CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: The Nature of Rhetoric

A NEW
HISTORY OF The English word "rhetoric" is derived from Greek rhetorike, which ap-
parently came into use in the circle of Socrates in the fifth century and first
appears in Plato's dialogue Gorgias, probably written about 385 B.C. but set
CLASSICAL RHETORIC dramatically a generation earlier. Rhetorike in Greek specifically denotes the
civic art of public speaking as it developed in deliberative assemblies, law
courts, and other formal occasions under constitutional government in the
Greek cities, especially the Athenian democracy, As such, it is a specific
cultural subset of a more general concept of the power of words and their
AND
potential to affect a situation in which they are used or received. Ultimately,
Greek Rhetoric under what we call "rhetoric" can be traced back to the natural instinct to survive
Christian Emperors and to control our environment and influence the actions of others in what
seems the best interest of ourselves, our families, our social and political
WITH ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF groups, and our descendants. This can be done by direct action—force,
threats, bribes, for example—or it can be done by the use of "signs," of
which the most important are words in speech or writing. Some concept of
GEORGE A. KENNEDY rhetoric, under different names, can be found in many ancient societies. In
Egypt and China, for example, as in Greece, practical handbooks were writ-
ten to advise the reader how to become an effective speaker.

AN EXTENSIVE REVISION AND

ABRIDGMENT OF
The Art of Persuasion in Greece
The Art of Rhetoric in the
Roman World
LATE LATIN RHETORIC
PR INC ETON UN IVER SITY PR ESS
PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY
Classical writers regarded rhetoric as having been "invented," or more
accurately, "discovered," in the fifth century B.C. in the democracies of
Syracuse and Athens. What they mean by this is that then, for the first time in
Europe, attempts were made to describe the features of an effective
speech and to teach someone how to plan and deliver one. Under democra-
cies citizens were expected to participate in political debate, and they were
expected to speak on their own behalf in courts of law. A theory of public
speaking evolved, which developed an extensive technical vocabulary to de-
scribe features of argument, arrangement, style, and delivery. In recent
years, the term "metarhetoric" has been coined to describe a theory or art of
rhetoric in contrast to the practice or application of the art in a particular
discourse. The first teachers of rhetoric were the itinerent lecturers of fifth-
century Greece known as "sophists," to be discussed in the next chapter;
beginning with Isocrates in the fourth century, regular schools of rhetoric
became common, and throughout the Greco-Roman period the study of
rhetoric was a regular part of the formal education of young men.

Classical rhetoricians—that is, teachers of rhetoric—recognized that

many features of their subject could be found in Greek literature before the
"invention" of rhetoric as an academic discipline, and they frequently used

1
 3

2
 CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER ONE
rhet orical c oncepts in lit er ary criticism Conv er sely, the teaching of rhe -
toric in the schools, ostensibly concerned primarily with training in public
address, had a significant effect on written corn posit ion, and thus on liter -
ature All literature is "rhetorical" in the sense that its function is to affect a
reader in sonic way--"to teach and to please," as the Roman poet Hor ace
and many other critics put it—but beginning in the last three centuries
muc h Gr eek and Latin literat ur e is ov ertly rhet orical in that it was
composed with a knowledge of classical rhetorical theory and shows its
influence.
In the third chapter of his lectures On Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished
three "species" of rhetoric. An audience, he says, is either a judge or not a
judge of what is being said. By this he means that an audience either is or is
not being asked to make a specific decision on an issue presented to it. If the
audience is a j udge, it is either j udging events of the past, as in a court of law, in
which case the speech is classified as "judicial," or it is judging what
action to take in the future, in which case the speech is "deliberative." If the
audience is not being asked to take a specific action, Aristotle calls the
speech "epideictic" (i e , "demonstrative"). What he has in mind are
speeches on ceremonial occasions, such as public festivals or funerals, which
speeches he characterizes as aimed at praise or blame. These three catego -
ries—judicial, deliberative, epideictic—remained fundamental throughout
the history of classical rhetoric and are still useful in categorizing forms of
discourse today. The concept of epideictic rhetoric, however, needs to be
br oadened beyond Aristot le's def init ion. In later antiquit y, some rhet or i -
cians included within it all poetry and prose. Perhaps epideictic rhetoric is
hest regarded as any discourse that does not aim at a specific action but is
intended to influence the values and beliefs of the audience.
•••••••...
In its fully developed form, as seen for example in writings of Cicero in
t h e f ir s t c e nt u r y a nd of Q ui nt ii a n a c e nt ur y l at er, cl as si ca l r het or ic al
teaching consisted of five parts that parallel the act of planning and deliver ing
a speech Since a knowledge of how to speak in a law court was probably the
skill most needed by most students, classical rhetorical theory primarily
focused on judicial rhetoric. Rhetoricians, however, usually also gave sonic
att ent ion t o deliber at iv e and epideic t ic for ms , and fr om t he t ime of t he
Roman Empire some treatises describe epideictic forms in considerable
detail.
The first of the five parts of classical rhetoric is "invention" (Gk. heuresis,
I,at inventio). This is concerned with thinking out the subject matter: with
identifying the question at issue, which is called the stasis of the speech, and
the available means of persuading the audience to accept the speaker's posi -
tion. The means of persuasion include, first, direct evidence, such as wit -
nesses and contracts, which the speaker "uses" but does not "invent"; sec -
o nd , " ar t i s t ic " me an s of p er s u as io n, wh ic h i nc lu de pr e se nt a t i on of t he
speaker's character (ethos) as trustworthy, logical argument (logos) that may
3
INTRODUCTION
convince the audience, and the p a th o s or emotion that the speaker can
awaken in the audience. The artistic means of persuasion utilize "topics"
(Gk. topoi, Lat. loci) , which are ethical or political premises on which an
argument can be built or are logical strategies, such as arguing from cause to
effect. A speaker can also use topics, many of which became traditional, to
gain the trust or the interest of the audience. The importance of the case
can be stressed, not only for the speaker, but as a precedent for future deci -
sions or for its effect on society.
The second part of classical rhetoric is "arrangement" (Gk. ta xi s, Lat.
dispositio). "Arrangement" means the organization of a speech into parts,
though the order in which arguments are presented, whether the strongest
first or toward a climax, is sometimes discussed. Rhetoricians found it dif -
ficult to separate discussion of arrangement from discussion of invention
a n d o f t e n m e r g e d t h e t w o i n t o a n a c c o u n t of t h e i n v e n t i o n a l f e a t ur e s of
each part of a speech. The basic divisions recognized by the handbooks and
applying best to judicial oratory are (1) introduction, or prooemium, (Gk.
prooimion, Lat. exordium); (2) narration (Gk. diegesis, Lat. narratio), the
exposition of the background and factual details; (3) proof (Gk. pistis, Lat.
probatio); and (4) conclusion, or epilogue, (Gk. epilogos, Lat. peroratio). Each
part has its own function and characteristics: the prooemium, for ex ample,
aims at securing the interest and good will of the audience; the nar rat ion
should be clear, br ief, and persuasive; the pr oof supplies logical
arguments in support of the speaker's position and also seeks to refute ob-
jections that might be made against it; the epilogue is often divided into a
recapitulation and an emotional appeal to the audience. Some rhetoricians
added other parts. At the beginning of the proof often a "proposition" and a
"distribution" of headings is discussed. Sometimes there is what is called a
"digression" or "excursus," which is not so much a true digression as a
discussion of some related matter that may affect the outcome or a descrip tion
of the moral character, whether favorable or unfavorable, of those in volved
in the case. Deliberative speeches usually have a prooemium, proof, and
epilogue and can often omit a narration. Epideictic speeches have a
structure of their own; for example a speech in praise of someone may take up
the "topics" of his or her country, ancestry, education, character, and
conduct.
Once the speaker has planned "what" to say and the order in which to say it,
the third task is to decide "how" to say it, that is how to embody it in words
and sentences. This is "style" (Gk. lexis, Lat. elocutio). It is characteristic of
classical rhetoric to regard style as a deliberate process of casting subject
into language; the same ideas can be expressed in different words with
different effect. There are two parts to style: "diction," or the choice of words;
and "composition," the putting of words together into sentences, which includes periodic
structure, prose rhythm, and figures of speech. Discussion of style is usually
organized around the concept of four "virtues" (aretai) that were first defined
by Aristotle's student Theophrastus: correctness (of grammar and usage),
clarity, ornamentation, and propriety. Ornamentation includes "tropes,"
literally "turnings" or substitutions of one term for another as in metaphor;
figures of speech, or changes in the sound or arrangement of a sequence of
words, such as anaphora or asyndeton; and figures of thought, in which a
statement is recast to stress it or achieve audience contact, as in the
rhetorical question. Styles were often classified into types or "characters," of
which the best known categorization is the threefold division into "grand,"
"middle," and "plain."
Invention, arrangement, and style are the three most important parts of
classical rhetoric, applicable equally to public speaking and written compo-
sition. The earliest recognition of them as three separate actions seems to be
in Isocrates' speech Against the Sophists (section 16), written about 390 B.C.
Aristotle discusses all three subjects in his lectures On Rhetoric, which in its
present form dates from around 335 B.C., but in the first chapter of book 3
he suggests that a fourth part might be added, "delivery." By the first cen-
tury B.C. in fact two more parts had been added. Fourth in the usual se -
quence comes "memory " Once a speech was planned and written out, the
student of rhetoric was expected to memorize it word for word for oral
delivery A mnemonic system of backgrounds and images had been devel-
oped for this purpose.' The best ancient discussion is found in the third
book of the Rhetoric for Herennius, written in the early first century B.C.
Fifth and last came "delivery," as Aristotle had proposed. This is divided
into control of the voice—volume, pitch, and so on—and gesture, which
includes effective control of the eyes and limbs. The best ancient discussion is
found in Quintilian's Education of the Orator, book 11.
Classical metarhetoric, as set out in Greek and Latin handbooks from the
fourth century B.C. to the end of antiquity, was a standard body of knowl-
edge. Once fully developed, it remained unaltered in its essential features,
though constantly revised and often made more detailed by teachers who
sought some originality. Was the teaching of rhetoric ever called into ques-
tion in antiquity? The answer is "yes." Just as today "rhetoric" in popular
usage can have negative connotations as deceitful or empty, so it was viewed
with hostility or suspicion by some in classical times.
The earliest context in which this criticism explicitly appears is the
Clouds of Aristophanes, a comic play originally staged in 423 B.C. at the
height of the activity of the older sophists.' The play includes a debate (lines
The beginnings of the mnemonic system were traditionally attributed to the sixth-century
Creek poet Simonides (Cicero, On the Orator 2 360); that some techniques were known in
the fifth century can be seen in Dissoi Logoi 9 (Sprague, The Older Sophists, 292-93).
The text we have is a revision by the poet made a few years later.
6 7
889-1104) between "Just Speech" and "Injust Speech," in which injus -
tice acknowledges itself the "weaker" but triumphs by verbal trickery over
justice, the "stronger." In Plato's Apology (18b8) Socrates, imagined as
4
speaking at his trial in 399 B.C., says he is accused of "making the weaker
argument the stronger." Aristotle (On Rhetoric 2.24.11) identifies "making
the weaker cause the stronger" with the use of argument from probability as
described in fifth-century rhetorical handbooks and says the phrase was
used against the sophist Protagoras. The phrase reflects the frustration of
those unskilled in the new techniques of debate when traditional ideas of
morality and truth were undermined by verbal argument and paradoxical
views that seemed wrong to common sense were seemingly demonstrated.
Examples might include not only the comic debate in the Clouds but
Zeno's argument that Achilles could never overtake a tortoise in a race or
the argument attributed to Lysias in Plato's Phaedrus that it is better to
accept as lover a person who does not love you than one who does. To make
the weaker argument the stronger can certainly be open to moral objections,
but historically the discovery in the fifth century of the possibilities of logical
argument, and thus the willingness to ask new questions, proved fundamental
to scientific progress and social and political change. That the earth is round
and circles the sun had long seemed absurd to most people, and to argue that
blacks should be equal to whites had long seemed to many the "weaker
cause."
The most important and most influential of the critics of rhetoric was
Plato, especially in the dialogue Gorgias.3 The word rhetOr in Greek means a
public speaker, but it often had the more dubious connotation of a "politi-
cian"; the abstraction rhetorike could then be represented as the morally
dubious technique of contemporary politicians in contast to the nobler
study of philosophy with its basis in "truth." Socrates in the Gorgias cer-
tainly criticizes fifth-century political orators as having corrupted the people,
but his criticism is more immediately addressed to Gorgias and Gorgias'
follower Polus for teaching a form of flattery and for their ignorance of the
subjects on which they spoke. Gorgias was one of several traveling lecturers,
called "sophists" (literally "wise men"), who sought to teach techniques of
success in civic life, including what came to be called rhetoric. The sophists as
a group were philosophical relativists, skeptical about the possibility of
knowledge of universal truth. The earliest of the sophists, Protagoras, had
begun a treatise with the famous words "Man is the measure of all things, of
things that are in so far as they are and of things that are not in so far as they
Schiappa, in "Did Plato Coin Rhitorike?" has argued that Plato actually coined the word
rhetorike, which does not occur in any earlier text, but the dramatic date of the dialogue is in
the late fifth century, and both Gorgias and Polus are represented there as accepting the term
without objection.
 CHAPTER ONE
are not." One of the surviving works of Gorgias, entitled On Nature, argues
in outline form that nothing exists, that if it does exist it cannot be known,
and that if it could be known knowledge could not be communicated by one
person to another.' The consequence of this position is that the value of
opinions about what is true, right, or just should he judged from the circum-
stances as understood by individuals at a particular time; courses of practical
action Can best he determined by considering the advantages of the alter-
natives This opens up a place for rhetoric in debate and a need to argue
hot h sides of an issue as persuasively as possible, but it also opens up a place
for skill in -making the weaker the stronger cause. - Socrates in the Gorgias,
and elsewhere in Plato's dialogues, contends that there is such a thing as
absolute truth and universal principles of right and wrong. In the Gorgias
(463a-b) he describes rhetoric as a form of flattery and a sham counterpart
of justice. But in a later dialogue, Phaedrus, Socrates is made to describe a
valid, philosophical rhetoric that would be based on a knowledge of truth, of
logical method, and of the psychology of the audience. As we shall see,
lsocrates and others attempted to answer Plato's objections, and Aristotle
eventually provided the best solution to the argument by showing that rhet-
oric, like dialectic, is a morally neutral art, which can argue both sides of an
issue but which draws on knowledge from other disciplines in the interests
of determining what is advantageous, just, or honorable and employs a dis-
tinct method of its own.
Although criticisms of rhetoric were occasionally voiced by others in the
fourth and third centuries B.C., the utility of the study of rhetoric for civic
life and for writing became generally recognized. The question was, how-
43 ever, reopened in the middle of the second century B.C. by teachers of phi-
losophy, who seem to have been threatened by the number of students
flocking to rhetoricians for advanced study rather than to the philosophical
schools, traditionally the source of higher education in antiquity. These stu-
dents included Romans interested in acquiring a knowledge of Greek cul-
ture. Cicero (On the Orator 1.46) says that the philosophers in Athens in
the late second century B.C. "all with one voice drove the orator from the
government of states, excluded him from all learning and knowledge of
greater things, and pushed down and locked him up in courts of justice and
insignificant disputes as though in a mill." Cicero's dialogue On the Orator,
written in the middle of the first century B.C., is an eloquent and thoughtful
response to criticisms of rhetoric, which are blamed in the first instance on
Socrates' division between tongue and brain (3.61). In books I and 3, Cras-
sus, the character in the dialogue with whom Cicero clearly most identified,
For discussion of this statement as well as "making the weaker the strong cause" as applied to
Protagoras. see Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, 103-33.
For English translations of the surviving writings of the sophists, see Sprague, The Older
Sophists
INTRODUCTION
5
describes an ideal orator trained in rhetoric, philosophy, law, history, and all
knowledge. Such an orator should be morally good and an active participant
in public life. The more practical process of rhetoric is substituted for the
more theoretical goal of philosophy, but with a deeper basis of knowledge
than could be derived solely from the study of rhetorical rules.
Hostility between rhetoric and philosophy existed throughout the period of
the Roman Empire. The problem was acerbated by Stoic and Cynic phi-
losophers who criticized the emperors as autocratic. The emperor Domi-
tian, toward the end of the first century after Christ, expelled philosophers
from Rome, and the rhetorician Quintilian, who enjoyed Domitian's pa-
tronage, scorned them as antisocial dissidents. The emperor Marcus Aure-
lius in the second century had studied with the rhetorician Fronto but in-
creasingly turned to the attractions of philosophy. That Plato's criticisms of
rhetoric were still regarded as forceful is seen in the fact that Aelius Aristides
in the mid-second century composed an extended reply to Plato entitled In
Defense of Oratory. Later in the century the skeptical philosopher
Sextus Empiricus in Against the Rhetoricians dismissed the study of rhetoric
as a waste of time. Rhetoric was a problem for early Christian thinkers.
Saint Paul in first Corinthians (2:4) rejects the "wisdom of this world":
"My speech and my proclamation are not in persuasive words of wisdom,
but in demonstration of the Spirit and power, in order that your faith may
not be in the wisdom of men but in the power of God." Radical early
Christians often scorned rhetoric as worldly, but Paul was, within his
own faith, a skilled rhetorician, and the Apologists of the second century
found traditional rhetorical skills useful in presenting the new faith to larger
audiences. With the toleration and official establishment of Christianity in
the fourth century, Christian leaders show a greater openness to the study of
rhetoric. Saint Augustine began his career as a teacher of rhetoric; though
he abandoned that on his conversion, he eventually worked out a
synthesis of the place of rhetoric in interpretation of the Bible and in
preaching as described in On Christian Doctrine.
Some modern readers sympathize with philosophy in its dispute with
rhetoric. In the former discipline they see devotion to truth, intellectual
honesty, depth of perception, consistency, and sincerity; in the later, verbal
dexterity, empty pomposity, triviality, moral ambivalence, and a desire to
achieve self-interest by any means. The picture is not quite so clear cut.
Rhetorical theorists such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian are not unscru-
pulous tricksters with words. Furthermore, rhetoric was at times a greater
liberalizing force in ancient intellectual life than was philosophy, which
tended to become dogmatic. The basic principle of humane law—that any-
one, however clear the evidence on the other side seems to be, has a right to
present a case in the best light possible—is an inheritance from Greek
justice and Roman law. Political debaters under democracy in Greece and
9
CHAPTER ONE

republican government in Rome recognized the need to entertain opposing

views when expressed with rhetorical effectiveness. Finally, linguistic, philo -
sophical, and critical studies in the twentieth century have pointed to the
conclusion that there is no such a thing as nonrhetorical discourse; even
ostensibly ob j ective scientific and philosophical writing contains social and
polit ic al as s umpt ions t hat may be ques t ioned and uses rhet or ical t ech -
niques that carry ethical and emotional connotations to argue its case. In
the first chapter of On Rhetoric Aristotle presents reasons for concluding
that rhetoric is useful; we can go beyond that to say it is necessary and
inevitable. In speaking, writing, hearing, and reading, we are better off if we
understand the process.

6
Aristotle: Art of Rhetoric
(Book 1, Chapters 1-3)
Translated by W. Rhys Roberts

7
 BOOK ONE current treatises forbid talk about legislating and
I on rhetoric have non-essentials. administering

R
constructed but a This is sound law justice is easier
HETORI small portion of and custom. It is than to find a
C is the that art. The not right to large number.
counterpa modes of pervert the judge Next, laws are
rt of Dialectic. persuasion are the by moving him to made after long
Both alike are only true anger or envy or consideration,
concerned with constituents of the pity-one might as whereas decisions
such things as art: everything well warp a in the courts are
come, more or else is merely carpenter’s rule given at short
less, within the accessory. These before using it. notice, which
general ken of all writers, however, Again, a litigant makes it hard for
men and belong say nothing about has clearly those who try the
to no definite enthymemes, nothing to do but case to satisfy the
science. which are the to show that the claims of justice
Accordingly all substance of alleged fact is so and expediency.
men make use, rhetorical or is not so, that it The weightiest
more or less, of persuasion, but has or has not reason of all is
both; for to a deal mainly with happened. As to that the decision
certain extent all non-essentials. whether a thing is of the lawgiver is
men attempt to The arousing of important or not particular but
discuss statements prejudice, pity, unimportant, just prospective and
and to maintain anger, and similar or unjust, the general, whereas
them, to defend emotions has judge must surely members of the
themselves and to nothing to do with refuse to take his assembly and the
attack others. the essential facts, instructions from jury find it their
Ordinary people but is merely a the litigants: he duty to decide on
do this either at personal appeal to must decide for definite cases
random or the man who is himself all such brought before
through practice judging the case. points as the law- them. They will
and from acquired Consequently if giver has not often have
habit. Both ways the rules for trials already defined allowed
being possible, which are now for him. themselves to be
the subject can laid down some Now, it is of so much
plainly be handled states-especially great moment that influenced by
systematically, for in well-governed well-drawn laws feelings of
it is possible to states-were should themselves friendship or
inquire the reason applied define all the hatred or self-
why some everywhere, such points they interest that they
speakers succeed people would possibly can and lose any clear
through practice have nothing to leave as few as vision of the truth
and others say. All men, no may be to the and have their
spontaneously; doubt, think that decision of the judgment
and every one the laws should judges; and this obscured by
will at once agree prescribe such for several considerations of
that such an rules, but some, reasons. First, to personal pleasure
inquiry is the as in the court of find one man, or a or pain. In
function of an art. Areopagus, give few men, who are general, then, the
Now, the practical effect to sensible persons judge should, we
framers of the their thoughts and and capable of say, be allowed to

8
decide as few and although the other people’s sort of syllogism,
things as possible. former is a nobler affairs that are to and the
But questions as business, and be decided, so consideration of
to whether fitter for a citizen, that the judges, syllogisms of all
something has than that which intent on their kinds, without
happened or has concerns the own satisfaction distinction, is the
not happened, relations of and listening with business of
will be or will not private partiality, dialectic, either of
be, is or is not, individuals, these surrender dialectic as a
must of necessity authors say themselves to the whole or of one of
be left to the nothing about disputants instead its branches. It
judge, since the political oratory, of judging follows plainly,
lawgiver cannot but try, one and between them. therefore, that he
foresee them. If all, to write Hence in many who is best able
this is so, it is treatises on the places, as we have to see how and
evident that any way to plead in said already, from what
one who lays court. The reason irrelevant elements a
down rules about for this is that in speaking is syllogism is
other matters, political oratory forbidden in the produced will also
such as what must there is less law-courts: in the be best skilled in
be the contents of inducement to public assembly the enthymeme,
the ‘introduction’ talk about those who have to when he has
or the ‘narration’ nonessentials. form a judgment further learnt
or any of the other Political oratory is are themselves what its subject-
divisions of a less given to well able to guard matter is and in
speech, is unscrupulous against that. what respects it
theorizing about practices than It is clear, differs from the
non-essentials as forensic, because then, that syllogism of strict
if they belonged it treats of wider rhetorical study, logic. The true
to the art. The issues. In a in its strict sense, and the
only question political debate is concerned with approximately
with which these the man who is the modes of true are
writers here deal forming a persuasion. apprehended by
is how to put the judgement is Persuasion is the same faculty;
judge into a given making a decision clearly a sort of it may also be
frame of mind. about his own demonstration, noted that men
About the orator’s vital interests. since we are most have a sufficient
proper modes of There is no need, fully persuaded natural instinct for
persuasion they therefore, to when we consider what is true, and
have nothing to prove anything a thing to have usually do arrive
tell us; nothing, except that the been at the truth. Hence
that is, about how facts are what the demonstrated. the man who
to gain skill in supporter of a The orator’s makes a good
enthymemes. measure demonstration is guess at truth is
Hence it maintains they an enthymeme, likely to make a
comes that, are. In forensic and this is, in good guess at
although the same oratory this is not general, the most probabilities.
systematic enough; to effective of the It has now
principles apply conciliate the modes of been shown that
to political as to listener is what persuasion. The the ordinary
forensic oratory, pays here. It is enthymeme is a writers on rhetoric

9
treat of non- observed in the to believe in. clear, also, that it
essentials; it has Topics when Again, (4) it is is useful. It is
also been shown dealing with the absurd to hold clear, further, that
why they have way to handle a that a man ought its function is not
inclined more popular audience. to be ashamed of simply to succeed
towards the Further, (3) we being unable to in persuading, but
forensic branch of must be able to defend himself rather to discover
oratory. employ with his limbs, the means of
Rhetoric is persuasion, just as but not of being coming as near
useful (1) because strict reasoning unable to defend such success as
things that are can be employed, himself with the circumstances
true and things on opposite sides speech and of each particular
that are just have of a question, not reason, when the case allow. In this
a natural tendency in order that we use of rational it resembles all
to prevail over may in practice speech is more other arts. For
their opposites, so employ it in both distinctive of a example, it is not
that if the ways (for we human being than the function of
decisions of must not make the use of his medicine simply
judges are not people believe limbs. And if it be to make a man
what they ought what is wrong), objected that one quite healthy, but
to be, the defeat but in order that who uses such to put him as far
must be due to the we may see power of speech as may be on the
speakers clearly what the unjustly might do road to health; it
themselves, and facts are, and that, great harm, that is is possible to give
they must be if another man a charge which excellent
blamed argues unfairly, may be made in treatment even to
accordingly. we on our part common against those who can
Moreover, (2) may be able to all good things never enjoy sound
before some confute him. No except virtue, and health.
audiences not other of the arts above all against Furthermore, it is
even the draws opposite the things that are plain that it is the
possession of the conclusions: most useful, as function of one
exactest dialectic and strength, health, and the same art
knowledge will rhetoric alone do wealth, to discern the real
make it easy for this. Both these generalship. A and the apparent
what we say to arts draw opposite man can confer means of
produce conclusions the greatest of persuasion, just as
conviction. For impartially. benefits by a right it is the function
argument based Nevertheless, the use of these, and of dialectic to
on knowledge underlying facts inflict the greatest discern the real
implies do not lend of injuries by and the apparent
instruction, and themselves using them syllogism. What
there are people equally well to wrongly. makes a man a
whom one cannot the contrary It is clear, ‘sophist’ is not his
instruct. Here, views. No; things then, that rhetoric faculty, but his
then, we must that are true and is not bound up moral purpose. In
use, as our modes things that are with a single rhetoric, however,
of persuasion and better are, by their definite class of the term
argument, notions nature, practically subjects, but is as ‘rhetorician’ may
possessed by always easier to universal as describe either the
everybody, as we prove and easier dialectic; it is speaker’s

10
knowledge of the the properties of furnished by the revealed by the
art, or his moral magnitudes, spoken word there speaker
purpose. In arithmetic about are three kinds. contributes
dialectic it is numbers, and the The first kind nothing to his
different: a man is same is true of the depends on the power of
a ‘sophist’ other arts and personal character persuasion; on the
because he has a sciences. But of the speaker; the contrary, his
certain kind of rhetoric we look second on putting character may
moral purpose, a upon as the power the audience into almost be called
‘dialectician’ in of observing the a certain frame of the most effective
respect, not of his means of mind; the third on means of
moral purpose, persuasion on the proof, or persuasion he
but of his faculty. almost any apparent proof, possesses.
Let us now subject presented provided by the Secondly,
try to give some to us; and that is words of the persuasion may
account of the why we say that, speech itself. come through the
systematic in its technical Persuasion is hearers, when the
principles of character, it is not achieved by the speech stirs their
Rhetoric itself-of concerned with speaker’s personal emotions. Our
the right method any special or character when judgments when
and means of definite class of the speech is so we are pleased
succeeding in the subjects. spoken as to make and friendly are
object we set Of the modes us think him not the same as
before us. We of persuasion credible. We when we are
must make as it some belong believe good men pained and
were a fresh start, strictly to the art more fully and hostile. It is
and before going of rhetoric and more readily than towards
further define some do not. By others: this is true producing these
what rhetoric is. the latter I mean generally effects, as we
such things as are whatever the maintain, that
II not supplied by question is, and present-day
Rhetoric may the speaker but absolutely true writers on rhetoric
be defined as the are there at the where exact direct the whole
faculty of outset-witnesses, certainty is of their efforts.
observing in any evidence given impossible and This subject shall
given case the under torture, opinions are be treated in
available means written contracts, divided. This kind detail when we
of persuasion. and so on. By the of persuasion, like come to speak of
This is not a former I mean the others, should the emotions.
function of any such as we can be achieved by Thirdly,
other art. Every ourselves what the speaker persuasion is
other art can construct by says, not by what effected through
instruct or means of the people think of the speech itself
persuade about its principles of his character when we have
own particular rhetoric. The one before he begins proved a truth or
subject-matter; kind has merely to speak. It is not an apparent truth
for instance, to be used, the true, as some by means of the
medicine about other has to be writers assume in persuasive
what is healthy invented. their treatises on arguments
and unhealthy, Of the modes rhetoric, that the suitable to the
geometry about of persuasion personal goodness case in question.

11
 There are, said at the outset. anything at all is said in the
then, these three Neither rhetoric bound to use Methodics applies
means of nor dialectic is the either syllogisms equally well here;
effecting scientific study of or inductions (and in some oratorical
persuasion. The any one separate this is clear to us styles examples
man who is to be subject: both are from the prevail, in others
in command of faculties for Analytics), it enthymemes; and
them must, it is providing must follow that in like manner,
clear, be able (1) arguments. This is enthymemes are some orators are
to reason perhaps a syllogisms and better at the
logically, (2) to sufficient account examples are former and some
understand human of their scope and inductions. The at the latter.
character and of how they are difference Speeches that rely
goodness in their related to each between example on examples are
various forms, other. and enthymeme is as persuasive as
and (3) to With regard made plain by the the other kind, but
understand the to the persuasion passages in the those which rely
emotions-that is, achieved by proof Topics where on enthymemes
to name them and or apparent proof: induction and excite the louder
describe them, to just as in dialectic syllogism have applause. The
know their causes there is induction already been sources of
and the way in on the one hand discussed. When examples and
which they are and syllogism or we base the proof enthymemes, and
excited. It thus apparent of a proposition their proper uses,
appears that syllogism on the on a number of we will discuss
rhetoric is an other, so it is in similar cases, this later. Our next
offshoot of rhetoric. The is induction in step is to define
dialectic and also example is an dialectic, example the processes
of ethical studies. induction, the in rhetoric; when themselves more
Ethical studies enthymeme is a it is shown that, clearly.
may fairly be syllogism, and the certain A statement is
called political; apparent propositions persuasive and
and for this enthymeme is an being true, a credible either
reason rhetoric apparent further and quite because it is
masquerades as syllogism. I call distinct directly self-
political science, the enthymeme a proposition must evident or
and the professors rhetorical also be true in because it appears
of it as political syllogism, and the consequence, to be proved from
experts- example a whether other statements
sometimes from rhetorical invariably or that are so. In
want of induction. Every usually, this is either case it is
education, one who effects called syllogism persuasive
sometimes from persuasion in dialectic, because there is
ostentation, through proof enthymeme in somebody whom
sometimes owing does in fact use rhetoric. It is plain it persuades. But
to other human either also that each of none of the arts
failings. As a enthymemes or these types of theorize about
matter of fact, it is examples: there is oratory has its individual cases.
a branch of no other way. And advantages. Types Medicine, for
dialectic and since every one of oratory, I say: instance, does not
similar to it, as we who proves for what has been theorize about

12
what will help to cannot take in at a because they are basis of rhetorical
cure Socrates or glance a based on premises syllogisms. Most
Callias, but only complicated that are not of the things
about what will argument, or generally about which we
help to cure any follow a long admitted or make decisions,
or all of a given chain of believed. and into which
class of patients: reasoning. The The therefore we
this alone is subjects of our enthymeme and inquire, present us
business: deliberation are the example must, with alternative
individual cases such as seem to then, deal with possibilities. For
are so infinitely present us with what is in the it is about our
various that no alternative main contingent, actions that we
systematic possibilities: the example being deliberate and
knowledge of about things that an induction, and inquire, and all
them is possible. could not have the enthymeme a our actions have a
In the same way been, and cannot syllogism, about contingent
the theory of now or in the such matters. The character; hardly
rhetoric is future be, other enthymeme must any of them are
concerned not than they are, consist of few determined by
with what seems nobody who takes propositions, necessity. Again,
probable to a them to be of this fewer often than conclusions that
given individual nature wastes his those which make state what is
like Socrates or time in up the normal merely usual or
Hippias, but with deliberation. syllogism. For if possible must be
what seems It is possible any of these drawn from
probable to men to form propositions is a premises that do
of a given type; syllogisms and familiar fact, the same, just as
and this is true of draw conclusions there is no need ‘necessary’
dialectic also. from the results of even to mention conclusions must
Dialectic does not previous it; the hearer adds be drawn from
construct its syllogisms; or, on it himself. Thus, ‘necessary’
syllogisms out of the other hand, to show that premises; this too
any haphazard from premises Dorieus has been is clear to us from
materials, such as which have not victor in a contest the Analytics. It is
the fancies of been thus proved, for which the evident, therefore,
crazy people, but and at the same prize is a crown, that the
out of materials time are so little it is enough to say propositions
that call for accepted that they ‘For he has been forming the basis
discussion; and call for proof. victor in the of enthymemes,
rhetoric, too, Reasonings of the Olympic games,’ though some of
draws upon the former kind will without adding them may be
regular subjects of necessarily be ‘And in the ‘necessary,’ will
debate. The duty hard to follow Olympic games most of them be
of rhetoric is to owing to their the prize is a only usually true.
deal with such length, for we crown,’ a fact Now the materials
matters as we assume an which everybody of enthymemes
deliberate upon audience of knows. are Probabilities
without arts or untrained There are few and Signs, which
systems to guide thinkers; those of facts of the we can see must
us, in the hearing the latter kind will ‘necessary’ type correspond
of persons who fail to win assent, that can form the respectively with

13
the propositions refuted, they then have the infallible syllogisms and
that are generally think that they are kind of Sign, the some cannot.
and those that are bringing forward only kind that The
necessarily true. A a ‘complete constitutes a ‘example’ has
Probability is a proof,’ meaning complete proof, already been
thing that usually that the matter has since it is the only described as one
happens; not, now been kind that, if the kind of induction;
however, as some demonstrated and particular and the special
definitions would completed statement is true, nature of the
suggest, anything (peperhasmeuou); is irrefutable. The subject-matter
whatever that for the word other kind of that distinguishes
usually happens, ‘perhas’ has the Sign, that which it from the other
but only if it same meaning (of bears to the kinds has also
belongs to the ‘end’ or proposition it been stated above.
class of the ‘boundary’) as the supports the Its relation to the
‘contingent’ or word ‘tekmarh’ in relation of proposition it
‘variable.’ It bears the ancient universal to supports is not
the same relation tongue. Now the particular, might that of part to
to that in respect one kind of Sign be illustrated by whole, nor whole
of which it is (that which bears saying, ‘The fact to part, nor whole
probable as the to the proposition that he breathes to whole, but of
universal bears to it supports the fast is a sign that part to part, or
the particular. Of relation of he has a fever.’ like to like. When
Signs, one kind particular to This argument two statements
bears the same universal) may be also is refutable, are of the same
relation to the illustrated thus. even if the order, but one is
statement it Suppose it were statement about more familiar
supports as the said, ‘The fact the fast breathing than the other, the
particular bears to that Socrates was be true, since a former is an
the universal, the wise and just is a man may breathe ‘example.’ The
other the same as sign that the wise hard without argument may, for
the universal are just.’ Here we having a fever. instance, be that
bears to the certainly have a It has, then, Dionysius, in
particular. The Sign; but even been stated above asking as he does
infallible kind is a though the what is the nature for a bodyguard,
‘complete proof’ proposition be of a Probability, is scheming to
(tekmerhiou); the true, the argument of a Sign, and of a make himself a
fallible kind has is refutable, since complete proof, despot. For in the
no specific name. it does not form a and what are the past Peisistratus
By infallible signs syllogism. differences kept asking for a
I mean those on Suppose, on the between them. In bodyguard in
which syllogisms other hand, it the Analytics a order to carry out
proper may be were said, ‘The more explicit such a scheme,
based: and this fact that he has a description has and did make
shows us why this fever is a sign that been given of himself a despot
kind of Sign is he is ill,’ or, ‘The these points; it is as soon as he got
called ‘complete fact that she is there shown why it; and so did
proof’: when giving milk is a some of these Theagenes at
people think that sign that she has reasonings can be Megara; and in
what they have lately borne a put into the same way all
said cannot be child.’ Here we other instances

14
known to the exercise or to conduct, natural distinct from
speaker are made those we have not science, or dialectic and
into examples, in yet acquired. anything else rhetoric. One may
order to show Missing this whatever. But succeed in stating
what is not yet distinction, people there are also the required
known, that fail to notice that those special principles, but
Dionysius has the the more correctly Lines of one’s science will
same purpose in they handle their Argument which be no longer
making the same particular subject are based on such dialectic or
request: all these the further they propositions as rhetoric, but the
being instances of are getting away apply only to science to which
the one general from pure rhetoric particular groups the principles thus
principle, that a or dialectic. This or classes of discovered
man who asks for statement will be things. Thus there belong. Most
a bodyguard is clearer if are propositions enthymemes are
scheming to make expressed more about natural in fact based upon
himself a despot. fully. I mean that science on which these particular or
We have now the proper it is impossible to special Lines of
described the subjects of base any Argument;
sources of those dialectical and enthymeme or comparatively
means of rhetorical syllogism about few on the
persuasion which syllogisms are the ethics, and other common or
are popularly things with which propositions general kind. As
supposed to be we say the regular about ethics on in the therefore,
demonstrative. or universal Lines which nothing can so in this work,
There is an of Argument are be based about we must
important concerned, that is natural science. distinguish, in
distinction to say those lines The same dealing with
between two sorts of argument that principle applies enthymemes, the
of enthymemes apply equally to throughout. The special and the
that has been questions of right general Lines of general Lines of
wholly conduct, natural Argument have Argument on
overlooked by science, politics, no special which they are to
almost and many other subject-matter, be founded. By
everybody-one things that have and therefore will special Lines of
that also subsists nothing to do with not increase our Argument I mean
between the one another. Take, understanding of the propositions
syllogisms treated for instance, the any particular peculiar to each
of in dialectic. line of argument class of things. several class of
One sort of concerned with On the other things, by general
enthymeme really ‘the more or less.’ hand, the better those common to
belongs to On this line of the selection one all classes alike.
rhetoric, as one argument it is makes of We may begin
sort of syllogism equally easy to propositions with the special
really belongs to base a syllogism suitable for Lines of
dialectic; but the or enthymeme special Lines of Argument. But,
other sort really about any of what Argument, the first of all, let us
belongs to other nevertheless are nearer one comes, classify rhetoric
arts and faculties, essentially unconsciously, to into its varieties.
whether to those disconnected setting up a Having
we already subjects-right science that is distinguished

15
these we may deal the ceremonial concerned with relative to this
with them one by oratory of display. the present, since one. Those who
one, and try to Political all men praise or praise or attack a
discover the speaking urges us blame in view of man aim at
elements of which either to do or not the state of things proving him
each is composed, to do something: existing at the worthy of honor
and the one of these two time, though they or the reverse, and
propositions each courses is always often find it they too treat all
must employ. taken by private useful also to other
counselors, as recall the past and considerations
III well as by men to make guesses with reference to
Rhetoric falls who address at the future. this one.
into three public assemblies. Rhetoric has That the three
divisions, Forensic speaking three distinct ends kinds of rhetoric
determined by the either attacks or in view, one for do aim
three classes of defends each of its three respectively at the
listeners to somebody: one or kinds. The three ends we
speeches. For of other of these two political orator have mentioned is
the three elements things must aims at shown by the fact
in speech- always be done establishing the that speakers will
making--speaker, by the parties in a expediency or the sometimes not try
subject, and case. The harmfulness of a to establish
person ceremonial proposed course anything else.
addressed--it is oratory of display of action; if he Thus, the litigant
the last one, the either praises or urges its will sometimes
hearer, that censures acceptance, he not deny that a
determines the somebody. These does so on the thing has
speech’s end and three kinds of ground that it will happened or that
object. The hearer rhetoric refer to do good; if he he has done harm.
must be either a three different urges its rejection, But that he is
judge, with a kinds of time. The he does so on the guilty of injustice
decision to make political orator is ground that it will he will never
about things past concerned with do harm; and all admit; otherwise
or future, or an the future: it is other points, such there would be no
observer. A about things to be as whether the need of a trial. So
member of the done hereafter proposal is just or too, political
assembly decides that he advises, unjust, honorable orators often
about future for or against. The or dishonorable, make any
events, a juryman party in a case at he brings in as concession short
about past events: law is concerned subsidiary and of admitting that
while those who with the past; one relative to this they are
merely decide on man accuses the main recommending
the orator’s skill other, and the consideration. their hearers to
are observers. other defends Parties in a law- take an
From this it himself, with case aim at inexpedient
follows that there reference to establishing the course or not to
are three divisions things already justice or injustice take an expedient
of oratory-(1) done. The of some action, one. The question
political, (2) ceremonial orator and they too bring whether it is not
forensic, and (3) is, properly in all other points unjust for a city to
speaking, as subsidiary and enslave its

16
innocent the enthymeme is the justice or
neighbors often a particular kind injustice, is great
does not trouble of syllogism or small, either
them at all. In like composed of the absolutely or
manner those who aforesaid relatively; and
praise or censure propositions. therefore it is
a man do not Since only plain that we must
consider whether possible actions, also have at our
his acts have been and not command
expedient or not, impossible ones, propositions
but often make it can ever have about greatness or
a ground of actual been done in the smallness and the
praise that he has past or the greater or the
neglected his own present, and since lesser-
interest to do things which have propositions both
what was not occurred, or universal and
honorable. Thus, will not occur, particular. Thus,
they praise also cannot have we must be able
Achilles because been done or be to say which is
he championed going to be done, the greater or
his fallen friend it is necessary for lesser good, the
Patroclus, though the political, the greater or lesser
he knew that this forensic, and the act of justice or
meant death, and ceremonial injustice; and so
that otherwise he speaker alike to on.
need not die: yet be able to have at Such, then,
while to die thus their command are the subjects
was the nobler propositions regarding which
thing for him to about the possible we are
do, the expedient and the
inevitably bound
thing was to live impossible, and
on. about whether a
to master the
It is evident thing has or has propositions
from what has not occurred, will relevant to them.
been said that it is or will not occur. We must now
these three Further, all men, discuss each
subjects, more in giving praise or particular class
than any others, blame, in urging of these subjects
about which the us to accept or in turn, namely
orator must be reject proposals those dealt with
able to have for action, in in political, in
propositions at his accusing others or
ceremonial, and
command. Now defending
the propositions themselves,
lastly in legal,
of Rhetoric are attempt not only oratory.
Complete Proofs, to prove the
Probabilities, and points mentioned
Signs. Every kind but also to show
of syllogism is that the good or
composed of the harm, the
propositions, and honor or disgrace,

17