Tamadhub, Takfir and Wahhabism

The relationship between Sharia, madhhab and fiqh , which you have always
emphasised in
your writings, and with which any Muslim must concur in its essence, has been distorted
in
practice by the process of “tamadhub”, the insistence on the primacy of one’s own
madhhab
over the rest. This may appear to have been harmless to the Umma but the reality is
different, and it is critical that this area be addressed with great care for the welfare of
the
believers generally.
The fiqh of the four madhahib differs often in important ways, but this is held not to
corrupt
the doctrinal belief, the ‘aqida, of the community. The fiqh of the Imami Shias, the
Jaafari
fiqh, is in most cases indistinguishable from one or more of the four madhahib, but the
Shia
are still viewed with great caution by the Ulema of the Sunni world. Why? Is it possible
to
have two fundamental versions of the truth, a majority and a minority perception, without
one or the other being held to be irremediably false?
I believe the answer is yes. It is legitimate to have two traditions that derive from the
same
source, acknowledge the same origin, but follow two different courses. One river may
flow
eastwards to the Ocean, while the other may flow westwards. One may traverse
deserts; the
other may flow through verdant pastures. The two rivers may flow close to each other,
and
appear to be twinned; or they may separate with the distance between them appearing
to be
vast. The point is that the two rivers carry unpolluted waters in their course from the
original
Muhammedi source. Without pushing this metaphor too far, the correct course of action
is
not to deny the existence of these two flows, even though it might be difficult for the
majority to recognise the validity of the minority. Or for the minority, for that matter, to
deny its own authenticity and merge with the majority.
There is no doubt that the brutal rise of the Umayyads left a legacy of hatred and
bitterness
amongst a very large number of people, including many of the Sahaba. This was
compounded by the tragedy at Kerbala, which confirmed to many others the illegitimacy
of
the Ummayyad’s rule. Loyalty to the person of Imam Ali and to his claim to Khilafa and
Imama preceded by a century the crystallisation of doctrinal Shiism, and was the
cornerstone of nearly all revolts against the authority of the Ummayyads. Long before
the
emergence of the Imami Shia or even the formalisation of the four madhahib of the Ahl
us-
Sunna, there was a substantial core of support for the cause of Imam Ali, both in Kufa
and in
Medina( where the great commentator Ibn ‘Abbas, may Allah be pleased with him, was
a
noted, but not uncritical, supporter of the ‘Alid cause).Even Abdallah ibn ‘Umar, may
Allah
be pleased with him, only reluctantly accepted Ummayyad rule for the sake of the unity
of
the community. The attitude to the person of Imam Ali,peace be upon him, and those of
his
descendants who challenged Ummayyad and Abbassi rule became an integral part of
many a
Muslim’s self-definition. This is the core of true shi’ism or tashayu’. The great masters of
the Sufi way all recognised the privileged status of the Imam Ali, peace be upon him, in
all
their silsilas, and fealty to the realised status of the Imam is a requirement for all
wayfarers
on the path. Love of Ahl ul-Bayt is an integral part of the journey of all true adepts.
So how is it that the madhhab of those who exalt Imam Ali and his progeny continues to
be
regarded with either curiosity, indifference, hostility and ultimately abhorrence, takfir, by
the misguided few? And why are the Shia woefully ignorant of the wellsprings of the four
madhahib? There is no doubt that the consensus reached by the fuqaha of Ahl-ul-
Sunna on
the elements of the ‘aqida and in particular the role of the Rightly Guided Khulafa,
together
with the development of tariqa Sufism and its formal connection in the spiritual silsilas to
Imam Ali, led to the incorporation of a number of positions associated with the Shia into
the
life of the Umma. Both Imam Abu Hanifa, may Allah be pleased with him, and Imam
Shafii, may Allah be pleased with him, were supporters of various Shia causes, with
Imam
Shafii actively participating in a Shia uprising in Yemen, while Imam Abu Hanifa was
involved in a Zaydi Shia rebellion in Iraq. The famous saying of Imam Abu Hanifa( al-
Nu’man) of :
“ Laula as-sanatan la halika an-Numan”
(Were it not for the two years (that Abu Hanifa spent together in jail with the seventh
Imam
of the Shia ,Musa ibn Jaafar) al-Nu’man would have been consumed by hellfire)
is sufficient testimony to the ‘Alid sympathies of the Imams of Ahl us-Sunna. The sixth
Imam of the Shia, Ja’afar as-Sadiq, was a recognised authority on matters of hadith and
fiqh,
and was instrumental in the education of a large number of fuqaha who established the
foundations of the madhahib of the Jamaat, including Imam Abu Hanifa, by his own
open
acknowledgement. The commentary on the Noble Quran of Imam Ja’afar as-Sadiq,
peace be
upon him, was the model tafsir used by a number of Sufi commentators on the Quran,
including the tafsir of the Master, Sahl ibn Abdalla at-Tustari, and the “Haqaiq at-Tafsir”
of
Abu Abd el-Rahman as-Sulami (author of the famous “Tabaqat as-Sufiyya”). In fact, all
the
sources depict the debate between the Shia and Sunni Ulema in the early days of Islam
to be
heated but not to the point where the mainstream Shia are excluded from the life of the
community. The position of Naqib , or paramount dignitary, of the Shia was an officially
recognised position in Abbassi times. The late Abbassi khalifa, al-Nasir, who
reorganized
the guild or futuwwa system in Islam, purposefully and consciously sought an
accommodation between the sects in the interest of the strengthening of the Islamic
state. In
many ways, the doctrinal disputes between the various Sunni madhhabs, particularly
between the Hanafis and Shafiis, were far more acute and frequently led to bloodshed
and
serious disturbances and divisions.
It was two events that over time hardened hearts and entrenched positions. The first is
the
emergence of an extreme form of Hanbali anthropomorphism associated with Ibn
Taymiyya
and his followers, especially Ibn Qayyim aj-Jawziya; and the establishment of a form of
official Shiism by the Ardebili Safawis in Iran formalising politically, the division of the
Muslim World and forcing a response from the Ottoman Empire.
It is my belief that Ibn Taymiyya’s influence has been mainly pernicious. His constant
campaigns of vilification against all and sundry- mixed with the occasional profundity-
led
him to being severely reprimanded by the leading scholars of the time. Even his own
student, Imam Ibn Dhahabi, may Allah be pleased with him, in his letter to his former
teacher “An-Nasiha ad-Dhahabiya li Ibn Taymiyya”(or “Ibn Dhahabi’s advice to Ibn
Taymiyya”) condemns him for his indiscriminate attacks on the pious and righteous and
his
constant takfirs. His attitude to tassawuf is riddled with contradictions and ambiguities
ranging from complete takfir and accusations of shirk to a grudging respect for a few of
the
leading awliya. His praise for the Ghawth, Sheikh Abd el-Qadir al-Gailani must be
balanced
against his vituperative hatred for the Sheikh al-Akbar, Ibn ‘Arabi. His reluctant
acceptance
of the legitimacy of celebrating the Mawlid of the Blessed Prophet, Peace and Blessings
upon him, must be compared to his violent outbursts against the visitations of shrines.
On
balance, there is no doubt that he was an enemy of tassawuf and has been viewed as
such by
all the great shuyukh of major tariqas over time. The famous retort of Ibn ‘Attallah,
author
of the famous aphorisms or “Hikam”, to Ibn Taymiyya is sufficient proof of his distance
and
hostility to tassawuf. His attitude to the Shia, however, in whatever form- Imamis;
Ismailis;
Zaydis- was implacably hostile and aggressive bordering on takfir.
Ibn Taymiyya’s influence was quickly forgotten in the world of Islam, until the advent of
Ibn Abd el-Wahhab, who relied on him as his main source for his own “Kitab at-Tawhid”.
You rightly condemn the effect that wahhabism has had on the unity of the Umma.
However, the legacy of salafism, which is a diluted version of wahhabism, has been
more
pervasive in the Arabic-speaking countries. It is salafism, being more “contemporary”
and
less doctrinally primitive, that has relied more extensively on the works of Ibn Taymiyya.
The Arab salafis were not, initially, either hostile to tassawuf nor to the Ottoman state. In
fact, the first salafi circles in Baghdad and Damascus were neo-sufi, such as those
associated
with the Alusi family of Ulemas in Baghdad and Sheikh Abd el-Razzaq al-Bitar in
Damascus. It is a point to emphasise that the early salafi circles in Damascus gathered
under
the protection of Emir Abd el-Qadir, the great Sufi mujahid, whose son, Tahir, was a
recognised authority on manuscripts and unearthed a number of Ibn Taymiyya’s works
buried in the Damascene libraries. In Egypt of course the “modernism” of ‘Abduh owed
little to Ibn Taymiyya and it was only with the arrival of the Tripolitan, Muhammed
Rashid
Reda, that the Salafiyya got their first pan Arab champion. Reda’s “al-Manar”
newspaper
was a mouthpiece for the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya and it was his deep dislike for tassawuf
and
his insistence on the ijtihad model of Ibn Taymiyya that coloured his “modernism”. It is
noteworthy that Reda himself, in his youth, was an ardent sufi of the Naqshabandi
tariqa,
and his teacher, the well respected Sheikh Hussein al-Jisr of Tripoli, was a master of
the
Khalwati tariqa. Apparently Reda turned against Sufism after attending a sama of the
Mawlawiyya, which he found deeply offensive. The influence of “al-Manar” was
enormous, especially its Quranic tafsir and proved the principle intellectual prop to the
salafi movement. Reda himself was a supporter of the Ottoman state, and a believer in
Khilafa, but switched his allegiance to Ibn Saud after the Great War, and his wahhabism
increased with time until his death in 1935.
The infidelity of the Arabs, if one can call it that, to the Ottoman state was not a simple
affair. The first attacks on the Arabic-speaking parts of the Ottoman state was in Algeria,
and the jihad of Emir Abd el-Qadir against the French was hardly assisted by the Porte.
It
was only with the Italian invasion of Libya that the Ottomans began a serious defence
and in
this instance the Arabic-speaking parts of the state were as one in the defence of
Muslim
territory. By and large the Arabs were loyal citizens of the state, and the nationalist
mutterings in Beirut and Damascus had no echo with the mass of people. This, one
might
add, was in spite of the policies of Turkification and de-emphasis on the use of Arabic in
the
educational system of the state by the so-called Young Turks. The Arabs’ political call
on
the Empire, prior to the Great War, was for decentralisation, while there was always a
fair
level of Arab representation in the Ottoman Council of State or Majlis al-Mabouthan in
the
Istana. The revolt in the Hijaz was only supported by a relatively few Syrian and Iraqi
officers, and the overwhelming mass of Arab troops and officers stayed loyal to the
state, in
spite of the frightful policies of the Turks in some of the Arab countries, notably Syria
and
Lebanon.
Careful note should be made that the only formal body of Ulema in the Arabic speaking
countries who made an unequivocal fatwa enjoining the muminun to support the
Ottoman
state in the Great War, were the Ulema of the Shia centres of Najaf and Kerbala. The
same
corps of Shia Ulema refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the non-Muslim mandate
over Iraq and launched the famous uprising against British rule in 1920. It is ironic that
the
only people who supported the Ottomans in their hour of need were from the very same
group who had borne the brunt of centuries of neglect and hostility from the ruling
religious
establishment.
The evolution of modernist Islamic thinking clearly shows its indebtedness to Ibn
Taymiyya
and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and this was carried into contemporary times with the likes of
Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, and even, paradoxically, to the Shii-based
Islamists such as the Islamic Da’awa Party. Ibn Taymiyya clearly placed himself in the
position of virulent opponent to the Ash’ari tradition, to which, the majority of the Ahl al-
Sunna belong. Ibn Taymiyya is the true herald of the bigotry of the modern salafiyya
movement. It is an inescapable fact that he was sent to prison by four judges
representing
the four schools of law and is no “Shaykh al-Islam”, as his followers have called him. In
doctrinal terms, lbn-Taymiyya can be seriously questioned on four central issues.
The first concerns Ibn Taymiyya’s prohibition as shirk of Sufi beliefs and popular
practices
such as al-shafa’a -appeals for intercession (al-tawassul) from the faithful to the
prophets
and awliya by using such expressions as ya Rasul Allah and ya ‘Ali. All great Shuyukh
have
allowed the use of these terms, along with the veneration of saintly persons and
visitation of
their shrines-all of which Ibn Taymiyya prohibited. Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of
consensus
(ijma’); opposition to Shi’ism and Sufism; and support of anthropomorphism (al-tashbih),
ascribing human attributes to God are all further indicators of his distance from the
considered positions of the Imams of the fiqh. The intolerance that the thought of Ibn
Taymiyya has inspired among contemporary Salafis toward different forms of Islamic
expression cannot be underestimated. There is a clear line between Ibn Taymiyya and
the
Wahhabis and militant Salafis in Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Jordan,
and
Lebanon, which support violence under the guise of Islamic revivalism and renewal.