

lived in the Peninsula for more than a millennium, others migrating in
more recent times from different parts of Indonesia.
The 1947 census shows that out of a total of 2,544,000 Malays

(including Singapore) there were 188,000 Javanese, 20,000 Boyanese,
1 1 ,000 Minangkabaus, 15,000 other Sumatrans, 62,000 Banjarese, and
7 ,000 Bugis. These figures contained' t�e significant feature of
immigration from different ethnic groups into the Peninsula. Unlike the
Chinese or Indian immigrants, these people were not 'birds of passage' ,
but had decided to make the p lace their permanent home. This sort of
altitude largely helped assimilation with the local people. Since they
shared a common area of culture with the local Malays and finally
subscribed to the Muslim faith, they became well integrated rapidly by
62
adopting the Malay language and customs as well as intermarrying. This
immigration of similar stock into the Peninsula may be termed as
7
83
' indigenous', the word 'indigenous' relating only to the Malays of the
23
twentieth century, and particularly of the last two de.cades.
-
01
What distinguishes an ind igenous Malay from the other denizens of
the Peninsula? Today, it is commonly accepted that the Malays belong
03
to a community that is culturally homogeneous (if by culture is meant all
#
the manifestations of social habits of a community), When speaking of
us
the culture of the Malays, a number of points need to be considered.
Firstly, their religion is Islam. The Malay is an orthodox Muslim of the
in
jo
S hafi' ite school, the basic tenets of which are the declaration ofone's faith
in the oneness of God and in the divine messengership of the Prophet
up
Muhammad (S.M.), prayer five times daily, distribution of Zakat or poor

ro
rate, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and a pilgrimage to Mecca for
G
the purpose of the Haj. Secondly, their language is ' Malay' - the vehicle
p
for the communication of their ideas. The Malay language spoken in

ap
Malaysia has the same roots as 'Bahasa Indonesia', the official language
ts
of Indonesia. It belongs to the Malay-Polynesian family of languages

ha
which extends from Taiwan lo New Zealand and from Madagascar to

W
Easter Island in the Pacific Ocean. The Malay language is referred to as

si
Bahasa Kebangsaan (national language) and is also widely used as a

ba
lingua franca among all peoples of Malaysia. And finally, besides religion
Ab
and language, ,th e Malays have their own social systems and customs.
Over the centuries, they have worked out a framework for accommoda
Q
tion in which those social systems and customs which are incompatible
A.
w ith their religion can be observed and perpetuated as adat (custom).

They take their adat so seriously that they have a proverb, B iar mati anak,
jangan mati adat (Let the child perish, but not the custom).
Malay culture stands not only quite distinct but it sets the Malays
apart from the other inhabitants of Malaysia.
Again, since the Malays and non-Malays were largely concentrated

in the Eastern as well as in the Western be! Ls of the Peninsula respectively,
the cultural cleavages between them had been further deepened by purely
economic-oriented transport policies pursued by .the British colonial
power. The extension of British political hegemony in the Pen insula
showed a marked divergence in transport and communication develop
ment between and within the Western as well as Eastern belts of the
Peninsula. The highly profitable tin and rubber resources which were
62
mainly concentrated in the Western Malay states were related to the
extension of the roads and railway networks. By 193 1 , the construction
7
83
of road and railway networks, linking almost all principal towns and
23
ports, running through the major rubber-growing and tin-mining areas in
the Western belt of the Peninsula had been completed. Until the 1940s,
-
01
the Eastern belt, which was relatively isolated, and had a sporadic
03
distribution of mineral deposits, was totally overlooked and remained
largely undeveloped. Hence, t�e pattern of railway development in the
#
Peninsula was solely dictated by econom iC, rather than by social or
us
politicalreasons. These roads and railway communications were mainly
in
concentrated in the Western belt of the Peninsula and were intended to

jo
serve the tin and rubber plantation industries and also the urban popula
'
up
tion (mostly composed of the immigrants) associated with them rather

than the vast majority of the rural Malay population whose cultural
ro
activities were closely interwoven with land and were to a large extent
G
neglected. Thus, overall cultural or social contact among the different

p
ap
ethnic groups was almost absent. Hence, like Pakistan, geographical

ts
isolation followed by lack of communication between the Eastern belt of

ha
the Peninsula and the Western belt was one of the major hindrances in the
process of cultural or social integration of the multi-ethnic nation of
W
Malaysia.
si
ba
However, a careful study of the evidence will indicate that as the

Ab
years passed, geographic isolation followed by lack of transport and of

communication became less of an obstacle in the campaign aimed at the
Q
national unification and integration in Pakistan and Malaysia. At the time

A.
of lndepehdence, communication and travel between and within the two

wings of Pakistan was extremely slow and difficult. In East Pakistan roads
and rivers constituted the main arteries of transportation and communi
cation, which were usable only during fair weather, while most of the
roads and highways in West Pakistan were accessible throughout the
year.
Prior to the British intervention in the state.s of the Malay Peninsula,

rivers and roads also formed the main arteries of communication and
'
transportation. The establishment of the British rule in the states of the
Peninsula was followed by the construction of railroads which served the
needs of the ru�ber and other industries. Consequently, at the time of In
dependence in 1957, Peninsular Malaysia inherited one of the best
developed networks of highways and roads in the region of South-East
Asia. Subsequently, both Pakistan and Malaysia were able to take
62
advantage of a developing economy and a number of modem technologi
7
cal advances to minimize the detrimental effects of the lack of commu
83
nication and transportation and also that of geographic divisions.
23
This phenomenal growth in road transportation can be attributed to
-
01
greater internal movement in the Peninsula. As a result, the factors of
03
geographic division, lack of transportation and communication were no
longer seen as insun:nountable barriers to national integration, and rather,
#
the linguistic, economic and political forces soon proved to be a far
us
greater strain permeating the entire national identity of the nation of
in
Malaysia.
jo
Similarly, while the physical problems of Pakistan with its geo

up
graphic division and lack of transportation facilities were more acute than
ro
those of Malaysia, they too were not insurmountable and, as with

G
Malaysia, conflicting linguistic, cultural, political and economic forces

p
were the factors which were to subject the nation to its greatest stress.
ap
ts
References
ha
Jawaharlal Nehru, An A utobiography, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1 980,

W
1.
p. 469 (first published in 1 936).
si
2. A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, London: Oxford University Press,

ba
1 966, p. 3.
3. O.H.K. Spate, "Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme"' Geographical
Ab
Journal, Vol. 102 (September 1 943), p. 129.

Q
4. S. van Valkenburg, Elements of Political Geography, op. cit.,p. 1 38

A.
5. Report ofthe Provincial Administration Commission, 1 960, op. cit., p . 1 1 ; and also
see M.A. Chaudhuri , op. cit., pp. 1 83- 1 85.
6. The disciples of the Prophet of Islam, Hazart Muhammad (S.M.), who had to flee
from Mecca with him and who sought shelter in Medina are called Muhajir
(refugee).
7. The Second Constituelll Assembly of Paldstan, Debates, Official Report, Vol. I,
Karachi : Government of Pakistan Press, January 16, 1956, p. 1 8 1 6 (speech by Mr.
Abu! Mansur Ahmad).
8. Damodar P . Singhal, Pakistan, New Jersey: Prentice-Hal l, Inc., 1 972, p. 9 .
9. A. Tayyeb, op. cit., p. 16.
10. A. Yusuf Ali, An Interpretation of the Holy Qur'an, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf, 1975, Chapter vi, Sura: Al - in-Am, Verse no. 152, Chapter xvii, Sura: Bani
- Israil, Verse no. 33 Chapter xxv, Sura: Al-Furqun, Verse no. 68.
11. Th e text of th e new clause of the Constitution of Pakistan i s as follows: " A person
who does not believe in the absolute . and unqualified finality of the Prophet
Muhammad (S.M.) the last of the prophets, or claims to be a prophet, in any sense
of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (S.M.), or recog
nizes such a claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the
purposes of the Constitution or law." See The Constitution oftht Islamic Republic
62
ofPalcistan, 1974, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Karachi: Government
7
Press, 1974, Clause (3) in Article 260. And also see Prof. Abdul Ghafoor Ahmad
83
(Member of the Parliament ofPakistan), "The Qadiyanies: A Non-Muslim Minority
23
in Pakistan" ,The Journal of Rabtttat Al-Alam Al-lslami (Muslim World League),
Vol. 2, no. 3 (January 1 975) , pp. 4 1-49.
-
01
12. The terms Malaya, Malay, Malayan, Malaysian and Malaysia have been used here
in their meanings, which are as follows:
03
"Malaya" refers to the geographical areas of the eleven states of the Malay
Peninsula (West Malaysia).
#
"Malays" are defined by law as the traditional subjects of the Sultans, and the people
us
whose native tongue is the Malay language and whose religion is Islam.
"Malayan" used a s a noun refers to someone who is a permanentresidentof Malay.i,
in
regardless of race. The term "Malaysian"formerly was applied to any of the Malay
jo
Indonesian ethnic stock peoples indigenous to the Malay Peninrnla. Recently the
up
term "Malaysian" includes the inhabitants of the Federation·of Malaysia, namely,

West Malay·sia or Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, i.e. Sabah and Sarawak.
ro
13. Ooi Jin-Bee, Land, People an d Economy in Malaya, London: Longmans, Green and
G
Co., Ltd., 1963, pp. 1 1 3- 1 1 4 .

14. See th e Immigration Regulations, 1 953 (No. 28 of 1 953); The Immigration (Prohi
p
.
bition of Entry) Order 1953 (No. 29 of 1953), and Minutes and CoU11cil Papus of
ap
tht Federal Legislative Council 195311954, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press,

ts
1954.
ha
And also see Federation ofMalaya, Annual Report, 1957, Kuara Lumpur: Govern
ment Press, 1 958, pp. 9-26.
W
1 5. K.S. SaJldhu, Malaysian Mi110rity: Planta(ion Workers ofIndian Origin A Legacy

of Colonialism, World Council of Churches, 1 972, pp. 28-29.
si
ba
Ab
Q
A.
3
62
EC ONOMIC BAC KGR OUND
7
83
23
Introduction
-
01
Despite its geographical, social and cultural divisions, Pakistan was
03
able to maintain through its majority religion, Islam, the conditions that
are necessary to detennine a nation state. However, it has been shown that
#
religion was at best a weak bond that kept both wings of Pakistan from
us
drifting apart. In general, therefore, althou � h religion provided some
in
necessary factors for integration it did not provide a sufficient condition.

jo
Increasingly both in Pakistan and in Malaysia, economic disparities

up
among its citizens became a major focus of political debate and disagree
ment.
ro
G
PAKISTAN
p
ap
In the years justafter Independence, between 194 7 and 1 950, the total
regional income of East Pakistan was almost certainly higher than that of
ts
ha
West Paki.Stan. S ubsequently,economic policies were designed that

helped West Pakistan to develop much more rapidly than the East in
W
almost all major areas of economic activity. Eventually, East Pakistan

si
was turned into a protected market for the manufactured goods of West
ba
Pakistan, and indeed the policy of the federal administration was geared
Ab
to maintaining that. This was colonialism par excellence and this might
have been the single sufficient cause for the dismem bennent of Pakistan.
Q
A.
The principal factors responsible for increasing disparity in Pakistan,

are aniilysed as follows.
I. The Economic Situation in 1947
When Pakistan was created by partitioning India in 1947, her

economy as a whole appeared to be relatively backward in comparison
to that oflndia. In the whole of Pakistan, there were only 34 factories with
an employment capacity of only about 26,000 people. Pakistan 's
economy was almost entirely based on agriculture, at subsistence level.
East Pakistan as the world's largest producer of raw jute had almost no
capacity to produce any jute manufactures: and West Pakistan, a major
exporter or raw cotton had only three textile mills after three years of
Independence. There were a few industries engaged in sugar refining, tea
processing and cement manufacturing, but the industrial products used in
Pakistan were all imported. Again, both regions of Pakistan lacked
62
industrial as well as commercial enterprises. By any standard, Pakistan
7
83
appeared to be an economically backward country.
23
The two regions of Pakistan differed substantially in their initial
-
factor endowments. Initially, East Pakistan was better off than West
01
Pakistan, for example, in the cottage industry sector where it had the edge.
03
There were about . five large-scale cottage textile industries in East
Pakistan. About 75 per cent of the world' s raw jute was produced by the
#
us
East with a jute baling capacity of 1 . 1 million bales against West
Pakistan's cotton ginning capacity of600,000 bales.1 In 1 947-48, West
in
Pakistan, with a population of 30 million, was five times larger in area

jo
than the East (55, 1 26 square miles) but had only 29 million acres of
up
cultivable land (both irrigated and unirrigated). Although East Pakistan

ro
with its 45 million people had very limited cultivable land (22 m illion
G
acres) its fertility was more than double that of the irrigated lands of the
p
West. As stated above, the economic activity of East Pakistan was

ap
dominated by agriculture with double-cropping of rice and jute, while

ts
wheat and cotton were the major agricultural products of the West. East
ha
Pakistan's main earnings were from exports of raw jute, hides and skins,
W
and tea which were more than sufficient to meet the cost of imports,
particularly food, while West Pakistan's export earnings from raw cotton,
si
ba
hides and skins, and wool ranged from 25 to 30 per cent of Pakistan 's total
earnings. Although West Pakistan received a larger income from the
Ab
·service sectors than did the East, the number of scheduled banks iP East
Q
Pakistan was 1 1 1 in 1 948 as compared with 89 in the West.2 East

Pakistan's service sectors-banks, insurance, education and distributive
A.
trade, which were increasing as an intermediary of Calcutta, suffered a

setback with the partition of India owing to an exodus of Hindus to India.
But this setback was soon overcome. Since East Pakistan was the
hinterland of Calcutta during the colonial period, it could not develop any
port facilities, nor was any effort made to discover mineral deposits.
Although a riverine land,electricity generation was insufficient, and East
Pakistan remained a predominantly agranan part of Pakistan.3
Economic Background 39
Both the Eastern and Western regions of Pakistan respectively
inherited from British India the fairly large networks of the Eastern and
Assam-Bengal Railways, and a large part of the old North-Western
Railway. Yet, the Eastern wing was relatively backward in inland
waterways and road transport facilities, while theoverall communication
facilities in the Western region were a little better. The Western region
also gainfully inherited a large army, mostly manned by those of Punjab,
62
old British Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier Province. The
7
Muslim members of the Indian Civil and Finance Services who opted for
83
Pakistan were appointed in the administrative machinery of the federal
23
government in Karachi also located in West Pakistan. Apart from this, a
-
large numberofHindusand S ikhs from the Punjab and S ind who migrated
01
to India created a big vacuum in th field of trade and commerce in the
03
Western region, but the influx of the Muslim m iddle class and business
#
men from North India and Bombay soon filled it up. This gave to the·
us
Western region a great potential for industrial development in which both
the large and small-scale sectors of industrial activity accounted for less
in
than 1 0 per cent of the regional GNP of Ea.st Pakistan which was without
jo
the advantage of such immigrant capital and expertise.

up
ro
It is very difficult to form a definite picture of the growth of

G
Pakistan's national income on a regional basis due to the lack of official

statistics until 1964 when, under the guidance of the National Income
p
ap
Commission, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) provided for the first
ts
time a regional breakdown of about 97 per cent of total domestic incomes

ha
and that was also only for the years 1957-60 to 1 962-63. Regional
breakdown was not attempted for the remaining 3 per cent of incomes
W
originating in banking and insurance, inter-regional communication and

si
the bulk of central government activities. Nevertheless, Khan and

ba
Bergan, Khandkar, and Haq who attempted to estimate regional incomes

Ab
and their disparity in the initial period of Pakistan's existence broadly

reached similar conclusions. Their estimates show that on the whole,
Q
between 1 947 and 1950, as far as regional resource endowments and the
A.
level of total income were concerned, East Pakistan's total regional

income was certainly higher than that of West Pakistan. Haq ' s estimates
show that East Pakistan 's total regional income was rupees 8,580 million
as against West Pakistan 's 8,460 million at 1949-50 to 1952-53 factor
cost Khandkar observed that regional income in EastPakistan was IO per
cent higher than that in West Pakistan for 1950-5 1 . It is now obvious that
East Pakistan 's income remained higher or just equal until 1954-55.
From 1954-55, Easl Pakistan's economic trend changed and West
Pakistan's income exceeded the East's for lhe first time that year after
which the gap continued to widen throughout the period. But, what had
gone wrong with the Eastern region of Pakistan which had exhibited
higher incomes in the initial years until 1 953-54 when it suddenly started
losing its economic superiority or growth potentialities, in a trend
continuing until as late as 1 97 1 ? For an objective and detailed answer to
62
this question, one has to examine events which took place after 194 7 and
7
dominated the whole course of Pakistan's economic development in the
83
years till 1 97 1 . Firstly, the location and centralized attitude of the Federal
23
Government of Pakistan was one of the most significant reasons for the
-
low level of economic growth in East Pakistan. Secondly, the top
01
positions of the civil , finance and military services which were obviously
03
important for the allocation of resources and formulation ofpolicies were
#
almost exclusively occupied by West Pakistanis. And finally, the Muslim
us
m iddle class and the capitalists-the Khojas, Bohras and Memons from
Bombay and North India also migrated, settled and invested their capital
in
in West Pakistan, which largely contributed to the development of this

jo
region's economy from the beginning.

up
ro
Since the seat of the federal government has always been located in
G
West Pakistan (at first in Karachi and later in Islamabad), it attracted

business and commerce, banking and industry to this part of the country.
p
ap
The unique geography of Pakistan was also a distinct advantage for the
Western region. For example, an indus trialist from West Pakistan could
ts
ha
come to the federal capital within a shorl time, and at nominal expense,
to get his business done at the Ministry of Industries while an . East
W
Pakistani who was separated from the federal capital by more than one
si
thousand m iles of Indian territory, might have to wait for months to get
ba
his business completed through postal communication. Again, West

Ab
Pakistan not only hosted the federal government, but also accounted for
nearly 90 per cent of its employment positions available to government
Q
officials. These West Pakistani officials used to exercise wide controls

A.
over the economic and political life ofthe country. Such factors including
easy access to the federal authorities counted for much in the gradual
growth of the regional economy of West Pakistan.
Il. Economic Development since Independence
Although East Pakistan showed higher regional income at the initial

stage, the per capita income of that region was lower than that of the West
region from the very dawn o f Pakistan. This was mainly be.c ause the
pattern of economic development between the two regions of Pakistan
was not balanced (Table Ill: 1).
TABLE ID: l
GNPs• of East and West Pakistan at 1959-60 Constant Factor
62
Cost
7
(Rupees in Million)
83
23
Annual Compound Rate
of per capita growth
-
01
(per cent)
03
1 949-50 1 959-60 1969-70 1 959-60 1969-70
East Pakistan 12,360 1 4,945 23,1 19 0.2 5.4
West Pakistan 1 2, 1 06 16,494 3 1 , 1 57 3.6
# 7.2
us
All Pakistan 24,466 3 1 ;439 54,276
in
Sources : Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, Karachi: Government
jo
of Pakistan Press, 1 967, p. 1 1 ; and Report of the'Panel of Econof1WIS on the

Fourth Five -Year Plan (1970-75), Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press,
up
1 970, p. 1 32.
ro
• Una! located items such as Pakistan International A i , : ines (PIA), and Banking and
to to
G
Insurance, etc., have heen apportioned Provincial Accounts in proportion

directly allocatable items.
p
ap
Similarly, the per capita incomes and the rates of per capita growth for
ts
the two regions of Pakistan were uneven (Table III:2) .

ha
W
si
TABLE III: 2
ba
Per capita incomes in East and West Pakistan at 1959-60 constant

Ab
factor cost
(in rupees)
Q
1949-50 1 959-60 1 969-70

A.
East Pakistan 287 278 33 1

West Pakistan 338 366 537
All Pakistan 311 318 424
Annual compound rate of per capita growth in percentages
1 959-60 1 969-70
East Pakistan -0.3 2.0

West Pakistan ,/
0.8 4.8
Sources : The Third Five -Y�r Plan 1965-70, op. ciL,p. 1 1 , and Report ofthe Pa11el of
62
Economists on Fourth Five -Year Plan (1970-75), Ibid., p. 133.
7
83
East Pakistan's contribution to regional income in agriculture was 65
23
per cent, which dropped to 55 per cent in 1964-65, , whilst that of the
-
manufacturing sector grew from 4 percent in 1949 to 7�5 percent in 1964-
01
65. In comparison, West Pakistan's agriculture fell from 55 per cent in
03
1949-50 to 42 per cent in 1964-65, and industry grew from 7 .5 per cent
#
in 1949-50 to about 14 per cent in 1964-65 (Tables III: 3 and III: 4)
us
in
TABLE DI: 3
jo
GNP of East Pakistan by origin in selected years at 1959-60

up
factor cost (rupees in million)

ro
Pre-Plan
G
Average
p
1950.51 to
ap
Sectors 1 949-50 1954-55 1 959-60 1 964-65

ts
ha
I. Agriculture 8,074 8,648 9,042 10,774

2. Mining and quarrying
W
3. Manufacturing 472 566 912 1 ,536

4. Construction 58 1 06 224 806
si
S. Electricity, gas
ba
and water power 6 8 20 1 13

Ab
6. Transportation and
communications 63 1 704 900 1 , 1 88
Q
7. Trade, finance snd

other services 3 , 1 33 3,478 3 ,874 5,000
A.
Total Gross Product 12,374 1 3, 5 1 0 1 4,972 19,4l7
Source: See Table III: 4

TABLE III: 4
GNP of West Pakistan by origin in selected years at 1959-60
factor cost (rupees in million)
Pre-Plan
Average
62
1950-51 to
Sectors 1 949-50 1954-55 1 959-60 1 964-65
7
83
I. Agriculture 6,595 6,608 7,7 1 1 9 , 1 24
23
2. Mining and quarrying 27 42 80 115
3 . Manufacturing 96 1 1 ,273 2,0 1 8 2,904
-
01
4. Construction 179 254 427 963
5. Electricity, gas
03
and water power 27 32 87 1 54
6. Transportation and
communications 608 716
#
921 1,238
us
7 . Trade, finance and
other services 3,964 4 , 1 12 6,233 6,750
in
Total Gross Product 12,091 1 3,027 16,467 21,248

jo
Sources: Central Staristical Office, Twenty years ofPakistan in Statistics 1947-67,

up
Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1968, pp. 4-5; and

ro
T.M. Khan and W.A. Bergan, "Measurement of Structural Change in the

Pakistan Economy ... " op. cit., pp. 1 82- 1 83 , 199-207 .
G
p
ap
Trade, finance and services wel'e increasing significantly at a higher

ts
rate in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. West Pakistan's infrastructure

ha
also grew more rapidly than that of East. For example, during the period
W
1947-58, enrolment in primary and secondary schools and in the

universities in West Pakistan increased by 1 63 per cent, 64 per cent and
si
ba
38 per cent respectively, whereas &st Pakistan 's enrolment in primary

schools increased only by 38 percent, in secondary schools it dropped by
Ab
6.6 per cent and in the universities it increased only by 1 1 .2 per cent
Q
(Table III: 5).

A.
Also, West Pakis;tan 's transport and communications facilities (Chapter

II) developed more rapidly than those of the East. This data from the
above table explains the differential speed of development, and the
relative shift and direction of structural change in the two regions of
Pakistan. The economic disparity between East and West Pakistan which
was 20 per cent in 1949-50, increased to 32 per cent in 1959-60 and to
6 1 per cent in 1 969-70 (Table III:6).
TABLE Ill: 5
East and West Pakistan
Regional development of selected economic and social overheads
1947-48 1 954-55 1957-58

East W�st East West East West
7 62
Primary school
83
enrolme.nt 2,021 ,702 544,360 2,604,369 1 ,274,099 2,794,915 1 ,4 3 1 ,921
Secondary school
23
enrolment 526,020 508,041 457,297 722,822 491 ,045 837,499
-
College enrolment na na 24,351 30,817 40,272 64,284
01
University enrolment 1 ,620 654 2,858 1 ,998 3,450 3 , 1 36
03
No. of doctors 21 1 1 ,014 3, 175 3,571 4,580 5,034
No. of nurses 204 188 1 ,553 275 2,021
No. of hospital beds 2,825 1 4 , 1 17 3,902
#
1 9 , 1 97 4,237 2 1 ,021
us
No. of motor vehicles 3,528 21 ,209 8,662 7 1 ,577 1 1 ,368 .89,277
Route mileage of
in
railways 1 ,6 1 5 5,316 1 ,708 5,333 1 ,7 1 3 5,335

jo
Road mileage 240 1 3 ,821 470 1 9 , 1 02 700 1 9,424

No. of radio
up
licenses issued 5,376 45,426 13,719 1 20,322 27, 147 1 83,550

ro
No. of newspapers
and periodicals na na 1 16 707 171 945
G
p
Source: Central Statistical Office, Twenty Years ofPakistan in Statistics 1947-67, op. cit.,
ap
pp. 149- 154, 157, 1 62- 163, 170- 186 and 190.
na - Not available.
ts
ha
TABLE III: 6
W
Per capita disparity between East and West Pakistan

at 1959-60 constant factor cost
si
ba
(in rupees)
Ab
Per capita Per capita East-West

gross regional gross regional disparity
Q
product of East product of West ratio

A.
1949-50' 287 345 1 .20

1 959-60 269 355 1 .32
1969-70 314 504 1.61
Sources : Report of the Panel of Economists on the Fourth Five - Year Plan (1970-75), op.
cit., p. 2, and Stephen R. Lewis Jr., Pakistan: Industrialisation and Tratk Poli
cies, London: Oxford University Press, 1 970, pp. 172-73.
• Since no official estimates of regional incomes have been available until 1964,
it has, however, been assumed that the position for the pcri,o ds from August
1947 until mid- 1949 was the same as that in 1949-50.
In this connection it is worth noting that regional economic disparity

ultimately became a major political issue in Pakistan 's politics. As a
matter of fact, East Pakistan 's sustained struggle for a decade for the
correction of regional economic disparity resulted i n the constitutional
recognition of this problem and a mandate for its removal.
Thus, the new .Constitution of Pakistan, which was introduced i n
62
March 1 962, recognized th e problem .and declared in Article 145 (4):
7
83
A primary object. .. in form ulating the plans . . . shall be to ensure
23
that disparities between the provinces, and between different areas
-
within a province, in relation to income per capita, are removed,
01
and that the resources of Pakistan (including resources in foreign
03
exchange) are used and allocated in such a manner as to achieve
that object in the shortest possible time, . .. 4
#
us
The following analysis shows that the then Ayub regime could not
in
fulfil its constitutional obligation to remove inter-regional economic

jo
disparity "in the shortest possible time" but rather the gap between East
up
and West Pakistan which existed during the initial years of Independ
ro
ence continued to widen further until the last day of united Pakistan. It is
G
thus argued that the roots of the problem of East Pakistan's economic
backwardness and its slow rate of development lay in the whole set of
p
ap
policies pursued by the Federal Government ofPakista.n .

ts
III. Economic Polices Pursued

ha
W
Perhaps Pakistan was the only country in the world which made the
removal of regional economic disparity a constitutional obligation. This
si
ba
obviously implied the need for a higher rate of development in East than
in West Pakistan. Although the Ayub regime's Twenty -Year Perspec
Ab
tive Plan ( 1965 - 1 985) set a twenty-year time limit for the complete
Q
removal of econom ic disparity between the two wings, an ultimate

analysis of the whole range of policies pursued by the regime would
A.
show that it could not have arrested the trend of disparity in absolute
temis, as the upward trend in disparity continued throughout the Plan
periods.5
Prior to the First Five -Year Plan ( 1 955- 1960) there was no specific
philosophy for regional development in Pakistan . From the beginning,
the economic policy adopted by the Government was an unrest
rained laissez-faire system with the immigrant Muslim enterprising
communities given a free hand in the growth of industry and trade. The
Government through its monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies,
patronized these business interests. The government further provided
funds through budgetary expenditures to build up basic infrastructure and
to create investment trends in the country. The creation of a ,semi
autonomous body called the Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation (PIDC) early in 1 948 was one of the devices for the economic
62
development of the country. Although the PIDC set up many industries,
7
83
namely cotton, jute, woollen, textiles, chemicals, fertilizers, sugar and
paper, subsequently most of these were sold off to private entrepreneurs.
23
This measure of the government had a positive effect on the economy of
-
01
the whole of Pakistan. While the government suffered the initial risks of
industrialization it carefully created, through its policies, a capitalist class
03
(West Pakistan-based) at a time when there was none on any significant
scale.
#
us
Perhaps the most important implicit thesis behind the industrializa
in
tion policy of the government of Pakistan was "to treat the two zones as
jo
constituting one economy".6 The one e.conomy thesis discouraged similar

up
industrial units in the two regions so as to ensure "economic efficiency"

ro
and to make the regions independent. This obviously implied East

G
Pakistan' s dependency on West Pakistan 's manufactured goods, the

p
former being the non-industrialized unit of Pakistan and the latter being
ap
the industrialized . It is thus argued that most of,the economic policies

ts
pursued by the government were all in the same direction of development

ha
which can be divided into two categories:

W
a) A/location offederal expenditure

si
ba
(Revenue and Development Expenditure in East and West Pakistan)

Ab
Since Independence, one of · the long-standing grievances of the

Government of East Pakistan was the fiscal relationship between the
Q
Federal and the Provincial Governments of Pakistan . Throughout the

A.
period, federal expenditure both in administration and development

sectors had been increasing enonnously. B ut the Report of the Panel of
Economists on the Fourth Five-Year Plan ( 1970- 75) which made a
comprehensive survey of the total revenue spending from 1 950 to 1 970
reveals that East Pakistan's share of total revenue expenditure varied
from 2 1 to 26 per cent. Again, on the development side, East Pakistan's
share was always very low. Jn the 1 950s it varied from 20 to 26 per cent,
and in the 1960s from 32 to 36 per cent. In the same period West Pakistan's
share varied from 64 to 80 per cent which was the largest single part of
Pakistan 's total federal expenditure (Table III: 7).
From this official document the picture that emerges in respect of

federal revenue-expenditure is that the federal government, by its alloca
tion pattern, not only favoured the Western region but also created a fa
vourable environment in the region for private investment. Besides, East
62
Pakistan did not receive any real benefit from the so called common
7
services,7 since the seat of federal government, as well as defence
83
headquarters were both located in West Pakistan, the huge expenditures
23
on defence, foreign affairs and many such areas which constituted the so
-
called common expenditures accrued benefits to the Western region only.
01
These allocation patterns of federal expenditures had both direct and
03
indirect effects particularly on the economy of West Pakistan. The huge
federal expenditure in West Pakistan contributed directly towards reduc-
#
us
. tion of private costs of investment (external economics) and it indirectly
served the interests of the private investors. This was one of the main
in
reasons why the immigrant capital from Bombay and North India moved
jo
to the Western region of Pakistan and created the "investment explosion"

up
from the mid-fifties onwards.

ro
At this stage it was alleged that East Pakistan's share of federal

G
revenue earnings was much lower than that of West Pakistan. For the first
p
ap
time in 196 1 , an attempt was made to estimate the contribution of East

and West Pakistan to federal revenue and the distribution of the current
ts
ha
expenditure of the federal government between them. The Report on

Economic Relations between East and West Pakistan reveals that be
W
tween 1955-60 East Pakistan's contribution to revenue earnings was 22

si
per cent and its share in current expenditure was 12 per cent while
ba
unallocated heads represented 7 per cent of the revenue income and 43

Ab
per cent for current expenditure.8 The Report on Allocation and Appor
tionment of Revenue between theCentreand the Provinces also estimated
Q
that for the same period, East Pakistan's shares in the total federal and
A.
provincial reven ues were 25 per cent and 34 per cent respectively .9 In this
connection it is worth noting that East Pakistan 's share in the federal
revenues did not take into consideration many corporations and assessees
who were earning their income in East Pakistan but in fact were paying
their taxes from their head offices in Karachi (West Pakistan). A closer
scrutiny, therefore, would reveal that East Pakistan's share in the total
federal revenue receipts would be somewhere between 35 and 40 per cent
which is nearly 10 per cent higher than the above estimates.
TABLE III: 7
Revenue and development expenditure in East and West Pakistan
(Rupees in Million)
East Pakistan
Period Revenue Development Plan Exp. Outside Plan Exp. Total Total Development Exp.
expenditure total public private works development expenditure as per all
programme expenditure Pakistan total exp.
A.
Q (3+4+5)
2 3 4 5 6 7
Ab
1950/51-'54/55 1 ,710 1 ,000 700 .300 1 ,000 2,7 10 20per cent
1955/56-. 59/60 2,540 2,700 1 ,970 730 2,700 5,240 26 per cent
ba
1960/61-'64/65 si 4,340 9,250 6,250 3,000 450 9,700 14,040 32 per cent
1965/66-'69/70 6,480 16,560 1 1 ,060 5,500 1 6,560 21,410 36 per cent
W
ha West Pakistan
Indus Basin
ts
1950/51-'54/55 7,200 4,000 2,000 2,000 4,000 1 1 ,290 80 pcr cent
ap
1955/56-'59/60 8,980 p 7,570 4,640 2,930 7;570 16,560 74 per cent
1960/61-'64/65 12,840 G 18,400 7,700 10,700 2,1 10 200 20,710 33,500 68 per cent
1965/66-'69/70 22,230 26, 100 10,100 16,000 3,600 29,700 51 ,950 64 per cent
ro
Source : Report of the Panel of Economics, op.ciL, p. 6, and K.U Ahmad, op.ciL, p. 36.
up
Notes : a. Revenue Expenditure in East Pakistan was the expenditure of East Pakistan Government excluding debt service plus 15 per cent of
Central Goverrunent expenditure on civil administration and 12 per cent ofthe latter's defence expenditure. All transfer payments of
jo
the Centre i.e., debt services, grants-in-aid. to provinces, and expenditure on foreign affairs had been excluded.
in
b. Public sector development expenditure of the provincial government plus that of the Centre on projects located in the piovinc. .e,
mainly based on Planning Commission.
us
#
03
0
On further investigation of the historical situation prior to the Indian
Independence Act of 1 947, one finds that for the first time in 1935, the
Government of lndia Act 1 935 granted some measure of responsibility to
the provincial governments, viz., sales tax, shares of import and export
duties as well as income and super taxes collected from the respective
provinces. After Independence the Federal Government of Pakistan by an
ordinance in 1 948 took away from the provinces the sales tax, income tax
62
and a larger share of export and import duties. The Government of East
7
Pakistan (at that time, East Bengal Government) was left only with land
83
revenue and agricultural income tax, the proceeds of which could hardly
23
meet its normal revenue expenditure. Apart from the maintenance of law
-
01
and order in the province, East Pakistan had to develop its economic
infrastructure particularly in agriculture, education, health and transport
03
facilities. Given the very limited resources at its command East Pakistan
#
could not effectively do this and ihus was left with a greatly under
us
developed infrastructure. On the other hand, the infrastructure of the
economy of West Pakistan at the same time grew at a faster rate and,
in
jo
furthermore, the hosting of the federal administration had of course a

distinct ad vantage for her economic development. Through its hold on the
up
federal government, West Pakistan controlled the federal allocation of

ro
strategic development resources in favour of her economy. It was at that

G
stage ( 1 948- 1 952) that the people of East Pakistan felt the 'squeeze ' of
p
the federal government's tax policies and deprivation of their foreign ex
ap
change earnings. Such fiscal and direct measures by t he federal

ts
government ultimately led to the demand for provincial autonomy for

ha
East Bengal: and the Awami League, the first opposition party, was born
W
in 1 949 out of that demand.

si
ba
In view of the growing Bengali discontent, the Government of

Pakistan undertook several steps to rectify the situation. Sir Jeremy
Ab
Raisman was asked to examine the fiscal relationship between the federal
1952 suggested
Q
government and the provinces. The Raisman Award of

A.
that most of the elastic sources of revenue should go to the direct control
of the federal government while the provinces were left with few financial
resources of their own. According to the Award, sales tax should remain
in the federal sphere. The Raisman Award further recommended that 62
per cent of the export duties raised by the provinces be channelled back
to them and that import duties be shared between the federal government
and provinces on a 60-40 per cent basis respectively. Income and
company taxes were to be allotted into divisible and non-divisible pools.
The non-divisible pool included income and super taxes collected from
the Capital Territory, and all company taxes of which the provinces had
no share. On the other hand ,the income and super taxes collected from
sources other than those of the Capital Territory were included in the
divisible pool from which the provinces used to get a share. But it should
be mentioned here that West Pakistan used to get a lion ' s share of sales
taxes collected from the Capital Territory from which East Pakistan had
62
no share.10 This 1 952 Awarcl fell far short of Bengali hopes. As against
7
the disparities in the economic and other fields in favourofWestPakistan,
83
the United Front Government of East Pakistan (at that time East Bengal)
23
which won the Provincial Election of 1 954 in East Bengal against the
-
ruling Muslim league, began to press the federal government for the
01
return of the sales tax and other federal taxes on the basis of her total
03
population . Finding no other alternative, the Federal Government of
#
Pakistan dismissed the United Front Government of East Pakistan under
us
the pretext of a law and order situation.
in
After the popular movements in the early fifties as well as early

jo
sixties, the federal government set up the first National Finance Commis
up
sion in 1 962 consisting of members from both East and West Pakistan.
ro
Unfortunately, the East and West wing members of the Commission were
G
sharply divided on the whole question of disparity and the role of the
federal government in the allocation of resources between the federal
p
ap
centre and the provinces. It was reported that both the groups submitted
ts
separate reports to the govemment. 1 1 The East Pakistani members

ha
advocated that the allocation of federal resources should be done on the

basis of population. But the National Finance Commission turned down
W
their demands and allegedly recommended its own arrangement. As

si
recommended by the Commission, the percentages of all taxes and duties

ba
collected and administered by the federal government and distributed to

Ab
the provinces were as follows:

Q
a) 50 per cent of the income tax including corporation tax (as compared
A.
to the 50 per cent of the income tax, excluding corporation tax, under
the previous arrangement);
b) 60 per cent of the sales tax (as against 50 per cent under the previous
arrangement);
c) 60 per cent of the excise duties on tea, tobacco, and betel nut (as
compared to the previous 50 per cent);
d) 100 per cent of export duties on jute and cotton, to be shared by the
two provinces (as compared to the previous 62.5 per cent ofjute duty
allotted to East Pakistan alone);
e) 100 percent of estates and succession duties on agricultural land, and
1 00 per cent of the tax on capital value of immovable property. 1 2
The 1 962 arrangement also modified the basis of allocation between
East and West Pakistan. Accordingly, 30 per cent of the sales tax was
allocated on the basis of collection, and 70 per cent on the basis of
62
population. But the federal centre still took the largest portion of income
7
and company taxes as well as export and import duties. Moreover, the
83
allocation of foreign exchange earnings, foreign aid and, above all, the
23
total resources of the nation were still left under the direct control of the
-
01
federal government In ab�olute tenns, the 1 962 recommendations paid
no attention to ihe East Pakistani autonomists' expectations.
03
#
TABLE III: . 8
us
Commercial im port licences issued by region of licences
(per cent of total commercial licence v a lue)
in
jo
Shipping period Karachi Others

up
West Pakislan East Pakistan

ro
1957-58
July-Dec 49.2 17.8 33.0
G
Jan-June 48.8 1 8.3 32.9

p
ap
1958-59
ts
July-Dec 49.9 1 8.2 3 1 .9

ha
Jan-June 48.9 I 1 5.3 35.8

W
1959-60
July-Dec 42.1 17.8 40.1
si
Jan-June 47.6 20.3 32. 1

ba
1960-61
Ab
July-Dec 4 1 .8 14.6 43.6

Jan-June 40.9 1 2.8 46.3
Q
A.
1961-62
July-Dec 36. 1 17.8 46.0
Jan-June 36.9 1 7.5 45.5
1962-63
July-Dec 42.9 1 8.8 38.4
Jan-June 41.3 2 1 .7 37.0
Source: P.S. Thomas, "Import Licensfng and Import Liberalil.ation in Pakistan" ,Pakistan
Development Review, Vol. 6 (Winter 1 966), Table-A-5, p, 533.
b) Control ofImport and Export Policies and Allocation and Utilization
of Foreign -Exchange Earnings and Foreign Aid
Throughout the existence of Pakistan, the federal government con

trolled the import and export trade of both the provinces of East and West
Pakistan. Since Pakistan maintained an over-valued currency, 13 it subsi
dized the importers to the extent of the over-valuation and thereby
62
benefited West Pakistani traders because most of the commercial and
7
industrial importers were from this province (Tables III:8 and III : 9).
83
TABLE III: 9
23
Industrial import licences issued by region or licences
-
01
(per cent or total industrial licences)
03
Shipping period Karachi Others
#
West Pakistan East Pakistan
us
1957-58
in
July-Dec 37.4 25.5 37. 1

jo
Jan-June 39.6 33.8 26.6

up
1958-59
July-Dec 42.8 3 1 .8 25.4
ro
Jan-June 46.9 30.5 22.6

G
p
1959-60
ap
July-Dec 38.0 2J..S 39.6

Jan-J1me 36.3 32. l 3 1 .6
ts
ha
1960-61
W
July-Dec 43.3 30.3 26.4

Jan-J1me 37.5 24.4 38.2
si
ba
1961·62
July-Dec 36.4 27.0 36.7
Ab
Jan-J1me 36.5 32.6 30.9

Q
1962-63
A.
July-Dec 46.6 27.4 26.0

Jan-June 45.0 30.3 24.7
Source: P.S. Thomas, "Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in Pakistan", op. cil.,
Table A-6, p. 534.
About 35 per cent of the licensees were from East Pakistan, but a
close scrutiny would reveal that the actual percentage of the licensees
from East Pakistan were much lower than presented in the Tables. This
was because, in the absence of an established Bengali merchant class, the
Economic Backgrollnd 53
West Pakistanis either had a direct partnership with an East Pakistani
trader or it was a business run by an East Pakistani but in fact owned by .
West Pakistanis. Thus the foreign commodities were either reimported of
exported directly to the Eastern region of Pakistan by West Pakistani
capitaJ.14
As stated earlier, Pakistan exported in the initial years only raw jute,
62
cotton, tea, hides and skins. In the mid-fifties, when the process of
7
industrialization through imported machinery and industrial raw materi
83
als began to take place in Pakistan, processed and manufactured com
23
modities like jute goods and cotton textiles were exported for the first
-
time. In the sixties her exporting items included manufactured goods like
01
electrical appliances and machinery. By 1960, East Pakistan 's share of
03
Pakistan 's export earnings was about 60 per cent (Table 111: 10).
TABLE III: 10 #
us
Export earnings or Pakistan
in
(in million rupees)

jo
Year East Pakistan West Pakistan

up
1947-48 272 444

ro
1 948-49 1328 542

G
1949-50 683 535

p
1 950-51 121 1 1342

ap
1 95 1 -52 1087 922

1952-53 642 867
ts
1 953-54 645 641

ha
1954-55 732 491

1 955-56 742
W
104 1 '
1 956-57 909 698

si
1 957-58 988 434

ba
1958-59 881 444

1 959-60 1080 763
Ab
1960-61 1259 540

1 96 1 -62 1300 542
Q
1 962-6 3 1249 998

A.
1 963-64 1228 1 075

1964-65 1268 1 1 40
1 965-66 1514 1204
1 966-67 1579 1 338
1967-68 1484 1 864
1%8-69 1540 1763
1969-70 1663 1608
Total 1947-70 25,559 2 1 , 137
Source: Central Statistical Office, Monlhly Foreign Tr� Stolistics, Jwu 1970, Karachi:
Government of Pakistan Press, 1 970, p. I .
This Table shows that West Pakistan 's export earnings were a little more
than East Pakistan 's only for the period of 194 7-48, 1 967-68 and 1 968-
69. Except for these short periods, East Pakistan continued its contribu
tion at a higher rate to Pakistan's export earnings than did West Pakistan.
In v.iew of this situation, the federal government adopted a system of
bonuses and rebates to give incentive especially to the manufactured
62
commodities of West Pakistan. For example, after 1959, the Government
of Pakistan ·introduced the Export Bonus Scheme which gave a price
7
83
advantage to costly products in the international market and thus made
23
them competitive. Under this scheme, an exporter of $ 1 00 worth of
manufactured commodities would be paid $60 in cash and $40 in a
-
01
voucher which could then be sold in the local market at a much higher
03
price in local currency. This system, in fact, provided the advantage of
devaluation to manufactured goods in .the export market while the
#
exporters of raw goods were not allowed to avail themselves of this
us
opportunity. Excise rebate was another great advantage to the exported
in
manufactured goods which were exempted from excise duties. S ince the
jo
products of the manufacturing industries of West Pakistan were export

up
able, they received special favour in import licensing, commonly known

ro
as "Import Liberalization", whilst the exportable primary goods of East

G
Pakistan were discriminated against. On the other hand, due to the over
p
valuation ofPakistani currency, East Pakistani exports suffered a setback.

ap
Moreover, the main exportable j ute products of East Pakistan were

ts
·
ha
never made eligible for the Bonus Scheme as was done for the manufac
tured products of WestPakistan. This was made possible by import policy
W
measures adopted by the federal government to help promote the export

si
of manufactured products of West Paksitan whilst the whole economy of

ba
East Pakistan suffered a great setback on account of the federal admin

Ab
istrative controls on her import-export trade. Behind these import-export

Q
measures of the federal government lay the foreign exchange budget

which was again solely controlled by the Foreign Exchange Committee .
A.
of the federal government mainly manned by.West Pakistanis.·u They

decided on the basic allocations to the government and to the private
sectors.
During the period from 1947 to 1970, Pakistan received huge

amounts of foreign aid from multilateral as well as bilateral sources. The
federal government prepared a list on the regional breakdown of foreign
Economic Bqckground 55
aid utilizations for the "Panel on Self-Reliance for the Fourth Five-Year
Plan" which covered the period from 1947-48to 1969-70. (Table III : 1 1 ).
TABLE Ill: 11
Utilization of foreign economic assistance
62
in Pakistan 1947-70
7
(in million dollars)
83
Type East Pakistan West Pakistan Federal Total
- 23
Project Loan 417 608 108 1 133
01
Non-Project Loan 408 673 53 1 134
03
PL 480 food 445 791 5 124 1
Guaranteed Loans 352 623 11 986
#
Project Grants &
Technical Assistance 56 140 200 396
us
Commodity Grants 263 575 15 793
in
Indus Basin Fund 0 756 0 756

jo
Total 194 1 4106 392 6439

up
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Reports ofAdvisory Panels/or

ro
the Fourth Five -Year Plan, Vol. 1 , Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press,
G
1 970, Table 2, p. 278.

p
ap
i:hough the share of East Pakistan was about 30 per cent of total
foreign aid, in reality this figure was considerably lower for at least two
ts
reasons . First, it was expected that all guaranteed loans received by the
ha
Pakistan International Airlines(PIA) and the National Shipping Corpora

W
tion (NSC) should be equally divided between East and West Pakistan,
si
but in fact, throughout the history of Pakistan, East Pakistan got no share
ba
of the assets of these two profitable' organizations. And finally, East

Ab
Pakistan could not reap any real benefit from federal expenditure because
the seat of federal government was in West Pakistan. This meant,
Q
therefore, that any expenditure by the federal government was concen

A.
trated in West Pakistan, to the exclusion of East Paksitan. Again this

pattern of distribution for foreign economic aid commitments in Pakistan
between 1947 and June 1970, reveals yet another glaring picture of
economic disparity between East and West Pakistan (Table III: 12).
TABLE DI: 12
Distribution of commitment of foreign economic assistance: 1947
to June 1970
(in million dollars)
Period Kind of Assistance East Pakistan West Pakistan Total
1947-60 Commodity 288 612 900
62
Project & Technical 254 904 \ I S8
7
1960-70 Commodity 579 1353 1 932
83
Project & Technical 903 1677 2580
Indus Basin 0 1070 1070
- 23
Sub-total 2024 5616 7640
01
1 954-65 Commodity - 120 + 120
03
1947-70 Total 1904 5736 7640
#
Sourcu: Estimates for 1947-60 period adopted from the Report on Economic Relations
between East and Wes.t Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
us
Estimates for . 1960-70 period adopted from The Budget in Brief 1968-69,
in
Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press, 1968, pp. 58-6 1 ; Report of the

Working Group on Debt Burdern, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press,
jo
1968, pp. 10, 99- 1 5 1 ; The Fowth Five -Year Plan 1970-75, Islamabad: Govern
up
ment of Pakistan Press, 1970, p. 65; Reports ofAdvisory Panels . . . op. cit., p. 278;
Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Memorandum/or the Pakistan
ro
Consortium, 1970, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan Press, 1 970, pp. 85-137.

G
The last line entry is for the element of non-economic assistance which entered
the other estimates on commodity aid for 1954- 65 period. Pakistan received
p
ap
about $400millionfrom USA as defence aid which was exclusively spent in West
Pakistan.
ts
See also A.M.A. Muhith, op. cit, p. 1 04 - 1 05 . .

,
ha
The "Report on Economic Relations between East and West Paki

W
stan" shows that up to 1960, sums of$482 million and$ 1 ,279 million were
si
allotted to East and West Pakistan re�pectively whilst $297 million

ba
remaine<l unallocable. Il was assumed that this unallocable money would

Ab
be divided between East and West Pakistan at the ratio of 20 : 80 per cent
respectively. The commodity aid obtained by the government was
Q
divided in the ratio of Rs. 30: 70 between East and West Pakistan. But it
A.
did not include $ 1 ,070 million expenditure for the Indus Basin and
Tarbela projects, funds which were spent totally" in the Western region.
(see Table III 1 2). If one carefully analysed commitments of foreign aid
in Pakistan made from time to time it would reveal that from 1947 to 1 970,
East Pakistan received only 23 per cent of total foreign aid. From the
utilization point of view, East Pakistan received massive foreign aid
during the �riod 1960- 1970. Although East Pakistan received only 23
per cent of the tofal committed aid to Pakistan, in fact, its share of foreign
aid ought to have been over 40 per cent of the national total. TI1e actual
utilization of foreign aid in East Pakistan stood at only 21 per cent of the
total aid committed to Pakistan while the remainder was committed to
West Pakistan. Thus, the greater net flow of foreign resources into West
Pakistan (than into East Pakistan) resulted in a wider regional disparity
in the 'absorption' of goods and services yet it was assumed that the
62
philosophy behind this flow of foreign assistance was to relieve the
7
83
miseries of the poor people of Pakistan.
23
The Eastern part of Pakistan was not only poor and underdeveloped
-
but also contained 56 per cent of Pakistan's total population. Therefore,
01
simply on even a population ratio basis East Pakis�n should have
03
obtained 56 per cent of the total foreign economic aid that Pakistan
received. It was in the organization and decision-making process of this
#
us
foreign exchange earning budget that one could not help but see the roots
of the neglect of East Pakistan.
in
jo
IV The Transfer of Real Resources from East to West Pakistan

up
The higher allocation of foreign aid to West Pakistan which raised

ro
the per capita income of that region and the exchange andimportlicensing
G
policies adopted by the federal government over the twenty-three years

p
of Pakistan ' s history, ultimately resulted in a net outflow of resources

ap
from East to West Paksitan.

ts
ha
This transfer of resources from the lower-income region to the

higher-income region of Pakistan should be examined mainly in two
W
ways: i) the triangular trade pattern that developed after partition and, ii)
si
the mechanism through which it had been transferred.

ba
Ab
During British colonialrule, port facilities were not developed either

· in East or in West Pakistan. Both the regions of Pakistan served as
Q
hinterlands for Calcutta and Bombay. Hence, their internal and interna
A.
tional trade connections were with and through these ports and industrial
cities.
After the Partition of India, both East and West Pakistan routed their
exports to the foreign countries through their regional ports of Chittagong
and Karachi respectively. Out of this arrangement, two phenomena
emerged.
First of all was the trade divers.ion of each region of Pakistan. Instead
of buying consumer goods from Calcutta, the Eastern region was then
compelled to buy the same from the Western region of Pakistan by their
common local currency.
TABLE III: 13 .
62
Interwing trade in Pakistan
7
(in million rupees)
83
Exports from Imports from
23
Years East Pakistan West Pakistan
-
01
1947-48 19 140
03
1948-49 50 235
1949-50 62 272
#
1950-51 na na
us
195 1-52 149 218
1 952-53 151 387
in
1953-54 19 8 305
1954-55
jo
238 334
1955-56 244 532
up
1956-57 269 701

1957-58 686
ro
289
1958-59 362 569
G
1959-60 363 826

p
1960-61 402 855

ap
1961-62 47 1 957
1962-63 511 895
ts
1963-64 544 875

ha
1964-65 655 1209

W
1965-66 739 1325

1966-67 785 1233
si
1967-68 87 1 1385
ba
1968-69 966 1800

Ab
Total 1947-69 8,238 15,739

Q
Source: Economic Survey of East Pakistan 1969-70, Planning Department, Government

A.
of East Pakistan, Dacca: Government ofEast P.akistan Press, 1969, p. 22: Twenty
Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67, op. cit., p. 295, and also see Central
Statistical Office, Pakistan Statistical Year Book 1968, Karachi: Government of
Pakistan Press, 1968, p. 289.
Secondly, the policy of exchange control required that exporters had

to surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the Stale Bank of Pakistan
for local currency at the official exchange rate. In this way, both East and
West Pakistan had to trade with eacfi other in terms of their local currency
and with the outside world in exchange for foreign currency. It is worth
mentioning here that all commodity flows should have been matched by
counterflow and that both these flows should have been held in balance.
So it was, the export and import policies of the Government of Pakistan
were devised in such a manner as to give preferential treatment to West
Pakistani merchandise. And, the flow of East Pakistani merchandise to
foreign countries was not• allowed to be matched by a corresponding
62
counterflow from the latter. Instead, it was supplanted by a flow of the
7
poor quality as well as high priced (in local currency) merchandise from
83
West Pakistan . I t was through this system that East Pakistani traders and
23
consumers incurred a net loss and were not only compelled to consume
-
the poorer quality West Pakistani products but were forced to buy them
01
at a higher price. Thus, West Pakistan appeared as the net beneficairy
03
whose domestic prod ucts were aecorded a high degree of protection by
this system at the equivalen t.cost to the East (see Table III: 1 3).
#
us
In this Table it appears that during the twenty-three years ofpartnet
in
ship, there was a net outflow of resources from East Pakistan, exporting
jo
abroad much more than importing. In trade with West Pakistan, East
Pakistan was importing more than exporting. Nevertheless, the deficit
up
was not sufficient to make up for the loss of resources gained through
ro
international trade but taken by West Pakistan. West Pakistan was

G
importing much more than she was exporting which meant that she
p
ap
iricurred a substantial foreign e"xchange deficit. About 50 per cent of this

deficit was met by the surplus foreign exchange of East Pakistan. By
ts
virtue of organizational and policy devices in Pakistan, West Pakistani

ha
importers spent the foreign exc�ange very largely earned by East

W
Pakistani traders. _The remaining portion of West Pakistan's net deficit

si
from foreign exchange was provided by foreign assistance and loahs.

ba
To estimate the exact magnitude of the transfer of resources from

Ab
East to West Pakistan , the export surplus of East Pakistan should be

Q
converted into local prices, using the scarcity price of foreign

A.
ex.change.16 This could be done over several years in two ways: firstly in
terms of the extent of over-valuation of the exchange rate itself and
secondly, in terms of the different offiCial prices given to various goods.17
(in particular manufactured goods as against agricultural products).
Apart from the "visible" resources transferred from East to West

Pakistan, 18 a refuting claim was often made that a net transfer of
"invisible" resources also took place from West to East Pakistan-in the
TABLE III: 14
Balance of Payments of East and West Pakistan
(In Million Rupees)
·
Balance of visible Balance of invisible Balance of visible Balance of Net Balance
foreign trade foreign trade and invisible foreign iriterwing of payments
uade trade
East West East West East .West East West East West
1948-49
A.
Q Nominal Price +1 1 23.00 -806.00 - 1 95.41 -4 1 1.68 +927.59 - 1217.68 1 -305.60 ... +621.99 -912.08
to
1949-50
Ab
Scarcity Price +2101.71 -2919.89 +1796. l l -26 14.29
1950-5 1
ba
Nominal Price
si +2122.00 - 1 002.00 -586.93 - 1399.48 +1535.07 -2401 .48 -809c00 +726.07 - 1592.48
to W
1945-55
Scarcity Price +4 134.89 -6406.8.4 . +3325.89 -5597.81
ha
1955-56
.
ts
Nominal Price a+2019.00 - 1 867.50 -775.74 -56 1 1 .85
to pp -5175.00 -907.24 -2304.35 + 1 1 1 1 .76 -7479.35
1960-6 1
Scarcity Price G +21 13.48 -4553.81 +245.98 - 1 2686.31
1961-62 ro
Nominal Price +69. 1 0 - 14645.30 -3765.80 -6526.10 - 1 8179.80
to
up -2829.40 -4300.30 -2760.30 -21945.60
1968-69 jo
Scarcity Price in -5620.40 ·-43840.90 -9386.20 -34075.10
Source : Report of the Panel of Economics onuthe Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75), op.cit., pp. 76 and 78
s
#
03
0
form of various services like banking and insurance, th e unremitted
profits from West Pakistan's investment in East Pakistan and West
Pakistan 's higher contribution to federal government revenues.
Apart from the difficulty of simply defining a "service" and a "di.s

service", the available data does not allow for measurement ofthe transfer
of "invisible" resources from West Pakistan. For instance, what portion
62
of the utility of a bank branch in East Pakistan with its head office in West
Pakistan was a service by the West to E.ast Pakistan whilst its capital and
7
83
manpower were largely supplied by WestPakistan? Was a West Pakistani
investment in East Pakistan filling the gap, or was it merely replacing a
23
possible East Pakistani investment with the help of federal backing?
-
01
Thus, the conventional idea of equal services to all by the federal
03
government could not be administered. Hence, the validity of the
argument for the transferability ofin visible resources from West to East
#
Pakistan is rather dubious. Table III: 14 presents a complete balance of
us
•:P<.yments ofresource inflows and outflows for East and West Pakistan.
in
A the scarcity price, the net balance ofpayments ofEastPakistan had

jo
a surpl � of Rs. 5367.98 million from the period of 1 948-49 to 1960-61 ,

up
and . a defdt of Rs. 9386.2 million during 196 1 -62 to 1968-69, whereas
ro
during th0se years, West Pakistan had a deficit of Rs. 55,004.54 million.
G
If foreign aid could have been allocated purely on a population basis

p
(which �'ad not been done), East Pakistan's net surplus would have been ·
ap
increas�d further, amounting to Rs. 31 , 120 million over the entire period.
ts
This caic ulation purports that the annual rate of transfer of real resources
ha
from East to West Pakistan amounted to about Rs. 1 ,556 million. If the
W
over�valuation of Paksitan 's currency is to be taken into account,East

Paksitan not only transferred about $4 billion worth of resources to West
si
ba
Pakistan but she incurred long-term damage to her primary economic

staple, jute. Through the maintenante of her -over-valued currency,
Ab
Pakistan made jute expensive on the foreign market. Hence, a search for
Q
and use of a substitute for jute in foreign countries has been going on ever
A.
since 1 949.19 · Effectively, this not only slowed the rate of growth in jute
exports from East Pakistan but it substantially stunted the growth
potentiality of East Pakistan.
Thus, it becomes obvious that the Government of Pakistan, through

its various economic policies-·like the exchange rate; allocation and
distribution of foreign exchange and aid; commercial and industrial
import licenses and the interregional distribution of federal
expendilures,-not only gave preferential treatment lo West Pakistan,
but also transferred real resources from East Pakistan. Furthermore,
throughout these years, Pakistan maintained relatively high export prices
on the foreign market which ultimately damaged the economic
potentialities of East Pakistan. The tariff protection policy and the
phenomenal growth of industries in West Pakistan finally turned the East
into its captive market. Thus, West Pakistani capital in East Pakistan
62
followed the pattern of British colonial investment in the Federation of
7
Malaya which did not provide economic benefits to the Malays in
83
particular, and to the Federation of Malaya in general, in any significant
23
manner, and instead facilitated economic exploitalionof the region.
-
01
The Ayub regime's failure to fulfil public commitment to removing
03
the interregional disparity within the "shortest possible time" created a
crisis of' communication with East Pakistan. 20 While the Ayub govern
#
ment celebrated the so-called "Decade of Progress" ( 1959- 1968) in
us
March l969, the continued low in vestment and the slower rates of gr01i th
in
in East Pakistan led the Bengalis not only to oppose the governmer t, but
jo
led them to demand an alternative planning for economic deve1Q)ment

up
in East Pakistan, that is the "Two-Economy Thesis".

ro
V. The Two-Economy Thesis

G
i
Over the years, the one-economy theory of � ePakistan Gov,ernment
p
maintainell that investment should be made where there were the �reatest
ap
ts
possibilities for absorption and demand; and investment in the western

ha
region did not have any significant effect on the economy of the Eastern
W
region, therefore, its dependence on the Western region' s manufac:ured

commodities made the Eastern region highly vulne.rable, and iri�er
si
regional trade was subject to constant interruption.

ba
Ab
The resultant pattern of economic relationship that developed

throughout the years between East and West Pakistan obviously agitated
Q
the Bengali consciousness, particularly Bengali ' economists who ulti

A.
mately demanded complete economie freedom for East Pakistan. They

felt that the so-called philosophy of the one-integrated-economy in the
physically divided country of Pakistan would not only exacerbate the
economic inequality between East and West Pakistan, but also damage
the economic potentiality of East Pakistan.
The idea of the two-economy thesis for Pakistan was first conceived
in 1 956 when economists met in Dacca at a conference to discuss
Pakistan' s First Five-Year Plan ( 1955- 1960). The Bengali economists
asserted that economic development of the two regions ofPakistan lay in
the concept of two seperate economies. Their demand was based on two
basic facts. Firstly, since Pakistan was already a geographically divided
country, she had, in fact, two distinct economies. Secondly , the one
econon:iy policy adopted by the various Governments of Pakistan on the
pretext of "economic efficiency"21 not only curbed the economic poten
62
tialities of East Pakistan but ultimately resulted in economic inequality
7
between East and West Pakistan.
83
23
The exponents of the-two-economy philosophy maintained that the
-
unique geography of Pakistan resulted in a lack of mobility for the factors
01
of production between the two regions of Pakistan, Hence, investment in
03
one region did not have a "spread effect" into the other. On the other hand,
structural differences bet�een the economies of the two regions-the
#
Eastern region being mostly agricultural with little private capital, and the
us
Western region having a lion 's share of manufacturing and with the huge
in
private capital-demanded separate economic measures for the two

jo
wings of Pakistan. Moreover, price differentials and trade imbalances

up
between East and West Pakistan (Table III: 1 3) further separated the two
ro
economies. According to the two-economy theorists, the various eco

G
nomic policies pursued by the Government of Pakistan not only led to a

transfer of real resources from East to West Pakistan causing enonnous
p
ap
damage to the economic backbone of East Pakistan but it also convinced

ts
them that pursuit of an independent economic policy by East Pakistan

ha
alone could prevent the flow ofresources from East to West Pakistan. The
economists, therefore, recommended complete economic autonomy for
W
each wing of Pakistan where separate economic measures w1mld be

si
taken. They. felt that by exercising full control over fiscal and monetary
ba
as well as over export and import policies, they could shape the economic
Ab
destiny of the region in a ·better way.

Q
Although the Third Five Year Plan ( 1965-70) and the Perspective
A.
Plan ( 1 965-85) adopted various measures fot the elimination of regional

disparity as far as possible.a comparison of current and constant price
estimates of regional incomes suggests that overall economic disparities
had widened during those planned periods. This was simply because the
"one-economy" thesis of the government failed to realise the vital
differences in economic behaviour and the problem of physical isolation
of the two regions of Pakistan.
IL was not, therefore, surprising that during the 1960s the philosophy
of two-economies soon gained momentum among all sections of the
Bengali community who demanded a clear-cut two-economy thesis.22
Although a small group of Bengali industrialists and businessmen
benefited from the economic policies of the Ayub regime which encour
aged the private sector, with their limited resources, the Bengali entrepre
neurs failed to compete with the already well-established West Pakistani
62
business magnates.23 In this connection the speech of Sulaiman, a trade
7
union leader, in the National Assembly (Parliament) of Pakistan would
83
be worth mentioning. It indicates the Bengali businessman's fear and
23
dissatisfaction over the economy policies of the government:
-
01
How can we, East Pakistanis, form capital? How can capital be
03
formed in East Pakistan? Sir, when the government decided to give
more and more to East Pakistan in the import trade--as you know in
#
the import trade East Pakistanis are not categorized importers-:-they
us
decided that there should be OGL(Open General License) importers
in
and the OGL system was introduced and East Pakistanis were
jo
allowed to import and they were registered as importers. But as soon

up
as the authorities found that East Pakistanis are coming and becom
ro
ing importers and trying to form small capitals, they overnight

abolished the system of OGL and brought free list. Sir, it is open to
G
everybody that East Pakistanis have very small capital. They cannot
p
ap
compete in free list. ... They cannot compete with the big industrial
ts
ists . ... In East Pakistan, you will find that not even a single Chamber
ha
will be able to come and stand for this system of free list because the
system of free list has completely damaged the economic backing
W
and background of the commercial community of East Pakistan ...

si
You cannot have the same system for both.East and West Pakistan
ba
... If you want real national integration ... treat us equally in the
Ab
economic life of the country.24

Q
Instead of responding to Bengali demands, the Ayub regime not only

A.
rejected the two-economy concept, but branded it as a prelude to political

disintegration.25
Thus, the Bengali ferment gradually transformed from a geographi

cal-linguistic-cultural phenomenon into a much broader economic and
political one, from demands for equal participation in the national
economic system to demands for a complete autonomy for East Paksitan.
MALAYSIA
In comparison to Pakistan, Malaysia enjoyed a healthy rate of

economic growth and developed rapidly from a sparsely populated
territory with riverine settlements, to a country with one of Asia's best
62
systems of communications. Roads, railways, ports, and other commu
7
nication services, including water and p6wer facilities were all well
83
developed (Chapter II).
23
Malaysia's economic progress was largely dependent on immigrant
-
01
labour and foreign capital. Agriculture was the major economic activity
03
of the country, and comprised rice, natural rubber, coconut and palm oil
production. Malaysia was the world's largest producer of natural rubber
#
(approximately 40 per cent of the total supply). Its major export earners
us
were natural rubber, tin, palm oil, tropical woods, and pepper. The first
in
big boost to the economy was created · not so much by increased

jo
productivity, but by the sudden and phenomenal price increase for

up
Malaysia' s principal exports: tin and rubber. Between 1955- 1 967 Malay
ro
sia maintained (in terms of Gross National Product at 1 964 prices) an

G
annual average compound rate of growth of about 5.2 per cent.

p
ap
In May 1 %9, after more than a decade of such phenomenal economic

development, the major ethnic groups, Malays and non-Malays, were
ts
ha
split asunder. The heart of the problem lay at the uneven distribution of
the nation's wealth, between the Malays and non-Malays, both on an
W
interpersonal and inter-racial basis.

si
ba
Although Malaysia's economic growth was impressive since Inde

Ab
pendence in 1957 , unemployment rose significantly during this period.

This was largely because the development was concentrated in the rubber
Q
plantations, tiri mines and urban areas, whilst the rural areas (where the
A.
majority of the population was engaged in the traditionally backward

sectors of small-scale rice cultivation, coconut and fishing activities)
were largely ignored.
After national Independence, most of the developing states of Asia

and Africa have faced this typical problem of the dualistic pattern of
economic development. Malaysia's problem seems to be more compli
cated: its dualistic pattern of economy resulted in the ethnic specializa-
tion of the labour force in economic activities. Although Malays were the
politically dominant ethnic group, the majority of them were rural
dwellers, engaged in the poor subsistence agricultural sector of the
economy. The majority of the non-Malays (immigrants), however, had
become urbanized, concentrating themselves in the foreign capital-based
industries and trades in the cities and towns.
62
This economic progress of the Malaysian export economy had
7
83
reinforced this division of the population. The Malays who left their
traditional occupations, whether by choice or lack of opportunity, and the
23
non-Malay immigrants (who had the ultimate aim of returning to their
-
01
homelands once they had made their fortunes), together formed the most
03
economically affluent group in Malaysia.
#
The economic polarization had created a growing gap between the
us
Malays' economic desires and achievements. Before the outbreak of the
Second World War, the Malays were not as conscious of the growing
in
jo
economic disparity between themselves and the non-Malays as they were

later to become.
up
ro
It was only during the Japanese occupation that they became aware
G
· of their inferior economic condition in relation to the non-Malays. Under

p
Japanese rule, the Malays demonstrated a� unprecedented desire for their

ap
economic advancement. Since then they have. experienced increased

ts
frustration as a result of growing material aspirations; increasing compe

ha
tition with the non-Malays, and growing realisation of the extent of their
W
poverty and backwardness in comparison with the �elative affluence of

si
the non-Malays.26
ba
After Independence the Malays became more concerned with the

Ab
problems of their increasing income disparity, their relative poverty and

Q
unemployment vis-a-vis the non-Malays, rather than with the phenome

nal economic development of the country as a whole. Therefore, to
A.
evaluate the problems of national integration in Malaysia, one needs to

look beyond cultural, social, geographic and demographic differences
between the races (see Chapter II) for the crucial economic factors which
had exacerbated ethnic compartmentalization.
VI The Pattern of Development since Independence
For about two centuries Malaysia was a small part of the British
Empire. Under the British, the development of Malaysia's economy

based on agriculture, mining and trade, was a lais§ez-faire.
The economic development which took place in the colonies was

almost entirely in the raw materials sector. As a result, after the Second
World War when the colonies were granted independence, they had to
62
depend heavily upon the export market as their main source of income.
7
The British establishment of an export economy in Malaysia meant that
83
an increasing number of people was needed to handle the transport,
23
financing and distribution of the export products, as well as to handle the
-
essential imports. In this way, the British paved the way for the introduc
01
tion of immigrant Chinese, Indians, and Europeans into Malaysia,
03
without considering the demographic, social, political and economic
#
effects on the Malays and other components of the indigenous population.
us
By 1957 non-Malays not only outnumbered the Malay population in
in
all the urban centres, but had also taken control of Malaysia's economy.
jo
By 1967, with her abundant natural resources and foreign capital ,

up
Malaysia had achieved distinction particularly on the economic front

ro
amongst the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. In terms of per
G
capita income, Malaysia ranked third in South-East Asia after Brunei and
, Singapore, and in South and East Asia, it occupied second position after
p
ap
Japan (Table III: 1 5).

ts
Among the Asian countries, Pakistan's position was ninth. Among

ha
the South and South-East Asian countries Malaysia, after a decade of

W
Independence, occupied the second highest position in per capita Gross

si
Domestic Product (GDP) with US $370, following the city-state of

ba
Singapore with US $584. Pakistan's figure was only US $ 1 23. In tenns

Ab
of the per capita private consumption expenditure and per capita fixed
capital fonnation, Malaysia stood in the highest position with US $229
Q
and US $67 respectively among the South and South-East Asian coun
A.
tries. The Beckennan and Bacon Index of Real Consumption for 1960
shows that Malaysia had $ 1 8 which was second only to that of Singapore.
In tenns of non-monetary indicators of the standard of living, Malaysia ·
occupied a relatively better position (TableIII: 16).

TABLE ill : 15
Various monetary indicators of the standard of living
for selected Asian countries, 1967
Per capita Per capita Beckerman and Per capita
62
GDP at private Bacon Index fixed
factor cost consumption of real capital
7
consumption formation
83
for 1960
23
(US $) (US $) (UK=lOO) (US $)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-
01
West Malaysia 370 229 18 67
03
Bunn a 63 42 2 10
Cambodia 130 na 6 na
Ceylon 141 104
# 9 22
us
India 77 na 5 na
Indonesia 98 92 4 6
in
Pakistan 123 105 4 18

jo
Philippines. 259 149 na . 41

Singapore 584 na 24 na
up
South Korea 146 1 14 6 31

ro
Taiwan 238 143 12 50

Thailand 140 109 6 36
G
p
Source: W. Beckerman and R. Bacon, "International Comparisons of Income Levels: A

ap
Suggested New Measure", Economic Journal, Vol. 76 (September 1966), pp.

ts
519-536, and David Lim, Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia :
1947-1970, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973, Table 1 . 1 , p .. 2 .
ha
W
si
a) Development Through Export and Import Trade

ba
Malaysia's prosperity had been largely dependent upon the export of

Ab
raw materials, an activity highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world

Q
demand. With a deterioration of the export markets, economic progress

was forced into a decline.27
A.
During the last quarter of 1966 and the first half of 1967 the price of
top grade rubber fell steadily from 62 Malaysian cents per pound to 47.4
Malaysian cents, the lowest price since November 1949. 28 Whilst rubber
and tin accounted fo� about 85 per cent of Malaysia's export income,
during the same period the Eastern part of Pakistan earned almost 60 per
cent of Pakistan 's total export income.
TABLE Ill : 16
Principal Non-Monetary IndicatorcS of the Standard of Living for Selected Asian Countries in Recent Years
Year West Burma Ceylon India Indonesia PakistanPhilippines Thailand

Malaysia
I . Food: Calories per head per day 1967 2,400 2,150 2,170 1 ,810 1 ,980 2,230 2,000 2,140
Proteins per head per day
(gm) 1967 54 51 48 45 38 52 50 46
2. Physicans per 1 ,000 population 1 967 9.7 9.6 4.1 4.8 27.6 9.9 1.4 8.6
A.
Q 3. Information Media:
Annual newsprint in consumption
per head (kg) 1967 2.4 0.6 I.I 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.5 I.I
Ab
Radio receivers licences per
10,boo population 1967 508 143 292 148 136 96 202 846
ba
Telephones per 10,000 population
si 1968 154 8 48 20 16 14 67 34
4. Energy: annual consumption of
W
coal equivalent per head (kg) 1968 442 57 114 1 84 99 96 248 198
5. Transportation:
ha
Passenger cars per 10,000
ts
population 1968 228 11 71 10 17 11 65 38
Commercial vehicles per 10,000
ap
population p 1968 60 11 33 9 10 5 48 46
6. Consumption of steel per head
G
per year (kg) ro 1968 45 3 10 11 2 8 30 23
7. Education: per cent of age cohort
completing primary school for
up
both sexes 1960 70 20 85 30 40 15 35 35
jo
Source : D. Lim, Econ,omk Growth. .. , op. cit., p.4.
in
us
#
03
0
Whilst Malaysia' s export income decline was largely due to difficul
ties of the foreign market beyond its control, the export income and
economy as a whole of East Pakistan lost its potentiality mainly because
of the export and import policies pursued by the Federal Government of
Pakistan. This kept export prices abnonnally high in the world markets.
The innovation of synthetic rubber added to the miseries of East
Pakistan's economy, whereas, despite the difficulties in the export
62
economy of rubber and tin, Malaysia's economy continued to develop
7
throughout the years. Thus, Malaysia's trade balance indicates that it
83
enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in South and South-East
23
Asia (Table III: _1 7);
-
01
03
TABLE III: 17
Trade balance 1947-1969
(in Malaysian dollars) #
us
in
Gross Gross Rubber and (2) (3)

jo
domestic export tin export (I) (2)

product proceeds proceeds
up
(Sm) (Sm) (Sm) % %

ro
( I) (2) (3) (4) (5)

G
1947 2,654 835 701 3 1 .5 83.9

p
1950 4,137 2,608 2,252 63.0 86.3

ap
1955 4,992 2,372 2,018 47.5 85. 1

1960 6, 134 2,924 2,336 47.7 79.9
ts
1965 7,841 3,096 2,240 39.5 72.3

ha
1969 9,510 4,061 2,880 42.7 70.9

W
Source: D. Lim, Economic Growth ... op. cit., p. 7.

si
ba
During the years before Independence, Malaysia' s gross export

proceeds accounted for about 45 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product.
Ab
About 85 per cent of the gross export income was derived solely from the
Q
export of rubber and tin. Lumber, palm oil and iron ore earned the rest.
A.
During the period 1960-69, the Malaysian economy became more

diversified and less dependent upon rubber and tin. However, its eco
nomic prosperity remained largely dependent upon these two major raw
productS because of their definite foreign margfoal tendency to import
(Table III : 1 8)
TABLE III: 18
Composition of imports in 1950 and 1965
1950 1965
(%) (%)
Consui;ner goods 68.9 52.1
62
!. Agricultural Foodstuffs 16.8 12.4
2. Other Foodstuffs 14 .0 1 1 .1
7
83
3. Beverages and Tobacco 6.6 2.3
4. Manufactured Goods 3 1.5 26.3
23
Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 24.l 24.4
I. Rubber and Tin 14.5 5.9
-
01
2. Raw Materials 2.7 1 .2
3. Intermediate Goods 6.9 17.3
03
Capital Goods 7.0 23.5
Total 100.0
# 100.0
us
Source: K.A.M. Ariff, "lmpons of Post-War Malaya', M. Econ. thesis, Univerisity of
in
Malaya, 1968, p. 271 .

jo
up
Malaysia was not only exporting its traditional raw materials

ro
___,
rubber, tin, lumber, palm oi.l and iron ore, but was also manufacturing
G
consumer goods O:able III: 19).

p
ap
TABLE III: 19
ts
Percentage distribution of real GDP by sector

ha
in 1957 and 1966

W
si
Sector 1957 1966

ba
(%) (%)
Ab
Primary 45.4 36.1

Secondary I i.1 1 5.4
Q
Teniary 43.5 48.5

A.
Source: D. Lim, Economic Growth ... , op. cit., p. 9.
The above survey ofthe Malaysian economy "indicates a rather high

standard ofliving compared with levels in most of the rest of the world".29
But Malaysia's impressive economic development concealed a growing
income disparity between the Malay and the non-Malay communities. It
is argued here that since Independence in 1 957, the Malays' increasing
sense of economic backwardness in comparison to the relative affluence
of the non-Malays was one of the major sources of conflict between the
two communities.
VII The Pattern and Extent oflncome Disparity, Poverty, Unem ploy
ment and Underemployment
In most of the new states of Asia and Africa, the problem of high
62
income disparity between the various sectors of the population is
7
"primarily a problem of seeking national integration in its necessary
83
combination with economic:: progress, the one being both the result ofand
23
·
the condition for the other".30
-
01
Pakistan and Malaysia, both new South and South East Asian states,
03
provide typical examples of nations with high income disparity groups.
In the case of Malaysia, income disparity between the·Malays and the
#
non"Malays created a massive problem for national integration. The
us
problem of income disparity in Malaysia can be viewed from the
in
interpersonal and interracial perspectives as well as from the viewpoint

jo
of poverty and unemployment.

up
a) Interpersonal Income Disparity

ro
G
Income disparity is generally measured by taking the lowest 40 per

p
cent of the population that receives less than 12 per cent of the total
ap
national income. Malaysia's situation among the high income disparity

ts
countries of Asia and Africa may be viewed as desperate. In 1 970 the

ha
bottom 40 per cent of the Malaysian population received only 1 1 .9 per

W
cent of the total national income, while the top 20 percent ofits population
si
received 55 per cent of the income (Table III:20).

ba
The Household Budget Survey of 1957-58 (Table.III:2 1 ) shows that in

Ab
Malaysia, the overall mean monthly income per household was M$ 199,
Q
but the disparity between the urban and rural areas was significant.
A.
·
TABLE III: 20
Household income distribution, Peninsular Malaysia
1957/58, 1967/68, and 1970
Percentage of income accruing to HBS 1957/58 SES 1967/68 PES 1970
Top 5% of households 23.2 26. l 27.7

Top 10% of households 34. l 38.7 39.7
62
Top 20% of households 49.3 56. l 55.0
Top 40% of households 69.8 76.2 75.7
7
Top 60% of households 84. l 90.7 88.l
83
Top 80% of households 94.2 • 98.l 96.0
23
Mean income ($ month) 217 199 271
Gini Concentration Ratio 0.427 0.5 13 0.5 16
-
01
Notes: HBS = Household Budget Survey
03
SES = Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households
PES = Post Enumeration Survey
#
us
Source: Department of Statistics, Economic Report 1973-74, Kuala Lumpur:
Government Press, 1975, p. 63
in
jo
TABLE III: 2 1
Urban-Rural differences in income distribution
up
ro
____ BBS 1957/58• SES 1967/68 .. PES 1970•

G
mean income mean income mean income

p
ap
(in M$/month) (in M$/month) (in M$/month)

ts
All Peninsular Malaysia 199 217 264

ha
Rural Malaysia 170 1 14 200

Urban Malaysia 26 1 283 428
W
Notes: • There are 28 size intervals in HBS, with no open-ended income classes. The top
si
most income band is M$900- l ,OOO. There is also no separate zero income class,
ba
zero incomes being lumped in the range M$0-25 per month.

..
Ab
The income rate for SES are presented in 7 income classes (including a zero
income category), with the top open-ended class beginning at M$750 per month.
A Pareto distribution was fitted through the last two classes alone, giving a = I ,
Q
7622 and mean for the open-ended interval of M$1 ,735.

A.
Source: S. Anand, The Size Distribution of Income in Malaysia, Part I (Draft), United
Nations: World Banlc, 1973, p. 1 4 .
b) Interracial Income Disparity
Interpersonal income disparity between urban and rural Malaysia' s

post-Independence multi-racial society grew at an alarming rate. The
existing problem was further complicated by the uneven racial distribu
tion of Malaysia's urban and rural population (Table IV:22).
TABLE ill : 22
Ethnic composition of the rural and urban poulations of West Malaysia, 1947 and 1957*
Malays Chinese Indians Others Total
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent

A. '000 of total '000 of total '000 of total '000 of total '000 Per cent
Q
Rural 2,153 59.7 1 ,074 29.8 35 1 9.7 29 0.8 3,607 1 00.0
1947 Urban 275 21.1 810 62.3 1 80 1 3.8 36 2.8 1 ,301 100.0
Ab
Total 2,428 49.5 1 , 884 38.4 53 1 10.8 65 1 .3 4,908 100.0
ba
si
W Rural 2,521 69.8 630 17.5 421 1 1 .7 38 1 .0 3,610 100.0
1957 haUrban 604 22.6 1 ,704 63.9 286 1 0.7 74 2.8 2,668 100.0
Total 100.0
ts 3, 125 49.8 2,334 37.2 707 1 1.3 1 12 1.7 6,278
Source : Populalion
1957ap Census ofFederalion ofMalaya, Report No. 1 4, op.ciL, Table 2.7, p. 9.
Nole : *Rural population
p has been defined as !hose people living in communities of less lhan 1 ,000 inhabitants.
G
ro
up
jo
in
us
#
03
0
This pattern of population distribution between rural and urban areas

in Malaysia shows that Malays were predom inantly rural dwellers; the
non-Malays urban. These racial factors were not only weakening Malay
and non-Malay interactions but also further added problems to the already
complicated problem of interpersonal income disparity (Table III: 23).
62
TABLE III: 23
7
83
Income distribution by ethnic groups*
23
HBS 1957/58 SES 1967/68 PES 1970
-
01
Mean income Mean income Mean income
03
(in MS per month) (In M$ per month) (in MS per month)
Malay H/H's 144 130

# 172
us
Chinese H/H's 272 321 394
Indian H/H's 217 253 304
in
Other H/H's 839 813

jo
• In Malaysian Dollars.
up
Source:· S. Anand, The Size Distribution .. op. cit. , p. 14.

.
ro
c) Poverty
G
p
Poverty is a situation that is said to prevail when people are in want

ap
of the means to meet their basic needs. This proposition leads us to two
ts
fundamental questions, Firstly, how to identify poor people and secondly,

ha
what items constitute the basic needs which are lacking for poor people.
W
To answer the first question, on.e can safely define poor people as
si
those who live at the near -starvation level. The second answer is related
ba
to the prevailing standard of living in the community. This criterion

Ab
covers only those people whose nutrition, housing and clothing are
merely adequate to preserve life, but do not match up to the standards of
Q
the community at large.31

A.
In this context an increase of the Gross National Product does not

necessarily lead to an improved standard of living for the population as
a whole, for two main reasons. Firstly, the rate at which a country's food
production increases is exceeded by a higher rate of increase of the
population. Secondly, despite marked increases in the Gross National
Products of most of the new states of Asia and Africa, a large proportion
76 Pakistan and·Malaysia
of the populations are engaged in the highly unrewarding sectors of the
economy.
It is remarkable, therefore, to find Malaysia giving such important

consideration towards the problem of poverty.32 As already indicated in
Table III: 23 the Malay household' s mean income per month was M$ 1 72
in 1970. For the Chinese and Indians it was M$394 and M$304 respec
tively. This indicates that the mean income of the Chinese alone was more
62
than double that of the Malays. These figures, however, do not clearly
7
explain the relative condition ofpoverty ofeach ethnic group in Malaysia.
83
The occurrence of poverty in Malaysia can be measured if it is viewed as
23
percentages of each ethnic group of the population falling below the
-
01
poverty line which is, by Malaysian standards, M$33 per month of the
household income per member (Table III:24).
03
TABLE III: 24 #
us
Households in poverty by race
in
in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970

jo
(in thousands)
up
All Poor Poverty Percentage of

ro
households households incidence total poor

G
(000) (000) ($) households

p
Malay 901 .5 584.2 64.8 73.8

ap
Chinese 525.2 136.3 26.0 17.2

ts
Indian 160.5 62.9 39.2 7.9

ha
Others 1 8.8 8.4 44.8 1.1

Total 1 ,606.0 791.8 49.3 100.0
W
All rural 1 ,166.7 683.7 58.6 86.3

All urban 439.3 1 08.1 24.6 13.7
si
ba
Source: Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, op. cit., p. 1 80.

Ab
These various figures of mean incomes of all households and

Q
households-in-poverty by race in 1970 lead us to two points. Firstly,

A.
according to the figures given in the Tables III: 23 and III: 24, in 1 970 the
majority of the poor households in . Malaysia fell in · the rural areas.
Secondly ,from the racial point of view, the majority of rural households
were Malay.
Although poverty was predominantly a Malay problem-it does not

mean that there was no poverty among the non-Malays. More than 49 per
cent of all the Malaysian households were living below the poverty line.
S ince poverty is not limited by racial barriers, it is a condition that applies
to many Chinese and Indians as well as to the Malays.33 But the relative
magnitude of the Malays• poverty exacerbates the already complicated
problems of interracial income disparity.
62
d) Unemployment and Underemployment
7
Closely related to the problem of poverty in Malaysia is the problem
83
of unemployment and underemployment. At the time of Independence i n
23
1 957, the total population o fPeninsular Malaysia was 6.3 million. Of this
-
01
· figure Malays made up just under 50 per cent, and non-Malays just over
50 per cent. In 1 970 the population increased to 9.3 million and the
03
Malays proportion increased to more than 52 per cent. Although since
#
Independence the rate ofpopulation growth has been cJeclining according
us
to the 1 970 census it is still about 3 per cent. In 1 957 the labour force
comprised about 2.2 million (Table III:25), of which more than 40 per
in
cent were below the age of 15 (Table III:26).

jo
up
ro
TABLE Ill: 25
G
Labour force and unemployment

p
ap
1957 1962 1967

/
ts
Total Population (in '000) 6,279 7,494 8,655

ha
Total Labour Force (in '000) 2,165 2,453 2;676

Total Employment (in '000) 2,126 2,305 2,440
W
Unemployment (in '000) 39 148 236(181)

si
Unemployment Rate (per cent) 1 .8 6.0 8.8(6.8)

ba
Labour force as per cent of

Total Population 34.5 32.7 30.9
Ab
Source: Lo Sum Yee, TM Development Performance o/Wist Malaysia: 1955-67, Kuala

Q
Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972, Table 9, p. 2 1 .

A.
In 1 970 the labour force had increased to 3.6 million, a t a ra te of 3 . 2 per

cent per year. More than 32 per cent fell between the age group of 15 and
24. In 1 957, the total employment was 2, 164,861 of whom 26.45 per cent
were employed in the agricultural sector, 6.25 per cent in the manufac
turing sector, 9.01 per cent in commerce and 14.76 per cent in services
(Table III: 27).
The total employment was increased to 2,783 ,000 (Table III:28) in 1970.
TABLE III: 26
Age distribution of population
Age Group % of Population
1957 1967
0- 14 43.84 44.2
62
1 5-19 9.75 10.5
20-24 8.30 7.6
7
25-39 1 8.31 17.4
83
40-64 17.oi 16.6
23
65 and over 2.76 3 .7
Unknown .02
-
01
Total 100.00 1 00.00
03
Source: Lo Sum Yee, The Development Performance ... op. cit., Table 8. p. 20.
TABLE III: 27 #
us
Percentages of occupational distribution by community
(Federation of Malaya, 1957)
in
jo
Occupation Total Malay Chinese . Indian Others % of

up
total
ro
employment
G
Agriculture, Forestry
p
Hunting, Fishing 572,789 80.3 17.6 0.8 1.3 26.45

ap
Agricultural Products
Requiring substantial
ts
processing (Rubber,
ha
Palm Oil etc.) 672,005 43.1 31.l 25.3 0.5 3 1 .04

W
Mining and Quarryi ng 58,499 17.6 68.3 1 1 .6 2.5 2.70

Manufacturing
si
(including handicrafts
ba
and automated mfg.) 1 35,382. 19.6 72.0 7.5 0.9 6.25

Ab
Building and
Construction 68,134 32.0 47.8 18.0 2.2 3.14
Electricity, Gas and
Q
Water 1 1 ,569 33.0 25.8 3 6.1 4.8 0.53

A.
Commerce 195,192 1 6.4 65.1 1 6.8 1 .7 9.01

Transport, Storage
Communications 74,755 35.9 39.0 2 1 .6 3.5 3.45
Services 3 19,745 39.9 34.4 1 5.0 10.7 14.76
Total Economically
Active 64,861 47.8 35.6 1 4.4 2.2 100.0
Source: H. Fell, 1967 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya.op. cit., Table 1 1 ,
pp. 102- 1 10: and Ronald Ma and Yon Peh Seng, "The Economic Characteristics
of the Population of the Federation of Malaya 1957", Malayan Economic Review,
Vol. V, no. 21 (October 1969), p. 35.
TABLE ID: 28
Employment by race and sector Peninsular Malaysia, 1970

('000)
% of % of % of % of
Sector Sector Sector Sector % of total
Sector Malays Total Chinese Total Indians Total Others Total Total • Employment
Agriculture, forestry
and fisheries 925.4 67.6 293.0 2 1 .4 138.3 J O. I 12.3 0.9 1360 49.1
Mining and quarrying 21.1 24.8 56.1 66.0 7.1 8.4 0.7 0.8 85 "3.1
Manufacturing 84.4 28.9 1 9 1 .0 65.4 15.5 5.3 1.2 0.4 292 I0.5
A.
Construction
Q 16.9 2 1 .7 56.2 72.1 4.7 6.0 0.2 0.2 78 2.8
Electricity, water and
sanitary services 10.2 48.5 3.8 18.0 6.8 32.3 0.3 1 .4 21 0.8
Ab
,
Transport storage and
communications 49.0 42.6 45.5 39.6 19.7 17. 1 0.8 0.7 1 15 4.1
ba
Commerce si 69.3 23.3 192.6 65.3 3 1 .6 I0.7 1.5 0.5 295 . I0.6
Services W 256.1 - 48.5 1 88.5 35.7 73.9 14.0 9.5 1 .8 528 19.0
Total 1432.4 5 1 .5 1026.7 35.7 73.9 14.0 9.5 1.8 528 19.0
ha
Labour Force
ts1,557.0 1 ,108.9 334.4 26.0 3,026
% 5 1 .5 36:6 1 1. 1 0.8 1 00
ap
Unemployment 124.6
p 82.2 36.8 243
% 8.0 G 7.4 1 1 .0 8.0
Population 4,84 1.3 ro 3,285.6 9,8 1.5 73.0 9,1 8 1
% 52.7 35.8 10.7 0.8 100
up
• Totals do not add because of rounding•
Source :
jo
Malay sia, Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, Mid-Term Revil!w oftM Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala
Lumpur: Govemment Press, 1973, p. 77.
in
us
#
03
0
The analysis of Lhe employment pattern reveals Lhat the majority of
Malays were engaged in the traditional sector, being Lhe poor subsistence
economy consisting of small-scale economic units employing labour
intensive methods of production. The majority of non-Malays were en
gaged in Lhe modem sector of the high-rewards exchange economy,
comprising large-scale economic units using capital ntensive methods of
62
production. This pattern of employment in Malaysia not only contributed
7
to poverty and income disparity between the Malays and non-Malays, but
83
also reinforced t�e identification of race with economic function, such as
23
Lhe Malays with agriculture and the non-Malays with commerce and
-
industry.
01
03
Unemployment was one of the most important problems the Malay
sian authorities had to face. From 1 957 to 197 1 Malaysia experienced a
#
high economic growth rate. The average annual growth rate of the GDP
us
and per capita GDP were 6.4 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively.
in
Despite this phenomenal growth the unemployment problems largely

jo
remained unresolved. The United Nation's Economic Planning Unit

up
report states:
ro
Employment during 19()9- 1970 grew at an annual rate of 3 per cent,

G
but this growth was uneven. The rubber estate sector, which is the
p
largest single employer of labour diverted a substantial production

ap
of its labour force under programmes to modernize and raise produc

ts
tivity in Lhe industry. Although land development and manufacturing

ha
contributed strongly to employment creation, they proved insuffi

W
cient to offset the slack in employment growth in the rest of the

si
agricultural sector and to absorb the annual expansions of Lhe labour

ba
force. As a consequence, the rate of unemployment rose to 7.5 per

Ab
cent in 1 970.34
In Lhis connection it should be mentioned Lhat there were many

Q
people considered as 'employed' whose income was below Lhe poverty

A.
level. This group is termed as undere_mployed or 'working poor'. Accord

ing to the Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, unemployment·
rates were lower in rural areas that in urban areas, but the percentage of
poverty was higher (61 .9 per cent) in rural areas than in urban areas (48.6
per cent). While most of the poor inhabiting the rural villages were
associated with a lowerrate of unemployment (Tables III: 25 and III: 28) ,
in urban areas a lower percentage of poverty was associated with a high
rate of unemployment. This indicates that underemployment continued
to be a greater problem i n the rural areas than i n urban areas. Thus
underemployment continued to be a serious problem with the high
incidence of poverty among the majority of the rural inhabitants. How
ever, it is difficult to ascertain why unemployment and underemployment
should largely be a Malay problem. The composition of the rural and
urban population, the distribution .of the labour force amongst the three
main ethnic groups and various other data (discussed above) show that the
62
majority of the Malays were rice-growers having an income far below the
7
poverty line. Hence the percentage of poverty was much higher among
83
the majority of the Malays who were underemployed. Conversely, the
23
percentage of poverty among the non-Malays, who were mainly urb&n
-
01
izedand mostly engaged in the export economy was lower. In this Context
some of the outlines of unemployment and underemployment of the
03
Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households (1967- 1968) are worth
mentioning.
#
us
a) Outline of Unemployment 1967-1968
in
jo
i) active unemployment35 rates among youths between the ages of

15 to 19 years in urban areas remained high; 76 per cent of the
up
unemployed were below the age of 25; 65 per cent had no

ro
working experience; and 60 per cent were both 16 to 24 years old

G
and first-time job seekers;

p
ii) active unemployment rates were lower in the rural areas than in
ap
the urbaq areas;

ts
iii) Indians ranked the highest in thje active unemployment rates

ha
(10.3 per cent), followed by Chinese (6.9 per cent) and Malays
W
(5.8 per cent);

si
iv) the majority of the active unemployed were single (marital

ba
status);
Ab
v) 57. 7 per cent of the active unemployed had no formal education

beyond primary level; 40.5 per cent had a lower or upper
Q
secondary education.
A.
b) Underemployment 1967-68
i) underemployment36 continued to be a serious problem;

ii) the extent of under-utilization of the labour force was particu
larly marked in the rural areas; the incidence of underemploy
ment in the agricultural sector was high;
iii) the incidence of underemployment was highest amongst the
Malays, followed by the Chinese and Indians;
iv) the incidence of underemployment was slightly higher for the
younger age group (1 5-24) and the older age group (35-64) than
the 25 to 34 age group;
v) by employment status, own account workers ranked high in
underemployment, and were slightly worse off than the unpaid
helpers/unpaid family workers.37
62
It becomes obvious from the study of the outlines of unemployment
7
and underemployment of the Socio-Economic Sample Survey of House
83
holds ( 1967-68) that the majority of non-Malays who were largely urban
23
inhabitants, educated and dependants of the family were unemployed. On
-
the other hand, the majority of Malays who were largely rural villagers,
01
less educated, comparatively older and heads of the households were
03
underemployed. It is clear therefore, that in Malaysia underemployment
#
was a significant factor contributing largely lo the increasing income
us
disparity and poverty amongst the Malays. The problem of economic
disparity was further aggravated by the problem of unemployment and
in
underemployment. Since identification of race with economic functions

jo
continued, such as the Malays with agriculture and the non-Malays with
up
commerce and industry, the achievement of integration of Malaysian

ro
society remained one of the most difficult tasks.

G
VIII The Types of Economic Policies Pursued by Federal

p
ap
Government
ts
The income disparity between the Malays and the non-Malays was
ha
a constant preoccupation of the Government of Malaysia. The

W
government's strategies to reduce the relative economic disparity be

si
tween the Malays and .the non-Malays can be studied in two separate
ba
phases: firstly for 1 957- 1969; and secondly for the post-1969 period. This
Ab
division is necessary because the official economic policies were sub

stantially modified after the 1969 racial riots. Although the immediate
Q
causes of Malaysian racial riots of May 1 3 , 1969, have · yet to be

A.
conclusively determined, the government was convinced that the under

lying problem of national integration in Malaysia (as also in Pakistan) was
the disparity in the economic roles of the Malays and the non-Malays. The
riots of 1969 made it clear that continuing racial economic disparities
would create a dangerous potential for social and political unrest in
Malaysia. Thus the government was convinced that the economic
policies affected prior lo the riots could not be allowed to continue, and
that a more positive economic policy was indicated.
a) Economic Policies ofPre- 1 969 Riots
Prior to Independence in 1 957 the Malays, especially the rural

peasants, were largely neglected by the British colonialists. The British
policies were largely designed to benefit the interests of the big
commercial concerns and the immigrant Chinese and Indian labourers.
For example, land laws were formulated in such a way as to provide
62
security of title only to the investors; little attention was given to laws
7
which created inequalities in the distribution of rural wealth through
83
subdivision and fragmentation. This in tum increased the poverty in the
23
rural areas. Similarly l ittle attention was given to the growing tendency
-
towards ownership of farmlands by urban inhabitants and non-farmers.
01
Furthermore, there existed a belief that Malays could not benefit from the
03
newly-introduced commercial and industrial sectors of the economy.
Thus they were provided with an education which led them to an
#
economic cul-de-sac. Malays were encouraged to continue with rice
us
cultivation, the least rewarding of the major occupations. Whilst the
in
Malays suffered neglect and paternalism , the non-Malays' commercial

jo
interests flourished. For example, the British export and import houses in
up
Malaysia preferred to appoint agents from immigrant stock (especially

ro
amongst the trade-minded Chinese) to trade with the rural villagers,

G
providing them with sole distribution franchises, exclusive transport

p
licenses and other opportunities. These facilities allowed the immigrant

ap
traders to charge monopolistic prices and to buy at monopsonistic prices

ts
from the rural population who formed the major market. Thus, "hemmed
ha
in on all sides the rural Malays were left on their own and slowly but
W
steadily poverty became their lot". 38 There is no doubt that Malaysia is

a rich country and abundantly supplied with natural resources-but as
si
Za'ba said "it is not they (Malays) who benefit thereby".39

ba
Ab
It was not Za 'ba alone who expressed his deep concern at the
backwardness of the Malays. Many others expressed similar views and
Q
asked for greater emphasis on development of the rural areas. For

A.
example in every session of the Legislative Council from 1948 onwards,

almost all Malay members became increasingly vocal in their demands
for more development in the economically backward Malay sectors.
S imilarly the government constant!y assured the electorate that the needs
of the rural people would be met. The colonial government maintained
that the Emergency (1948- 1960) declared to counter the Commu�ist
insurgents in Malaysia(details later), demanded resources that otherwise
might have been devoted to rural development. The Malay members of
the Legislative Council became increasingly impatient with this stance.
They asked for more assistance for the rural areas in the fonn of roads,
schools,assistance to cottage and small-scale industry, special attention
to the people of the East coast states and to the Malays as a whole. This
Malay impatience ultimately led to racial antagonism .. For instance, in
the budget debates at the end of 1952 on rural development, the resettle
62
ment of Chinese squatters in the New Villages became a crucial racial
7
83
issue. Dato Haji Mohammed Eusoff, a Malay Legislative Council
Member, gave an emotional expression to this issue. His speec h high
23
lighted the government's neglect of the loyal Malays who were mobilized
-
01
in force against the Communist insurgents. The Malays were being
neglected in their kampong (villages) whilst the government provided
03
ample amenities to the Chinese in the New Villages. The Government
#
argued that it was necessary to win the loyalty of the Chinese whilst
us
pleading that insufficient funds were available to help the Malays.
in
Up to the time of Merdeka (Independence) the demancjs for

jo
increased rural development gained momentum. While the colonial

up
government side-stepped its pledges ofrural upliftment with the demands

ro
of the Emergency, the newly-elected government of the post-Merdeka

G
period gave top priority to the development of the rural areas. The
p
government's efforts in assigning priority to rural development and the

ap
resulting reduction of disparity between the Malays and non-Malays can

ts
be divided into two parts. The first part related to the provision of social
ha
services and land development in the rural areas, while the second part
W
concerned the increase of Malay participation in commerce and industry.

si
Priority of Social Services and l:.and Development Schemes: The co

ba
lonial government was indifferent towards the development of

Ab
communications,education, health and the overall welfare of the rural

Malays, but the independent governments of Malaysia have since dem
Q
onstrated their deep commitment to the improvement of the standard of

A.
living of the rural people.
Under the first Malaya Plan ( 1?56-60) only 250 miles of roads were
built in the rural areas. After Independence there was an unprecedented
increase in rural transportation and communication facilities. For in
stance, of the 3,500 miles of new roads constructed in Malaysia during
1961 -70, about 65 per cent constituted rural roads. A striking increase in
health and medical facilities was also achieved. From a mere 16 main
health centres and sub-centres, in the rural areas· in 1960, the numbers
increased to 39 main health centres, 122 health sub-centres and 643
midwifery clinics by 1965 . By the First Malaysia Plan (1966- 1970), the
numbers of main health centres, health sub-centres and midwifery clinics
had increased to 44, 1 80, and 943 respectively. Rural electrification was
extended to 42,000 households during 1961 -65 and to a further 5 1 ,750
households during 1966-70. The number of mosques, community
62
centres, playing fields and other social amenities were also considerably
7
increased, also the drinking water supply. Substantial investment was
83
made in drainage and irrigation as part of the overall agricultural
23
programme designed to increase the productivity and incomes of culti
-
vators.
01
03
One of the most important government programmes for rural
upliftment during the period 1957- 1970 was the development of educa
#
tional institutions. Under the First Malaysia Plan, both primary and
us
secondary education. facilities for rural children were greatly expanded.
in
This was achieved by the construction of schools in rural areas and by

jo
providing residential facilities in established schools, enabling the enrol

up
ment of rural students, especially in the field of science education. As a

result of these programmes, more than 75 per cent of the 4,440 primary
ro
schools, and about 50 per cent of the 880 secondary schools were
G
. established in rural Malaysia. Enrolment and retention rates in rural areas

p
ap
were also greatly improved. Similarly, the standard of teachers and

facilities for science education at secondary levels were vastly improved.
ts
By any standards these were impressive achievements in rural develop

ha
ment. In thirteen years ( 1 957-1970) the Government of Malaysia pro

W
vided its rural people with vastly improved health , education, roads and
si
communications, allowivg the rural population easier and cheaper access

ba
to the urban markets.

Ab
The rural development programmes directly affected the agricul

Q
tural output of the country. The increase in paddy land, as well as coconut,
A.
rubber and other crops can perhaps be determined more by the improved
drainage and irrigation facilities than by any other factor. Moreover, the
linking of previously inaccessible fanns to the market centres had often
transformed subsistence-oriented agricultural areas into market-oriented
areas.
Despite the progress made in rural development, Malaysia continued

to face the problems of poverty, unemployment and economic disparity.
For instance, absentee landlords and a very small group of rural landown
ers controlled the land tenure system and the rural marketing system
remained a monopoly. The credit system was also controlled by these
people, as well as by pawnbrokers and money-lenders. The improved
infrastructure of the rural areas was unlikely to be of any help to the
majority of the rural population in more than a marginal way under these
circumstances. Since the absentee landlords and monopsonistic operators
62
controlled the bulk of the increased production, the cultivators saw little
7
incentive for greater productivity and showed indifference to the im
83
proved rural infrastructure.
23
ii Land Development Schemes: In the attempt to stimulate a health
-
01
ier rural economy the Government of Malaysia placed great emphasis on
03
agricultural land development schemes. During the 1960s more than
three-fourths of the agricultural public dev!!lopment ex penditure was
#
devoted to land development. Expenditure increased from M$ 17 million
us
in 1956-61 to M$ 130 million in 1 96 1 -65; it was further increased to
in
M$3 10 million under the First Malaysia Plan, 1965-70. During the
jo
decade, more than 800,000 acres were developed under the public sector
up
· programmes.
ro
In 1956 the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA) was

G
form·ed to undertake the major agricultural land development schemes

p
and to provide land for the landless. Although the FLDA's rural devel
ap
opment programmes met with some success, the 1 Authority was not
ts
capable of overcoming the existing structural shortcomings of the

ha
agrarian economy. Only a small proportion of the rural Malay population

W
benefited from the schemes. For instance, by 1 965 only about6.5 per cent
of rural Malays were settled, and by 1970 the increase was only up to less
si
ba
than 15 per cent. Thus, in excess of 85 percent of the rural Malay people
were left landless. It is argued that "even if it can considerably increase
Ab
the rate of its ability to settle landless rural population, the FLDA is still
Q
unlikely to be able to deal with more than one-fifth of the problem of

Malay landlessness".40 This situation imposes great difficulty for the
A.
integration of the Malay have-nots with the haves (non-Malay immi

grants).
iii Malay Participation in Commerce and Industry.' To assist and

promote participation by Malays in commerce and industry persistent
efforts were made by the government in the form of business permits and
licenses. In a speech to the Federal Legislative Council on December 1 3 ,
1958, the Minister of Transport said: "The Government will continue to
give the closest attention to increasing the quantum of Malay participa
tion in the road transport industry". The Minister further maintained that
the aim of the Government was to "render the proportion of Malay taxi
proprietors in each State equivalent to the Malay proportion of the
population of that State".41 Overall development in trucking and bus
services had been striking, but it was evident that in the mid- 1960s Malay
62
participation in these sectors remained quite insignificant. The Transport
7
Minister further reported that Malay capital in bus services grew from
83
M$ 1 .7 million in 1 958 to M$7.3 million in late 1966, and accounted for
23
more than one-fifth of the total investments in this sector.
-
01
The Malays were also encouraged by the introduction of a govern
03
ment contracting system. To this effect, a Royal Commission was
established in mid- 1 960. In May 1 964 the Commission recommended
#
that the aim of the Government should be to allocate by administrative
us
action not less than 25 per cent of all classes of Government contracts to
in
Malay contractors".42The Government also encouraged Malay participa

jo
tion in the development of Malaysia's mineral resources. Reservations of

up
mining land and subsidies were made available to encourage Malay

ro
participation. B ut despite the Government's initiatives, only a very small

G
acreage was being worked by Malay concerns (Table III: 29).

p
ap
TABLE III: 29
ts
Malay participation in m ining

ha
W
Total acreage in mining leases in States of Malaysia 51 5,085 acres

Acreage held by Malays 9,234 acres
si
Acreage held jointly by Malays and non-Malays 1 ,324 acres

ba
Acreage held by non-Malays 504,526 acres

Ab
Acreage of leases actually worked by Malays

- less than 1 ,000 acres
'
Acreage worked by Malays alone and jointly with
Q
- non Malays 1 ,40.! acres

A.
Source: Kongerres Ekonomi Bumiputra, "Mining Land Within Malay Reservation",

Kertas Kerja Working Paper no. 7C/1/65, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press,
1965, p. 124.
Malay participation in the timber and lumber industry was also

encouraged by the government, but with minimal result. The Konggeres
Ekonomi Bumiputra in its working paper entitled "Land" reported that at
the end of 1 964, Malays owned 428 licences and permits of the timber
industry, while non-Malays owned 802. With the objective of involving
the Malays in modem economic activity, the government also established
the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) in 1950. This
was the first national organization formed to stimulate development in
rural Malaysia. The strategy of RIDA included changing the structure of
the rural economy through the provision of rural credit, marketing and
62
technical assistance, and fostering a spirit of self-reliance and initiative
7
amongst the rural population. During 1950- 1958 RIDA advanced loans
83
totaling M$ 12.6 million to 3 ,238 borrowers. These funds were used to
23
finance enterprises in commerce, industry, agriculture, animal hus
-
bandry, fisheries and transport. A government committee (led by Dato
01
Ahmed Perang, a former chairman of RIDA) was set up in 1959 to
03
ascertain the condition of the Malay economy. In February 1960, the
#
committee reported that out of a total of 89 ,000 businesses registered in
us
the Federation of Malaya by the end of 1959, only 8 ,000 were classified
as Malay, and of a total capital investment of M$400 mi Ilion in registered
in
companies, the Malay share accounted for only M$4.5 million. The
jo
committee further disclosed that in 1958, out of33 ,000 income taxpayers,
up
only 3 ,000 were Malays, and their contribution to all personal income
ro
taxes amounted to only 4 per cent. The committee observed that "most
G
of the Malay taxpayers were government officials".43 The committee also

p
advanced a number of reasons for Malays backwardness in business,

ap
commerce and Industry. The Malays preferred to invest in real estate

ts
rather than to take part in commerce and industry. There had been a
ha
general lack of Malay support for Malay business, and the lack of capital
W
available to Malays made them unable to compete with the Chinese

wholesalers.
si
ba
With the absence of Malay initiatives in the modem sector, there

Ab
evolved the commercial partnership generally referred to as "Ali-Baba".

"Ali" represented the Malay, who enjoyed "Malay Privileges" for readily
Q
obtaining business permits, licences and contracts as guaranteed under

A.
the Constitution. Since the Malays generally lacked capital and business
acumen they "sold" the business operating rights to the Chinese who had
capital and expertise. The Chinese were referred to as "Baba". 44 The
"Ali" element represented only 4 per cent of the. Malay population, and
mostly comprised the income taxpayers of this ethnic group. A small
portion of the non-Malay "Baba" element was engaged in business and
money-lending activities. The majority were workers and peasants who
were as poor as the poor Malays. Although there were Malay businessmen
and money�lenders, by comparison on the national level there were-more
non-Malays in the higher income bracket than Malays. The non-Malays
predominated in the commerce, business and industry sectors. This
situation often created community resentment and antagonism which was
inflamed by political movements thriving on the exploitation of commu
nity discord.
7 62
By the end of the decade, RIDA's record disclosed that it had
83
primarily con_centrated on the improvement of "physical amenities" of
23
the rural areas. In 1958 the Finance Minister reported to Parliament:
"Experience had shown that in a substantial number of cases in which
-
01
loans have been granted, the desired results have not been achieved, due
03
not to any inherent flaw in the enterprise but to lack of energy, experience,
acumen and steady application on the part of the borrowers".45
#
us
In the autumn of 1 966, Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat (MARA) or the
Council of Trust for Indigenous People was established by a reorganiza
in
jo
tion of RIDA. The objectives of this body included the provision of

technical and financial assistance to Malay and other indigenous busi
up
nessmen in the new or existing businesses, and the establishment of new

ro
industrial and commercial projects to be subsequently transferred to

G
Malays once they were operating effectively,, In the period 1966-70,

p
MARA advanced about 4,800 loans totalling M$3 1 million to finance

ap
various projects. A number of manutacturing and commercial concerns

ts
were set up producing such items as batik and batik garments, leather
ha
goods, handicrafts, sawn timber and timber products, tapioca starch and
W
pellets and processed rubber. MARA also built shops for Malay busi
si
nesses, and entered into wholesale supply ;md contracting for construc
ba
tion materials. Bus services were also introduced by MARA. In January

Ab
1967 Tun Abdul Razak:, the then Deputy Prime Minister, disclosed that
MARA-operated bus routes were serving one-quarter of the rura:l popu
Q
lation. The Minister further stated that the MARA bus lines would be sold
A.
to Malay companies once they were operating efficiently.
The Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Limited was set up as a commercial

bank in 1 965. Its activities included the provision of banking and credit
facilities to assist the Malays in commerce, industry and other modem
economic activities. By 1970 the Bank granted loans totalling M$ 1 34
million. A major portion ofthese loans was advanced to Malay individu
als and businesses for housing, eonstruction, oil palm cultivation, logging
and saw-milling, import and export businesses, manufacturing and small
scale commercial industrial enterprises. The Bank also provided techni
cal and advisory services to encourage the Malays to avail themselves of
the credit and banking opportunities offered.
Despite the significant progress made in improving the economic

condition of the Malays, the problem of economic disparity between the
62
Malays and the non-Malays remained. Although there was substantial
mobility into more productive activities within the agricultural sector,
7
83
most rural Malays continued to be engaged in low-inco�e agricultural
23
activities, while most non-Malays were engaged in modem productive
activities. Hence the wide gaps in incomes and standard ofliving between
-
01
the pre<,lominantly Malay and non-Malays continued to exist. In view of
03
the meagre achievements of the various government programmes and
policies designed to encourage Malay participation in modem economic
#
activity, the Malays' dissatisfaction with their economic situation stead
us
ily increased over the years. The racial riots of May 1969 indicated the
in
government's failure in solving the problem.

jo
b) Economic Policies of the Post-1969 Period

up
ro
During the last decade and as a result of the political events of May
G
1969, the Malaysian Government's entire approach to economic policy

was largely transfonned. In his "Foreword" to the Second Malaysia Plan,
p
ap
197 1 - 1 975 , the Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak declared:

ts
We are entering a new era of development, fully committed to

ha
meeting the challenges of our time and forging a strong, united

W
Malaysian nation w ith continued progress and prosperity. A new

si
approach to development which reflects these commitments, and the

ba
policies and programmes associated with it, are embodied in the

Ab
Second Malaysia Plan.

Q
The government's development strategy ado.pted following the

racial riots of May 1969 was in many respects an improvement on its
A.
earlier ones.
For the first time since Independence the Government of Malaysia

placed considerable emphasis on greater Malay participation in the
manufacturing and commercial sectors. Thus, the Second Malaysian Plan
provided a blueprint for the New Economic Policy (NEP), incorporating
two basic objectives fc r development. The first related to the eradication
of poverty by raisii,g income levels and increasing employment oppor
tunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second objective was
the acceleration of the process of restructuring the society to correct the
economic imbalances, thus reducing and eventually eliminating the
identification of i:ace with economic function. The aim of the New
Economic Policy was to create a socio-economic environment that
supported and nurtured nation-building and national integration. It would
62
seem that the New Economic Policy was a shift in focus away from the
7
traditional rural economy towards a modem commercial and industrial
83
one without undermining the importance of agricultural development.
23
What was crucial was the adequacy and feasibility of the objectives
-
01
of the NEP, as incorporated in the Second Malaysia Plan. The first two
03
objectives of the Plan, the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of
the society, were objectives that could be attained only by "definition".
#
Since the New Economic Policy was a response to Malay and other
us
indigenous peoples' politic al interest, the viability of the political system
in
in Malaysia depended mainly on the economic growth of the country.

'
jo
Therefore, the attainment of the objectives of the Second Malaysia Plan,

up
which was entifely related to economic development, was critical.

ro
The Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak reported in November 1 973

G
that the Government had made considerable progress in achieving the

p
Plan 's objectives. In order to materialize its aims and objectives, the
ap
government further incorporated a long-term programme in the Outline

ts
Perspective Plan (OPP), covering the period 1 970-1990. This Plan first
ha
appeared in the Report of the Government on the Mid-Term Review of

W
the Second Malaysia Plan 1971 -.1975. Like Pakistan 's Prospective Plan
of 1965- 1 985, it was prepared to provide a long-term perspective within
si
ba
which policies and programmes would be shaped on the result assessed.

Broadly, the objectives were to reduce inequality by favouring the
Ab
Malays, and they were to:

Q
i) create employment opportunities soon enough to bring about'

A.
full employment of the labour force;

ii) increase the incomes and by productivity of the poor, both urban
and rural, by offering greater access to skills, land and capital,
and eliminating underemployment;
iii) offer opportunities for worker mobility from low productivity
activities to more productive occupations;
iv) reduce racial and socio-economic inequalities;
v) develop the rural sector and improve living conditions amongst
the urban poor;
vi) allow the Malays and other indigenous peoples to manage and
own a minimum of 30 per cent of the total commercial and
industrial sectors by 1990;
vii) restructure employment patterns to reflect the population's
racial composition by 1990;
62
viii) expand a:fid improve education and training facilities to allow
7
the attainment of the above objectives.46
83
The key element of success of the New Economic Policy would
23
appear to be the attainment of employment opportunities at a rate
-
sufficient to bring about full employment of the labour force, and the
01
minimum 30 per cent Malay/other indigenous peoples ownership and
03
management of the.commercial and industrial sectors within a period of
#
twenty years. The task not only involved creating employment opportu
us
nities, but also to develop more productive and rewarding occupations for
the underemployed, being mostly Malays.
in
jo
TABLE III: 30
up
Asset ownership by race, Peninsular Malaysia , 1970

ro
Share capital Planted acreage in Fixed assets in

G
in limited modem agriculture industry

p
companies Corporate Non- Cor- Non-corporate

ap
sector corporate porate sector

sector sector
ts
(per cent 9f (per cent of 1 000 (per cent

ha
M$ Mil.) acres) M$ Mil.)

W
Malaysians 39.3 29.2 94.1 42.8 97.6

si
Malay 1 .9 0.3 47. 1 0.9 2.3

.
ba
Chinese 22.5 25.9 32.8 26.2 92.2

Indian 1 .0 0.3 10 .1 0.1 2.3
Ab
Other 1 3.0 2.7 1 .8 1 4.3 0.8

Government 0.9 2'3 1 .3
Q
Non-Malaysians 60.7 70.8 5.9 57.2 2.4

A.
100.0 100 100 1 00 1 00

(M$ 5,289 ( 1 . 8 mil (0.7 (M$ 1 ,307 (M$ 1 7 1 . 3
mil.) acres) m i l m i l .) mil)
acres).
Source: C.L. Robless, "Some Notes on the Feasibility and Consistency of the New
Economic Policy" in Stephen Chee and Koo Siew Mun (eds.), Malaysian Eco
nomic Development ... op. cit., Table 5, p. 43, and Second Malaysia Plan (1971-
75) , op. cit., p. 40, Table 3- 1 .
The government's attempt to adjust the income distribution through
changing the system of employment also appeared insufficient. Equally
urgent was the transformation of the pattern of ownership, which the
government expected to achieve through creating a Malay indigenous
peoples' commercial and industrial comm unity. One of the major reasons
for income differentials between the Malays and the non-Malayas was the
62
acute disparity in the distribution of wealth in the corporate and non
corporate sectors (Table lll: 30).
7
83
It appears that a Malay capital growth rate of about 28 per cent would
23
be needed to increase Malay ownership to 30 per cent by 1990. This
-
assumes a total corporate assets increase of 10 per cent per annum. It.is
01
arguable that such a growth rate could have been achieved in the early
03
years of starting from a low base, but it seems highly improbable that it
#
could be achieved over the next twenty-year period. Moreover, the
us
government had the options of developing private Malay entrepreneurs,
or public ownership, or joint ownership with foreign-private firms. This
in
proposition, however, seems to be more apparent than real, because past

jo
experience shows that private Malay entrepreneurs heed assistance in a

up
number of ways. The Malays could not have saved sufficient funds to
ro
attain a 30 per cent ownership share without direct government assistance

G
and participation. The crux of the problem is how Malay self-reliance

p
may be stimulated whilst receiving government assistance at the .same

ap
time.
ts
ha
On the other hand, it is argued that the non-Malays are concerned that
the New Economic Policy will not benefit them. Their concern is mainly
W
related to the total growth rate of the country. They apprehend that if the
si
growth rate decreases and falls short of the New Economic Policy
ba
objectives, a further reduction of the opportunities for non-Malays may

Ab
occur. In a multi-racial society such as Malaysia's the Government's

preoccupation with Malay interests may create amongst non-Malays a
Q
sense of deprivation and eventually cause further serious racial

A.
antagonism.
It may, therefore, appear that the government's plan to achieve

national integration with the New Economic Policy is not only insuffi
cient, but also impracticable.
References
1. The First Five Year Plan, 1 955-1960, op. cit., pp. 2 1 6 , 399-400; and Report on
Eco110mit Relations between East and West Pakistan, Karach i: Government of
Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Government Press, 1 96 1 , p.21 .
2. Economic Survey ofEast Pakistan, 1 963-1964, Dacca: Finance Department, Gov
ernment of East Pakistan, East Pakistan Government Press, 1964, p. 97.
3. Kabir Uddin Ahmed , Breakup of Pakistan: Background and Prospects of
62
Bangladesh, London: The Social Science Publishers, 1 972, pp. 27-28.
4. The ConstituJion of the Republic of Pakistan, Karachi: Ministry of Law, Govern
7
83
ment of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan.Press, 1 962, p.76.
5. Planning Commission, The Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-
23
70), Karachi: Trade and Industry Publications, GovernmentPress, April 1 96 8, p.42;
idem Statistics of Development Planning in Pakistan, Karachi: Government of
-
01
Pakistan Press, 1 960; and also see Md. A. Rahman, "The Pakistan Perspeciive Plan
and the Objective of Elimination of Dependence on Foreign Assistance", Pakistan
03
Development Review, Vol. 7, no. 3 (Autump 1967), pp. 4 1 2-41 5.
6. K. U. Ahmed, op. cit., p.35.
7. #
The federal expenditure on defence, foreign affairs and many such subjects were in
us
the interest of the whole of Pakistan (both East and West Pakistan) and therefore,
the services accrued from these sectors were usually called "common services".
in
8. Ministry of Finance, Report on Economic Relations between East and West

jo
Pakistan, op.cit., p.46.

up
9. Ministry of Finance, Report on the Allocation and Apportionmelll of Revenue

between the Celllreand the Provinces, Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press,
ro
1 96 1 , p.4; and also see Debates -National Assembly ofPakistan, Questions/or Oral
G
Answers and Their Replies - Question llO . 253, Dacca: Government of Paksitan
·
Press, February 6, 1 969, pp. 1 9-20.

p
ap
10. Government of Pakistan, Report ofthe Eco110micAppraisal Commillee, Vols. I and

II (1952-1953), Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1953; and also see K.U.
ts
Ahmed, op. cit., p. 38.

ha
11. Morning News (Dacca), January 20, 1 962.

12 . Raunaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National llllegration, New York: Columbia
W
University Press, 1972, p. 70.

si
13 . That the Government of Pakistan kept its. currency over-valued all through was a
ba
well acknowledged fact.

For a precise estimate of the extent of over-valuation se� A.I. Aminul Islam, "An
Ab
Estimation of the Extent ... ", op. cit., Table I, p.58; S . Huq, ".Devaluation for
Pakistan?", Forum, 1 8 July, 1 970. Aminul Islam's estimates suggest that the over
Q
valuation was considerable and often of the order of 100 per cent or more.
14.
A.
K.U. Ahmed, op. cit., p.42.

1 5. During most of Pakistan's history, a very small number of men, the Govemor
General or the President, the Central Finance Minister and the Deputy Chairman of
the Plann ing Commission who had considerable influence on the allocation of
.resources, were never of East Pakistani origin.
l6. The official exchange rate was about Rs. 4.76 to the U.S. dollar, whereas econo
mists' estimations imply a rate more like Rs. 10.
17. A.I. Aminul Islam, " An Estimation of the Extent ofOver-Valuation of the Domestic
Currency in Pakistan at the Official Rate of Exchange, 194 8/49 - 1964/65",
falci.sllJn De11dopment Review, Vol. X, no. 1 (Spring 1 970), p. 58; and, Stephan R.
Lewis Jr., Eco110rroc Policy and Industrial Growth in Palci.stan, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1 969, p. 82.
1 8. For detailed descriptions of the transfer of resources. from East to West Pakistan see
Keith Griffin and A.R. Khan (eds), Growth and Inequality in Pakistan, London:
Macmillan & Co.Ltd . , 1 972.
19. A.K.M. Rabbani, "Jute in the World Economy: A Statistical Study", Ph.D. thesis,
University of London, 1 964, Chapter VI.
20. For detailed explanations of the Two-Economy Thesis, see A. Sadequc, The
Economic Emergence ofPakistan, Parts I and II, Part I, Dacca: East Bengal Gov
62
ernment Press, 1 954; and Part II, Dacca: The Provincial Statistical Board (Planning
Department), 1 956; idem, Pakistan's First Five YearPlan in Theory and Operation,
7
83
Dacca: East Pakistan Government Press, n.d.
21. For some o f the contradictions o f the "economic efficiency", see Md. A.
23
Rahman.East and West Pakistan . . , op. cit., pp.2 1 -32.
.
22. Sheik Mujibur .Rahman,Amader Banchar Dabi: Chaya Dafa Karmasuchi (Six
-
01
Point Formula: Our Demandfor Survival), Dacca: General Secretary, East Paki
stan A wami League, 1 966. (Awami League, the party instrumental Lo Bangladesh
03
li beration, included the "two-economy thesis" in its Six-Point Formula).
23. See the editorials in The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), May 3 1 , 1 968; and June 22,
1 968.
#
us
24. Speech by A.S.M. Sulaiman, Pakistan National Assembly, D ebates, Vol. 11, June
22, 1966, pp. 1 2 8 1 - 1282.
in
25. R. Jahan, op. cit., p.87.

jo
26. Marvin L. Rogers, "The Politicii.ation of Malay Villagers: National Integration or

up
Disintegration", Comparative Politics, Vol. VII, no. 2 (January 1 975), p. 2 1 2.

27. Joseph W. Dodd, "The Colonial Economy, 1 967: The Case of Malaysia", Asian
ro
Survey, Vol. IX, no. 6 (June 1 969), p. 439.

G
28. Joseph W. Dodd., "The Colonial Economy ... ", op. cit., p. 439. According to 1 967
market price, US $ 1 (one dollar) equals M$3.07.
p
ap
29. R.S. Milne, Governmefll and Politics of Malaysia, Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1 967 , pp. 7-8.
ts
30. Gunnar Myrdal quoted in Harvey Stockwin ' s "Divided Stand", Far Eastern
ha
EcoMmic Review, Vol. L. no.4 (October 28, 1 965), p. 162.

31. M. Orshansky, uHow Poverty i s Measured", Monthly Labour Review Vol. 92
W
( 1 969), pp. 37-4 1 .

si
32. According to the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976-SO) the poverty line is defined as
ba
covering minimum basic needs with respect to housing, nutrition, clothing and
transport facilities, to preserve a decent standard of living. In this definition of the
Ab
TMP there is no exact figure on income of the poverty line. However, poverty line
is estimated at M$33 per month of the household income per member. See the Third
Q
Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1 976, p. 5.

33.
A.
Tjoa Soei Hock, Institutional Backgrowui to Modern Economic and Social Devel
opment in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Liu and Liu, 1963. pp. 34-36.
34. United Nations ' Economic Planning Unit, "Development Planning Techniques in
Malaysia", EcoMmic B ulletinfor Asia and the Pacific, September/December 1974,
p. 57.
35. "Active unemployment" i s defined as those actively looking forjobs, and "passive
unemployment" those who are unemployed, and passively awaiting jobs and who
will accept a job if offered. See Tan Ting Yean, Ibid. , F.N. 5.
36. uUnderemployment" i s defined here as those working voluntarily as part-time
workers for less than the normal work hours per week.
37. Depanment ofStatistics, Socio-Economic Sample Survey ofHouseholds - Malay
sia 1967-1968, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1 970, pp. 146- 1 5 1 , and also
see Tan Ting Yean, op. cit., pp. 13- 1 5.
38. D. Lim, Economic Growth ....op. cit., p. 60.
39. Za'ba orZainal Abidin Bin Ahmad quoted in Ungku A. Aziz's "Footprints on the
Sands of Time: The Malay Poverty Concept Over Fifty Years from Za'ba to Aziz
and the Second Malaysia Five Year Plan" in Stephen Chee and Khoo Siew Mun
(eds.), Malaysian Economic Development and Policies, Malaysian Economic As
62
sociation Conference Proceedings Series, no.3, Kuala Lumpur: Dicetak Oleh
.•
Yayasan Anda Percetakan, 1975, p. 10.
7
83
40. See Ungku A. Aziz, "Agricultural Development and Economic Development in
Malaysia", in The Structure and Development in Asian Economics, Proceedings
23
of a Conference held by the Japanese Economic Research Centre in September
-
1 968, Tokyo: 1 969, p. 43.
01
41. Federation o f Malaya, ugislative Council Debates, Second Legislative Council,
3rd session September 1957- October 1958, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press,
03
1 958, pp. 4330-433 1 .
42. Federation of Malaysia, Report ofa Commission to Enquire into the Government
Tender System, CMD6/64 of 5 May 1964, p.20. #
us
43. Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur, February 3, 1 960.
44. S. Husin Ali, "Some Aspects of Change, Mobility and Conflict in Post-Merdeka
in
Malaysia", Manusia dan Masharakat.B ii, /, 1972, p. 57.

jo
45. ugislative Council Debates, Second Legislative Council, 3rd session, op. cit.,
up
p.3389.
46. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
ro
G
p
ap
ts
ha
W
si
ba
Ab
Q
A.
4
62
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
7
83
23
PAKISTAN
-
01
Divisions between the East and the West were becoming more than
03
just geographical, cultural or social and increasingly political in Pakistan.
#
Therefore to get at it, it is essential to investigate briefly the historical and
us
ideological setting, and the basic political contradictions which origi
nally gave birth to the state of Pakistan.
in
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I Colonial Heritage
up
Before the establishment of British rule in India, "Hindus and

ro
Muslims had lived side by side for about a thousand years in distinct social
G
compartments, accommodating each other's religious beliefs."1 Em

p
peror Akbar's successful efforts to bring about national integration

ap
through an amity and understanding between Hindus and Muslims

ts
remained continuous sources of strength for the secularist tradition of

ha
India till 1 605. This trend of communal harmony was reversed during the
W
reign of Aurangzeb (1 658-1707), who not only wanted to lslamize his

administration but also offended his non-Muslim citizens by imposing
si
ba
Jizya2 -a discriminatory tax, on them.3 The result was a widespread

Hindu resistance and thus the seeds of Hindu-Muslim discord were firmly
Ab
sown.
Q
The British conquest of India in the mid-eighteenth century m arked

A.
the final end of Hindu-Muslim tranquillity. The British not only

dismantled the Mughal sovereignty in India but they brought about
radical changes in the political and economic structure of the country as
well as intellectual life which had significant repercussions on society.
They replaced the old Muslim landed aristocracy with a new commercial
class of bankers, speculators and money-lenders, the majority of whom
were Hindus. The B ritish system of economy also damaged the economic
prospects of Muslim craftsmen. Their administrative and military
measures ultimately led to the replacement of Muslim civil and military

officers by Europeans which affected the Muslim aristocracy adversely.
Finally, in the early nineteenth century the British introduced Western
ideas and English education which also created di�ontent among the
62
Indian Muslims. It was argued that psychologically the Muslims had not
recovered from their loss of power and past glories when they were ousted
7
83
as the sovereign rulers of the Indian subcontinent by the British.4 Hence
the Muslims rejected the alien ideas and methods, and refused to give up
23
Persian and Arabic to learn English. When they failed to grasp the
-
01
opportunities available in the colonial government, the other
03
coµimunities,mainly the Hindus.utilized them. Consequently the
Muslims were largely supplanted by Hindus in all fields. It is said that the
#
British policy not only demoralized the Muslims but left them
us
economically crippled. For example, it was Lord Corn'.Vallis who made
in
the first contract with the landlords in 1 789- 1 790, out of which developed
jo
the 1 793 Bengal Pennanent Settlement Regulations. As a result, the

up
Muslim zamindars, particularly in Bengal, had lost much of their land,

and their possessions and influence were assumed by new rent farmers
ro
who were mainly Hindus. Thus, the Muslims became weak and poor.
G
Again the Sepoy Mutiny of 1 857 fu rther worsened their position. The
p
ap
British put all the blame on the Muslims for the revolt of 1 857 and as a
result they were discriminated against�
ts
ha
Thus by the 1 870s the Indian Muslim community was in decay,

W
politically suppressed, economically backward and deprived of access to

positions in government service by a dominant Hindu majority commu
si
ba
nity. It was this discriminatory policy of the government that gradually

led to an uneven development of the two communities and that was
Ab
ultimately responsible for much of the origins of the Hindu-Muslim

Q
conflicts which provided fuel for the movement of a separated homeland

A.
for the Muslims in the 1 940s.
This situation within the Indian political world in the latter half of the
nineteenth century combined with the impact of Western liberalism
ushered in a new course of politics in the history of British India. By the
1 880s Hindu leaders of various shades were .talking in terms of their
political rights while their Muslim counterparts were suffering from
uncertainty. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1 885 with the
patronage of Englishmen like Lord Dufferin, the then viceroy of
India.Allan Octavian Hume and Sir William Wedderburn. 'Realising the
apparent backwardness of the Muslims, several Muslim leaders began to
The Political Background 99
call upon the Muslims to promote English education among them to avoid
the risk that their boycott was going to inflict upon them in the future. S ir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a staunch supporter of British rule in India, was one
of the leading spirits of this Muslim revival. He began to agitate for the
Muslims' share in government services and also opposed Muslims join
ing in the Indian Congress. In his thinking and actions:
62
Sir Syed Ahmed was both modem and moderate. He believed that
7
83
Islam was a state of mind, not a political entity: he did not take part
23
in the Mutiny... He supported continuing British rule. But he also
fought successfully for separate nominations for Muslims and Hin
-
01
dus, so that Muslim representation would be guaranteed in all self
03
governing institutions. He asked all Muslims to believe in love, not
in violence; to be tolerant; to be self-critical; to look to the future, and
#
not to the past. There is no question that his liberal philosophy had
us
a great effect on the attitudes oflater generations of Muslim leaders. 7
in
Perhaps Sir Sayyid's greatest single contribution to the Muslim re-

jo
vival was th(( establishment of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College

up
in 1 875 which was eventually raised to university status in 1921 as the

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Aligarh Muslim University. Although the medium of teaching was

G
English and the main curriculum Western, both the Arabic language and
p
religious instruction were compulsory. In fact Sayyid Ahmad was

ap
concerned with promoting a sense of identity amongst the Muslims of

ts
India. There were two sides to his approach to the Aligarh movement.
ha
First, he wanted to produce Muslim candidates capable of acquiring

W
higher ranks in government services, and secondly to create a class of

Muslim political leaders to counter Hindu leaders.
si
ba
Until the Partition of India, Aligarh University played a leading role

Ab
in shaping Indian. Muslim opinion. Also, Sayyid Ahmad succeeded in

winning recognition of the principle of separate electorates for Muslims
Q
on Ripon's Council in 1 882. He kept his community uninvolved in the

A.
Congress Party's renewed demand in 1 887 for the introduction of the

Western type ofparliamentary democracy in India. On the political future
· of India, Sayyid Ahmad wrote in 1 888:
Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations-the Mo

hammedan and Hindu-could sit on the same throne and remain
equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary .that one of them
should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could
remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable.8
1 00 Pakistan and Malaysia
If Sayyid Ahmad's observation is considered the reflection of the

group consciousness of the nineteenth century Muslim elite, it can be
safely said that the twentieth century Muslims, fear and inferiority
complex vis-a-vis Hindus is not a new phenomenon. Sayyid Ahmad's
remarks only opened a new chapter of bitterness and suspicion between
the Hindus and the Muslims. At this stage, the role of the British Raj
62
further aggravated Hindu-Muslim relations. For example, when the
7
Congress Party began to demand India's political nationalism, the Raj
83
then changed its tactics and patronized the Muslim elites to confront the
23
Congress. Thus, by dividing Bengal in 1905 to bestow favours on the
Muslims of the Province, Lord Curzon , the Viceroy oflndia, declared that
-
01
Dhaka would become
03
... the centre and possibly the capital of a new and self-sufficing ad
#
ministration which must give to the people of these districts by reason
us
of their numerical strength and their superior culture the preponder
ating voice in the province so created, which would invest the
in
jo
Mohammedans in Eastern Bengal with a unity which they have 1_1ot

enjoyed since the days of the old Mussulma� Viceroys and Kings.9
up
ro
Although the partition of Bengal in 1905, in one sense, could be

G
regarded by the Muslims as favourable to their interests, it was primarily

p
done for administrative convenience. To the Raj the boundaries ofBengal

ap
were unwieldy as, at that time, they stretched from the borders of the
ts
Central Province to the end of Assam, thus covering the provinces of

ha
Orissa, United Province, Bihar, Bengal and Assam of later days.

W
In fact, the partition opened employment as well as educational op

si
portunities for the Bengali Muslims in particular-which Muslims in

ba
India nowhere had experienced. Nevertheless, the partition was not

Ab
equally welcome to the Hindu leadership. It met with strong criticism

from the Congress and very bitter opposition from the Bengali Hindu
Q
community. An unbiased thinker like Nlrad C. Chaudhuri also wrote:

A.
It was from the end of 1906 that we became conscious of a new kind
of hatred for the Muslims, which sprang out of the present and
showed sings of poisoning our personal relations with our Muslim
neighbours... 10
This trend of mental separation and mutual m istrust between the

Hindu and Muslims began to penetrate every walk of life on the one hand,
and on the other hand, the partition strengthened Muslim solidarity.
Again with the patronage o f the British officials, most o f the upper class
Muslims oflndia founded the All-India Muslim League at Dacca in 1906.
Like the Congress, the League expressed its allegiance to the British
Empire. Its aims were specified in its first resolution as:
To promote among the Muslims of India feelings of loyalty to the

British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise
62
as to the intention of the Government with regard to any of its
7
measures;
83
To protect and advance the political rights and interests of the
23
Muslims of India and to respectfully represent their needs and
-
01
aspirations to the Government;
03
To prevent the rise among Musi ims oflndia of any feeling of hostility
#
towards other communities without prejudice to the aforementioned
us
objectives of the League.11
in
The birth of the Muslim League set the seal upon the Muslims'
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feeling that their interests must be regarded as completely separate and

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distinct from those of the Hindus, and that no fusion of the two
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communities was possible. Out of the creation of the Indian National

G
Congress in 1 885 and, after twenty-one years, the All-India Muslim

League in 1906, a question might be asked; why did the British Viceroys
p
ap
and other officials bring the two political organizations into existence at
ts
different times in India? Was it for the interest of the two communities?
ha
Certainly not. While the real reason behind the foundation of the
Congress was to preempt a popular upsurge of the common people, that
W
of the Muslim League, at a time when the general trend of the Indian
si
political movement was turning anti-British, was undoubtedly to divide

ba
the Indians. While the B ritish authorities did not fail to declare that
Ab
"Divide and Rule" was going to be their motto, it was the failure of the
Indian leaders (Hindus and Muslims alike) who were not only completely
Q
unaware of the socio-economic forces at work in India but also failed to

A.
realise the shrewd manipulation of.the British authorities that kept them
permanently separated.
In 1 906 another significant political event took place. Lord Morley,

the Secretary of State for India, declared in Parliament that he was
prepared to bring constitutional transformation in the Government of
India by increasing the representative element in the Indian Legislative
Council. Many leading Muslim leaders immediately reacted to this
announcement. They realised that their political interests would be'

jeopardized by the introduction of any democratic principle to the Indian
political context, since the Muslims, being the m inority community, had
little chance of winning the election in a system ofjoint electorates which
were composed of both Hindus and Muslims. Hence, this system would
definitely lead to majority rule where the Muslim could not defy this
arithmetic reality. These were the reasons which led them to demand
62
separate electorates and consequently, seventy leading Muslim leaders
7
consisting ofnobles, ministers of various states, landowners, lawyers and
83
merchants led by the Aga Khan met Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, in
23
October 1906, and submitted a memorandum for the introduction of
-
separate electorates (representation on the basis of religious groups) all
01
over India. The Viceroy acknowledged their aspirations and assured the
03
delegation that their "political rights and interests as a community will be
concerned, . . ."
12 #
safeguarded by any administrative reorganization with which I am
us
in
Thus the Muslims' demand for the principle of separate electorates

jo
was accepted and it was implemented in 1909. Again the introduction of

up
this policy gave the Hindu-Muslim communalism a constitutional colour.

ro
The British Government, through these measures, drove a wedge between

G
the two major Indian communities pennanently and the Muslims were
pitched against the Hindus irrevocably. The Hindu nationalists, on the
p
ap
other hand, continued denouncing the British policy. This was quite
ts
evident when at the twenty-fifth (Allahabad) se�sion of the Indian

ha
National Congress in 1910, the Congress Party, "while recognizing the

W
necessity of providing for a fair and adequate Representation in the

Legislative Councils for the Muhammadan and other communities where
si
they are in a minority," condemned the system of separate electorates and

ba
asked for the removal of "anomalous distinctions between different

Ab
sections of His Majesty 's subjects in the matter of franchise .. ."13

Q
In the face ofsuch vehement Hindu opposition, the British authorities

A.
had to annul the partition of Bengal in 19 1 1 . The annulment of the

partition turned the existing strained relations between the two commu
nities into a conct<aled animosity; it also changed Muslim attitudes
towards the British authorities. The Muslims were assured throughout
14
Minto ' s v iceroyalty that the partition of Bengal was "a settled fact" , the
subsequent deviation from its stand destroyed their faith in the British
authorities. The Muslim feeling was articulated by Nawab Sir Salimullah
of Dacca (Bengal) who observed:
The Political Background 1 03
The annulment of the Partition . . . has appeared to put a premium on

sedition and disloyalty, and created an impression in the minds of the
irresponsible masses that even the Government can be brought down
on its knees by a reckless and persistent defiance of constituted
authority.15
The nationalist elements of the Muslim League began rethinking the
62
future course of Muslim politics in India. As a result, in 19 1 3 there was
7
a change, for the first time, in the League's objectives which sought to
83
achieve a suitable form of self-government for India. The League also
23
sought to promote and maintain among Indians feelings of loyalty to the
-
British Crown, and to protect the rights and interests of Indian Muslims.
01
This strategy of the League, however, brought it closer to the Congress
03
sentiment. At this stage M.A. Jinnah, a staunch supporter of Congress,
#
who had refused to join the Muslim League which he regarded as a
us
communal organization, joined the League. A few years later, in 1 9 1 6,
Jinnah presided over the annual sessions of both the League and the
in
Congress which were held simultaneously at Lucknow in which he

jo
strongly pleaded for unity between the Hindu and the Muslims.
up
However, according to the Versailles Treaty of 19 19, when the

ro
British dismembered the Turkish Caliphate as the latter sided with

G
Germany against the former in the First World War, the Muslims of lndia
p
ap
considered the British action as a provocation towards Muslims all over

the world. Thus, in defence of the Turkish Caliphate, they launched the
ts
ha
historic "Khilafat Movement" which was actively supported by the

Congress. When the Congress and the League jointly launched a civil
W
disobedience against the British Government in 1920, Jinnah, a consti

si
tutionalist who never believed in popular mass struggle, at that time

ba
resigned from the Congress in protest against the Gandhian politics of

Ab
mass agitation. Here lies the political contradiction between the leader
ships of the Congress and the League. While the Congress leader Gandhi
Q
succeeded in closing the gap between the Hindu elite and the Hindu
A.
masses, the League leadership failed to realise the importance of mass

participation in politics and hence the gulf dividing the Muslim elite from
the Muslim masses continued to widen.16 However, the Khilafat move
ment ended abruptly when in March 1 924 Kamal Ataturk, the President
of the newly established republican Government in Turkey, overthrew
the Caliph and abolished the Khilafat (Caliphate). The failure of the
Khilafat caused the Muslim leaders deep frustration and self inquiry.
While the Congress was intensifying its campaign for self-determination
the League did not have any clear objective to fight for. Thus the co
operation and understanding between the Congress and the league did not
continue beyond 1924. There was no unity at the social level between the
two communities. In the absence of such a social unity and homogeneity
at the bottom, there cannot be political unity of a durable character at the
top. This can be understood from the analysis of the events that occurred
after the famous Lucknow Pact was signed in 19 16. The Pact was the first
62
major attempt made by the Congress and the League to formulate the
7
basic outline of self-government for India. Both the comm unities realised
83
the problem of safeguarding the minority rights in a democratic frame
23
work and the need of their adequate representation in the legislative·
-
01
bodies. Hence the provisions of separate Muslim electorates and the
Muslim "weig htage" in the minority provinces were provided in the Pact.
03
In return, the League had to surrender the additional advantage of voting
#
in the general elections. Thus, the doctrine of pure majority rule was
us
abandoned in favour of the mutual accommodation in the national
politics. This Hindu-Muslim harmony did not last long as the Muslim's
in
jo
old sense of separateness, their deep mistrust of Hindus and their fears for
their future security were haunting them.17
up
ro
While the Kilafat movement was in progress, the Government of

G
India Act of 1 9 1 9 which introduced dyarchy in the provinces had been put
p
into operation. S ince the Congress did not cooperate with this scheme
ap
officially, the system could not work satisfactorily and subsequently in

ts
November 1 927 the British Government appointed the Simon Commis

ha
sion to investigate and make recommendations on the Indian problem.

W
Both the Congress and the League boycotted the Commission as it did
not include any Indian members. The reason given by the British for the
si
ba
non-representation oflndtans on the Commission was that Indians, being

deeply divided, were not capable of working out common proposals.
Ab
In response to the British allegation, a major attempt was made in

Q
February 1 928 when various political parties-the Indian National Con

A.
gress, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikh League, and
others, called the All-Party Conference-set up the constitution commit
tee under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru. The proposals framed by
this committee are known as the Nehru Report. The Report rejected the
Muslim demand for separate electorates and weightage for minorities-
a departure from the policy of the Lucknow Pact. Although it accepted
Muslim demands for the creation of separate provinces of the North-West
Frontier and Sind, it advocated that there was to be no reservation of seats

in central legislature and recommended joint electorates.
The League's reaction IO the Nehru Report was obvious. It turned

down the recommendations of the Report as it did not satisfy their
demands. However, Jinnah wanted to bring some amendments to the
Report but the Congress rejected them . Thus, he put forward his famous
62
Fourteen Points in 1928 which provided the main plank of Muslim
7
politics in the subsequent decades.18
83
23
The failure of the Nehru Report led to a new phase in the Indian
political scene. It consolidated the various Muslim factions to come
-
01
together in a Conference held at Delhi in January 1929 under the
03
presidency of the Aga Khan and accelerated its opposition against the
Congress. While the Congress boycotted the S imon Commission of 1 927
and adopted the resolution for Indian independence in #
1929, and launched
us
the civil disobedience movement in 1930 to intensify their movement for
in
independence, the Muslims stood aside as they did not want IO change
jo
British domination for that of the Hindus. This Hindu-Muslim dichotomy

up
ultimately led to the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of
India.
ro
G
a. The Concept of Pakistan

p
ap
Sir Muhammad Iqbal, in his presidential address at the Muslim

ts
League annual session in December 19 30, advanced the philosophy of the

ha
ideological basis of a new Muslim state in India. In his address Sir Iqbal
W
said:
si
... I would like to see the Punjab, North�West Frontier Province, Sind
ba
and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government

Ab
within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the fonna
tion of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me
Q
to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.i9

A.
Incidentally, Bengal which had a larger Muslim population than any

other province of British India had no reference in Iqbal ' 11 scheme. Three
years later in January 1933, Choudhry Rahmat Ali with three other
students from Cambridge published a leaflet "Now or Never: Are We To
Live Or Perish Forever?" and-coined the word "Pakistan" and explained
it thus:'
'Pakistan' is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of

letters, taken from the names of all our homelands - ' Indian' and
• Asian ' . That is, Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province),
Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharis
tan, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks - the
spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and the
ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial
62
constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no
7
83
bther meaning; and it does not admit of any other interpretation.20
23
In his leaflet Rahmat Ali also proposed three independent Muslim
-
nations forming Pakistan in the North-West, Bang-i-Islam consisting of
01
Bengal and Assam in North-East, and Usmanistan in the South formed by
03
the State of Hyderabad. Although Rahmat Ali's exercise was mainly
academic, his ideas provided a new dimension in the Muslim politics in
#
us
India in the 1940s.
in
Passing of the Government of India Act of 1935 was another major

jo
event in the developmept of the political history of lndia. Under this Act,
up
the Congress won the election of 1937 and installed its ministries in seven
provinces in India and exercised powers for about two years; from July
ro
193 7 to October 1939. The experience of two years' administration under

G
the Congress was unhappy. The Muslim League under Jinnah 's instruc
p
ap
tions prepared a document called the "Pirpur Report" embodying a list of

injustices done by the Congress Ministries against the Muslims in India.
ts
ha
Thus this Report served as the basis of the League's anti-Congress

propaganda among the Muslims. On the other hand the Congress refuted
W
the League�s allegations as "absolutely unfounded" .42

si
ba
However, at the outbreak of the Second World War the Congress

Ministries had to resign in protest against the alleged declaration of the
Ab
British Government that India was at war against Germany. Upon the end
Q
of Congress rule, the League expressed its sense of relief by celebrating

A.
December 22, 1939, as "The Deliverance Day"-for the Indian Muslims.

This strategy of the League "marked a turning point in the Congress
League relationship, and possibly closed the door finally to rapproche
ment."21 At this stage the British gave the Muslims "a solemn assurance
that no future settlement of India would be undertaken without their
assent.''22 This decision by the British and the strategies of the League led
to bitter quarrels, conflicts and communal riots between Hindus and
Muslims which ultimately led to the partition of India.
From January 1940 on, Jinnah began to develop his communal

feeling by discarding majority rule. He said: "Democracy and adult
franchise ... would mean a Hindu raj" all over India. He further empha
sized that "Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must
necessarily result in a Hindu majority government.''23 In January 1940,
Jinnah elaborated on what he called his Two-Nation Theory that the
62
Hindus and the Muslims constituted two separate nations by any accepted
definition or criterion of nationalism . He argued that " ... a constitution
7
83
must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two Nations who
23
both must share the governance of their common motherland.''24 Thus
Jinnah ' s Two-Nation Theory rationalized the demand for Pakistan.
-
01
Two months later, on March 23, 1940, the League at its 27th Session
03
at Lahore adopted the historic Lahore Resolution and sought the partition
#
oflndia. This resolution proved the inability of the Indian political parties
us
concerned to agree on a common platform. Although the Indian nation
alists rejected the concept of Pakistan, the resolution laid the foundation
in
for the Pakistan movement and its future constitutional framework. B ut,
jo
more important, it provided the League leaders ' mass support which the
up
League had lacked so far.

ro
G
In the early 1940s when the Congress intensified its anti-British

campaign and launched its "Quit India" movement in 1 942 bringing the
p
ap
British administration to a deadlock, Jinnah kept his fol lowers away from
ts
it. His strategy was mainly to weaken to Congress claim of being the only
ha
nationalist organization of India. In this way he asserted the leadership of

W
the Indian Muslim Community.

si
In the tense situation which followed, the League presented its

ba
demand for Pakistan before the Cripps Mission of 1942. This Mission
Ab
failed as the Congress disputed the League's demand for a separate state
and instead maintained that they (Congress) represented all communities
Q
of India who wanted an undivided, independent India. Soon after the

A.
Second World War, Lord Wavell was made Viceroy of India; and in
September 1945, the Wavell Pian of election to the central and provincial
legislatures was announced. In the elections of the winter 1945-46, the
League put its demands for the formation of Pakistan to test and "the
results showed a decisive victory for Pakistan; the League won all the
Muslim seats in the central assembly and 446 out of a total of4 95 Muslim
·
seats in the provincial assemblies.''25

After the elections the British Government sent out a Cabinet

Mission in 1946 consisting of three ministers to find a solution to the
constitutional problems oflndia and its future. During March-April 1946,
a series of negotiations among the British, the Con gress and the League
were attempted but proved fruitless. When the Mission failed to provide
what the League considered to be essentials for the establishment of
62
Pakistan, Jinnah launched his "Direct Action" campaign throughout
India. On July 29, 1946, the League Council declared that
7
83
Now the time has come for the Muslim Nation to resort to Direct
23
Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just rights, to vindicate
-
their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and . the
01
contemplated future castt'r-Hindu domination.26
03
Jinnah called upon his followers to observe August 16, 1946, as
#
"Direct Action Day". The consequence of the Direct Action Day was a
us
chain reaction of violence and destruction which turned the whole oflndia
in
into a theatre fora communal bloodbath. Ultimately partition oflndia was

jo
the only means left for the British to end the bloodshed between the
up
Hindus and the Muslims; and hence, as a result of a complex three-party

ro
game (Chapter I) among the British authorities, the Hindus and the
G
Muslims, India was divided and the Dominion of Pakistan came into
existence on August 14, 1947.
p
ap
b. The Ideology of Pakistan

ts
ha
The birth of Pakistan clearly speaks of its national ideology which

was formed from the conflicti ng and divergent aims and aspirations held
W
by Hindus and Muslims in an undivided India. The leaders of the Pakistan

si
movement claimed that the Musli ms living under non-Muslim rule for
ba
about two hundred years had been detrimental to their religious beliefs,
Ab
and hence they fought for a separate homeland.

Q
In the early 1 940s M.A. Jinnah denounced landlords and capitalists

A.
for their alleged exploitation of common people. He said:
There are millions and millions of our people who hardly get one
.
meal a day. Is this civilization? Is this the aim of Pakistan? If that is
the idea of Pakistan I would not have it27
In 1 949, two years after Independence, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali

Khan declared in the Constituent Assembly debate:
Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this subcontinent

wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and
traditions oflslam , because they wanted to demonstrate to the world
that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept
into the life of humanity today.28
62
Besides, the fear of Hindti majority rule in an independent India was
7
the urgent and immediate issue which pushed the Muslims from behind
83
to demand a state of their own. They realised that the establishment of a
23
parliamentary deijlocracy in an undivided independent India would result
in relegating the Muslim population to a permanent minority. Hence they
-
01
evolved the concept of "Two-Nation Theory"-upon the basis of which
03
they justified their claims for an independent Pakistan. This political
stand of the League shows a clear contradiction between the Islamic
#
ideology of democracy and their demand for a separate state. Neverthe
us
less, these were the ideological foundations of a separate homeland for
in
Indian Muslims.
jo
c. Failure ofIdeological Unity

up
ro
In the 1940s when the Muslims of India were united under the
G
leadership of Jinnah to protect themselves against the threat of the Hindu

p
majority, they put all their emphasis on religion by pushing aside all other
ap
regional problems and hence became integrated enough to be able to fight

ts
for a separate homeland. With the creation of Pakistan in 194 7, when the
ha
fear of Hindu domination receded the reality ofregionalism (an important

W
factor in determining group loyalty in the new state of Afro-Asia)

appeared. Many regional problems which did not receive attention during
si
ba
the independence movement gradually emerged and finally changed the

political thinking of the people and their ideas about the national
Ab
ideology. Even Islam, the religion of the Muslims which served as the
Q
only cohesive force among the Indian Muslims, experienced its weak
nesses in an independent Pakistan. Firstly, Muslims all over the world are
A.
divided into a numberof sects. Within the Muslim community of Pakistan

the Shias were a minority whilist the Sunnis were in the majority, and had
religious friction with the former. On the other hand, the Ahmadiyas or
Qadiyanies who were at first regarded by many as heretics and later
accorded the status of a religious minority in their own right (Chapter II)
were reduced to the position of second class citizens. Secondly, Islamic
ideology could not integrate adequately with the State of Pakistan and yet
another significant religious minority, namely the Hindus, the indigenous
people of Bengal. The Pakistani Ulamas declared that in an Islamic

country the non-Muslims could not be given the status offull citizens and
suggested that they might be treated only as Zimmies.30Thus"an ideology
which necessarily and decisively kept a large number of minorities
isolated from the mainstream of the national life of the State could not be
a suitable agency for national integration. "JI The ruling elites of the new
62
State of Pakistan not only failed to solve its religio-ideological as well as
7
regional problems, but also failed to grasp its realities whose centrifugal
83
tendencies promised to become serious obstacles in the process of
23
national integration. Conflicts arising from differences between regional
-
problems and the national ideology coupled with political contradictions
01
at the crux of Pakistan 's historical identity, ultimately erupted and
03
crystallized into a different movement, which culminated in the disinte
#
gration of Pakistan in late 197 1 .
us
The course o f national politics o fPakistan served as a preliminary to
in
the problem of national integration. United Pakistan, which existed for a

jo
little more than two decades, had been regulated by three Constitutions
up
and two martial law administrations. Before the adoption of Pakistan's

ro
first Constitution in March 1956, the country was governed by the Indian
G
Independence Act of 1947, and Government of India Act, 1 935, whic_h

acted as its interim Constitution. Pakistan was administered by its first
p
ap
Constitution from March 1 956 to October 1 958 which may be tem1ed the
so-called 'era of parliamentary democracy ' . From October 1958 to June
ts
ha
1962, the country was ruled by its first martial law administration under
General Ayub Khan who promulgated a second Constitution on June
W
1962 which was in effect until March 24, 1969. From March 25 , 1969, to
si
December 1 5, 1 97 1 , the country was run by its second martial law

ba
administration under General Yahya Khan, during whose regime the

Ab
country finally spliL

Q
II The Interim Constitution of Pakistan (1947-1956)

A.
The transfer of power and the creation of two independent Domin

ions, Pakistan and India, was legaily implemented by a Statute of the
British Parliament known as the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Section
8 of the Act provided that, until such time as the Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan had adopted a Constitution, the country would be ruled in
accordance with the Government of India Act, 1 935, with necessary
modifications and amendments and the Constituent Assembly would
function as its Federal Legislature. 32
This Constituent Assembly of Pakistan met for the first time on

August 1 0, 1947, with Jogendra Nath MandaP3 as its temporary Chair
man. On the following day, Jinnah, who had already assumed the post of
Pakistan ' s first Governor-General, became the President of the Assem
bly. The important point here is that Jinnah united in himself the offices
of Governor-General and the President of the Constituent Assembly, a
62
unique position terminated only by his death in September 1 948. He was
7
also the Chief of the All-Pakistan Muslim League. As a recognition of his
83
contribution to the creation of Pakistan, the Assembly passed a resolution
23
conferring on him the title of Quaid-i-Azam (the GreatLeader) which was
to be used henceforth in all official correspondence. the official
-
Dawn,
01
daily paper of Pakistan, compared his position with that of Kamal
03
Ataturk, the 'Father of Turks':
#
Whatever the constitutional powers of 1the Governor-General of a
us
Dominion may nominally be, in Quaid-i-Azam's case no legal or
formal limitations can apply. His people will not be content to have
in
jo
him as merely the titular head of the government, they would wish
him to be their friend, philosopher, guide and ruler, irrespective of
up
what the constitution of a Dominion of the British Commonwealth ·

ro
may contain.34
G
p
Thus Jinnah was not only the Head of the State, but he became the
ap
virtual Head of the Cabinet. He appointed Liaquat Ali Khan as his Prim e
ts
Minster and selected other members o f the Cabinet and distributed

ha
portfolios among them . Liaquat had nq say in these matters. This was the
W
culmination of the absolute power which corrupted absolutely even in the

hands of the Quaid-i-Azam .
si
ba
A few examples of Jinnah's exercise of legislative and executive

Ab
powers will illustrate how the seeds of an authoritarian rule were firmly
established in Pakistan by none other than the Quaid-i-Azam, the father
Q
of the nation himself. Firstly, he chose Karachi as Pakistan's Federal

A.
Capital without taking any note of the wishes of the Bengalis who formed
65 -per cent of the population of his country. Secondly, in addition to
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency, he put under the Central Govern
ment, Industry, Agriculture, Internal Commerce, Education, Health and
Communication, which were by their very nature provincial areas. In case
of a conflict between the provinces and the Centre over provincial
matters, the Centre used to overrule the provinces. Finally, Jinnah
deprived the provinces of their only flexible sources of revenue such as
Sales Tax, Income Tax and Cusloms Duties, which Lhey enjoyed under
the Governmenl of India Acl, 193 5.
On the political side, Jinnah not only took Lhe initiaLive in forming
the Cabinet, but also in. formulating its policies. Jinnah was also the
Chairman of Lhe Emergency Commillee of the Cabinet. Instead of
opening a new MinisLry wiLhin Lhe CenLral Cabinet, he crcaLed new
62
departments, of Baluchistan and Lhe Frontier Region, Evacuee and
7
83
Refugee Rehabilitation, under his direct conlrol. Secondly, he also
directly controlled the provincial adminisLration Lhrough his chosen
23
Governors who were obliged to send confidential reports to him on Lhc
-
01
activities of Lhe Provincial CabineLS. Accordingly M.A. Khuhro losL �is
03
Chief Ministership of Sind on April 2 6, 1 948, because he opposed
Jinnah's scheme of Lhe separation of Karachi from Sind. Similarly Jinnah
#
dismissed Khan of Mamdot, Lhe Chief Minister of West Punjab, on the
us
grounds of his inefficiency in handling the refugee problem. Again, it was
in
Jinnah who shrewdly kept two prominenl Bengali leaders, A.K. Fazlul
jo
Huq and H.S. Suhrawardy, isolated from naLional as well as provincial

politics, whereas bolh Lhese leaders were the able Chief Ministers of
up
· united Bengal, and it was Suhrawardy who led Lhe All-India Muslim
ro
League Lo vie Lory in Lhe 1 94 6 elections. Thirdly, iL was Jinnah again who
G
introduced Lhe most infamous law in Lhe inLerim Constitution of�akistan.

p
He brought SecLion 92A into legislaLion on Lhe basis of which the

ap
GovernorlGeneral was empowered to dismanLle any provincial govern

ts
·ment (even elecLed ones) whenever Lhe lauer's policies did not suit the
ha
taste of Lhe former. On the strength of this power Jinnah took action
W
againsl the Governments of Lhe West Punjab and Sind (discussed above),
si
and controlled them directly through his agents. In fact Section 92A
ba
conferred upon the Governor-General unlimited power which had no ·

Ab
parallel even in the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Indian
Independence Act, 1947; and because of SecLion 92A, Jinnah's succes
Q
sors did not hesitate to overthrow the most popularly elected United Front
A.
Government of East Bengal (Lhis will be discussed later). Finally, and

more surprisingly still, it was Jinnah who wanted to impose Urdu a<; the
only State Language ofPakistan, upon the Bengali-speaking people who
formed the majority of the population of Lhe counLry. Thus, it was Jinnah
who created a precedent to make the position of the Head of the State an
all-powerful one without any check whatsoever. Autocratic policies
which Jinnah adoted throughout his life were completely contradictory
to the spirit of "Independence," "autonomy" and "sovereignty" for the
two regions of Pakistan envisaged by the historic Lahore Resolution of

1940. In the subsequent years of Pakistan's political history Jinnah's
exercise of absolute power had its dangerous effects on his successors
who frequently abused such powers. The anti-democratic tendencies of
Jinnah became the modus operandi of a slate machine. Therefore, it wa<;
Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam who was as much responsible as his successors
62
for the death of democracy in Pakistan which contributed largely to the
d isintegration of the country.
7
83
After the death of Jinnah and his trusted lieutenant and Prime
23
Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, conOict became polarized and broke out
-
between the Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan. The conflict
01
beginning in the question of a Slate Language, spread throughout all
03
policy areas.
a. State Language Issue #

us
From the pre-Independence days, the Muslim League's language
in
jo
policy was detennined by considerations of national integration based on

Islamic ideology. As early as 1937, at the Lucknow session of the All
up
India Muslim League a resolution was brought forward recommending

ro
' Urdu' as the official language of Ltie Muslim League and as the lingua
G
franca of the Muslim community of India. The resolution was fiercely

p
opposed by the delegates from Bengal on the ground that the Bengali
ap
Muslims, who constituted one-third of the Muslim population of the

ts
whole of India, did not understand Urdu. However, this issue subsided at
ha
Jinnah's intervention when he altered the resolution to read " ... to make
W
all efforts possible to make 'Urdu' the lingua franca of the Muslim
si
League."35
ba
A decade after Pakistan came into existence, the ruling authorities

Ab
again tried to introduce a cultural uniformity based on Islam. They failed

Q
to acknowledge the fact that nations are composed of human beings

whose deep feelings about such questions as their mother tongue should
A.
rot be ignored easily. A federal framework of government cannot be

workable and strengthened without allowing cultural freedom and auton
omy to its units (Chapter I). In complete disregard of the norms of the
federal union, Pakistan auempted to impose uniformity where diversity
was most desirable. The authorities seemed to be unwilling to grasp the
implications of their cultural thesis. They thought that the two regions of
Pakistan could be integrated securely if there were one national language
and one culture between the two. This view of the Government became
more clear when Jinnah , the first Governor-General of Pakistan, declared
to a Bengali audience at Dhaka on March 2 1 , 1 948, that "Urdu and no
other language" was going to be the State Language of Pakistan. He
further warned the Bengalis that "anyone who tries to mislead you is
really the enemy of Pakistan.''36 The Bengalis felt that their cherished
culture and way of life were going to be disrupted if ultimately Urdu, a
62
minority language of a mere 3.3 per cent of the people, was to be made
7
· the only State Language of Pakistan (see Chapter II, Tables 3 and 4).
83
Obviously they reacted violently to Jinnah 's language policy and de
23
manded that Bengali should be recognized along with Urdu as one of the
-
01
State Languages of Pakistan which appeared to Jinnah as extremely
unrealistic. Even before Jinnah 's announcement of the language policy,
03
which triggered widespread agitation in Bengal, Dh irendra Nath Datta,
#
a Bengali Hindu member of the Constituent Assemb�y, first missed the
us
question of due recognition of the Bengali language and demanded its use
along with English and Urdu in the deliberations of the Assembly. Liaquat
in
jo
Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, rejected Dalt's suggestion

outright and said: "Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have its lingua
up
franca, the language of the Muslim nation." He further emphasized that

ro
"it is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can
G
only be Urdu and no other language. ''37 This arbitrary or stubborn attitude
p
of the central ruling elite raised a conflict between the Bengali and non
ap
Bengali members of the Assembly which marked the beginning of the

ts
historic language movement of 1952.

ha
W
By this time a large number of students and teachers at Dhaka

University had already started a movement demanding the recogn ition of
si
ba
Bengali as one of the State Languages of Pakistan. To ventilate their

demand, a Bengali cultural organization called Tamaddun Majlis was
Ab
fonned inSeptember 1947 underthe guidanceofProfessor Abu! Kasem.38

Q
At this stage Khwaja Nazimuddin's (Chief Minister of East Bengal)

speech in favour of Urdu caused great disappointment among the
A.
intelligentsia of Dhaka, and a large scale protest was registered by calling

a strike on February 26, 1948 which got spontaneous mass support. A
series of demonstrations, meetings and processions held in Dhaka and
other parts as East Bengal mainly organized by different student organi
zations to express their disapproval of the Government's language policy
was followed by the arrest of large numbers of students and political
workers. This explosive language issue was aggravated by Jinnah when
he once more declared in Dhaka that Urdu would be the only State
Language of Pakistan.39 Jinnah's statement confirmed that the national
ruling elite was determined to impose Urdu alone as the State Language
of Pakistan in utter neglect of the wishes of the Bengalis who fonned the
majority of the country 's population. The Government of Pakistan
decided to make Urdu the State Language of the country on the grounds
62
that Urdu was closely associated with the Muslim politics ofBritish India.
7
Moreover, the script was written in Persian and many of its words were
83
drawn from Persian and Arabic. On the other hand, a section of the people
23
in both the regions of Pakistan could understand Urdu and considered it
as a language of aristocracy. Thus Urdu, though a small minority
-
01
language, had a special status among the Indian Muslims. The Govern
03
ment of Pakistan, however. justified its language policy only in the name
of Islam. On the other hand, the Bengalis' claim was reasonable and
#
democratic. Bengali being the language of the majority should have been
us
made as the only State language of Pakistan. But the ruling elite were not
in
even willing to recognize the natural right of the majority of the people
jo
nor were th.ey ready to accept their language, Bengali, as one of the state
up
languages of Pakistan.
ro
Thus, the language move111 ent turned into an open struggle between
G
the nationalists from Bengal and the central ruling elite of Pakistan. The
p
genesis of Bengali sub-nationalism within Pakistani nationalism can be

ap
traced to this movement. Meanwhile the Basic Principles Committee

ts
which was formed to determine the main principles of the Constitution

ha
submitted its interim report to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in

W
September 1950. In this report it was stated categorically that Urdu would
si
be the only State Language of Pakistan . The report generated much heat
ba
in both the regions of Pakistan. The Eastern region rejected it for two
Ab
reasons. Firstly, the report did not recognize Bengali as one of the state
languages of Pakistan; and secondly, it denied adequate autonomy to the
Q
provinces. The Western region protested against the Report on the

A.
grounds that the principles enunciated in it were not sufficimnly Islamic.

Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had to
withdraw the interim report.
On becoming Prime Minister after the assassination of Liaquat Ali

Khan iri October 195 1 , Khwaja Nazimuddin became the champion of the
cause of Urdu and announced at a public meeting held in Dhaka on
January 26, 1952 that Urdu should be the State Language of Pakistan.
Nazimuddin's statement provoked the Bengali sentiments and led to

widespread resenunent in the form of strikes and demonstrations through
out East Bengal. An All-Party National Language Action Committee,
comprising the political leaders, intellectuals and students, was formed
and urged the people to continue the movement until their demand was
accepted by the Government. Thus the Bengalis integrated themselves
62
under a common cause for once. The Action Committee also called a
7
province-wide strike on February 2 1 , 1952 which. they observed breaking
83
Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan which imposed
23
bans on public meetings and processions. The police opened fire on the
processionists, killing some, injuring many others: and a large number of
-
01
persons, many of them students and teachers, were arrested. However on
03
the following day, it turned into a fully fledged mass movement.
#
This movement for the Bengali language did not confine to urban
us
middle class, it drew wide sympathy and support from the rural areas as
well, since a large numberof the Bengali students who principally led the
in
jo
movement came from these areas. Thus the language issue of 1952
consolidated Bengali nationalism more than any other issue. Although
up
subsequently the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 recognized both Urdu

ro
and Bengali as the State Languages of Pakistan, the bitter struggle which
G
the Bengalis had to suffer to secure due recognition for their language had
p
left a permanent scar, which was but the first of its kind, on the process
ap
of integration between the two regions of Pakistan. The dogmatic

ts
approach adopted by the Muslim League Government concerning the

ha
language issue served merely to amplify the linguistic and regional

W
loyalties which already existed in the geographically divided nation of

si
Pakistan.
ba
The Constitutional Issue

Ab
Besides the language issue which stirred up B,engali resenunent

Q
towards the Federal Government, the controversy over the framing of the
A.
Constitution greatly aggravated the political conflict between the two

wings of Pakistan during the first decade of the nation 's existence.
At Independence, Pakistan inherited a Constituent Assembly from

the All-India Constituent Assembly which had been created in 1946 as
a result of the British Cabinet Mission's Plan from the then existing
Legislatures of the provinces. . l ts members were indirectly elected by the
legislatures of those Indian provinces which formed Pakistan and which
themselves were the result of the All-India general election held in the
winter of 1946. This Assembly functi(l)ned both as a Federal Legislature
as well as the constitution -framing body. The Federal Legislature in
Pakistan was composed of one house and a Governor-General. At the
beginning, there were 69 members in the Legislature but subsequently the
number was increased to 79. The Table below shows the allocation of
62
seats distributed among the nine units of Pakistan.
7
83
TA BLE IV: 1
23
-
01
Distribution of seats among the nine units of Pakistan - 1947
03
East Bengal 44
West Punj ab 22
#
us
Sino 5
N-W.F. Province 3
in
Baluchistan I
jo
Baluchi stan States I

Bahawalpur I
up
Kalpur I
ro
N-W.F. States I
G
Source: M.A. Chaudhuri,. op. cit., p. 156.

p
ap
1
In the process of constitution- frarning, the Assembly faced three
ts
ha
major political issues. Firstly, what would be the basis of representation

in the Federal Legislature? Would it be on a regional or on a population
W
'
basis? Secondly, what quantum or autonomy should be granted to the
si
provinces? Also, what would be the status of the provinces in West

ba
Pakistan? Would they remain separate or would they be amalgamated

Ab
into one unit?

Q
After its existence of nineteen months, the Assembly passed a

A.
resolution-commonly known as the Objective Resolution-in March

1 949, which was the first major step towards framing the Constitution of
Pakistan. The major principles outlined in this Resolution were that the
S tate would exercise its powers and authority through the chosen
representatives of the people. It also provided that principles of democ
racy, freedom, equality, and soical justice as enunciated by Islam would
be ful ly observed; also minorities would be free to profess and practise
their religions and develop their own culture. The Resolution further
provided that Pakistan would be a federation wherein its units would be

autonomous, with such limitations as might be prescribed by a judiciary
with guaranteed independence. For the purpose of considering details of
the future Constitution of Pakistan, the Assembly also set up the Basic
Principles Committee (BPC) in accordance with the Objectives Resolu
tion.
62
c. Basic Principles Committee (BPC) Recommendations
7
83
The BPC appointed three sub-committees:
23
I) Sub-committee o f Federal and Provincial Constitutions and Distri
-
01
bution of Powers;
03
2) Sub-committee on Franchise;
3) Sub-committee on the Judiciary.
#
us
If one examines the composition of these various committees, it
becomes,clear that the Bengali representation was less than minimal: of
in
the 25 members ofthe B PC only 6 were from East Bengal. Further, its sub
jo
committee for Federal and Provincial Constitutions and Distribution of

up
Powers (which was to prepare the list or principles upon which the federal
ro
structure of Pakistan would be made) had 20 members, of which only 9

G
were Bengal is. It is interesting to note here that a number of non-Bengali

p
members of these committees who opted to live in Pakistan rather than

ap
' in India could not be elected to the Constituent Assembly from West
ts
Pakistani constituencies and ultimately they had to gain their seats from
ha
East Bengal. For example, Dr. Ishtiaq Hossain Qureshi, Dr. Mahmud
W
Hossain , and even the Prime Min ister Liaquat Aki Khan had to represent
Bengali constituencies in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. These
si
ba
people had nothing in common with the Bengalis excepting religion -

Islam . For all practical purposes they failed adequately to represent the
Ab
wishes and aspirations of the people of East Bengal.a situation which

Q
became more pronounced in the event of inter-regional disputes; Thus,

A.
the Bengalis, as the nation 's largest population set, not only lost their
rightful representation in all the government decision-making bodies, but
also, were at a disadvantage throughout Pakistan's history as is reflected
in the various constitutional proposals and provisions formulated by the
authorities.
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, presented the
Report of BPC to the Constituent Assembly in September 1950,
according to which the F�deral Legislature of Pakistan was to have two
houses -the House of Units (Upper House) and the House of People
(Lower House�ach ofan equal numberofrepresentalives from the Lwo
regions of Pakistan, and Lhus, a superficial parily of power. According Lo
this Report, East Bengal wiLh 56 per cent of Lhe populaLion would elect
200 members Lo the Lower House and 60 members to Lhe Upper House
while all units ofWesL Pakistan, collectively with only 44 per cent of the
62
total population, were given equal representalion in both Lhe Houses.
7
83
TABLE IV: 2
23
Constitutional proposals and provisions presented by the
-
premiers/president: 1950 to 1962
01
03
1950 1950 1 953 1956-58• 1962..
(Liaquat (K. (Bogra (First (Ayub Khan's
Ali's Nazimuddin's Mohammed
#
Constitution) Constitution
us
proposals) proposals) Ali's
proposals)
in
LH(i) UH(ii) LH UH LH UH One house One house

jo
East Bengal 200 60 200 60 165 10 155 78

up
West
ro
Pakistan 200 60 200 60 1 35 40 155 78

G
(i) LH stands for Lower House

p
(ii) UH stands for Upper House

ap
ts
Sources: •For the con�titutional proposals and provisions up to 1956:1 958 see Keith
ha
Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London: George Allen & Unwin Limited,
1 957, p. 179 .
W
.. The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 2 1 . and also K.U.
Ahmad, op. cit., p. 54.
si
ba
This report made iL clear LhatLhe BPC aimed to reduce the people of
Ab
Bengal individually and collectively to having the same franchise as a

minorily group. In view of their preponderance in population, the
Q
Bengalis obviously expected a greater representation in the Lower House.

A.
Still, the Report not only ignored this crucial issue but also it denied the
legitimate rights of the people of Bengal, nor did it offer them any
substantial degree of autonomy which could defend them against political
and economic injustices by the Federal Government. Finally, the report's
recommendation on Urdu being the only Stale Language of Pakistan not
only infuriated the Bengalis but also served to confinn their suspicions
of the Federal Government
As soon as the Basic Principles Report was made public, a reaction

ary political movement in East Bengal was aroused.
d. Anti-BPC Movement and the Birth of Awami League: The First

Opposition Political Party in Pakistan
Under the Chairmanship of Ataur Rahman Khan at the Grand

'
62
National Convention in Dacca, November 1950, Bengalis organized
7
themselves on political issues, denounced proposals of the Basic Prin
83
ciples Committee and demanded full provincial autonomy for the first
23
time in the history of Pakistan. The Convention rejected the interim report
-
ofBPC and claimed maximum provincial autonomy in all subjects exct'.pt
01
defence, foreign affairs and currency. The BPC Report also met with
03
severe opposition from inside the Assembly. For instance, Nur Ahmed,
a member of the Constituent As5embly said:
#
us
... in East Bengal there 1s a growing belief ... that there are principles
in
in the Report which, if adopted, will reduce the majority of East

jo
Bengal into a minority and it will turn East Bengal into a colony of
up
Pakistan."°
ro
On January 4, 1948 a student organization known as the Students'

G
League (formerly, Muslim Students ' League)41 started a movement

p
demanding maximum provincial au ton om y. The senior members of this

ap
League and the di�satisfied factions of the ruling Muslim League merged
ts
to a new political party. On June 23 , 1949 under the leadershipofMaulana

ha
Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (a former president of the Assam Muslim

W
League) this reformed party renamed itself the Awami League after its
predecessor, the East Bengal Muslim Awami League. Of the 42-point
si
ba
manifesto of the Awami League, the first two demands were related to
1 ) provincial autonomy in accordance with the provisions of the Lahore
Ab
Resolutions leaving defence, foreign affairs, currency and coinage with

Q
the Federal Government, and 2) recognition ofBengali as one of the State

Languages of Pakistan. In political terms these two demands were crucial
A.
to East Bengal and they gained quick support of the Bengali middle class.
At this stage, the Awami League's base of support began to spread
throughout the Moffussils of East Bengal, hence its anti-BPC Report
movement became more forceful.
By this time, a large number of Muslim Leaguers from East Bengal
also criticized the BPC Report and suggested its substantial amendment.
The Pakistan Observer, a Dacca English daily, in its issue of October 1 ,
1950 commented on the Bengali reactions to the Report, thus:
The citizens o f Dacca, mostly F.ast Bengalis, were rudely shocked

when local dailies carried to them the full text of the Basic Principles
Committee Report with regard to tlie future Cons titu tion of Pakistan.
It came from all walks of lifo, high officials, professors, teachers,
lawyers, students, medical men, police personnel, etc. Their first
reaction was that of bewilderment.
62
Even the orthodox members of the Constituent Assembly opposed
7
the · Report on the grounds that it failed to fully implement Islamic
83
ideology. Under this background, Liaquat Ali Khan 's constitutional
23
proposals were withdrawn on November 2 1 , 1950; and thus the constitu
-
01
tional conflicts in Pakistan were shelved for the time being.
03
After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in September 195 1 ,
Khwaja Nazimuddin stepped down from the Governor-Generalship to
#
':>ecome the Prime Minister. Considering the suggestions of the public.and
us
the Talimaat-e-Islamia Board,42 and the recommendations of various sub
1
in
committees, Nazimuddin adopted some marginal changes for the Report,

jo
yet as he presynted almost the same old formula to the Assembly on

up
December 22, 1952 (Table IV : 2) this Report met with the same fate as
ro
its precursor. Both the Bengal is and the Punjabis reacted violently to this
G
new Report. The Bengalis continued to feel that they had been deprived
of their legitimate advantage of being in the numerical majority while the
p
ap
Punjabis thought that too much had already been conceded to F.ast
ts
Bengal. The Punjabis raised objections to this Report mainly on the

ha
question of ttie principle of parity which they held was not enough to
establish a proper balance between the two regions of Pakistan. S ince the
W
Western part of Pakistan was divided into various units having divergent
si
interests, the Punjabis apprehended that the Bengalis might utilize the
ba
advantage of these divisions and to get rid of this situation , they (the
Ab
P mj11bis) proposed the unification scheme for the Western units of

Pakis .an. This unification scheme popularly known as the "One Unit"
Q
scheme was vehemently opposed by the Bengalis and thus, an intense

A.
rivalry arose between the Bengali and the Punjabi elements of the
Assembly
Mean while, the political scene at the Centre had undergone a radical
change. Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General of Pakistan , violat
ing all principles of constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy,
dismissed the Nazimuddin Ministry on April 17, 1 953 on the grounds of
incompetence at a time when the latter held a clear majority in the
Assembly and appointed as Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohammed Ali

(Bogra) who at that time was not even a member of the Assembly but was
the Ambassador to the USA. The summary dismissal of the Nazimuddin
Cabinet rudely offended Bengali sentiment. This measure of the Punjabi
Governor-General not only marked the beginning of the end of parlia
mentary democracy in Pakisdm but also the beginning of direct·bureau
62
cratic rule in country. The choice of Mobammed Ali (Bogra), a Bengali
by birth, as thePrime Minister ofthecountry was a move to pacify Bengali
7
83
sentiments, but as in fact, he had neither any following nor any foothold
within the ruling party, he was actually acceptable to the Punjabi power
23
elite led by Ghulam Mohammad, Gurmani, and Chudhri Muhammad Ali.
-
01
Nevertheless, the members of the Assembly not only remained silent at
03
the arbitrary action of the Governor-General but they witnessed, without
any protest the triumph of bureaucracy over democracy .
#
us
The new Prime Minister announced his constitutional proposals
known as the Mohammed Ali formula on October 7, 1953 (Table IV : 2).
in
According to this formula, the Federal Legislature would be bicameral.

jo
The Upper House would consist of 50 members being an equal represen

up
tation from the five units of Pakistan of which East Bengal was one; the
ro
Punjab and the remaining components of West Pakistan were grouped

G
together into four units; each with the same representation, that is, ten
p
seats each. The Lower House would be composed of 300 seats which,
ap
likewise, were divided among the same five units, on the basis of
ts
population. Accordingly, East Bengal held 1 65 seats, the Punjab 75, the
ha
North-West Frontier Province group 24 seats, the Sind and Khairpur

W
group 19 seats and the Baluchistan , Bhawalpur, and Karachi group 17

seats. It also recommended that both Bengali and Urdu were to be the
si
ba
State Languages of Pakistan. This formula was considered by the

Assembly over thirteen days during the month of October, and on
Ab
November 14, the Assembly appointed a Draft Committee to draft the

Q
new Constitution for Pakistan on the basis of the Mohammed Ali formula.
A.
It seemed at last a solution to overcome the impasse on constitution

framing in Pakistan had been found. Four months elapsed after the
appointment of the Draft Committee, yet no attempt to frame a
Constitution could be made as the bureaucratic ruling elite of West
Pakistan perceived a threat to the preservation of their class interests from
a possible unity of the Bengali elements as forewarned by the constitu
tional proposals. In the meantime, certain political developments took
place which threw the whole constitution-making process of the country
out of gear. The nation's attention was diverted to the question of

provincial elections in East Bengal, due in March 1953, but held in 1 954.
e. Elections in East Bengal, 1 954
Throughout Pakistan ' s history there had been no general elections,

neither for the Federal nor Provincial Legislatures. More.over, by 1 954
62
thirty-four seats had fallen vacant in the East Bengal Legislature. In one
7
by-election held in 1 948 for the district of Mymensingh, the ruling
83
Muslim League's nominee was defeated-by the Awami League's nomi
23
nee. The Government declared this by-election void, simply because the
-
outcome did not suit them. Since then , the elections of the Federal or
01
Provincial Legislatures had been postponed. The bureaucrats who were
03
holding the top political positions at the Centre had no support-base
#
within the electorate and naturally faced the prospect of an election with
us
fear. On the other hand, it was becoming increasingly clear that, despite
the numberofyears which had passed, the Constitution of the country had
in
not been forthcoming. Hence, any attempt at a further, arbitrary extension

jo
of the Provincial Legislatures or further postponement of their elections

up
might have aroused considerable dissatisfaction and hostility towards the

ro
ruling elite at the core. It was in such a climate that the elections to the
G
Provincial Legislature in East Bengal were held in March 1 954.

p
ap
In this election , the major opposition political parties of East Bengal

formed an electoral alliance against the ruling Muslim League which the
ts
ha
alliance denounced as being opposed to Bengali interests. Thus, a United

Front (a coalition of opposition parties) was formed in 1 953, consisting
W
of the Awami League (people's league) led by H.S. Suhrawardy and

si
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani; the Krishak Sramik Party

ba
(peasants ' workers party) led by A.K. Fazlul Huq; theNizam-i-lslam; and
Ab
Ganatantri Dal (democratic party). The United Front adopted the famous
2 1 -point programme for its election manifesto. In all, sixteen political
Q
parties contested the 1 954 elections, but the main contest was between the
A.
Muslim League, the party of the national ruling eliteand the United Front,
the party of the Bengali counter-elite, for the 309-member Legislative
Assembly (Table IV : 3).
� The Muslim League party fought the elections on issues of the

solidarity and the integrity of the country, and pleaded for a strong federal
government, and an Islamic Constitution , whilst the United Front fought
on the basis of its 21 -point programme demanding that:
... East Pakistan be recognized as a sovereign and autonomous re

gion in accordance with the principle of the Lahore Resolution of
1940, . the Central Government should be vested only with three
. .
subjects such as defence, foreign affairs and currency and that all
other subjects including the residuary powers should be in the
hands of the elected government of East Pakistan.43
762
Although the State Language issue was the key point of the United
83
Front's election manifesto, th� main issue stated was the demand for
23
full regional autonomy for East Bengal on the basis of the Lahore Reso
lution. On the other hand, the provincial and central Muslim League
-
01
ruling elite challenged the Front's demand for maximum autonomy.
03
Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, a federal Minister, made a statement in
Dacca during an election campaign refuting the demand for autonomy.
He maintained: #
us
in
... such demand may have been understandable if it came from

jo
small provinces of West Pakistan . It could not be understandable in

up
the case of East Pakistan which will always be in a strong position

ro
in the Centre. What was needed was a strong Pakistan. When a

G
country like Bharat needed a strong centre, Pakistan with its two
far-flung parts needed a strong centre even more.44
p
ap
TABLE IV: 3
ts
The allocation of seats in the 309-mem ber single cham ber

ha
of the East Bengal Iegislat-ive assembly, 1954

W
i) Muslims 237 (including 1 1 women)

si
ii) General 3 1 (including 1 woman)

ba
iii) Scheduled Castes

(Casie-Hindus) 38 (including I woman)
Ab
'
iv) Buddhists 2
v) Christians I
Q
A.
Source: Dawn (Karachi), March 8, 1954.
The Muslim League fighting the elections of 1 954 also branded the
Front's leaders as enemies of Pakistan who were alleged to be involved
in the secession of East Bengal. Commenting on the election, Nurul
Amin, the then Chief Minster ofBengal, said that there would need to "be
a sort of referendum to decide the issues whether East Pakistan would
remain in existence or would it become a part of B harat." He further said:
Those who did not want Pakistan to come into being, had combined
and were out to disrupt and destroy the organization which brought
· about Pakistan . ... The coming elections , therefore, were not ordi
nary. Pakistan had been achieved through votes and could be lost
through votes.4s
62
f Elections Results and the Aftermath
7
83
Despite massiye electioneering the people's disil lusionment with the
23
polices of the. ruling elite could not be arrested. The results of lhis election
were understandable.
-
01
In this ·election of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly, the
03
provincial ruling Muslim League met with a devastating defeat and
#
almost disappeared for it secured only 9 seals in the Assembly while the
us
rest of the Muslim seats went to the Front (228 out of 237 Muslim seats).
The result of this election was undoubte<!lY a referendum of the people
in
jo
of East Bengal for full provincial autonomy. In this election the Bengalis
not only rejected the provincial Muslim League Government but also the
up
entire set of policies pursued so far by the Central Government. On this

ro
issue The Economist commented: "It was also a vote against the govern
G
ment at the centre . . . "46 The Mail of Dhaka wrote: "It was plainly speaking
p
not an election, but a revolution.a peaceful revolution."47 In fact, auton

ap
omy wa<; the central issue which brought the United Front to power in the
ts
1 954 elections. On April 3, 1 954, the Front formed a Cabinet under the
ha
leadership of A.K. Fazlul Huq. Immediately after taking office, Huq's

W
Government, citing the population as the basis, raised the demand fo� a
si
greater share of the federal revenue for East Bengal. Finding no other
ba
alternative, the Central Government, in the name of "integrity and Islam"

Ab
began to accuse the most popular, elected leaders of East Bengal 'of
conspiring fo secede from Pakistan. Thus, by using its most repressive law
Q
of Section 92A, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad,

A.
dismissed the duly-elected Huq Government on May 29, 1 954, imposed

Governor' s rule and prorogued the Provincial Assembly sine die . Major
General Iskander Mirza, Defence Secretary of the Central Government,
was appointed Governor of East Pakistan. Immediately after the imposi
tion of Governor' s · rule in the Province, several th<;msand political
workers were sent to jail and warrants were issued for many others. The
prominent leaders of the Front were kept under house arrest. Thus, East
Bengal' s legitimate demands and its freedom of expression, the elected
1 26 Pakistan and Malaysia .
Assembly, was silenced by means of military force. The summary

dismissal of the Huq Ministry uncovered a Pakistan Army and
bureaucracy's conspiracy that had been working behind the political
scene from the very inception of the country. It was yet another
ilJustration of the central ruling elite's intolerance of any popular
political, as wel� as constitutional, movement in Pakistan.48·
62
g. The Dissolution .of the First Constituent Assembly : The Beginning
7
of an Unconstitutional Era
83
23
The disgruntled members of the Constituent Assembly led by
-
01
Khwaja Nazimuddin, Fazlur Rahman, Pirzada, Gazdar and Tamizuddin
Khan were trying to frame the Constitution on the Westminster model
03
reducing the powers of the Governor-General to a mere constitutional
#
head of the State. In this respect, the Assembly passed three BilJs of
us
substantial importance on September 24, 1954. The first Bill attempted
to curb the existing powers of the Governor-General who. was still
in
enjoying all the prerogatives o f the 1935 Act, in the absence of any
jo
Constitution for the country, and aimed to assure the sovereignty of the
up
Constituent Assembly. The second one required the Prime Minister and
ro
other mi.nisters to be members of the Assembly before appointment and

G
collectively they would be made responsible to the Assembly. Finally

p
PRODA (Public and Representative Offices-Disqualification- Act)

ap
which was mainly used for suppression of political opposition was

ts
repealed . Forobvious reasons, the Governor-General reacted violently to

ha
these constitutional amendments. He not only withheld his assent to these

W
Bills passed by the Assembly, but dissolved the Constituent Assembly

si
itself by issuing an ordinance on October 24, 1954 . With this, an era of

ba
unconstitutionalism was begun and continued till the death of united

,
Ab
Pakistan.
Q
The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly led to a political and

constitutional crisis in the country. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan who was
A.
President of the Assembly filed a legal suit in the Chief Court of S ind
against the Governor-General, challenging his power to dissolve the
Assembly. The Court held that the action of the Governor-General was
illegal and ultra vires since the Acts of the Constituent Assembly did not
require the assent of the Governor-General, thus, he had "no power ofany
kind to dissolve the Constituent Assembly ."49 The case was then referr((d
to the Federal Court of Pakistan where after a prolonged debate, the
Government won the case,50 but the Court asked the Governor-General
to constitute a new Constituent Assembly to give legal validity to the
government he was going to install in office. The first Constituent
Assembly was dissolved unconstitutionally by the Governor-General.
The formation of the Second Constituent Assembly was equally uncon
.stitutional. Thus, the judgment of the Federal Court further reasserted the
62
powers of the Governor-General. The people of Pakistan, mainly the
7
Bengalis, who brought Pakistan into being by democratic means in 1 946,
83
once again witnessed the ubiquitous influence of the Governor-General
23
that was evident in every section of the administration, including the
-
judiciary. It could be seen how democracy in less than seven years, had
01
become a major casualty in the hands of those who did riot fight for the
03
establishment of a separate "ideal homeland". Thus, the verdict of the
#
court made the political as well as the constitutional situation in the
us
country even more uncertain and the country was "faced with a grave
situation,"51
in
jo
After the dissolution of the Assembly, the Governor-General asked

up
Mohammed Ali (Bogra), the existing Prime Minister to remodel his

ro
Cabinet. Into this Cabinet were inducted two Army officers who were
G
held largely responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan . General

p
Iskander Mirza who was the Governor of East Bengal became the
ap
Minister of Interior, and General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then ·

ts
Comm·ander-in-Chief of Pakistan's Armed Forces, took over the Defence

ha
Ministry while the key Ministry of Finance was occupied by Chaudhri

W
Muhammad Ali who was a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts
S ervice. None of lhese people had any political background whatsoever.
si
ba
The fonnation of this Cabinet disclosed that "the take over of the
country ' s political leadership, through the back-door, by bureaucrats and
Ab
the Army Generals, was now complete."57

Q
Meanwhile, General Iskander Mirza became the Governor-General

A.
after Ghulam Mohammad retired. At this stage two crucial political

developments took place between October 1954 and September 1955.
During this period, the cause of autonomy and the Bengali nationalist
movement suffered a major setback largely because of its leaders '
political frustrations as well as their lack of poli tical perception .
The first crucial step that the Cabinet undertook was the amalgama
tion of four provinces of West Pakistan, that is, the Punjab, Sind,
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province into One Unit. This
One Unit scheme was denounced in bitter terms by members of both the
wings of Pakistan. Pirzada Abdus Sattar, the ChiefMinister of Sind, who
vehemently opposed the One Unit scheme, was dismissed and was
replaced by Mohammad Ayub Khuhro on November 8, 1954. It is argued
here that the unification of the various units of West Pakistan was mainly
62
sought to counteract the claims of the Eastern wing. This statement is
confirmed by a paper known as the "Document" which was drafted by
7
83
Daultana in consultation with other Punjabi leaders. Mahmud Ali, a
23
Bengali parliamentarian, disclosed in the Assembly that this "Document"
spelled out the Punjabi strategies that were to be taken to bring the
-
01
Western region ofPakistan down into One Unit, and he further stated that
03
this scheme was designed to bring more effective power to the people of
West Pakistan which would ultimately bring the Federal as well as
#
Provincial Government of West Pakistan under the direct domination of
us
the Punjabi leaders. Although the One Unit B ill was passed in the
in
Assembly by 100 votes to 4, two parliamentarians who opposed the Bill

jo
were from East Bengal. Mahmud A Ii was one of them and alleged the Bill
up
was counter to the principles of the Lahore Resolution of 1 940 which

ro
envisaged Pakistan as a federation of autonomous units. Another Bengali

G
parliamentarian was Fazlur Rahman who pointed out that the effect of the
p
Bill was to divide Pakistan clearly into two parts, the results of which
ap
would only serve to stimulate provincialism and parochial outlooks. He

ts
argued:
ha
W
It has been stated that the greatest merit of this B ill is to do away with
the distinction between Punjabis and Sindhis and Pathans and this
si
and that, but you do not realize that by dividing Pakistan into two you
ba
are manifoldly magnifying that provincialism by making it a l.ocal

Ab
patriotism for the two regions. Then no longer the cry will be Punjabis
Q
and Sindhis but the cry will be B,engalis and non-Bengalis.�3

A.
However, despite all this opposition , the One Unit scheme secured
its approval from the provincial legislatures of West Pakistan. Other
important aspects of this Bill were the renaming of East Bengal as East
Pakistan; and the signing of military pacts between Pakistan and the
USA, both being endorsed by the Bengali leaders, including Mohammed
Ali (Bogra) and H.S. Suhrawardy. The One Unit scheme was brought
.about mainly to underm ine the Bengalis' claim of numerical majority,
and to maintain stable balance between the two regions of Pakistan. Yet
in fact, this administrative reorganization provided the Punjabis an
opportunity to control both the wings of Pakistan.
The second disastrous event that occurred in this period was the
Awami League leader S uharwardy' s acceptance of the Law Ministership
62
under the Cabinet of Mohammed Ali (Bogra), and his unconditional
7
support of the principle of parity. Hence, Suhrawardy argued:
83
Democratic rights do not mean representation in the Legislature, in
23
the Constituent Assembly or in the Legislature according to popula
-
01
tion, or that because we are superior in number we should get larger
03
representation. Democracy does not mean only numbers. In democ
racy you will have to give and take. Democracy means agreement
#
between the people and friendship and co-operation.s4
us
Although Suhrawardy persuaded the Working Committee of hi�
in
Awami League to favour the parity, the Fazlul Huq group of the United
jo
Front opposed the scheme for s9me time and accused Suhrawardy of
up
selling out Bengali interests to thePunjabis. It is worth remembering here

ro
that the Awami League came into existence in 1948, and since then they
G
had been consistently rejecting the principle of parity on the grounds of

p
the numerical majority of East Bengal; and in most specific terms they
ap
insisted on the "principle of one man-one vote. Howev�r. the Awami

ts
League's deviation from its stand marked a turning-point in the political

ha
and constitutional development of the country. Once the principle of

W
representation which was one of the most formidable of obstacles in the

si
process of constitution-framing in Pakistan was out of the way, the matter

ba
was referred to the Second Constituent Assembly.

Ab
h. The Second Constituent Assembly

Q
A.
This Assembly was brought iHto existence in June 1955 by indirectly

elected members from the existing Provincial Assemblies and it met for
the first time in July of that year. It comprised 80 members, equally
divided between the two regions of the country. The members of the
Provincial Assemblies and electoral colleges in Karachi and Baluchistan
elected n members while the st.ates and tribal areas nominated 8
members. Table IV : 4 below shows the party alignmentoftheConstituent
Assembly.
TABLE IV: 4
Party alignment or the second constituent assembly
(legislature or Pakistan , 1955-1956)
Muslim League 26
United Front 16
62
Awami League 13
Noon Group 3
7
Pakistan Congress
83
4
Scheduled Casie Federation 3
23
United Progressive Party 2
Independent Muslim 1
-
01
Others 12
03
Source: M Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
#
It is interesting to note here that Mohammed Ali (Bogra) was the only
us
Muslim League memberof the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan
in
who somehow managed to get elected from there. The res ult was obvious,
jo
that, with such a narrow political base, he. could not hold the confidence
up
of his ruling parliamentary party for long and soon had to hand over the
Prime Ministership to his Finance Minister, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali on
ro
August 1 1 , 1955. He came from Punjab and originally belonged to the

G
Indian Civil Service. It happened for the first time in the political history
p
of Pakistan that both the Governor-General and the Prime Minister came
ap
from West Pakistan. This seems to be the first manifestation of West

ts
Pakistani domination that was covertly taking place under the fonnula of
ha
One Unit. It was during Chaudhri Muhammad Ali's Prime Ministership

W
that the Constitution came to be finally framed, and was passed on March
si
23, 1956 within 6 months of his take-over of office.

ba
Ab
ill The Constitution or 1956

Q
The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan, officially known as the

A.
"Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," came into being after

nine years deliberations but was not to remain in operation for longer than
2 years. It was never given the chance of a fair trial. Although Pakistan
was born as a federal parliamentary democracy modelled on the
Westminster system, during the first decade of existence neither the
parliamentary democracy nor the federal system was genuine. The
political situation in Pakistan during this period was marked by chaos and
confusion. Throughout the history of Pakistan, there was not a single
general election (except one i n 1970 which marked the end o f United
Pakistan) and the provincial elections of East Bengal were characterized
as "a farce, mockery and a fraud upon the electorate."'' There were not
even any All-Pakistan based political parties except the Pakistan Muslim
League which alone had the credit for the formation of Pakistan but after
Independence it began to decline as it never believed in mass politics. The
62
Awami League which was the largest political organization of the
7
country, drew its support only from East �akistan, and had no followers
83
in West Pakistan . The vacuum created by the absence of such well
23
organized national parties emerged as one of the major factors for "the
-
development of an all-powerful and irresponsible executive" at the
01
1
Centre which was "aided and supported by a powerful bureaucracy" ,56
03
and finally the undue interference of the Head of the State led to an
extreme political ins�bility in both the Centre and the Provinces of
#
us
Pakistan. The emergence of this all-powerful ruling elite had largely
contributed to the disintegration of Pakistan.
in
jo
However, under the new Constitution, Pakistan was set in motion for
up
development through a semblance of parliamentary democracy. Accord

ing to this Constitution, the Federal Parliament of Pakistan was made
ro
unicameral and was named the National Assembly. It consisted of 300

G
members equally divided between East and West Pakistan. Additionally,

p
ap
10 seats, also evenly distributed between the two provinces, were

reserved for women. Accordingly, General Iskander Mirza was elected
ts
ha
the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, but he did not
remain a nominal head , rather he became the most powerful figure in the
W
Republic. Since he had no solid political base in the country, he started

si
playing games with politics from the very beginning. He created a party
ba
of his own - known as the Republican Party with the old powerful, but
Ab
anguished, Muslim Leaguers and some right wing members from the
Assembly. The members of this party had no following outside the
Q
Assembly. Thus Mirza' s Republican Party may be termed a rootless

A.
party. With the strength of a handful of party members, Mirza began to

set one party against another, which led to a variety of short-lived
coalitions both at the Centre and in the Provinces. Chaudhri Muhammad
Ali, refusing to join Mirza's Republican Party ; had to resign from the
Prime Ministership in September 1 956; and then the Awami League
leader, H.S. Suhrawardy, was persuaded to form a Central Cabinet. It was
an uneasy partnership between a career politician and an army bureaucrat.
From the beginning Suhrawardy was moving towards a shift of power, by
'
favouring politicians from the bureaucracy whilst President Mirza him·

selfwas feeling uncomfortable with the Suhrawardy administration as the
industrial and business interest group of West Pakistan began screaming
out against the policy of the Awami League Government.
On the other hand, neither was the political climate of East Pakistan
favourable to Suhrawardy. By this time the demand for provincil.1.1
62
autonomy was intensified in East Pakistan and on April 3, 1957, a
7
83
resolution was passed in the East Pakistan Assembly in favour of full
autonomy for East Pakistan. The Awami League which formed the
23
Provincial Cabinet in East Pakistan upon the resignation of the United
-
01
Front Government on August 30, 1 956 insisted that the autonomy was
essential for the people of East Bengal. Its leader Sheikh Mujibur
03
Rahman, General Secretary of the East Pakistan Awa mi League, bitterly
#
criticized the federal government whom he "likened to the former British
us
rulers. It was the Awami League's contention that the demand for
regional autonomy was geographically inescapable; that the Eastern and
in
jo
Western wings had dissimilar economies, and therefore, were to be

treated both separately and differently. Until this fact was realized , it was
up
i ntimated, East Pakistan would continue to be little more than a colony

ro
of the Western region."57 Ironically enough, Suhrawardy, the central

G
figure of the Awami League and the Prime Minister, described the
p
demand as a "political-stunt". Following the Prime Minister, Ghulam Ali

ap
Talpur, a Republican Party leader and a Central Minister, went somewhat

ts
further. He wished to apply force against the autonomists whom he

ha
considered were creating an obstacle to the integration of Pakistan.

W
.
However, the stand of the Awami League over the question of
si
ba
autonomy, and its support of pro-American foreign policy led to a rift

between two groups of the Awami League, one group supporting the party
Ab
President Maulana Bhashani and the other group supporting the leaders
Q
who were in the administration, commonly known as the leftist or pro

Bhashani and the rightist or pro-Suhrawardy elements of the Awami
A.
League respectively. The relations between the leftist and rightist groups
became extremely bitter when at its council meeting held in Dacca on
June 13 and 14, 1 957, it managed to pass resolutions approving
S uhrawardy's pro-American foreign policies. The council meeting
shelved the question of regional autonomy leaving its implementation
subject to the approval of the National Assembly. At this stage, the leftist
group led by Bhashani withdrew its support from the Awami League and
on July 25, 1 957 it founded a new party which came to be known as the
National Awami Party, having the cooperation of the National Party of
West Pakistan and the Ganatantri Dal of East Pakistan. The National
Awami Party (NAP) stood mainly for an independent foreign policy, and
opposed the Security Pacts to which Pakistan had already become com
m itted. It also declared that it would continue its fight for the realization
62
of full regional autonomy for both the regions of the country which
implied the breakup of West Pakistan into its former four units. Further
7
83
more, it committed itself to land reform and the nationalisation of major
industries. Accordingly, the NAP suggested thatthe Federal Government
23
of Pakistan would exercise power over the three areas - defence, foreign
-
01
affairs and currency, with all other areas being administered by the
03
provincial governments. In its constitution, it stated that "all people will
be equal before the law; all people, irrespective of religious belief, caste,
#
community, race and sex, will have the guarantee of employment, shelter,
us
education, civil liberty and freedom to observe religious rites so that every
individual will have full scope for. development. '038 Thus the NAP
in
jo
remained secular and democratic, in accordance with its socialist lean

up
ings. S ince the NAP was a composite of different groups from East and
West Pakistan, it lost its homogeneity whereas the Awami League after
ro
its breakup had become more homogeneous and a largely East Pakistani
G
dominated party.
p
ap
Although the rift in the Awami League weakened Ataur Rahman's

ts
Ministry in the East Pakistan Assembly, 1 2 out of 1 3 Awami Leaguers in

ha
the National Assembly still remained Joyal to the Suhrawardy Cabinet.

W
President Mirza, an advocate of "controlled democracy", violating all

si
norms of Parliamentary democracy called for the Suhrawardy Cabinet to

ba
resign on October 1 1 , 1957, as the latter had bitterly opposed President

Ab
Mirza's statement pleading for a Presidential form of government. The

President then appointed I.I. Chundrigar, the leaderofthe Muslim League
Q
Party, as Prime Ministerof Pakistan. Chundrigar formed his.Cabinet with

A.
the help of President Mirza's Republic Party and a group of the KSP led
by Hamidul Huq Chowdhury of East Pakistan. But the Chundrigar
Ministry fell in December, within two months of taking office as it failed
to change the joint electorate system. Following Chundrigar, President
Mirza appointed Firoz Khan Noon, a leader of Mirza' s Republican Party,
as Prime Minister on December 16, 1957. Firoz Khan Noon formed a
coalition Ministry with the Awami League, the major partner of the
-Ministry. At this stage it was expected that a general election in Pakistan
wold bring an end to the prevailing political crisis in the country. It would
alsoprovide new leadership which would be able lo remove the anomalies
and undesirable provisions of lhe Constitution of 1956, which the various
Heads of State had exploited thus misusing their power. The date for
general elections was finally fixed for February 1959, a year later than
originally scheduled. However, the Awami League which expected tqtal
victory in East Pakistan lent its full support to the proposed general
62
elections of 1 959. The prospect of the elections thus consolidated all the
7
83
opposition political parties of the country which opposed the
Government's involvement in the Security Pacts with the USA, and also
23
the One Unit scheme. Before the scheduled date of elections, political
-
01
opinions were also crystallized in favour of full regional autonomy for
both the East and various units of West Pakistan. The ruling elite,
03
including President Mirza and his followers, realized that prospects for
#
success in a national general election were remote. On the one hand, the
us
Pakistan military command was worried about having to face substan tial
in
reductions in the country 's defence budget and on the other, it felt uneasy
jo
about the recruitment level of Bengalis who had long been under
represented in the armed forces (Tables IV : 6 and IV:7). The civil
up
bureaucracy which was mainly manned by the Punjabis and immigrant

ro
elements, and had enjoyed maximum powers and privileges, suffered

G
from the same dilemma. It is also argued here that the general elections
p
ap
in Pakistan could only have exposed the magnitude of injustices and

exploitation which not only the Bengalis, but also the S indhis, the people
ts
of the N-W.F. Province and the Baluchis suffered in the hands of the
ha
central ruling elite composed mainly of Punjabis and immigrants from

W
India. Meanwhile, the political crisis of East Pakistan which was a

si
product of Mirza' s undue interference came lo its peak. The crisis became
ba
aggravated when the Speaker Abdul Hakim Khan, a nominee of the KSP,
Ab
was declared disqualified in the Assembly by the Awami League, the

party is power. In retaliation, the opposition led by the KSP refused to
Q
accept the Deputy Speaker Shahed Ali, a nominee of the Government;

A.
and while the Deputy Speaker was c;pnducting the business of the
Assembly, he was seriously assaulted by his opponents and later he
succumbed to his injuries on September 26, 1958. However, while the
civil-military bureaucracy, including the neo-capitalists and feudal elite
or' the Punjab who consolidated their position in the last twelve years of
Pakistan's existence, were conspiring lo frustrate the democratic transi
tion in thecountry, East Pakistan's political crisis provided the ruling elite
with an excuse to impose Martial Law throughout Pakistan on October
7, 1958 marking the end of the so-called Parliamentary democracy and

the beginning of the rise of military dictatorship in the country.
While the country was approaching its first ever general elections in
an effort to correct its economic and political imbalances, General Mirza,
instead of surrendering to the wishes of the electorates, abrogated the
1956 Constitution, dismissed the Central and Provincial Cabinets, dis
62
solved the National and Provincial Assemblies, banned the activities of
7
political parties and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial
83
Law Administrator while he himself remained President. Within three
23
weeks, General Ayub, having the backing of the armed forces, dislodged
-
Mirza from the presidency on October 27 and himself assumed power,
01
and for the next 1 0 years he remained the sole authority in the country.
03
Thus the rise of the Ayub regime not 'only marked the end of whatever
#
semblance of legitimacy and federal democracy Pakistan had experi
us
enced, but was also the loss of any chance tor the Bengalis, the majority
partners of Pakistan, to participate in the country's power echelon through
in
constitutional means, as they came under Marital Law. The emergence

jo
of army rule, dominated absolutely by West Pakistani elements appeared

up
to the Bengalis as alien rule and as such all possibilities of reconciliation

ro
and integration between the two parts of Pakistan became remoter still.
G
IV The Martial Law Administration I (1958-1969) and the

p
ap
Constitution or 1962
ts
Instead of solving the basic problems of integration, Ayub' s personal

ha
dictatorship and his policies as a whole brought about the total breakup
W
of Pakistan in late 1 97 1 .
si
ba
General Ayub in his first broadcast to the nation on October 8, 1958

said:
Ab
Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Q
politicians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds

A.
were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each
other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to whet their
appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to
the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit, and degradation.
Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings,
sectarian, religious, and racial differences to set a Pakistani against
a Pakistani. They could see no good in anybody else. All that
mattered was self-interest. In this mad rush for power and acquisi-
tion, the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were
concerned. 59
Witb this impression of the country 's politicians it was understand

able that the military regime would hardly transfer power to the civilians
or even share power with them. Ayub in his autobiography justified the
military takeover and recalled that:
62
The President had throughly exploited the weaknesses in the
7
Constitution and had got everyone connected with the political life
83
of the country utterly exposed and discredited. I do not th ink that he
23
ever seriously wanted to hold general elections; he was looking for
-
a suitable opportunity to abrogate the Constitution. Indeed, 'he was
01
setting the stage for it. ... From a soldier's position it was quite clear
03
to me that the general elections were going to be stand-up fights.
There would be large-scale disturbances all over the country, and
#
civil authority, already groaning under the heels of the politicians,
us
would be incapable of dealing with the situation. Whether the army
in
liked it or not it would get embroiled, because in the final analysis

jo
it would become a question of maintaining some semblance of law

up
and order in the country. The army could not remain unaffected by
the conditions around it; nor was it conceivable that officers and men
ro
would not react to all the political chicanery, intrigue, corruption,

G
and inefficiency manife_st in every sphere of life. They had their

p
ap
relatives, they read newspapers, and some had their contacts. Being
a patriotic and national army it was bound to respond to the thinking
ts
of the people in the country.60

ha
W
Although he put all blame on President Iskander Mina and the

politicians for creating serious political instability and political wran
si
gling in the country and·he himselfappeared to be the saver of the country

ba
from "complete disruption", it could be argued here that the anny take
Ab
over in October 1958 did not come out of the blue.

Q
The first disillusionment between the political leadership and the

A.
military started over the Kashmir dispute when Liaquat Ali Khan signed
the ceasefire pact with India in 1948. The Military Generals were
dissatisfied with the civil government's Kashmir policy and described it
as a blunder which cost them victory . The rift between the Generals and
the political leaders went to such an extent that it was alleged that a few
m il itary leaders conspired to takeover power by staging a coup d' etat
in 195 1 .
However, after the assassination of the country 's first Prime Minis
ter, Liaquat Ali Khan, the civil and military bureaucracy was virtually
all powerful and regarded the politicians as obstacles to modernization of
the country. Their 'indignation towards democracy and the country' s
political elite, particularly towards the rising Bengali elite became clear
when the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad arbitrarily dismissed
the Prime Minister Nazimuddin, a B engali by birth, and subsequently
62
dissolved the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Both the civil and
7
military bureaucrats looked to the politicians with suspicion and espe
83
cially considered the Bengalis as disruptive forces. Both Mirza and Ayub,
23
the spokesmen of the Civil and Military bureaucracy, were anti-democ
-
racy. Thus when Mirza publicly advocated a "controlled democracy",
01
Ayub was circulating his own draft constitution asking for a "controlled
03
form of democracy with checks and counter-checks."61 So long as Mirza
remained at the top of the power structure, the civil military bureaucratic
#
elite felt secure and stayed back. But when they became convinced that
us
the politicians and political institutions under the 1956 Constitution, were
in
not going to serve their interests they decided to strike ostensibly to avert
jo
chaos and national disintegration. Thus Tariq Ali puts it correctly in

up
stating that"when the army and the civil service decided on a military take
over they were, in fact, fonnalizing a situation which had existed almost
ro
since the Partition of the sub-continent."62

G
p
Ayub's take over from the civilian government was followed by

ap
thousands of political workers and many prominent leaders ' arrests. For
ts
a few years (from 1958- 1962), all political activities were ruthlessly
ha
suppressed. Freedom of the press was heavily restricted and many

W
newspapers were closed down. Talking to the New York Times, Ayub said
that "the biggest weapon of a politician is his tongue, which we have
si
controlled. I think things are going to be quiet for a while".63 In fact, during
ba
the initial four years of Ayub's personal rule (from 1958 to 1962), political
Ab
activities were virtuafly ·silenced. In the absence of any democratic

process, public opinion within the country was growing stronger against
Q
the authoritarian rule of Ayub. At the same time the nationalist forces of
A.
East Pakistan began to campaign for regional autonomy, openly defying

the Martial Law regulations. At this stage, the military regime evolved
a new type of political system which was seen as likely to help preserve
their vested interests. Accordingly, Ayub introduced in the country a new
Constitution in June 1 962 based on "Basic Democracy". The 1 962
Constitution was "granted", but not framed by the people' s
representatives whom Ayub considered. unfit for democracy. It was a
Constitu tion .of Ayub, by Ayub and for Ayub.
a. The Constitution of 1962

The most powerful institution under the 1962 Constitution was the
post of the President, and all other institutions whether central or
provincial were made subordinate to it
This Constitution also retained the principle ofparity and introduced
62
a unicameral legi.slature consisting of 156 members equally divided
between the two wings of Pakistan (see Table IV: 2). A system of indirect
7
83
elections was introduced to elect the President and members of the
National and Provincial Assemblies by the 80,000 Basic Democrats who
23
were, in their turn, elected by adult voters of the country. The President
-
01
could select his Cabinet members who were responsible to none but him
alone. The most interesting aspect of the 1962 Constitution was that it
03
introduced the old British viceregal system in Pakistan. Like the British
#
Viceroy in India, .he controlled provincial administrations through his
us
nominated Governors who acted as his agents being directly accountable
to him. Another aspect of the Constitution was that it provided a central,
in
rather than a federal structure, which was the major deviation from the
jo
1956 Constitution. This new system again made the President the central
up
focus of power.
ro
b. National Integration through Economic Development

G
p
Immediately after assuming power the Ayub regime like the military
ap
regimes of Indonesia and Burma focused its attention towards

ts
programmes of nation-building through economic development. Being

ha
aware of the economic disparity which existed between the two wings of
W
Pakistan, the regime recorded in its Constitution that it was a

constitutional obligation of the government to "ensure that disparities
si
between the provinces ... are removed,... in the shortest possible

ba
time,. . .'064
Ab
Yet, after ten years under his personal rule, interregional disparities
Q
had further increased and created additional problems of national

A.
integration. There was no doubt that Ayub's economic policy earned

remarkable growth but it utterly neglected the distributive aspect of
economic development. As a result, the wealth of the nation was
concentrated in the "twenty-two families" and Mahabubul Haq, the chief
Economist of the Paksitan Planning Commission headed by Ayub
himself, disclosed that Ayub's own family was one of these. Thus instead
of bridging the<Jisparity gaps, Ayub' s economic policy exacerbated these
and it intensified the Bengali distrust towards the people of West
Pakistan.
c. Disparity in Regional Representation

As compared to the earlier so-called parliamentary era, the Ayub
regime's policy did not basically change the power structure of the
country. Rather his nation-building policies completed the dominance of
the new power elite composed of the civil-military bureaucracy. The
emergence of this all-powerful ruliqg elite had a direct impact on the
62
alienation of Bengal is from the political system of Pakistan. The ruling
7
elite was composed of the senior civil and army bureaucrats none of
83
whom was a Bengali. Although Bengalis did represent nearly 50 per cent
23
in the central political elite (see Table IV: 5), they had hardly any voice
in any vital national issues. They had political posts without power.
-
01
Except during thirteen months of S uhrawardy's Cabinet in 1956-57,
03
every important decision, whether it related to political or defence or
economic or diplomatic affairs, was ultimately made by the ruling elite,
composed of the West Pakistani civil and military bureaucrats.
#
us
in
TABLE IV: 5
jo
Central political elite in Pakistan 1947-1958

up
ro
East Pakistan West Pakistan

G
Heads of state 2 2
p
Pri me ministers 3 4
ap
Ministers, deputy ministers,

ts
state ministers• 27 27
Members of Constituent and
ha
National Assemblies 84 75
W
• The number of ministers, deputy ministers, and state ministers includes those up to ·
si
1957 and omits those in the two short-lived ministries from 1957 to 1 958.
ba
Source: R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in , op. cit., Table 1 1 .8, p. 25

...
Ab
TABLE IV: 6
Q
Military elite in Pakistan, July 1955-56

(number of officers)
A.
Service East Pakistan West Pakistan
Army 14 894
Navy 7 593
Air Force 60 640
Sowa: Dawn (Karachi); January 9 and 18, 1956.

In the case of the military elite, Bengali representation was as

minimal during the Ayub regime as during the 1 950s (Table IV: 6 and
Table IV: 7).
TABLE IV: 7
East Pakistan's representation in the military establishment, 1963
62
(percentage of total)
7
83
Commissioned Junior commissioned Warrant Other
officers officers officers ranks
23
Army 5% 7.4% 7.4%
-
01
Air Force 17% 13.2% 28.0%
Branch Chief Petty Petty Leading Seamen
03
officers officers officers , and below
Navy 5% 10.4% 17.3% 28.8%
#
us
Source: National Assembly ofPakistan, Debates, March 8, 1963, Karachi: Government
of Pakistan Press, 1963, pp. 30-3 1 .
in
jo
Again the bureaucracy (the civil service) which functioned as an

up
information resource for all the decision-making bodies was largely made
up ofpersons from West Pakistan. The participation of the Bengalis in this
ro
important national institution was only about 30 per cent (Table IV: 8 and
G
Table IV:9).
p
ap
' TABLE IV: 8

lnterwing representation in the civil service
ts
ha
of Pakistan, 1948-1958
W
Year Total no. East Pakistan West Pakistan

si
of officers No. % of total No. % of total

ba
1 948 18 2 1 1. l 16 88.9
Ab
19'19 20 9 45.0 11 55.0

1 950 20 6 30.0 14 70.0
Q
1951 11 4 36.4 7 63.6

1 952 17 5 29.4 12 70.6
A.
1953 13 3 23. 1 10 77.9

1 954 25 7 28.0 18 72.0
1955 17 5 29.4 12 70.6
1956 21 11 52.4 10 47.6
1957 20 7 35.0 13 65.0
1 958 24 10 4 1 .7 14 58.3
Note: Figures are for the beginning of each year.

Source: R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in, .. , op. cit., Table 1 1 . 1 0, p. 26.
Table IV: 9
Interwing representation in the higher ran�s of the
Central Secretariat, 1955-56
Rank East Pakistan West Pakistan % of total
Secretary 19
62
Joint Secretary 3 38 7.3
7
Deputy Secretary IO 1 23 7.5
83
Under Secretary 38 510 7.0
23
Source: Pakistan, Consliluent Assembly, Debates, Vol. /, January 17, 1956, Karachi:
-
Government of Pakistan Press, 1 956, p. 1 844.
01
03
Obviously, the Bengalis were given hardly any scope for effective
and equal participation in national affairs.
#
us
There are several historical factors for this disparity in regional
in
representation. In the case of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the disparity

jo
was a direct result ofBritish recruitment policies of the pre-partition days.

up
The colonial government was inclined to recruit the "martial races" of

ro
West Paksitan (who had a long traditional offighting) for ther army. They
1
G
did not adopt any conscious policy to recruit Bengalis for it. Thus this
British policy of army recruitment had affected the Bengali representa
p
ap
tion in thePaksitan Army during the post-Independence period. Morever,

ts
at the time oflndependence, out of the' 1 33 Muslim Indian Civil Service/

ha
Indian Political Service (ICS/IPS) officers who opted for Pakistan, only
W
one was a Bengali. Although recruitment policy in th� higher Civil

Service of Pakistan (CSP)65 introduced a quota system to increase the
si
number of Bengalis, an initial lag still resulted in a continuing gap in

ba
participation by the two regions of Pakistan . Despite the introduction of

Ab
. this quota system, Bengali repre_sentation in various Central Services

taken together remained well below one-fourth of the total until the final
Q
disintegration of Pakistan.
A.
Unlike the Central Civil Services, the Pakistan military did not adopt
any serious policy to coun teract the existing disparitiesin this institution.
Since the Kashmir War of 1948, the Government of Pakistan put
enormous emphasis on strengthening the defence force of the country.
S ince various methods and conditions of recruitment policy were

strictly imposed in the defence services, it was difficult for. the B engalis
to meet those standards, 66 and thus Bengalis were bluntly excluded from
these services. Although there were maximum quotas . prescribed for

Bengali recruitment into various defence services, because of the severe
limitations, nowhere did Bengali representation exceed 12 per cent. The
fact that the installations ofall the defence services were in West Paksitan
also contributed to non-recruitment of Bengalis in the defence .services.
As a result, virtually all defence personnel were from West Pakistan, and
62
among them the Punjabis alone represented almost 80 per cent of the
7
personnel of the Defence Services of Pakistan. After the so-called parlia
83
mentary era, the Ayub regime did not take any pragmatic step to remove
23
the existing interwing imbalances in the Pakistan Defence Services.
-
01
d. Disparity in the Power Elite
03
Inthe power elite as well as in decision-making bodies, the represen
#
tation of the Bengalis was v irtually nil. When Ayub came to power in
us
1958 he did not include any Bengali politicians in his first Cabinet (1958-
1962) except one, Abu! Kasem Khan who was not known as a politician
in
but as a leading Bengali businessman. In 1962, Ayub gave Pakistan a new

jo
Constitution which introduced a quasi-constitutional and civil regime. ·

up
Although this regime came to an understanding with the political elite and
ro
allowed renewed political activity with some restrictions, non.e of the

G
important Cabinet portfolios such as Defence, Planning, Finance and

p
Home Affairs were given to Bengali politicians. Thoughout his rule,

ap
Ayub's political order was a depoliticized quasi-constitutional system i n

ts
which the real decision-making machinery consisted of the top bureau

ha
crats and army generals. Ayub usually discussed all peripheral issues and
W
issues of less importance with his Cabinet members, namely, Z.A.

Bhutto, Manzur Qadir, Shoaib, Q.A. Shahab, Altaf Gauhar and Fida
si
ba
Hasam-none of whom was a politician. Among these members, Bhutto,

after serving eight years, left the Cabinet and later became a politician.
Ab
Shahab, Gauhar and Fida Hasam were all civil servants; and Manzur
Q
Qadir was a lawyer. Matters of vital importance such as defence, foreign

affairs and economic policy were decided in the Presidential House with
A.
the inner cabinet from which Bengalis were totally excluded. Tho total
exclusion of the Bengalis from the decision-making bodies plus the
existing imbalances in regional representation within the various national
institutions of Pakistan had great impact on the separatist movement in
East Paksitan.
In provincial matters as well, the Bengalis, even in their own

province, were denied their legitimate rights to formulate their policies.
All key posts in the provincial administration were held by West

Pakistanis who had direct access to the central ruling group. In theory, the
1962 Constitution.provided a federal system but in reality the provincial
government throughout Pakistan 's existence remained subordinate to the
Centre in almost all matters. In Article 80 of the Constitution, the
executive authority of the province was vested in the Governor who "shall
62
be appointed by the P!esident" and Article 66 states that the Governor
would act "subject to the directions of the President". 67 So, the Governer
7
83
could not go against the diiection of the President, and the President used
to control the entire provincial administration through the executive
23
authority of his chosen Governer.
-
01
Moreover, the West Pakistani Civil and military officials who served
03
in East Pakistan behaved towards the Bengal is as would colonial rulers,
#
never caring to develop any real bonds with the local people. Indeed, the
us
West Pakistani officials considered themselve's socially "a superior
class". It is alleged that the first Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, Aziz
in
Ahmed , a West Pakistani, instead of being loyal to the Provincial

jo
Ministers, used to report against them to the central Government. Thus,

up
the West Pakistani bureaucrats posted in East Pakistan carefully culti

ro
vated racism instead of contributing to Pakistani nationalism. The

G
Bengalis found a new ruling clique placed over them in succession to

p
former British colonial personnel, and once again, they discovered that
ap
they were invested with the status of colonial subjects. It is this colonial
ts
mentality of th� West Pakistani ruling elite that contributed to a great

ha
extent to the alienation of the Bengalis from the political system of

W
Pakistan.
si
To give his whole system a political order, Ayub formed an alliance

ba
with the old national political elite and created a political party in
Ab
September 1 962, known as the Convention Muslim League. This was

however still opposed by the majority political elites ofEastPakistan who
Q
remained anti-Ayub. Even the Council Muslim League (mainly West

A.
Pakistani based) also remained opposed to Ayub's party and his regime.
The regime not only lost the support of a major proportion of mobilized
political elites but also the organizational experiences of the politicians
who commanded mass support. Obviously, the participation of these
elites in Ayub's regime could have been fruitful, but he did allow them
to share his power. As a result Ayub relied heavily upon the civil and
military bureaucracy rather than on his political supporters for the
stability of his political order.
e. Basic Democracy: A New Instrument of Exploitation
In its failure to come to an understanding with the majority of the

political elite, the Ayub regime devised another political expedient to
give the regime the appearance of a democracy. He introduced a system
known as "Basic Democracy" according to which 80,000 members were
to be elected directly on the basis of universal adult franchise to run locf 1
62
government at the grass-roots level.
7
83
These Basic Democrats (BD), in tum were given the function of the
23
Electoral Colleges to elect the President, members of the National and
-
two Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan. This system created an institution
01
of the "surplus farmers" class to buttress and legitimize the regime at the
03
rural level. In the name of economic development for East Pakistan, the
regime intrOduced a Rural Public Works Programme during the year of
#
1962-63. Under this "works programme" Ayub used to distribute large
us
amounts of money every year through the Basic Democrats who were not
in
accountable to anybody for the money they spent on their projects. The
jo
maif! purpose of this programme was to buy political support for the
up
regime by distributing favours among rural elites. It was hoped that this
ro
so-called rural-elite class would be a substitute for the urban elites

G
composed of lawyers, joumalis�. doctors, teachers and other profes

p
sional groups, and thus the elite-mass gap would be closed substantially.
ap
In fact, Ayub's works programmy was designed to serve both an

ts
economic and a political purpose. But he achieved only limited success

ha
in his objectives. Under the works programme the regime created 80,000
W
so-called rural elites or "rich farmers' who monopolized rural econqmic

and political power, while many charges of corruption, mishandling of
si
funds, nepotism and inefficiency were laid against them. Thus, this
ba
system exacerbated the economic inequality of the rural areas and the
Ab
rural poor felt even more frustrated and disappointed than before.
Q
From the political point of view, Ayub succeeeded in channelling the

A.
rural elites' participation in the country ' s political process, but he entirely
failed to moblize the rural masses because of the newly created rural elite
mass gap. Morever, Ayub's system fully restricted rural elite participa
tion in the national politics. B y creating the new rural elite bypassing the
urban elite, the regime widened the elite-mass gap instead of closing it. .
Finally, the Bengalis were alienated from this system a step futther,
and they saw Basic Democracy as a means of mere exploitation by which
Ayub wanted to perpetuate his power. Lawrence Ziring puts it rightly by

saying that Basic Democracy was a "clandestine and unsophisticated
technique employed to ensure the dominance of the m ilitary-bureaucratic
. elite and to keep the Eastern province in a condition of servitude".68
['Movement against Ayub and His Constitution
62
Neither East Pakistan nor West Pakistan was happy with Ayub ' s
7
Constitution and his Basic Democracy. Although the 1 962 Constitution
83
. introduced a presidential government, unlike the USA it made the
23
National Assembly (Parliament) powerless and ineffective. The system
-
01
of Basic Democracy further denied fundamental rights to the people.
There was no common political machinery through which the people of
03
both wings could develop an understanding. Instead of achieving national
#
integration, Ayub's Constitution brought prospects of national disinte
us
gration to Pakistan. In both parts of Pakistan, the demand for the
restoration of parliamentary democracy gained momentum. Ayub faced
in
jo
bitter opposition from East Pakistanis wlio were not ready to accept the
"condition of servitude''. Along with the demand for parliamentary
up
democracy, the Bengalis renewed the demand for the restoration of full
ro
provincial autonomy. Instead of conceding to Bengali demands, the

G
regime considered that "a strong Centre is necessary for . a unified

p
Pakistan" and branded the Bengal is as"disruptionists" or"secessionists".

ap
ts
Anti-Ayub Movement in East Pakistan: In East Pakistan, the first open

ha
anti-Ayub movement was launched by the students of the Dacca Univer�

W
sity when the Awami League leader H.S. S uhrawardy was arrested on
January 30, 1962. His activities, according to Ayub, were "prejudicial to
si
the security and safety of Pakistan". Ayub even suspected Suhra..yardy' s

ba
loyalty to Pakistan , whereas it was Suhrawardy alone who had the credit
Ab
of leading the Muslim League to victory in the 1 946 elections which in

Q
tum led to the creation ofPakistan in 1 947. In a press conferericeatLahore

on March 22, 1 962, Ayub held the communists of lndia responsible for
A.
the deterioration of la:.v and order in East Pakistan. He said that

"communists of Calcutta and Agartala (India) were instigating the
student community in East Pakistan".
However, the anti-Ayub movement sparked thereafter at every

comer of East Pakistan which was followed by mass arrests and political
oppression. Until the so-called presidential election of January 1 965 , the
anti-Ayub agitation in East Pakistan took a constitutional form of
restoring parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. But the political move

ment in East Pakistan took a regional complexion when the Combined
Opposition Party (COP), which had fought the election mainly for the
restoration of parliamentary democracy, failed to get its nominee Miss
Fatema Jinnah, sister of M.A. Jinnah, elected.
62
The election results show that after a well-publicized election
campaign and widespread bribery and rigging of the elections, Ayub was
7
83
able to secure 63.3 1 per cent of the total vote. The election results
23
convinced all politically conscious elements in Pakistan that by taking
part in the election under the so-called Basic Democracy, parliamentary
-
01
democracy could never be restored to Pakistan. Since the members of the
03
Electoral College were the 80,000 Basic Democrats who had been
receiving pecuniary benefits under the Basic Democracy system, it was
#
not an easy task for the COP to change their mc11tality and attitude.
us
Moreover, the Basic Democrats were constantly kept under the influence
in
of the government machinery.

jo
Under this situation, it became clear to the opposition leaders that

up
mere constitutional methods were not sufficient to remove the all

ro
powerful Ayub regime and restore parliamentary democracy, and thereby

G
too, the autonomy of the provinces. After seeing the futility of the election
p
under Basic. Democracy, they seemed inclined to resort to unconstitu

ap
tional means. The popular mass upheaval of 1968- 1969 which overthrew
ts
Ayub and his "brain child", the Constitution of 1962, was a distinct
ha
expression of the extreme resentment against Ayub' s oppressive political

W
order. Before the mass uproar of 1968-1 969 could take a concrete shape,
si
there were three issues, namely the Inda-Pakistan warof 1965, theAwami
ba
League'� famous Six-PointFormula, and the so-called Agartala Conspir

Ab
acy Case, which provided fuel for the fire.
The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: Although after fighting for seventeen

Q
days, neither side could claim victory in absolute terms , the 1 965 War and
A.
its subsequent ceasefire and the Tashkent Agreement had a "disastrous

effect both on Ayub's authority and image in the-armed forces and on
relations between East and West Pakistan".69 After the War, the Ayub
regime met serious challenges not only from inside the country but also
from his real constituency of power (the armed forces). Many army
officers, including some generals, were unhappy with Ayub's handling
of the War. They felt that he should have prolonged the War with the
Chinese and Indonesian offers of help. Some officers also alleged that
Ayub overlooked "national interests" at the Tashkent Conference under

the pressures of the external forces.
In view of the heavy loss oflife, resources, and prestige the Tashkent
Agreement, however, could not provide any favourable terms for Paki
stan. Hence the reactions of the army and the subsequent mass uprising
62
in West Pakistan were understandable: Another effect of the War, as in
7
the case of any war, was general economic depression. The stoppage of
83
American arms and economic supplies during the war, and the burden of
23
heavy tax imposed upon the people after the war to rebuild the shattered
armed forces, caused an abrupt deterioration in the general economic
-
01
conditions of the people. While West Pakistani feelings were running
03
high against Ayub' s acceptance of the Tashkent Agreement at that time,
Bhutto 's action in disassociating himself from the Ayub regime added an
#
additional impetus to the movement which turned into a mass upheaval
us
against Ayub.
in
jo
Another effect of the war on the unity of Pakistan was that it exposed
the extreme apathy of the Central Government towards the vital interests
up
of the Province of East Pakistan. During the war, the Bengalis were left
ro
completely undefended. There was not more than half a division of

G
soldiers with very limited military supplies, no air base, and an insignifi
p
cant naval presence in East Pakistan which could hardly defend its
ap
borders if India wanted to invade. Virtually, Bengal is were left to the

ts
mercy of the Indian forces. Again to meet the loss of the army, the regime
ha
diverted all the major developmental funds from the budget allotments
W
of East Pakistan. B engalis were again forced to undergo economic

si
suffering in the interest of the West Pakistanis. S ince the War was fought
ba
exclusively in West Pakistan and for the exclusive interests of the

Ab
Western part of Pakistan, the Bengalis were confronted with the realities
that their relationship with the West Pakistanis and the survival of
Q
Pakistani nationhood were both subordinate to the ullimate interests of

A.
West Pakistan. Thus, the effect of the War between India and Pakistan
further weakned the ties between the two regions.
Six-Point Formula-The Charter ofthe Survival: The second important

issue which followed after the war and which intensified the mass
movement of 1968- 1969 was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's famous six
point demand. When the people ofEast Pakistan were looking for a new
formula which could ensure their social, political and economic freedom,
in February 1 966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Mujib)
came out with his "Six-Point Fonnula" which he explained as "our

demand for survival". In fact, the Six-Point Formula was a landmark in
the history of the political changes in Pakistan. This fonnula, unlike
previous ones, did not call upon the Central Government to do more for
the Bengalis, rather it asked the authorities to let the Bengalis act for
themselves. The bas.c points of the demand included the following:
62
1. a Government based on a federal parliamentary structure in
7
83
which direct elections would detennine membership in both
23
central and provincial legislatures, on the basis of population
distribution;
-
01
2. the powers of the federal government were to be limited to
03
national defence and foreign affairs and, to a limited extent, to
the issuance of currency;
#
us
3. either two separate currencies which were freely convertible or
in
one currency with adequate constitutional provisions provided

jo
to ensure no flight of capital from the East and the West, were
up
to be established;
ro
4. all poweroftaxation to be left in the hands of the federating units,

G
while the centre would receive some fixed share for the expenses
p
which it incurred;
ap
ts
5. all foreign trade and foreign exchange matters were to come

ha
within the sphere of provincial powers, this included the eco

W
nomic transactions between the various provinces and other

· nations. In this provision a:lso the centre would be forced to rely
si
on the provinces for a fixed ratio of the foreign exchange income

ba
to meet their requirements; and

Ab
6.. the Government of the federating units to be empowered to raise

Q
· and maintain such military establishment as was found neces

A.
sary for preserving national security.70
The Six-Point Formula differed from the previous 2 1 -point pro

gramme of the United Front Party in the sense that it totally denied the
Central Government power of taxation and revenue collection which it
suggested should be vested in the federated units (point 4 ) . It also
suggested that the federated units would be empowered to establish trade
and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into
agreements with foreign countries; and also, it advocated that there would
be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two
wings of Pakistan (point 5). These proposals of the Six-Point Fonnula
made it clear that it advocated a confederal rather than federal system for
Pakistan.
During the years of Ay11b's regime there was no change in the already
politically deprived status of the people of East Pakistan and they were
62
continually denied access to their democratic rights. Besides, this period
7
of almost eight years saw the development of a level of exploitation
83
unsurpassed in the post-Independence era. IL was in this socio-political
23
climate that the Six-Point Formula was introduced. No sooner had Mujib
-
made his Six-Point Formula public and started touring East Pakistan to
01
rally mass support for his movement, than the Ayub regime reacted
03
sharply and accused Mujib and his supporters as being enemies of
#
Pakistan. Following Mujib's fashion, President Ayub also spoke at
us
different rallies in East Pakistan and branded the fonner's fonnula a
"sucessionist move", "a demand for greater Bengal" which according to
in
Ayub would destroy the integrity and stability of Pakis�n. In a meeting

jo
of the Convention Muslim League in Dacca, March 1966, Ayub warned

up
against a "civil war" and threatened that he would use force against those
ro
who would talk of the six-point programme. S ince the Independence of

G
Pakistan it had been a common practice of the ruling elite tobrand the
p
Bengalis' demands for autonomy or democratic rights as secessionist

ap
In fact, Mujib's six points created political controversies and at

ts
ha
tr�cted vehement political criticisms both from the regime or the party in
power and other right- wing political parties of the counuy.
W
si
But all the accusations and political opposition to the Six-Point

ba
Fonnula could not help the regime's purpose of weakening Mujib and his
Ab
party, rather they provoked the Bengalis. At this stage, the regime adopted
a policy ofpolitical persecution against Mujib and his followers on a large
Q
scale. While, in April 1966, Mujib was touring East Pakistan explaining
A.
his six-point programme to the Bengalis, he was harassed by the

Government authorities and arrested three times in the districts of Dacca,
. . Sylhet and Mymensingh. He was finally arrested under section 32 of the
Defence of Pakistan Rules in the interest of security of the State and
maintenance of publicurder on May 9, 1966; This was followed by the
arre st of several hundred Awami Leaguers including its leaders, and
student leaders ail over East Pakistan.
1 50 Pakistaf' and Malaysia
These indiscriminate arrests of political leaders and others created a

panic even among the common people of East Pakistan. In support of the
Six-Point Formula and in protest against the arrest of Mujib and his
followers, a province-wide hartal (strike) was called on June 7, 1966. On
that day police fired on the processionists, killed 4 1 of them and arrested
about 1 ,000 Awami League supporters. In its editorial of June 1 6, the
lttefaq, the most widely circulated vernacular daily of East Pakistan,
62
referred to the incidents of June 7. As a result the Government seized all
7
copies of the daily of that day. The regime also banned the publication of
83
the lttefaq, confiscated its press and imprisoned its editor, Tofazzal
23
Hossain. These repressive measures of the regime only proved its failure
-
to appreciate the genuine grievances of the Bengalis. Even when Mujib
01
declared that he was willing to negotiate with any political party on the
03
basis of the six points or when he hinted that he was ready to drop his
#
demands if the Capital was movt'd to East Pakistan , the Ayub regime did
us
not respond to his. call. It seems that the regime was reluctant to come to
a political solution of what was essentially a political thesis.
in
jo
In the beginning of May 1967, five opposition parties presumably

up
moderate autonomists and centrists, from both East and West Pakistan,
ro
namely, the National Democratic Front, Council Muslim League, Jamat

G
e-Islami and Awami League of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan formed the

Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). This Movement adopted an
p
ap
eight-point programme which included a parliamentary fonn of govern

ts
ment based on adult franchise and a federal structure with provincial

ha
autonomy. Although it proposed greater autonomy than that provided for

W
by the Constitution of 1 956, it fell short of the demands of Mujib's six

points. In general, Mujib's Six-Point Fonnula aimed at taking power
si
away ftotn the Centre, while the PDM's eight-point programme stressed
ba
on devising means for parity. But actually, the absence of the Mujib's
Ab
Awami League and Bhashani 's NAP made the PDM movement ineffec
Q
tive. Ayub soon realised that the PDM was not a threat to his regime arid
thereby rejected their programmes. His main concern was the radical
A.
autonomists--the Awami Leaguers of East Pa.leis tan who repre$ented the

national aspirations of the Bengalis. Ayub came to Dhaka in the middle
of December 1967 and bitterly criticized Mujib's Six-Point Fonnula and
his followers. Following his tour in East Pakistan, Mujib and others were
charged with conspiracy against Pakistan in January 1968.
The Agartala Conspiracy Case: The next important issue which led to
the outbreak of a mass movement against the Ayub regime and finally
alienated the Bengalis from the polity was the so·called "Agartala
Conspiracy Case" instituted against 35 persons including Mujib by the
regime in 1 968.
The regime soon became aware of the real substance of the Bengali
sentiments which were moving towards Mujib's Fonnula. The regime
unwilling to face the ultimate consequences, decided on a final attempt
to crush and eliminate Mujib and his supporters once arid for all, and thus
62
resorted to framing a conspiracy case against the State in East Pakistan.
7
83
The regime disclosed that certain political leaders and government
officials both civil and military (all were Bengalis) were arrested because
23
of their involvement in a conspiracy to bring about the secession of the
-
01
Eastern region from Pakistan with the collaboration oflndia.71 On January
03
18, 1968 theregimealso announced Mujib's involvement in this so-called
conspiracy case while the latter was already in prison under the Defence
#
of Pakistan Rules. By implicating Mujib as an Indian agent, the regime
us
perhaps wanted to serve two purposes. Firstly, it was the view that the case
in
would expose Mujib' s involvement in the dismembennent of Pakistan

jo
and destroy his political image for good. Secondly, if the first attempt was
up
achieved, the autonomy movement in East Pakistan would be nipped in

the bud. But, inste�d of exposing the "conspirators", the regime's
ro
attempts had just the opposite effect. It is gathered from the proceedings
G
of the case that the regime ultimately failed to establish its charges against
p
ap
Mujib and others in the Court of Law. It was revealed that during the trial
some government witnesses turned hostile which reduced the whole case
ts
ha
to a fraud.
W
The Agartala Conspiracy Case again exposed the regime' s total

si
disrespect for the majority people's legitimate demands. The reaction

ba
among the Bengalis to the Agartala Case was spontaneous. They pro
Ab
tested against the regime's cooked-up "conspiracy" trial by holding

public meetings and strikes throughout East Pakistan during the months
Q
which followed� The repressive measures which the regime undertook to

A.
suppress the movement turned the B engali demand from regional au ton-·
omy into a national movement for a separate S tate for Bengalis.
When Ayub began to make preparations for the coming Presidential

election in 1969 - 1 970, the majority of opposition parties decided to
boycott it The results of the 1964-1965 election convinced them that
unless the indirect method of elections through the Basic Democrats was
altered, there was no use in their contesting the election. On the other
hand, Bhutto's links with some military generals and his friendship with
General Peerzada strengthened his prospects at the election, and so he
refused to join the opposition parties' election boycott. Bhutto's real
difference with the regime started from the signing of the Tashkent
Agreement with India which he denounced. His ultimate aim was to
dislodge Ayub from his power and to make himself the supreme "Boss"
in Pakistan. He fonned, at the end of 1967, his own party known as.the
62
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) which was based on three main principles,
7
namely Democracy, Socialism and Islam. His chief slogans were: "Islam
83
is our faith; democracy is our policy; socialism is our economy".72 His
23
party's basic programme consisted of five points:
-
01
1 . constitutional structure to be of republican pattern responsible to
03
directly elected representatives of the people;
2. universal adult franchise;
#
3. nationalization of finance and key sectors of industry;
us
4. amelioration of conditions of peasants and workers; and
in
5. people's rights of participation in national defense.73

jo
Political Movement in West Pakistan: Meanwhile, the climate for anti

up
Ayub agitation turned into mass movements in both regions of the

ro
country. The controversy over the Tashkent Agreement, the growing

G
tensions between East and West Pakistan threatening the viability of a

p
united Pakistan, and economic discontent after the 1965 War were all
ap
working against the Ayub regime. Yet, the anti-Ayub movement in East
ts
and We,s t Pakistan differed substantially. In West Pakistan, it was merely

ha
an agitation against Aytib or his regime, while in East Pakistan, it was a

W
revolt against what the Bengalis considered as their "domination" by

si
West Pakistan or more accurately, by the Punjabis.

ba
The mass movement in West Pakistan, which originated over a

Ab
conflict between the students and customs officials at Rawalpindi, was

Q
initially led by the students. In November 1968, the students of

A.
Rawalpindi brought out a huge procession shouting anti-Ayub slogans

which gave rise to a clash with the police and resulted in the death of a
student from police firing. This incident in Rawalpindi ultimately
triggered off the anti-Ayub movement in West Pakistan. Bhutto's
presence in Rawalpindi, while the student was killed in the police firing,
added fuel to the movement in West Pakistan. Thus, the undercurrent of 1
pbpular resentment against Ayub and his policy became articulate and
was given a violent manifestation.
The protest against the police firing in Rawalpindi quickly spread all
over West Pakistan and especially in the major cities of Karachi, Lahore,
Peshawar and Multan. This was the first time that a students' revolt had
turned into a mass movement in West Pakistan.
People from all walks of life, professionals and labourers alike, all
joined with the students in the anti-Ayub demonstrations. On November
62
13, 1968 the regime arrested some leading members of the Pakistan
7
People's Party including its president Bhutto, and also held in custody a
83
num berof the NAP (Pro-Moscow) leaders including its prominent leader
23
Khan Abdul Wali Khan. The students reacted violently to Bhutto's arrest,
-
as Bhutto, by condemning the police firing at Rawalpindi, became the
01
champion of the students' cause. After Bhutto's arrest, Air Marshal
03
Asghar Khan, the former Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, and Justice S.M.
#
Murshed, former Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High Court, appeared
us
on the political horizon of Pakistan providing fresh momentum to theanti
Ayub movement
in
jo
Again the Ayub regime became ,totally unpopular among the Pa
up
thans, Sindhis and the Baluchis because of the One-Unit scheme. The
People of West Pakistan were antagonized by the Tashkent Agreement
ro
with India which appeared to them as humiliating. Both Bhutto and

G
Ashgar Khan utilized this state of affairs to their political ends. Thus the
p
ap
vigorous expression ofthe anti-Ayub movement in WestPal.dstan clearly

demonstrated that the regime had all but lost its support even in its
ts
ha
favoured territory, except in its own constituency, the armed forces.

W
Meanwhile the anti-Ayub movement took a different sbape once it

si
had spread to East Pakistan. The movement was launched at first in East
ba
Pakistan by the Awarni League on the basis of the Six-Point Formula, and
Ab
the students of East Pakistan, like their counterparts in West Pakistan;

provided violent expression to the movement. In -the beginning of
Q
December 1968, various student organizations formed a united front

A.
which came to be known as the All Parties Students Action Committee

(SAC), and adopted a Eleven-Point Programme of demands. In addition
to the Awami League's six points, the eleven points incorporated certain
popular demands, such as nationalization of banks, insurance, and all big
industries; reduction of taxes on the farmers; and better wages for
labourers. The students further insisted that their eleven-point demands
would have to be incorporated in any future constitutional arrangement
of Pakistan. AU political parties except the Convention Muslim League

lent their support to the students' demands.
Early in January 1969,when both wings of Pakistan were in the grip

of students' agitation, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)
formed an alliance called the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) to
give a strong leadership to the mass ilgitation. The DAC which included,
62
besides the five parties of the PDM, Mujib's Awami League, the NAP
7
(Pro-Moscow Group) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, adopted a Eight
83
Point programme. The points were:
23
1) Federal and Parliamentary system of Government;
-
01
2) direct election on the basis of univeral adult franchise;
3)
03
withdrawal of state emergency;
4) restoration of civil liberties and repeal of all black laws provid
ing for detention without trail;
#
us
5) release of all political prisoners including Sheikh Mujibur Rah
in
man, Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the
jo
withdrawal of all political cases pending before courts and tri

up
bunals;
6) withdrawal of all prohibitory orders under Section 14 4Cr .P.C.;
ro
7) restoration of the right of labour to strike;

G
8) withdrawal of all curbs on thepress and restoration ofall presses,

p
ap
papers and periodicals which had been confiscated such as

lttefaq and Chattan to original owners.
ts
ha
Although the DAC's programme did not include the Awarni

W
League's main demand of full regional autonomy, it is argued here that

the Awami League's partnership with the DAC served the purpose of
si
ba
putting pressure on the regime for the release of its leaders including
Mujib as well as for the withdrawal of the so-called Agartala Conspiracy
Ab
Case.
Q
When the anti-Ayub movement continued vigorously for over four

A.
months in both wings of Pakistan, the regime expressed its willingness to

have a discussion at a Round Table Conference (RTC) with "responsible"
political leaders to find a solution to the political crises that confronted
the people of the country. At the same time the regime condemned the
activities of those elements which were responsible for the disorder in the
country. Both Bhashani's NAP and Bhutto's People's Party (at that time
Bhutto was in "jail) who were out of the DAC, ruled out the idea of
J"he Political Background 155
participation in the proposed conference while the East Pakistan Stu

dents' Action Committee (SAC) declared that they would start a mass
movement against those leaders who would take part in the Conference
with Ayub if such discussions went against the interests of the people of
Pakistan. Only the DAC responded by saying thatAyub shouldrevoke the
state of emergency and the Defence of Pakistan Rules which had been
62
imposed since the 1 965 War with India, and should release all political
prisoners including Mujib and Bhutto.
7
83
Ayub conceded to some of the demands of the DAC and accordingly
23
released some political prisoners including Bhutto, by revoking the
-
Defence of Pakistan Emergency Rules (under which Bhutto was ar
01
rested). Still, however, Ayub Was reluctant to withdraw the Agartala Case
03
or to release Mujib against whom there was a "genuine case". Mujib, on
#
the other hand, refused to join the RTC unless the "Agartala Conspiracy
us
Case" was revoked and he was released unconditionally. Ayub rejected
this proposal and thus the RTC was shelved.
in
jo
At th�s stage, in the middle of February 1969, the anti-Ayub

up
movement took a violent tum in East Pakistan. And again, the movement
ro
took a radical turn when the police opened fire on a students' procession,
G
that defied the Government' s order of Section 144, killing a professor of

the Rajshahi University (East Pakistan). At that time, the anti-Ayub
p
ap
movement in East Pakistan turned in a different direction. Not only were

ts
governmental orders repeatedly violated but also the anti-West Pakistan

ha
and anti-military feelings ran high amongst the Bengalis. Ayub soon
realised the separatist dimension of the movement; and on February 2 1 ,
W
1969 h e announced his "final and irrevocable" intention not contesting

si
the next presidentail election and urged the political opposition leaders
ba
to join him in finding a solution to the political problems of the country.

Ab
The next day on February 22, theregime withdrew the "Agartala Conspir
acy Case", and released Mujib and other persons accused in the case.
Q
A.
After the release of Mujib, the RTC was held in Rawalpindi on

February 26, 1969. While the DAC leaders demanded the establishment
of a federal parliamentary democracy and introduction of a system of
direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, Mujib reiterated his six
points and the students' eleven points, and accordingly, insisted on full
provincial autonomy. The differences between Mujib and the DAC
leaders ultimately led to a stalemate in the RTC. At this stage Mujib put
forward his constitutional amendments "to provide for representation on
the basis of population in the federal legislature as well as for the granting
of full regional autonomy as outlined in the Six-Point Programme. . ."74
President Ayub rejected Mujib's constitutional amendments and

referred to it as "spelling the liquidation of Pakistan". He further
reiterated that his regime would not tolerate any attempt to bring about
a fundamental restructuring of the political system of Pakistan. In
62
conclusion, Ayub accepted the DAC's two points, and announced that
7
other disputed issues would be left to be settled by the incoming parlia
83
ment w hich would be elected on the basis of adult franchise. Ayub's an
23
nouncement was welcomed in West Pakistan, whereas it was denounced
-
in East Pakistan. In fact, the popular sentiment of the Bengalis referred
01
to Ayub's announcement as a triumph for the West Pakistani elites and
03
a defeat for them.
#
However, before Ayub could carry out his decision which he made
us
at the RTC, he had to exit. Perhaps, the Pakistani Anny Generals could
in
visualize the implications of transfer of power and the prospect of a

jo
parliamentary-democracy. So long as Ayub was in power, Anny interests

up
were fully preserved. But the Generals apprehended that if, as result of
holding a free general election on the basis of universal adult franchise,
ro
the Bengali counter-elite played a dominant role in the national decision

G
making agencies and introduced parliamentary democracy, granting full

p
ap
regional autonomy, dismantling the Punjabi monopoly in the Anny, the

net results of the last twenty-three years of endeavour to safeguard the
ts
ha
interests of the anny-bureaucracy. would be eroded overnight. That was

why instead of submitting tQ the popular wishes of the people, the
W
Generals led by the Anny Commander-in-Chief, General Agha Moham

si
mad Yahya.,Khan, overthrew the Ayub regime on the pretext of total

ba
anarchical conditions prevailing in the country, and imposed the second

Ab
Martial Law on March 25, 1969 becoming the supreme authority of the
country.
Q
A.
It was said in some quarters that the new military regime was
"reluctant" to take over power in the country in 1969. This was as untrue
as Ayub 's pretended "reluctance" when he first came to power in 1 958.
It is, therefore, argued here that the imposition of the second period
of Martial Law in Pakistan was rather the final attempt of the military
bureaucracy to thwart any popular movement carried out by the Bengalis
through constitutional means. This action of the anny-bureaucrats further
intensified Bengali frustration and partially explains why the Bengalis

fought for separate independent Bangladesh in 197 1 .
V The Martial law Administration II (1969-1971) and the Breakup

of Pakistan
The problems of national integration in Pakistan as so far discussed,
62
had their origin in a numberof factors-geographical, social and cultural,
7
83
political and economic-present since Pakistan came into existence in
1947. But the immediate problems of integration which culminated in
23
total disintegration of Pakistan were the results of the policies pursued by
-
01
the military junta during the post -1 969 period.
03
It was a great tragedy for the people of Pakistan who removed the
#
Ayub regime through their mass movement in 1968-69, which had
us
resulted not in the restoration of democracy but in the re-assumption of
a new military rule led by General Yahya Khan.
in
jo
After imposing the second period of Martial Law, Yahya adopted

up
some conciliatory policies to appease the disgruntled poli ticians who had
led the mass uprisings: B ut unlike Ayub who was "reluctant" to come to
ro
G
terms with the politicians whom he considered as "disruptives", Yahya

seemed to acknowledge the necessity of both politicians and politics. He
p
ap
did not ban political parties when he impased martial law on March 25,
1 969, and wanted t� "be a mediator amon� the political groups". But in
ts
ha
the final analysis he utterly failed to remain neutral. His purpose was
similar to his predecessor.
W
si
As a gesture of his neutrality upon assuming power, Yahya pledged

ba
that his regime's rule would be merely of a transitional nature. He:

Ab
announced that the ultimate aim of his regime was to "create conditions
conducive to the establishment of constitutional government... and
Q
smooth transfer of powe� to the representatives of people elected freely

A.
and impartially on the basis of adult franchise".7s On April 10, 1969,

Yahya pledged a major concession to the Bengalis. He declared that
elections would be held throughout the country on the basis of one man
- one vote. This electoral system enabled the East Pakistanis, for the first
time since 1956, to occupy the majority of seats in the National Assembly
a demand which had been rejected by previous regimes on the plea of '
parity between the two wings of Pakistan.
On November28, 1 969, Yahya reaffirmed his pledge and announced

�
that on October 5, 1970 elections would be held to elect members of the

National and Provincial Assemblies.
To facilitate the electioneering campaign, Yahya lifted the ban on

political parties and their activities from January 1 , 1970. In an effort to
win the confidence of both the wings, the "One Unit" scheme was
62
annulled in April 1970, greatly reducing the tensions which it had created
7
among the 4 units of West Pakistan since 1956. These were undoubtedly
83
positive steps taken by the Yahya regime to achieve solutions to the
23
problems which had divided the people of Pakistan since its birth. Thus
a new chapter in Pakistan 's political history began to open . Later, this
-
01
chapter was to depict the last scenes of the country 's political drama.
03
a. Yahya' s Scheme for the Transfer of Power
#
us
Both Ayub and Yahya, upon assumption of power, pledged them
selves to strive for the restoration of democracy in the country. BQt there
in
were some differences in their approaches. Ayub qualified his pledge in

jo
1958 by declaring that he would institute a kind of democracy which

up
(according to Ayub) would suit the genus of the people of Pakistan, while
ro
Yahya's pledge for democracy was unqualified.

G
In his first press conference on April 10, 1969, Yahya announced:

p
ap
Our aim must be to establish constructive political life in the country

ts
so that power is transferred to the elected representatives of the

ha
people.
W
On the question of elections, he maintained that representatives of

si
the people would be elected "on the basis of direct adult franchise", and
ba
regarding the future constitution, he said that it would be the business of

Ab
the representatives of the people to give the country a constitution.

Q
But, unqualified commitments as they might have been, they were

A.
"greeted with considerable scepticism". In fact, Yahya's regime can be

characterized as Ayub's political order without Ayub. Whatever the
pledges the Yahya regime made, they ultimately proved to be spurious.
The regime had its own modus operandi. The subsequent imposition of
the Legal Framework Order (LFO) in March 1970 was one of the glaring -
instances of the gap between the military regime's professions and
practices.
b. Legal Framework Order (LFO) and People's Reaction
It soon becameevident thatYahya's announcementofNovember 28,

1969 was not to the satisfaction of most of the army generals, and to the
West Pakistani leaders including Bhutto who were backed by some top
military officers and bureaucrats. They considered that Yahya had gone
62
too far in making concessions to the Bengalis' demand at the cost of the
7
"national interest". Thus, to preserve their vested interests against a
83
possible Bengali-dominated Assembly, the regime modified its earlier
23
pledge and on March 3 1 , 1970 issued the Legal Framwork Order (LFO).
-
01
The LFO contained a Preamble, 27 Articles and two Schedules. It
03
was Article 20 which spelled out five "fundamental principles" on the
basis of which the future constitution of the country would be framed by
#
the representatives of the people. These principles were as follows:
us
1. Pakistan would be a Federal Republic based on Islamic ideol
in
ogy;
jo
2 Pakistan was to have a democratic Constitution providing for

up
direct and free periodical elections to the Federal and Provincial

ro
Legislatures on the basis of population and adult franchise;

G
3 territorial integration of the country must be upheld in the

p
Constitution;
ap
4. the Provinces must be provided with "maximum autonomy" but

ts
"the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers

ha
including legislative, administrative and financial powers, to

W
discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal .

affairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity
si
ba
of the country".76
the existing disparity between the Provinces and between
Ab
5.
different areas in a Province must be removed by the adoption
Q
of statutory and other �easures.

A.
The other Articles of the LFO also imposed some guidelines

according to which the Preamble and Directive Principles of the
Constitution would be framed. Article 24 set a time limit for framing the
Constitution. It stated that "the National Assembly shall frame the
Constitution... within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
date of its first meeting", and if the Assembly failed to do so within the
stipulated time, it "shall stand dissolved".77 Article 25 stated that the
"Constitution Bill" passed by the National Assembly must be, presented
to the President for authentication. The Article further stated that "the
National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that authentication
is refused".78 Article 27 (1) stated that "any question or doubt as to the
interpretation of any provision of this Order shall be resolved by a
decision of the President, and such decision shall be final and not liable
to be questioned in any court".79
62
Yahya's Legal Framework Order was criticized by many of the
7
83
political parties in East Pakistan. They held the view that by imposing the
23
LFO, Yahya deprived the National Assembly of its sovereign character
and hence they refused to take part in such a sham of democracy. Mujib
-
01
and his party, the Awami League, demanded the repeal of the Articles 25
03
and 27 of the LFO to make the Consitutent Assembly a sovereign body.
TheEastPakistan S tudents' League and the National Labour Leaguealso
#
demanded revision of the LFO. Both groups of the NAP (Bhashani and
us
Wali Groups) also demanded the repeal of the provisions of the LFO
in
which gave the President theright ofrejecting the Constitution framed by

jo
the Constituent Assembly. All other parties, except the Muslim League
up
(all factions) and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), questioned the
sovereign character of the Constituent As�embly. In reply to these
ro
objections against the LFO, Yahya urged the people to keep faith in him,
G
and tenned the President's authentication to the Constitution B ill as "only

p
ap
a procedural fonnality".
ts
ha
TABLE IV: 10
W
National Assembly or Pakistan, 1970

(The number of seats allotted to East Pakistan and
si
the four provinces of West Pakistan in 1970 elections)

ba
Ab
General Women
East Pakistan 162 7

Q
The Punjab 82 3
A.
SirKl 27 I
Baluchistan 4 I
The Nonh-West Frontier Province 18
Centrally Administered Tribal Areas 7
:
Tot.al 300 13 .
Sowcts : Whitt Paptr 011 tltt Crisis in East Pakistan, op. cit., Appendix-B, Legal
Framework Order 1970, Schedule I, Article 4(2), p. 26; and TM ugal
Framtworlr. Order 1970, Presidential Order No. 2 of 1 970, Karachi:
Govermnent of Pakiatan Press, 1970, p. IS.
After Yahya's assurances, Mujib decided to go to the polls and said

ifhe could get the verdict of the people in favour of his Six-Point Formula
he would implement it, irrespective of the provisions imposed in theLFO.
c. The First and Last General Elections in Pakistan, 1970
According to Yahya's Legal Framework Order of March 1970,the
62
National Assembly comprised 3 1 3 elected members, including 1 3 seats
reserved for women (Table IV: 10).
7
83
TABLE IV: l l
23
Provincial Assemblies o f P..akistan
-
(The nwnber of seats for the provincial assemblies in East Pakistan
01
and the four provinces of West Pakistan in 1970 elections)
03
General Women
#
us
East PakiS!an 300 10
The Punjab 1 80 6
in
Sind 60 2
jo
Baluchistan 20 I
The North-West Frontier Province 40 2
up
ro
SoUTces : White Paper on ... op. cit., Schedule II, Article 5(1), p. 26; and The Legal
.
Fr1UMworlc .. ., op. cit., p. 16.

G
p
ap
In all, 24, parties put up 1 ,58 1 candidates in the 1970 elections of

ts
whom 78 1 candidates contested 162 seats in the Nation! Assembly from

ha
East Pakistan while a total of 800 candidates contested 138 seats from the
W
4 Provinces in West Pakistan.

si
Election Results : As stated earlier, Yahya did not ban political parties
ba
although their activities were restricted by his administration. When the

Ab
ban on political activities was lifted on January 1 , 1 970, and the different
parties started their election campaign, the old issues. of regional auton
Q
omy and economic disparities emerged, particularly, on the· political

A.
scene in East Pakistan. Mujib, who considered his Six-Point Formula as

a Magna Carta for the Bengalis, emerged as the symbol of� Pakistani
aspirations. He maintained that any new governmental form would have
to �ccommodate the autonomy demands as envisaged in his Six-Point
Formula and the students' Eleven-Point Programme.
The situation in West Pakistan was dominated by a new m iddle class

who came into prominence as a result of the economic development of
the Province during Ayub's regime. It was this same class who had
originally initiated the mass movement in West Pakistan that resulted in
the downfall of the Ayub regime in 1969. Bhutto's and PPP's main
support came from this newly emergent group. His party's manifesto
included radical changes in the economic system, the overthrow of
capitalism and the ushering in of Islamic socialism.
62
However, it was the results of the election that gave an edge to a the
7
East-West confrontation. The detailed election results for both the
83
National and Provincial Assemblies are shown in Tables IV: 1 2 and IV:
23
13.
-
01
TABLE IV: 12
03
Pakistan National Assembly elections, 1970-71
Pany Pwijab Sind NWFP Baluchisi.an

#
West East Total
us
Pakistan Pakistan
in
AL 160 160
jo
PPP 62 13 1 81 81
PML (Q) 1 1 7 9 9
up
PML 7 7 7
ro
(Convention)
JU 6 7 7
G
MJU 4 3 7 7
p
NAP (W) 3 3 6 6
ap
JI 1 2 1 4 4
ts
PML (C) 2 2 2
1
ha
PDP
Ind. 5 3 7 15 16
W
Total 82 . 27 25 4 138 162 300

si
ba
Sources : G.W. Choudhury, The !Ast Days .... op. cit., p. 128, and M..B. Naqvi, "West
Ab
Pakistan's Struggle ... ", op. cit., pp. 224-225.
d. Post-election Events: Towards Breakup of Pakistan

Q
A.
For th� Yahya regime, the election result was somewhat unexpected.
The regime expected that no politic1,1l party would be able to dominate an
election in East Pakistan. The general idea of the regime was that if the
Awami league would at best win 60 per cent of the seats allotted to East
Pakistan, as the public opinion polls predicted, it would enable the regime
to keep the Awami League out of power, or if the Awami League wanted
to form the goverment, they would have to share power with the West
Pakistani parties, and in that case, the Awami League would be forced to
TABLE IV: 13
Pakistan National Assembly Elections, 1970-71
Party Punjab Si,KI NWFP Baluchistan West East Total

Pakistan Pakistan
AL 288 288
62
PPP 113 28 3 144 144
PML (Q) 6 5 110 3 24 24
7
PML 15 4 I 20 20
83
·
(Convention)
23
JU 2 4 2 8 '8
MJU 4 7 II II
-
01
NAP (W) 13 8 21 22
JI I I 3 4
03
PML (C) 6 2 8 8
PDP 4 4 2 6
Ind. ·28 14 6 5
#
53 7 60
us
Others I I 2 4 I 5
in
Total 180 60 40 20 ·300 300 600

jo
Sowces : G.W. Choudhury, The I.Ast Days op. cit., p. 128.

up
....
ro
"negotiate" its Six-Point programme, and thus the ruling elite's interest
G
and its position as a mediator among parties would be preserved.

p
ap
Thus, the post-election period left three personalities-Yahya,

Mujib and B hutto in the last political scene of united Pakistan. Among
ts
them, Mujib and Bhutto, the two political leaders of East and West
ha
Pakistan respectively, held diametrically opposed views on most major

W
issues.. Mujib who advocated Bengali nationalism against the West

si
Pakistanis, fought the elections on the basis <;>f his Six-Point Fonnula and
ba
for a socialist economic order. He won the absolute majority in the

Ab
National Assembly as well as the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan.

"Almost every Bengali endorsed the Sheikh's six-point programme
Q
which turned the election into a referendum".10 The Awami League's

A.
electoral victory made them confident ofcoming to power. Bhutto, on the

other hand, championed Islamic socialism, a strong centre and anny, a
new offensive to liberate Kashmir and "a thousand-year war with India".
But Mujib's total success upset Bhutto's plan. The election result, how
ever, made B hutto, and for that matter the West P'akistani ruling elite in
general, afraid of the Bengali domination at the Centre. In fact, the
lan.dslide victory of the Awami League created fear in the minds of the
business magnates, the Army Generals and top bureaucrats (the defence
- business lobby) of West Pakistan.
\
Bhutto who did not initially oppose Mujib's Six-Point Formula, now
in his post-election speeches showed his provocative and uncompromis
ing attitude towards Mujib and his programme. In a public meeting, he
declared: "No constitution could be framed, nor could any government
62
at the centre be run without my party's co-operation". He further stated
7
that his party was not "prepared to occupy the opposition benches in the
83
national assembly." He went on to say that "majority alone does not count
23
· in national politics". 8 1
-
01
Bhutto, on another occasion, on December 24, 1970, said: "People
03
vote.ct for PPP in great majority in West Pakistan and for Awami League
in East Pakistan", so, according to Bhutto, "both these parties have to
#
share responsibilities of the country as the majority parties".82 Bhutto also
us
declared that the Punjab was "the bastion of power", which according to
in
him had to have importance in any political dialogue. Hence he came out
jo
with a suggestion that Pakistan might have to recognize "two majority

up
parties" and even "two prime ministers" in one country.

ro
An analysis ofBhutto' � speeches during December 1 970 and January

G
197 1 reveals that Bhutto's faith in democracy was feigned. His ultimate
p
aim was to capture power. It was Bhutto who wanted power, even by
ap
breaking Pakistan into two pieces, whereas Mujib was preparing to play
ts
his role as a leaderofunited Pakistan. Bhutto's demand forpower-sharing

ha
appeared illogical to Mujib. Mujib wanted to paly his role as the leader
W
of the majority party in the National Assembly. Having failed to get a

favourable response from Mujib, Bhutto with his usual unconstitutional
si
ba
tactics, started an anti-Mujib and anti-Six�Point movement in West

Pakistan to pressurise Mujib to share power with' his party. He demanded
Ab
the postponment of the session of the National Assembly which was

Q
scheduled to meet in Dhaka on March 3 , 197 1 . Also, he threatened to .

A.
launch a movement "from Khyber to Karachi" if any West Pakistani

members travelled to Dhaka to participate in the session. But the Awami
League and the minor political parties in West Pakistan (except the
Qayyum Muslim League) were ready to sit in the Assembly even if the
PPP boycotted it
In fact when the majority of the members of the National Assembly

gathered in Dhaka for the Assembly session, Yahya acquiesced to
'
Bhutto's demands and on March 1 , 197 1 , he postponed the National

Assembly session calling the political leaders of both wings to come to
a common consensus on the major political problems the country was
facing. The Bengalis immediately reacted violently against Yahya's
postponement which they interpreted as a conspiracy against the Ben
galis.
62
Postponment of the National Assembly Sessio� : The Bengali,s' reaction
7
to the postponement of the Assembly session was immediate, spontane
83
ous and violent. They took it as a conspiracy against their legitimate
23
rights. People from all sections demonstrated in the streets of Dhaka and
-
other cities of East Pakistan against the provocative decision of the
01
military regime. The regime imposed a curfew in Dhaka on the evening
03
of March 2, 1971 which was defied by the processionists at different
#
places. As a result the army opened fire with machine guns on the
us
processions killing hundreds of the demonstrators which greatly aggra
vated the situation . Within a few weeks, Mujib came under heavy
in
pressure both from the left-wing parties and from the radicals of his party
jo
to declare Independence for East Pakistan.83

up
ro
However, as soon as the postponment of the Assembly session was.

G
announced over the radio, Mujib declared a non-violent and non-co

operation movement throughout the province. From March 3 to 25,
p
ap
Mujib's action virtually paralyzed the authority of the East Pakistan

ts
Government and even the Central Government's Writ was not accepted
ha
in the province.14 In reply to Mujib's action, the Governmen� like an

occupation am:iy. adopted repressive measures, opening fire with ma
W
chine guns on unarmed Bengali demonstrators.

si
ba
In an effort to solve the political and constitutional crisis, Yahya

Ab
invited Mujib to a Round Table Conference of the twelve elected leaders15

of the parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to meet at Dhaka
Q
on March 1 0, which Mujib rejected on the grounds of the army shooting

A.
the Bengalis in Dhaka and other cities.
To avert a disaster while he was addressing a mass rally in Dhaka on

March 7, Mujib put forward four pre-conditions to his taking part in the
Assembly session. They were: the immediate ttansfer of power to the
elected representatives of the people; immediate withdrawal of martial
law; the return of the troops to their barracks; and a judicial inquiry into
the "mass killings" in East Paki.stan.
Reaction in West Pakistan : Even in West Pakistan, all political parties

except Bhutto's PPP and Qayyum' Muslim League strongly criticized the
postponement of the Assembly_ session and the subsequent army
atrocities in East Pakistan. The Punjab Pakistan Front considered the
postponement of the Assembly session as "completely unwarranted,
uncalled for and unjustifiable". They said that the regime's postponement
decision "had destroyed all avenues of democratic initiative", and
62
endorsed Mujib ' s demand for the withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer
7
83
of power to the elected representatives.86 Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar
Khan and his party also urged Yahya, in a press conference at Karachi,
23
to hand over power to Mujib. Furthermore, he bitterly criticized the army
-
01
action against the unarmed Bengalis who were fighting for the restoration
03
of democracy in the country and said "our hearts bleed when East
Pakistani brothers are being killed with bullets."87
#
us
In protest at the postponmentoftheAssembly session, theNAP (Wali
Group) called a complete strike at Quetta (a city of West Pakistan) on
in
March 4, 1971 and declared the regime's action as "deplorable and

jo
undemocratic''. 88 Maulana Abdur Rahim , a leader o f the Pak is tan J amaat

up
e-Islami, also urged the regime to transfer power to the elected represen
ro
tatives. Mian Nizamuddin Haider, leader of the Bhawalpur United Front,

G
called upon the regime to accept all the demands of Mujib and he also
asserted that Mujib was the only man who could keep Pakistan together.
p
ap
Maulana Gulman Gaus Hazarvi of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam also con

ts
demned B hutto's Lahore speech ofFebruary 28, when he threatened West

ha
Pakistani members going to Dhaka to attend the National Assembly

session with "liquidation". In fact, all the minority groups in the National ,
W
Assembly from West Pakistan except the Qayyum group accepted

si
Mujib's leadersh'ip and in a meeting held on March 1 3 at Lahore, endorsed

ba
all the four demands ofMujib. They further maintained that Bhutto after
Ab
his failure to get a share in Mujib's Government at the Centre, created the
constitutional crisis in Pakistan.
Q
A.
e. Yahya' s Final Showdown: From Ballot to Bullet
In an attempt to appease Bengali sentiment, Yahya declared that the

postponed session of the Assembly would meet on March 25, 1 97 1 . But
Yahya's announcement was too late. There could not have been another
fresh start after the situation created by Yahya 1 s action of March 1 , 1 97 1 .
One thing became quite clear that at this critical stage when Mujib was
facing tremendous pressure from the left and the right-wing forces of East
Pakistan, he "was still prepared to participate in the Union of Pakistan".89
It was in the third week of the province-wide strike and the civil
disobedience movement that Yahya arrived in Dhaka on March 1 5, to talk
to Mujib for a political settlement to the crisis. Tney were Yahya' s final
attempts to save the country from di vision. The Y ahya-Mujib talks began
on March 16 under strict secrecy and lasted for about ten days. It is
gathered from the regime's White Paper that Yahya, in principle,
62
accepted Mujib's pre-conditions; and on March 20, Yahya agreed on a
draft proclamation to be announced by him which would contain the
7
83
outline of an interim arrangement for transfer of power to the elected rep
23
resentatives.
-
01
On March 22, Bhutto also joined the Yahya-Mujib talks. While the
protracted constitutional dialogues were going on, Yahya and his militant
03
army generals were getting ready to take military action against the
#
Bengalis. Although Mujib was informed earlier by his supporters includ
us
ing some Bengali army officers and personnel9()about the regime's secret
preparations for a military offensive against the Bengalis, he was still
in
jo
talking to Yahya in terms of a political settlement.

up
The delay in the negotiations, however, enabled the Yahya regime

ro
to build up its resources. It reinforced its preparation by bringing in about

G
50,000 soldiers, and a large number of Army tanks, weapons and

p
bombers. The regime' s White Paper also bears testimony to its military
ap
preparations in East Pakistan. Thus, under the facade of a prolonged

ts
constitutional dialogue, the regime completed its logistical preparations.

ha
Yahya, without formally breaking the talks, flew back to Karachi and
W
ordered General Tikka Khan, the Governor of East Pakistan, to take

action against the Bengalis. In an attempt to silence all the political
si
opposition which had grown over the last twenty-three years in East
ba
Pakistan, Tikka Khan, on the night of March 25 ordered his army units
Ab
to move in. On that night they killed thousands of the Bengali army and
Q
police personnel, Awami League leaders including Dhaka University

teachers and students. Even common men, 'women and children became
A.
victims of the army �ttacks. In fact, the bruta l army action in East Pakistan
unleashed a reign of terror which drove some two million people to flee
and take refuge in India and finally ensured the disintegration of Pakistan.
Yahya's military solution to the political crisis finally exposed the

fact that the ruling elite was not ready to renounce its vested interests at
the Centre in favour of the Bengalis, although the last general election
results confirmed the legitimate rights of the latter. Thus, the atrocities
committed by the Pakistani troops wiped out the last hope of integration
between the two wings of Pakistan. The Bengalis, under the leadership
of the Awami League, had to declare the Ind ependence of Bangladesh
unilaterally on March 26, 197 1 which plunged them into a civil war. After
about nine months of continuous armed struggle, the Bengalis at the cost
of millions of lives compelled the occupying army to surrender and thus
62
the final disintegration of PakisUJn came about in December 197 1 .
7
The army action i n East Pakistan raised several questions. Did the
83
military regime sincerely want the unity of Pakistan? And if so, why did
23
they use brutal force? Why did the regime change its policy from ballots
-
01
to bullets?
03
Pakistan was (and still is ) one of those unfortunate countries under
the yoke of military dictatorship. Military dictatorship has its own modus
operandi. #
k's capacity to solve the problems that confront the people of
us
the country is limited. The downfall of the Ayub regime confirmed the
in
view that military dictatorship is an unmitigated evil. Both Ayub and

jo
Yahya, taking over full authority of the country by imposing martial law,
up
pledged themselves to the nation to strive to restore democratic institu

ro
tions in Pakistan. While Ayub betrayed democracy and imposed his

G
personal rule for ten years, Yahya's belief in democracy was a 11Jere
pretence. The general election of 1 970 was an experiment to test popular
p
ap
support for the m ilitary regime. After the election Bhutto's anti-demo
ts
cratic role was not unexpected, after all he had served the Ayub regime
ha
for eight years and had very close links with Yahya's administration.
W
The reactions in West Pakistan at the postponement of the National

si
Assembly session at Bhutto's demand clearly proved that Bhutto repre

ba
sented army interests rather than those of the people of West Pakistan. In
Ab
fact, Bhutto was a mouthpiece of the ruling elite. The regime used him
as a stalking horse.
Q
A.
If the regime believed in democracy as they prete_nded, one could ask

what else counted in a democracy except the verdict of the majority of the
people?
MALAYSIA
Malaysia's political integration problems are more complex than

were those of Pakistan. After Independence in 1 957, these problems
increased not only through the racial, cultural and religious factors, but
also as a result of ethnically based economic disparity. The majority of

the Malays are engaged 'in the rural subsistence agricultural economy,
whereas the majority of non-Malayas have occupied the capital oriented
sectors, makingthem Malaysia's economically dominant ethnic group.
Traditionally, however, the Malays are the politically dominant ethnic
group. These factors have motivated the Malays to arrest the political
62
aspirations of the non-Malays.
7
The development of Malaysia's political institutions over a little
83
more than two decades can be divided into three periods: the first roughly
23
covers fifteen years ( 1945-1960) and includes the constitutional and
-
01
political development of Malaysia after the Second World War, leading
to the Independence of the Peninsula in 1957. During the Communist
03
insurgency which led to the imposition of Emergency Rule for about a
#
decade, the nation suffered serious setbacks to national integrat_i on. The
us
second period ( 1 960- 1965) sa·w the conception and fonnation of the
greater Federation of Malaysia, encompassing Singapore and the Borneo
in
states of Sabah and Sarawak. The expulsion of Singapore from the

jo
Federation in 1965 exposed the conflict between the Malays and the nori
up
Malays, particularly the Chinese. This soon proved to be too great a strain
ro
for Malaysia 's fragile national structure to withstand.

G
p
Finally, the political conflicts between the Malays and the non
ap
Malays from 19.65 to 1 969 (intensified by the 1969 pre-election politics)

ts
led to the outbreak of the communal riots of May 1 3 , 1 969. From May
ha
1969 to 1 97 1 the country was again run by Emergency Rule, operated by

W
the National Operations Council (NOC). With this died any semblance
of parliamentary democracy which Malaysia had previously enjoyed .
si
The communal riots of May 1969 and the subseque.nt measures ;idopted
ba
by the ruling elite created additional problems for national integration and
Ab
aggravated the Malay/non-Malay conflict.

Q
VI Political and Constitutional Developments (1945-1960)

A.
a. The Malay States: Prior to Independence
Before th� Second World War, Malaya91 waspolitically divided into

the S traits Settlements, the Federated Malay States (FMS) , and the
Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) , each under a different form ofBritish
rule. These administrative divisions allowed little scope for the develop
ment of a sense of unity or national conscioushess among the Malayans.
This situation remained unchanged until the Japanese invasion of Malaya

in December 1 94 1 .
After the three and a half years of Japanese occupation, Malaya again
fell to the British in September 1945. For a period of almost seven months,
the country was ruled by the British Military Administration led by
Admiral Mountbatten until April 1 ; 1 946- when it was replaced by the
62
Malayan Union.
7
83
b. The Unification of the Malay States: The Malayan Union
23
The Malayan Union scheme announced by the Colonial Secretary in
-
01
the British House of Commons on October 10, 1945 was not the first
attempt at unification of the·politically splintered four Federated and five
03
Unfederated Malay States plus three Straits Settlements under a common
system of law and administration. In
#
1932, a Colonial Office official, Sir
us
Samuel Wilson, formulated a concrete proposal for the administrative
unification and reorganization of the Malay state.s. This scheme was
in
jo
abandoned because of the opposition by the Malay Rulers. The Union

scheme was finally reopened by the Colonial Office after the Japanese
up
surrender in September 1945. Two days after the announcement of the

ro
Malayan Union plan, Sir Harold MacMichael, the Special Representative

G
of the British Government, was sent to Malaya to seek the approval of

p
each Ruler for the implementation of the Union. On December 2 1 , 1945

ap
MacMichael declared that his mission "has c.oncluded Agreements with

ts
the Rulers of the Malay States wherby full powers of jurisdiction in their
ha
States are granted to His Majesty".92

W
The entire Malayan Union proposals were made public in a British

si
White Paper on January 22, 1946. The British plan was aimed primarily
ba
at the improvement of administrative efficiency and thereby consolidat.

Ab
ing her authority over the entire Malay states, rather than granting them
any form of self-government such as they had pledged to India after the
Q
War. The Union plan provided for the unification of all the three former
A.
administrative units except Singapore. The plan also removed from the
Sultans their legislative and administrative powers and positions, and
reduced them to the status of mere advisors on social customs and
religious affairs. At the head of the Malayan Union was placed a
Governor-General to whom the Sultans were subordinate. The Govemor
General would appoint the members of the Federal and State Legisla
tures, the majority of whom would be Government officials.
The most radical departure from the former British policy was the
introduction of revised citizenship rights in the New Malayan union.
Previously, people born in any of the Malay states were subjects of the
state of their birth, while persons born in the Straits Settlements were
considered as British subjects (though not British citizens).
Under the new scheme, persons born in either the Malayan Union· or
62
S ingapore automatically acquired Malayan Union citizenship (although
7
S ingapore was not a part of the Union). It was also possible for those not
83
born in the Union or Singapore to acquire Union citizenship provided they
23
could prove residency of either area for ten out of fifteen years preceding
-
the adoption of the Union Constitution. Foreigners could also acquire
01
Union citizenship by naturalization after five years' ordinary residence
03
·in the Malayan Union or Singapore, after giving evidenc.e of good
#
character, possession of an adequate kno,wledge of either Malay or
us
English, and taking an oath of allegiance to the Union.
in
At the outset, it would seem that the British Union proposals,

jo
reducing the Sultans' power to" a nominal status and granting universal
up
citizenship, were indeed progressive steps towards the goals of state and
ro
nation-building.
G
The plan attempted to unify all the different administrative units

p
(except Singapore) into a geo-political whole under the firm control of a

ap
central administrative authority. Also, by rejecting the traditional con

ts
cept of bumiputraism (which was based purely on racial considerations),

ha
the provisions for univeral citizenship established the principle of racial

W
equality. This allowed the growth of a sense of ' we-feeling' , trust and
si
confidence among the discrete races of Malaya.

ba
S ince the Union plan eliminated the Malay monopoly in the

Ab
country ' s governing authority and the non-Malays were granted equal
Q
political rights with the Malays, the problems of vertical ties between the
former and the latter were expected to be overcome. But it soon became
A.
apparent, however, that the British had seriously underestimated the

strength of the growing nationalist movement in Malaya. Largely be
cause of the peculiarly heterogeneous character of the Malayan popula
tion, nationalism in Malaya was almost non-existent until the thirties
when the sudden collapse of the world rubber market pushed the whole
,
population towards poverty. .
Thus, for the first time, all the Malayans (Malayas, Chinese and
Indians) were united against the instability of their colonial economy and
subsequently they joined the great colliery strike of 1937 which was
ruthlessly suppressed by the authorities. After this, the resentment against
the colonial authority continued to grow, and flared up in 1 94 1 when a
British armoured division used force on the strikers. Such action by the
colonial authority further drew the Malays and the non-Malays in
62
increasing numbers into the national liberation movement.
7
The Malay and non-Malay unity, suddenly took an opposite turn with
83
the Japanese occupation of Malaya for three and a half years. The
23
Japanese, instead of making concessions to the Malay nationalist feeling
-
01
(which they did offer in the Philippines, Indonesia or Indo-China),
adopted the British policy of fostering antagonism among the various
03
ethnic groups. Like the British, the Japanese posed as benevolent
#
protectors of the Malays and their Sultans, a "protection" that virtually
us
kept them backward.
in
Unlike the Malays, the Chinese fell victim to Japanese atrocities

jo
during the occupation, and later were compelled to organize guerrilla

up
attacks against the invaders. When the Japanese began to persuade the
ro
Malays and the Sultans to collaborate with them in their attempt to

G
"liquidate" the Chinese, relations between the Malays and the Chinese
deteriorated. The Malays, enjoying Japanese "protection", accused the
p
ap
Chinese of being trouble makers, attempting to take over Malaya and

ts
conspiring to turn it into a province of China. The Chinese labelled the

ha
Malays as traitors who had betrayed the nation by collaborating with the
Japanese in an attempt to wipe out the Chinese. Such was the state of
W
affairs when the British returned to Malaya: and introduced the '.'new
si
policy for Malayan Union which had been decided upon in London".93
ba
Ab
When the Malayan Union was officially inaugurated on April 1 ,

1946 a wave of Malay protest and resentment had already swept through
Q
the length and breadth of the country. In fact, the Union plan opened "the
A.
first chapter in organized communal agitation .... in Malayan history".94

One of the major results of the British policy of the Malayan Union was
the recurrence of overt Malay hostility toward the non-Malay
communities, similar to the situation which existed during the Japanese
occupation.
Opposition to the Union plan seems to have taken a serious turn. The
Sultan of Kedah, one of the signatories of the agreements, complained
that he was compelled to sign the agreements, which he later termed "the
.
Instrument of Surrender".!IS Malay demands for the withdrawal of the

Malayan Union were so widespread that even Malay women led
processions and addressed rallies and public meetings.
It seemed that the Malays were in danger of losing their country.

During the protest rallies Malay communal sentiment reached its peak
and was clearly expressed by the following slogans written on banners or
62
shouted during demonstrations: "Down with Equal Citizenship", "Ma
7
laya belo.ngs to the Malays", "Long live the Sultans and Malay Rights",
83
"Equal Citizenship Means Suicide for the Malays", llidup Bahasa!
23
Hidup-lah Bangsa: and "We will Fight for Our Rights and Country".96
-
01
A number of influential high-ranking British officials and civil
03
servants who had served in Malaya, also sympathized with the Malay
viewpoint, and supported the Malay demand for the withdrawal of the
#
Malayan Union scheme. These officials included two ex-Governors of
us
the Straits Settlements, and an ex-Chief Secretary of the Federated Malay
in
States. They called the Malayan Union scheme "an instrument for
jo
annexation". 97
up
One uf the most striking political developments of the anti-Malayan

ro
Union movement was the revival of pre-war Malay associations and the
G
formation of a national Malay organization which ha� not been possible

p
during 1939- 1940. In response to a call by Dato' Onn bin Ja'afar, Mentri
ap
Besar (Chief Minister) of Johore, an All-Malay Congress was convened

ts
in Kuala Lumpur on March 1 , 1 946. Forty-one Malay associations re

ha
sponded to Onn 's call and on May 1 1 , 1946, the Pertubohan Kebangsaan
W
Melaya Bersatu or United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was

si
officially born in Johore Bahru with Dato' Onn as its first elected
ba
president. Under the leadership of Dato' Onn, the Malays continued their
Ab
struggle to repeal the Malayan Union scheme and to restore their rights.
Thus this scheme ultimately led to the consolidation of Malay commu
Q
nalism as the dominant political force in post-war Malaya and in today's

A.
Malaysia. The organization that probably contributed most to upset

Britain's preconceived policies for the post-war administration of the
Malay States was the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) .
Non-Malay Reaction to the Malayan Union : The Malayan Union plan

was equally rejected by the leaders of the non-Malay communities. After
the Japanese surrender the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) became the
mouthpiece of non-Malay political opinion . The Malayan Demqcratic
Union.(MDU), an affiliated left-wing political organization of the Com

munist Party, bitterly opposed the Union proposals and accused the
authorities of ignoring the non-Maiay viewpoints.
Unlike the Malays who were concerned with protecting their "spe
cial privileges" in the government of Malaya, the non-Malays concerned
themselves with the principle or self-determination. The British granted
62
this to India after the Second World War, but it was denied to the Malays
7
in favour of the imposition of centralized colonial rule. Whereas the
83
'
Malays considered the provision of common citizenship as a weapon by
23
which non-Malays might overrun them, the non-Malays regarded the
-
01
citizenship offer as nothing more than their due. The non-Malays
characterized the Malayan Union as "colonial" and "undemocratic".
03
They also argued that the new citizenship formula was misleading, since
#
it did not contain any democratic political rights such as self-government
us
or free elections. They also vehemently opposed the British policy of the
creation of S ingapore as a Crown Colony, separating her from the fold of
in
the Malayan Union. It was argued that the exclusion of Singapore tended
jo
to perpetuate.the British policy of divide and rule,_this being hostile to the

up
interests of the Malayan people. They further observed that as equal

ro
citizens of that country, they had not been consulted before the Union
G
proposals were intoduced.

p
ap
In fact, the non-Malays wanted more concessions than they were

ts
given in the Malayan Union plan. The leaders of the non-Malay co111 m u
ha
nities argued that the union proposals "do not touch the essence of the
W
matter. That essence is democratic representation".98

si
The agitation forthe repeal ofthe Malayan Union continued for about
ba
two years until it. was finally replaced by the Federation of Malaya on
Ab
February l , 1 948.
Q
c. The Federation ofMalaya Agreement 1 948

A.
While the Agreement proposals were being negotiated between the

British authority, the nine Sultans of the Malay States and the represen
tatives of the UMNO, there was growing concern among the non-Malay
communities that the colonial pre-war policy of discrimination in favour
of the Malays would be preserved.
In fact, it became apparent when the Constitution of the Federation

of Malaya came into existence.on February l , 1 948, that the Agreement
granted substantial concessions to the Malay demands while the non

Malay viewpoints were totally ignored.
The Malay reaction against the Malayan Union scheme was echoed
by a similar non-Malay reaction against provisions of the Federation
Agreement. This largely involved the restriction on the non-Malays
securing federal citizenship as it denied them full legal and political rights
62
in Malaya as their right (see Appendix 3). The non-Malay communities
7
also viewed the restrictive immigration policies, incorporated into the
83
Agreement, as discriminatory and a weapon to undennine their political
23
aspirations.
-
01
Before the Federation Agreement came into effect, Governer Gent
03
announced the formation of a Working Committee consisting of twelve
members (six Government members, four Malay Rulers and two repre
#
sentatives of the UMNO) to try to reach an agreement on '.'tentative
us
proposals with a view to recommendations being submitted to His
in
Majesty's Government which will be acceptable to all concerned in

jo
Malaya".99 When Gent's decision for the formation of the Committee,

up
which excluded non-Malay representation, was announced in the sum

merof 1 946, a storm of non-Malay protest followed. Since their demands
ro
for equal status with the Malays was ignored in the Committee, the
G
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and a number of organizations oppos

p
ap
ing the Federation Agreement (which came into force as a result of the
recommendations proposed by .the working Committee), met together
ts
·
ha
and formed the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action on December 22,

1 946. This later came to be known as the All-Malayan Council of Joint
W
Action.(AMCJA).
si
ba
To solve the country's constitutional crisis the AMCJA, led by Tan

Ab
Cheng Lock, announced a six-point proposal. This demanded the creation

of a United Malaya inclusive of Singapore, responsible self-government
Q
based on universal suffrage, equal citizenship rights for all legal Malayan
A.
residents, and demanded that the British should consult the AMCJA
concerning the future constitutional arrangement of Malaya.
The AMCJ A's constitutional proposals were totally rejected both by

the British and the UMNO leadership whose fundamental concern was
the creation of Malay political and cultural supremacy to the exclusion
of non-Malays. Moreover, the Malay masses "were more attracted by the
traditional (Malay) nat,ionalism of the UMNO, and preferred to support
a party which had identified itself with Malay interests alone".100 How
ever, to give the anti-Federation movement a multi-racial complexion ,
the Malay Nationalist Party and other radical Malay groups including the
Angkatan Permuda /nsa/ (Progressive Youth Corps) and the Angkatan
Wan ita Seda ra (Awakened Women 's Forces)withdrew from theAMCJA
and fanned a Malay Council of Joint Action called the Pusat Tenga
Ra' ayat (PUTERA) or People's United Front. Thereafter the AMCJA and
62
PUTERA fanned an alliance and continued their struggle against the pro
7
83
Malay Federation of Malaya until June 1 948 when the Emergency was
declared.
- 23
d. The Emergency
01
03
The resultant alienation of the non-Malay _communities from the
colonial administration started almost five months after the implementa
#
tion of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. The �eds of conflict
us
between the Malay and non-Malay communities were quietly but firmly
in
sown by none other than the 'protectors' of the Malay interests, the B riush
jo
authorities, who first nullified the Malayan Union scheme and finally
up
imposed the Federation Agreement on February 1 , 1 948.

ro
From the viewpoint of Malay/non-Malay integration , the most

G
crucial development during the first decade of the Federation Agreement

p
was the rise of communist movements in Malaya. Although the circum

ap
stances leading to the communist revolt against the British colonial

ts
authority in open warfare in June 1948 are still largely obscure, there
ha
seems little reason to doubt that the authoriti es ' sudden reversal of the
W
Union policy and its replacement by the Federation Agreement helped to

si
create the immediate conditions for the communiscrevolt and made it

ba
difficult to quell. During the Japanese occupation the British lent nominal
Ab
support to the communist guerrilla forces, commonly known as the Malay

People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to liberate Malaya from the
Q
clutches of the invaders. But once Japan's defeat became inevitable, the
p the leaders of
A.
British Military Administration immediately rounded u

the MPAJA, outlawed the party and treated the guerrilla forces (that had
fought as Britain 's allies) as enemy.
The oppressive political measures aroused w idespread resentment

amongst the left-wing and communist organiz;ition in Malaya, adding
fuel to the fir.e . For whatever the reason, the 'armed struggle' between the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the governing authority took
formal shape in June 1948. In fact. "the rebellion in Malaya in June.was
only an accentuation of the violence and lawlessness that was already

sporadic". 101 From 1920 onwards, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
received guidance for its activity from the Chinese Kuomintang Party and
the Russian Communist Party , and thereafter initiated action mainly
through the labour movement. In February 1948, when the Communist
Youth Conference was held in Calcutta (India), the MCP received advice
on how to weaken and later elim inate British and European colonial rule
62
from the archipelago. With this end in view it adopted the following
7
83
strategy:
23
i) disrupt the Malayan economy by attacks on plantations and mines:
-
ii) establish "liberated areas" under their control; and
01
iii) lead a popular revolt in the form of a "liberation anny" which
03
would link the liberated areas and complete the conquest of the
rest of Malaya.
#
us
In their campaign against the colonial and Western plantation own
in
ers, communist-led trade unions first began to dislocate the economy of

jo
the West coast states of Malaya from April 1948. This was achieved by
up
organizing a series ofstrikes in those areas. The murder of three European

rubber plantation managers at Sungei Si put in Perak in June 1 948 was one
ro
of the first major attacks on the authorities.

G
p
Followi�g further incidents of violence, the British took stem and

ap
repressive measures against the workers, trade unionists, left-wing and

ts
communist organizations and their sympathizers. These measures were

ha
accompanied by large-scale arrests. As a res1.11t. thecommunistsand other

W
activities had to flee into the jungle in mid-June. There they organized a
si
resistance force called the Malayan Races Liberation Army. At this stage,
ba
the colonial authorities declared a state ofEmergency covering the entire

Federation on June 1 8, and extended it to Singapore on June 24, 1948.
Ab
"Communist terrorists"102 in 1 948 numbered 4,000 to 5,000 rising to

Q
about 8,000 in the early 1 950s . The govern ment deployed 40,000 regular
A.
soldiers assisted by aircraft, artillery and naval vessels, 70,000 police and
a quarter of a million village "Home Guards". Besides, administrative
and technical services were kept on alert to support the government
"security forces". The state of "Emergency"· which lasted until 1 960
when the "communist terrorist<;" were defeated, resulted in the loss of
1 1 ,043 lives, and the operation cost the Government of the Federation an
estimated M$ 1 .7 billion.
The/mpact ofthe Emergency : Malaya's decade-long state ofEmergency

had lingering effects on racial harmony, and a great impact particularly
on the Malays' political behaviour and attitudes towards the non-Malays.
There existed the continuing belief and tendency on the partofthe Malays
and their government to equate the Chinese with the communists, whose
ultimate aim (according to the government) was to liberate Malaya from
the colonial yoke and establish their authority. This belief was reinforced
62
by the fact that the Malayan guerrillas were not on! y comm uni st led and
7
trained, but were almost entirely composed of Chinese.
83
23
The counter-insurgency measures employed by the British and
Malay military forces also tended to intensify racial antagonism. From
-
01
the beginning of the communist revolt, the British colonial policy
03
reflected the stance that a Chinese was by nature either a communist or
a sympathizer of the communist cause, while the Malays were trusted as
#
British allies. This preconceived attitude further estranged the Chinese
us
from the political and social order of the Peninsula. For example, in 1 9 5 1
in
when the government called a l l the young men o f all communities to

jo
undertake m ilitary training under a national service scheme, thousands of

up
unenthusiastic Chinese left for Singapore, Hong Kong, and sorne even
ro
went to China by the end of the year. Thus, the British colonial policy
G
contributed to some extent to the continuing attitude of separation

between the Malays and non-Malays.
p
ap
Briggs' resettlement operation1 03 which was undertaken in 1 950-5 \

ts
displayed about 573,000 people from their rural farming lands, which
ha
created far-reaching political repercussions on Malay's multi-racial

W
society.
si
ba
S ince the Chinese were the main source of support and supply for the
guerrillas, they obviously formed the primary target of the Briggs Plan.
Ab
Among the total population involved in the resettlement programme, 86

Q
per cent were Chinese, who were forced to bum their huts and desert their
A.
farms to i solate the guerrillas and to cut off their support and supply lines
in the rural areas. Moreover, the resettlement programme administrators
being non-Chinese caused general dissatisfaction and bitterness among
the displaced people. The resettlement policy also caused a further
problem for Mafays. S ince almost all New Villages were Chinese
populated and located along pre-existing highways and railroads, the
Chinese were easily exposed to modem ideas and practices through their
increased contact with "world culture", (i.e. mass media, schools,
movies, social clubs, Western culture, government personnel, political

leaders and various communication agents). The Briggs Plan not only
mobilized and de-traditional ized the Ci'.inese, but also produced a
modernizing impact on their economic and political outlook. The
kampong Malays however remained traditional, their backward status
hardly being improved despite the development programmes undertaken
62
in the rural areas. Thus, the unequal pace of modernization between the
Malays and the Chinese magnified the imbalance between the rural
7
83
Malays and the urban Chinese. This was largely responsible for the
23
communal tension, mutual exclusiveness and suspicion prevalent in
Malaya. Moreover, very few New Villages were multi-racial. The vast
-
01
majority were almost entirely Chinese. As a result, the normal integration
03
between the Malays and the non-Malays through mutual understanding
and social communication was frustrated. The Emergency intensified
#
Malay suspicion and distrust of non-Malays to such an extent that it was
us
difficult for the Chinese to ventilate their legitimate grievances through
in
the proper channels, as they were already identified with the communists.
jo
Furthermore, the outbreak of the guerrilla revolt in Malaya con

up
vinced the British that only the Malays could be trusted with arms.
ro
G
During the first years of the Emergency, the vario�s Federal Govern
ment decision-making bodies were manned by the British al'ld the UMNO
p
ap
leaders, whereas the non-Malays, particularly the Chinese, were totally

ts
bereft of representation in the crucial stages of the country' s develop

ha
ment: However, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed in

1949.
W
si
It became apparent that the Emergency further enabled the Malays

ba
to assume a position of political and m iii tary supremacy to the exclusion

Ab
of the non-Malays. The long-term effect may have been one of the causes
of the disadvantaged non-Malay communities resorting to violence to
Q
establish their legitimate political rights. The political and racial crises
A.
of 1969 were broadly caused by the Emergency and Malay supremacy.

Although the Emergency ended more than two decades ago it has left a
lasting impact on the political orientation of Malaysia's multi-racial
population.
e. From Emergency to the Malaya Merdeka (Independence of Malaya)
Although the Emergency was not formally li fled until 1 960, Malaya
was sufficiently peaceful to allow Independence negotiations to
commence by 1955. Thus instead of holding back Independence, the

Emergency virtually set the stage for political and constitutional
development, ultimately leading to the Independence of Malaya being
granted in 1957.
When the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) raised such issues as

"liberation of Malaya", "self-government" and "common enemies" the
62
British Government changed its tactics. It began patronizing the Chinese
7
elite to counter the Communist charges. Thus the British were instrumen
83
tal in the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in
23
February 1949 with Tan Cheng Lock as its President.
-
01
The British were, thus, instrumental in the creation of both the
03
communal parties - UMNO and MCA.
#
The Malayan Union proposals stimulated the formation of UMNO
us
as an entirely Malay party, and the creation of the MCA to pre-empt a
popular upsurge of the non-Malays (particularly the ordinary Chinese)
in
jo
was undoubtedly designed to divide the Malay and non-Malay commu

nities.
up
ro
While the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was intensifying its

G
campaign for self-government and self-determination for Malaya, Oliver

p
Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, declared on November

ap
29 in Singapore that "the restoration of law and order in Malaya had first
ts
priority and that political reforms must come after" .104 General Sir Gerald
ha
Templer, High Commissioner and the Director of Operations, also shared

W
Lyttleton's views and maintained:

si
It would be a tragedy not only for Malaya but for the whole of
ba
Southeast Asia, if power were handed over so precipitately that the

Ab
remarkable progress now being made in all directions were thrown

out of gear, quite apart from the communal differences that might
Q
arise.1os
A.
It was commonly believed that the British Government would use the
Emergency as an excuse to delay Malay advance towards self-govern
ment as long as possible. None the less, during the late 1940s, the UMNO
and MCA leadership began thinking in terms of independence with co
operation and accommodation between the Malays and the non-Malays.
However Dato' Onn, the UMNO leader, failed to persuade the rank and
file members to his ideas of racial accommodation, and left the party to
fonn the Independence o f Malaya Party (IMP) on August 20, I 9 5 1 . Dato'

Onn failed to get support for his new party from the Malays or even from
UMNO which he himself had established. The foundation ofIMP, which
was based on the principle ofracial equal ity, only created misunderstand
ing and suspicion in the minds of many Malays who feared losing their
"special position" and privileges. Thus, the majority of the Malays
62
showed apathy towards Dato' Onn 's IMP and expressed.their continuing
allegiance to UMNO which found new leadership in a Prince of Kedah,
7
83
Tunku Abdul Rahman.
23
The new leadership opposed the idea of cooperation with the non
-
Malays and showed no urge to hasten independence from the British.
01
However, in l 952 an electoral alliance between the UMNO and MCA was
03
formed to defeat the IMP candidates at the Kuala Lumpur municipal
elections. The UMNO-MCA Alliance
#
(Perikatan) candidates won the
us
elections with nine seats, while the IMP got only two seats and an
independent won one.
in
jo
The Alliance originally evolved from state or local levels, but the
up
1952 municipal elections laid the foundation for the so-called grand
ro
Alliance at the national leveL This led its leadership to call for an early
G
Malayan independence through their mutual co-operation. Thus, in

March 195 3 , the UMNO and MCA reached an agreement at lhe national
p
ap
level to fight the fist general elections to the Federal Legislative Council,
without losing their communal identity. This Alliance was further
ts
ha
extended to the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) which was included in

1 955.
W
si
The 1 955 Elections : The First General Election� to the Federal Legis
ba
lative Council : The Alliance partners' 1955 electoral campaign and

Ab
movement towards independence confronted several issues which gave

rise to communal tensions. These greatly impeded the development of
Q
national unity and integration in Malaya.

A.
When the UMNO general assembly met in October 1954, Tunku

Abdul Rahman , President of the party, faced violent opposition from the
pro-Malay groups within the party "for being too vague on policy matters
· and for not insisting upon a more positive programme to preserve and
promote Malay interests.106 His critics demanded a finn commitment to
Malay special rights and to acceptance of Malay as the sole official
language of Malaya.
- Before the Tunku could overcome this opposition from wi thin his .
party, he came under sharp attack from one of his political opponents, the
Party Negara.107 In the course of his election campaign, Dato' Onn, the
Party Negara leader, declared that his party would not accept a ' Babel of
Languages ' . He asked for Malay as the only national language, with
English as a second language. Viewing the consequences of the increas
62
ing birth rate among the Chinese and Indian communities, Dato' Onn
suggested that immigration from a neighbouring country such as Indone
7
83
sia could be encouraged to save the Malays from becoming a racial
23
minority in their ownhomeland. During his election campaign he further
elaborated on immigration thus:
-
01
If we do not want the Chinese to outnumber the Malays in this
03
country, we must encourage more Indonesians to come here. The
#
Indonesians-our history tells us-are our blood-brothers.108
us
Attacking UMNO, Dato' Onn 's party maintained that "UMNO' s partner
in
ship with the MCA amounted to nothing less than a betrayal of the Malay
jo
community". S uch statements by the Party Negara leadership plus those

up
of the Tunku 's critics within UMNO greatly disturbed communal har
ro
mony in Malaya in general and the Alliance in particular.

G
In view of their numerical majority in the Malayan electorate in 1955

p
ap
(see Table IV: 14) the pro-Malay elements in the UMNO demanded
ts
nominations of at least42 seats out of 52 elected positions for the Malays,

ha
while the Alliance National Council wanted 40 seats for the UMNO
W
candidates, 12 for MCA and none for MIC candidates.

si
TABLE IV: 14
ba
The 1955 General Elections: Communal breakdown

Ab
of the electorate
Q
Communal group . Voters (per cent)

A.
Mal ays 1 ,078,000 84.2

Chinese 143,000 1 1 .2
Indians 50,000 3.9
Others 9,000 0.7
1 ,280,000 100.0
Source : K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya,

op cit., p. 1 87, Table 8.
.
Considering the possible alienation of the Chinese and Indian

partners in the Alliance, Tunku Abdul Rahman had to warn the pro-Malay
elements of the consequences of their emphasis towards a policy of
"Malaya for the Malays". The Tunku finally retained his position in the
UMNO only after threatening to resign from the party.
S imilarly, many Chinese accused the MCA of selling out Chinese
62
interests to the UMNO. They criticized the MCA for its failure to secure
7
adequate representation for the Chinese on the Alliance ticket, being
83
allotted only 12 out of 52 elected seats. The dissident MCA elements also
23
went to the extent of demanding equal status for Chinese and Indian
-
dialects along with Malay as the national languages of Malaya. This
01
demand for multi-lingualism antagonized the Malays, who formed more
03
than 84 per cent of the electorate (Table IV: 17). Consequently the
Alliance National Council dismissed the Chinese demand.
#
us
Failing to persuade the MCA leadership to compromise their com
in
munal demands with the Malays in the UMNO, several MCA members
jo
resigned from the Association. This action caused the Alliance National
up
Council to reconsider its earlier seat allocation decision, and they

subsequently increased the Chinese seats by 3 to a total of 15. The
ro
Alliance also faced criticism from the MIC who were initially deprived
G
ofany representation because of their tardiness in joining the Alliance and

p
ap
their comparatively weak position. Subsequently, however, the MIC

were allotted two seats to contest on an Alliance ticket. The MIC,
ts
representing only about 4 per cent of the Federation ' s electorates (Table
ha
IV: 1 7), had little voice in the political dialogue of the Alliance, a
W
coalition controlled by the other two dominant communal groups-the

si
Malays .and the Chinese.

ba
The decision to further reduce the Malay quota and increase the
Ab
Chinese met with severe opposition from both communities alike. While
Q
the Malays criticized their leaders for showing undue favour to the MCA,
A.
the Chinese criticized their leaders for meekly dealing with the UMNO.
This situation made the Alliance partners ' task in framing its election
manifesto very difficult. After almost half a year's protracted negotia
tions, the three communal groups of the Alliance finally produced a
manifesto called the "Road to Independence", 109 which included pledges
such as increased social services, economic development and "Malayani
zation" of the civil services. The Alliance failed to reach an agreement
on citizenship and nationality rights for non-Malays, and its manifesto
called for the setting up of a neutral commission to conduct investigations

into the issue. Over controversial issues such as education and national ·
language, the Alliance manifesto carefully remained vague. To avoid any
controversy, the only issue that the alliance election campaign focused on
was the call for Malaya Merdeka (Independence of Malaya). Against this
background, the Alliance partners went to the polls.
62
Election Results · Eight parties (including independents) partici
7
pated in the 1 955 elections and 1 29 candidates contested the 52 seats
83
(Table IV: 1 5).
23
TABLE IV: 15
-
01
The 1955 General Elections: Party performances
03
No of Seats Votes % of total votes
#
candidates won polled (invalid votes
Party exclurled)
us
Alliance 79.6
in
52 51 81 8,013
Negara 30 78,909 7.6
jo
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 11 40,667 3.9

up
National Assoc. of Perak 9 20,996 2.0

Perak Malay League 3 5,433 0.5
ro
L�bour Party 4 4,786 0.4

G
Perak Progressive Party 2 1,081 0. 1

p
Independents 18 31 ,642 3.0

ap
Total 129 52 1 ,001 ,527 97.1

ts
ha
Sowct : KJ. Ratnam, Corrvn.unalism and /he Polilical... , op. cit., T>lble 10, p. 196.
W
The result of the country' s first national elections shows clearly that
si
the electorate gave priority to national issues over communal ones. When
ba
the ballot count was announced in July 1 955, the Alliance reaped a total
Ab
of 8 1 8,013 votes or about 80 per cent of the total votes cast (see Table
above). The Alliance thus polled 4 times more votes than the combined
Q
opposition candidates.
A.
Among the non-eleeted members of the Legislative Council, the

Allianc;e safely counted 19 seats which gave them a majority of 7 1 in the
Council of 98. Thus, under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the
Alliance formed the first elected Government of Malaya, and started
working for the country's independence. The 1955 federal elections,
although only partial, marked the beginning of the end of the colonial
phase and laid the foundation of a _new era of Malayan politics.
f The 1 957 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya

The overwhelming victory of the Alliance in the elections of July
enabled its leadership to negotiate with Britain for independence before
the official end of the Emergency. A Constitutional Conference was held
in London between I 8 and February 8, 1956 including representatives of
the Alliance and the Sultans. The Conference decided that Malaya should
62
become a self-governing and virtualfy independent state within the
7
Commonwealth by August 1957, "if possible", and that an independent
83
Constitutional Commission should be appointed to frame a draft
23
Constitution for Malaya. For the preparation of the new Constitution, the
-
provisions of"a common nationality for the whole of the Federation", and
01
"the safeguarding of the special position of the Malays and the legitimate
03
interests of other cbmmunities"1 10 were i ncluded among the terms of
reference of the Commission ' s agreement.
#
us
The 1956-57 Constitutional Commission .: The Commis.> ion, commonly
in
known as the Reid Commission, comprised five non-Malay members

jo
headed by Britain's Lord Reid. The other four members were Sir William
up
McKell from Australia, B. Malik from India, Justice Abdul Hamid from
Pakistan and S ir Ivor Jennings from the United Kingdom.
ro
G
The Commission commenced its task in June 1956, and by October

p
1956 had received 1 3 1 written memoranda from different organizations

ap
and individuals for its consideration. After a number of closed-door

ts
meetings, the Alliance produced a joint memorandum called a "bargain",

ha
whereby UMNO made concessions lo non-Malay interests in such areas

W
as citizenship. In return the non-Malays accepted the "special position"

si
of the Malays (relating to government employment, allocation of educa

ba
tional scholarships, access to educational insti tutions and the allocation

Ab
of business licences) and the establ ishment ofMalay land reserves, Malay
as the S tate language and Islam as the official religion. Although the
Q
Commission conceded to most of the Alliance demands generally and

A.
UMNO's viewpoints particularly in its Report, It was accused of favour

ing non-Malay interests. 1
In the course of preparing a constitutional document of Malaya, the

Commission had to resolve many communal and political issues.
The Commission 's report recommended a Federal parliamentary

system on the Westminist�r model, with Sultans appointed as constitu
tional figureheads. The racial, lingual and religious diversity · of the
population prompted the Commission to recommend (contrary to Alli

ance demands) that there should not be a state religion, and that a limited
period of multi-lingualism should be permitted in the deliberations of the
Federal and State Legislatures. In setting a time limit for reviewing the
Malay special righ,ts, the Commission remarked that
we found it difficult . . to reconcile the terms of our preference if the

.
62
protection of the special position of the Malays signified the granting
of special privileges, permanently, to one community and not to
7
83
others.111
23
The Commission therefore suggested that the "special position" of the
-
Malays be made subject to review by the Parliament after fifteen years,
01
with a view to the special privileges being eventually abolished.
03
. UMNO, the Malays party, reacted sharply to the Commission' s
#
recommendations, and particularly concerning the "special position"
us
proposals. The UMNO leader and Chief Minister of the Federation,
in
Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated that the Reid Report "has overlooked
jo
provision for the Malays . . . [and] caused some fear on the part of the
Malays".112The Tunku declared that UMNO would never compromise on
up
the qu�stion of Malay "special position", and observed that "it is well to
ro
remember that no natives of any country in the world have given away
G
so much as the Malays have done".113 Because of the communal pressure,

p
the time limit for Malay special privileges was dropped from the final
ap
draft of the 1957 Constitution. Instead, Article 1 59(5) of the Constitution

ts
provided that any amendment of those issues relating to the "special

ha
position" of the Malays should require the consent of the Conference of

·
W
Rulers.
si
This Article, which still exists, implies that the Conference of Rulers
ba
possesses a veto power on any attempt by the Parliament to amend or

Ab
abolish the preferential treatment awarded to the Malays.
Such constitutional coverage of the Malay "special position" (which

Q
was made unamendable without the consent of the Conference of Rulers)

A.
created a sense of deprivation and suspicion in the minds of the non

Malays. However, the "special position" clause seemed to create strong
vested interests among the Malays, so that instead of abolishing it at the
first opportunity, the concept would be perpetuated.
A lthough Malay reaction to the final draft of the Constitution was

minimal, issues such as national language were still a cause of concern
to many Malays. They questioned the lack of detailed progran1mes (or the
developmentand implementation of Malay as the only national language,

and strongly opposed the inclusion of a provision (excluded in the earlier
draft Constitution) which enabled the authorities to proteCt the use and
study ofother tongues . The Malays were also unhappy w ith the provision
of making English an official language for ten years (after which Malay
would be the only national and official language). '.fhis was qualified by
the words "and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides. . . "114
7 62
Such ambiguous terms in the Constitution agitated the Malays and
83
·
caused intolerance of other languages. There were other constitutional
23
provisions in the final draft which contained similar ambiguity, but the
-
demand for independence was so pressing that the uncertainties remained
01
unresolved. The apparent manifestation of these unsettled issues in
03
Malayan politics was the clear mental break between the Malay and the
#
non-Malay communities. This situation gave little scope for racial
us
accommodation, mutual confidence or trust. On August 3 1 , 1957
Malaya's Independence was granted, giving fonnal recognition to these
in
grim realities.
jo
up
From this analysis of the development of the constitutional and

ro
political crises leading to the Independence of Malaya, the fact emerges

G
that the Independence of the Malay Archipelago came through a complex

three-party game. The British, as protectors of the Malays and the third
p
ap
party of the game, departed safely preserving their economic interests,

ts
leaving the two discrete racial communities, Malays and non-Malays,

ha
with many unresolved communal issues . These were sufficient to gener

ate suspicion and mistrust for years to come.
W
si
VII Formation of the Federation of Malaysia and the Expulsion of

ba
Singapore (1960-1965)
Ab
The foregoing analysis shows that the communal feeling, largely

Q
latent before the Second World War, was aroused both during the
movement for merdeka and after Independence. The politics of Malaya
A.
had always been communal in character, and Independence did not bring
any solution to these problems. When Malaya gained her Independence
in 1957, the people of the country were already divided not only by race,
but also by culture, religion, language.economic and political roles. The
formation of Malaysia in 1963 further complicated the existing problems
of the process of integration of the country. Political development must
be seen against this background of comm unal politics.
a. Political events leading to theformation ofthe Federation ofMalaysia
In a speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association on Southeast

Asia in S ingapore on May 27, 1961 the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku
Abdul Rahman, suggested that Malaya
should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the
62
territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is pre
mature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be
7
83
brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this
objective... 1 1 '
- 23
01
This idea of a Greater Malaysia, particularly a merger between
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya was not new . 1 1 6 The All-Malayan
03
Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) led by Tan Cheng Lock was one of the
#
first movers. The Council asked for the creation of a United Malaya
us
inclusive of S ingapore on December 22, 1946. However, while on the one
hand, both the UMNO leadership and the British authority turned down
in
the AMCJA's proposal, on the grounds that such a "merger" might create
jo
a critical racial imbalance affecting Malay political and cultural suprem

up
acy, on the other hand, British commercial interests needed to keep

ro
Singapore as a separate Crown colony. About a decade later in 1955,

G
David Marshall, S ingapore's first Chief Minister, mooted the concept of

p
a wider union between Singapore and Malaya. Singapore.' s next Chief

ap
Minister, Tun Lim Yew Hock, also suggested a union of Singapore with
ts
the Federation of Malaya, but until M.ay 196 1 , the idea of merger was
ha
rebuffed by the Tunku 's Government mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the
W
unstable political situation in Singapore made the prospect of merger

unlikely. For example, in the second half of 1 956, the S ingapore middle
si
ba
school riots and trade union protests reminded the Federation Govern�
ment of the dangers of Chinese chauvinism· and racialism . Again, in
Ab
January 1957, the racial riots in Penang convinced the Government that
Q
"there was no point in adding to their own troubles by embracing more

A.
in Singapore".117 Secondly, the Malayan Government was acutely aware

of Singapore' s 1 .5 million non-Malay population, being mostly Chinese,
w hose inclusion might upset the racial balance ofpowerin the Federation.
However, in 1961 circumstances changed the Tunku Government's

attitude in favour of a merger with Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo
(Sabah) and Sarawak. Had tl).c Tunku's merger decision in 1 961. any link
with the political developments in Singapore? The Tunku's,wider union
concept seemed to have close links with the developments in Singapore's

internal political uprest. When the left-wing People's Action Party (PAP)
led by Lee Kuan Yew won the absolute majority in the 1 959 Singapore
elections (winning 4 3 out of 5 1 seats in the Legislative Assembly) , it had
to satisfy its left-wing elements by adopting "a more lenient policy
towards" 1 1 8 them in addition to conceding some of the communal
demands ofthe Chinese. Yet Singapore's leaders (particularly those in the
62
PAP) were consistently working for the reuniting of the two territories.
7
83
In its election campaign, the PAP advocated Singapore's independence
through merger with the Federation of Malaya.
- 23
Thus, when the Tunku introduced a Malaysia proposal, a Singapore
01
Minister for Culture immediately hailed it thus:
03
The politics of the PAP directed towards building a genuine Malayan
#
loyalty, the acceptance of Malay as the national language, the
us
fostering of a Malayan culture, the consistent rejection of racial
in
politics and of the ridiculous concept of an independent S ingapore,

jo
and finally two years of persuasion and of argument with the Federa
up
tion leaders bore fruit.119

ro
The PAP leadership was also convinced that the independence of

G
Singapore as a sovereign state would be economically unviable. The PAP

p
leaders argued that for speedy industrialization their island should

ap
explore a wider market. The need for such a market also prompted them
ts
to have ties (particularly economic), with the Federation of Malaya. The

ha
Singapore Ministry of Culture said:

W
The real problems of providing for an adequate number of jobs for

si
a fast rising population, of making a major improvement in standards

ba
of living, increasing the national output and the income per head can
Ab
only be tackled when Singapore becomes part of a larger economic

Q
entity through merger with the Federation and Malaysia.120

A.
The problem of internal security was also a factor which motivated the
PAP leaders to have ties the the Federatio,n.
For many years, communist-controlled trade unions had been inten

sifying activities in 'the form of strikes, riots and civil disorder in
Singapore. It was felt that the internal political unrest might discourage
potential domestic and foreign investment in S ingapore, which was
crucial to her rapid industrialization. Thus, the PAP leadership argued
that Singapore ' s union with the Federation of Malaya would not only
provide for its political stability, but would also attract substantial foreign
investment.
Under these circumstances, the PAP leaders were concerned about

Singapore' s viability as an independent state. This independence was
scheduled to be granted by Britain in 1963. The PAP leader and the Prim.e
62
Minister of S ingapore Lee Kuan Yew said:
7
83
It would be utterly ludicrous for us . . . . with our 1 .6 million people...
to try to chart our own way in this world . . . This is the age when man
23
and his efforts must co-ordinate. Any country that has not got
-
01
sufficient ballast, sufficient depth of economic strength, would fall
by the wayside. 1 21
03
#
The PAP leadership argued that an independent S ingapore would be
us
an impossible proposition politically, militarily and economically,
though independence through association with the states of Malaya
in
would be a possible viability.

jo
up
Against this background, and with the possibility of a rise to power

ro
by the communist element if Singapore gained independence in 1963 , the

G
Tunku put forward a proposal to include S ingapore in a Federation of

Greater Malaysia. The Tunku believed that if the communist element
p
ap
gained power in Singapore, with the assistance of other communist

powers it would "try to overrun the whole of Malaya". 1 22 He felt that this
ts
ha
constitutional device would help to neutralize the communist element in

Singapore.
W
si
However, perhaps the most formidable obstacle.in the formation of

ba
Greater Malaysia was the fact that Singapore was predominantly Chi
Ab
nese. To offset the possible Chinese dominance, it was proposed that the
non-Chinese territories of Brunei, North Borneo (Sabah) and S arawak
Q
would be partners in the Federation. This was the real genesis ofMalaysia.
A.
It became apparent ih October 1 961 when the Tunku declared in the

Parliament (Dewan Ra'ayat):
While Singapore is under the British there is no threat of open action

by the Communists which might endanger the peace and security of
the Federation, but with an independent Singapore anything could
happen ...
Merger would prevent those who are Communist-minded from being,

able to align an independent S ingapore with the Communist block ...
National security demands it, our mutual economy demands it, and
. so do the people of both territories. 1 23
Moreover, there was also an ex ternal threat to the Borneo territories
62
from Indonesia which might make "the negotiations for Malay�ia ex
tremely difficult, if not impossible". 124
7
83
Thus, between May 1961 and until the Federation of Malaysia was
23
finally formed in September 1963, a series of negotiations and investiga
-
01
tions took place on the possible terms of merger. As a first step, the leaders
of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei met
03
at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Regional Meeting held
#
in Singapore in July 196 1 . A Malay�ia Solidarity Consultative Commit
us
tee of the Association was formed to produce a memorandum concerning
the general terms of reference for the Federation.
in
jo
Meanwhile, by November 196 1 , the Heads; of the Government of

up
Malaya and Singapore came lo an agreement on certain issues which was

ro
embodied in a White Paper.

G
Among the issues which were agreed upon between the two govern
p
ments were those of S ingapore's autonomy in labour and educational

ap
matters, its representation in Parliament by 1 5 seats, the retention of

ts
multi-lingualism, and the automatic gaining of Malaysian nationality by

ha
all her citizens. Certain points such as the formation of a 'common mar
W
ket' and the allocation of tax revenues were hastily decided in last-minute
si
sessions before the Federation ofMalaysia was formally inaugurated on

ba
September 1 6, 1963.
Ab
In November 1 96 1 , the Prime Ministers of Malaya and Great Britain

Q
met in London and agreed to set up a 5-member Commission of Enquiry

A.
with Lord Cobbold, the former Governor of the Bank of England, as

Chairman to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo (Sabah)
and Sarawak on Malaysia. The Cobbold Commission reported in June
1962 that a substantial majority of the population in both Sabah and
Sarwak was in favour of joining the Federation. To decide the details of
the terms of merger an Inter-Governmental Committee under Lord
Lansdowne was set up.
Following the acceptance of the Cob bold ReporL by the Malayan and
British Governments in July 1 962, an agreement was reached on the
formation of the Federation of Malaysia by August 3 1 , 1963. By
September 1 962, both the Legislatures of North Borneo and Sarwak had
decided, in principle, on their association w ith the new Federation on the
grounds that their special interests would be preserved. After arduous dis
cussions, the Malaysia Agreement was finally reached in London on July
62
9, 1 963 between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo
7
83
(Sabah),Sarawak and Britain. 125 Accordingly the B ritish agreed to grant
independence to North Borneo, Sarawak and S ingapore on August 3 1 ,
23
1963. The formation o f Malaysia did not take place on that date (as had
-
·
01
been earlier agreed) due to the opposition from the Governments of
03
Indonesia and the Philippines, which publicly obstructed the creation of
the new Federation, This opposition resulted in a meeting of the Heads
#
of the Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, at the end
us
of July 1963 at which the Philippines and Indonesia had agreed to end
in
their opposition on the formation of 'Malaysia provided the United

jo
Nations ' Secretary-General or his representative ascertained the views of

up
the peoples of North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak.

ro
On September 1 3 , 1963 the UN Secretary-General reported that the

G
majority of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak supported the

p
formation of M,alaysia. Nevertheless, Indonesia and the Philippines

ap
refused to recognize Malaysia, resulting in the breaking of their diplo

ts
matic relations. In the shadow of this confrontation the Federation

ha
agreement known as the "London Agreement" was finally signed on July

W
8, 1963 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
si
Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. However,

ba
the Malaysia dispute officially expired when Tun Abdul Razak, the
Ab
Deputy Prime Minister, visited. Jakarta and signed an agreement ending

the confrontation policy on August 1 1 , 1966. Thus, the Federation of
Q
Malaysia was finally officially inaugurated on September 16, 1966.

A.
b. The Separation of Singapore
Malaysia was the first of the Afro-Asian states to break up (the second
being Pakistan). This was a result of the failure to integrate its tiny city
state, Singapore, into the body politic of Malaysia. After two years of as
sociation, S ingapore was expelled from the Federation, becoming an
independent republic � n August 1965.
Why did Malaysia fail to achieve national integration or produce a

viable political order in which the people of both Malaya and Singapore
could live together as equal partners? The growth of a common national
identity in the newly formed Federation of Malaysia was undoubtedly
complicated by diversity of language, race, culture and religion. But
many countries in Asia and Africa with discrete cultural, racial, linguis
62
tic and religious backgrounds have been integrated under a Federal
system. Why, then, did the Federation of Malaysia fail to create a
7
83
condition in which both Singapore and Malaya could co-exist as equal
23
partners?
-
01
Among the more serious problems facing the Federation of Malay
sia, the economic and political factors (which had operated before the
03
Federation) appeared to be the immediate causes of the breakaway of
#
S ingapore from the Federation . The uncompromising attitudes of the
us
leaders of Malaya and S ingapore, and more particularly the dubious role
of Lee Kuan Yew, a naive and ambitious politician, were equally
in
responsible· for the exclusion of S ingapore.

jo
up
The separation of S ingapore was not unexpected. When the Federa

ro
tion proposal was tabled by the leaders of Malaya, Singapore, North

G
Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei, the possibility of separation

became immediately apparent from the ullerances of many PAP leaders
p
ap
of S ingapore. These leaders claimed Singapore's supremacy in the

ts
proposed Federation. Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP leader, declared: "Calcu
ha
late anyway you like, peaceful happy prosperous Malaysia is only

possible if we keep Singapore the centre ofMalaysia". 126 ln the late spring
W
of 1963, Singapore's demands for the creation of a common market, its

si
financial contribution to the Federal Government, a loan for the develop

ba
ment of the Borneo territories and other issues brought the negotiati�ns
Ab
of Malaysia to a deadlock. The dispute between the leaders of Malaya and

S ingapore reached such proportions that the Tunku (while he was in
Q
Mal<tya) had to ask his lieutenant Tun Abdul Razak (who was in London
A.
for negotiations) to "break off the talkS' and return home" if their
(Malaya' s) "final offers" were not accepted.127 Although Singapore of
ficially agreed upon the terms for becoming a part of the Federation,
signing the Agreement in London July 9, 1 96 3 the economic issue, being
one of Singapore' s major reasons for the merger, set the framework for
her political conflict with the Federation.
\
The FinancialDispute : One of Singapore's major objectives in becoming
a unit of Malaysia was the resolution of Singapore's economic problems,
as it was argued by them that " . . .a common market is of the essence of
merger.;."128
The Annex J of the Agreement states:
62
The Federal Government... shall progressively establish a common
7
marketin Malaysia for all goods or products produced, manufactured
83
or assembled in significant quantities in Malaysia, with the exception
23
of goods and products of which the principal terminal markets lie
outside Malaysia.129
-
01
03
Accordingly, a Tariff Advisory Board was set up to help the
formation of the ·common market and to recommend products for
inclusion in the market #
us
Though Malaya agreed in principle of the need for such a common
in
market during the two years of its partnership with Singapore little was
jo
done to implement the project, which Singapore regarded as the "essence

up
of merger". It soon became apparent that the Federal Government had

ro
deferred the execution of the common market plans until a national

G
industrialization policy had been formulated. This was because of the

p
actual and potential industrial imbalance between S ingapore and other

ap
units of Malaysia. Outlining the problems in implementing the common

ts
market project, the Federal Finance Minister, Tan Siew Sin, announced
ha
that the Federal Government should not take a step which would be to the
W
economic advantage of Singapore at the expense of the other units of the

Federation.
si
ba
Failing to obtain a definite commitment on the common market issue

Ab
from the Federation authority, Lee declared, shortly before the separa
tion, that if Singapore "does not benefit economically from Malaysia, and
Q
if the common market is not set up as laid down in the Malaysia

A.
Agreement, then Malaysia is meaningless"1 30
The common market dispute reached its peak when the Federal
authority closed down the Singapore branch of the Bank of China, on the
pretext that the PAP was receiving money from communist sources
through the Bank of China, and that the PAP was sending money out of
the country through the same bank for "safe-keeping abroad". The
Singapore Government violently reacted against the Federal
Government's action and accused the authorities of breaking an under

standing .made before the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.
The dispute over the financial issues reached such proportions that
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the Federation, issued a
statement whilst convalescing in London questioning the loyalty of the
Bank of China and asking the directors to sever all links with Peking or
62
face closure. However, the Bank of China was taken over by the Bank
7
Negara Malaysia onAugust 5, 1965 and just five days after the expulsion
83
of Singapore was announced in Parliament, theBank of China was closed
23
down.
-
01
Political Conflict : The acceptance of Singapore into the Federation of
03
Malaysia was primarily politically motivated, both on the part of the
Tunku, the Malayan leader, and on that of S ingapore' s PAP leader Lee
Kuan Yew. #
us
in
The fourteen-year war against communist guerrillas prompted the

jo
Malayan Government's anxiety for the possible political developments

up
in Singapore, which was leaning towards the extreme left (communist).

To prevent S ingapore from overrunning Malaya with the help of commu
ro
nists, the only course open to the Tunku was to "accept Singapore as
G
member of the Federation of Malaysia".131 On the other hand, Lee Kuan

p
ap
Yew's firm commitment to the concept of Malaysia was due to his desire
to re-establish his political image by strengthening the foundation of his
ts
People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, which had been weakened by

ha
defection from its left-wing.

W
Although Malayan and S ingapore leaders agreed upon the constitu

si
ba
tional provisions of the Federation of Malaysia, their interpretations of

these provisions differed greatly. setting the framework for their political
Ab
disputes. Not only did they differ in their interpretations, but also there
Q
was a marked divergence in t�eir political outlook, leading to the

A.
expulsion of S ingapore from Malaysia.
The most immediate internal threat to the authority of the Alliance,

the ruling clique of the Federation, seemed to emanate from the results
of the Singapore legislative Assembly elections of September 2 1 , 1963
(see Table IV: 1 6).
TABLE IV: 16
Party distribution in Singapore Legislative Assembly
Seats in Seats % of total Appointed

previous won in vote 1963 parliamentary
Assembly 1963 seats
62
People's Action Pany 25 37 47 12
Barisan Sosialis 14 13 33 3
7
United People's Pany 3 I 7
83
Singapore Alliance: 8
23
Singapore People's Alliance 4
UMNO . 3
-
01
Malayan Chinese Association
Worker's Pany
03
Independents
:to Includes both independents and minor pany votes.

#
us
Sources : G.P; Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., Table 15, p. 334. For a detailed
account of the results of the Singapore elections of 1 963, see Milton E.
in
Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 95- 1 1 2.

jo
up
PAP emerged with a landslide victory, winning 37 of the 5 1 seats

with 47 percent of the votes. The left-wing Barisan Sosialis party secured
ro
1 3 seats with 33 per cent of the votes while the newly formed S ingapore
G
Alliance Party which had been fully backed by the Malayan Alliance, was
p
ap
wiped out. The total defeat of the S ingapore Alliance by the PAP
candi�tes made the relationship between the Federation and S ingapore
ts
complicated and difficult. The reaction of the Singapore Alliance (par

ha
'
ticularly of its UMNO partners) to the loss of three constituencies with
W
Malay majority electorates which they had previously held was not
si
unexpected. The results of the Singapore elections "shocked" the Federal

ba
authorities because most of the. rank and file members of the Mal�yan
Ab
Alliance (including the Tunku himself) joined in the election campaigns

in favour of the S ingapore Alliance. The results of the elections so
Q
incensed the UMNO supporters that they burned an effigy of Lee Kuan
A.
Yew on September 27, 1963 which contributed lo a deterioration of the

PAP-Alliance relations. Syed Ja 'afar Albar, the ChiefPublicity officer of
the national UMNO, commented that he would fix PAP's leader Lee
Kuan Yew at the proper time, further exacerbating PAP - Allianceenmity.
Lee Kuan Yew's reaction was understandably violent. In a speech

before a mass rally he cautioned the Federal authorities agl,J.inst any
attempt at controlling S ingapore by force and advised the authorities to
' lel\ve S ingapore "to resolve the problems which they could not'. under
stand", and asked them to realise that S ingapore was really "the hub of
the overseas Chinese in Malaysia.132 Lee also expressed S ingapore's will
ingness to cooperate with the Federal Government on equal terms
(without differentiating between various races) , but criticized the MCA
leadership, majorpartner of the ruling Alliance, for lacking an intelligent
62
approach to the urban Chinese.
7
On September 29, 1 963 the Tunku denounced Lee's attack on the
83
MCA leadership and announced that he would stand by the MAC. The
23
Tunku' s unequivocal support of the MCA leadership made i t increasirigly
-
01
difficult for the PAP leaders to cooperate with the Federal Government.
However, the PAP's victory in the September elections over the three
03
Malay-dominated constituencies in S ingapore previously occupied by
#
the UMNO candidates, confirmed the Malay leaders' suspicions of the
us
P AP's capacity to win the Malay electorates in Malaya. In fact, the results
'of the Singapore elections set the seeds of dissension in the PAP - Alliance
in
relations, reaching the point of no return with Lee's PAP decision to

jo
participate in the Malayan elections of 1 964.

up
ro
The 1 964 Malayan Elections : The PAP's landslide victory in the

G
September 1963 elections helped consolidate its political strength in S in

gapore, and perhaps stimulated its expansion of influence in the Federa
p
ap
tion of Malaya. Despite the PAP leadership's solemn pledge to the Tunku
ts
(before the formation of the Federation of Malaysia) that the PAP would
ha
not play any role in Malayan politics, its Chairman and Deputy Prime
W
Minister of S ingapore, Dr. Toh Chin Ch ye, announced on March 1 , r964

that his party "should consider' itself a national party", and declared that
si
they would take a "token part" in the Malayan state and Federal elections
ba
in April 1 964. 133 The formal decis}on of the PAP to enter the Mal11yan
Ab
elections had a disastrous effect on the Alliance - PAP relations.

Q
The Malayan leaders (especially the Alliance) viewed the PAP's

A.
decision as a threat Lo their authority, while the Malays saw itas a Chinese
threat to the Political status quo insuring their privileged positions. Thus
the PAP's attempt to expand its influence in the national political arena
confirmed the Malays' distrust � f Lce, who had emerged from the 1964
elections as a political enemy particularly towards the Malay community.
What started as a political battle was transformed into a communal one,
u ltimately resulting in the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation.
The Election Man ifesto of the PAP was set out "Lo assist in the
building of a united democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the
principles of social justice and non-communal ism". Its immediate objec
tive in contesting the Malayan elections was "to ensure that the Socialist
Front does not benefit from the substantial protest votes against the
MCA". 134 The PAP contestcd only 1 1 Federal parliamentary and 1 5 state
62
assembly seats, all located in urban centres. Throughout the election
campaign, the PAP made it clear that its participation in the Malayan
7
83
elections was .not directed as opposition to UMNO or its leadership, but
deqionstrated its resentment towards the MCA. He also referred to the
23
unintelligent and insensitive MCA men who were counselling the Tunku,
-
01
and cautioned that to save the country from harm, the Tunku had to be
03
saved from his so-called "friends".
#
Despite the PAP leadership's favourable attitude and praise for the
us
UMNO, its bid to replace the MCA as a member of the ruling party was
rejected by the UMNO leadership., The Tunku also maintained that the'
in
UMNO would stick by the MCA even if only 5 of its candidates were
jo
retumed. 13s The PAP's participation in the Malayan elections not only
up
antagonized the MCA, but its campaign against the MCA also alienated
ro
the UMNO who considered the PAP tactics as an attempt to spilt the
G
Allia�ce. Although the PAP avoided communal politicking, its election

p
campaign was not without communal colouration. For example, Lee's

ap
advice for urban people to vote for the PAP to force the UMNO leaders
ts
"to adjust their social and economic policy to take into account the wishes
ha
of the people in the town."136 clearly indicated UMNO 's neglect of the
W
needs of the non-Malays, the majority of whom were Chinese. Moreever,

PAP's call for equal opportunities and an egalitarian just and equal
si
ba
society was clearly a direct challenge to the Malay "special position".

Thus the UMNO saw the PAP campaign as communal politicking.
Ab
In the 1964 elections the Alliance commanded a majority of 89 seats

Q
out of a total 1 04 seats. The MCA emerged with 27 seats, 9 more than in
A.
.the 1 959 elections. The PAP which had expected to gain most of the
parliamentary seats it contested, won only one out of a total of 1 1 , while
in the state legislative assembly election all of its 15 candidates were
defeated.
The PAP's failure and the victory of the Alliance in the 1964
elections led the two bodies in diametrically opposed directions. The
results of the elections convinced the PAP that the forces for a Malay
Malaysia had become firmly entrenched within the UMNO and that the
PAP' s likelihood of bringing about change in Malaysia by cooperating
with the UMNO within the Alliance formula was remote. The PAP
decided to launch the concept of a Malaysian Malaysia by totally
'
rejecting Malay supremacy and the Alliance formula. Conversely the
Alliance vic tory stimulated the UMNO to initiate a campaign for " special
position" for the Malays in S ingapore, despite the Malaysian Agreement
62
which stated that the "special position" enjoyed by the Malays in the
7
Federation of Malaya should not be extended to Singapore. This
83
campaign resulted in the commu nal riots between the Chinese and the
23
Malays in S ingapore in July and September 1964. After these riots Lee
-
01
began to challenge the 19 57 "racial bargain" and rejected the concept of
Malay supremacy for the idea of a non-communal Malaysia-a "Malay
03
sian Malaysia"-in which (according to Lee) the state and the nation
#
would not be identified with the supremacy or interests of any particular
us
race or group.137 Apparently the PAP meant by the concept of Malaysian
Malaysia that Malaysia should appear less Malay and more multi-racial.
in
jo
Prior to S ingapore's expulsion in August 1965 , the · PAP leaders

up
launched a vigorous campaign both inside and outside the country against
ro
the "special position" of the Malays, and sought to win popular support
G
for their movement for a Malaysian Malaysia. The PAP intended to

p
mobilize political support throughout Malaysia to end what it ch1imed to

ap
be the monopoly. of Malay political supremacy in the Federation's

ts
governmental machinery. To take a political action against the Alliance

ha
five Malaysian opposition parties (the PAP, the Sarawak United Peoples
'
W
Party, the People's Progress Party, the United Democratic Party and the
Machinda of Sarawak) met on May 9, 1965 in S ingapore to form the
si
ba
Malaysian S olidarity Convention (MS C) and pledged to continue its

struggle for building a Malaysian Malaysia-a non-communal Malaysia.
Ab
The Malays viewed the PAP's plan as a chauvinistic scheme

Q
designed to take over the country for the Chinese. The UMNO therefore
A.
bitterly condemned. the PAP scheme, but the PAP skilfully parried the
UMNO attack and made it appear an attack on the Chinese community
as a whole. This situation left the MCA, the Alliance partner, in a very
awkward position. It became difficult for the MCA to support the UMNO
blindly without alienating its Chinese followers. Fearing the PAP's
growing popularity among the Chinese community, the MCA began to
intensify its fight for Chinese demands for equal status from within the
Alliance. The PAP's auack on UMNO from the outside and MCA' s
agitation from inside the Alliance made i t increasingly difficult for the
Malays lo preserve their "special position". The PAP and its predomi
nantly Chinese MSC partners' action exacerbated comm unal sentiments,
which ran so high that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the
Federation of Malaysia, took a decision on July 25, 1965 lo evict
S ingapore from the Federation. Thus, in favour of racial politics, democ
62
racy was betrayed for the first time in Malaysia. Without seeking the
7
83
mandate of either the people of S ingapore or the other Malaysian states,
S ingapore was expelled from the Federation. Even the parliamentary
23
members of the ruling Alliance were not aware of the Tunku's decision
-
01
of expulsion until half an hour before the Dewan Ra'ayat (House of
03
Representatives) began its sessions on August 9, 1965, at 1 0.00am.
Without any formal discussion or debate, the Con.s litu tional Amendment
#
Bill separating S ingapore was unanimously passed in the Dewan Ra 'ayat,
us
and on the same day the Dewan Negara (Senate) endorsed the Amend
in
ment Bill after only about two hours' debate.

jo
One important consequence of the separation bf Singapore with a

up
lasting impact on Malay/non-Malay integration was that the com muni

ro
ties began to regard each other with enmity. With Singapore's separation,
G
both the political and racial issues became inex tricably intertwined in
p
Malaysia. The Malay community, in particular, began lo suspect the

ap
chauvinistic Chinese scheme to take over the Malays' homeland. The

ts
non-Malay community, or more particularly the predominantly Chinese

ha
composed parties such as the United Democratic Party, the Sarawak

W
United People's Party and the People's Progressive Party, blamed the
Government for failing to solve communal problems and accused the
si
ba
Government ofadopting repressive methods against those who supported

the "Malaysian Malaysia" concept. Finally, the act of evicting Singapore
Ab
from the Federation was not only undemocratic but it made the Parlia
Q
ment a "rubber stamp'',138 thereby alienating the Chinese partners of the

A.
Alliance from the political system of Malaysia. The decision to expel

S ingapore from the Federation ofMalaysia was taken solely by the Tunku
himself whilst in a London hospital. Without fol lowing no'rmal proce
dures of parliamentary democracy, the Tunku piloted his own parliamen
tary members to get his decision passed by both the Dewan Ra'ayat and
the Dewan Negara. Thus S ingapore was expelled and authoritarianism
triumphed over democracy in Malaysia. The seeds on an'antidemocratic
tendency were quietly but firm ly sown at this stage of Malaysian political
history by none other than the father of modern Malaysia. Although

S ingapore was out of the Federation, the two Malaysian communities
(Malays and non-Malays) were left with bitter hatred and hostility suffi
cient to be at each other's throats for years to come.
VIII Racial Violence and the Breakdown of Racial In tegration in

Malaysia (1965-1970)
62
The outbreak of racial riots in Malaysia in May 1969 was commonly
7
believed Lo have originated from a "victory" parade in Kuala Lumpur
83
staged by the Gerakan and DAP supporters on the day following the
23
elections of 1969. But if the political history of Malaya is examined, one
can trace the origin of racial conflict to the political system devised by the
-
01
British colonial power for Malaya, later preserved to sustain the Malay
03
political supremacy (discussed earlier). However, the racial riots of May
1 3 , 1969 were perhaps the first major traumatic events leaving a
permanent scar on the racial integration of Malaysia for many decades to #
us
come.
in
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a. The Malay Political Supremacy

up
The origin ofMalay political dominance can be traced to two primary

factors: i) the communal distribution of the electorate on a constituency
ro
basis, and ii) the weighting system in the allocation ofparliamentary seats
G
which favoured the rural constituencies.

p
ap
i) Communal distribution of the electorate: Compared to the

ts
electorate in 1 955, Malay superiority had slightly diminished since 1959

ha
elections, yet they still hold a dominant position in the electorate (Table
W
IV: 1 7).
si
TAB LE IV: 17
ba
Malayan elections of 1959: Communal breakdown

Ab
of the electorate
Q
Communal group Voters (approx) (per cent)

A.
Malays 1 ,2 1 7 ,000 56.8

Chinese 764,000 35.6
Indians 1 59,000 7.4
Others 4,000 0.2
Totai 2,144,000 1 00.0
* No official breakdown of the electorate by communities has b:een made &\'.ailable.

Sources : K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process . . , op. cit., Table 1 1 , p.
.
200; and The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 19 August, 1959.

In the year 1959, Malays constituted more than 56 per cent of the
electorates, Chinese about 36 per cent and ' Others' (including Indians)
about 8 per cent. In 1964, the proportion of Malays droppe� to about 54
per cent, Chinese had risen to about 38 per cent while the proportion of
'Others' remained the same. 139 These figures clearly indicate that by 1964
the proportion of the non-Malay electorates had significantly increased
62
since 1955 when it was only about 16 per cent.140 There were two reasons
7
for the substantial increase in the proportion of the non-Malay electorates.
83
Firstly, in 1 955, about 75 percent of the non-Malay Federal citizens had
23
been under 2 1 years of age. These non-Malay citizens between 18 to 21
-
years ofage had qualified themselves by 1958. Secondly, the Constitution
01
of 1957 had also provided easier provisions for non-Malays to become
03
citizens of the Federation of Malaya.
#
Although the size of the non-Malay electorate had increased substan
us
tially over the years, this was not reflected in their share of the number
in
of parliamentary candidates in different elections. With the Malay

jo
electorates concentrated largely in rural areas and the non-Malay (mainly

up
Chinese) electorate in the urban areas, a constitutional amendment was

passed in 1 962 repealing Article 1 16 (4). A weighting system was
ro
introduced both to counter the non-Malay voting power and to maintain

G
p
ap
TABLE IV: 18
ts
The 1955, 1959, 1964 and 1969 elections: communal breakdown

ha
of the population, electorate and parliamentary candidates

W
(in percentages)
si
ba
Malays Non-Malays
1955 1959 1964 1 969 1955 1959 1964 1969
Ab
Population 50 51 50 51 50 49 50 47•
Q
Electorate 84 56 54 55 16 44 46 45
Parliamentry
A.
candidates 67 60 60 64 33 40 40 36
Parliamentary
seats 67 63 64 64 33 37 36 39
• The category of 'Others ' is excluded her� .

Sources : KJ. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Mala-yan Parliamentary Election of 1964,
op. cit, pp. 365-368; and Martin Rudner "The Malaysian General Elections of
1969: A Political Analysis'', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (January
1 970), pp. 2-2 1 .
the Malay political dominance in the national political arena. In fact, the
introduction of the weighting device had given "the scattered Malay
communities a disproportionately large number of seats in relation to
their percentage in the total electorate".141
The disparity in communal representation in the national politics is

shown in Table IV: 1 8.
62
The disparity in the allocation of parliamentary seats favouring the
7
83
Malays contributed greatly to the alienation of the Non-Malays from the
political system, and this device no doubt formed one of the primary
23
reasons for the growth of distrust among the non-Malays towards the
-
01
Malays communities.
03
The Malay political dominance in the Federation of Malaya and
#
today' s Malaysia can also be seen in the "special position" awarded to the
us
Malays in the vital areas· of the Malayan Civil and Military Services.
These functioned as the information resource for all the various govern
in
ment decision-making bodies.

jo
up
The Malayan Civil Services : The disparity ofracial representation within

the various national institutions of Malaysia was a primary element in the
ro
growth of communal conflicts in the country. One of the important

G
elements in the "special position" was the preferential access of Malays

p
ap
to the Malayan Civil Servie (MCS). Although all the senior administra
" tive officials of the Federal Government of Malaysia were recruited from
ts
ha
the MCS with the recommendation of the Federal authorities, many of the
top posts in the state government were also filled by the MCS.
W
si
Under the British rule, access to the MCS was monopolized by the
ba
British and Malays, particularly those who had connections with the
Ab
feudal aristocracy. At the end of 1952, however, S ir Gerald Templer, the

High Commissioner for Malaya, introduced "four-to-one ratio" for the
Q
MCS, that is, for every four new Malay entrant<; there was to be one
A.
vacancy for a non-Malay federal citizen. But in the functional branches

of the bureaucracy, that is, medical service, police, educational service,
public works and so forth, this policy was not applied as there were few
Malay applicants for these positions. From 1953 onwards, the proportion
of Malays in the very top positions of the MCS was high. For example,
in 1972, among the 53 Malayan bureaucratic elite, 50 were Malays, 2
Chinese and one Eurasian.
Although much of the original inequ�ty in communal representation

in the MCS can be traced to the B ritish colonial policies, after Independ
ence in 1957 the continued existence of these communal disparities in the
MCS new entrants (Table IV: 19) must be seen in terms of the provisions
of the Malay "special position" incorporated in the Constitution of the
Federation of Malaya.
62
1
TABLE IV: 1 9
7
Communal representation in the Malayan civil service, 1957-62
83
23
1957 1958 1959 1 960 1 962
-
Expatriate 220 154 104 55 26
01
Malay 128 123 166 195 219
03
Chinese 9 11 13 16 17
Indian 3 4 9 12 15
#
Source : Robert 0 . Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, op. cit., Table 20, p . 73.
us
in
Although the Constitutional Commission 's terms ofreference stated

jo
that provision should be made in the future Constitution of Malaya for the
up
safeguarding of the special position of the Malays and the legitimate

interests of other communities,142 the Constitution which was finally
ro
a<jopted in 1957 di4 not have any provision for the reconsideration and
G
subsequent elimination of the "special position".

p
ap
As a result of a recruitment quota of four Malays to one non-Malay

ts
(which was sanctioned by the Constitutions of 1957 and 1 963), the MCS
ha
retained its predominantly Malay character since Merdeka (Independ

W
ence). This discrimination in the national services was generally resented

by the non-Malays, and particularly resented were the ratios introduced
si
ba
for the MCS. The quota system was also condemned on the grounds that
such a policy had lowered the quality of the Malayan bureaucracy, since
Ab
the better qualified candidates from the non-Malay community were

Q
rejected for reasons of their racial origin. Obviously -the non-Malays

A.
would suffer for their lack of representation in this important national

institution.
The Royal Malay Regiment : Similar to the preferential treatment

· traditionally granted to the Malays in the Malayan Civil Services, the
Royal Malay Regiment was also strictly limited to Malays. Continuing
the British recruitment policies of the colonial period, the Malaysian
Government in the post-independence period also limited the non-Malay
The Political B.ackground 205
representation in the Malaysian Armed Forces. From its beginning in the

1930s and onwards, the Malay Regiment was exclusively a Malay unit.
This Regiment remained the essence of the local military force until the
early 1950s. However, the Emergency of 1 948- 1 960 prompted the
authorities to reverse their .recruitment policy and a Federal Regiment
which embraced other races was formed. By recruiting non-Malays into
62
the Federal Regiment, the British strategists' objective was to counter the
Chinese communist insurgency in Malaya. Although on paper the
7
83
Malaysian Armed Forces had become a multi-ethnic institution, the
23
authorities were reluctant to recruit Chinese armed guards for the tin
mines and the villages. Moreover, the authorities found it difficult to
-
01
recruit non-Malay elements, especially Chinese, for the Federal Regi
03
ment. As a result, the infantry regiments, regardless of their formal titles,
had been mainly manned by Malays whilst the Army's tech nical corps
were filled mainly by Chinese and Indians. The field command posts #
us
however remained open exclusively to Malay careerists. The establish
in
ment ofthe Navy and Air Force, although.much smaller in manpower than
jo
the Army(Table IV: 20) and second in order of the internal bureaucratic
up
influence, provided the non-Malays better opportunity for recruitment.

ro
B1,1t in the internal bureaucratic influence, the Malaysian Army stood first
G
where non-Malay representation was m inimal. Thus, in the Malaysian

Armed Forces, Malay domination was complete. After Merdeka the
p
ap
military, like the civil service, made no effort to counter the imbalance
between the Malays and the non-Malays.
ts
ha
TABLE IV: 20
W
Branches of the Malaysian Armed Forces

si
manpower: 1973-74*
ba
Service Number of men

Ab
Army 56,000
Q
Air force 5,300

A.
Navy 4,800
Total 66, 1 00
• No official breakdown o f the Malaysian Armed Forces by communities has been made
available.
Sources : Cynthia H. Enloe, "Malaysia's Military in the Interplay of Economic and
Ethnic Change", in John A. Lent (ed.) Cultural Pluralism in Malaysia: Polity,
Military, Mass Media, Education, Religion and Social Class, Northern
Illinois: Northern Illinois University, the Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
1977, Table 5, p. 25.
. 206 Pakistan . and Malaysia
Besides Lhe Malaysian Armed Forces existed Lhe Malaysian police

units, which were largely modernized in organization , role and equip
ment. The British, during Lheirrule in the Peninsula, created a Police Field
Force, militarily equipped in order Lo counteract mainly rebels. Today,
the Police Force's responsibility is to lead anti-guerrilla operations along
62
the Malaysia-Thailand border.
7
The Federal Reserve Unit (FRU),locally dubbed "For Rough Use"143
83
was and st111 is another special riot squad recruited separately by Lhe
23
Police Force. Here again, as a resulloflhe British recruitment policies and
-
·
01
the policies adopted during Lhe post-Merdeka period, this Force ·was made
up largely of Malays (Table IV:21)
03
In 1 968 the non-Malays outnumbered the Malays, although senior
#
ranks and officer corps were manned mainly by Malays. Moreover,
us
recruitment and promotion formulae always favoured the Malays.
in
jo
TABLE IV: 21
up
Ethnic composition of Division 1 of the

ro
Police Service in West Malaysia

G
(in percentage)
p
ap
Year Malay Chinese Indian Expatriate

ts
1957 26.7 9.0 6.7 67.6

ha
1962 51.1 29.0 16.7 12.2

W
1968 45.l 32.0 22.9 0

si
Source : D.S. Gibbons and Haji Zakaria Ahmad, "Politics and Selection for the Higher
ba
Civil Service in the New States: The Malaysian Example", Journal of

Comparative Administration, Vol. 3, no. 3 ( 1 97 1), p. 34 1 .
Ab
Thus, in all th e vital national institutions, non-Malays were not only

Q
discriminated against, but their representation.in these fields was less than
A.
m inimal. Although, non-Malay participation in the national political elite

and national public services was nearly 40 per cent, they were always
deprived ofreal power and position. They had nominal political positions
and were powerless.
Enche Senu bin Abdul Rahman, the then Minister oflnformation and
Broadcasting, declared in 1965: "there is no party that can rule over us
(Malays), but on the contrary, we [meaning the UMNO] have the right to
rule over them [the non-Malays].144The frustration of the non-Malays was

not only based on the fact that they could not reach the top of the public
services, but aim on their deep-rooted fear that the Malays' special
privileges carried the implication of the Malay right to rule the country
permanently. This fear of Malay domination shattered non -Malay hopes
and aspirations of ever sharing political power with Malays.
62
The uneasy situation naturally alienated non-Malay communities
7
83
from the Alliance formula and the Malay political system as a whole. The
non-Malay resentment against the country 's political process was clearly .
23
evidenced in the election campaigns of 1969 which subsequently resulted
-
01
in the outbreak of racial riots on May 1 3 , 1969,
03
b. The 1 969 Election Campaign
#
As indicated in the preceding analyses, the seeds of racial animosity
us
which created an integrative crisis were carefully sown and nurtured by
in
the British colonial powers in the form of Malays "special position",

jo
subsequently preserved by the Alliance system. This animosity reached

up
its peak during the election campaign of 1 969 which resulted in racial
riots on May 13 of the same year. This resulted in the breakdown of racial/
ro
national integration in Malaysia. The Federal elections of May 10, 1 969

G
(the third general elections after Merdeka) acted as a catalyst sharpening

p
ap
Malay/non-Malay conflict.
ts
The earlier analyses show that in all the preceding general elections,
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communal and racial issues were at the core of Malayasian politics. Par
W
ticularly during the 1960s, the intense communal polarization arising out
si
of the PAP's participation in the Malayan politics; the expulsion of

ba
S ingapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1 965 (which "had strong

Ab
communal overtones"); controversy over the National Language issue;

and racial discrimination in all the important civil and military bureauc
Q
racies-each provided for a sharp rise in communal and racial conflicts

A.
during and immediately after the election campaign of 1969.
During the five-week election campaign, both the Alliance and

opposition parties indulged in open and heated debate over the communal
issues which resulted in more racially delineated voting than ever before.
The Alliance, a major contestant, faced opp9sition from both the left
wing, comprising the Gerakan Rakyat, the Democratic Action Party
(DAP} and the People's Progressive party (PPP); and the right, compris
ing the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). Except the PMIP, these
opposition parties came Lo an electoral arrangement among themselves

to fight against the Alliance formula of "Malay Malaysia'', and to build
up a "Malaysian Malaysia" - a concept which had been defined by them
as "the nation and the State is not identified with the supremacy, well
being and the interests of any one particular community or race".14s The
opposition leaders bitterly criticized the Alliance for its pro-Malay
62
policies and its overemphasis on the special position of the Malays. The
7
use of Malay as the sole official language of Malaysia was ceaselessly
83
attacked by the opposition parties as an attempt to wipe out Chinese and
23
other languages and cultures. The opposition parties, particularly the
Chinese-controlled DAP, the successor of PAP, challenged MCA, the
-
01
Chinese partner of the Allia�ce. It maintained that the MCA had been
03
selling out Chinese rights to UMNO. The DAP's prime object was to
project itself as the sole champion of the rights and interests of the non
#
Malay communities. The Gerakan Rakyat, on the other hand, carefully
us
avoided antagonizing the Malays and maintained the non-communal
in
characterof the party whilst the People's Progressive Party remained true
jo
to the ideals and principles of the concept of a Malaysian Malaysia. A

up
Malaysia-for-Malaysians or Malaysian Malaysia was the antithesis of a

ro
"Malay Malaysia" and these could not co-exist. Conversely, the PMIP
G
attacked the UMNO, a dominant partner of the tripartite Alliance, for a

sell-out of Malay interests to the non-Malays. The PMIP, which formed
p
·
ap
the StateGovernmentofKelantan through two consecutive elections, had

ts
a greater appeal in rural areas where the Malays found it difficult to

ha
identify themselves with the "westernised" urban Malay elite who

controlled the Federal Government. It maintained that the UMNO leaders
W
not only betrayed their "true religion",but also were "the greatest obstacle
si
to efforts to establish an Islamic State in Malaysia".146

ba
Ab
In its election manifesto, the Alliance attempted to build up its image

by projecting the economic progress that Malaysia had achieved under its
Q
rule. In his preface to the election manifesto Tunku Abdul Rahman, the
A.
Alliance leader and Prime Minister of the country, wrote:

I have always descril?ed myself as the happiest Prime Minister in the
world. This is because I enjoy the support of the people, and with it
this country has progressed so well and so fast since Merdeka that it
has become a "shining star" in the Asian horizon.147
The Alliance election manifesto was divided into two parts. The first
part gave a broad outline of the Alliance policy such as. "our economic
approach'', "defence and security" and "foreign affairs", while the second
part dealt with a detailed record of the achievements of the Government
under Alliance rule in various fields. In the manifesto it also included
various programmes and pledges for the future.
"Vote Alliance for racial harmony" was the main slogan. Although
the Alliance had designed and applied their policies on the basis of a
62
multi-racial nation.when they realised that the Chinese-dominated oppo
7
sition parties and PMIP were gaining support among the electorate
83
through racialist appeal, their leaders also resorted to racial politics
23
towards the end of the election campaign.
-
01
For several months each party 's electioneering was based on racial
03
issues, contributing to an increase in racial antagonism , mutual fear,
suspicion and disrespect. The sitution was aggravated when a Labour
#
Party activist (a Chinese youth) was shot and killed by a police detective
us
nine days before the election. The subsequent funeral procession was held
in
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up
TABLE IV: 22
Federal Parliamentary and State Elections
ro
in Malaysia, 1959, 1964 and 1969

G
,
p
1959 1964 1969

ap
ts
Federal State Federal State Federal State

ha
P/C Seats Seats P/C Seats Seats P/C Seats

Seats
W
Alliance 5 1 .8 74 206 58.4 89 24 1 48.4 66 1 62

si
PMIP 21.3 13 43 14.4 9 25 23.7 12 40

ba
DAP 2. l 1 0 13.7 13 31
Ab
Gerakan 8.6 8 26
Socialist Front 12.9 8 16 16.2 2 7
Q
Party Rakyat• 1 .2 0 3
PPP 6.3 4 8 3.6 2 5 3.9 4 12
A.
UDP 4.3 l 4
Party Negara 2.1 1 4
Malayan Party 0.9 1 0
Independents 4.8 3 5 0.7 0 0 0.3 0 3
*The people who Conned the Party Rakyat after the 1964 elections, were a part of the
Socialist Front during the 1959 and 1 %4 elections.
Source : R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969, op. cit, Appendix 1 1 ,
pp.77-96.
in Kuala Lumpur on the eve of the election. In short, the 1969 election
eering was charged with a strong communal flavour.
The Election Results : The Federal and States elections were held on May
1 0, 1 969. The results were an unprecedented challenge to the Alliance
leadership. Although the Alliance had not been displaced a.s majority
party in the Parliament (a situation it had enjoyed sinc.e Independence in
62
1 957), its loss of a score of seats and a substantially reduced vote were
7
seen by Malays as the beginning of the end of their political supremacy
83
(Table IV: 22).
23
In 1 969 the MCA suffered a crushing defeat, capturing only 13 of the
-
01
33 parliamentary seats contested on an Alliance ticket. In 1969 the
03
Alliance lost what· it had gained in 1964, and compared to the 1959
elections, popular votes and majorities were substantially reduced in both
#
the Parliamentary and State elections, the Alliance electoral casualties in
us
1969 were heavy. A number of senior ministers and top-ranking leaders
in
of UMNO and MCA lost their seats in Parliament. The Minister for
jo
Information and Broadcasting and the Chairman of UMNO Youth

up
Section, Senu bin Abdu l Rahman and a key leader of UMNO, Dr.
ro
Mahathir bin Mohamad both los� their home (Kedah) seats to the PMIP.
G
Two Federal Cabinet Ministers from MCA, Dr, Lim Swee Aun (who was
also the Deputy President of the MCA) and Ng Kam Poh were both
p
ap
defeated in their home constituencies of Larut Selatan and Teluk Anson

ts
respectively. Amongst other casualties were the Secretary -General of

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the MCA, Kam Woon Wah and his counterpart in the MIC, Secretary
W
General Murugesu. Even more distressing was the drubbing received by

the only MCA Chief Minister of Penang, Wong Pow Nee, who failed to
si
retain his seat at the S tate elections. Furthermore, most Alliance leaders
ba
suffered considerably reduced majorities. Even the Tunku had his

Ab
majority cut from 1 1 ,647 in 1964 to 3,504 votes in the 1969 elections.
Q
Likewise, Tun Razak's votes were reduced from 1 0, 147 in 1964 to 8,925
in 1 969. In stark contrast stood the 1969 landslide victories enjoyed by
A.
certain opposition candidates. The combined opposition parties had

increased their share of Parliamentary seats from 15 in 1 964 to 37 in 1969,
capturing more than 5 1 per cerit of the vote. Although the opposition
parties were unable to dislodge the Alliance from its overall majority in
Parliament, their "electoral understanding" succeeded in reducing the
Alliance's clear two-thirds majority in Parliament (Dewan Ra 'ayat). This
was a great blow to the Alliance political hegemony, since it lost its power
to amend the Constitution freely without the support of opposition

parliamentarians (which was a remote possibility). This situation risked
repercussions in Federal-State relations, since the Alliance Federal
Government no longer had the required parliamentary members to amend
State Constitutions.
On the State level, the Alliance suffered critical defeats, losing
62
control in the predominantly non-Malay States of Selangor, Perak amt
7
Penang. In these States the MCA, a Chinese partner of the Alliance was
83
almost totally dislodged: The losses ofUMNO, the predominantly Malay
23
partner, in these States were not significant, except in Penang where the
-
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM) won a clear majority, allowing it to
01
form the State Cabinet. In both Selangor and Perak the Alliance lost its
03
clear majority, and wa's obliged to manoeuvre considerably to form a gov
ernment. It was only after the Gerakan Rakyat announced that it would
#
not enter into an opposition coalition that the Alliance was able to form
us
governments in these States. The Alliance also persuaded sufficient State
in
Assembly opposition members to defect to give' the Alliance a working

jo
majority in the State Governments. In other non-Malay States of Negri

Sembilan and Malacca, Alliance losses were not substantial but the MCA
up
suffered heavily. In the predominantly Malay State ofKelantan (thePan

ro
Malayan Islamic Party -PMIP-stronghold), the Alliance after suffi

G
cient manipulation managed to increase its seats from 9 in 1964 to 1 1 in

p
the 1969 State elections. However, itfailed to actively dislodge thePMIP,

ap
who had remained in power sinceMerdeka. In all other States the Alliance
ts
retained its clear majority, but its MCA partner suffered losses to the
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opposition parties. The result of the 1969 elections created a situation

W
which was seen by the Malays as the beginning of the end of the Alliance
formula. The Alliance was founded on the quid pro quo arrangement
si
ba
between the UMNO and the MCA, but the election results signalled the
end of the MCA as the sole representative of the Chinese community. The
Ab
supremacy of the Malays in the country's politics, administration and

government which they had enjoyed since Merdeka in 1 957 was retained.
Q
The MCA's poor performance and the resultant loss of the Alliance
A.
majority in predominantly non-Malay States in the 1969 State and Par

liamentary elections, caused serious concern to the Malays and their
·
leadership.
Although the combined opposition parties could not totally dislodge
the Alliance from power, they had mounted a presistent and effective
challenge at the sub-national or State level. Moreover, the 1 969 election
result-; indicated an opposition strategy which aimed at replacing the
weaker partners of the tripartite Alliance by a strong appeal to racial
loyalties. Although the Alliance had retained a comfortable majority in

the Parliament and managed to form governments in all but two States in
peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia), the psychological impact of the
opposition's victory was significant and was a crucial factor in the
subsequent reactions of both the Alliance and opposition supporters
which led to the racial riots of May 1 3 , 1969.
62
The May Racial Riots and their Aftermath : Racial disturbances had
7
become an intermittent phenomenon in the Malaysian region since
83
Merdeka. But the traumatic event that erupted in Kuala Lumpur on the
23
evening of May 13, 1 969, was a tragedy of dimensions hitherto unknown
in Malaysian political history.
-
01
The final election came as a "shock" and "surprise" both to the
03
supporters of the Government and opposition parties. It was a "shock" to
#
the Alliance Government, because for the first time in the history of
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Malaysian politics a non-communal political party (GRM) had won po
litical power in one of the Federation States. A further blow to the Alliance
in
was its failure to secure a two-thirds majority in the Parliament. The

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election results "surprised" all the political parties opposed to the

up
Alliance formula. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman stated:

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No one was more surprised, I am sure, than the DAP and the newly
G
formed Gerakan with their unexpected success.148

p
ap
The opposition parties, particularly the DAP and the Gerakan, lost
ts
no time in arranging celebrations for: their "unexpected" victories. The

·
ha
day following the election ,DAP and Gerakan supporters staged several
W
victory processions in Kuala Lumpur (on May 1 1 and 12, 1969). From the
political point of view, these processions were held on an unprecedented
si
scale, arousing racial tensions in all the communities. According to a

ba
report of the National Operations Council· (NOC), the demonstrators

Ab
(mainly Chinese) shouted in Malay such abusive anti-Malay slogans as:

Apa polis boleh buat - Kita raja (What can the police do - we are King !);
Q
Buang semu polis Melayu (Sack all Malay policemen!); Mati Melayu
A.
sakai pergi masok hutan! (Death to the Malays, aborigines go back to the
jungle!). The demonstratorsalsochanted:Kuala Lumpur sekarang China
punya (Kuala Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese); Melayu balek
Kampong (Malays go back to your Kampong); Melayu sekarang ta' ada
kuasa lagi (Malays have lost power); Sekarang kita kontrol (We are now
in .control); Melayu keluar apa lagi dudok (Malays get out - why do you
remain here), and Kita henta'm lu; sekarang kita besar (We ll thrash you,
'
we are now powerful). 149

Tun Tan Siew Sin, the President of the MCA, made an unexpected
public announcement on May 1 3 , stating that in view of the 1969 election
results, the MCA had decided to refrain from taking part in the Alliance
Government either federally or on the Executive Councils of State
Assemblies. He declared, however, that the MCA's support for the
Alliance Government would continue, allowing the Alliance to retain
power both at the Federal and State levels. Tun Sambanthan, the leader
62
of the MIC, also felt that his party had lost the support of the Indian
7
community in certain areas. Reacting to the attitude taken by the MCA,
83
Tun Sambanthan thought that his party should also withdraw from
23
participation in the Alliance Government, but the Tunku advised him to
-
"stay on". For the first time in 14 years of Alliance rule the non-Malays,
01
particularly the Chinese.were to be unrepresented in the Alliance Gov
03
ernment. Thus the quidpro quo arrangement between the UMNO and the
#
MCA seemed to be shattered. The MCA' s dissociation from the Alliance
us
contributed indirectly though significantly lo the subsequent riots. A cli
mate of confusion and uncertainty was created along the Malays, particu
in
larly when the jubilant Chinese and Indian demonstrators taunted them
jo
in their Kampongs and in Malaysia's federal capital, Kuala Lumpur

up
(where the majority of residents were Chinese).

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G
The opposition parties' "victory" parades and subsequent dissocia

tion tlecisions of the Non-Malay leaders were "an additional factor con
p
ap
tributing to racial tensions and �nxietie(1 50 in Malaysia. For instance, on

ts
Tuesday morning, May 1 3 , a group of Kampong Bharu UMNO youths

ha
met Haji Ahmad Razali bin Ali, an Alliance State Assembly member, and
told him that they wanted to hold an UMNO procession for the purp.ose
W
of "showing to the opposition parties that the UMNO, too, had a good
si
reason to celebrate,as they were not defeated in the State election."151 The
ba
UMNO supporters, "mindful of the fact that the procession was to be held
Ab
in a city whose population was mainly Chinese", realised that "something

untoward might happen". Da�o· Harun bin �aji Idris, the Mentri Besar
Q
'(ChiefMinister) of Selangor, organized a massive counter-demonstra

A.
tion and led the Malays in the procession on Tuesday evening, May 1 3.
Many of the Malays who paraded the city streets were armed with deadly
weapons. They decided to retaliate if attacked by the Chinese. The Malay
demonstrators were highly emotional "because of the previous two days
of provocations. The tempo of the Malay counter-demonstrations
reached an extent where they (Malays) became uncontrollable.
Since the main thrust of the Malay actions was directed against the
Chinese, the latter naturally reacted violently, resulting in full-scale
racial riots throughout the city. The May 13 debacle which was almost
certainly "planned" by men in the government profoundly disturbed
racial integration in Malaysia. When the Alliance Government suddenly
lost control Malaysian army , units were called in to assist the Police
Forces. It was alleged that the Malay army units (mainly manned by
62
Malays) took a most vindictive attitude towards the Chinese, who were
7
assumed to be the "trouble makers" and the "anti-national" elements. The
83
post-mortems of the riots revealed that the Malaysian Police Force, which
23
was ethnically more diverse (Table IV: 20), often had different ap
-
proaches to the May 1 3 conflicts than did the Malay Regiment.
01
03
The Chinese-Malay street fighting which was largely wnfined to
Kuala Lumpur continued for two days, costing (according to Government
#
estimation) 1 78 lives and creating about 6,000 refugees (about 90 percent
us
being Chinese) and many more missing.
in
On May 1 5 , the 'Government of Malaysia declared a State of

jo
Emergency. The racial riots that resulted from the General elections of
up
1 969, generally referred to as the May 1 3 incidents, plunged Malaysia

ro
into a State of Emergency for the second time since the Second World
G
War. 1 52The Constitution and Parliament were suspended , whole political

p
processes were halted and the elections still in progress in Sabah ahd
ap
Sarawak were postponed indefinitely. The entire administration of the

ts
country was placed under the direct control of a National Operations

ha
Council (NOC), with the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak as its
W
Director.
si
The National Operations Council : For the period of the Emergency

ba
Malaysia's administration was devolved to a special body, the National

Ab
Operations Council. This comprised 7 Malays and only 2 non-Malays,

Tun Abdul Razak being th� Director with almost absolute powers.
Q
A.
On May 20, to maintain a semblance of parliamentary rule, an

Emergency Cabinet was formed with the Tunku as Prime Minister, Tun
Abdul Razak as Deputy Prime Minister, Defence and Acting Finance
Minister, Tun Dr. Ismail as Minister of Home Affairs, Khir-Johari as
Commerce and Industry Minister, and Tun Tan Siew Sin and Khaw Kai
Boh as Ministers with Special Duties. It soon became evident that
"effective power on the critical issues of resolving the communal crisis
had passed to the National Operations Council".153 Thus, after the
The Political B ackground 215
proclamation ofa StateofEmergency by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, the

NOC became an authoritarian Government charged with restoring law
and order to the country. The NOC, under Tun Razak, administered the
country by executive decree, and by its instruction thousands of the
"trouble-makers" and government opponents were detained without trial.
The press and opposition were prevented from "any public discussion of
the Government's role in the crisis and its reliance upon authoritarian
62
rrieasures".154 Several British and American correspondents were con
7
fined to their hotels, and foreign publications such as Life, Time,
83
NewsweeK., The Economist, The Times, Far Eastern Economic Review,
23
and The Observer carrying factual reports of the authorities' handling of
-
01
the riots were banned. The NOC was fully supported by an army of2,000
and 3,000 strong police force, both composed mainly of Malays. Lt.
03
General Dato Ibrahim bin Ismail, a Malay senior army officer, was the
#
Chief Executive Officer of the NOC. Similar Operation Councils also
us
took over the administration of all States and Districts. In each of the
councils the Military and Police were well represented. In fact, the
in
jo
country was virtually placed under martial law. Dr. Tan Chee Khoon,
Secretary-General of the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM) announced
up
that "a coup d' etal had been staged by elements inside the government
ro
and that the army had taken over the country".155 Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul
G
Rahman who took over the Ministry of Home Affairs confessed on May
p
16, 1969, that "Democracy is dead in Malaysia", and maintained that "it
ap
died at the han.ds of the Opposition parties who triggered off the events
ts
leading to this violence" .156 These allegations made by the Home Minister
ha
against the opposition parties were echoed by the leading UMNO

W
"ultras", including Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, an unsuccessful candi

si
date in the Kota Star Selatan constituency, Kedah and Mukhtaruddin

ba
Dain, a University of Malaya lecturer in Malay studies. In open letters and

Ab
leaflets, they blamed the Government(particularly the Tunku) for putting

"the Chinese and Indians in their place", and demanded the Tunku's
Q
resignation as Prime Minister. They also demanded that the principle of

A.
Malay supremacy be guaranteed by abolishing absolute rule of the

UMNO.
Those opposed to the Tunku's softness and weakness towards the
non-Malays were responsible for emotional outbursts among militant
Malays, who later attacked the non-Malays' of Sentul, a racially mixed
suburb of Kuala Lumpur, on June 28, 1969. The victims were mainly
Indians, of whom 1 5 were killed and several others'injured. Many Chinese
and Indian houses were burnt down. Over 70 Indians and Chinese
residents of Sentul were removed to a refugee camp. During the attack the
Malay extremists shouted: "We've finished with the pigs! Now for the
goats!"m
From mid-May the Chinese bore the main brunt of the Malay attack,
.
and the Indian community avoided becoming involved in racial riots. But
62
the June 28 incident forced the Indians to support the Chinese. Malay
militancy thus intensified the racial conflict between Malays and non
7
83
Malays more than at any other time in the political history of Malaysia.
23
Following the May 13 riots, the Government's curb on the political
-
01
activities of the unruly elements of both Malays and non-Malays was less
than minimal. Only 40 Malays and 5 Chinese were held on murder
03
charges arising from the riots. All trials of persons charged with serious
#
crimes were deferred to the following year for unknown political reasons.
us
When the rioting flared up again on June 28, the Government suffered
from a general lack of confidence in its ability to restrain the Malay
in
extremists ..However, as a first step in curbing the influence of the "ultras"

jo
within UMNO, the Government expelled Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad and
up
Musa Hi tam for their alleged complicity in the anti-Tunku campaign and
ro
their incitement of the Malay extremists: However, merely expelling

G
"ultras" ofMahathir's calibre could nor restrain the political activities of

p
the fast-growing Malay extremist fact�on. Rather the NOC'� twenty-one

ap
month authbritarian rule gave the national leadership the opportunity to

ts
consider a new political strategy which would satisfy the Malay militancy
ha
and allow the country to return to a degree of normalcy.

W
According to the Government, there are three alternatives facing the

si
country:
ba
Ab
i) remain passive and allow racial animosity to deteriorate and finally

destroy the nation;
Q
ii) return to the pre- 1 948 Constitutional position; or

A.
iii) formulate a S<>lution to work out a positive formula whereby the

aspirations of the people can best be achieved with racial harmony
and goodwill. 1 58
Of the three options the Government found only the third acceptable.
But the fundamental question remained: would the propos� political
formula or strategy achieve national integration or would it only achieve
non-Malay containment? Obviously, ordinary Malays were
apprehensive ofa recurrence of non-Malay attempts to remove them from

political power. To set about restoring Malay confidence the Malay
leaders who controlled the Government suggested pursuing
unparliamentary (if not undemocratic) measures to prevent non-Malays
from threatening Malay supremacy again. In this context, Tun D�. Ismail
was the first to comment on democracy:
62
Democracy must suit the conditlons of the country. So long as the
7
fundamentals of democracy are there it is democracy. It is wrong to
83
say that there is only Western style democracy, since it is a Western
23
innovation. It is not necessary that we. should adopt wholesale
Western style democracy. u9
-
01
Tun lsmail's contention was further elaborated and explained later
03
by the Director of the NOC, Tun Razak. He said:
#
Democracy is practised in many countries in the world today. But
us
each country must assess its own political and social environment
in
realistically and evolve its own Constitution, rules, conventions and

jo
practices. Malaysia possesses her own distinct characteristics based

up
on her history and present racial composition. She must now find a
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solution to her problems-a solution that will provide a guarantee

G
that in future racial sensitivities will never again be provoked by the

p
operations of normal denwcratic processes,e.g. , election cam

ap
paigns. 1 60
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c. The Political Stra�egy of the Government

ha
W
The National Consultative Council : To help alienating non-Malays, the

Government announced the formation of the National Consultative
si
ba
Council (NCC) in January 1970, asking all major parties (except the
outlawed Malayan Communist Party) and certain religious, professional
Ab
and minority groups to send representatives. The NCC consisted of 65

Q
members (about half being government officials or politicians) and was

purely an advisory body. It was given the responsibility of "finding
A.
permanent solutions to ......racial problems to �nsure that the May 13

tragedy does not recur". 161 Although the members of the Council were
asked to express their opinions freely and honestly, the meetings of the
NCC were held in camera. The final authority for implementation of their
recommendations rested with the NOC. Over a period of one and a half
years, the NCC considered Malaysia's racial problems, and prepared
proposals which were submitted lo the NOC for consideration.
The government soon realised that the communal issues-like

Malay special privileges, language, education and culture of the non
Malays -<:ould not be resolved by public debates or even free exercise
of the existing fonn of parliamentary democracy. Such public discussion
might polarize racial feelings, creating a situation which would make
racial integration extremely difficult, or possibly creating conditions for
more racial violence on an even greater scale. What options then were
62
open to the government in constructing a political strategy to promote a
7
degree of consensus between the Malay and non-Malay communities?
83
23
Despite the veneer of confidence displayed by the establishment of
the NCC, it was obvious that lasting racial harm�ny could not be achieved
-
01
by mere legal and administrative directives of the NOC. The government
03
debarred certain communal issues from public discussion, yet simultane
ously solicited public support for its policies to demonstrate a degree of
#
legitimacy. This led to the government's fonnulation of the national
us
ideology-the Rukunegara (presumably on the recommendation of the
in
NCC).
jo
Rukunegara : By launchingRukunegara (literally, the fundamental prin

up
ciples of the State)162 on August 3 1 , 1970 the government aimed to

ro
legalize its existing communal policies by making Rukunegara a basis

G
for them. In short, it contained "Five Beliefs" and "Five Principles" ac
p
companied by five commentaries explaining the meaning of these

ap
principles. The Rukunegara which was formally promulgated by the

ts
Yang Di-Pertuan Agong on Aug�st 3 1 , 1970 reads as follows:

ha
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Our Nation, MALAYSIA, being dedicated-

to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples;
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to maintaining a democratic way of life;

ba
to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be

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equitably shared;
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to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural

traditions;
A.
to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modem

science and technolqgy;
We, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided
by these principles--
Belief in God (Keperchayan kapada Tuhan)
Loyalty to King and Country (Kesetiaan kapada Raja dan Negara)
Upholding the Constitution (Keluhoran Perlembagaan)
Rule o f Law (kedaulatan Undang2)

Good behaviour and Morality (Kesopanan dan Kesysilaan).
The five commentaries explaining the meaning of the above principles

were as follows:
I. Islam is the official religion of the Federation. Other religions and
62
beliefs may be practised in peace and harmony and there shall be no
discrimination against any citizen on the ground of religion.
7
83
2. The loyalty that is expected of every citizen is that he must be
23
faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty, the Yang Di-Pertuan
-
01
Agong ....
03
3 . It is the duty of a citizen to respect and appreciate the letter, the
spirit and the historical background of the Constitution. This historical
#
background led to such provisions as those regarding the position of . . . the
us
Rulers, the position of Islam as the official religion, the position of Malays
in
and other Natives, the legitimate interests of the other communities, and
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the conferment of citizenship. It is the sacred duty of a citizen to defend

up
and uphold the Constitution.

I
ro
4. Justice is founded upon the rule of law. Every citizen i:;; equal
G
before the law. Fundamental liberties are guaranteed to all citizens. These
p
include liberty of the person, equal protection of the law, freedom of

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religion, rights of property and protection against banishment. The

ts
Constitution confers on a citizen the right of free speech, assembly and

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association and this right may be ·e njoyed freely subject only to limita
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tions imposed by law.

si
5. Individuals and groups shall conduct their affairs in such a manner

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as to not violate any of the accepted canons ofbehaviour which is arrogant

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or offensive to the sensitivities of any group. No citizen should question

Q
the loyalty of another citizen on the ground that he belongs to a particular

community.1 63
A.
These commentaries qualifying the five "basic principles" included

contradictions which did not conform to existing laws and practices of the
country. For instance, in the first principle, "Islam" was made the official
religion of the country, but at the same time "other religions and beliefs"
were assured that "there shaII be no discrimination against any citizen on.
the ground of religion". Yet in Malaysian laws and practices, the
non-Malays were discriminated against on accqunt of religion which was

not "Islam". Moreover, considerable political a�d economic pressure had
been applied to convert the non-Muslims (especially non-Muslim na
tives) to Islam. The most controversial communal issues-like the
position of Islam, status of Malay as the only national language, the
special "p0sition of Malays and other Natives", and the rights of other
communities to acquire citizenship (enunciated in the third principle)
62
were preconceived on the grounds of the "special position" of Malays
7
over the non-Malays, In the fourth principle, there was another contradic
83
tion relating to the "rule of law". It was stated that "every citizen is equal
23
before the law". Itfurther stated that "fundamental rights were guaranteed
-
01
to all citizens-yet their "fundamental liberties" were subject to restric
tions 'imposed by the law". The last principle, however, referred mainly
03
to not offending the sensitivities of anybody, particularly by questioning
#
his loyalty to the nation "on the ground that he belongs to a particular
us
community".
in
In short, the government designed the Rukunegara in such a way that

jo
policies on communal issues would be accepted by al l com m uni ties. With

up
the promulgation of the Rukunegara Declaration, the government in

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tended to achieve "national unity" by peripheral participation of the non

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Malays, but not accommodating them into the body politic of Malaysia.
p
Again, there were Malay government leaders commi tted to building a

ap
national culture hy adopting a liberal cultural policy. Tan Sri Md. Ghazali
ts
bin Shafie, Minister of Information and the architect of Rukunegara,

ha
declared:
W
The Malaysian nation is indeed unique in having rich and diverse

si
cultural traditions and practices. We aspire to a society in which this

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diversity can be an asset and a source of strength.164

Ab
Ghazali further clarified that Rukunegara' s commitment to a na

Q
tional culture meant a Malay-based culture, and he qualified "Malay" by

A.
describing "the definite people of the country". 165 Clearly, this directly
contradicted Rukunegara' s "Five Beliefs", Thus, the conclusion may be
drawn that "the Rukunegara is directed primarily towards the creation
of a strong sense of political community rather than towards the stimu
lation ofa strong common feeling of national identity".166 In this way the
Malay ruling elite's assimilationist cultural policies contributed to drive
the lwo discrete communities apart rather than bringing them together.
The contradictions inherent in Rukunegara, which neither reflected

public consensus nor were consistent with government policies prompt
the questions: Why was the government committed to Rukunegara?
Secondly, by launchingRukunegara, what were the government's objec
tives?·
Answers to these questions are not difficult to find. The
62
government's main purpose in drawing up the Rukunegara, a new
7
ideology, was to obtain a multi-racial seal of approval to further its
83
politica� strategies. Besides the cultural issues, by the time Rukunegara
23
was promulgated to the Malay ruling clique, it was made clear that
-
01
political power must rest in the future predominantly with Malays.
03
The Malay political strategy towards this end became more evident
when at the end of Emergency Ruic, the government issued a "White
#
Paper" which suggested certain changes in the Constitution. These
us
changes were primarily to prevent non-Malays from threatening the
in
Malay position ever again. Earlier, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul
jo
Rahman, announced that he would retire in three weeks, and that

up
parliamentary rule would be reinstated in February 197 1 . He also de

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clared that the ensuing Parliament would be subject to certain restrictions.

G
The "White Paper", designed to reassure the Malay primacy, con

p
ap
tained two basic objectives: firstlY, " . ... to remove sensitive issues from the
realm of public discussions so as to allow the smooth functioning of
ts
parliamentary democracy;" and second ly "to redress the racial imbalance

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' in certain sectors of the nation 's life and thereby promote national
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unity .''1 67 As a precondition to realising the first objective, the g�vernment

si
asked all the political parties concerned to restrain themselves from

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public debate or criticism of those parts of the Constitution which were

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specified in theRukunegara·as "Sensitive Issues". These issues included

the powers and position of the Malay Rulers; Malay special rights; the use
Q
of Malay as the only national language; the position of Islam as the official
A.
religion and citizenship rights. The "White Paper" funher suggested that
any further amendments to the Constitution concerning these matters
could not be made without the approval of the C--0nference of Rulers.
However, to end public discussion on these issues the government,
empowered by its emergency decree, altered the "Sedition Ordinance" to
issue a "seditious tendency" ordinance, further cur�ing freedom of
speec h , press and publication.
To question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty

or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part Ill
of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 1 8 1 of the Federal
Constitution were considered to be seditious.168 These issues were
said to be so "sensitive" that the restrictions were even imposed on
members of Parliament, who were prohibited from questioning them
62
in parliamentary debates.
7
83
To accomplish the second objective the authorities suggested the
extension of the Malay "special position" principle to certain sectors such
23
as science, engineering and medicine, where Malay participation was
-
01
m inimal. For this, the "White Paper" proposed an amendment to the
Constitution empowering the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong to reserve seats for
03
Malays at post-secondary institutions "in those selected courses of study
#
where the numbers of Malays are disproportionately small".169 In this
us
way, the government ensured a greater proportion of Malays entering
technical sectors of education. However, this policy had an adverse effect
in
jo
on the quality of students, since better candidates were denied admission

on the grounds of their ethnic origin.
up
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Commenting on the "White Paper" containing these constitutional

G
amendments, the new Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak made it clear that
p
legislation ending public debate on "Sensitive Issues" was a precondition

ap
for the restoration of "democratic rule" in Malaysia. Thus, when Parlia

ts
ment was recalled on February 23, 1 97 1 , a Bill designed to remove

ha
"Sensitive Issues" from public debate or discussion was introduced.

W
These issues included the acceptance of Malay as the sole national

language, the "special position" of Malays and the institution of the
si
ba
constitutional monarchy. The Bill also contained a series ofother consti

tutional changes designed to "entrench" such issues in the Constitution,
Ab
making it impossible to alter wi�hout the approval of the Conference of

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Rulers. Tan S iew Sin, leader of the MCA, endorsed the government
measures but maintained that the Bill did not demonstrate an ideal model
A.
of democracy under parliamentary rule. He observed: "it is better to have

something less than a hundred per cent democracy than no democracy at
all"170Theopposition parties, mostly Chinese, who were held responsible
for the May 13 incidents and who, therefore, suffered the army atrocities,
were mostly disorganized. Among them only the Democratic Action
Party and the People's Progressive Party opposed the constitutional
amendments on the grounds that they severely curtailed the practices of
parliamentary democracy. After opposing the prohibition of public
/
discussion on "sensitive issues", the opposition leaders maintained that

such "issues" would then only create "underground problems" for
Malaysia.
After several days of debate, the government managed to pass the

proposed amendments to the Constitution with a vote of 1 25 to 17 in the
Dewan Ra'ayat on March 3, 197 1 .
7 62
d. Conclusion
83
These constitutional amendments not only severely curtailed the.
23
scope of parliamentary democracy in Malaysia, but also tended to
-
01
alienate the non-Malay communities from the political system.
03
These measures created an amputated democracy which neither
#
corresponded io Sukarno' s "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia, nor
us
Ayub's "Basic Democracy" in Pakistan, where the basic fundamental
rights of the people were guaranteed in the Constitutions. Malaysia was
in
now purely a "controlled" or "limited" democracy which , according to

jo
the new Prime Minister Tun Razak, was especially designed to

up
"suit.....present conditions". 171

ro
The particular clauses of the amended Constitution which prohibited

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public discussion of the so-called "sensitive issues" neither reflected

p
ap
popular public consensus, nor were harmonious with the values and
practices of parliamentary democracy. The Pri ?1e Minister claimed:
ts
ha
These amendments are considered very necessary to avoid the

W
recurrence of another May 13 incident... It is only in this way we can

si
guarantee the future of our democratic system ofGovernment and the

ba
unity .of our nation. 172

Ab
With the passing of the new laws, it soon became apparent that the
Q
restriction on raising "sensitive issue" was intended to maximize overall

Malay interests at the expense of the non-Malays. If this trend continues
A.
and fundamental issues (which the government branded as "Sensitive

Issues") are suppressed , democracy will die in Malaysia. This will not be
because of the opposition parties (as Tun Dr. Ismail believed), but
because of the ruling elite's new approach to national unity or integration.
The failure of national integration in Pakistan was inevitable because

the ruling junta had no belief in democratic processes, nor was it willing
to renounce its fundamental interests, even though the election results of
1 970 clearly signalled the. vict0ry of the Bengali counter-elite. Unlike

Pakistan, Malaysia's problems after the May 1 3 racial riots remained too
fluid to warrant prediction of the political future of the country . However,
with the passage of the new restrictive discriminatory laws it became
clear that the Malay ruling elite had deliberately altered the normal course
of parliamentary democracy, to ensure Malay primacy at all levels at the
62
cost of the legitimate rights of the non-Malays, who represented almost
half of the population.
7
83
This political strategy might have driven Chinese political opposi
23
tion underground-a situation which had existed when the country was
-
01
plunged into a State ofEmergency in the wake of the guerrilla insurgency
of 1 948- 1 960. In the event of underground resistance the possibility of a
03
military coup could not be ruled out. Having regard to the way in which
#
the Royal Malay Regiment was being expanded , following the May 1 3
us
riots, and the way military bureaucrats were given importance, it would
not be premature to predict that military rule would be inevitable in
in
jo
Malaysia's political development.

up
As mentioned earlier a military dictatorship has its own modus

ro
operandi. It is idle to suggest that it can, in any way, solve the problems
G
confronting the people of a country. Moreover, there was no evidence to

p
support the contention of the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, that
ap
future racial sensitivities woulct be provoked by the operation ofnormal

ts
democratic process·.113 It has already been discussed how parliamentary

ha
democracy was never honestly and sincerely tried in Malaysia or in

W
Pakistan. Thus the question of its suitability in Malaysian "conditions"

does not arise. After the traumatic events of May 1 3 the ruling elite,
si
ba
instead of surrendering to the wishes of the electorate, devised all possible

tactics to avoid communal issues by curtailing parliamentary democracy
Ab
and imposing a ruthless autocracy in the country in the name of"Sensitive

Q
Issues".
A.
The eventual breakdown ofracial or national integration in Malaysia ·

in May 1 969 should be viewed as a result of the national leadership's
continual refusal to reconcile itself to accept non-Malays into the body
politic of the country.
References
1. D.P. Singhal, Pakistan op. cit.,p. 37.
2. Jizya The Concept ofJizya was one of the methods of social expression of Islamic
-
toleration in the days of the Prophet Muhamad (S.M.) and under the Ottomans. It
was a kind of tax levied on the able-bodied male population among the non
Muslims, who were unwilling to go to war, but it was a compulsory duty for the
Muslims.
62
3. Jawaharlal Nehru·, Tll2 Discoverx_of India, New York: The John Day Company,
1 946,p. 269.
7
83
4. Jim Masselos, Nationalism on The Indian Swbcontinent: An Introductory History,
Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Limited, 1 972, p. 95, and also see R.C.
23
Majumder, History oftll2 Freedom Movement in India, Vol.I, Calcutta: .Firma K.L.
Mukhopadhyay, 1962, pp. 466-467.
-
01
5. The 1 857 Mutiny has al ways been recorded in history as "the Sepoy Mutiny of
1 857'', but since Partition in 1947, academics view the incident as India's First War
03
of Independence. Malik Salah-ud-din argues that it was a muljny on the part of the
British and not on the part of the Sepoys. Britons were pennitted to trade .o India
#
but in defiance of the (Indian) government framed an act of mutiny and the Sepoys
us
were ordered (by the Indian government) to subdue the British. For a detailed
account of the Sepoy Mutiny, see his 'Mutiny, Revolution or Muslim rebellion:
in
British Public Reactions Towards the Crisis or 1 857' ,Ph.D. thesis, McGill Univer
jo
sity, Montreal, 1966.

up
6. R.P. Dutt, India Today,op.ci t. , pp. 277-285, and also see J. Masselos, Nationalism
on the Indian Subconlinent . . . ,op. cit., pp. 62-73.
ro
7. R.D. Campbell, Pakistan: Emerging Democracy, op.cit., p. 12.

G
8. Quoted in Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistnn, London: Faber and Faber,
1 950, p. 3 1 .
p
Cited in Haridas Mukherjeeand Uma Mukherjee, India's FighJfor Freedom or 1112

ap
9.
Swa<kshi Movement (1905-1906), Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1959, P.
ts
20.
ha
10. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, TM A uJobiography ofAn Unknown Indian, London: Maanil

lan & Co. Ltd., 195 1 , p. 233.
W
11. See R . Symonds, op. cit., p.4 J ; and also see A.D. Rajput, Muslim leagw Yesterday
and Today, Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf; 1948,pp. 19-20.
si
12. Quoted in R.C. Majumdar, History of tll2 Freedom Movement in India, (Vol. II),
ba
Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhayay, 1963, p. 223. The debate of the partition of
Ab
Bengal, the Morley-Minto Reforms and the establishment of the Muslim League
have been treated in a number of monographs. See, inter a/ia, Lal Bahadur, TM
Q
Muslim league: Its History, Activities and Ach ievements , Agra: Agra Book Store,
1 954; K.K.Aziz, Britain and Muslim India: A study ofBritish Public Opinion vis
A.
a-vis the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947, London:

Heinemann, 1 963; S.A. Wolpert, Morley and India 1906-1910, Berkeley: Univer
sity of California Press, 1967; M.N. Das, India under Morley and Minto: Politics
Behind Revolution, Repression and Reforms, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1964,
and S.R. Wasti, lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905 to 1910,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 964.
13. Cited in D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhallach �ryya, Congress in Evolution: A Collection
of Congress Ruolwtions from 1885-1934 and other Important DocWMnts, Cal
<U lta The Book Company Lid., 1 93 5 , p. 1 18.
14. Sec tan Stephens, Pakistaft, (3rd edn.), London: Ernest B en n Limited, 1 967, p . 72 .
1 5. Quoted in Afzal Iqbal (ed.), Se/ut Writings and Speeches of Maulana Moluuned
Ali, Vol. I (2nd edn.), Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1963,p. 94.
16. Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict, Crises and War in Pakistan, London: The Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1 972, p. 35.
17. K.U. Ahmad, op. cit, p. 17.
18. R. Gopal, Indian Muslims, A Polilical History, Calcutta: Asia Publishing House,
1959, p. 99. For the Full tcxr of Jinnah's 14 Points, see Maurice Gwyer and A.
Appadorai, Speeches and Docunumts on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947, Vol.
62
I, London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 244-245; and also see B.R.
Ambedlcar, op. cit., p. 247-248.
7
83
19. Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Presidential Address, Allahabad Session, December
1 930, Delhi: All-India Muslim League, 1945, p. 12.
23
20. Choudhry Rahmat A Ii, Pakistan the Fatherland ofthe Pak.Nation, London: The Pak
-
National Liberation Movement, 1947, p. 225.
01
21. D.P. Singhal, op. cit., p . 60.
K.U. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 2 1 , and also see K.B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 6.
03
22.
23. M.A. Jinnah, quoted in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.).,SollU! Recenl Speeches and
Writings ofMr. Jinnah, op. cit., pp. 154 and 209.
24. ibid., p. 1 19. #
us
25. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The EllU!rgence ofPakistan, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1967, p. 48.
in
26. Quoted in K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative ... , op. cit., pp. 159-160.
jo
27. M.A. Jinnah, quoted in K.U. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 6.

up
28. Debates, Constitu.ent Assembly by Pakistan, Vol V,March 7, 1949, Karachi: Gov
ernment of Pakistan Press, 1949, p. 3.
ro
29. Ulama -is an Arabic word-means those people who are educated in the laws and
G
religion of Islam.
30. Zimmies: Arabic word - referring to non-Muslims who can be accorded social and
p
ap
cultural rights but not political rights. See Munir Report (Report of the Court of
Inquiry into the Punjab disturbances of 1953), Lahore: West Punjab Government
ts
Press, 1954, pp. 2 1 2-219.

ha
31. G.P. Bhattacharjee, Renaissance and Freedom MovellU!nt in Bangladesh, Calcutta:

The Minerva Associates, 1973, p. SS.
W
32. Herbert Feldman, A ConstituJion For Pakistan, London: Oxford University Press,
si
1955, p.4; and also sec The Indian Independence Act, 1 947, Clause 8, Section 2.
ba
33. A representative of the Scheduled Castes, usually referred to as "untouchables".

34. Dawn (Delhi), July 13, 1947, Editorial - "From Founder to Builder".
Ab
35. Quoted in The Pioneer (Allahabad), October 17, 1937.

36, M.A. Jinnah, quoted in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Mr.
Q
Jinnah, Vol. II, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964, p. 490.

37. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. II, February 25,
A.
1948, pp. 15 and 17.

38. He is now the Principal of Bangla College, Dacca.
39. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Speeches and Writings ofMr. . Jinnah, Vol. II. op. cit.,
p. 490.
40. Constiluent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. 8, November 2 1 , 1950, p. 1 83
(speech by Nur Ahmed).
41. The Students' League was the first student organization which launched the historic
language movement in 1952.
42. The Board was formed with religious leaders to help the BPC to frame the
Constitution of Pakistan on Islamic principles.

43. Dawn (Karachi), December 20, 1953; and also see Talukder Maniruzzaman,
'Political Development in Pakistan, 1 955- 1 958', Ph.D. dissertati'on, Queen's Uni
versity, Canada, 1 966, p. 88.
44. See Dawn (Karachi), January 6, 1 954.
45. Dawn (Karachi), January 22, 1 954.
46. The Economist (London), June 5, 1 954.
47. The Mail (Dhaka), March 13, 1 954.
62
48. R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in... ., op, cit., p. 30; and also see Ataur Rahman Khan,
7
Ojaratir Dui Bachara (Two Years of Chief Ministership), Dacca: Avijan Printing
83
House, 1964; Abu I Mansur Ahmad,Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchasa Bachara (Fifty
Years ofPolitics As I Saw It.), Dacca: Nauroj Kitabistan, 1968. These two Awami
23
League leaders argued that the Central Government's undue interference in their
-
administration was an attempt to keep them out of gear. ·
01
49. G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, London: Longmans,
03
Green & Co., 1959 p. 1 4 8; and also see Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics
.
in Pakistan, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1 959, pp. 14- 1 8. For detailed
#
judgement of the case, see Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan
London: Oxford University Press, 1 957; and Chief Court of Sind, DLR, Moulvi
us
Tamizuddin Khan Vs. Federation of Pakistan, Supplementary !Ssue Vol. VIII, pp.
in
96- 1 2 1 .
50 Dawn (Karachi), March 26, 1 955.
jo
51. H.S.Suhrawardy quoted in G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional DevelopmenJ in Paki

up
stan, op. cit., p. 151.

52. K.U. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 74.
ro
53. ConstituenJAssembly (Legislature) ofPakistan, Debates Vol. l, Scptember 3, I 955,

G
p. 1436 (speech by Fazhur Rahman).

p
54, ConstituenJ Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates, VoLI, September 12,

ap
1 955, p. 680 (speech by H.S. Suhrawardy).

55. Quoted in the Report of the Electoral Reforms Commission, Karachi: Government
ts
of Pakistan Press, . 1956; and also in G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United
ha
Pakistan, op. cit., p. 5.

W
56. ibid., p. 6.
57. Lawrence Ziring, 'The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan: East Pakistan and the
si
Central Government, 1947-58', Ph.D. dis s ertation, Columbia University, 1 962, p.

ba
263.
58. NAP Constitution quoted in G.P. Bhauacharjee, op. cit., p. 1 87.
Ab
59. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, 1958-1964, Vol. 8, Karachi:
Ferozsons, n.d., pp. 1 -2; and also quoted in R. Jahan, Pa kistan: Failure in ... , op. cit.,
Q
p. 55.
A.
60. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, Kara
chi: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 56-58.
61. A . Khan, Friends Not .... , op. cit., p . 1 88.
62. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, London: Jonathan Cape,
1 970, pp. 87-88.
63. The New York Times, October 1 9, 1 958.
64. The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 76.
65. Only 20 per cent were selected purely on merit basis, while 40 per cent had to be
chosen from East and West Pakistan respectively.
66. The standard of 5'6 1/2" in height and 1 25 lbs. in weight were fixed for the Defence
Services of Pakistan. Generically East Pakistanis (Bengal is) are a people of short
heightand light weight. Because of these limitations, plus the myth of "martial" and
"non-martial races", it was hard to find many Bengalis who could also meet these
standards for the Defence Services. See A.M.A. Muhith, op. cit., p. 62.
67. See The Constituiion ofthelslamic Republic ofPakistan - modifiedup toApril 1968,
op. cit., Articles 66 and 80, pp 45 and 52.
68. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Palitics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 197 1 , p. 1 6. See also Badruddin Umar, "Basic Democ
62
racies and Convention League", Thi! Pakistan Observer (Dacca), January 24 , 1969.
7
69. G.W. Choudhury, The last Days ofUnited Pakistan, Western Australia, University
83
of Western Australia, 1 974.
70. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Amader Banchar Dabi: Chaya Dafa Karmasuchi (Six
23
Point Formula: Our Demand/or Survival). op, cit., pp. 2- 1 1 ; and also see Talukder
-
Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution AndIts Aftermath, Dacca: Bangladesh
01
Books International Ltd., 1980, I'!'· 22-23.
03
71. Thi! Pakistan Observer (Dacca), January 7 , 1 968.
72. G.G.B. Budruddin, Election HandBook, 1970, Karachi: 1970, p. 3 1 ; also quoted in
#
G.W. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 123.
73. See The Pakistan Times (Lahore) , February 25, 1969; and also quoted i n G.P.
us
Bhattacharjee, op. cit. ,pp. 23 1 -232.
in
74. For a full tel\t of Mujib's statement at the RTC, see G.S. Bhargava, Pakistan in
Crisis, 1969, Appendix JV, pp. 201-206..
jo
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.,

75. �
Peo le's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and
up
Documents, Dacca: n.d., p. 52.

76. See Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Is
ro
lamabad: Government of Pakistan Press, August 5, 1 97 1 , Appendix B, The Legal

G
Framework Order, p. 25.

p
77. ibid.
ap
78. ibid.
79. ibid.
ts
80. See reports by Peter Hai.elhurst on background to the Bangladesh "disaster" in Thi!
ha
Times (London), June 4, 1 97 l .

W
81. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), December 22, 1 970.

82. Dawn (Karachi), December 25, .1970.
si
83. Until March 1, 197 1 , the demand for a separate State for the Bengalis did not arise.
ba
It was only after Yahya's postponement announcement for the Assembly session
that both the Bhashani and Muzaffar factions, commonly known as the pro-Peking
Ab
and the pro-Moscow NAP, called for a declaration of Independence. Later, the
radicals of the Awami League and its st11dents front (Students' League) also urged
Q
Mujibto declare Independence but Mujib, until March 26 , 197 1 stood for a peaceful
A.
political settlement.
See R. Jahan, op. cit., p. 1 94.
84. By March 7, 197 1 , all branches of the Civil'administration in East Pakistan began
to respond to Mujib's call. Even the Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High Court
refused to swear in General Tikka Khan, President Yahya's nominee, as Governor
of the province.
85. The 12 leaders invited to the RTC were:
l. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Awami League);
2. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan People's Party);
3. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (Pakistan Muslim League);
4. Mr. Nurul Amin (Pakistan Democratic Party);

5. Mian Mumtaz Daulatana (Pakistan Muslim League - Council);
6. Khan Abdul Wali Khan (National Awami Party);
7.- Maulana Mufti Mahmood (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e�lslam);
8. Maulana Shah Ahmed Nurani (Jamiat.ul- U lema-e-Pakistan);
9. Mr .' Abdul Ghafur Ahmed (Jamaat-e-lslami);
10. Mr.Mohammad Jamal Koreja (Pakistan Muslim League - Convention);
11. Major-General Jamal Dar-Representing Tribal Areas.
62
1 2. Malik Jehangir Khan Representing Tribal Areas.
See White Paper on The Crisis In East Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 1 1 - 1 2.
7
86. Dawn (Karachi), March 4, 1971.
83
87. ibid., March 5, 1 97 1 .
23
88. ibid.,
89. See report by Hazelhurst, The Times (London), June 4, 1 97 1 .
-
01
90. The East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles as well as the police force
of th11 provincial Gove.mmenl in East Pakistan, all expressed their allegiance lo
03
Mujib. See G.W. Choudhury, op, cit., pp. 164- 1 65.
91. Malaysia was called 'Malaya' until 1963 when the Federation of Malaysia was
formed.
#
us
92. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Vol.
4 1 8, 1 946-47, p 58 See also Sir Harold MacMichael, Report on a Mission to
. .
in
Malaya October 1945 - January 1946, London: H.M.S.O., Colonial No. 194, 1946.
jo
93. The Straits Tinus (Singapore), October 13, 1 945.

94. K.J. Ratnam, Communalism'and Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Uni
up
versity of Malaya Press, 1 965, p. 43.

ro
95. See Robert 0. Tilman Bure;;ucratic Transition in Malaya, op. cit., n. 66, p. 33.
G
96. Utusan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur), December 22, 1 945.

L.D. Gammans, a British M.P. who vi sited Malaya with Rees-Williams in 1946,
p
asserted that Malaya had the makings of another Palestine in the sense that there
ap
would be trouble unless the powers and positions of the Sultans were restored and
ts
the provision of the citizenship rights restricted.

ha
See L.D. Gammans, "Crisis in Malaya", The Spectator, Vol. 176 (1946), p. 60 1 ;
idem, "The Situation in Malaya", World"Affairs, Vol. 2 (October 1 948), pp. 353-
W
356; and Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), 30 May 1 946.

97. See The Times (Londen). April 1 6, 1946. For a detailed account of the protests of
si
the British officials, see Sir Richard 0. Winsted!, "Sharp Practice in Malaya", The
ba
Spectator, March 8 , 1 946, p. 237; B. Whittingham-Jone.• , "Malaya Betrayed",

Ab
WorldReview (May 1946), pp. 1 4-21 ; A.G. Morkill, "The Malayan Union",Asiatic
Review, Vol. 42 (April 1 946), pp. 1 8 1 - 1 87, and the Malay Mail (Kuala LIDTlpur), 27
Q
April 1946.
98. Victor Purcell, "A Malayan Union: The Proposed New Constitution", Pacific
A.
Affairs, Vol 19, no. 1 (March 1946), p. 38.

99. Straits Times (Singapore), July 26, 1 946.
100. K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and .. ., op. cit., p. 1 5 1 .
101. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956,
p. 44 .
102. The 12 years' struggle is usually referred to in Malaya as "the Emergency". The
armed communists were called "communist terrori s ts" (CTs in official parlance)
and the forces deployed against them were collectively called the "security forces".
Sec J.M. Gullick, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 1 12, n.-1.
103. Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs who was appointed Director of Operations
in Malaya in April 1950 initiated the resettlement operation commonly known as
the Briggs Plan. See Edgar O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 97- 1 16.
I 04. 0. Lyttleton quoted in Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Modern ... , op. cit., p. 47,
.
105. General Sir Gerald Templer quoted in V. Purcell, ibid., p. 55.

106. Gordon P. Means, Malaysianf'olitics, London: Hodd and Stoughton, 1976, p. 162.
1 07. After the Kuala Lwnpur municipal elections, the IMP met its natural death, and
thereafter its leader Dato' Onn founded a new political party, the Party Negara.in
62
February 1954.
108. Dato' Onn quoted in the editorial, The Straits Times (Singapore), 7 July 1955.
7
109. See Menuja Kearah Kemerdekaa , Kuala Lumpur: Alliance National Council, n.d.
83
1 10. Federation ofMalaya Information Services, Bulletin, no. 6072/56, Kuala Lumpur:
23
Government Press, 1956, pp. 1-2.
1 1 1. See Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Fede�atiolt ofMalaya Constitu
-
01
tional Commission, 1 957, Colonial no. 330, op. cit., pp. 70-7 1 .
1 12. Tunku Abdul Rahman quoted in The Straits Times (Kuala Lwnpur), 1 8 March
03
1957.
1 13. Tunku quoted in The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), April 23, 1956.
1 14.
#
John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia,. A Study of UMNO and PAS, Kuala
us
Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1980, p. 48.
1 15. See The Straits Times (Kuala Lwnpur), May 28, 196 1 ; Sunday Times (Kuala
in
Lumpur), May 28, 1961 ;,and the Federation of Malaya, Departmentoflnformation,

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Malaysia, no. 2, April 1962, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1962, p.6.
1 16. Historically, Malaya and Singapore had ample social, economic and political ties.
up
When the Malayan Union was formed in 1946, Singapore was officially separated
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from the Union and became a separate Crown colony.

1 17. See Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, llhaca: Cornell University Press,
G
1964, p.4.
p
1 18. G.P. Means, op. cit., p. 295.

ap
1 19. Singapore Ministry of Culture, Year of Fulfilment, June 1961 June 1 962,
-
ts
Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 45.

Singapore Ministry of Culture, Year of Fulfilment, op. cit., p. 29.
ha
1 20.
121. Lee Kuan Yew quoted i n The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), September 29, 1962.
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1 22. See the Tunku 's speech in the Times ofMalaya (Pcnang), Septc;mber 25, 1962.
123. See Federation of Malaya, Dewan Ra' ayat Debates, �of.III, no. 16 (October 1 6,
si
1961), Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1961, cols. 1 590- 1613.

ba
124. G.P. Means, op. cit., p. 294.

The Government of Brunei decided to stay out of the Federation due largely to
Ab
125.
disagreernent over financial matters, see R.S. Milne, op. cit., p. 65. For a detailed
Q
account of the formation of Malaysia, see M. Noordin Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 125-182.
126. Straits Budget (Kuala Lwnpur), July 3, 1963.
A.
127. The Guardian (Manchester), July 5, 1963.

128. Straits Budget (Singapore),July 10, 1963.
129. SeeMalaysia: Agreement Concluded between the Uni.tedKingdomo/GrealBrilain
and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and
Singapore (Cmd. 22 of 1963), Singapore: Government Pre11, 1963, p. 226,
hereafter cited as Malaysia Agreement Annex J.
-
130. The Straits Times (Kuala Lwnpur), July 22, 1965.

131. Strails Budget (Kuala Lumpur), October 3 , 1962.
132. Timu ofMalaya (Penang), September 30, 1963.
13�. The Straits Tim.es (Kuala Lwnpur), March 2, 1964.

1 34. People's Action Party, Election Manifesto of the PAP, Singapore: PAP Political
·
Bureau, 1 964, p. 4.
1 35. Malay Mail (�uala Lumpur), April 24, 1964.
136. Quoterl in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1968, p, 297.
137. Boon- Ngee Cham, op. cit., pp. 478-479.
138. G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., p. 354.
1 39. K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliam.entary Elect ion of1964, op. cit.,
62
p. 368.
1 40. K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process .. ., op. cit., Table 8, p. 1 87.
7
141. T.G. McGee, "The Malayan Elections of 1 959: A Study in Electoral Geography"
83
Journal a/Tropical Geography, Vol.16 (October 1 96�). p. 74.
23
142. Federation of Malaya, Report ofthe Federation ofMalaya Constitutional Commis
sion, 1956-1957, Kuala Lumpur: The Government Printer, 1957, p. 7 1 .
-
The Guardian (Manchester), May 9 , 1975.
01
143.
144. Utusan Melayu (Kuala Lwnpur), March 30, 1965.
03
145. R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of1969, Kuala Lwnpur: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1 972, p. 66;
146.
#
For a detailed account of the election manifestos of the contesting parties in the 1969
us
general elections, see R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of1969, op. cit.,
Appendix I, pp. 56-72.
in
1 47. Alliance Manifesto 1969; An Even Beller Deal/or all, Kuala Lumpur: April 1 969,p.
jo
I.
1 4 8. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, May 1 3 , Before and After, op. cit., p. 75.
up
1 49. See The National Operations Council, The May 13 .... , op. cit., pp. 29-3 1 ; and Tunku
ro
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 75-84.

G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., p. 397.
G
150.
151. The National Operations Council, hereafter it is cited as The NOC Report, op. cit.,
p
p. 37.
ap
1 52. The previous State of Emergency declarerl in 1948 when Malaysia was still under
'
ts
colonial rule lasted until after Independence, and was lifted only in I 960.
ha
153. G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, op. cit., p. 398.

1 54. G.P. Means, "Malaysia" in Robert N. Kearney (erl.), op. cit., p. 1 88.
W
155. Quoterl in Garth Alexander, op. cit., p. 97.

156. Quoted in The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 2 1 , 1969.
si
157. The total figures of deaths in these incidents were di sputed. The official figure was
ba
5, see Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Baj, op. cit. p. 1 1 3. Reporter Bob Reece
Ab
estimated that 15 Indians and 2 Chinese were killed; see his "Pigs and Goats", For
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXV, no. 28 (July 10, 1969).
Q
158. See The NOC Report, op. cit., p. 8 1 .

159. The Strails Times (Kuala Lwnpur), June 2 1 , 1969.
A.
160. The NOC Report, op. cit., (emphasis added), p. 80.

161. The Straits Tim.es (Kuala Lumpur), January 13, 1 970.
1 62. Rukun is an Arabic word which means "five pillars of Islam'',while R ukunegara is
translated as "basic principles of the Nation". See Government of Malaysia,
R ukunegara, Kuala Lµmpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1 970.
163. Rukunegara, op. cit., pp 15- 17.
164. Tan Sri Md. Ghazali bin Shafie, Nation-Building, Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Peneran
gan Malaysia, 1974, pp. 8-9.
165. ibid., pp. 3 and 7.
166. D.S. Gibbons, uNational Integration and Cultural Diversity: The Case of Malaysia"
in S.S. Hsueh (ed.), Development in SouJheast Asia: Issues and Dilemmas, Hong
Kong: Southeast Asian Social Science A ssociation, 1 972, p. 130.
167. Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony, op, cit., p 2.
168. See Government of Malaysia, Emergency Ordinance No.45 of 1970, as quoted in
Patrick Low (ed.), Proceedings and Background Paper of Seminar on Trends in
Malaysia, �ingapore: Institute of Southeast A s ian Studies, 197 1 , pp. 1 9-20.
1 69. Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony, op. cit., p. 6.
62
170. The Strait Times, Feb rua ry 24, 197 1 .
171. Quoted in The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) February 24, 1 97 1 .
7
172. Q\loted in Malaysian Digest, Kuala Lumpur: February 197 1 , p. 3.
83
173. The NOC Report, op. cit. (emphasis added), p. 80.
- 23
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5
62
C ONC LUSION
7
83
In this stuCly an attempt has been made to review the problems of
23
nation-building in the new states during the post-colonial period . Most of
-
the new states were characterized by demographic features which
01
emphasized multi-ethnic and multi-cultural interaction rather than
03
homogeneous social systems. The political institutions which often were
#
borro·wed wholesale from the West, which in tum had developed them
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gradually over several centuries, tended to heighten the cleavages in the
social systems of the new statesrather than integrate their plural societies.
in
In particular, we have examined the growth of political party systems in

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both Pakistan and Malaysia that exploited communalis·m, parochialism

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and ethnic chauvinism to effect maximum support from a divided and

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politically inexperienced electorate by placing great emphasis on oppor

G
tunistic, and short-term strategies. Widespread illiteracy has often been

p
quoted by political scientists as a major cause of extremist tendencies and

ap
political instability in the new states. Yet, ofgreater significance was the
ts
lack of political awareness and realism and a capacity to distinguish

ha
political rhetoric from reality which characterized the mass of the

W
population. Political leadership and the party system, given their narrow
interests, did no more than exploit these features in their own interests.
si
ba
Pakistan was divided both geographically and culturally. The East

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ern wing suffered a lower level of economic development and received

a smaller proportion of government revenues. Over a period of time,
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political power increasingly became the prerogative of the West Pakistan

A.
military-economic elite. Pakistan's only semblance of unity was the

common religion o( Islam.
Malaysia was (and still is) divided not only by racial, ethnic, cultural
and religious differences, but also by · economic disparity between
indigenous and immigrant groups, as well as the political dominance and
entrenched position of the indigenous Malay population. Malaysia is
united only by virtue of its geographical contiguity and national bounda
ries.
Having analyzed and explored these three issues i n relation to

Pakistan and Malaysia, the resultant conclusion is that political suppres
sion was of paramount importance in the failure to attain national
integration, and a particular aspect was the failure to adhere to principles
ofrepresentative democracy. Political suppression is highlighted because
of its penetration of and presence in all aspects of an emerging nation's
62
life.
7
It may be seen that the demise of democracy in Pakistan spelled the
83
inevitable dismemberment of the nation into West Pakistan (now Paki
23
stan) and &st Pakistan (now Bangladesh). West Pakistan's ruling
-
military and economic elite gained power disproportionate to it's number',
01
and exercised that power to a considerable extent, favouring it's own
03
community and interest groups.
#
Pakistan's authoritarian political system as devised by its founders
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was sustained and later strengthened by successive regimes of Martial
in
Law. These authoritarian policies were pursued in the main by and for the
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benefit of the West Pakistani elites. In this way their power was estab
up
l ished and maintained at all levels at the expense of the &st Pakistanis,
who formed the majority of Pakistan's population. Th us the East had no
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confidence in the political system or process since it was largely from the
central administrative structure. The abandonment of the principles ofde
p
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mocracy as the basis of political power in Pakistan was inextricably

ts
l inked to the divisive tendencies in the nation. This led to the division of
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Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh in late 197 1 .
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I n a political system where one component group has had its interests
si
constantly undervalued and its rights denied while another component

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has laid claim to and exercised preponderant control, it becomes clear that
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w here systematic change is not possible, continued participatic:m in and

efforts by the oppressed group to integrate with that system are perceived
Q
to be counter-productive. Continued support for a national entity within

A.
which the role, status and bargaining power of a constituent group are
undervalued or disregarded is not to be expected from that group, and it
is on the basis of this general analysis that the breakup of Pakistan in 1971
is explicated.
In contrast, Malaysia's disunity does not involve convergent issues.

Political, economic and military power are not the exclusive property
of one population group, but are distributed amongst constituent
Conclusion 235
communities. Broadly, indigenous Malays hold political and military

power whilst the immigrants have the economic power.
It is clear that democratic principles were abrogated in favour of the

interests of the Malays, the politically entrenched and domina.nt sector of
the population . Under colonial-domination Malaysia suffered the typical
British strategy of 'divide and rule' which established racialism as the
62
foundation of the political structure. A framework favouring political
7
suppression and an inclination towards the principles of limited, rather
83
than genuine representative democracy, was introduced. The rejection of
23
the Malayan Union Plan by the Malays heralded the adoption of the
-
system allowing special rights and privileges to the Malay sector of the
01
population.
03
The immigrant Chinese and Indian groups were discriminated
#
against by ci tizenship laws, and the Malays sole preserve on political
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power was tightened and institutionalized. The Emergency period polar
in
ized the situation further: the police and army largely comprised Malays,
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with the immigrant Chinese classed as guerrillas and suspected terrorists.

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The Emergency widened the existing divisions and further complicated

political life. After the events of 1 969, the government forbade debate on
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inter-racial grievances; the powers and position of the Malay ·Rulers;

citizenship; Malay special rights; the use of Malay as the sole national
p
ap
language; the preponderance of Malays in the Civil Service and Military;

and a whole range of preferences given to Malays. Thus, in Malaysia as
ts
ha
in Pakistan, authoritarian solutions were applied to national problems.

W
It is argued that Malaysia 's relative wealth prevented the tensions

si
generated by political suppression to escalate to a force capable of

ba
disrupting the country. Another arguments is that the opposed commu

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nities still needed lo interact, since the. immigrant communities had the
economic power while the indigenous communities retained political
Q
power. This provided a basis for negotiations between the protagonists,

A.
thus actually promoting and enhancing a degree of national integration.
It may be noted that currently an attempt is being made to remove the

economic disparities between the communities by 1990. Up to the
present, the New Economic Policy (NEP) programme has met with
limited success. It is suggested that should the Malays, as prime movers
of the NEP, direetly use their political dominance to gain economic
parity, grave tensions could result leading to a disturbance of the fragile
balance of complementary interests upon which the nation rests.
The conclusion of the analysis of the problems of Pakistan and

Malaysia is that the national integration for both countries has been
inextricably connected to the political problem of intercommunication
between two mutually inconsistent ideologies. These ideologies may be
summarized as authoritarianism, or limited democracy on the one hand,
and representative democracy with the voicing of political aspirations of
62
all groups on the other. In both Pakistan and Malaysia an inclination
towards authoritarianism works against bridging the differences between
7
83
the comm unities, thus precluding reciprocal participation and interaction
which is an essential function of national integration. The division of
23
Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh and the dangers facing Malaysia
-
01
are tlie result of the adoption of authoritarian polie ies that have hampered
03
development and fostered separatism, causing disaffection and commu
nal division instead of integration.
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APPENDIX 1
7 62
83
The Eleven Points of the East Pakistan Students' All-Party Committee
of Action are :
23
1. a) Restoration of provincialized colleges to their original status.
-
01
b) Extension in number of schools and colleges.
c) Night shift arrangements in provincial colleges.
03
d) Fifty per cent reduction in tuition fees.
#
e) Bengali as medium of instruction as well as work in all
us
offices.
in
t) Hostel charges to be subsidized by fifty per cent.

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g) Increase in salaries of teachers.

h) Free and compulsory education up to class VIII.
up
i) Medical University to be set up and Medical Council Ordi-

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nance to be withdrawn.
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j) Facilities for condensed course for polytechnic students.

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k) Train and bus concessions.

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1) Job guarantee.
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m) Repeal of University Ordinance and full autonomy for uni

ha
versities.
W
n) Repeal of National Education Commission and Hamoodur

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Rahman Reports.
ba
2. Parliamentary democracy on basis of universal franchise.

Ab
3. a) Federal form of government and sovereign legislature.

b) Federal government's powers to be confined to defence, for
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eign policy, and currency.

A.
4. Sub-federation of Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province',

and Sind with regional autonomy for each unit.
5. Nationalization of banks, insurance companies and all big indus-
tries.
6. Reduction in rates of taxes and revenues on peasants.
7. Fair wages and bonus for workers.
8. Flood control measures for East Pakistan.
9. Withdrawal of all emergency laws, security acts and other pro
hibitive orders.
10. Quit SEATO,CENTO and Pakistan-US military pacts.

11. Release of all detainees and political prisoners including those of
Agartala Conspiracy Case.
Source : Translated from Sangbad (Dacca), January 6, 1970, cited in
G.P.Bhattacharjee, Renaissance and Freedom Movement in Bang
ladesh, Calcutta: The Minerva Associates, 1973, pp.3 1 5-3 16.
7 62
83
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APPENDIX 2
Elections to the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1970
(Number of votes serurcd by each political party and its percentage to total valid votes polled)
Total Pakistan East Pakistan The Punjab Sind N-W F.P.

Baluchistan
Total of Registered voters 55,207,547 29,479,386 16,364,495 5,335,523 3 ,072,098 956,045
Total of valid votes polled 32,364,280 16,454,278 10,,879,056 3,1 17,988 1 ,439,7 1 8 373,240
Total invalid votes polled 1 ,059,152 - 550,885 367,584 . 87,460 38,728 14,495
Total of votes polled 33,323,432 17,005,163 1 1 ,246,640 3,205,448 1 ,478,446 387,735
parties
1. Pakistan People's Party 6,148,623 4,532,501 1 ,401 ,660 205,593 8,869
1 9.5% - 4 1 .6% 44.9% 1 4.2% 2.3%
2. Pakistan Muslim League 1 ,465,377 175,822 589,150 333,694 325,884 40,8Z7
4.5% 1.0% 5.4% 10.7% 22.6% 1 0.9%
A.
3. Pakistan Muslim League 1 ,083,912 464 , 1 85 555,71 2 55,759 8,256
Q (Convention) 3.3% 2.8% 5.1% 1.7% 0.5%
4. Pakistan Muslim League 1 ,963,562 274,453 1 ,377,006 21 3,383 57,690 4 1 030
(Council) 6.0% 1.6% 12.6% .6 .8% 4.0% 10.9%
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5. Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam 1 ,306,038 158,058 571,351 135,507 366,471 74651
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(West Pakistan) 4.0% 0.9% 5.2% 4.3% 25.4% 20.0%
6. MJUP 1 ,308,878 1 ,076,439 232,195 244
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W 4.0% 9:8% 7.4% 0.0%
7. National Awami Party
ha 757,499 3 1 0,986 - l l ,4Z7 266,282 168,804
(Wali Group) 2.3% 1 .8% 0.3% 1 8.4% 45. 1 %
8. Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan 1 ,937,183 991,908 5 15,538 321 ,471 1 03935 4331
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6.0% 6.0% 4.7% 10.3% 7.2% 1.1%
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9. Pakistan Democratic Party
p 737,960 483,571 265,955 2,398 4,642 1,934
2.2% 2.9% 2.2% 0.04% 0.3% 0.3%
JO. All Pakistan Awami League
G 12,361,868 12,338,929 8,089 7,7 1 3 3,170 3,965
38.3% 74.9% 0.07% 0.07% 0.2% 1.0%
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1 1. Independents up 2,300,627 56 1 ,083 1 ,292,285 335,366 86,488 28,405
7.1% 3.4% 1 1.8% 10.7% 6.0% 6.8%
Note
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: The above figures do not include the number of contesting candidates. in constiwencies where proceedings were terminated due to the cy-
clones and the death of three of the contesting candidates in East Pakistan.
in
Sowce : G.W. Oioudhury.'The Last Days of United Pakistan, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press,
us 1974, Table 5.4 p. 129.
#
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APPENDIX 3
7 62
Under the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, there were two main
83
features of the provisions for federal citizenship:
23
1) Automatic Acquisition of Federal Citizenship, and
-
01
2) Acquisition of Federal Citizenship by Application.
03
1) Automatic Acquisition ofFederal Citizenship
#
From and after the appointed day the following persons would
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automatically be Federal citizens:
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a) any subject, whenever born, of His Highness the Ruler of an:y

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State;
b) any British subject born at any time in either of the Settle
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ments, who is permanently resident, (that is to say, has com

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pleted a continuous periOd of 15 years' residence) anywhere in

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the territories to be comprised in the Federation;

c) any British subject born at any time, in any of the territories
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now to be comprised in the Federation whose father, either

ha
i) was himself born in any of these territories; or

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ii) has resided therein for continuous periOd of not less than 15
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years;
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d) any person born at any time in any of the territories now to be

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comprised in the Federation, who habitually sp�s the Malay

language and conforms to Malay custom;
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e) any person born in any of these territories at any time, both of

A.
whose parents were born in and have been resident in any of

such territories for a continuous periOd of not less than 15
years; and
f) any person whose father is, at the date of that perosn 's birth, a
Federal citizen.
2) Acquisition ofFederal Citizenship by Application

The High Commissioner might grant a certificate conferrin g the
Appendix 24 1
status of a Federal citizen on any person who applied there for and
satisfied the High Commissioner that either:
i) he was born in any of the territories now to be comprised in the
Federation and had been resident in any one or more of such
territories for not less than 8 out of 12 years preceding his
application; or
ii) he had been resident in any one or more off those territories for
62
not less than 15 out of the 20 years immediately preceding his
7
application;
83
23
and that 'he is of good character, possesses an adequate knowledge
-
of the Malay or English language, has made a declaration of perma
01
nent settlement in the prescribed form , and if his application is
03
approved, that he is willing to take the citizenship oath'.
#
See Federation of Malaya, Summary of Revised Constitutional
us
Proposals, Cmd.71 71 , London: H.M.S.0. 1 947, p. 1 1 ; and also see
in
The Federation ofMalaya Agreement, 1948 , reprinted with amend- ·

jo
me�1ts, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952, pp.40-43.

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A.
INDEX
Abdul Hakim Khan, 134 Assam, l 00; Assam Muslim League, 1 20

Abdul Hamid, Justice, 1 85 Ataturk, Kamal, 103
· Abdul Qayum Khan, Khan, 1 24 Ataur Rahman, 133
Abdur Rahim, Maulana, 166 Aun, Dr. Lim Swee, 210
62
Abdul Rahman, Enche Senubin, 206, 210 Aurangzeb, 97
7
Abdul Rahman, Tun Dr. Ismail, 2 1 5, 217 Autobiography (Nehru), 4
83
Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 1 8 1 , 1 83, 1 84, Awakened Women 's Forces, 176
1 86 , 1 88, 1 89, 190, 195, 1 97, 200, 208, Awami League (AL), 49, 120-123, 129,
23
210, 212, 22 1 ; Anti-Tunku campaign, 130, 1 3 1 , .1 32, 133, 1 34, 145, 146, 149,
-
216 150, 153, 154, 160, 162, 163, 1 64, 167,
01
Abdul Razak, Tun, 9 1 , 192, 2 1 0 , 2 1 4, 222, 168; 42-point manifesto of, 120
03
224 Ayub Khan, Mohammad, 45, 62, 64, 1 10,
Abdul Wali Khan, Khan, 1 53, 160 1 19, 1 27, 128, 135, 136, 1 37, 1 38, 139,
#
Abdul Sattar, Pirzada, 128 140, 142, 1 43 , 144, 145, 146, 147, 149,
Abul Kasem, Professor, 1 14 1 50, 152, 1 53, 155, 1 56, 1 57, 1 58, '162,
us
Abut Kasem Khan, 142 168, 223; Anti-Ayub Movement in
East Pakistan, 145- 146, 1 52- 1 57; Eco
in
Afro-Asian countries, 3, 192

Aga Khan, 1 02 nomic policy of, 138; Twenty-Year
jo
Agartala Conspiracy Case, 146, 150-152, Perspective Plan (1965-1985), 45

up
154, 155, 238 Aziz Ahmed, 143

Agong, Yang Di-Pertuan, 215, 2 1 8, 219,
ro
222 Baluchistan, 7, 39, 1 22, 1 28 , 1 29, 160, 1 6 1 ,

G
Ahmadiyas, 1 09 162, 237

p
Akbar, Emperor, 97 Baluchis, 153

ap
Albar, Syed Ja'afar, 196 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Limited, 89-90

Aliens Ordinance of 1933 (Malaysia), 22 B�sic Democracy (Pakistan), 144- 145,
ts
Aligarh movement, 99 146, 223; Basic Democrats (BD), 144,

ha
All-India Constituent Assembly, 1 16 146, 151

W
All-lndi.a Muslim League (see also Muslim Basic Principles Commiuee (BPC) (Paki
League), 1 0 1 , 1 12, 1 13
stan), 1 15, 1 1 8; Anti-BPC Movement,
si
All-Malay Congress, 173

120- 123; Report of, recommendations
ba
All- Malayan Council of Joint Action

of, 1 1 8- 120, 1 2 1
(AMCJA), 175, 176, 1 88
Ab
Bengal (see also East Bengal), 100, 105,

All-Pakistan Muslim League, 1 1 1
1 10, 1 1 5 : Bengal Permanent Seule
All Parties Students Action Committee
Q
ment Regulations (1793), 98; partition

(SAC), 1 53
of; 100, 102:
A.
All-Party Conference, 1 04
Bengali: counter-elite, 224: demands, 64:
All-Party National Language Action Com
mittee (Pakistan), 1 1 6 language, movement for, 1 1 5, 1 16: na
Alliance National Council (Malaysia), 182, tionalism, 1 1 6, 127: sentiment, 1 1 6,
183 122
Amery, L.C.M.S., 4 Bengalis, 15, 19, 64, 100, 1 1 4, 1 20, 1 2 1 ,
A�ghar Khan, Air Marshal, 153, 166 128, 1 34, 1 39, 1 4 1 , 142, 1 4 3 , 1 4 7 , 1 49,
Asia (Asian Countries), 3, 26, 65, 67, 68, 1 50, 1 5 1 , 152, 155, 157, 1 59, 1 65, 167,
72, 75, 193; South Asia, 7(}, South 168
East Asia, 16, 35, 70, 107, 1 80, 1 88 Bergan, 39
Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan, Combined Oppo sition Pany (COP), 146
1 20, 123, 132, 150, 154, 160 Cornilla, 7
Bhawalpur, 122; Bhawalpur United Front, Commerce and Industry; Malay's Partici-
166 pation in, 86-90
Bhutto, Z.A., 142, 1 52, 153, 154, 155, 162, Commonwealth, 1 1 , 23, 1 85
163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 Communal riots (1 969) (Malaysia), 169
Bob, Khaw Kai, 214 Communist Party, 174
Bohras, 40 Communist Youth Conference, Calcutta,
62
Borneo, 188, 190, 1 9 1 , 192, 193 177
Brailsford, H.N., 4 Confucianism , 30
7
83
Briggs Plan, 178, 179; Briggs resettlement Constituent Assembly (Pakistan), 16, 1 1 1 ,
operation, 178 1 15, 1 16, 1 1 8, 1 20, 1 2 1 ; Dissolution of
23
Britain (British-Empire, Government Raj, first Constituent Assembly: beginning
of an Unconstitutional era of Pakistan,
-
Rule) (see also Great Britain, UK), 9,
01
15, 21, 35, 67, 97, 98, 99, 100, 1 0 1 , 126-129; Second, 1 29- 1 30
1 02, 1 03, 1 04 , 105, 106, 108, 1 69, 170, Constitution of (1956) (Pakistan), 130-135,
03
1 7 1 , 172, 174, 177, 178, 179, 1 80, 1 88, ISO Constitution of (1962) (Pakistan),
190, 192, 203; British Baluchistan, 39; 1 38, 143, 146
British Cabinet -Mission ' s Plan, 108,
#
Constitutional Commission 1 956-57 (Ma-
us
1 16; British colonial power, 34; B ritish laysia), 1 85- 1 87
Commonwealth, 1 1 , 23, 185; British Constitutional Issue (Pakistan), 1 16- 1 30
in
India, 39, 98, 1 15; British Military Convention Muslim League, 143, 1 54
jo
Administration, 170; British White Council Muslim League, 143, 150

up
Paper (1946), 170 Council of Trust for Indigenous People

Brunei, 1 88, 190, 1 9 1 , 193 (Malaysia), 89
ro
Buddhism, 30; Buddhists, 124 Coupland, R., 4

G
Criminal Procedure Code (Pakistan), 1 16

CENT0, 238
p
Cripps Mission, 107

ap
Cabinet Mission, 108, 1 16 Cultural Variation (Pakistan), 7- 1 1

Cambodia, 68 Culture difference (Malaysia), 29-35
ts
Capitalists, 1 08 Curzon, Lord, I 00

ha
Central Province, 100

central Statistics Office (CSO), 39 Dacca (Dhaka), 100, 1 0 1 , 102, 1 1 4, 1 1 5,
W
China, 21, 22, 30, 178; Chinese, 19, 20, 2 1 , 1 20, 1 21 , 149, 1 50, 164, 165, 166,
si
22, 23, 27, 28 , 29, 30, 3 1 , 32, 33, 67, 167; Dacca University, 1 14, 145, 167;
ba
76, 77, 8 1 , 83, 84, 88, 92, 169, 1 7 1 , Grand National Convention, 1 20
172, 1 7 8 , 179, 182, 1 83, 194, 197, 199, Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, 173, 1 80, 1 8 1, 1 82
Ab
200, 20 1 , 202, 203, 204, 205,206, 208, Datta, Dhirendra Nath, 1 14

213, 214, 216, 222, 224, 235 Chinese Defence of Pakistan Emergency Rules, 155
Q
Kuomintang Pany, 177 "(The) Deliverance Day", 1 06

A.
Chittagong, 7, 57 Democracy, 152, 217; Basic Democracy : A

Chaudhuri, Nirad C., 1 00 New Instrument of Exploitation in
0.owdhury, Hamidul Huq, 133 Pakistan, 144-145
Chundrigar, I.I., 133 Democratic Action Committee (DAC),
Chye, Dr. Toh Chin, 1 97 154, 155, 156; Party (DAP) , 207, 208,
Civil Disobedience, 1 03 209, 2 1 2, 222
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), 140- 1 4 1 Demographic Composition of Malaysia, 20
Cobbold, Lord, 1 9 1 ; Cobbold Commission, Demographic differences between East and
1 9 1 ; Cobbold Report, 192 Wesl Pakistan, 1 96 1 , 1 1 -13
Colliery strike (1937) (Malaysia), 172 Demonstrations (Malaysia), 173
Index 277
"Direct Action", 108; "Direct Action Day'', West Malaysia, 206-207; groups, 75;
108 variation in Pakistan, 7- 1 1
"Down with Equal Citirenship", 173 Eurasians, 23, 203
Dufferin, Lord, 98 Europeans, 23, 26, 67, 98
Dutt, P., 4 Eusoff, Dato Haji Mohammed, 84
Expatriates, 204, 206
East Bengal (as East Pakistan) (see also Export, 66: control of (Pakistan), 52-57;
East Pakistan). 10, 15, 49, 50, I 00, development through, in Malaysia, 68-
62
1 12, 1 14, 1 16, 1 1 8, l 19, 1 20, 121, 122, 72; earnings of Pakistan, 53-55; from
124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131; East East-Pakistan, 58
7
Bengal Estates Acquisition and Ten
83
ancy Act of (1950), 10; East Bengal Fazlur Rahman, 126, 128
23
Legislative Assembly, 124, 125; East Federal Land Development Authority
Bengal Muslim Awarni League, 120; (Fl.DA) (Malaysia), 86
-
01
Elections, 123- 1 25 Federal Reserve Unit (FRU), 206
Economy (Economic): economic back Federated Malay Stales (FMS), 169
03
ground of Malaysia, 65-93; develop Federation of Malaysia, 191, 192, 193, 195,
ment since Independence in Pakistan, 199, 200; Federation of Malaya· Agree
40.45; development, National Integra
#
ment (1948), 174-176, 240; formation
us
tion through, in Pa\dstan, 138; New of, 1 87-201
Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia), Fida Hasarn, 142
in
90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 235; Policies of Post- Foreign Aid (Pakistan), 52-57; distribution
jo
1969 period (Malaysia), 90-93; Poli of commitment of foreign economic

up
cies of Pre- 1969 Riots (Malaysia), 83- assistance: (1947), 56; ·utilization of
90; policies pursued in Pakistan, 45- foreign assistance, 55
ro
57; situation in 1947 of Pakistan, 37- Foreign Correspondents Association on

G
40; Two-Economy Tues.is (Pakistan), South-east Asia, Singapore ( 196 1), 188
62-64; Types of Policies pursued by Foreign ExchRngc (Pakistan), 52-57
p
Federal Gov ernment of Malaysia, 82-

ap
93 Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party) (East

ts
Eight-Point Programme, 154 Pakistan), 123, 1 33

ha
Elections: All-India general election Gandhi, Mahatma, 4

(1946), 1 17; Malaysia: First (1955), Gauhar, Alaf, 142
W
1 8 1 - 1 84; (1964), 197-201; (1969), Geographical location: of Malaysia, 20; of

207-210; Communal breakdown of
si
Pakisran, 4-7
electorate, 201-203; Pakistan: First
ba
Gerakam Rakyat Malaysia (GRM), 207, \

and Last General Elections ( 1970),
208, 209, 2 1 1 , 215
Ab
161- 162; in East Bengal, 123- 125;

Germany, !03, 106
Post-election events: towards break-up
Ghularn Ahmad, Mirza, 17
Q
of Pakistan, 162-166; results and after

Ghulam Mohammad, 137
math in Pakistan, 125-126
A.
God, oneness of, 33

Eleven-Point Programme of Demands
(Pakistan), 153, 237-238 Government of India Act of (1919), 1 04
Emergency (Malaysia), 176-179; impact Government o f India Act (1935), 49, 106,
of, 178-179 1 10, 1 12
Employment, 77-82 Grand National Convention, Dacca, 120
"Equal Citizenship Means Suicid.e for the Great Britain (see also Britain), 1 92
.Malays", 173 "Gui ded Democracy" in Indones i a ,
Ethinic: difference in Malaysia, 29-35; Eth Sukarno's, 223
nic Composition Police Service in Gurmani, 122
Haider, Mian Nizamuddin, 166 Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 19, 150, 162, 163, 166
Haq, 39 Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-lslam (JU), 154, 162,
Hazarvi, Maulana Gulman Gaus, 166 163, 1 66
Hidup Bahasa! Hidup-lah Bangsa, 1J3 Japan, 22, 66, 172; invasion o f Malaya in
Hindu Mahasabha, 104 (194 1), 170
Hindus, 10, 15, 16, 3 1 , 39, 97, 101, 102, Jennings, Sir Ivor, 1 85
106, 107, 108; Caste-Hindus, 124; Jinnah, M.A. (Quaid-i-Azam), 103, 106, ·
Hindu nationalists, 102; Hindu-Mus 107, lQCJ, 1 1 1 , 1 12, 1 13, 1 14, 1 15,
62
lim communalism, 102; HinducMus- 135; launched his "Direct Action",
1 im harmony, 104; Hindu-Muslim 108; Two-Nation Theory of, 4, 107,
7
tranquillity, 97
83
109
Hock, Tun Lim Yew, 188
23
"Home Guards", 177 Karachi, 39, 40, 47, 5 1 , 57, 1 1 1 , 1 12, 122,
Hume, Allan Octavian, 98 129, 153, 164, 167
-
01
Huq, A.K. Fazlul, 1 12, 123, 125, 126, 129 Kashmir: dispute, 6, 136; War of (1948),
141
03
Immigration: . "Immigration Ordinance Kedah, Sultan of, 172
1952" (Malaysia), 23; Immigration Khairpur, 1 22
Restriction Ordinance of 1930 (Malay
#
Khan of Mamdot, 1 12
us
sia), 22; settlement Pattern of, in Ma Khandkar, 39
laysia, 2,1-29 Khilafat Movement, 103, 104
in
Imports: Composition of (Malaysia), 7 1 ; Khir-Johari, 214.

jo
Control of (Pakistan), 52-57; develop Khojas, 40

ment through (Malaysia), 68-72; from
up
Khoon, Dr. Tan Chee, 215

West Pakistan, 58; Licences, Commer Khuhro, M.A., 1 12
ro
cial (Pakistan), 5 1 Khyber, 164

G
Income disparity (Malaysia), 72-74 Krishak Sramik Party (Peasants Workers

Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), 1 8 1 Party) (KSP) 123, 133, 134
p
India, partition of, 4, 1 0 , 1 5, 1 7 , 99, 1 06

ap
Kuala Lumpur, 173, 1 8 1 , 210, 212, 214,

Indian Civil Service (ICS), 1 4 1 215
ts
Indian Community b y dialect groups

ha
(1947-1957), 30 . Labour force and unemployment in Malay

Indian Independence Act of (1947), 49, sia, 77
W
1 10, 1 12 Labour Party, 1 84

Indian National Congress, 99, 100, 101, . Lahore, 153, 166; Resolution of (1940),
si
1 02, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107; Con

ba
107, 1 13 , 120, 128

gress-League relationship, 106 Land: Land Development Schemes (Ma
Ab
Indian Political Service (l:>S), 141 laysia), 84, 86; Land-Ownership (East
lndo-Pakistan War: of (1948), 141, of
Pakistan), 1959, 10; Land utiliution
Q
(1965), 146-147, 152, 155

(Pakistan), 5; Landlords, 108 .
Indonesia, 68, 172
Lansdowne, Lord, 191
A.
Industry: Malay Participation in Commerce Languages, 7 : Commonly spoken as

and Industry, 86-90 mother tongue in Pakistan, 8-9; addi
"(The) Instrument of-Surrender", 172-173 tional tongues in Pakistan, 9; Linguis
International Labour Organization (lLO), tic difference in Malaysia, 29-35; Lin
13 guistic Variation in Pakistan, 7-1 1 ;
Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 105-108 State Language Issue in Pakistan, 1 13-
Islam, 16, 19, 37, 1 13, 1 15, 152, 219·
1 16
Islamabad, 40 Legal Framework Order (LFO), 158; and
Ismail, Dato Ibrahim bin, 215
people's reaction (Pakistan), 159- 161
Ismail, Tun Dr., 214, 217, 223
Index 279
Liaquat Ali Kh an , 1 08, 1 1 1 , 1 13, 1 14, 1 1 5, Malaysia (see also Malaya), 19-35, 168-
1 18, 1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 135, 1J6, 137 224; Armed Forces, of, 205-206; Eco
Lock, Tan Cheng, 175, 1 80, 1 88 nomic background, 65-93; Economi
"London Agreement", 192 cally active population by race and
Lucknow, 103, 104, 1 1 3; Pact, 104 industry with selected subdivisions in
Lyttleton, Oliver, 1 80 Malaysia, 1957, 28; Ethnic composi
tion, Police Service in West Malaysia,
MJU, 162, 163
206-207; Ethnic, Linguislic, Societal
and Cultural differences, 29-35; for
62
Mac Michael, Sir Harold, 170
mation of federation of, 1 87-201; Po
Machinda of Sarawak, 199
7
litical and Constitutional Develop
83
Mahmud Ali, 128
ments (1945-1960) (Malaysia), 169-
Mahmud Hossain, Dr., 1 18
1 87; Political strategy of Government
23
Majlis Amanah Ra' ayat (MARA) (Malay
of, 2 17-223; Rada) Violence and
sia), 89
-
breakdown of Racial Integration in
01
Malay language, 33 Malaysia (1965- 1970). 201-207; re
Malay People ' s Anti-J apanese Army
03
gion, 212; West Malaysia, 68, 212
(MPAJA), 176 Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Commit
Malaya (see also Malaysia), 19-35, 65-93, tee of the Association, 191
168-224: Area and number of people
#
"Malaysian Malaysia" - concept, 200, 208
us
within the western-belt of the Penin Malay�ian Solidarity Convention (MSC),
sula Malaysia (1957), 24; Constitution 199
in
of the Federation of Malaya (1957), Malik, B., 1 85

jo
1 85; Development pattern since Inde Manda!, Jogendra Nath, 1 1 1

Maududi, Al-Sayyid Abu! Ala, 19
up
pendence of, 66-72; Immigrants in,

2 1-29; racial cornposition in, 23; Mansur Ahmad, Abu!, 16
ro
Martial Law in Pakistan, 135-167

states, prior to Independence, 169-
G
Mckell, Sir William, 1 85

170; urban poptilation, 25-26
Memons, 40
"Malaya belongs to the Malays", 173
p
Military: dictatorship, 168; establishment,

ap
M�lay Council of Joint Action, 1 76

East-Pakistan ' s representation in
"Malaya for the Malays", policy of, 1 83
(1963), 140; elite in Pakistan (1955-
ts
Malaya Merdeka (Independence of Ma-

56), 139- 140
ha
laya), from Emergency to, 1.79- 184 Mini ng, Malay participlltion in, 87-88
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 179,
W
Minto, Lord, 102

1 80, 1 81 , 1 82, 1 83, 197, 198, 200, 208, . Mirza, lskander, 125, 127, 1 3 1 , 132, 133,
si
210, 21 1 , 213, 222 1 34, 1 35, 136, 1 37

ba
Malayan Civil Service (MCS), 203-204 Mitchell, K., 4

Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 173, Mohamad, Dr. Mahathirbin, 210, 215, 216
Ab
175, 176, 177, 180, 2 17 Mohammed Ali, Bogr11, I 19, 122, 127, 128,
Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), 173- 129, 130
Q
174 Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College Ali-

garh Muslim University, 99
A.
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 1 8 1 , 213

Malayan Political supremacy, 201-207 Morley, Lord, 101
Malayan Races Liberation Army, I TI Mountbatten, Admiral, 170
Mugl:ial sovereignty in India, 97
Malayan Union, 175; Malayan Union Plan,
Muhammad, Prophet, 33
235; Non-Malay reaction to, 173- 174;
Muhammad Ali, Chaudhri, 122, 127, 130
Unification of Malay State, 170-174
Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh, 132, 147- 150,
Malays, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 66, 76, 77,
151, 154, 155, 156, 1 6 1 , 163, 165, 166,
80, 8 1 , 82, 84, 88, 90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 169, 167; Six-Point Formula of, (see Six
171, 172, 174, 178, 179, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 183, Point)
1 86, 1 87, 199 , 201, 203, 204, 206, 208, Mukhtaruddin, Dain, 215
2 1 8, 220, 235
Multan, 1 53 "One Unit" scheme (Pakistan), 1 2 1 , 1 53

Multi-racial peoples, problem of integra- Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) (Malaysia),
tion of, 3 91
Murshed, Justice, S.M., 153
Murugesu, General, 210 PML (C), 162, 163
Musa Hitam, 216 PML (Q), 1 62, 1 63
Muslim League, 50, 101, 103, 1 04, 105, Pakistan, 1 - 19, 34, 35, 37-64, 67, 68, 72,
106, 107, 1 09, 1 1 6, 120, 123, 1 24, 125, 97- 168, 192, 224; allocation of federal
62
130, 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 , 145, 1 49 expenditure in, 4 6 - 5 1 ; Colonial
Muslims, 4, 10, 1 3 , 16, 19, 97, 98, 99, 100, heritage, 97- 1 1 0; Concept of, 105-
7
1 0 1 , 102, 1 05, 106, 107, 1 08, 109, 1 1 3, 108; Constitution of ( 1 956), 1 3 0- 1 35;
83
1 15, 124 Constitution of ( 1 962), 1 3 5 - 1 57;
23
Mymensingh, 7, 123 , 1 49 Control of Import and Export policies;
foreign exchange earnings and foreign
-
01
Nasrullah Khan, Nawabzada, 1 50 aid, 52-57; Creation of, 109; Displaced
National. Assembly (Pakistan): Elections ,persons in, 1 4; East-West
03
( 1 970-7 1 ) , 160, 162, 163; postpone confrontation, 1 62; economic
ment of Session, 165- 166 background of, 37-64; export earnings
National Association of Perak, 1 84
#
of, 53-55; failure of Ideological Unity
us
National Awami Party (NAP), 133, 150, of, 1 09- 1 1 O; ideology of, 1 08-109;
1 53 , 1 54, 1 62, 163, 1 66 Interim Constitution of (1947-1956),
in
National Consultative Council (NCC) 1 1 0- 1 30; landownership in West

jo
(Malaysia), 2 1 7, 2 1 8 Pakistan , 1 0- 1 1 ; Martial Law

National Democratic Front, 1 50 Administration I ( 1 95 8 - 1 969) and
up
National Finance Commission ( 1962) first Constitution of ( 1 962), 1 3 5- 1 57;

ro
(Pakistan) , 50 Martial law Administration II (1969-

G
National integr,ation, 19, -97, 1 3 8, 157, 223 1 97 1 ) and break-up of Pakistan, 157-
National Labour League, 160 167; Pakistan Congress, 130; Pakistan
p
National Party of West Pakistan, 1 33 US military pacts, 238; political

ap
National Operations Council (NOC) (Ma- background, 97- 168; 1 39; Political
ts
laysia), 169, 212, 21 4-217, 2 1 8 Movement in West, 1 52-157; Power

National Shipping Corporation (NSC), 55
ha
Elite, disparity in, 142-143; problem of

Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 16, 1 19, national integration in, 157- 1 67;
W
1 2 1 , 122, 126, 1 37 Religious problem of, 16- 19; ratio of

si
Nee, Wong Pow, 2 10 different communities of, 1 7 ;

ba
Negara, 1 84 Settlement pattern of Refugees in, 13-

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3 1 6; Trade jn, 58; transfer of real
Ab
Nehru Report, 1 04 , 1 05 resources from East to West Pakistan,

New Economic Policy (Malaysia) (NEP), 57-62; Two-Economy Thesis, 62-64;
Q
90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 235 Utilization of foreign economic

Noon, Firoz Khan, 133; Noon Group, 1 30 assistance in (1 947-70) , 55; State
A.
North Borneo (Sabah), 190, 1 9 1 , 192 Languages of, 122

North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 7, Pakistan, East (now Bangladesh), 160,
39, 1 04 - 1 05, 122, 128, 1 34, 160, 1 6 1 , 1 6 1 , 1 62, 163, 164, 165, 166, 1 67, 168,
\
237 234; Air communication between East

"Now or Never: Are We to Live Or Perish and West Pakistan (1 955-65), 6; Anti
Forever", 105-106 Ayub Movement in, 145- 1 46, 152-
Nurul Amin, 1 24 1 57; representation in military estab
lishment (1963), 140; Students Action
OGL (Open General Licence), 64 committee (SAC), 155; Students All
Objective Resolution (Pakistan), 1 17, 1 1 8 Party Committee of Action, eleven
Index 28 1
points of, 237-238; Students League, Qayyum Muslim League, 1 64, 166
120, 160; Exports from, 58; Population Quetta, 166
density in, 1 2- 13; Provincial Assembly "Quit India" movement (1942), 107
of, 163; Resources, transfer of, from Qur'an, Holy, 17
East to West, 57-62; Revenue and de Qureshi, Dr. l shtiq Hossain, 1 1 8
velopment expenditure in East and
West Pakistan, 46-51 Rabwah, 1 8
Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), Racial: composition-1921 to 1957 of Ma
62
1 50, 1 54 laysia, 20, 27; breakdown of, integra
Pakistan Industrial Development Corpora tion in Malaysia, 201-224; Riots and
7
tion (PIIX:) , 46 their aftennath in Malaysia, 212-214;
83
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), 6, 55 Violence in Malaysia, 201-224
23
Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 152, 1 53, Rahmat Ali, Choudhry, 105, 106
1 62, 163, 1 64, 166, 1 99, 200, 207, 209 Raisman, Sir Jeremy, 49
-
,
01
222 Raisman Award of (1952), 49, 50
Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, 175 Rajendra Prasad, 4
03
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), 1 84, Rajshahi University (East Pakistan), 1 55
207, 209, 210 Rawalpindi, 1 52, 1 53, 1 55
Party Negara, 182, 2()CJ
#
Razalibin Ali Haji Ahmad, 213
us
Party Rakyat; 20CJ Reid, Lord, 1 85; Reid Commission, 1 85-
Pathans, 1 28, 153 1 87; Reid Report, 1 86
in
Peerzada, General, 152 Republ.�an Party, 133

jo
Penang, 21, 2 1 1 ; racial riots in, 1 88 Revolt of (1857), (see Sepoy Mutiny)
up
Peoples Action Party (PAP), 1 89, 190, 193, Ripon, Lord, 99

1 94, 196, 197, 198, 1 99, 200, 207, Round Table Conference (Pakistan), 154,
ro
208; PAP-Alliance relations, 196, 1 97 1 55, 1 56, 1 65

G
People's United Front, 176 Royal Malay Regiment, 204-207

Perak, 211; Perak Malay League, 184; Rukunegara, 21 8-221
p
ap
Perak Progressive Party, 1 84 Rural: development programmes, 85; Rural

"Pennanent Settlement of 1 793", 9 and Industrial Development Authority
ts
Peshawar, 1 53 (RIDA) (Malaysia), 89, 99; Rural Pub

ha
Philippines, 68, 172 lic Works Programme (Pakistan), 144

"Pirpur Report", 1 06 Russian Communist Party, In
W
Pirzada, Gal.dar, 126

si
Poh, Ng Kam, 210 SEAT0, 238

ba
Poverty in Malaysia, 75-n Salimullah, Nawab Sir, 102

Progressive Youth Corps, 176 Sarawak, 1 88, 1 90, 191, 192, 193; Sarawak
Ab
Public and Representative Offices Dis United People's Party, 199, 200
qualification Act (PRODA) (Pakistan), Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Sir, 99, 100
Q
126 Scheduled Castes, 124; Scheduled Caste

A.
Punjab, 17, 1 8, 19, 39, 122, 1 27, 130, 134, Federation, 130
160, 161, 162, 164; Punjab Pakistan Security Pacts, 133, 1 34
Front, 166; West, 1 12 Selangor, 2 1 1
Sepoy Mutiny of (1 857), 98
Qadir, Manzur, 142 Shafic, Tan Sir Md. Ghazali bin, 220
Qadiyanies, 17, 1 8, 19, 109: Financial Sup Shahab, Q.A. 1 42
port, 1 8; Literature, 18; Penetration in Shahed Ali, 1 34
Services, 1 8; Rabwah, 18; Resources Shias, lOCJ
of the, 1 8; Schools, Colleges and Hos Shoaib, 142
pitals, 18 Sikh League, 104
Qayyum group, 1 66 S imon Commission, boycott of, 104-105
Sin, Tun Tan Siew, 194, 213, 214, 222 Turkish Caliphate, 103
Sind, 7, 1 12, 122, 127, 128, 160, 161, 162, (Twenty) 20-Point Programme (Pakistan),
237 123, 148
Sindhis, 128, 134, 153 · Two-Nation Theory, Jinnah's, 4, 107, 109
Singapore, 3, 32, 68, 169, 170, 171, 177,
178, 1 88, 189, 190, 192, 199, 200; Al USA (see also America), 128, 134
liance, 195, 196; expulsion of, 187- USSR (see also Russia), 4
201; financial dispute, 194-195; Legis Unemployment and Underemployment in
62
lative Assembly, 195-196; political Malaysia, 77-82
conflict, 195-197; separation of, 192- Unfederated Malay States (UFMS), 169
7
·201 United Democratic Party (UDP), 190, 200,
83
Si x-Point Fonnula-The Charter of the Sur 209
23
vival (Pakistan), Mujib's, 146, 147, United Kingdom (see also Britain; Great
153, 1 6 1 , 163, 164 Britain), 192
-
01
Social Seivices (Malaysia), 84-86 United Front (Pakistan), 123, 130
Socialism, 152 United Malays National Organization
03
Socialist Frm1t, 209 (UMNO), 173, 174, 175, 179, 180,
Societal di fference in Malaysia, 29-35 181, 1 82, 1 83, 185, 186, 1 88, 196, 197,
Societal Variation in Pakistan, 7- 1 1
#
198, 1 99, 200, 206, 208, 210, 21 1, 213,
us
Sorensen, R . , 4 2 1 5, 216; UMNO-MCA A l liance
South-East Asian countries (see Asia) (Peri/um), 1 8 1- 1 84
in
Spate, O.H.K., 4 United Progressive Party (Pakistan), 130

jo
Students (see also Pakistan, East): agitation United Province, 100

up
of, 154; of East Pakistan, 1 53; Eleven Unity, failure of ideological (Pakistan),
Point Programme (Pakistan) of, 161, 109- 1 1 0
ro
237-238; Students Action Committee

G
(SAC) 155; Students All-Party Com Valkenburg, S . Van, 4

mittee of Action, 237-238; Students Versailles Treaty of (1919), 103
p
League (fonnerly, Muslim Students

ap
Wah, Kam Woon, 210

League), 1 20, 160
Wavell, Lord, 107; Wavell Plan, 107
ts
Suhrawardy, H.S., 1 12, 123, 128, 129; 1 3 1 ,

Wedderburn, Sir William, 98
ha
1 32, 1 33 , 139, 145

Westminister model, 1 85;
Sukarno: Guided Democracy in Indonesia,
W
"White Paper" (Malaysia), 221, 222; (Paki

223
stan), 167
'
si
Sultans, 172, 174, 1 85

Wilson, Sir Samuel, 170
ba
Sunnis, 1 09
World War: 1st, 103; llnd, 67, 106, 107,
Sylhet, 7 , 149
Ab
169, 174, 1 87
Tailmaat-e-Islamia Board, 121 Yahya Khan, General Agha Mohammed,
Q
Taiwan, 68 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164,

Talpur, Ghulam Ali, 1 32
A.
165, 166; Final Showdown from Ballot

Tamaddun Maj/is, 1 14 to Bullet, 166-168; Legal Framework
Tamizuddin Khan, Moulvi, 126 Order of, 159-161; Scheme for the
Taoism, 30 Transfer of Power of, 158; Yahya
Tariff Advisory Board (Malaysia), 194 Mujib talks, 167
Tariq Ali, 1 37 Yew, Lee Kuan, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195,
Tashkent Agreement, 146, 147, 152, 153 197, 199
Templer, Sir Gerald, 1 80
Tikka Khan, General, 167 Za'ba, 83 .
Trade: balance 1947-1969 (Malaysia), 70; Zafrullah Khan, Sir, 18
development through Export and Im- Zamindari, (Landlordism), 10, 108
'
port (Malaysia), 68-72 Ziring Lawrence, 145
Pakistan
A Study in National Integration
62
The case of Pakistan provides a stiking example of a new state
7
83
that appeared to have achieved a high degree of national
23
integration especially since political awareness had been
-
focussed on the external differences with neighbouring India and
01
the traumatic cost of separation. Its eventual breakup therefore
03
came as a . surprise to those who mistook the illusion for the
reality.
#
us
This book examines the political processes in new states such
as Pakistan and Malaysia and sheds light on those aspects which
in
jo
enhance national integration or aggravate disintegrative

up
tendencies.
The author touches upon various dimensions of the modem
ro
nation�state problematic, especially the geographic and

G
economic background to Partition and subsequent political

p
ap
developments under the martial law administrations of Gen

ts
Ayub Khan and Gen Yahya Khan which culminated in the

ha
creation of Bangla Desh.

W
M. NAZRUL ISLAM, Ph. D., did the research for this book
si
ba
while at Griffith University in Australia in 1980. He is the author

Ab
of several learned articles in international journals and now lives

and teaches in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Q
A.
Price Rs 150.00 Paperback, 1991

.
·. �
l,'

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The task of nation building or national integration always appears

number of the components of national integration identified by theorists

situation of Pakistan and Malaysia. For Pakistan, problems of ethnic,

linguistic and cultural diversity together with political and economic

imbalances, further cOQJpounded by geographical separation, are

identified. Against these factors, the operation of three potentially

integrative institutions-ruling political party, civil service and the

federal structure--are also examined. Malaysia's problems are stated as

a diversity of cultures, religions, languages, economi.c interests, races

and communities. The function of three potentially integrative

institutions of Malaysis-the ruling coalition type party UMNO, the

civil service and the federal system-have also been examined. It is

principles in favour of authoritarian and. military rule and Malaysia's

success or failure in achieving national integration is also directly

Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur and Penang). As a lecturer in Political S cience

having been particularly appreciative of Ms. Patience Thoms' time.

In particular I wish to acknowledge the kind personal attention that

Professor Colin Mackerras, Chairman of the School , has given me. I

University Library as well as by _the Library staff of Queensland

University, who did their utmost to trace as well as provide access to

some elusive documents and publications: During my stay at Griffith I

have benefited by participating in several international conferences

both in Australia and overseas. I wish to record my thanks lo the School

for providing me financial assistance without which I could not have

I am indebted to my alma mater, Dhaka University, and m y

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor S erajul Islam, Secretary

My wife Feroza Islam , my son Kamrul and my daughter Poppy

II 1 Land utilization in Pakistan, 1967-68 5

West Pakistan, 1961 11

II 8 Population density in East Pakistan 12

II 9 Displaced persons as percentage of total

II 10 Ratio of different communities 17

II 11 Racial composition (Federation of Malaya)

II 12 The number and raeial composition of the

population in the Peninsula in 194 1 23

western-belt of the Peninsula, 1957 24

II 14 Distribution of the urban population,

II 15 The racial composition o f the major towns

II 16 Economically active population by race and

industry with selected sub-divisions, 1957 28

III 3 GNP of East Pakistan. by origin in selected

III 12 Distribution o f commitment of foreign

economic assistance: 1947 to June 1970 56

III 15 Various monetary indicators of the standard of

living for selected Asian countries, 1 967 68

III 16 Principal non-monetary indicators of the

standard of living for selected Asian countries

III 17 Trade balance, 194 7-1969 70

III 18 Composition of imports i n 1950 and 1965 71

in 1957 and 1966