Radio Communications of the Philippines vs. Secretary of Labor in connection with the Application for Exemption.
onnection with the Application for Exemption. In consideration, the UNION, its officers and
GR 77959 January 9, 1989
Facts:
RCPI engaged in the telecommunications business filed with the National Wages Council an
application for exemption from the coverage of Wage Order No. 1. The application was opposed by
respondent United RCPI Communications Labor Association (URCPICLA-FUR), a labor organization
affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR). The application of RCPI was disapproved and
they were ordered to pay it’s covered employees the mandatory living allowance of Php. 2 daily
effective March 22, 1981.
As early as March 18, 1985 respondent union FUR filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, asserting therein its claim to 15% of the total backpay due to all its members as “UNION
SERVICE FEE” for having successfully prosecuted the employees claims for payment of wages and
for reimbursement expenses incurred by FUR .
Subsequently on October 24, 1985 without the consent and knowledge of FUR, RCPI entered
into a compromise agreement with Buklod ng Mangagawa Sa RCPI as the new bargaining agent of
RCPI employees. RCPI prayed that for the dismissal of the decision of the National Wages Council
because it’s decision was already novated by the compromise agreement entered by RCPI and the new
bargaining agent.
Issue:
WON RCPI is solely liable for the “UNION SERVICE FEE” to respondent FUR?
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Attorney's fee due the oppositor is chargeable against RCPI. The defaulting employer or
government agency remains liable for attorney's fees because it compelled the complainant to employ
the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim. It is an undisputed
fact that FUR is the counsel on record of the RCPI employees in their claim for ECOLA in wage order
number 1 and since the very start of the controversy from the proceedings from the NWC up to the SC.
Therefore FUR is entitled to “attorney’s fee” aka. “Union Service Fee”.
The new bargaining agent’s compromise agreement is invalid for it is not a party in interest in
the controversy. Finally RCPI cannot invoke the lack of an individual written authorization from the
employees as a shield for its fraudulent refusal to pay the service fee of FUR. When RCPI entered into
the compromise agreement with the new bargaining agent they expressly and impliedly remedied this
requirement when they agreed to the 10% deduction and held RCPI free from any claim. Thus RCPI
should pay 15% union service fee of P427,845.60 to FUR.
General Rubber and Footwear Corp. vs. Drilon (Secretary of Labor)
GR 76988 January 31, 1989
Facts:
On December 26, 1984, Wage Order No. 6 was issued, increasing the statutory minimum
wage rage by 2 pesos and the COLA by 3 pesos for non-agricultural workers in the private sector. Of
course General Rubber appealed to the National Wages Council wherein they lost.
On May 25, 1985, some members of the General Rubber Worker’s Union-NATU, led by one
Leopoldo Sto. Domingo, declared a strike against General Rubber. Three days later general rubber and
sto. Domingo entered into a compromise agreement, Return-to-Work-Agreement, Article 4 of which
provided:
The COMPANY agrees to implement in full Wage Order No. 6 effective May 30, 1985, and
agrees to withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration which it filed with the National Wages Council
members, agrees not to demand or ask from the COMPANY the corresponding differential pay from
November 1, 1984 to May 29 1985 arising out of the non-compliance of said wage order during the
said period.
The agreement was ratified by 268 members of the union while 100 members of the union
who were unhappy with the agreement did not sign the agreement. General Rubber in honoring the
agreement filed a motion to withdraw its motion for reconsideration which it filed with the National
Wages Council.
Issue:
WON the waiver of the majority members of the union is binding upon the minority
members?
Held/Ratio:
No. Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected
by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The
beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only
assist them but cannot decide for them. Awards in favor of laborers after long years of litigation must
be attended to with mutual openness and in the best of faith. Only thus can we really give meaning to
the constitutional mandate of giving laborers maximum protection and security. Since Article 4 of the
Return-to-Work Agreement was not enforceable against the non-consenting union members, the Order
of the National Wages Council dated 4 March 1985 requiring petitioner to comply with Wage Order
No. 6 from 1 November 1984 onward must be regarded as having become final and executory insofar
as the non-consenting union members were concerned.
General Rubber is required to pay the minority members of respondent union their
claims for differential pay under Wage Order No. 6, which totaled P90, 090.00.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
GR L-46496 February 27, 1940
Facts:
Ang Tibay, owned by Toribio Teodoro was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a
shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off 89 members of the National Labor
Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the
employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty
of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly
favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer.
Issue:
WON special courts like the CIR should observe due process?
Held/Ratio:
Yes, the case is remanded to the CIR, the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and
quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and
employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a
locality by order of the president.
 That the records of the case are barren, the does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis
upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law justifies the want for a retrial.
Fundamental essential requirements of Due Process:
1. Right to a hearing
2. Consideration of evidence by the court
3. Duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. Substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as
to free them from technical rules
5. The decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also
delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely accept the
views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.
Zenaida Ascunion vs. NLRC and Prudencio Agbuya
GR 109311 June 17, 1997
Facts:
Private respondent Prudencio Agbuya was employed as designer by ABC Mirror Tower and
Aluminum Supply (ABC) allegedly run by petitioner Asuncion as general manager. ABC was
compelled to retrench some of its employees, including respondent, due to serious business reversal,
prompting the latter to file against petitioner and ABC a complaint for illegal dismissal, violation of
P.D. No. 525, non-payment of wages and violation of R.A. No. 6640. On March 11, 1991, Labor
Arbiter de Vera rendered a decision which reads:
"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondents to reinstate the complainant to his former position as designer with all the
rights, benefits and privileges appertaining thereto, plus backwages in the total sum of P73,892.00
without deduction or qualification. Further, the respondents are ordered to pay complainant the latter's
salary differential amounting to P400.00.
When the decision attained finality because of failure of petitioner to file an appeal within the
reglementary period, Agbuya filed a motion for writ of execution which was granted but was
subsequently opposed by Ascuncion on the ground that she was "not the owner or even part-owner" of
ABC, and therefore, cannot be held personally liable for the judgment award.
Issue:
WON Ascuncion may be held liable for the judgment award in favor Agbuya?
Held/Ratio:
Yes. This Court has held that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case
whether or not said decision is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities
and errors it may contain, which cannot be corrected by certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that the judgment was rendered without due process of law and is,
therefore, null and void because she was not properly summoned by the NLRC. The records
sufficiently contradict this assertion. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC correctly found that, not
only was petitioner served with summons but she also filed an answer to the complaint in the
form of a position paper wherein her inclusion as a respondent was never disputed. "As a
matter of fact, some notices were even addressed to her with the company as the forwarding
addressee.
QUIAMBAO VS NLRC (1994) - Re BOND: Substantial compliance of appeal bond-
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Quiambao was hired as officer-in-charge of private respondent Central
Cement Corporation’s Tuguegarao Branch on December 1, 1982. Six months later, he was made
permanent Branch Manager Among other things, petitioner, together with William Kho, the Branch
Cashier, was in charge of credit collections. He submitted monthly reports to the Central Office on the
operations of the branch and the outstanding balances of its customers. He was also required to attend
regular monthly meetings in the Central Office, together with the Vice President for Marketing and the
Marketing Manager.
In April 1984, a financial and performance audit made by the Central Office showed the
Tuguegarao Branch of which he was the Manager to be in “a state of disarray and chaos.”
On May 25, 1984, petitioner was suspended for an indefinite period for poor performance in
extending credit to customers, violation of company rules and regulations and gross negligence. He
then demanded reinstatement with backwages. But Central Cement ignored his demand and instead
served him with a notice of termination on the ground of loss of confidence.
Petitioner therefore filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
NLRC ruling: in favor of Quiambao. Central cement filed an appeal to which petitioner moved to
dismiss on the ground that Cement Central had not posted a supersedeas bond as required by Art. 223
of Labor Code, but the NLRC did not act on his motion. Instead, NLRC rendered a decision reversing
the finding of the Labor Arbiter and dismissing Quiambao’s complaint
ISSUE: WON Central Cement is required to post a supersedeas bond
HELD: YES. Art. 223 expressly provides that “In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.”
RATIO:
(1) . Petitioner is right that the filing of a supersedeas bond is indispensable to the perfection of an
appeal in cases whichinvolve monetary awards and that because Central Cement failed to comply with
this requirement, the decision of the Labor Arbiter, finding Central Cement guilty of the illegal
dismissal of petitioner, became final and executory.
(2) RE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
Respondent contends that Art. 223 of the Labor Code is not self executing and that since the rules
implementing it took effect only on September 5, 1989, after private respondent had appealed to the
NLRC on June 19, 1989, and that at the time it brought its appeal, there was no requirement to give a
supersedeas bond as condition for perfecting its appeal. CONTENTION UNTENABLE. The Court
said that the requirement of posting supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal can be
relaxed. But the decisions in those cases were justified by the fact that there was substantial
compliance with the rule, so that on balance, technical considerations had to give way to
considerations of equity and justice.In the case at bar, no similar justifications exist excusing Central
Cement’s failure to comply with the rule on mandatory posting of supersedeas bond.
The Court said that the rule re bond may be relaxed. In the case of Rada v. NLRC the bond was
paid, although belatedly. On the other hand in the case of Blancaflor v. NLRC[ the failure to give a
bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of backwages and
separation pay due. There was therefore no basis for determining the amount of the bond to be filed by
private respondents therein. Central Cement’s only excuse in this case for not complying with the
rule is that no supersedeas bond was required to be posted when it appealed on June 19,
1989. As already stated, however, Art. 223 is self executing.
The consequence of private respondents’ failure to comply with the mandatory requirement for
the perfection of the appeal was to render the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
BLANCAFLOR VS NLRC (1993) Re bond; failure of the labor arbiter to
state amount
FACTS: Petitioners in the case at bar are regular members of the faculty of respondent Gregorio
Araneta University (GAUF for brevity) and were concurrently holding administrative positions as
dean, department heads and institute secretaries therein. In the implementation of the RRR Program of
the said university effective January 1, 1984, herein petitioners were retired but subsequently
rehired. Their appointment to their administrative positions as dean, department heads and institute
secretaries, respectively, had been extended by private respondent from time to time until the
expiration of their last appointment on May 31, 1988.
With the aforestated subsequent termination of their tenure in said administrative positions having
been implemented, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and
Employment a case against private respondent GAUF for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, separation
pay and/or retirement pay, damages and attorney's fees. On May 29, 1989, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners.
Private respondent GAUF then appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which rendered its decision reversing the labor arbiter's aforestated decision and dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of merit.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
the appeal of private respondents, the same having been filed out of time by reason of the latter's
failure to file a supersedeas bond within ten days from receipt of the labor arbiter's decision
ISSUE: WON THE FAILURE TO FILE SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS SIGNIFICANT IN THE CASE
OF DISMISSAL FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDNETS
HELD:NO. The court held as they previously ruled that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, requiring a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from for the perfection of an appeal may be considered a
jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better
served by allowing the appeal on the merits to be threshed out by the NLRC, the foregoing requirement
of the law should be given a liberal interpretation. 7
In the case at bar, a relaxation of the rule is called for. At the time the appeal was made, there
were still no implementing rules and regulations on the aforestated requirement. It was only on
February 12, 1991, that the NLRC required herein private respondents to post a cash or surety
bond which the latter complied with on February 25, 1991.
As aptly explained by the NLRC:
In our review of the record, we found that appellants failed to post the required
surety/appeal bond. Since the appealed decision is under date of May 29, 1989, or
after the effectivity of Republic Act 6715 on March 21, 1989 which mandated the
posting of the bond, but before September 5, 1989, the adoption of the NLRC Interim
Rules which implemented the aforesaid Act, appellants were notified on February
12, 1991 to post the required bond. On February 25, 1991, appellant complied by
posting the appeal bond with the Cashier of this Office in the amount equal to the
judgment award in this case. 8
Additionally, in the appealed decision of the labor arbiter the exact amount due to petitioners is not
stated, hence there could be no basis for determining the amount of the bond to be filed by private
respondents. It was only the NLRC in its order, dated February 12, 1991, that specified the amount of
the bond to be posted by private respondents.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY VS LEVANTINO (2005) Re bond : Strict
compliance
FACTS: Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer) is engaged in the recruitment
and placement of Philippine Overseas Contract Workers, and duly licensed for that purpose by the
Department of Labor and Employment and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).[1]
A complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and illegal deductions was filed by
respondent Noe Levantino wherein the latter’s contract provided for twelve (12) months, however,
barely six (6) months after the start of his employment, Levantino was terminated by the foreign
employer and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines.
The labor arbiter upheld the employee’s dismissal but granted a monetary award. Sameer,
appealed to the NLRC but the appeal was dismissed for lack of appeal bond.
 Having received a copy of the labor abiter’s decision on 17 Oct 1997, Sammer had until 28
October 1997 to perfect the appeal, 27 October falling on a Sunday. It file dits notice of appeal and
memorandum of appeal on 27 October along with a motion for exetension of time to file a surety-
appeal bond. It wa sonly on 3 November 1997 that it filed appeal bpnd. Thus, the NLRC dismissed the
appeal for failure to file within the 10-day regelementary period.
SAMEER CONTENTION: that since it subsequently submitted the appeal bond, the filing
bond should retroact to the date of the filing of motion for reduction, which had been filed within the
reglementary period.
ISSUE: WoN the appeal bond was perfected
Memorandum of Appeal with a Real Estate Bond consisting of land and various improvements therein
worth P102,345,650.
The private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Article 223 of the Labor
Code, as amended, requires the posting of a cash or surety bond. The NLRC directed petitioners to post
a cash or surety bond of P17,082,448.56 with a warning that failure to do so would cause the dismissal
of the appeal. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging it is not in a viable financial
condition to post a cash bond nor to pay the annual premium of P700,000.00 for a surety bond.
On 6 October 1992, the NLRC dismissed petitioners' appeal. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied by the NLRC in a resolution.

HELD: NO. Contrary to Sameer’s contention, the appeal bond requirement is not merely procedural ISSUE: WoN property bond is acceptable
but jurisdictional, for without it the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Applying the
express provisions, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over Sameer’s appeal within 10-day HELD: YES. While Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by the employer may be
reglementary period. Had Sameer been inclined to diligently comply with the requisites of appeal, it perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond, this provision should be given a liberal
could have, as early as 17 October 1998, undertaken steps to procure the appeal bond. There is nothing interpretation. This policy stresses the importance of deciding cases on the basis of their substantive
in the period between 17 October 1998 and 28 October 1998 that suggests innate difficulty in obtaining
merit and not on strict technical rules. When the real property bond sufficiently protects the interests
the said bond. In fact, Sameer, who submitted the bond only on 3 November 1998, probably incurred
further delay in submitting the appeal bond due to the early November holidays, though such fact is of of the workers should they finally prevail, the appeal should be allowed.
no moment considering that these holidays came only after the lapse of the reglementary period.
RATIO: In the case at bar, the judgment involved is more than P17 million and its precipitate
Nor should have there been eminent difficulty in obtaining the said bond, considering that the execution can adversely affect the existence of petitioner medical center. Likewise, the issues
amount of the monetary judgment, Six Hundred Thirty-Three U.S. Dollars and Sixteen Cents involved are not insignificant and they deserve a full discourse by our quasi-judicial and judicial
(US$633.16), is relatively miniscule. It is not even expected that Sameer itself expends from its own authorities. We are also confident that the real property bond posted by the petitioners
funds the entire amount of the monetary judgment for the appeal bond. As the Court noted sufficiently protects the interests of private respondents should they finally prevail. It is not
in Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corporation v. NLRC:[12] disputed that the real property offered by petitioners is worth P102,345,650. The judgment in
favor of private respondent is only a little more than P17 million.
. . . The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted
provision that the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. It is not an
excuse that the over P2 million award is too much for a small business enterprise, like the petitioner
company, to shoulder. The law does not require its outright payment, but only the posting of a
bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners
have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such bond. [13] (Emphasis
supplied.)

UERM-Memorial medical Center vs NLRC (1998) - Re Property bond; allowed-

FACTS: A complaint was filed by the private respondents, rank and file employees of Petitioner
Medical Center. They were represented by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), to which they’re
claiming salary differentials under Republic Act Nos. 6640 and 6727, correction of the wage distortion
and the payment of salaries for Saturdays and Sundays under Policy Instruction No. 54.
Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro sustained the private respondents except for their claim of wage
distortion. Within the reglementary period for appeal, the petitioners filed their Notice and