De Bisschop vs.

Galang

De Bisschop vs. Galang GR L-18365, 31 May 1963; En Banc, Reyes JBL [J]

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this
country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as the prearranged employee of the
Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for
extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In
view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin
de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front
than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be,
and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax, the
Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his application for extension of stay as a
prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he
should depart within 5 days.
To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de
Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main
case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a
quo on the same day ordering herein respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and
detaining petitioner-appellee unless and until proper and legal proceedings are
conducted by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration in connection
with the Application for extension of stay filed by petitioner with said Board.
Appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred (a) in
holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal
hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens, and (b) in ruling that said
Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases.

ISSUE:
Whether the right to a notice and hearing in certain administrative proceedings is
essential to due process?

HELD:
No. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of
the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No.
613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the
procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that
courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may
warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of
appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a
preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellant’s answer to the complaint, the “requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs
voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion”. In Cornejo vs.
Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal, it was held that a day in court is not a matter of
right in administrative proceedings. The fact should not be lost sight of that we are
dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge
Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of
law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day
in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. . . . In certain proceedings,
therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction,
that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.