government vehicle, when in fact, he did, in order to receive the transportation Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
aw Complaint. He confessed that
118 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs.CARMENCITA D. CORONEL – BAIRD
FACTS ; "[Respondent] Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the
Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. On September 26, 1997, the Board of
Directors of Linamon Water District,designated respondent as Officer-in-Charge. In the
morning of October 14, 1998, called for a meeting the officers of the different Water
Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, as well as their advisors from the Local
Water Utilities Administration. The group opted to continue their meeting at Marvilla’s
Store. As the host of the said meeting, paid for the lunch in the amount of 1,213.00 as
shown in cash Invoice No. 0736. On November 13, 1998, respondent claimed for
reimbursement of her expenses against the representation and entertainment account
of her office. That very same day, the voucher was approved. "On November 17, 1998,
Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District. On
February 1999, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-
complaint against [respondent] for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that respondent
falsified the cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that
the luncheon bill was for 1,213.00php when in fact, it was only 213.00php as reflected
in the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736. Grace H. Morales,
Graft Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Mindanao, rendered a decision and holds that
respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits. On March 7,
2001, Graft Investigation Officer I Grace H. Morales issued an Order, the decretal
portion of which states- the Motion for reconsideration is granted and the Decision of
this Office dated November 27, 2000 dismissing from the service respondent
Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby SET ASIDE."
ISSUE ; Whether petitioner’s Disapproval Order, expressed as a marginal notation
violated her right to due process
RULING ; No, The original decision stands," was a valid resolution. Hence, respondent
should find her bearings from that holding.The notation does not deny respondent of
her right to due process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies
simply in the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.In
this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly, her
intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the bases for
the ombudsman’s Decision. In fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she
thought would merit our review.
MAINPOINT ; The essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain
one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is
proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE vs.LYN B. MACALINGAY et al
FACTS ; Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Region
I, Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint against
petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to
petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using
the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle,
when in fact he did, in order to collect transportation allowance. After the
investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution, charged petitioner with Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the
monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any
allowance.After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No.
020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from
the service.Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.In
the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA upheld the CSC Resolution.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not
afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at
his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to
present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their
position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC
over his objection.Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present
evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the
complainants.
ISSUE ; Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied
due process .
RULING ; No, since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one’s Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial
process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court
is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings
since they rest upon different principles. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal
MAINPOINT ; In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side
OMBUDSMAN vs.BUNGUBUNG and COURT OF APPEALS-BAIRD
FACTS ; Bungubung is the Chairman of the Ports District Security Bids and Awards
Committee of the PPA. On 24 September 2001, Roberto C. Doromal, the President of
Combat Security & Executive Protection Agency, a security agency that participated in
the bidding for security services for the PPA, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
Bungubung before PPA Resident Ombudsman Manolo M. Mabini, alleging that
sometime in June 1995, his wife was in negotiating a contract for Security Services with
the Philippine Ports Authority. That after a service contract, Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung
and other PPA officials asked for certain amounts from my said wife as "balato" for
winning the award where the latter obliged herself to give. when my wife died,the
same arrangement was pursued and carried over through the period that I was already
the one dealing with PPA. That after giving the P50,000, he asked from me a Mitsubishi
Pajero van, to be due and delivered supposedly to him while there is no award of the
winning bidder yet. However, due to the expensive value of the said Pajero van, I was
not able to deliver. Hence, on March 30, 2001, I was served a Notice of Award of the
winning bidder which is STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN & DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. I
instructed my men to conduct an investigation and there, they found a late model
Pajero van parked in from of the residence of Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung. In support of
the allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal submitted an affidavit of his
secretary Evalyn Cruz and an alleged "blue book" of CSEPA. Cruz recounted in her
affidavit another incident wherein she personally handed over the amount of
P50,000.00 cash to Bungubung at his office.In the meantime, Doromal executed an Ex-
Bungubung never demanded or received any balato from him or his wife in exchange
for the award of the PPA security service contract; nor did Bungubung ask for a
Mitsubishi Pajero van from him .Bungubung counters that the Court of Appeals
correctly held that there was no substantial evidence to hold him liable for grave
misconduct; and that the reliance by the Ombudsman on the affidavits of Doromal and
Cruz in determining his administrative liability, despite the fact that the contents
thereof were not personally attested to by the affiants before the Ombudsman, was a
clear violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE ; Whether bungbung was denied of due process
RULING ; No, The fact that no formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say
that due process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in administrative
proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for
resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as
fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.
MAINPOINT ; Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, which requirement was afforded Bungubung.
121
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
SEC V. INTERPORT
FACTS:
An investigation proceeding was conducted by the SEC against respondent
IRC for failure to make timely disclosure of their negotiations with Ganda Energy
holdings, a violation against revised security act. However, the proceeding was
interrupted by a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA, which became
permanent.
During the pendency of the case, the Security Regulation Code repealed the
Revised security act, which give SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the
case, or the RTC to hear any case which may be later filed against the respondent.
As a defense, respondent averred that the case is already deemed moot
and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting
from the SEC investigation has already prescribed. They point out the prescriptive
period of 12years from the time of the commission of the crime, under sec. 1 if act no
3326 ( An act to establish period of prescription for violations penalized by special
acts.) Since the offense was committed in 1994 prescription has already set as early as
2006.
ISSUE;
Whether the filing of complaint by SEC against respondent has already
prescribed, in pursuant to sec. act 3326.
RULING: No, It is an establish doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the
period of prescription.
MAIN POINT: A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an
offense has been committed and whether there is a probable cause for the accused to
have committed the offense.
 122
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
CALINISAN V. ROAQUIN
FACTS: Reynaldo Roaquin served 16 years with the PNP. The government charged
Roaquin with murder before the RTC. 7 years later the RTC acquitted him of the crime
of which he was charged upon a finding that he acted in complete self-defense.
Following this development, Roaquin asked the PNP to reinstate him into the police
service. Roaqin was reinstated by P/Chief Superintendent.
However, PNP Directorate directing P/Chief Superintendent to nullify
Roaquin’s reinstatement he contend that Roaquin could not be entitled to
reinstatement since he failed to file a motion for reconsideration within 10 days of
being notified of his discharge.
Roaquin filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against his superior
officers before the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision, ordering Roaquin’s
reinstatement. On appeal by Roaquin’s superior officers, CA rendered judgment
dismissing their appeal for lack of jurisdiction as the issues involved were purely legal,
hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes, As Roaquin’s superior officers’ appeal involves only questions of law,
they erred in taking recourse to the CA by notice of appeal. Hence, the CA correctly
dismissed their appeal.
MAIN POINT: An issue of fact exists when what is in question is the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts, whereas an issue of law exists when what is in question is what the
law is on a certain state of facts. The test, therefore, for determining whether an issue
is one of law or of fact, is whether the CA could adjudicate it without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is an issue of law; otherwise, it is an issue of
fact.
123
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
IBP V. ATIENZA
Facts:
The IBP, through its National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the
City Mayor of an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. Mayor
Atienza granted the permit but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead
of Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved, Cadiz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the permit for being violative of their right to freedom of expression.
Meanwhile, the IBP pushed through with the rally at the Mendiola Bridge.
Thus, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for violating
the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Cadiz prayed for the suspension of the
criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza
is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBP’s rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
Yes, Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it
bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which
"blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court
would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
MAIN POINT:
The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
Case No. 124 – Cruz
Administrative; QJ Proceedings; Arbitration; aspects of the proceeding
Domingo v. OMB 577 SCRA 476
Main Point: Due process requirement mandates that every accused or respondent be
apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in
support thereof be shown or made available to him so that he can meet the charge
with traversing or exculpatory evidence.
Facts: SK officials filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Petitioner Barangay Charmain for malversation, falsification of public
document, dishonesty and grave misconduct. OMB rendered judgment and held
petitioner administratively liable for the irregular submission of a falsified instrument
to the Manila Barangay Bureau (MBB) in connection with his barangay’s budget finding
petitioner guilty of violation of R.A. No. 6713. All other charges were dismissed.
Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking reversal of such decision on the ground
that one cannot be indicted for the submission of a document which he himself has
repudiated.
Issue: Whether petitioner was denied due process for being charged with a violation
that was not initially alleged.
Ruling: There is obviously a denial of due process in this case. A cursory reading of the
complaint-affidavit does not reveal that petitioner was charged with violation of R.A.
No. 6713. Likewise, in the OMB’s Evaluation Report, the charges indicated were for
malversation, falsification, dishonesty and grace misconduct.
Case No. 125 – Cruz
Administrative; QJ Proceedings; Arbitration; aspects of the proceeding
Zambales v. Castellejos 581 SCRA 320
Main Point: Due process requirement mandates that every accused or respondent be
apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in
support thereof be shown or made available to him so that he can meet the charge
with traversing or exculpatory evidence.
Facts: Respondent CASCONA filed a letter-complaint with the NEA seeking the
removal of petitioners from the Board based on the NEA’s Financial Audit Report of
ZAMECO. The NEA endorsed the letter-complaint to the NEA-Office of the
Administrative Committee, which in turn immediately set the case for mandatory
conference after completion of the exchange of pleadings between the parties. The
NEA-ADCOM thereafter recommended the removal of the petitioners from office. NEA
issued its resolution removing the petitioners from office with the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to run for the same position.
In arriving at its conclusions, the NEA relied on the NEA-ADCOM’s Report and
Recommendations and the audit report that was not part of the letter-complaint or of
the proceedings before the NEA-ADCOM. The petitioners thus moved for
reconsideration of the NEA resolution contending that they had been denied due
process as they had never been notified of the charges based on the audit report. Their
motion was denied, thus this petition for review.
Issue: Whether petitioners were denied due process when NEA failed to notify them of
the charges based on the audit report
Ruling: Yes. The court agreed with the petitioners’ observation that they had been
denied due process before the NEA, as they had not been informed of the charges
based on the audit report. But the court refused to nullify the entire proceedings after
finding substantial evidence to support the other allegations in the letter-complaint, to
justify the petitioners’ removal from office.
Case No. 126 – Cruz
Administrative; QJ Proceedings; Arbitration; aspects of the proceeding
OMB v. Evangelista 581 SCRA 350
Main Point: Neither prior notice nor a hearing is required for the issuance of a
preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman.
Facts: An administrative case with the Ombudsman was filed against Mayor
Evangelista, along with 2 others, for allegedly using the Special Education Fund (SEF) to
purchase speech kits and textbooks without the authorization of the Local School
Board (LSB) and that the said speech kits and textbooks were not even received by the
recipient schools. Plaintiff prayed for the preventive suspension of the three. Without
furnishing the respondents with a copy of the complaint, the Ombudsman issued an
Order preventively suspending them for 4 months without pay. The CA reversed the
preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman on the ground that the order was
issued without informing the respondents of the charges against them.
Issue: Whether a preventive suspension order may be issued even without notifying
the respondents in an administrative case of the charges.
Ruling: Yes. While a preventive suspension order may stem from a complaint, the
Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint
prior to ordering preventive suspension. The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a
preventive suspension order are clearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. no. 6770. The
CA cannot alter these requirements by insisting that the preventive suspension order
aslo meet the requisites found in Section 26 of the same law.
CASE NO. 127
Art. III, Sec. 1. Aspects of the proceedings
Phil Export v. Pearl City 608 SCRA 280
MAINPOINT:
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.
FACTS: Pearl City, the respondent, is a PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authortiy)-
registered Ecozone Export Enterprise located in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City engaged in
business of recycling and processing, for export, of used clothing into wool, fiber,
cotton ffiber, polyster fiber and useable clothings and industrial rags. The individual
respondents are the employees of the PEZA. The PEZA board now, informed the Pearl
City that a physical inventory in their respective zones on their businesses will be
conducted and upon the completion, PEZA officers discovered that the Pearl City had
an unaccounted importation of 8,259, 645 kilo of used clothing for the period of 15
months covering from Jan. 2003 up to March 2004. Moreover, the respondent
corporation was instructed to submit an explanation for the said unaccounted
shortaged in import-export liquidation. A special audit was conducted and PEZA board
passed a resolution canceling the PEZA registration of the respondent corpation as an
Ecozone Export Enterprise. The respondent corporation averred that they were denied
of their right to due process of law because the power and authority to conduct
inquiries is lodged with the PEZA Director General and not with the PEZA Board.
ISSUE:
Whether the Pearl City was deprived of right to due process.
RULING:
No. Even the primary power and authority to conduct inquiries is lodged with the PEZA
Director General and not with the PEZA Board, it does not mean that such inquiry
made by the PEZA board a denial of due process since nothing prohibits the BOARD to
conduct the same. In fact, in administrative proceedings, the requirement of notice
and hearing does not connote full adversarial or trial type proceedings. Hence, the
absence of formal proceeding does not mean procedural due process were not
complied with because PCMS was given sufficient opportunity to explain whether is
really incurred shortage or whethere the materials it imported were properly disposed.
Board did not arbirtrarily arrived at its decision to cancel the registration of PCMC
since the inventory and audit are precisely the bases upon which the cancellatiion was
made.
CASE NO. 128
Art. III, Sec. 1. Aspects of the proceedings
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA 408
MAINPOINT:
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.
FACTS:
President Benigno S. Aquino III issued (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase
by the LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a
Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the
same transaction is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging
that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O.
13.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichay’s right to due process and the
equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
No. Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichay’s right to due process and the equal
protection of the laws. Pichay’s right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for
the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain one’s side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his
side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of
Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that
require his informed decision.
CASE NO. 129
Art. III, Sec. 1. Aspects of the proceedings
Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee
with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on
the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the
Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary
investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s
for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges
against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
No. Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose
is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that
the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public
officials linked to the Arroyo Administration. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked
to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with
their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee. The equal protection guarantee
exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination
and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
130. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377
Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition
were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded
with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty
which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent,
then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition
request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of
the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD
1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty)
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the
DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal
cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in
criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such
that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.
The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was
made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing.
Ruling:
Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power
exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the
DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for
the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of
the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at
two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the
submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective
extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly,
there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation
process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately
the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore,
the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life,
liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or
penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar,
similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his
liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice
& hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to
access to official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is
like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil &
administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate
the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear
therein & present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive
suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants,
cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent
isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time
(summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not
been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and
obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both
states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to
the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of
Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due
process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal
statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted
during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process
conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal
cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person
ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated
from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to
privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate
as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he
is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to
controvert them.
Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an
accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our
government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a
citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within
that jurisdiction.
131. Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
Facts: The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a
warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven (7)
counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven (7) counts of
conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong
The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of
the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law
Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of
the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon application of the NBI, RTC
of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and
issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was
arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI
detention cell.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of
Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of
Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for
provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of
facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient
to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest.
Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and
its accompanying documents must be authenticated.
Ruling: The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its
accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no
requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and
its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-Hong
Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must
be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while
Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for
provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition
Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of
any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In
other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or
extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest.
The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the
purpose sought to be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest.
The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its
accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic
channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is
naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of
the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier
initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were
formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush
its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable.
Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription
against the admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile
machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the
instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means
of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition
Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional
arrest by means of a fax machine.
132. Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
Facts: The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order
set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government
requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to
determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such
warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his
provisional liberty.
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition
proceedings
Ruling: The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. No. The court agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing
with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in
the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
136 – MUSA
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
FACTS:
In November 1975, the petitioner Jose Angeles, a professor of the Institute
of Technology of the Far Easter University file an administrative case against his two
students: Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran before the office of Gilberto G.
Mercado – Dean of the Institute for allegedly assaulting him at the Oak Barrel
Restaurant located outside the campus. Dean Mercado, taking action on the complaint
filed by Angeles, immediately created a committee headed by him to investigate the
complaint. The two respondents, Picar and Patawaran questioned the authority of
Mercado and his committee to conduct an investigation on the basis of jurisdiction
since the incident happened outside the premises of the university campus.
The respondents filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint with petition for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from proceeding with the administrative investigation for which the judge
granted by issuing a decision perpetually enjoining the petitioners from further
proceeding with the administrative investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school through its duly authorized representative has the
jurisdiction to investigate its student or students for an alleged misconduct committed
outside the school premises and beyond school hours?
RULING:
Yes. A college or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students.
One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community.
Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility. The respondent
judge correctly stated that the general rule is that the authority of the school is co-
extensive with its territorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any action taken
for acts committed outside the school premises should, in general, be left to the police
authorities, the courts of justice, and the family concerned.
However, this rule is not rigid or one without exceptions. It is the better view that
there are instances when the school might be called upon to exercise its power over its
student or students for acts committed outside the school and beyond school hours in
the following:
a) In cases of violations of school policies or regulations occurring in connection with
a school sponsored activity off-campus; or
b) In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his status as a student or
affects the good name or reputation of the school.
There can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such
rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property. The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. Hence, when as the case at bar, the conduct complained of
directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no reason
why the school cannot impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took
place inside the campus.
137 – MUSA
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University.
They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting
from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with
other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the
charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the one-year suspension violates their due process.
RULING:
YES. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at
a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball
court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than
the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted
activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m. Private respondents could
thus, take disciplinary action. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
A one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both
respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality
between the offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element
of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this
constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension
would be punishment enough.
138 – MUSA
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699
FACTS:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of
respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were
denied due process due to the fact that they were active participants in peaceful mass
actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand
claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enrol for the first semester of the school year
1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing
was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The
petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process.
RULING:
YES. Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and
memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to
determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" or perpetrated acts of
"vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing
disdain for and defiance of University authority." Also apparent is the omission of
respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students
may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
A school cannot refuse to re-enroll a student it believes guilty of acts inimical to the
school, without first conducting an investigation.
The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that “no penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the manual and/or in
the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation
shall have been conducted.
There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
139 REYES
Academic Discipline; In General
Alcuaz vs. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) and petitioner-
students had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities
within the school. The PSBA provided that it will not allow the students to directly
participate in the policy-making body of the school, as this is provided by law, but its
administration will be open to suggestions and questions. Petitioner-students
demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by
the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the
regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester. The President of
the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA
for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Despite
demands regarding their enrollment, no relief appeared to be forthcoming.

ISSUE:
Whether there was deprivation of due process of the law.
RULING:
No. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
essential part thereof. A student once admitted by school is considered enrolled for
one semester. Thus, after the close of the first semester, the PSBA no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening-teachers. The charge
of denial of due process is untenable. The contract being terminated, there is no more
a contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract
with said students and teachers.
MAIN POINT:
No denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due process were
met by the school and the student given the opportunity to be heard.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE SARMIENTO:
Education is a concern impressed with a public interest. While there is an existing
contractual relation between school and students, the agreement should not be the
final basis settling school-student disputes. It is important to determine, at the same
time, whether the school itself, in meting out expulsion against its students, had acted
within the permissible limits implied in the Constitution. In any event, the contract
should yield to the Constitution.
140 REYES
Academic Discipline; In General
Non vs. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini College were not allowed to re-
enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in
student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The trial court
dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being a
mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled,
respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-
enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
ISSUE:
Whether there was deprivation of due process of the law.
RULING:
Yes. In Alcuaz, the Court anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory.
But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the
student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. A school cannot
refuse to enroll a student on the simple ground that his contract expires every end of a
semester.
In the case at bar, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the
action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair
play.
MAIN POINT:
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
141 REYES
Academic Discipline; In General
ADMU vs. Capulong 222 SCRA 644
FACTS:
Lennie Villa, a first year student of the Ateneo Law School, died of physical injuries as a
result of the initiation rites of the Aquila Legis. Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the death of Villa which required the respondent-students
to submit written statements within two days from receipt. Although the said students
received a copy of the notice, they failed to file a reply which prompted ADMU to hold
them in preventive suspension. The Joint Committee found the students to have
violated the prohibition against any hazing activities. The students were dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether there was denial of due process.
RULING:
No. The minimum standards to be observed by schools before imposing disciplinary
sanctions are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
In the case at bar, ADMU complied with the minimum standards required in expelling
respondent-students from that school. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School notified
and required respondent-students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies
of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
MAIN POINT:
The argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine
the written statements which became the basis of petitioners’ order and that they
were denied procedural due process may not be considered because disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.
Administrative proceedings made by a school against students charged with fatal
hazing need not be similar to a judicial proceeding.
CASE NO. 142
UP VS LIGOT-TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents supend Nadal for one year, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has
not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received. The disciplinary action is meted
after a guilty verdict on Nadal’s alleged willful withholding of the information in his
application for scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, Nadal complained that he
was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28,
1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP
Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the
following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for Reconsideration, which this
time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of
notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board.
MAINPOINT:
Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a
judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as
adequate to support a conclusion.
CASE NO. 143
GO VS LETRAN
FACTS:
FRATERNITY CASE
Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in the strict judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation.61 Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kim’s denial of his fraternity
membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the
disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be
explained, not the form in which the notice is given.
The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary
charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show
that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that
the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership.
Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in
December 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response to this plain charge.
We also note that the information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is
no different from the information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the
petitioners: the simple unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity
membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kim’s right to
explain his side as exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished.
MAINPONT: The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity
to be heard.
 CASE NO. 144
LAO GI VS CA
145. SALINAS- Domingo v Scheer, 421 SCRA 468
Facts: Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a
permanent resident status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and started a
family as well as a business in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed the Philippine
Ambassador to Germany that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities
in Germany. The DFA receive from the German Embassy in Manila that the respondent
is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn over his German passport to the
Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27,
1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in abeyance pending
respondent’s case and he shall remain in the custody of the bureau. In issuing this the
BOC relied on the statements of the German Vice Consul on the speculation that it is
improbable that the respondent will be issued a new passport, the warrant of arrest
for insurance fraud and alleged illegal activities in Palawan. Respondent nevertheless
stayed in the Philippines after airing his side to then BID Commissioner Verceles, the
latter giving him time to apply for a clearance and a new passport. Scheer eventually
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating that his right to due process was
violated, for there was no notice or chance to be heard before the issuance of the
deportation order. Eventually the criminal case for physical injuries against the
respondent was dismissed, and he was issued a passport. He informed Commissioner
Verceles about this matter and reiterated the cancellation of the order, but the
Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter Commissioner Domingo assumed office and
on June 6, 2002, she ordered the apprehension of the respondent who was held in
custody awaiting deportation. Shocked, respondent sought remedy with the CA, during
the hearing of which the Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave the
country first then just re-apply. A decision was reached in favor of Scheer, permanently
enjoining Domingo from continuing the deportation, thus this petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s arrest and detention was premature, unwarranted
and arbitrary.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that BOC committed grave abuse of discretion in causing
the arrest and detention of the respondent. Aliens may be deported from the
Philippines only on grounds and in the proper manner provided by the Constitution.
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights grants every person rights, and that
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. BOC ordered
respondent’s deportation without even conducting summary deportation proceedings,
but merely relied on the speculation of the German Embassy and the Vice Consul that
it is improbable that the respondent will be issued a new passport, warranting the
deportation. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all, and not given the
opportunity to put up a defense for himself, thus violating his right to due process. A
deportation proceeding may not be a criminal action, but since it affects the liberty of
a person, the right to due process of a respondent must be respected. Even six years
after the motion for reconsideration of the respondent which was still not attended to,
out of nowhere and arbitrarily the agents were ordered to arrest him. Even after being
issued a new passport and even securing clearances from the PNP and NPA, the BOC
still proceeded with the deportation. BOC is required to resolve the motion of the
respondent first, giving him the chance to be heard and present his evidence. The
petitioner put up the defense that they cannot review cases decided before the change
of members, but since it is the same government entity, they have the authority to
review past cases. In addition, the court finds the contention of the OSG for the
respondent to leave the country then just re-apply again ridiculous when there is no
legal impediment for the respondent to continue his stay in the country.
146. SALINAS- Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
Fact: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of
the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services
by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. Petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public
convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as
the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. petitioner filed with respondent
NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same
facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been
providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such
services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services
and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. petitioner was granted a
provisional authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3 times,
but the last extension directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates
through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Hence
this petition.
Issue: whether the Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued
without prior notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the
Petitioner?
Ruling: Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due process. if the authorities that
where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law, Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing
in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing.
147. SALINAS-Radiocom v. NTC
FACTS: On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed an application with
respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service
Facilities under NTC Case No. 84-003. On January 25, 1984, the respondent
Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the prescribed
30-day period allowed by law.
Later, on February 2, 1984, the respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing,
setting private respondent PLDT’s application for hearing on February 22, 1984 at 9:30
o’clock in the morning (Rollo, p. 37). In the aforementioned notice of hearing, herein
petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not included
in the list of affected parties (Rollo, p. 38). At the hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along
with other petitioners which came to know of the pending petition through the
former, appeared and moved for some time within which to file an opposition or reply
to said application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private
respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this provisional authority (Rollo, p.
10). Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the PSC has the power to approved provisionally rates of utilities
without prior hearing.
Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is
empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior
hearing (Republic v. Medina, 41 SCRA 643 [1971]). Under the Public Service Act, as
amended (CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a
provisional amount for the subscriber’s investment to be effective immediately,
without hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, CA 146, as amended; Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. v. NTC, 131 SCRA 260 [1984]). Further, the Public Service Act makes
no distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are necessarily proposed
merely, until the Commission approves them (Republic v. Medina, supra). Moreover,
the Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or
hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their
nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing (Republic v. Medina, supra; Cordero v. Energy Regulatory
Board, G.R. No. 83931, November 3, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) and it was so
stated in the case at bar, in the National Telecommunications Commission’s order of
January 25, 1984. Radio Communications of the Philippines vs. National
Telecommunications Commission, 184 SCRA 517, G.R. No. 66683 April 23, 1990
148. SALVADOR
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
Maceda v. ERB
Facts: ERB issued an order granting provisional increase per liter as to the request of oil
companies. Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify the provisional
increase. Maceda also claim that the provisional increase involved amounts over and
above that sought by petitioning oil companies.
Issue: Whether ERB can increase the price of oil prices
Ruling: YES. The court ruled in matters of rate or price fixing, it is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative
agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings.
Main point: Its decisions should be appealed to the President under he established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, especially on a matter
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.
 149. SALVADOR
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession; Rates
Globe Telecom v. NTC
Facts: NTC issued Order which held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition
of VAS the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory. NTC also declared
that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it, in
violation of its rules. Globe invokes deregulation in support of its claim that it need not
secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS.
Issue: Whether the Order made by the NTC is binding
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that before the NTC could penalize Globe and Smart for
unauthorized provision of SMS, it must first establish that SMS is VAS (Value Added
Service). Since there was no express rule or regulation on that question, Globe and
Smart would be well within reason if they submitted evidence to establish that SMS
was not VAS. More pertinently to the case at bar, the qualification highlights the fact
that the legal rationale for regulation of VAS is not strictly a public a service offering in
the way that voice-to-voice lines are, but merely supplementary to basic services.
Main point: Every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity
to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective
standards that have to be met. Such rule provides indubitable opportunities to weed
out the most frivolous conflicts with minimum hassle, and certain footing in deciding
more substantive claims.
150. SALVADOR
Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession; Profession
Corona v. UHPAP
Facts: PPA promulgated an order which embodied the rules and regulation governing
pilotage services. These rules mandates that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot
licenses. Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the
implementation of the administrative order. Corona dismissed the petition and
concluded that such administrative order was not the act of Dayan, but of PPA; thus he
also concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing
the assailed administrative order.
Issue: Whether pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that the administrative order does not constitute a
wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of
those affected thereby. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on
the nature of a property right. Thus, the exercise of one's profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
property rights without due process.
Main point: In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing
rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements
or notice and hearing.
PILOTAGE - act of conducting a vessel from the high seas into a port. It is conducted
within a two-mile area offshore to an assigned berthing area and vice versa.
CASE NO. 151 - Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Dismissals; Suspensions; Reinstatements: Dismissals in Government
Boards and Commissions
Abalos vs. CSC
Facts:
Francisco Abalos, Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte, filed a malversation case
against his predecessor for using government-owned bulldozers for his personal use. 2
of the witness were Villabona and Yap. They signed a Sworn Affidavit but were later
disowned because accordingly it was spurious. Abalos then gave them a memo
ordering to explain why no disciplinary actions should be imposed within 72 hours, in
the meantime, they are suspended until investigation is over. Simultaneously,
dishonesty and intentionally making false statements in material facts had been filed
against they were terminated as equipment operators. The 2 petitioners argued that
initial affidavit was forced upon them in the moment when they had no legal counsel
present.
Issue:
Whether due process was violated?
Ruling:
Yes. The 2 employees were simultaneously given notice and disciplinary actions.
Before any disciplinary actions should be enacted, they should be given a chance to be
heard. The right to be heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free society. We
should be proud that in this jurisdiction every person who may be involved in
controversy is entitled to present his side, no less than his adversary, at a hearing duly
called for that purpose.
Main Point:
The right to be heard is available to citizen and alien alike, from the humblest to the
most exalted, and covers with its protection the offer of arguments and evidence, from
the profound to the absurd, in defense of one’s life, liberty and property.
CASE NO. 152 - Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Dismissals; Suspensions; Reinstatements: Dismissals in Government
Boards and Commissions
GSIS vs. CSC
Facts:
Evelyn Kintanar was a Control Clerk working under the GSIS Cebu Branch. Her main
function is to receive cheques requested by GSIS members and mail a request letter if
the loan is ready for receiving. 2 teachers filed a complaint citing they never received
any cheques even though the logbook cited they actually received the loans. Branch
Manager then filed an investigation without citing Kintanar as a possible person of
fault. After investigation, the manager found Kintanar to be guilty of misconduct and
terminated her without giver her a chance to be heard.
Issue:
Whether the branch manager violated due process?
Ruling:
Yes. Although an employee can be terminated in cases of malfeasance without a
formal investigation, he must first be given the chance to know the charges against
him and he must be given the chance to present his side. Sec. 40 of the Civil Service
Decree only states the necessity of formal investigations. It does not mention any
deprivation of right to due process.
Main Point:
The right to be heard is available to citizen and alien alike, from the humblest to the
most exalted, and covers with its protection the offer of arguments and evidence, from
the profound to the absurd, in defense of one’s life, liberty and property.
CASE NO. 153 - Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Dismissals; Suspensions; Reinstatements: Dismissals in Government
Boards and Commissions
Macayayong vs. Ople
Facts:
Atty. David Macayayong was a legal officer of Bureau of Labor Standards under DOLE.
He was ordered on multiple occasions to report to back to his home office and if he
would not return, there would be disciplinary actions. The DOLE secretary notified him
multiple times, but he failed to respond, and he was then terminated for abandonment
of office. Macayayong cited that the termination was invalid because he was not given
the chance to be heard and his right to due process was violated.
Issue:
Whether the DOLE secretary violated due process?
Ruling:
No. The records show that before petitioner was dropped from the roster of the
Department of Labor, he was notified twice by his home office to report back to work.
No violation of due process is committed even where no hearing was conducted but
the parties were given the chance to explain their side.
Main Point:
There is no denial of due process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity to
present his case but he failed to act upon it.
FELIX UY,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT – BAIRD
FACTS ; Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the
Provincial Engineering Office, Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the
service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. when the latter assumed office,
allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office.t appears that during the
pendency of the petition for reinstatement, Governor Paredes issued a Memorandum
providing for the hiring of casual employees to replace the dismissed employees,
allegedly due to exigency of service.The law applicable in the case at bar, which is
hereby quoted as follows are Section 29 of E.O. 292 and Section 14 of the Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies, thus:Whenever it becomes necessary for lack of work
or funds wherein the reduction is to be effected, shall be reasonably compared in
terms of relative fitness, efficiency and length of service, and those found to be least
qualified for the remaining position shall be laid off. Sec. 14. The names of permanent
employees laid off shall be entered in a reemployment list for the appropriate
occupation. Pursuant to a Motion for Clarification filed by petitioners, the MSPB issued
an Order dated April 19, 1993 which directed the Provincial Government of Agusan del
Sur pay petitionerstheir back salaries and other money benefits for the period that
they had been out of the service until their reinstatement. In the meantime, the
Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del Sur made a partial payment to the reinstated
employees.on July 9, 1994, the Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor
Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent COA through the Provincial auditor. As a result, the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur, through its Acting Provincial Treasurer,
refused to release petitioners' remaining back salaries and other monetary benefits.
ISSUE ; Governor Paredes's right to due process was violated
RULING ; Yes, In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to
nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures,
nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice
to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable
ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes
personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without
giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings
holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts
done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official
and personal capacities
MAINPOINT ; Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is
not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an
indispensable ingredient of due process.
PEDRO C. LAMEYRA vs.MAYOR GEORGE S. PANGILINAN- BAIRD
FACTS ; Pedro C. Lameyra was a janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy,
Laguna. He was given a permanent appointment on January 1, 1989 to the same
position by then Municipal Mayor Melquiadez Acomular who was defeated in the last
election for the mayoralty post by respondent Mayor George S. Pangilinan. On August
21, 1995, petitioner Lameyra received a letter from respondent Mayor Pangilinan
informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local government
unit of Famy, Laguna pursuant to the Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of
the Civil Service Commission due to Insubordination and AWOL. Undisputedly,
Lameyra was absent for the period from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 and that he has
not submitted any proof that he actually filed an application for leave. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that he was a permanent
employee and that he was terminated without prior written notice of the charges and
without investigation and hearing, in violation of his security of tenure and due
process. He claims that he was not given due process before Mayor Pangilinan
terminated his employment, and that the Civil Service Commission erred in refusing to
consider the new evidence submitted with petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Mayor pointed out that clearly the basis for the petitioner's separation is
not abandonment but absence without official leave, and that the affidavits which he
submitted before the Civil Service Commission cannot be considered "newly
discovered evidence" as they were all along readily available to him. petitioner
contests the finding that he was absent at all. He claims that he reported for work but
was prevented from signing the log book by the very officer, Benito Vicencio, who
certified that he did not report for work on the dates in question. He alleges in his
reply, that he was not furnished a copy of Mayor Pangilinan's comment, and was able
to secure a copy only after receiving a copy of the Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission upholding the termination of his service.
ISSUE ; Whether Lameyra was denied of due process
RULING ; Yes, While it is settled doctrine findings of fact of an administrative agency
must be respected and this Court should not be tasked to weight once more the
evidence submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic that such findings of
facts should be supported by substantial evidence. Although no prior notice is required
to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without
approved leave for at least thirty calendar days.We are not convinced that the
certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not convinced that the
certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not report for work from July 6,
1995 to August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the petitioner's
submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented him from signing the log
book , that he has been asked to submit his resignation which he refused to do. Under
these circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and proper compliance with the
requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove
his contention that the termination of his service was illegal.
MAINPOINT ; Under these circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and proper
compliance with the requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full
opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his service was illegal.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.AGUSTIN A. ZOZOBRADO - BAIRD
FACTS ; On 28 August 1998, respondent Agustin A. Zozobrado, a permanent employee
of petitioner National Power Corporation assigned as Pilot in the aviation group,
received a letter dated 18 August 1998 from NPC President Frederico C. Puno,
informing him that that he was being dropped from the rolls. Respondent Zozobrado
filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPC’s implementation of dropping him
from the rolls. The CSC issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal dismissed for
lack of merit. Respondent Zozobrado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Resolution, which the CSC denied in another Resolution.On 22 March 2000,
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, The
Court of Appeals granted the appeal in the assailed The Court of Appeals, in finding
that the respondent’s separation "was made with utter lack of due process,"
held:Dropping from the rolls means separation from the service. Such separation is
made summarily, without any case, investigation or due process. Thus, before the
dropping from the rolls, it is imperative that the following requisites should be
complied with, the employee concerned should be informed of his unsatisfactory
performance for a semester;such notice shall be in writing; the same must be made
within thirty (30) days from the end of the semester when the first unsatisfactory
rating was given; the notice should contain a warning that a succeeding unsatisfactory
performance shall warrant his separation from the service; and the notice shall contain
sufficient information to enable the employee to prepare an explanation.Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the 12 April 2002
assailed resolution.
ISSUE ; Whether The dropping of respondent from the rolls is a violation of procedural
due process
RULING; Yes, As the Supreme Court constantly rules, it is bad enough to lose a job; it is
worse if it is taken away by government itself without due process of law. Our
Constitution abhors such arbitrariness. Petitioner claims that, contrary to the findings
of the Court of Appeals, its compliance with Memorandum Circular No. 12 is full and
not merely substantial. However, the evidence submitted by petitioner to prove this
allegation, namely the affidavit of Gen. Lagera, only confirms the findings of the Court
of Appeals that if there really was a notice to respondent, it had been oral. This is in
clear contravention of the requirement in Memorandum Circular No. 12. As held by
the Court of Appeals, dropping from the rolls is made summarily, making it imperative
to strictly observe the circular to prevent its being used for harassment or
vindictiveness.1avvpNot even one of the requisites mentioned by the Court of Appeals
had been complied with. It is an uncontested fact that respondent was never notified
in writing of his Unsatisfactory rating within 30 days from the end of the semester
when the Unsatisfactory rating was given.
MAINPOINT ; One’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right, the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.Taking this away without due
process is a violation of a constitutional human right, and the consolation of not being
disqualified for later employment does not erase nor mitigate such infraction.
160
Dismissals in government boards and commissions
PAGCOR v. CA, GR 185668
FACTS: Respondent Mia Manahan was a Treasury Officer of petitioner PAGCOR. She
was charge of serious procedural deviation/gross negligence, arising from the
anomalous fund transfer transaction in the amount of [₱]4.2 million, consummated at
the VIP Booth last April 14, 2004 wherein you were on the 6-2PM duty and was put in a
preventive suspension. Later on, she received a letter:
Please be informed that the Board of Directors in its meeting on June 1,
2004, resolved to dismiss you from the service effective April 16, 2004 due to the
following offense:
"Gross neglect of duty; Violations of company rules and regulations; Conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of the corporation; and Loss of trust and confidence;
Failure to comply with Treasury rules and regulations which resulted in payment of a
spurious Fund Transfer amounting to [₱]4.2 million last April 14, 2004."
Manahan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the PAGCOR BOD's decision
to dismiss her from the service, giving the following grounds in support thereof that
she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process of law when the PAGCOR
BOD outrightly dismissed her from service without informing her of the formal charges
and apprising her of the documentary evidence against her;
ISSUE:
Whether her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner failed to substantially comply with the requisite formal
charge, as well as with the other requirements under CSC Resolution No. 99-1936
concerning the procedure for the conduct of an administrative investigation. What
PAGCOR claims to be the formal charge it issued in compliance with the CSC rules was
the memorandum addressed to Manahan under the subject "Preventive Suspension,"
MAIN POINT:
While a liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure is allowed
and applied in some cases, this is resorted to when it can promote their objective and
aid the parties in reaching a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses. Without proper investigation and, thereafter, a
decision that clearly indicated the facts constituting the offense imputed upon the
respondent and the company rules she supposedly violated, the respondent did not
get the chance to sufficiently defend herself; and more importantly, the petitioner, the
CSC and the courts could not have had the chance to reasonably ascertain the truth
which the CSC rules aim to accomplish.
161
DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
HELLINIC V. SIETE
FACTS: Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping. Co.Capt.
Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to
take over its command. These instructions were confirmed by a telex sent by Sultan
Shipping to Siete. Neither Lim nor the telex indicated the reason for his relief.
Siete filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of his salary and other benefits under their employment contract. After
considering the position papers and documentary evidence of the parties,
Administrator Achacoso of the POEA dismissed the complaint, holding that there was
valid cause for Siete's removal.
ISSUE: Whether the POEA was right in dismissing the case
RULING: No, section 1 of the labor code provides: No worker shall be dismissed except
for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. The law requires
that the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after. That omission
cannot be corrected by the investigation later conducted by the POEA.
MAIN POINT: No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law and after due process.
162
DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE SECTOR
SALAW VS NLRC
FACTS: Salaw, was employed by the private respondents in September 1967 as a credit
investigator-appraiser. The Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary, National Capital Region, extracted from the petitioner without the
assistance of counsel a Sworn Statement which made it appear that the petitioner, in
cahoots with a co-employee, Reynaldo Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the acquired
assets of respondent Associated Bank, sold and divided the proceeds thereof in equal
shares of P30,000.00 between the two of them.
He was requested to be investigated without counsel or representative and
it was emphasized. Then the petitioner was terminated from his employment
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the petitioner by the private respondents was legally
justified.
RULING: No, Under the Labor Codethe requirements for the lawful dismissal of an
employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only
must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided by law but the
rudimentary requirements of due process notice and hearing must also be observed
before an employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
MAIN POINT: The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee concerned
of the employer's intent dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on
other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employ the opportunity to answer
his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom
before dismissal effected. Neither one of these two requirements can be dispensed
with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution.
Case No. 163 – Cruz
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; dismissal in private sector
Conti v. NLRC, GR 119253 April 10, 1997
Main Point: The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements
of due process in the dismissal of employees.
Facts: Respondent Cofarm employed the petitioners and the term of their employment
is coterminous with the effectivity of the contract between Cofarm and MERALCO.
Upon the expiration of said management contract and on an additional ground of
anomalous transactions imputing them, petitioners were dismissed from their jobs.
Petitioners filed with the arbitration branch of NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal
and was awarded accordingly. Respondents appealed and had the NLRC set aside the
labor arbiter’s order and dismissing herein petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.
Petitioners contended that they were denied due process when they were dismissed
without a written notice, specifying the particular charges constituting the grounds for
their dismissal, and a hearing, as required by law. They further contend that the
memorandum issued by Corfarm to petitioners directing them "to explain why they
should not be dismissed for alleged acts of negligence and carelessness" was never
received by them. Besides, said memorandum did not specify the particular acts or
omissions of petitioners. It merely stated that based on the results of the investigation
conducted by Cofarm's internal audit staff, petitioners were found to have been
negligent in the performance of their duties.
Issue: Whether petitioners were denied due process as based by their contentions
Ruling: As to the requirement of notice, it has been held that the employer must
furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected: a) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought and b) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. With regard to the requirement
of a hearing, the Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and
indispensably be held.
Case No. 165 – Cruz
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; dismissal in private sector
Aparente v. NLRC, GR 117652
Main Point: In labor cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfil
the requirements of due process.
Facts: Petitioner was an advertising foreman for Coca-Cola. One day, petitioner
sideswiped a victim while driving respondent’s advertising truck. The victim suffered a
skull fracture and underwent surgical operation. She stayed in the hospital for about a
month. Five days after, petitioner reported the incident to private respondent. Thus,
private respondent conducted an investigation of the incident where the petitioner
was given the opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself. Thereafter,
petitioner was dismissed from employment for having violated the company rules and
regulations for blatant disregard if established control procedures resulting in company
damages. Petitioner contends that the NLRC erred in holding that private respondent
afforded him due process. He argues that when he was investigated for his
involvement in the vehicular accident, it was simply for the offense of driving without a
valid driver's license. He further asserts that had he been informed of the alleged
damages incurred by private respondent, he could have presented evidence to prove
otherwise. Thus, he would not have been terminated from service pursuant to Sec. 12
of Rule 005-85 of CCBPI's Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations
Issue: Whether petitioner was denied due process by private respondent
Ruling: No. Entrenched is the rule that the essence of due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard.
He was fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular
accident that took place. The investigation was conducted because he figured in an
accident in which he sideswiped the victim, and not for mere violation of traffic rules.
It was also known to petitioner that as a result of the accident, the victim suffered a
fracture on her skull which led to the latter's surgical operation and confinement in the
hospital for which private respondent incurred expenses amounting to P19k which
Insurance Company refused to reimburse upon finding that petitioner was driving
without a valid driver's license. Thus, being aware of all these circumstances and the
imposable sanctions under private respondent's Code of Disciplinary Rules and
Regulations, petitioner should have taken it upon himself to present evidence to lessen
his culpability.
Case No. 165 – Cruz
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; dismissal in private sector
Lopez v. Alturas 647 SCRA 568
Main Point: Dismissals have two facets: the legality of the act of dismissal, which
constitutes substantive due process, and the legality of the manner of dismissal which
constitutes procedural due process.
Facts: Petitioner Lopez was hired by respondent Alturas Group of Companies as truck
driver. He was dismissed after he was allegedly caught by respondent’s security guard
in the act of attempting to smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap iron
aboard respondents’ Cargo Van that was then assigned to him. When questioned,
petitioner allegedly admitted to the security guard that he was taking out the scrap
iron. Petitioner, in compliance with the Show Cause Notice issued by respondent
company, denied the allegations by a handwritten explanation written in the Visayan
dialect. Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory, respondent company
terminated his employment by Notice of Termination on the grounds of loss of trust
and confidence, and of violation of company rules and regulations. In issuing the
Notice, respondent company also took into account the result of an investigation
showing that petitioner had been smuggling out its cartons which he had sold for his
own benefit
Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated in the case at bar
Ruling: As to substantive due process, the Court finds that respondent company’s loss
of trust and confidence arising from petitioner’s smuggling out of the scrap iron,
compounded by his past acts of unauthorized selling cartons belonging to respondent
company, constituted just cause for terminating his services.
As to procedural due process, Court has held that there is no violation of due process
even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his
side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be
heard. Petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side when he was informed
of the charge against him and required to submit his written explanation with which he
complied.
CASE NO. 166
Art. III, Sec. 1. Preventive suspension
Alonzo v. Capulong 244 SCRA
MAINPOINT:
It is now settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer
can be ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
FACTS:
Alonzo, the petitioner, the Chief Executive Officer of Home Development Mutual Fund
filed for a petion for certiorari to set aside the decision of Judge Capulong, the
respondent which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner from
preventively suspending private respondent Juliet Fajardo as manager of the
Administrative Services Department of the Home Development Mutual Fund. Juliet
Fajardo who was preventively suspended due to dishonesty, misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, contracting of loans of money or other property from persons
with whom the office of the employee concerned had business relations, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The employee contended that she was
denied of due process of law because no prior hearing was conducted before she was
suspended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fajardo was denied of due process of law.
RULING:
No. In administrative proceedings, prior notice and hearing was not required. It is now
settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be
ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose is to prevent the
accused from using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper
with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. In this
case, private respondent is manager of the Administrative Services Department. She is
in a position to influence employees under her or otherwise impede the investigation.
CASE NO. 167
Art. III, Sec. 1. Preventive suspension
Castillio¬ – Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717
MAINPOINT:
The law does not require that only the Ombudsman himself may sign the order of
suspension.
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that under RA No. 7975, only the Ombudsman has the authority to
sign the order placing official with salary grade of 27 or above like the petitioner-
governor under preventive suspension for violating the Sec. 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for the uncovered irregularities in the purchase of equipment
that instead of brand new what was acquired were reconditioned equipment which is
contrary as required by the resolutions of the Pronvince’s Sanggunian.
ISSUE:
Whether the Deputy Ombudsmn is not authorized to sign the order of preventive
suspension.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in RA No. 7975 that would remotely suggest that only the
Ombudsman, and not his Deputy may sign an order preventively suspending officials
occupying positions as grade 27 or above. Hence, In this case, even it was not the
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto but its Director Emilio Gonzales III who signed the order
of suspension and wasapproved by Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerero, it is still valid.
Moreover, the Deputy is also given such power with the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend a person under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 and Sec. 9, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
CASE NO. 168
Art. III, Sec. 1. Preventive suspension
Bacsasar v. CSC 576 SCRA 787
MAINPOINT:
A formal type of hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process,
what is simply required is that the party concerned is given due notice and is afforded
an opportunity or right to be heard.
FACTS:
This case is a special civil action in the SC. The petitioner, Bacasasar was charged with
dishonesty by the CSC-ARMM for misrepresenting in her Personal Data Sheet that she
passed the CSC Professional Examination with rating of 87.54% which she used to
support the issuance of appointment of Mayor of Lanao De Sur as Municipal Assessor
under permanent status. She denied the charge and avered that a certain Tingcap
Pandi, deceased, approached and convinced her to obtain CS Eligibility without need of
taking an examination. She informed CSC that she is waiving her right to a formal
investigation. Consequently, she was imposed of a penalty of dismissal from service
with all its accessory penalties. Petitioner appealed which was denied and moved for
reconsideration which was also denied. Hence, this petition. She contended that she
was denied of due process because the case was decided without formal investigation.
She was not able to present evidence, confront the witnesses against her and object
the evidence adduced against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process.
RULING:
NO. Firstly, she waived her right to a formal investigation, thus, she cannot decry that
she was denied of her right to the same. Second, records show that petitioner never
raised this issue in the proceedings below. It is too late for petitioner to raise the issue
in this petition. Third, she was given ample opportunity to defend her case, contrary to
what she portray.
169. Carabeo v. CA 607 SCRA 390
Facts: Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 259, investigators of the
Department of Finance (DOF) Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS)
made lifestyles check of DOF officials and employees. As a result of these
investigations, the DOF charged petitioner Liberato Carabeo, Parañaque
City Treasurer, before the Office of the Ombudsman for violations of
Section 7 in relation to Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code. The informations filed with the Sandiganbayan
totaled eight in all. These, in essence, accused Carabeo of failing to disclose
several items in his sworn SALN filed over the years.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was allowed to previously exercise his
right to be informed beforehand and to take the necessary corrective action
on questions concerning his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN, for brevity), as provided under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6713
before the instant charges were filed against him
Ruling: No. Carabeo claims that his head office, the DOF, should have
alerted him on the deficiency in his SALN and given him the chance to
correct the same before any charge is filed against him in connection with
the same. But, the Sandiganbayan, citing Pleyto v. Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),4 held that the
review of the SALN by the head of office is irrelevant and cannot bar the
Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an independent investigation
for criminal violations committed by the public official or employee.
Carabeo contends, however, that the head of office has a mandatory
obligation to inform him of defects in his SALN and give him the chance to
correct the same. Further, he cannot be subjected to any sanction until
such obligation has been complied with. Carabeo points out that Pleyto
could not apply to him because the authority that reviewed the SALN in
Pleyto was not the head of office. Although the respondents involved in
that case were employees of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, it was the Philippine National Police that investigated and filed
the complaints against them. Carabeo points out that, in his case, it was the
DOF-RIPS, headed by the Secretary of Finance, which filed the complaints
against him with the Office of the Ombudsman. As city treasurer, Carabeo
reports to the Bureau of Local Government Finance under the Secretary of
Finance.
But what Carabeo fails to grasp is that it was eventually the Office of the
Ombudsman, not the DOF-RIPS, that filed the criminal cases against him
before the Sandiganbayan. That office is vested with the sole power to
investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint of any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.5
The Office of the Ombudsman could file the informations subject of these
cases without any help from the DOF-RIPS.
True, Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds
the SALN of a subordinate incomplete or not in the proper form such head
of office must call the subordinate’s attention to such omission and give
him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an internal office
matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect
to a particular subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from
investigating the latter.6 Its power to investigate and prosecute erring
government officials cannot be made dependent on the prior action of
another office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its constitutionally
guarded independence.
Further, Carabeo’s reliance on his supposed right to notice regarding errors
in his SALNs and to be told to correct the same is misplaced. The notice and
correction referred to in Section 10 are intended merely to ensure that
SALNs are "submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form."
Obviously, these refer to formal defects in the SALNs. The charges against
Carabeo, however, are for falsification of the assets side of his SALNs and
for declaring a false net worth. These are substantive, not formal defects.
Indeed, while the Court said in Pleyto that heads of offices have the duty to
review their subordinates’ SALNs, it would be absurd to require such heads
to run a check on the truth of what the SALNs state and require their
subordinates to correct whatever lies these contain. The responsibility for
truth in those SALNs belongs to the subordinates who prepared them, not
to the heads of their offices.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in excluding
from its pre-trial order the first and fourth issues that Carabeo proposed.
170. Villasenor v. OMB, GR. No. 20230, 725 SCRA 230
Facts: The petitioners, along with several others, were administratively
charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire tragedy that took place on
August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury to others. Petitioner
Villaseñor was an electrical inspector from the Electrical Division, and
petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the Electrical Engineering Office,
both of Quezon City.
In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross
negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with
violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). In its Memorandum,3
dated July 26, 2004, the Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint
Decision as regards the petitioners.
On December 13, 2004, Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions
for reconsideration4 of the Joint Decision.
Issue: Whether Villaseñor was denied of his constitutional right of not to
be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law, was
grossly violated by the Ombudsman when:
1. He was prevented from cross-examining complainant’s witnesses;

2. He failed to receive any copy of any order relative to the preliminary
conference of the case; and
3. His dismissal from the service was ordered implemented while his motion
for reconsideration remains unresolved.
Ruling: The first two issues raised by petitioner Villaseñor do not relate to
the assailed CA Resolutions, which ruled upon the Order of the
Ombudsman implementing the Joint Decision. They are, therefore,
irrelevant to the present petition. The sole issue before the Court now is,
thus: Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and
suspension of one year can be implemented pending resolution of
petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman,
and petitioner Mesa’s appeal before the CA? An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure
that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order
of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. The
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in
nature and therefore, may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases
which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No.
17. No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the
respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended
while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note that there is no
such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office.
171. People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136
Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay
his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond
operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a
resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao,
Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of
failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he
was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty
thus this petition.
Issue: 1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and
void for being ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post
facto
Ruling: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual
operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was
the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only
leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit
as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated
“Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in
1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be
that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply
retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since
1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty
175 – MUSA
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Mendenilla v. CSC 194 SCRA 278
FACTS:
Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. a
reorganization ensued within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A
revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of
personnel was issued.
Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human
Resource Development Officer. On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to
the disputed position. Amparo Dellosa, Rosalinda Juria and Marita Burdeos together
with Matilde Angeles, Catalina Espinas, Alicia Nercelles and Ramon Racela, all of whom
are employees in the Human Resource Training and Material Development Division,
Administrative and Manpower Management Service of the DPWH, jointly lodged a
protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of
the petitioner to the position. The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank
employees, one of them should have been appointed to the said position. The CSC
dissolved Medenilla’s appointment as Supervising Human Resource Development
Officer. Subsequently, he filed motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner interposes that the resolutions were issued by the Respondent
Commission, without giving notice to the petitioner of the existence of an appeal filed
before the CSC, thereby denying the petitioner due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC denied petitioner’s due process.
RULING:
NO. Since the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, she cannot now complain
that she was deprived of due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone of due process. What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, any defect was cured
by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
176 – MUSA
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Mendiola v. CSC 221 SCRA 295
(Mendenilla sa syllabus)
FACTS:
A Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petitioner Teodorico Mendiola against
respondents Civil Service Commission (Commission) and Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (Bureau). Petitioner seeks from this Court the annulment of the
resolutions passed by the Commission which terminated him from service upon the
reorganization of the Department of Finance and an order for his immediate
reinstatement to the service. Alleging that he was not informed of the cause of his
dismissal, petitioner appealed his case to the chairman of the Appeals Board. His
appeal was denied. Subsequently, he appealed to the Commission and averred that he
was denied due process when he was dismissed from the service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC denied petitioner’s due process.
RULING:
NO. With respect to petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process when the
Commission heard the Bureau’s motion for reconsideration without notice to him, We
agree with respondent Bureau’s argument that the defect was cured by the filing by
petitioner of his Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1990. Thus, in Medenilla v. Civil Service
Commission, We said that the lack of notice to petitioner regarding the pending appeal
and the hearing of said appeal was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
177 – MUSA
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Rodreguez v. Proj. 6 247 SCRA 528
FACTS:
Petitioner Peter Rodriguez is a vendor occupying and leasing one of the stalls at the
Project 6 Market, Project 6, Quezon City from respondent Project 6 Market Service
Cooperative, Inc. (Cooperative), the operator of said market. The instant petition
stems from filed in 1984 by the Cooperative against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), Branch 39, Quezon City. The Cooperative sought to eject petitioner
from his market stall and recover from him arrears in his monthly rent over the
property Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering petitioner to vacate the leased
premises and pay rent in arrears and until such time as he vacates the leased property.
The judgment of the MTC having become final and executory, the Cooperative moved
for its execution with the RTC and a writ of execution was issued accordingly.
Petitioner however moved to quash the writ on the ground that the situation of the
parties had changed after trial that would now render execution inequitable. The
Cooperative opposed this motion. The trial court denied the motion to quash on and
reconsideration thereof. Petitioner contends that he was deprived of procedural due
process when the trial court issued the order of August 31, 1987 without any hearing
and without him having been furnished a copy of the Cooperative's opposition to his
motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process
RULING:
NO. Petitioner admits that when he moved for reconsideration of said order, he
received his copy of the opposition and respondent judge conducted a hearing on his
motion. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
178 REYES
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; Motion for Reconsideration
Lazo vs. CSC, 236 SCRA 469
FACTS:
The CSC received a letter reporting that petitioner Lazo had boasted to him that he had
bought his career service eligibility from the CSC. It ordered the examination answer
sheets of petitioner retrieved and hand-checked by the Office of Recruitment,
Examination and Placement. The rechecking disclosed that petitioner's actual score
was 34.48%, not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of eligibility. Accordingly, the CSC
charged petitioner with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interests of the service, and ordered the Regional Office to conduct anew a formal
investigation of the case. The Regional Office recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case. The CSC dismissed the case but revoked petitioner’s eligibility for
being null and void.
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration alleging that the CSC violated his right to due
process and it had found him to have failed the Civil Service Examinations without
evidence being presented to support the finding.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process of the law.
RULING:
No. While it is true that the CSC cannot motu propio revoke a certificate of eligibility
without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned, the case at bar simply
involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than a reevaluation
of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key
previously set by it. Hence, notice and hearing was not required. Petitioner could have
examined the rechecking of his examination papers and, if he found anything wrong,
he could have asked for reconsideration. But, while he filed one in this case, he did not
show that his score was really 76.46%. He simply argued that he should not be made to
answer for an irregularity in which he had no participation and, on this basis, asked the
CSC for a formal investigation.
Petitioner was given the right to be heard, but, as already said, he did not make good
use of it by showing that his actual score was 76.46%, and not 34.48%. For that matter,
even here petitioner does not allege that his grade in the civil service examination is
76.46% and not 34.48%. All he is alleging is that he should have been given a chance to
see the examination sheet himself.
MAIN POINT:
The case simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than
a reevaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard
answer key previously set by it. Hence, notice and hearing was not required.
179 REYES
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; Motion for Reconsideration
Salonga vs. CA, 269 SCRA 534
FACTS:
Private respondent Izon (President of Paul Geneve Corporation) agreed into a joint
venture enterprise with petitioner Salonga (owner of Solid Intertain) and that both
companies will form a new corporation. This joint venture will provide leasehold
holding rights of the property in Makati. Izon signed the documents prepared and the
same were delivered to Salonga for his signature. However, the said documents were
not signed. With the memorandum of agreement still unsigned, not notarized, and in
the possession of Salonga, he transferred all his equipment to the said property in
Makati. Club Ibiza was then opened and made operational on the leased premises in
question.
Izon filed a complaint against Salonga for motion for writ of preliminary injunction with
prayer for damages. During the first hearing, only the private respondents appeared.
During the second hearing, the petitioners still failed appear. Despite two motions of
extension, petitioners failed to file an answer. Hence, petitioners were declared in
default and the motion was granted in favor of private respondents. Petitioner claims
to have been denied due process of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process of law.
RULING:
No. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. As long the parties were given
the chance to present their case or defense before judgment was rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.
In the case at bar, the trial court had given them reasonable opportunity to be heard
and present their side in all the proceedings before it. They admit that their counsel
was able to file a timely Motion for Reconsideration on their behalf which was set for
hearing by the trial court. The fact that petitioners and their counsel failed to attend
said hearing and adduce evidence on their behalf is of no moment. What is important
is that they were given the chance to do so. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard in his motion
for reconsideration.
MAIN POINT:
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. Deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard in his motion for reconsideration.
180 REYES
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement; Motion for Reconsideration
Bernardo vs. CA, 275 SCRA 413
FACTS:
A complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction was filed against Bernardo because it appears that the lot
subject was the object of a double sale by the National Housing Authority to Bernardo.
The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial. Bernardo filed
for an ex parte motion for extension of time to file an answer signed by Atty. Puerto as
counsel, but when the answer was submitted later, his counsel became Puerto Nuñez
& Associates, with the same Atty. Puerto signing. Upon hearing, neither Bernardo nor
his counsel came despite due notice. The court interpreter informed the judge that an
associate of Atty. Puerto allegedly called to say that Atty. Puerto had died. Pending
official and verified notification of such death, the court decided to proceed with
reception of evidence from the plaintiff.
Atty. Abibas filed a notice of appearance as new counsel for Bernardo, mentioning the
death of Atty. Puerto. Without acting on the notice filed by Bernardo’s new counsel
and without receiving evidence from Bernardo, the trial court promulgated its decision
in favor of complainant. Bernardo moved for reconsideration and filed for a motion to
reopen the case and grant a new trial on the grounds that he had been denied his
substantive right to due process, particularly the right to be heard.
ISSUE:
Whether there was denial of due process.
RULING:
No. Bernardo failed to comply with the necessary requirements for substitution of
counsel where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the
counsel, a verified proof of the death of such attorney (usually a death certificate)
must accompany the notice of appearance of the new counsel. His new counsel’s
notice of appearance33 merely mentioned that Atty. Jose B. Puerto recently died. A
verified certificate of death was not attached thereto.
It should be stressed that petitioner was able to file his motion for reconsideration in
which he presented his legal defenses with respect to the main subject of the original
complaint. His arguments were substantially discussed and debunked by the trial court
in its order disposing of said motion. Such motion for reconsideration cured whatever
defect there may have been, if any, as regards the alleged denial of due process.
MAIN POINT:
It is a time-honored ruling that lack of opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily
absence of prior notice, constitutes violation of due process.
CASE NO. 181 – SABTALUH
CASUELA vs. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
A complaint was charged against the Respondent, a POEA Employee, for allegedly
receiving an amount of money to process the papers of Valeriano. Despite the
withdrawal of the complaint, a hearing was forthwith proceeded. POEA Administrative
Complaints committee declared respondent liable for dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of his service. The respondent is adjudged and meted
out the penalty of dismissal pursuant to the CSC rules which was further affirmed by
DOLE. Private respondent filed a complaint on Ombudsman contending that they acted
within the scope of their function and in good faith. Considering all the evidences,
Ombudsman found the petitioner was consequently found liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties and meted out the penalty of three
(3) months suspension pursuant to CSC Regulations. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration. The ombudsman, however, was unconvinced and forthwith denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s right of due process was infringed.
RULING:
No. Petitioner may not also successfully plead violation of his right to due process
because he readily admits having filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated July 22, 1993. The court quoted the postulations of the Solicitor General:
“Petitioner’s claim that ‘the Ombudsman virtually deprived [him] of his right to due
process by failing to inform [him] of the charges against him is without of merit. In the
first place, as petitioner admits he had raised the alleged ‘lack of sufficient opportunity
to be informed of the charges against him in a motion for reconsideration.’ This
Honorable Court has repeatedly stressed that the requirements of due process are
complied with when a party is heard on a motion for reconsideration and Secondly, the
Constitution has vested the Ombudsman with plenary authority in the scope of his
investigation.
MAIN POINT:
The requirements of due process are complied with when a party is heard on a motion
for reconsideration.
CASE NO. 182 – SABTALUH
CORDINELLERO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
The private respondent Bolivar was granted by Bureau of Forest Development a permit
covering 16 hectares in Capiz while de Jesus was issued by the defunct Fishpond
permit by BFAR covering 35 hectares which was likewise located in the same city. On
1963, petitioner Cordenillo filed MSA to Bureau of Lands and constructed fishpond on
a 10-hectare portion which was later found to be with the area under the private
respondent’s NB Permit. Respondent’s protested against the MSA of the petitioner.
The case was set to be heard in DARN. After investigation and ocular investigation,
Undersecretary of DARN ruled that Bureau of Forest Development was admonished for
for having renewed the Nipa-Bacauan Permit of Jose Bolivar even after it had
previously declared itself as having no jurisdiction over the area in question, which
area is a part of the Tinagong Dagat Bay. Unsatisfied, Respondent Bolivar sought for
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the Petitioner was deprived of his right to due process.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner pretends to be a victim of due process violation because he was not
afforded the opportunity to be heard vis-a-vis private respondent Bolivar’s motion for
Issuance of the Writ of Implementation. Suffice it to say that the mere fact that
petitioner herein assails two Resolutions of the Office of the President, the one with
the later date of which was issued precisely upon petitioner’s filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution first issued on dated May 7, 1993, shows that
petitioner was in fact heard, for purposes of administrative due process, when he filed
said Motion for Reconsideration. As such, any contention of denial of due process must
fail as the same was cured by the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
MAIN POINT:
Petitioner was in fact heard, for purposes of administrative due process, when he filed
Motion for Reconsideration. As such, any contention of denial of due process must fail
as the same was cured by the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
CASE NO. 183 – SABTALUH
CHUA VS CA
MAINPOINT:
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual
hearing should always and indispensably be held; Denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Roberto L. Chua, a bachelor, died intestate and was survived by his minor children.
Petitioner appeared and averred that she was alleged wife of the Chua, thus, filed a
petition for the guardianship of the minor children as well as the administration of the
intestate estate. The petitioner presented evidences indicating that Chua’s status is
married. The court dismissed her case for the lack of merit. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration furthermore contending that the trial court acted beyond
its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate of Roberto L.
Chua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the
amended petition being published in the newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was afforded with the right to due process.
RULING:
Yes. Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual
hearing should always and indispensably be held. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard. Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of
the orders of the trial court, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall
letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a “mistrial,”
which motions were denied. A motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial
was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13 December
1993. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
184. SALINAS- De la Cruz v. Abelle 352 SCRA 691
Facts: Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total landholding of 13.0561 hectares,
located in Infanta, Pangasinan, comprising of Riceland, cogonland, coconut land and of
residential land.
Since 1968, Balbino dela Cruz was an agricultural tenant in the riceland tilling an area
of 2.84 hectares. 4 He died on June 14, 1981. After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was,
nevertheless, issued a Certificate of Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27.
The certificate was entered in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax
Declaration No. 1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz.
On April 3, 1987, Herminio Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging, among others, that he was not notified of
the coverage of his land under OLT; that he learned of its coverage only on March 25,
1987; that prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer, DAR did not notify
him or his representative; that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due
process.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was denied of due process
Ruling: No, The court agreed with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners
were not given the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in
his Order dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer
No. 0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an
emancipation patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they
raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by
DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21, 1992, and also in
their (petitioners’) motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of
185. SALINAS- Rodreguez v. CA GR 134275 August 7, 2002
Facts: The PNP launched operation AJAX to minimize the cases of extortion of traffic
policemen in Makati. One of the arrested police is PFC Rodriguez. In a summary
hearing, Rodriguez was dismissed. His appeal was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM. He
then filed a petitioner by way of certiorari and mandamus which was dismissed by the
CA. Hence the Petition. He contends that he was not offered due process by the
NAPOLCOM
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez.
Ruling: No, Petitioner cannot now claim that he was not afforded due process by the
NAPOLCOM. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of administrative
due process is the opportunity to be heard.15 As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
In the instant case, a scrutiny of the NAPOLCOM decision denying petitioner’s appeal
from the PNP Chief’s order of dismissal clearly shows that petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to present his side and defend his interests.
Main Point: Lack of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.— Lack of due process cannot be
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. The resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration clearly
shows that petitioner was given every opportunity to air his side.
186. SALINAS- Gonzales v. CSC 490 SCRA 741
Facts: Petitioner was a casino operations manager. He was administratively charged
for violation of company rules and was dismissed by PAGCOR’s decision. He appealed
to the CSC but the same was dismissed. He raised his appeal to the CA but likewise
dismissed. Hence the petition.
Issue: Whether the Commission violated his right to due process
Ruling: No, Where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.5 Here,
petitioner was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the
memorandum of charges against him. He was given the opportunity to testify during
the marathon hearings conducted by a panel of investigators. He was also able to
participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding as shown by the appeal he
filed with the Commission.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.6 Any seeming defect in its
observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.7 Thus, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
187. SALVADOR
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement
Berboso v. CA
Facts: P.D No. 27 was signed into law that laid down a scheme for the purchase by
small farmers of the land they were tilling. DARAB rendered a Decision fixing the
amount of disturbance compensation due to Berboso –Berboso contested the
lawfulness of the said amount. Then the period for the Conversion Order expired
hence the petitioners Berboso are now barred from assailing the said Order.
Issue: Whether the petitioners Berboso were deprived of due process
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that lack of notice had been cured when the petitioners
actively intervened and participated in proceedings before the courts. Petitioners also
made appeals and had also repeatedly moved for the reconsideration of each decision
adverse to them.
Main point: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek for reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
188. SALVADOR
Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement
Pontejos v. Desierto
Facts: Pontejos is held liable for grave misconduct and the propriety of the penalty of
dismissal from his employment; for allegedly being involved in bribery and estafa.
Pontejos contends that he was denied of his right to due process when he was not able
to confront Aquino who failed to appear in two hearings.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of Pontejos is valid
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain
one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration.
Main point: Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.
189. SALVADOR
Suretyship
Stronghold Insurance v. CA
Facts: The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability on a surety bond executed
for the protection of a Filipino seaman. The required surety bond was submitted by
petitioner to answer for the liabilities of the employer. Urtesuela then filed a complaint
against petitioner based on surety bond that resulted to the judgement rendered
against the petitioner. However, the petitioner asks for reversal; it submits that the
decision of the POEA is not binding because it was impleaded in the complaint and it
was not notified thereof, nor did it participate in the hearing.
Issue: Whether the petitioner can invoke due process to escape liability on a surety
bond.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that it is too late for the petitioner to challenge the
stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it should have done
was object when its inclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the
POEA.
Main point: The consequence of its submission is that it cannot now argue that it is not
bound by that condition because it was coerced into accepting it. The right to be heard
is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party is given an
opportunity to heard on his behalf.
SUREETY BOND - intended for the protection of our citizens who are engaged for
overseas employment by foreign companies; to insure that if the rights are violated by
their employers, recourse would still be available to them against the local companies
that recruited them for foreign principal.
CASE NO. 190 – Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Tariffs and Customs Code
Feeder International Lines vs. CA
Facts:
M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel owned and operated by Feeder International Lines of
Singapore, left Singapore carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 fuel oil. They
were assigned to deliver to Far East Synergy Corp. of Zamboanga. The vessel anchored
at Iloilo without the knowledge of the local custom authorities. The customs team
seized the vessel and found out there was a lack of necessary shipping requirements
except for a clearance to Zamboanga. The local customs ordered the seizure of the
vessel and all resources therein because they violated Article 2530 (a and f) of the
Tariffs and Customs Code. Petitioner argued that the forfeiture proceedings were
premature because they enjoyed presumption of innocence.
Issue:
Whether the forfeiture proceedings were valid?
Ruling:
Yes. The penalty in seizure cases are distinct and separate from the criminal liability
that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor. The proceedings for
the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not
result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.
Furthermore, the petitioner is a corporate entity and cannot invoke the right to be
innocent in a criminal suit.
Main Point:
Seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal
in nature, hence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to justify the
forfeiture of the goods.
CASE NO. 190 – Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Appeal
Alba vs. Deputy Ombudsman
Facts:
Dr. Ramon Alba was working in the Department of Education Culture and Sports. He
was suspended by the Ombudsman for 30 days due to gross misconduct in his
functions as a medical school educator. He now assails the constitutionality Section 27
of RA 6770 and Section 7 of Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 because they violate
the right to due process in cases of appeal. Both state that the certain penalties
imposed by the Ombudsman are unappealable and can be only be reversed on a
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the mentioned provisions violate due process?
Ruling:
No. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law. Thus, deprivation of appeal is not a deprivation of the right
to due process.
Main Point:
The constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the
denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
be heard and to present evidence in support of one’s case.
CASE NO. 192 – Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Appeal
Telan vs. CA
Facts:
Pedro and Angelina Telan were in a suit for ownership of a lot against Virginia Telan.
The lower court awarded the lot to Virginia. When the couple wanted to appeal, their
lawyer in the lower court was disposed not to do so. They then requested the services
of a certain Palma who claims to have been a lawyer. The CA then dismissed the case
without the knowledge of the couple due to prescription. They then could not locate
“Atty. Palma” and when they acquired the services of a true attorney, it was found out
that no Atty. Palma existed in the rolls of attorney. They now claim their due process in
the appeal was violated.
Issue:
Whether the right to due process was violated in the appeal?
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners had not been accorded due process of law because they lost their right
to appeal when they were deprived of the right to counsel. Also, the SC ruled that the
right to due process is also available in civil cases, especially if his right to property is
endangered.
Main Point:
The right to due process of law in appeal is violated if the right to counsel is deprived.
This applies not only to criminal cases but also to civil cases where the right to life,
liberty, and property are endangered.
Central Bank vs.Court of Appeals-BAIRD
FACTS; Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination
Sector, Department II, of the Central Bank "that the financial condition of TSB is one of
insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors
and creditors,’’ the Monetary Board issued on 31 May 1985 Resolution No. 596
ordering the closure of TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines,
placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. On 11 June
1985, TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, against
Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for
injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269,
otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to
take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any law or
regulation, much less found guilty thereof. The question really is, May a Monetary
Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership be annulled on the ground
of lack of prior notice and hearing?
ISSUE ; Whether the lack of prior notice and hearing constitute as a denial of due
process in closure proceedings
RULING ; No, appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to
be prevented; hence, We rule that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound legislation
promulgated in accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of police power of the
state. Consequently, the absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a
Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under receivership. The absence of prior
notice and hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith. Thus, an MB
resolution placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may
only be annulled after a determination has been made by the trial court that its
issuance was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination is
made, the status quo shall be maintained, i.e., the bank shall continue to be under
receivership.
MAINPOINT ; Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the
dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day,
resulting in panic and hysteria.
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS-BAIRD
FACTS ; The petitioner is the Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. In 1980, an examination of the
books and affairs of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural Banks and Savings and
Loan Association Central Bank of the Philippines, which has charge of the supervision
and examination of rural banks and savings and loan associations in the Philippines.
However, said petitioner refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial
assistance was suspended.On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank's
affairs and operations was conducted and there were found by DRBSLA represented by
herein respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, massive irregularities in its operations
consisting of loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers. The promissory notes
evidencing these loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result
thereof, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced its depositors and creditors.
Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report recommending to the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership. Imelda del Rosario,
Manager of herein petitioner Buhi, filed a petition for injunction with Restraining
against respondent and DRBSLA deputies which assailed the action of herein
respondent Odra in recommending the receivership over Buhi. Petitioner Rural Bank's
position is to the effect that due process was not observed by the Monetary Board
before said bank was placed under receivership. Said Rural Bank claimed that it was
not given the chance to deny and disprove such claim of insolvency and/or any other
ground which the Monetary Board used in justification of its action.
ISSUE ; Whether the monetary board of the CB can place a rural bank without prior
notice or hearing
RULING; Yes, there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be
first conducted before a banking institution may be placed under receivership. On the
contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the
Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to
appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They
are: (a) an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b)
report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that
the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
MAINPOINT ; due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL vs.COURT OF APPEALS-BAIRD
FACTS ; PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC, was established to train and
produce competent marine officers. For several times prior to 1985 respondent
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner's requests
for renewal permit. However, on 11 March 1986 the DECS issued petitioner a renewal
permit for SY 1985-1986. Later, petitioner applied for a summer permit for 1986 which
the DECS favorably indorsed to the Minister of Education in consideration of the
graduating students. On 9 April 1987 the DECS Inter-Agency Technical Committee
(IATCOM) recommended renewal of permits for the maritime courses offered by
petitioner provided that a development plan for the improvement of its buildings
classrooms, laboratory rooms, library offices and other rooms be formulated and
implemented before the start of school year 1987-1988.Despite lack of permit,
petitioner continued to enroll students and offer courses in Marine Engineering and
Marine Transportation for SY 1987-1988.
In a DECS-PAMI survey conducted by the DECS technical staff in 1988, petitioner
scored way below the DECS requirements.Subsequent inspection of petitioner's
premises by the Bureau of Higher Education-DECS Technical Panel for Maritime
Education (TPME) affirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI survey. It found petitioner
deficient in terms of the minimum requirements. In a letter dated 11 July 1989 the
DECS through Secretary Quisumbing informed petitioner that it had received reports
that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered
phased out effective SY 1989-1990. Pursuant to petitioner's request, another
inspection of the Manila premises was conducted by the TPME-Secretariat on 8 August
1989. However, petitioner only obtained a general rating of 31.17% for Nautical
Studies and 28.53% for Marine Engineering. Consequently, the inspection team
reiterated its previous recommendation to gradually phase out the maritime programs
of petitioner's Manila campus. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS
phase-out and closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed.
ISSUE ; Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process
RULING ; No, As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met . It should
also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various
orders of respondent DECS and its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS
to the extent of allowing and granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In
connection therewith, it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the essence
of procedural due process and that any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration
MAINPOINT; As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met
199
Biddings
Concerned Officials v. Vasquez
FACTS:
In order to provide million liters of water daily to people in the
metropolitan area, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) launched
the Angat Water Supply optimization ("AWSOP") consisting of several phases. An
"Invitation for Pre-qualification and Bids" for Projects were opened. After an
evaluation 11 out of 14 were qualified, Meanwhile, private respondent Philippine
Large Diameter pressure Pipes Manufacturers' Association ("PLDPPMA"), sent seven
letters to the MWSS requesting clarification. Petitioners were asked to comment on
the letter-complaint of PLDPPMA. Petitioners moved for an extension of time within
which to comment. Petitioners filed their letter-comment. Responding to the reply of
PLDPPMA, petitioners later filed a rejoinder. When an adverse order was rendered
against them, petitioners moved for its reconsideration, albeit to no avail.
The Ombudsman directed the Board of Trustees of MWSS (a) to set aside
the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment ("PBAC-CSTE") that Contract No. APM-
01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and (b) to instead award the
contract to a complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1594.
ISSUE:
Whether the rudiments of due process have been properly observed in the
issuance of the assailed orders of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
Yes, Petitioners were asked to comment on the letter-complaint of
PLDPPMA. On 25 June 1992, petitioners moved for an extension of time within which
to comment. On July 16, 1992, petitioners filed their letter-comment. Responding to
the reply of PLDPPMA, petitioners later filed a rejoinder. When an adverse order was
rendered against them, petitioners moved for its reconsideration, albeit to no avail.
MAIN POINT:
The absence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. 32 One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more
creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. 33 In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.
200
THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT – REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7279
PEREZ V. MADRONA
FACTS: Spouses Madrona are registered owners of a residential property, they built
their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. They
received a letter from petitioner Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office
ordering them to removed their fences as it is constructed in the sidewalk.
As response, respondent Madrona sent a letter stating that the letter (1)
contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property
without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order
authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not
expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation
since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
More than a year later, petitioner sent another letter with the same
contents as the previous letter but this time giving respondents ten days from receipt
thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted
respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the Marikina City RTC. The RTC
held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the
peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property.
ISSUE: Whether the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction present
RULING: Yes, the two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be protected,
that is, respondents’ right over their concrete fence which cannot be removed without
due process; and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which
the injunction is directed, would violate said right.
MAIN POINT: Respondent having been warned by respondents that his acts were in
fact violations of law, petitioner should have been more circumspect in his actions and
should have pursued the proper remedies that were more in consonance with the
dictates of due process.
201
Cancellation of Property Rights and Privileges
American Inter-Fashion v. OP
FACTS: Respondent Glorious Sun Fashion (GLORIOUS) was found guilty of dollar-salting
occurs when dollars are removed from the Philippines without approval from the
Central Bank and transferred to an account outside the county and misdeclaration of
importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) in OSC Case No. 84-B-1
and, as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.
GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 67180, contending that its right to due process of law was
violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Respondent GLORIOUS alleged that the charges against it in OSC Case No.
84-B-1 were not supported by evidence. Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision
cancelling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation
and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to
transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil
Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and petitioner American Inter-fashion
(AIFC).
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Glorious Sun was denied due process during the
hearings held in GTEB.
RULING: Yes, AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious
vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of
dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where relevant
documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was given an opportunity to
comment thereon, cured the defect. This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is
misleading. The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of
the GTEB.
AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence
used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The glaring
fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence
used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.
MAIN POINT:
The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be
disregarded if they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings
are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Case No. 202 – Cruz
Cancellation of Property Rights and Privileges
Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565
Main Point: Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the DOLE,
are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, nonetheless, they are
bound by law and practice to observe the essential requisites of due process.
Facts: The Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization (ADFLO) filed an application
for registration as a national federation alleging, among others that it has 12 affiliates.
After proper evaluation of its application, it was issued a Certificate of Registration to
the federation. The Confederation of Labor and Allied Social Services (CLASS) filed a
petition for the cancellation of the Registration Certificate issued to ADFLO.
The first hearing conducted by the BLR after the case was remanded to it for further
proceedings. However, since CLASS was not yet ready with its evidence, the hearing
was postponed. The Bureau of Labor Relations Director without first ruling on the
admissibility of the exhibits of CLASS and without any further hearing then cancelled
the registration of ADFLO.
Issue: Whether a certificate of registration can be cancelled without a hearing
Ruling: Yes. The cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing
out the life of a labor organization. For without such registration, it loses its rights
under the Labor Code. Under the circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled
to be heard before a judgment could be rendered cancelling its certificate of
registration. In David vs. Aguilizan, it was held that a decision rendered without any
hearing is null and void.
Case No. 203 – Cruz
Cancellation of Property Rights and Privileges
ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
Main Point: Courts cannot substitute our discretion for Congress, and even though
there are provisions in Rep. Act No. 9337 which we may believe as unwise or
iniquitous, but not unconstitutional, we cannot strike them off by invoking our power
of judicial review. In such a situation, the recourse of the people is not judicial, but
rather political. If they severely doubt the wisdom of the present Congress for passing
a statute such as Rep. Act No. 9337, then they have the power to hold the members of
said Congress accountable by using their voting power in the next elections.
Facts: A law was passed authorizing the president upon recommendation of the
Secretary of finance to raise the VAT rate to 12%. The petitioner questions said law
alleging that, among others, such law is in violation of due process and equal
protection clause.
Issue: Whether such law is in violation of the due process and equal protection.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to
make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the
rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation
and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
Case No. 204 – Cruz
Cancellation of Property Rights and Privileges
British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511, 585 SCRA 36
Main Point: Classification if rational in character is allowable. The taxing power has
the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation
Facts: British American Tobacco challenged the validity of Sec. 145 of the NIRC as
amended by R.A. 8420, arguing that the provision violated the equal protection clause
and the rule on the uniformity of taxation. The provision created a four-tiered tax rate
based on the net retail price of cigarette brands. BAT introduced a “newbrand”, Lucky
Strike, which was taxed under the “current retail price” it was introduced. Old brands
would be taxed based on the retail price before 1996. BAT argued that the tax was
unfair since older brands would benefit from a “freeze” on the tax rates while newer
brands would be taxed based on current retail prices even if older brands now had the
same current retail price.
Issue: Whether RA 9334 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the constitution
Ruling: No. Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, it must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. A
legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws.
The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all
things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to
all those belonging to the same class. Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly
demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the price is not the only factor that
affects competition. For as long as the legislative classification is rationally related to
furthering some legitimate state interest, as here, the rational-basis test is satisfied
and the constitutional challenge is perfunctorily defeated.
CASE NO. 205
Art. III, Sec. 1. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman Roxas v.
Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001
MAINPOINT:
In criminal prosecutions, a re-investigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case
open for review; The Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the
action or in action of the complainants.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed for petitioner of certiorari and prohibition seek to set aside the
Orders of the Ombudsman insofar as they found probable cause to charge petitioners
Policemen for violating Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and prohibit
respondents from trying the petitioner in Criminal case filed against them before
Sandiganbayan. They were Chairman and member of the Bids and Awards Committee
which offered bidding to different agencies as PC-INP wanted for supply purchase of 65
units of fire trucks. When the bid was given to Tahei Co. Ltd, a discrepancy of
P19,030,570 for all fire trucks purchased was discovered. Their appeal and motion for
reconsideration were denied hence, this petition. They contended that the
respondents Ombudsman Vasquez acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding on reinvestigation.
Since their criminal case was dismissed, it could no longer conduct reinvestigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman Judge is without jurisdiction to conduct
reinvestigation.
RULING:
No. In criminal prosecutions, a re-investigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case
open for review. It matters not that the complainants did not seek reinvestigation or
reconsideration of the dismissal of charges against petitioners. Consistent with its
independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of
public officers, The Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the
action or in action of the complainants. Sec. 15 of RA No. 6770 provides that the
Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do
not go unpunished.
CASE NO. 206
Art. III, Sec. 1. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman
Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA
MAINPOINT:
Failure to file a counter-affidavit even an order was issued is deemed a waiver of his
right to present evidence.
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolutions of the
Ombudsman which dismissed petitioner from service, with forfeiture of benefits and
special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government of any GOCC’s. The
petitioner was Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., as subsidiary of National
Irrigation Administration who conducted a training program to 6 Nepalese Junior
Engineer. However, the training fee was received by the petitioner after the said event
but never remitted such. The president of NIACONSULT file an administrative case
before the Ombudsman for serious misconduct, fraud, or willful breach of trust. The
ombudsman issued an order twice requiring the petitioner to file counter-affidavit
with 20 days but failed and such failure would deem a waiver of his right to present
evidence. Petitioner contended that he was denied of due process because he was not
given an opportunity to file counter-affidavit and was not given access to the records
of the subject transaction vital to his defense despite his verbal requests to the graft
investigator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process.
RULING:
No. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably
and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense. Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was
required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given
considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit twice. Thus, petitioner’s
failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own
remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator.
CASE NO. 207
Art. III, Sec. 1. T. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan GR 148468 Jan. 28, 2003
MAINPOINT:
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a right
conferred by a statute
FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson
and turned it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the
account with the Equitable PCI Bank. In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities triggering the filing with the
Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Estrada, including petitioner.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and
other persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional released of the
accused. Petitioner filed an MR and was denied because the information was already
filed with the Sandiganbayan, which issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of warrants of arrests for the accused, including petitioner.
Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame for the said charge. Arraignment was set and
petitioner filed a petition for Bail which did not push through. Even before the
Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be declared void because he was denied due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the
law.
RULING:
No. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges against him during
the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary investigations. It
was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to
determine probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. The lack of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed before
the court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to
due process because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the
petitioner. Petitioner has voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas
corpus does not lie because there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the
hearing of the bail cannot be solely pinned upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also
to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to
bail.
208. US v. Toribio – 15 Phil. 85
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of
Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the
respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a
permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was
slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act
prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is
the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a
permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the
municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his
carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for
public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment
of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of
police power.
Ruling: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state. The Supreme court
Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any
place without the permit provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected
which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to
defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of
Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if
ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified,
The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the
use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held
to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an
epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme
Court also said that these animals are vested with public interest for they
are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the
requesites of a valid exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the
inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for
the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general
welfare and public interest.
209. Churchill v. Rafferty – 32 Phil. 580
Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the
advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards
located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon
complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of
the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no
sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals,
or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon
the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided
that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is
otherwise a nuisance.”
Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the Government?
Ruling: The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or
signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not
disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing
a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further
application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a
healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort
and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police
power. Judgment reversed.
210. People v. Fajardo – 104 Phil. 443
Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council
passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that
blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of
permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside
the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly
denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he
needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due
to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the
question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.
Issue: Whether the ordinance constitutional.
Ruling: No. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant
of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely
arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are
unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities
cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and
the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for
urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and
they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
 An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can
not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation
and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The
municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue
permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued.
The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to
the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal
council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set
standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired
within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said
ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority
of sec. 2243 (c)
214 – MUSA
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Balacuit v. CFI – 163 SCRA 182
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969,
“penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay
full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et
al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said
ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for
review. Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for
being oppressive, unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance violates the due process clause.
RULING:
YES. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must
be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or
calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonable interfered with even
by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct,
control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and
lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a
price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence,
the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to
fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away.
215 – MUSA
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil. Vet. Bank
192 SCRA 257
FACTS:
Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three
parcels of land. Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company,
then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among
others, the extinguishing of all the mortgages and liens attaching to the property of
Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process claims against the company to be
administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company
before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba,
Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it.
Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed
by filing another case in the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held
in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree; mainly
violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and
violation of the equal protection clause. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1717 violates the due process clause.
RULING:
YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of the Bill of Rights. So do interests on loans, as well as penalties and
charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply
be taken by law from one person and given to another without compensation and any
known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
Constitution. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and
other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX constitutes taking
without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection
clause.
216 – MUSA
Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC – 238 SCRA 190
FACTS:
On 16 June 1990, private respondent Gina G. Castro was hired on a probationary basis
for six months as a guest relations officer of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, a five-
star hotel located at Malate, Manila, owned by the petitioner. On 10 November 1990,
she was dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the standards set forth in her
probationary employment contract. She then filed on 13 November 1990 with the
Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region of the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal with reinstatement, back wages, and damages against the hotel and its
former general manager, Peter Grieder.
In its resolution of 25 March 1993,11 the NLRC (Second Division) reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that there
was no illegal dismissal but rather a failure of the private respondent to comply with
the petitioner’s standards for permanent employment.
This special civil action of certiorari raises the issue of whether the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
payroll reinstatement of an employee despite its resolution reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and declaring that there was no illegal dismissal. The factual and
procedural antecedents in this case are in the main not disputed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC) acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payroll
reinstatement of an employee despite its resolution reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and declaring that there was no illegal dismissal.
RULING:
YES. NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petition should thus be granted.
The resolution of the issue is found in the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor
Code which reads: “In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal
or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.” In the absence of an order for the issuance of the writ of execution
on the reinstatement aspect, petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to
work the private respondent.—In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a
writ of execution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
the petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to work the private
respondent under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at
the petitioner’s option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll.
217 REYES
Substantive Due Process
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 190
FACTS:
PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City but the reaction of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile which
resulted in the enactment of ordinances to prohibit the issuance of business permit
and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing
to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino and for providing
a penalty therefor.
ISSUE:
Whether such ordinances were valid.
RULING:
No. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that, “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”
In the case at bar, the ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod are invalid
for contravening PD 1869, which authorized casino gambling. The legislature may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute
is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

MAIN POINT:
The national government, through the legislative department, exercises police power
but the same is also delegated, within limits, to local government.
(Hindi ako sure kung paano naging substantive due process ang Magtajas, but I think it
has something to do with governmental powers being restricted/limited since ganun
naman ang guarantee ng Bill of Rights; in this case, since delegated legislative powers
lang meron ang local governments, the ordinances they enact should not contravene
statutes)
218 REYES
Substantive Due Process
Bennis vs. Michigan, No. 94-8729
FACTS:
Tina Bennis and her husband John Bennis were joint owners of an automobile. John
Bennis was arrested by the police after observing him engaged in sexual activity with a
prostitute in the automobile while it was parked. He was convicted of gross indecency.
A Michigan court ordered the automobile forfeited as a public nuisance, with no offset
for Tina Bennis’ interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's
activity.
The gravamen of petitioner's due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an
opportunity to contest the abatement of her car; she was accorded both. Rather, she
claims she was entitled to contest the abatement by showing she did not know her
husband would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law.
ISSUE:
Whether due process of law was denied.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not protect her interest against forfeiture by the government. It has long been settled
that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner to another who
uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due
process clause.
219 REYES
Substantive Due Process
Cruzan vs. Director Missouri No. 88-1503
FACTS:
Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car while driving at nighttime. She was thrown from
the vehicle and landed face-down in a water-filled ditch. Paramedics found her with no
vital signs, but they resuscitated. After three weeks in a coma, she was diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state. Surgeons inserted a feeding tube for her long-
term care. A few years later, Cruzan’s parents asked her doctors to remove her feeding
tube but the hospital refused to do so without a court order, since removal of the tube
would cause Cruzan’s death.
The Cruzans filed for and received a court order for the feeding tube to be removed in
which the trial court ruled that constitutionally, there is a “fundamental natural right
to refuse or direct the withholding or withdrawal of artificial death prolonging
procedures when the person has no more cognitive brain function and there is no
hope of further recovery.” The State of Missouri appealed and the court reversed the
trial court’s decision ruling that no one may refuse treatment for another person,
absent an adequate living will "or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence
absent here. The parents appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Missouri violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
refusing to remove Nancy’s feeding tube.
RULING:
No. The Court found in favor of the Missouri Department of Health and ruled that
nothing in the Constitution prevents the state of Missouri from requiring “clear and
convincing evidence” before terminating life-supporting treatment. The Court ruled
that competent individuals have the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due
Process Clause. However, with incompetent individuals, the Court upheld the state of
Missouri's higher standard for evidence of what the person would want if they were
able to make their own decisions. This higher evidentiary standard was constitutional,
the Court ruled, because family members might not always make decisions that the
incompetent person would have agreed with, and those decisions might lead to
actions (like withdrawing life support) that would be irreversible.
MAIN POINT:
It established that absent a living will or clear and convincing evidence of what the
incompetent person would have wanted, the state's interests in preserving life
outweigh the individual's rights to refuse treatment.
CASE 219 – SABTALUH
CRUZAN VS. DIR. MISSOURI
NOT FOUND 😔
CASE 220-SABTALUH
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. C. CA
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino pursuant to the State power controled the deployment of
female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a
precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.
By contending that the right to overseas employment is a property right within the
meaning of the Constitution, petitioners contends that deprivation thereof allegedly
through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and
constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause
RULING:
No. Professionals leaving for abroad are required pass rigid written and practical exams
before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests
determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has
begun to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing
education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that
these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the
due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable
regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
MAIN POINT: The Artist Record Book (ARB) is a valid regulation under the Police
Power. Due process is not infriged so long as professionals and other workers meet
reasonable regulatory standards.
CASE 221 - SABTALUH
CORONA V. UNITED HARBOUR
FACTS:
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), was organized to control, regulate and supervise
pilots and the pilotage, allegedly violated respondents’ right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process by issuing AO 04-92 which limited the term of
Harbour Pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. The AO 04-92
mandated that aspiring that must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as
probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four
months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are
given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor
pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. The respondents questioned the
validity of this issuance arguing that due process was not observed because no hearing
was conducted and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views.
ISSUE:
Whether PPA-AO 04-92 disregarded the respondent’s right against deprivation of
property without due process of law.
RULING:
No. The respondent contention cannot prosper since the alleged curtailment of due
process arise from the procedural process of the enactment of the AO 04-92. In the
case at bar, respondents question the validity of the aforementioned AO for no less
that four times before finally reaching to the tribunal. Their argument however failed
to persuade the court.
MAIN POINT:
In this case, the contention of the respondent that due process is not observed is not
tenable. The fact that he was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, means that he cannot be said to have been denied of the due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
223. Salinas- Chavez v. Romulo: Substantive Due Process
Facts: PGMA directed PNP Chief to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines.
However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition. He raised the
argument that the PNP guidelines violate the due process clause of the constitution as
the said guidelines deprive petitioner of his most potent, if not his only, means to
defend himself.
Issue: Whether or not the PNP guidelines deprive petitioner of this right without due
process of law
Ruling: No, it did not. In due process claims, the first and foremost consideration must
be whether life, liberty, or property interest exists. Jurisprudence points out that
authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right
and does not create vested right, and that the PTCFOR like ordinary licenses can be
revoked anytime. Therefore, the guidelines of the PNP is not violative of his right.
 224. Salinas Cruz v. Flavier- Substantive Due Process
Facts: Isagani Cruz brought a suit assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
IPRA and its IRR. Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They
argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains
violates the due process clause. They contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the
vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such
communities.
Issue: Whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws.
Ruling: No, no violation has been made. The “property rights” referred to in Section 56
belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous
peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership
of these “property rights.” The IPRA thus recognizes and respects “vested rights”
regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where
the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. What IPRA only
requires is that these “property rights” already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
225. Salinas- Smith Kline v. CA: Substantive Due Process
Facts: private respondent filed with the BPTTT a petition for compulsory license to
manufacture and produce its own brand of medicines using Cimetidine. The BPTTT
granted the petition. Thereafter herein petitioner assailed the decision of the BPTTT on
the ground that the rate of royalties payable to petitioner as fixed by the BPTTT was
rendered without factual basis and amounts to an expropriation of private property
without just compensation.
Issue: Whether the grant of a compulsory license to private respondent results in the
deprivation of petitioner’s property without just compensation.
Ruling: No, it must be pointed out that as owner of Letters Patent No. 12207,
petitioner had already enjoyed exclusive rights to manufacture, use and sell Cimetidine
for at least two years from its grant in November, 1978. Even if other entities like
private respondent are subsequently allowed to manufacture, use and sell the
patented invention by virtue of a compulsory license, petitioner as owner of the patent
would still receive remuneration for the use of such product in the form of royalties.
226. SALVADOR
Substantive Due Process
Parreño v. COA
Facts: P.D. 1638 was enacted which states that a military personnel must not lose his
Filipino citizenship for him to remain in the AFP retired list and receive his retirement
benefit. The petitioner claims that such P.D is violative of his vested and that it
contrary to public policy and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative to the
right of due process.
Issue: Whether P.D. 1638 impairs vested rights to the benefits that is protected by the
due process clause.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that P.D 1638 does not impair any vested right or interest
of petitioner. Since, at the time of approval of it the petitioner was still in active
service. Hence, petitioner's retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not
constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an
employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the
nature of employment, age, and length of service. There was no denial of due process
since the petitioner had the opportunity to contest the termination.
Main point: The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but
is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane tot
he purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d0 must
apply equally to each member of the class.
227. SALVADOR
Substantive Due Process
Espinocilla v. Bagong Tanyag
Facts: The BATAHAI was incorporated to enable the occupants of the land. Petitioners
alleged that respondents subdivided the lots which they have been occupying since
1987 without their knowledge and consent, reassigned the lots without observing due
process of law, omitted or deleted their names from the certified list of prospective
beneficiaries, and unlawfully replaced three BATAHAI directors.
Issue: Whether petitioners were deprived of due process
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when
no vested right has been acquired. The period during which petitioners occupied the
lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to claim ownership since it is
fundamental principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of
license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the
period of acquisitive prescription. The records of the case show that petitioners had
had more than sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before they were delisted
as prospective beneficiaries.
Main point: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard.
228. SALVADOR
Substantive Due Process
BF v. City Mayor
Facts: Petitioners invoke Presidential Decree No. 957 and maintain that it intended
primarily to protect the buyers and to ensure that subdivision developers keep their
promises and representations. Petitioners allege that one of the promises of the
developer of BF Homes Parañaque is that the property shall be used for residential
purposes only. Petitioners assert that the reclassification of certain portions of BF
Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it
impairs the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot
buyers.
Issue: Whether the claims of petitioners are valid.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that he constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. such ordinance is reasonable and not
discriminating or oppressive. The increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes
necessitated the addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to service the need of
the homeowners.
Main point: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard. Equal protection erects no shield against private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
CASE NO. 229– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Substantive Due Process
St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s Association vs. NLRC
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992.” Said law
requires that no person shall practice as a radiology or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines without having obtained the proper license. Maribel Santos is an X-Ray
Technician in St. Luke’s Medical Center without a license. Pursuant to the law, HR and
the department head ordered all currently employed persons who are covered by said
law to pass the necessary documents and if they do not comply, they will be
terminated. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal dismissal.
She contends that her failure to pass the board licensure exam did not constitute just
cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to substantive due process
through security of tenure.
Issue:
Whether substantive due process was violated?
Ruling:
No. The dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate of registration from
Board of Radiologic Technology. While the right of workers to security of tenure is
guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to
the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.
Main Point:
The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians
and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens.
CASE NO. 230– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Substantive Due Process
Carlos Superdrug Corp vs. DSWD
Facts:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines. RA 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003”
was enacted which states that senior citizens shall be given 20% discount in hotels,
restaurants, recreation centers, purchases in medicine, and funeral and burial services
of said senior citizens. Petitioners assert that the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling owners of establishments to
the discounts that will result in a loss of profit. They further alleged that government
failed to provide for a scheme that will just compensate them for the discount.
Issue:
Whether substantive due process through right to private property was violated?
Ruling:
No. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object; When the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Main Point:
The state may practice police power which deprives property rights if general welfare
so demands.
CASE NO. 231– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Substantive Due Process
Perez vs. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines
Facts:
The LPGR Association assailed the circular of the Department of Energy (DOE). They
argued that the circular included new crimes and added penalties in BP 33. The circular
states that penalties for those who commit crimes in relation to BP 33 will be penalized
per cylinder. The lower court agreed that the circular added new crimes not initially
listed in BP 33 but nonetheless held the arguments of respondents untenable because
the penalties are not confiscatory.
Issue:
Whether substantive due process was violated?
Ruling:
No. The SC held that the added penalties by the circular were indeed not confiscatory.
They further stated that to provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited
act therein, regardless of the number of cylinders involved, would result in an
indiscriminate, oppressive, and impractical operation of BP 33. Thus, it is a valid
exercise of the state’s police power if general welfare so demands.
Main Point:
For substantive due process to be violated, it requires that the state must have outrun
the bounds of reason and result in oppression.
237-baird
substantive due process in topic
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.EVANGELINE SITON
FACTS ; Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with
vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal CodeIn the instant case, the
assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support. Instead of
submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to
Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and
overbroad. claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2),
apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since
the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise
performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated
the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the
poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. On
July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition
ISSUE ; Whether the court a quo erred in declaring article 202 unconstituitional
RULING ; Yes, Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does
it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws
are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license
or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
MAINPOINT ; It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.
It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same.
238
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Mayor Lim signed into law the Ordinance barring the operation of motels and
inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area contending that The
lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering
"wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of
life, liberty, or property.
RULING: No, Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face
of the norms of due process of liberty.
MAIN POINT: The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property
is concerned.
239
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
CREBA v. Romulo 614 SCRA 605
FACTS: Petitioner assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income
tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real
properties classified as ordinary assets.
Petitioner also asserts that the enumerated provisions of the subject
revenue regulations violate the due process clause because, like the MCIT, the
government collects income tax even when the net income has not yet been
determined. They contravene the equal protection clause as well because the CWT is
being levied upon real estate enterprises but not on other business enterprises, more
particularly those in the manufacturing sector.
ISSUE: Whether MCIT Is Violative of Due Process
RULING: No, The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "[no]
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." In
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, et al.,38 we held that the due process clause may properly be
invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a revenue measure39 when it amounts to a
confiscation of property.40 But in the same case, we also explained that we will not
strike down a revenue measure as unconstitutional (for being violative of the due
process clause) on the mere allegation of arbitrariness by the taxpayer.41 There must
be a factual foundation to such an unconstitutional taint.42 This merely adheres to the
authoritative doctrine that, where the due process clause is invoked, considering that
it is not a fixed rule but rather a broad standard, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character.
MAIN POINT: The power to tax is plenary and unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
its very nature no limits, so that the principal check against its abuse is to be found
only in the responsibility of the legislature (which imposes the tax) to its constituency
who are to pay it.
240
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Southern Hemisphere v. ATC 632 SCRA 146
FACTS: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on
March 6, 2007.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective
jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9372 “ Human security act of 2007 is unconstitutional
RULING: No, As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge
nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis
of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a
statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
MAIN POINT: A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.
Case No. 241 – Cruz
Substantive Due Process
Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211
Main Point: The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition. The doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
Facts: Petitoiner Roxas was detained for allegedly being a member of the NPA. She was
tortured for 5 days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was
released and was given a cellular phone. She was sternly warned not to report the
incident. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell
phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and filed a petition for
the issuance of a writ of amparo and habeas data against several government officials
including former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and former Defense Secretary
Gilbert Teodoro, on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture.
Issue: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo
petition
Ruling: No. The court held that since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
Case No. 241 – Cruz
Substantive Due Process
Meralco v. Lim 632 SCRA 195
Main Point: An employee’s plea that she be spared from complying with her
employer’s Memorandum directing her reassignment under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data. The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to
protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual – it is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse
in this age of information technology.
Facts: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim,
an administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns
over her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of
her due process. She filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to
meralco’s omission of providing her with details about the report of the letter. To her,
this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the
data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the
petition wasn’t in order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the SC, Meralco petitioned
that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home
Issue: Whether Habeas Data is the proper remedy for Lim
Ruling: Yes. Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a
quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data.
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a
response to killings and enforced disappearances. In Castillo v Cruz, and habeas data
will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the
letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related
due to references to “real intent of management”.
Case No. 241 – Cruz
Substantive Due Process
Pollo v. Karina Constantino. GR 181881, October 8, 2011
Main Point: A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will.
Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter
complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The
respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all
the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The petitioner was dismissed from service. Peittioner was charged of violating R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He
assailed the formal charge and filed a motion assailing the formal charge as without
basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
Issue: Whether the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner
constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of
the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
CASE NO. 244
Art. III, Sec. 1. U. Substantive Due Process
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245
MAINPOINT:
The State under its police power “may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment
will secure or tend secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against
the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud, hence
it is not a violation of substantive due process.
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042) which sets the Government’s
policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in
distress. Petitioner contended the constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30 of the Act
which commanded the DOLE to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the
business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and
phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
ISSUE:
Whether RA No. 8042 violates substantive due process.
RULING:
No. As the Court held in People v. Ventura, 4 SCRA 208 (1962), the State under its
police power “may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.” Police power is “that
inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”
CASE NO. 245
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
People v. Cayat – 68 PHIL. 12, 18
MAINPOINT: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification.
FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member
of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No.
1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor,
which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines
who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process
clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act. 1639 violates due process clause.
RULING:
No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
“accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to
religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.”This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the
Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and
among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from
perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality
of its application.
CASE NO. 246
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
Ichong v. Hernandez – 101 PHIL. 1155
MAINPOINT:
The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1180 known as, “An Act to Regulate Retail Business” was passed by
the Congress which nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against
persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S.
citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are required to present registration to the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses.
Now, petitioner Lao Ichong, was a Chinese businessman in the markets of Pasay City
who seeks to declare the nullification of RA 1180 for it violates the international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. The said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. He contends
that RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 1180 violates due process of law.
RULING:
No. A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the
Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay City market.
247. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho – 86 SCRA 270
Facts: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being
employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying
the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who
was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such
ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.
Issue: Whether the said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution.
Ruling: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due
process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who
may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens
within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
248. Dumlao v. COMELEC – 96 SCRA 392
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired
elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of
retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act
of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any
of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity
therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the
Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
Ruling: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP
Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class
can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65
years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose
of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In
regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as
both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person
disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence,
and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger"
that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent
one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be
aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as
the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two
government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of
only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52
which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is
hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.
249. Goesart v. Cleary - 335 US 464
Facts: A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities
with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a
woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter
of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders
challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim.
Issue: Whether the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access
to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Ruling: No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court
concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing
a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting
social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the
latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature,
in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to
bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may
devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in
no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind
of Michigan legislators."
CASE NO. 253
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
Himagan v. People – 237 SCRA 538
MAINPOINT:
The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection clause.
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension to be limited to (90)
ninety days relying on the ruling in Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan and Layno vs.
Sandiganbayan. He was suspended because of he is charged with murder and
attempted murder under RPC falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which applies to
members of the PNP. He contended that suspension more than 90 days is contrary to
CS Law and a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s right to equal protection of the laws is violated.
RULING:
No. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing
that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The
first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within
which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the
mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days",
there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the
accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal8 or civil liability.
CASE NO. 254
Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
Mainpoint:
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the
subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring
petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian,
respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce
“all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence,
such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him
from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of
the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with
his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner contended that Ombudsman cannot order them to produce documents
relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that
such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on
the ground that “knowledge of EIIB’s documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla will necessarily lead knowledge of its operations, movements, targets,
strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being” and this could “destroy the EIIB.
RULING:
Nor is there violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners complain that “in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their
identities fully disclosed,” while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and
in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.31
On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who
cannot afford to hire lawyers.32 Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, G.R. No. 95367
May 23, 1995.
CASE NO. 255
Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
FACTS:
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected
by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.Petitioners challenge the validity of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: “Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio
and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free
of charge, during the period of campaign.” Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of
the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines
with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of
charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
No. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege
may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising
radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing
and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air
time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
253 – MUSA
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Himagan v. People – 237 SCRA 538
FACTS:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for
the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was
placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the
filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one
(1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed
the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be
a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
RULING:
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of
the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and
the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his
case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under
Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.
254 – MUSA
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286
FACTS:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and
Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from
enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued
by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter
alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the
EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman’s investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter
violate the equal protection clause.
RULING:
NO. There is violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners complain that “in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their
identities fully disclosed,” while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form
and in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who
cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
255 – MUSA
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337
FACTS:
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected
by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on
the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC
to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for
one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view
of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for
COMELEC Time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use
them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment
of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
The constitutional qualification that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation” is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse
and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to
be enforced.
256 REYES
The Equal Protection Clause
Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410
FACTS:
RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other
productive uses. Section 12 thereof grants special privileges to certain
cities/municipalities. EO 97 was issued which provides for the tax and duty-free
importations to be applied only to businesses and residents within the “secured area”
of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the
Zone but outside such “fenced-in” territory.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 97 violates the equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
No. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
In the case at bar, the Constitution does not require absolute equality among
residents. The real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the
US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage
investors, both local and foreign.
MAIN POINT:
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
257 REYES
The Equal Protection Clause
Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132274
FACTS:
Petitioners contend that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its classification of persons running for
office is not a valid classification. They contend that the classification in Section 67 is
not based on substantial distinctions and, thus, violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, asserts that the classification embodied in Section
67 is reasonable and based on substantial distinction. It points out that incumbents
running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of the
law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in
the delivery of essential services. Those running for different positions are considered
resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their present position by
their act of running for other posts.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code violates the equal protection clause.
RULING: No. Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut
short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application
of Section 67 is covered by the term “voluntary renunciation.” This statutory provision
seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging
them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by
making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
former position.
258 REYES
The Equal Protection Clause
De Guzman vs. COMELEC 336 SCRA 188
FACTS:
Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause
because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as
prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than 4 years.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
No. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The singling out of election officers in order to ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place
of assignment does not violate the equal protection clause. The guarantee of security
of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the
employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss.
MAIN POINT:
The legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of “all or
none”—under-inclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification.
262. Salinas - International School v. Quisumbing: Equal Protection Clause
FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires
including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance
and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic
disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its
claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here
that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered
by foreign-hires and local-hires.
263. Salinas- Central Bank Employees v. BSP: Equal Protection Clause
Facts: The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. Thereafter, other Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also
amended their charters. After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’
charters, BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against
the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank Act which
provides for the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees
with salary grade of 19 and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under
19. They alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid “class legislation”. They
contend that the said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the officers
of the BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are exempted from the SSL ,
those belonging from 19 and up and those 19 below do not really differ from one other
in terms of the nature of work and expertise and lasty, other GFIs, which are the same
as the BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.
Issue: Whether or not the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal
protection clause.
Ruling: Yes, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause. The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter resulted to the
oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-
and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that
as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The
distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and
the seven other GFIs. The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other
GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from
SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
264. Salinas Yrasuegui v. PAL: Equal Protection Clause
Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein respondent.
Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of
the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed. Petitioner
invokes the equal protection clause guarantee of the Constitution
Issue: Whether or not invocation of the equal protection clause is proper
Ruling: No, the claim is not proper. The court ruled that in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th
Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in
saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate
the equal protection guarantee.
265. SALVADOR
The Equal Protection of the Laws
Ycasuegi v. PAL
Facts: Petitioner was a cabin crew of PAL. He was given the time to lose weight in
order to be able to achieve the weight requirement of being a crew member in PAL.
However, after a given time, instead of his weight going down he gained weight.
Therefore, he was dismissed from his employment due to being obesity, since it was
indicated in the employee requirement of PAL to maintain a certain weight. The
petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty.
Issue: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. Also, in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.
Main point: Equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.
266. SALVADOR
Scope of the Protection
SJS v. Atienza
Facts: The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they
have invested billions of pesos in the depot. Its forced closure would result in huge
losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. Essentially, the
oil companies are fighting for their right to property
Issue: Whether the ordinance resulted to discrimination.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that an ordinance based on reasonable classification does
not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. Thus, in the
exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. The restriction
imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not taking. It is merely
the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights
of the public.
Main point: The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
267. SALVADOR
Scope of the Protection
Gobenciong v. CA
Facts: Gobenciong parlays the theory that the application of RA 6770, which authorizes
the OMB to impose a 6-month preventive suspension, instead of the civil service
provisions of the Administrative Code, which limits the disciplining authority's
prerogative to only imposing a prevention for suspension for a period not exceeding 90
days, violates the equal protection guarantee.
Issue: Whether there is a violation of the equal protection of law.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that the fundamental guarantee of equal protection is not
breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that there is a
substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Main point: The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.
CASE NO. 268– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Equal Protection of Laws
Nicolas vs. Romulo
Facts:
Daniel Smith, a USAF, was charged with the rape of Suzette Nicolas, a 22-year-old
Filipino in Subic Bay, Olangapo City. He was imprisoned in Makati Jail but was
transferred to the US Embassy building as per the VFA agreement. Nicolas now files for
a petition for certiorari claiming that VFA is unconstitutional for decreasing the
jurisdiction of the Philippines and that it violates the equal protection clause because it
unreasonably exempts the USAF from detainment in local jails.
Issue:
Whether the equal protection of laws is violated?
Ruling:
No. There is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory. The rule in international law is
that foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
Main Point:
The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. Classification can
be made for as long as it reasonable.
CASE NO. 269– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Equal Protection of Laws
League of Cities vs. COMELEC
Facts:
57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed
before the HoR. However, Congress did not act on the 24 out of the 57 municipalities.
RA 9009 was enacted revising the Local Government Code by increasing the income
requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to
P100 million locally generated income. 16 of the 24 municipalities filed their individual
cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the
16 from the new income requirement. Petitioners filed to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether the equal protection of laws was violated?
Ruling:
No. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and
acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. Also, the petitioners
being juridical persons, can only invoke the equal protection clause insofar as their
property is concerned and cannot invoke further as to arbitrariness, undue favor, or
hostile discrimination.
Main Point:
A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation of equal protection of laws only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. A law need not operate with equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 270– Tan
Article III, Sec. 1: Equal Protection of Laws
Quinto vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners assail Section 4 of Resolution 8678 of the COMELEC. They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. The
provision states that “Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling
of his certificate of candidacy “. It being discriminatory and violates the equal
protection of laws.
Issue:
Whether the equal protection of laws was violated?
Ruling:
No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an
appointing authority.
Main Point:
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute but is subject
to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
different from the other.
274. League V COMELEC-BAIRD
FACTS ; These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by
the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the 16 laws, each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.In
the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions
and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6,
Article X, and the equal protection clause. The petitioners argue that there is no
substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
ISSUE; Whether cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause
RULING; No, Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other
was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may
clause.As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The
permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted.
(4) applies equally to all members of the same class. Verily, the determination of the
existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not MAINPOINT;
simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the
Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the
respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose people without violating the equal protection clause. It must be based on substantial
of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC. distinctions,It must be germane to the purposes of the law.It must not be limited to
existing conditions only.It must apply equally to all members of the
MAINPOINT; The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
276. Gangayco V Quezon City –BAIRD
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law,
FACTS;
not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC. Congress, by enacting the
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
land located at EDSA, Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters. On 1956, the
become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the
Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of
Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones. An
their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood
arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first-floor projecting over the
up to the present.
sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or
sun. The ordinance covered the property of Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in
1965, Gancayco sought the exemption of a 2 storey building being constructed on his
275. PAGCOR V BIR-BAIRD
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from
constructing an arcade on his property. On 1966, the City Council acted favorably
FACTS; PAGCOR was created pursuant to P.D. No. 1067-A on January 1, 1977.
on Gancayco’s request. Decades after, in 2003, the MMDA conducted operations to
Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B was issued exempting PAGCOR from the
clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City. Gancayco did not comply
payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the gross
with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the 15 days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish
revenue. hereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope of
the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor
PAGCOR's exemption. PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through
structure. On 29 May 2003, Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary
P.D. No. 1931, but it was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City,
issued in September 1984.On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424, otherwise known as
he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424
process of law. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the
provides that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, except petitioner PAGCOR, the
payment of damages. The RTC rendered its Decision on September 2003 in favor
Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the SSS, the Philippine Health
of Gancayco.It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, The MMDA
Insurance Corporation, and the PCSO. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24,
thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the CA partly
2005, certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended.
granted the appeal. The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the
The particular amendment that is at issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance.
which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by
ISSUE;
excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from payment of
Whether Ordinance no. 2904 is unconstitutional as it takes personal
corporate income tax. Different groups came to this Court via petitions
property without the due process of law
for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No.
HELD;
9337 contending that it is violative of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, or the
No, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
ISSUE; Whether ra 9337, section 1 is null and void ab initio for being repugnant to the
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. In the case at bar, it is
equal protection clause
clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the
questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety
RULING; No, Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the
of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement
classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the
of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades
people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an
provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the
pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the
exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that
contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. PAGCOR cannot find support in the
zone along EDSA.
equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral
Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means,
show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as provided in
Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not
MAINPOINT; When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
277
Equal Protection of the Laws
Mendoza v. People, GR 183891, October 19, 2011
FACTS:
RA No. 9903 creates two classifications of employers delinquent in
remitting the SSS contributions of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers
who pay within the six (6)-month period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent
employers who pay outside of this availment period (the latter group). The creation of
these two classes is obvious and unavoidable when Section 2 and the last proviso of
Section 48 of the law are read together. The same provisions show the law’s intent to
limit the benefit of condonation to the former group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise
intended to benefit the latter group, which includes the petitioner, it would have
expressly declared so. Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on
the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly construed
against the applicants.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled under the equal protection clause to the
dismissal of the case against him
RULING:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
CONCLUSION: The equal protection clause guarantee, simply means "that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
278
Equal Protection of the Laws
Bureau of Customs v. Teves, GR 181704, December 6, 2011
FACTS: RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board).
Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria
and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose revenue
collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9335, and its IRR are unconstitutional as these violate the right of
bir and boc officials and employees to the equal protection of the laws
RULING: No, the equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With
respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the
law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
CONCLUSION:
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the
state’s duly constituted authorities.
279
Equal Protection of the Laws
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (supra)
FACTS:
E.O. No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the
Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",
President Arroyo issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection
clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
RULING: No, The equal protection clause is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated
differently from each other.
CONCLUSION:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
Case No. 280– Cruz
Equal Protection of Laws
Alvarez v. People
677 SCRA 673
Main Point: The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an
erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the
statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Facts: The Mayor of the Municipality of Munoz, Nueva Ecija was found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for awarding to
Australian-Professional, Inc. (API) the contract for the construction of the Wag-Wag
Shopping Mall under the BOT scheme despite the fact that it was not a licensed
contractor and does not have the experience and financial qualifications to undertake
such costly project, among others, to the damage and prejudice of the public service.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan disregarded the right of Mayor Alvarez to the equal
protection of the laws when he alone among the numerous persons who approved and
implemented the unsolicited proposal was charged, tried, and convicted.
Ruling: No. It bears stressing that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is
handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of
other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused. But more
importantly, petitioner failed to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose in prosecuting
him alone despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the Sangguniang Bayan "has
conspired if not abetted all the actions of the Accused in all his dealings with API to the
damage and prejudice of the municipality" and said court’s declaration that "this is one
case where the Ombudsman should have included the entire Municipal Council in the
information.
Case No. 281 – Cruz
Equal Protection of Laws
Garcia v. People
677 SCRA 750
Main Point: The application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly-constituted authorities.
Facts: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was convicted of
violation of the 96th and 97th Articles of War for failing to disclose all his assets in his
Sworn SALN. Garcia argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President
directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served
following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC. Hence, a week
after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was
arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum
security. The Office of the Solicitor General stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not
applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts. The
Court found such argument by OSG unmeritorious as Article 29 of the RPC is deemed
to be applicable in the present case.
Issue: Whether the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the
Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.”

Case No. 282 – Cruz
Equal Protection of Laws
Arroyo v. DOJ
Main Point: Since the Comelec is granted plenary investigatory powers by the
Constitution, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself
be considered a violation of any of the parties’ rights to the equal protection of the
laws.
Facts: The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 & 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In
its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in
the 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), among others to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC
en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information for the crime of electoral
sabotage be filed against GMA and company while that the charges against Jose
Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Joint Order creating the COMELEC-DOJ Join Panel is violative of the
equal protection clause
Ruling: No. Petitioners’ main argument is that the Joint Panel’s sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the
Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public
officials linked thereto. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to
preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there
were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the
performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee. The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent
undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression
based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does
not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
CASE NO. 244
Art. III, Sec. 1. The Equal Protection of the Laws
Republic v. Daisy Yahon, GR No. 201043, 726 SCRA 437
MAINPOINT:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, hence does not
violate the equal protection of the laws.
FACTS:
Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon, an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006.
A Temporary Protection Order was issued by RTC which include that the husband must
provide for financial spousal support. An order was issued which directs the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as
spousal support, however the AFPFC contented that RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of
summons, and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law (P.D.) No. 1638 governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 9262 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not
violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon, the issue of constitutionality
was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to
enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We
ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the
classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
CASE NO. 284
Art. III, Sec. 2. Scope of Protection
Moncada v. People’s Court, 80 PHIL 1
MAINPOINT:
The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1180 known as, “An Act to Regulate Retail Business” was passed by
the Congress which nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against
persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S.
citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are required to present registration to the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses.
Now, petitioner Lao Ichong, was a Chinese businessman in the markets of Pasay City
who seeks to declare the nullification of RA 1180 for it violates the international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. The said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. He contends
that RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 1180 violates due process of law.
RULING:
No. A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the
Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay City market.
CASE NO. 285
Art. III, Sec. 2. Scope of Protection
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
MAINPOINT:
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. Protection of due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
FACTS:
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila
and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a
citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged
in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said
ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional It is a revenue measure. The city
ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be
employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true
that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires
the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines
to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is
not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the
issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
286. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
Facts: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized
in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the
corporation.
Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.
287. People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57
Fact: In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to
a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the
name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052
Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view
of appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, He made an
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents
thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the NBI and informed the them that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the
Reyes’ office at Ermita. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise
opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects .
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate
the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?
Held: No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would
result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection.
288. Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, GR 113271, Oct 16, 1997
Facts:Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.YSP
Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren
Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the
price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the
discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid
to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.Catolico
denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to
Catolico.Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of
dishonesty.NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP)
being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants. In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidenceHeld: Yes.
The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the
SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from
employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for
the termination of Employment.
289.LIM
PEOPLE v. OCTAVIO MENDOZA Y LANDICHO, GR No. 109279-80, 1999-01-18
Main Point: The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such rights applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies. Citing People vs.
Marti.
Facts: On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to
death. The trial court found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was
separately charge with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under two Informations. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges,
whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced, following which, a judgment of
conviction was rendered.
But accused-appellant claims that these documents (which was found by his father-in-
law) were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issues: Whether there was a breach of Mendoza’s right against unreasonable search
and seizure pertaining to the crime of illegal possession of firearms
Ruling: NO, In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were
discovered by accused-appellant's father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen.
Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies. The constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person
from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellant's claim that he was licensed and authorized to
carry a .45 caliber pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief,
Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated
December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed fiream holder of
any kind.
290. LIM
People vs Bongcarawan G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002
Main Point: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
FACTS: Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland
passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m.
on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its
security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing
jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to
search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily
searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to
the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened
the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel
immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused
beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction was valid
RULING: YES. In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside
the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any governmental function.
291.LIM
Henry v. US 361 US 98
Main Point: An arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search discloses. Under
our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better,
so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens
be subject to easy arrest. There is still the need for probable cause.
Facts: Without a warrant for search or arrest, federal officers who were investigating a
theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey twice observed cartons being placed in a
motor car in a residential district, followed and stopped the car, arrested petitioner
and another man who were in it, searched the car, and found and seized cartons
containing radios stolen from an interstate shipment. At petitioner's trial for unlawfully
possessing radios stolen from an interstate shipment, his timely motion to suppress
the evidence so seized was overruled, and he was convicted.
Issues: Whether there was probable cause
Ruling: No. On the record in this case, the officers did not have probable cause for the
arrest when they stopped the car; the search was illegal; the articles seized were not
admissible in evidence; and the conviction is
The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that the particular package carried
by the citizen is contraband. Its shape and design might at times be adequate. The
weight of it and the manner in which it is carried might at times be enough. But there
was nothing to indicate that the cartons here in issue probably contained liquor.
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. Carroll v. United
States, supra, liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is
involved. But that decision merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on grounds
of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable cause.
292 MUSA
People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil 667
FACTS:
Narciso Mendiola, agent of BIR, filed for a search warrant based on the information
from a reliable source alleging that certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or
records were being kept in the Building No. 482 in Binondo, Manila occupied by
Santiago Sy Juco. CFI Manila through Judge Albert issued a search warrant directing
peace officers to seize the above-stated articles. After making the required search the
officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by
Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and
papers belonging to his clients.
Remo filed a petition in CFI Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and
his agents be prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff
of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said property in the
meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is
null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the search warrant was valid.
RULING:
No. The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the
appellant attorney on the ground that he is not the person against whom it had been
sought. It is Santiago Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be used,
because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much so that Narciso Mendiola,
who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in his
report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue and at the trial of this
case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the premises
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an investigation was then pending against him,
for having defrauded the Government in its public revenue.
MAIN POINT:
The oath required must be such that it constitutes a guaranty that the person taking it
has personal knowledge of the facts of the case and that it convinces the committing
magistrate, not the individual seeking the issuance of the warrant or the person
making the averment by hearsay, of the existence of the requisite of probable cause,
and by probable cause are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant, that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to
rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof. The true test of the sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant the issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon in case the allegations contained
therein prove false.
293 MUSA
Alvarez v. CFI , 64 Phil 33
FACTS: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a
sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits,
lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law.
Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on
his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source.
Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents
namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts,
etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the
judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared
guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because
the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they
be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the
judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed
that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury
Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause to issue a valid search warrant.
RULING:
No. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made,
and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to
attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively
upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
MAIN POINT:
The oath required must refer to the truth. of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon.
294 MUSA
Webb v. De Leon, GR 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department
of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne
Marie Jennifer in their home in 1991. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de
Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them, hence the warrant of arrest is invalid
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
MAIN POINT:
In determining probable cause, facts and circumstances are weighed without resorting
to technical rules of evidence, but rather based on common sense which all reasonable
men have. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
295 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Probable Cause for Search
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
FACTS:
A search warrant for the newspaper WE Forum is issued on the basis of a broad
statement of the military that Burgos, Jr. “is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion.”
ISSUE: Whether such allegation is sufficient to establish probable cause.
RULING: No. The Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized. A search warrant against a publisher must particularize the
alleged criminal or subversive material to be seized. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish.
In the case at bar, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Probable
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Hence, the
search warrant is null and void.
MAIN POINT: Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
296 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Probable Cause for Search
Prudente vs. Dayrit
FACTS: P/Major Dimagmaliw filed with the RTC of Manila presided by Judge Dayrit the
issuance of a search warrant against Prudente for violation of PD 1866 or illegal
possession of firearms. Prudente assails the validity of the search warrant on the
ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not
within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay
evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant was valid.
RULING:
No. The applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant. One
of the requisites for a valid search warrant is probable cause. This has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In this case, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that “he has been informed” that
Nemesio Prudente “has in his control and possession” the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he “has verified the report and found it to be a fact.” On
the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as
a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they “gathered informations
from verified sources” that the holders of the said firearms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing
the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
MAIN POINT:
Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
297 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Probable Cause for Search
United States vs. Jones
FACTS:
A joint Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Metropolitan Police Department task
force began investigating defendant Jones for alleged drug trafficking. During the
course of investigation, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device was installed on
Jones’ Jeep Grand Cherokee without a valid warrant. This device tracked the vehicle's
movements 24 hours a day for four weeks. The FBI subsequently arrested Jones. Jones
was tried and found guilty. Upon appeal, he argued that his conviction should . be
overturned because the use of the GPS tracker violated the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless attachment of a GPS device on a person’s car and use of that
device to monitor that car’s movements on public streets violate the Fourth
Amendment.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that installing a Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle and using the device to monitor the vehicle's
movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. By physically installing
the GPS device on the defendant's car, the police had committed a trespass against
Jones’ “personal effects” – this trespass, in an attempt to obtain information,
constituted a search per se and violated his right under the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable search and seizure.
CASE NO. 298 – SABTALUH
WHO DETERMINES PROBABLE CAUSE
PEOPLE V. CA, (GR 126005, JAN 21, 1999)
FACTS: Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an information for murder in connection with
the fatal shooting of rosalinda Dy. The information was ammended to include Billy
cerbo as one of the accused and a warrand for his arrest was issued. Respondent
judge dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence and recalled the warrant issues
and ordered the prosecution to withdraw its ammended information and to file a new
one charging jonathan cerbo only. The CA affirmed that the RTC has authority to
reverse prosecutors finding of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming that RTC has authority to reverse
prosecutors finding of probable cause.
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause to hold a person liable for trial is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. Its
correctness is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not compelled to
pass upon.
MAINPOINT:
If the information filed is valid in its face the court should not dismiss it for want of
evidence because evidentiary matters should be heard and presented during trial.
CASE NO. 299 SABTALUH
KIND OF EVIDENCE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
MICROSOFT V. MAXICORP
FACTS:
Maxicorp was charged with copyright infringement. To support these charges,
petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician
Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian and a sales receipt was also presented by Agent Samiano as
proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp in the name of a certain “Joel
Diaz”. Armed with search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of maxicorps
premises and seized property described in the serach warrants. Maxicorp alleged that
there was no probable cause in the issuance of warrants. CA grant the petition of
Maxicorp.
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants.
RULING: Yes. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano
presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, Sacriz,
who was present when Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI
Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit. even if we disregard the sales receipt
issued in the name of “Joel Diaz,” which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent
Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
MAINPOINT: Testimonies of two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence are sufficient proof to establish the existence of probable cause.
 CASE NO. 300 – SABTALUH
PROBABLE CAUSE
NALA V. BARROSO, {GR 153087 AUG. 7, 2003}
FACTS:
PO3 Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence
of the petitioner Bernard R. Nala in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal
possession of Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel
Nalagon, respondent judge of RTC of Malaybalay City issued Search and Seizure
warrant against Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4,
Poblacion, Kitaaotao, Bukidnon. Several firearms not stated in the warrant was seized.
petitioner filed a Motion seeking to Quash Search and Seizure Warrant. The
respondent Judge denied the said Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air
rifle to the petitioner. Respondent stated that there was probable cause which was
duly established from the deposition and examination of the witness and the
testimony of Alcose
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a search and
seizure warrant against the petitioner.
RULING: No, the affidavit and testimony of the witness and PO3 Alcoser failed to
establish the existence of probable cause. While Alcoser testified before the
respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed,
this does not qualify as “personal knowledge” but only “personal belief” because
neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from the
appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm.
MAINPOINT:
Personal knowledge of petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions
and explosive is required to prove the existence of probable cause that petitioner had
no license to possess a firearm.
301. SALINAS
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause in general
Betoy v. Judge Mamerto Coliflores
Facts: Betoy charged Judge Mamerto Coliflores with gross negligence for allegedly
issuing a search warrant wherein the latter solely relies on the mere affidavits of
deponents police officers which should be considered hearsay and not information
personally known to the responding judge as required by settled jurisprudence
through examination with probing and exhaustive questions of witnesses in
determining probable cause in order for the Honorable Judge to prevent arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the Search Warrant.
Issue: Whether Judge Mamerto issued the search warrant with probable cause
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must
take his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. In this case,
respondent judge failed to ask follow-up questions on the circumstances surrounding
the possession of illegal firearms and ammunition by complainants and two others
during the examination.
Main point: PROBABLE CAUSE - facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of
the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
302. SALINAS
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause in general
20th Century Fox v. CA
Facts: Petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the government's anti-
film piracy campaign. Together with NBI they conducted surveillance and investigation
and subsequently filed 3 search warrants. However, upon the act of motion to lift the
search warrants by the respondents the court a quo lifted the 3 search warrants that it
issued.
Issue: Whether the search warrants were properly lifted.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that they find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the court a quo when it lifted the search warrants. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter
of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by respondents.
Thus, to say that the problem of pirated films can be solved by the use of
unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long history and experience behind the
searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights.
Main point: Probable cause for a valid search warrant are such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
303. SALINAS
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause in general
Columbia Pictures
Facts: Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that private
respondent had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising materials
and other items used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition. VRB filed a verified Application for Search
Warrant dated and was granted. Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that the Search Warrant did not state a specific
offense. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant
was issued for one specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the
same was likewise denied. Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the
Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized Articles alleging that Search Warrant
is a general warrant, and that it was issued without probable cause. The RTC granted
the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized articles to private
respondent. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said
Order in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Search Warrant is validly issued
Ruling: Yes. The requirements of a search warrant to be valid is stated in Sec. 3 which
states: “A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible officer
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.” Herein case, Judge Flor observed all the requirements
necessary before the search warrant was issued: he heard the testimonies and studied
the depositions of the witnesses for the petitioners. Therefore, issuance is valid.
Main point: A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible
officer authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized
304. SALVADOR
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause personally determined by the judge
Lacer vs. Villanueva
Facts: Petitioners filed for a warrant of arrest order; respondent Judge Villanueva
required the petitioners to submit affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his
power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Upon
submission of the requirements, Judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to
petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders and to compel Judge to
issue the warrants.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of warrant of arrest is valid.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information the
judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification an require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause.
Main point: The issuance of a warrant is not a ministerial function; it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. The judge has the
power to order outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the
affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit.
305. SALVADOR
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause personally determined by the judge
Lim vs. Judge Fenix
Facts: Petitioners filed with the respondent court that no warrant shall issue unless the
issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable
cause. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution. The
respondent court issued an order denying petitioners order for lack of merit and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether the warrant of arrest issued is valid.
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that if the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest. For the
ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits,
respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was
satisfied that probable cause existed.
Main point: The phrase "personal determination by the judge" means, the
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; second, the preliminary
inquiry made by a prosecutor dies not bind the judge; and third, judges and
prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
306. SALVADOR
Requisites for a Valid Warrant; Probable cause personally determined by the judge
People vs. Inting
Facts: Petitioners filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case against the OIC
Mayor. The respondent court issued an order of a warrant of arrest against the
accused OIC Mayor after the preliminary investigation. The respondent court however
ordered to dismiss the warrant since the lawyer has no authority to determine the
probable cause. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the dismissal by the Judge is valid.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that the determination of probable cause for the warrant
of arrest is made by the Judge; the preliminary investigation proper is the function of
the Prosecutor. However, RTC Judges still have the power to make a preliminary
examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does
not bind the Judge; it merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.
Main point: The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only
the judge and the judge alone make this determination.
CASE NO. 307– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant: Personally Determined by the Judge
People vs. Delgado
Facts:
COMELEC received complaints from the election registrar from Toledo City against
private respondents herein for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Information were filed against the respondents in the RTC. Private respondents filed
motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. RTC
ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of the service of the
warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether the RTC judge alone has the power to determine probable cause initially filed
by the COMELEC?
Ruling:
Yes. When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case
must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by
the court.
Main Point:
The RTC has the authority to review actions of the COMELEC in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses filed in said court. Thus, the RTC judge can order for
reinvestigation based on his determination of probable cause.
CASE NO. 308– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant: Personally Determined by the Judge
Allado vs. Diokno
Facts:
Petitioners, Allado and Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the
kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist. An information for the said
crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement
by Umbal to the prosecutors, who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped
and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge,
Roberto Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests were effected whimsically as there is no
probable cause, questioned their arrests.
Issue:
Whether probable cause was present in the arrest warrants?
Ruling: No. Probable cause did not exist to merit the order of arrest against the
petitioners. Respondent judge did not personally examine the evidence, nor did he call
for the complainant and his witnesses. Instead, the judge relied only on the
certification made by the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
Main Point:
The SC ruled that strict compliance of the requirement in a warrant of arrest shall issue
only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, not
mere certifications by prosecutors.
CASE NO. 309– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Requisites for a Valid Warrant: Personally Determined by the Judge
Gozos vs. Tac-an
Facts:
Certain PNP officers were accused for the murder of Gilbert Dyogi while in a school
party. The OMB filed for a complaint that stipulated all officers involved were
principals of the murder. However, the RTC judge ruled separately with regards to the
degree of probable cause. 1 was accused as principal, 1 was accused as accomplice,
and the other 3 were acquitted due to lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether the judge can determine separately if there is probable cause even if all were
stipulated in the complaint together?
Ruling:
Yes. The contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of the offense
committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged, is valid.
Under Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution, a judge can determine personally. This
also means the separation of designation.
Main Point:
The judge has the power to have a contrary opinion regarding the designation of
offenses in cases where there are multiple defendants.
316. Bache v. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971
Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The
next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At
that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz
asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz
signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search
was subsequently conducted.
Issue: Whether there had been a valid search warrant.
Ruling: No. SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search
warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The
documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search
Warrant. “Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars,
receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;
certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business
records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and
records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.” The description does
not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things
to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
317. Borlongan v. Pena
G.R. No. 143591, November 23. 2007
Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and
the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.
Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly
entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts
necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban
Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a MD
arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel, accompanied
by with documents as proof showing that the respondent was appointed as agent by
ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-
Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City claiming that said documents
were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures,
and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.
Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing
that they were falsified. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal
of the respondent. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the
arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were
denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-
affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge
merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing
the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. On the same day that the
Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail which expressly provided that they
do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. MTCC held the
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules.
More so, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they
already posted bail.
Issue: Whether the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the
warrants for their arrest were properly issued.
Ruling: In the issuance of warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants
were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant.
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal
determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that
probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
to the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which
makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could
determine probable cause. SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The respondent’s claims of the
falsity of the documents were mere assertions.
318. People v. Mamaril43
G.R. No. 147607, January 22, 2004
Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing
the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the
search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana
leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of
the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which was
signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. The PNP
Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the
presence of marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant
affirmed that it was positive for the same. Appellant denied that he was residing at his
parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when the search was conducted
only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property
Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on
the certification that the house was properly search was his.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant
Ruling: Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of
probable cause, it is required that: (1) The judge must examine the complaint and his
witnesses personally; (2) The examination must be under oath; and (3) The
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put
into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. When the Branch Clerk
of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he was
only able to present before the court the application for search warrant and
supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of the proceedings of a searching question and
answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that
the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing
was presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly
determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search
warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
CASE 319
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Requisite of a valid warrant; Personal Examination
Ortiz v. Palaypayon (234 SCRA 391)
FACTS: There was a complaint for damage to property thru reckless imprudence
involving a collision between Toyota Corolla owned by Rosalinda Tanay, driven by her
husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck owned by Juliana Lu which was entrusted to
herein complainant, then driven by Rodrigo Vasquez. Respondent judge issued an
order for the arrest of accused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant,
David Ortiz, on the basis of mere affidavits by the offended party and without
conducting the preliminary investigation required by Rule 112 of the RPC. It is alleged
in the administrative complaint that herein complainant was wrongfully included as
one of the accused even if there existed no basis for his indictment of the criminal act
as he was not among the 9 passengers nor was he the driver of the mini-truck.
Respondent judge filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of factual or legal basis. He
claims that pursuant to the said rule, he personally examined in writing and under oath
the private complainant and his witnesses by asking the same questions propounded
to them in their sworn statements and the same answers were given. At the same
time, respondent judge maintains that it is customary for him to adopt the sworn
statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied of the existence of
probable cause. This practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings and save the
party litigants' time and money.
ISSUE: Whether Palaypayon is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
RULING: Yes. It is evident that there was no preliminary investigation conducted.
Respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and her witnesses by
asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. He ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural due process. This
Court cannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly elementary legal
principles and substituting it with highly irregular practice which appears convenient
only to respondent judge. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from
an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and
fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative
upon the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima
facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused.
MAIN POINT: Probable cause must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
CASE 320
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Requisite of a valid warrant; Particularity of description
People v. Veloso (48 Phil 169)
FACTS: In May, 1923, the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Veloso was at that time a member
of the HOR of the Philippine Legislature and the manager of the club. The police of
Manila had reliable information that the so-called Club was nothing more than a
gambling house. Indeed, Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the
club and verified this fact. As a result, Detective Geronimo of the secret service of City
of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño. Thus
provided, the police attempted to raid the Club. Once inside the Club, nearly fifty
persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was defendant Veloso. Veloso
asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant.
Veloso told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that
the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was
considered as John Doe. As Veloso’s pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling
utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. Veloso
refused and the patience of the officers was exhausted. So the policeman Rosacker
took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker which injured
the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and
Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, or reglas
de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets. All of the persons
arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department It was
necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted
so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. In
the MTC of the City of Manila, the persons arrested in the raid were accused of
gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in CFI for lack of proof, with the sole
exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house.
ISSUE: Whether a search warrant which did not specify the specific person is
constitutional and valid.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that even though John Doe warrants are generally void,
they can be considered valid if in addition it also contains a descriptio personae such
as will enable the officer to identify the accused. Based on the wording of the warrant,
that the police could identify John Doe as Veloso without difficulty, the search warrant
is valid.
MAIN POINT: JOHN DOE WARRANTS: It is valid if the best description possible is given
in the arrest warrant, it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served
by stating his occupation, personal appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or
other circumstances which he may be identified. Moreover, the rule is that a
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officers with the warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.
CASE 321
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Requisite of a valid warrant; Particularity of description
Alvarez v. CFI (64 Phil 33)
FACTS: The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the DOJ, presented
to Judge Eduardo David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. He did not swear to the truth
of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information
received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on
said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the
books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to
be disposed of in accordance with the law.
ISSUE: Whether there was a sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search
warrant.
RULING: No. The affidavit which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made,
and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in
any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
MAIN POINT: The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant are held liable for damage caused. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a
search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person
whom one considers to be reliable.
322. Corro V Linsing – Baird
FACTS; On September 29, 1983, respondent RTC judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City,
upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and
seizure of Printed copies of Philippine Times; Manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication in the Philippine Times; Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners;Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which have been used and are being
used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition. On
November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties. On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied
the motion in a resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with
application for preliminary injunction and restraining order to enjoin respondent RTC,
Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002
issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and
that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and
severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein
petitioner. Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant.
ISSUE; Whether the articles were particularly described in the warrant
RULING;
No, mere generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed. In the case at bar, the
search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the
Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, and tape
recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal
or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
MAINPOINT ;The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things
to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed.
323. Pangandaman V. Casar – Baird
FACTS;
On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Lanao del Sur,
which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. According to one
version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers
and defenders suffering casualties. On the following day,
Atty. Mangurun Batuampar,filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal
at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. No
case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until
Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed
before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan. On that same day, the respondent Judge
"examined personally all witnesses under oath thru (his) closed and direct
supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's
answers. 9 Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest" against the 14 petitioners and fifty (50)
"John Does.The petitioners ask this Court to annul the warrant for their arrest issued
by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao
del Sur. Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest
was issued by the respondent Judge without a proper preliminary investigation. An
"ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by
Atty. Batuampar seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a
"thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been
"hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been
propounded; That issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does"
transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should
particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.
ISSUE; Whether the warrant issued against fifty (50) "John Does were valid?
RULING;
No, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom
the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general
warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of
the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the
person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects,
be voided.
MAINPOINT;
The warrant against 50 john does is clearly violative of the constitutional
injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to
be seized.
324- Stonhill V Diokno (1967) - Baird
FACTS; Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the RPC." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because they do
not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; In their
answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent.
ISSUE; Whether the Warrants are valid
RULING;
No, he warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whim's caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
MAINPOINT; The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
325
Particularity of description
People v. Martinez – 235 SCRA 171
FACTS: On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty
at the Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned
citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz
and members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house.
Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team
entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the
house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from
the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and
brought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police
Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for
methylamphetamine HCL.
On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin
Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation
to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP
500,000 plus cost of suit.
The CA supported the findings of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence is admissible
RULING: No, the markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic
sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically
pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry
Report that the precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated.
The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject items were
never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces," "several pcs," and "shabu
paraphernallas."
MAIN POINT: Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a
number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the
suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with
adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container.
At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he
observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
326
Particularity of description
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)
FACTS: NBI Agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC
against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the
RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses,
Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants.
Paragraph C of the search warrant states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a
search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the
search warrants.
ISSUE: Whether the motion to quash the search warrant be granted
RULING: The court partially granted the petition. Still, no provision of law exists which
requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be
seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut
off without destroying the whole warrant.45 The exclusionary rule found in Section
3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized
under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f,
should be returned to Maxicorp.
MAIN POINT: A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and
the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the
articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures be committed.
327
Particularity of description
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 890
FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants.
The petitioner pointed out defects in the search warrant; The two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search
two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to
have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses
of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and
since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is
the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82
[b].
ISSUE: Whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity
RULING: No, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises
to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.
MAIN POINT: This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the
affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also
been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched."
Case No. 328– Cruz
Probable Cause - Particularity of Description
Frank Uy v. BIR
344 SCRA 36
Main Point: In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the
issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder; Seizure
of items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive to “seize and
take possession of other properties relative to such violation,” which in no way can be
characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.
Facts: BIR received a report that herein petitioners are committing acts in violation of
the National Internal Revenue Code. BIR’s representative applied for search warrants,
which an RTC judge issued for violation of Sec 153 of the NIR Code. A second warrant
was issued, almost identical to the first, except for the city address which changed
from Cebu City to Mandaue City and the addition of “alias Frank Uy.” A third warrant
was issued, which was identical to the first 2, except this time for violation of Sec. 238
of the NIR Code. Acting on these warrants, BIR agents seized, along with the records
and documents of the accused, other items which were not particularized in the search
warrant.
Issue: Whether the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched and
the persons/items to be seized considering the inconsistencies with their descriptions
Ruling: Place to be searched – Valid. The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community.
Persons named in warrant – Valid. The warrant was issued not for search of the
persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied
by them.
Things seized – Valid, but only insofar as the items particularly described. The warrant
in the case at bar is severable and those items not particularly described in the warrant
(through failure of particularity test or actual exclusion from warrant) may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant.
Case No. 329 – Cruz
Probable Cause - Particularity of Description
Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA
GR 126859 Sept. 4, 2001
Main Point: The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by
the police. Court concludes that the gun seized in the illegal search (Apartment 8)
cannot be used in evidence. But the articles seized in Apartment 2 are admissible.
Facts: Judge Mangay issued 2 search warrants for the search and seizure of certain
items in Apartment No. 2. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same
compound and found one.45 caliber pistol. Found in the apartment particularized by
the warrant were 2 firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Petitioners were charged
before the RTC accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. Petitioners contend
that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well
as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place
searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.
Issue: Whether the search made at Apartment No. 8 was valid
Whether items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with particularity.
Ruling: No, such search was deemed illegal for violating Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of
rights and the item seized therein was considered inadmissible evidence against
petitioners.
Yes, the Court held that the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of
the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrants. The
items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in
question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical
description. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would
suffice.
Case No. 330 – Cruz
Probable Cause - Particularity of Description
People v. CA
291 SCRA 400
Main Point: The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence
they adduced in support of their application for the warrant – the particularization of
the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge,
and only in the warrant itself.
Facts: A police officer applied for a search warrant before QC RTC against Hussain who
allegedly had in possession of firearms and explosives at a variety store in Apt. 1207
Bagong Buhay Avenue. A search warrant was served but not on the said address but on
Apt 1, adjacent to Apt 1207. Several Pakistani nationals were arrested and several
items not listed on the warrant were also seized, including a piece of dynamite stick,
two pieces of plastic explosives, grenade, cash and receipts. On arraignment, private
respondents pleaded not guilty and filed an urgent motion to quash search warrant
and to declare evidence obtained inadmissible. RTC and CA granted the motion. OSG
seeks reversal of the verdict, averring that such decision disregarded the issuing court’s
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched.
Issue: Whether the apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
Ruling: No. In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the
first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of the variety store to be the subject
of their search. The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant
had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds
as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge
had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
mind. This should not have been done.
CASE NO. 331
Art. III, Sec. 2. Particularity of description
Paper Industries v. Asuncion GR 122092 May 19, 1998
MAINPOINT:
The Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described
in the warrant.
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said
RTC of Quezon City, stating that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or control of
high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which are being kept
and concealead in the premises. The warrant was issued and the search was pursued.
Petitioner contends the validity of the search warrant as it failed to describe the place
in particularity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid.
RULING:
No. The Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those
described in the warrant. Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a
more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient
showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular
place.
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with
particularity. It simply authorizes a search of “the aforementioned premises,” but it did
not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the “Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay
Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur.” The PICOP compound, however, is made up of “200
offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23
warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous
structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.”
Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to
search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.
CASE NO. 332
Art. III, Sec. 2. Particularity of description
Malalaon v. CA, 232 SCRA 249
MAINPOINT:
A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to
an incident in the main case. There is no provision as to the extent of the territory
wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises
specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court.
FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions) perpetrated at Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. Respondent RTC
Judge of Calookan City issued search warrant and the same day, members of the
CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the place wherein
firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized
and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the
premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them
were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners.
Petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For
the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court
contending that the RTC of Caloocan is without jurisdiction to issue said warrant
because the placed to be searched is in Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether the said search warrant is valid.
RULING:
Yes. In the implementation of the search warrant, properties are seized thereunder
and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably
with of the Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been
assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the
criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of
petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place
to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. A court whose territorial
jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched is not prohibited to issue a
search warrant, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
CASE NO. 333
Art. III, Sec. 2. Particularity of description
People v. Estrada – GR 124461, June 26, 2000
MAINPOINT:
If the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority from the
appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although
the search warrants were declared void and illegal for its failure to allege and specify in
the application of search warrant that the products were either fake, misbranded,
adulterated, or unregistered.
FACTS:
The Court denied the petition filed by the petitioner questioning the trial court's order
which quashed the search warrant it issued and ordered the return of the seized goods
on the ground that the warrant failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements for
issuance of warrant for its failure to allege in the application for search warrant that
the subject drugs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fake,
misbranded, adulterated, or unregistered". Petitioner now seeks a partial
reconsideration of the said decision arguing that the seized drugs subject of the void
warrant can no longer be returned because the same are contraband goods. In its
motion for reconsideration, petitioner attached annexes purporting to show that the
52 boxes of medicines seized under the void warrant, upon laboratory examinations,
were found genuine but were illegally imported.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the goods seized under a void warrant should be returned.
RULING:
No. If the seized 52 boxes of drugs are pharmaceutically correct but not properly
documented, they should be promptly disposed of in the manner provided by law in
order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the
drugs underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court
that the applicant "failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the
subject drugs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fake,
misbranded, adulterated, or unregistered" in order to obtain the return of the drugs.
The policy of the law enunciated in R.A. No. 8203 is to protect the consumers as well as
the licensed businessmen. Foremost among these consumers is the government itself
which procures medicines and distributes them to the local communities through
direct assistance to the local health centers or through outreach and charity programs.
Only with the proper government sanctions can medicines and drugs circulate the
market. We cannot afford to take any risk, for the life and health of the citizenry are as
precious as the existence of the State.
334. Salazar v. Achcoso, 183 SCRA 145
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal
recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against
petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it
was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the
place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside
the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted
costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by
Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the
confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since
the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts
sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we
consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti,
that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held
that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final
order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
335. Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438
Facts: The PCGG issued a separate orders against private respondent Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their sequestration. PCGG also
issued a “Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking Corporation.
Issue: Whether PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.
Ruling: No. The PCGG has no authority to issue a search and seizure order. Only a judge
and such other officer responsible as may be authorized by law because EO No. 1 did
not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants or
order.
346. Morano v. Vivo, 80 SCRA 562
Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines
on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her
children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of
neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun,
her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun
were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two
months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau
Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on
September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan
Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on
September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on
or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a
warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.
Ruling:Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She
is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if
she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last
paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and
third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of
Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance
with the requirements of the immigration Act..
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order
of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It is also
held that the requirement of probable cause is not applicable in deportation
proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely
administrative, its purpose being not punishment but the return to his country of the
alien who has violated the conditions for the admission to the local state.
337.LIM
Sy v. Domingo
NONE
338. LIM
Tran Van Nyhai vs Liwag
Main Point: Only a Judge may issue a warrant only upon probable cause
FACTS: A complaint was filed with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
against the petitioner alleging that the French national is an undesirable alien for
“committing acts inimical to public safety and progress.” Respondent CID
commissioner issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner after the later twice
refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status.
Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national with temporary address in Sta.
Ana, Manila. Originally admitted to the Philippines on November 1, 1981 as a
temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant on November 16,
1984 based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the
Philippines. To date, however, petitioner has not made any investment and has
engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure.
A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there
is nothing in the records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on
petitioner prior to his apprehension.
ISSUE: Whether the warrant of arrest issued and petitione’s subsequent arrest were
valid and legal
RULING: No, Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police
officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the
Commissioer on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The
essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.
339. LIM
Board of Commissioners vs Judge De La Rosa
Main Point: a warrant of arrest issued by the Commission of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
FACTS: The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner
Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting respondents
Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigratrion issued a
mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
RULING: Whether the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration
was valid
ISSUE: No. a warrant of arrest issued by the Commission of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is
null and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of the mission order/warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the same was
issued only for the purposes of investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian
included.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the
Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.
340 MUSA
Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840
FACTS:
The Immigration Law empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants
for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to
the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this
country.
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, are both American, while Adriaan Van
Elshout is a Dutch citizen.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents. Two (2) days after
apprehension seventeen (17) of the twenty-two arrested aliens opted for self-
deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another
was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa.
Thus, of the original twenty-two only the three petitioners have chosen to face
deportation. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for
violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code which the petitioners assail to be invalid as respondent
violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of
arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid.
RULING: YES. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their
activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the
seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without. Those articles were
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence. The
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest without a warrant may
be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has
committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;
and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section
5).
MP:
The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue warrants to carry out a
final finding of a violation. (Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa, 197 SCRA
853) It is issued after a proceeding has taken place. This is an exception to the rule that
only a judge may issue a warrant.
341 MUSA
Ho vs. People – 280 SCRA 365
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against the petitioner along with other persons for the violation
of RA 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. After investigation, the GIO officer
recommended that a complaint be filed against Rolando Narciso only and the case
against the others including that of the petitioner be dismissed. However, upon
review, SPO Tamayo recommended that both Narciso and petitioner be charged with
the violation. Thus, Narciso, VP of NSC, a GOCC, and petitioner, president of NMC, a
private corporation, were charged with violation of RA 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that they had, through conspiracy, entered to a contract
of affreightment to the prejudice of the State.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against Narciso and Ho. Ho
filed an urgent motion to recall warrant of arrest/ motion for reconsideration which
was adopted by Narciso alleging that, in the determination of probable cause, the
Sandiganbayan had issued the warrant by merely relying on the information and
resolution filed by the Ombudsman and without other supporting document. The
Sandiganbayan denied said motion on the ground that besides from the information
and resolution by the Ombudsman, they had used the facts and evidence appearing in
the resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/prosecutors in the
determination of probable cause. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON an issued warrant of arrest wherein probable cause was determined solely on
the basis of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman is valid.
RULING:
No. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in this case.
MP:
The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause “personally.”
The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the
function of the Prosecutor.
342 MUSA
Material Distributions v. Judge, 84 Phil 127 (1989)
FACTS:
Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons)
seeking a money judgment against petitioners on three causes of action.
On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of the
following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of some persons or entities
4. All letters exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material
Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and Harry Lyons
5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and Material
Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas,
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons
Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and inspection of the originals
of Annexes A and B of the complaint. Material Distributors filed a memorandum and
opposition to Sarreal's above mentioned original and supplemental motion on the
ground that he failed to show good cause and that the motion were evidently filed for
the purpose of fishing evidence. Respondent judge, granting both motions, required
petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in question on July 24, 1947.
Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders issued by the respondent judge alleging
that he acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion, and
amounts to unreasonable search.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such inspection amounts to unreasonable search.
RULING:
NO. The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a
civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production
and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant,
the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them
outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question that,
upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in
question, that they are material and important to the issues between him and
petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the
controversy are placed before the trial court.
343 REYES
Section 2, Article III: “Of whatever nature and for any purpose”
Oklahoma Press vs. Walling
FACTS:
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Fair Labor and Standards
(FLSA) was granted authority by the US Supreme Court to enforce subpoenas against
petitioner pursuant to Sec. 11 (a) of the FLSA which enforces Section 9 and 10 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The subpoenas sought the production of pertinent
records to determine whether petitioners were covered by the FLSA and if they were
violating the Act. Petitioners claim that the Act is not applicable to them, and insist
that the question of applicability must be adjudicated before the subpoenas may be
enforced.
ISSUE:
Whether the enforcement of the subpoenas in ordering petitioners to produce the
specified records is a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the Administrator as authorized by Congress and upon a
judicial order may enforce the production of documents. It has long been established
that Congress may exercise wide investigative power over private corporations.
Moreover, there is a distinction between a “figurative” or “constructive” search and an
actual search and seizure. Constructive searches are limited by the Fourth
Amendment, where actual search and seizure requires a warrant based on “probable
cause.”
The requirement of “probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,” literally
applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied, in the case of an order for production,
by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress and is for
a purpose Congress can order, and that the documents sought are relevant to the
inquiry. Beyond this, the requirement of reasonableness, including particularity in
"describing the place to be searched, and the persons to be seized," also literally
applicable to warrants, comes down to specification of the documents to be produced,
adequate but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry.
In relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Constructive searches are limited by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
where actual search and seizure requires a warrant based on “probable cause.”
However, where the subject of the constructive search are of corporate character, the
constitutional provision does not apply since corporations are not entitled to all the
constitutional protections created in order to protect the rights of private individuals
(to be secure in person/home, right against self-incrimination etc.).
344 REYES
Section 2, Article III: “Of whatever nature and for any purpose”
Camara vs. Municipal Court
FACTS:
An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to investigate possible
violations of a City’s housing code without a warrant. The inspector was informed that
Camara was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector
confronted Camara and demanded to inspect the premises because residential use
was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. Camara did not allow the
inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. A few weeks later the inspector
attempted again to gain access to the building but Camara again refused. A complaint
was then filed against him for violation of the Housing Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the inspector may enter the building without a search warrant.
RULING: No. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to
permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through
the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials. With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented
warrantless search of private property is “unreasonable.”
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated,
then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. It merely
gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and
best fulfills the historic purposes behind the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable government invasions of privacy.
In relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
The inspector cannot obtain access to Camara’s personal residence without first
securing a search warrant. What is required is probable cause arising from knowledge
of condition of the district or area, and not necessarily individual buildings. Routine
inspections are not so urgent as to have to take effect immediately without warrant.
Thus, Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to
search and appellant may not be convicted for refusing consent to the inspection.
345 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; General Rule
People vs. Aminnudin
FACTS:
The Philippine Constabulary officers received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused Aminnudin was on board M/V Wilcon for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was arrested and searched upon disembarking from said vessel. The
officers were not armed with a warrant although the officers had at least two days to
obtain a warrant. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying which was
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the
NBI forensic examiner.
ISSUE:
Whether the search and seizure was valid.
RULING:
No. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
Moreover, there was no urgency to effect a warrantless search, as it is clear that the
Philippine Constabulary had at least two days from the time they received the tip until
the arrival of the vessel within which they could have obtained a warrant to search and
arrest the accused. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. The officers had all the time to obtain a warrant yet they
did nothing. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against
the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
MAIN POINT:
A search cannot be considered an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the
Rules of Court.
CASE NO. 346 – PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ
GENERAL RULE: GET A SEARCH WARRANT
People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 85
FACTS: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz appellant was charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The accused was allegedly caught in
flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven
(7) fully grown marijuana. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First,
the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures
ISSUE: Whether or not there was unlawful search.
ANSWER: Yes. There was no search warrant issued by a judge. The police had ample
time to obtain such search warrant after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause which they did not do. The protection against illegal search and seizure
is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intention.
MAINPOINT:
Regardless of the praiseworthiness of the intention a search warrant is still needed.
CASE NO. 347 - SABTALUH
PEOPLE VS. EDAÑO
FACTS: Members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group together with a
female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds to conduct an entrapment
operation against a certain alias "Nato."
At around 7:00 p.m., appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi.
Informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards,
the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellants
went out of the vehicle and ran away. the police were able to grab the appellant and
recpvered "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant's right hand,
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police
station for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
RULING: No. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer." In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was
actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.
MAINPOINT: Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
CASE NO. 348 - SABTALUH
USE OF GPS TRACKER
DALE GRADY V. NORTH CAROLINA {MARCH 30, 2015 }
FACTS: Petitioner Torrey Dale Grady was convicted in North Carolina trial courts of a
second degree sexual offense in 1997 and of taking indecent liberties with a child in
2006. After serving his sentence for the latter crime, Grady was ordered to appear in
New Hanover County Superior Court for a hearing to determine whether he should be
subjected to satellite-based monitoring (SBM) as a recidivist sex offender. He argued,
however, that the monitoring program--under which he would be forced to wear
tracking devices at all times--would violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE: whether or not subjecting grady to wear tracking devices at all times would
violate his right of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ruling: Yes. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures may apply to
tracking devices on sex offenders, since they are intended to collect information
without the individual's consent and thus constitute a search. However, they are
unconstitutional only if their use is unreasonable. The reasonableness of a search
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the
search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy
expectations.
MAINPOINT:
Tracking device are intended to collect information without the individual’s consent
and thus constitute a search.
SALINAS- 349. Valmonte v. De Villa
Facts: As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints
in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Issue: Whether the checkpoint conducted by NCRDC is considered unlawful search and
seizure.
Ruling: No. Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure is not sufficient
to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Main point: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
SALINAS- 350. Guazon v. De Villa
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the “saturation drive” or “aerial target zoning”
that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged
that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant
or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their
sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.
Issue: Whether the saturation drive is considered unlawful search and seizure
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that all actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill
of Rights specifically Sec 3. Which state that: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” In their action of conducting saturation drive, the police is violating the
requirement of a search warrant issued by a judge after determination of a probable
cause. Therefore, it is unlawful.
Main point: The court ruled that all actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill
of Rights
SALINAS- 351. People v. Tudtud
Facts: Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named
Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbours have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Relating to the report, the police conducted surveillance in
Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered
information and leared that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. Solier informed the
police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new
stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore
a hat. At around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted themselves at
the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian
clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto
and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man
also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects
and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the
police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that
night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any
drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then said “it
was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one
wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were
unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
Issue: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s
alright”) is considered a waiver.
Ruling: NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2,
Art. 3 of the Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure. Because a warrantless search is in
derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke
regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden
of proving that the search was unconsented.
Main point: Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right,
peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was
unconsented.
352. SALVADOR
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; No presumption of regularity in search cases
Sony Music vs. Judge Espanol
Facts: DOJ criminally charged the respondents with violation of the Presidential Decree
No. 1987. Th four were engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of
video-grams without license and authority from VRB. Petitioner's applied for the
issuance of search warrants against respondents in the factory and production facility
of SLC. Private respondents armed with the resolution of DOJ moved to quash the
search warrants issued. Eventually the judge granted the motion to quash, hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether the warrant of search and seizure is validly quashed.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal construction in search and seizures cases
is given in favor of the individual. The presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of
the search process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
Main Point: The presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit
of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
detests. As a general rule the procurement of a warrant is required before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
individual.
353. SALVADOR
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Instances of warrantless searches and seizures
People vs. Sevilla
Facts: Petitioners in this case are convicted for violating R.A No. 7659 for aiding and
abetting each other, without authority of law, have in their possession of illegal drugs
(marijuana). However, the police officers conducted a warrantless search and seizure
wherein the petitioners contended that is against their constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure is valid.
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that there was no probable cause for conducting an
extensive search in the house occupied by appellants. As a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house or effects of a ny individual. Evidence derived from an illegal search
is placed beyond the Court's consideration, as a practical means to enforce the
constitutional injunction and to discourage violations of basic civil rights under the
guise of legitimate law enforcement.
Main Point: There are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the
absence of a warrant. Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a
warrantless search and seizure may be effected, to wit:
1. Search which is incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view"
3. Search a moving vehicle
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
354. SALVADOR
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Instances of warrantless searches and seizures;
Incidental to a lawful arrest (Rule 16, Section 12)
Padilla vs. CA
Facts: High-powered ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla and was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under
P.D. 1866. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and to recall the warrant of
arrest but was denied by the court. Petitioners questions the legality of his arrest;
there is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest but that per se did not
make his apprehension illegal.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure is valid.
Ruling: YES. The court ruled that a suspect cannot defeat the arrest which has been set
in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto
and possession of an unlicensed firearm, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as
he was again actually committing another offense and this time in the presence of a
peace officer.
Main Point: A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it
 c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgement or temporarily
confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
CASE NO. 355– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Espano vs. CA
Facts:
The policemen were told by an informant that selling of illegal drugs was frequent in
Zamora, Manila and when they went to said area, they saw Rodolfo Espano with 2
cellophane bags of marijuana. They arrested him and when asked if he had more, he
said there were more in his home. Espano’s defense was that it was a frame-up
wherein he was just sleeping when he woke up to the police arresting him in his home.
Issue:
Whether the arrest, search, and seizure, without a warrant was valid?
Ruling:
Yes. His defense was disproven. Therefore, the version of the prosecution stands. He
was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers
based on information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The
police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the
buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
Main Point:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person caught in flagrante as a result
of a buy-bust operation, and the marijuana thereby seized after searching the latter
are admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
CASE NO. 356– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures
People vs. De Lara
Facts:
Armando De Lara was arrested in flagrante in a buy-bust operation without a warrant.
During the investigation in his house, he was told his Miranda rights. He was asked to
give a written statement but refused to do so without the presence of his lawyer.
However, he was still compelled to sign the marked bills, receipt of property seized,
and booking and information sheet. These were given as evidence and he was
ultimately penalized with life-imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether the contemporaneous searches were valid?
Ruling:
Yes. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of
appellant’s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was
made.
Main Point: The warrantless arrest was valid because he was caught flagrante selling
drugs. The search was also valid because the police can contemporaneously search in
the immediate vicinity where the accused was arrested.
CASE NO. 357– Tan
Article III, Sec. 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures
People vs. Leansgiri
Facts:
Suchinda Leansgiri, a Thai national, was caught flagrante possessing heroin in NAIA. He
told the NARCOM that he was dealing with 2 others in Las Palmas hotel where they
learned that the 2 others did not carry drugs on them. After a conversation between
the police and the others, there were no drugs to be found and the latter went to a
different hotel where they were billeted. The police followed and seized their room.
They found a telephone book with the name of the Thai and along with it were drugs.
The defense stated that the drugs were inadmissible because no warrants were
presented. However, the prosecution argued the Plain View Doctrine in warrantless
searches.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless searches and seizure were valid?
Ruling:
No. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. However, in
this case the officer clearly was beyond the bounds of his ordinary vision when he
seized a telephone book not specified in the search warrant and that it was clearly
hidden from is considered as plain view.
Main Point:
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspect’s person and the premises under his immediate control
admits of an exception.
364. United Laboratories v. Isip
G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005
Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be
manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took
some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place.
UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the
court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished
products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was
however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60
ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB.
NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence,
alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners
opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain
view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.
Issue: Whether the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained
Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.
Ruling: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain
view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements
for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement
officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position
from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure. It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items
were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view
of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present
when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had
personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that
the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In
sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine
applies to the seized items.
365. People v. Doria
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999
Facts: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria
red-handed of selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers
searched for the marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to
be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house, the
police officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and
inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside
the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried
marijuana leaves.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house,
and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.
Ruling: The court ruled that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not
unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5
of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not
only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless
arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of
the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. Our Constitution
proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant
Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to
flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going
about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. This brings the question
of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
366. Del Rosario v. People
G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001
Facts: Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No.
1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly, the police received a report that
he was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon
the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division issued a certification stating that per records in his office that he is
not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the
house of appellant. Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team of police officers went to
Norzagaray to serve the warrant but before proceeding to the residence of the
accused-appellant, the former requested Barangay officials to accompany them in the
implementation of the said warrant. In their arrival, the police officers introduced
themselves to the wife of accused-appellant. When he came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique
informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search
his house. After he gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the
house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found
in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673
(Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of
the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed
to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms. For his
defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in
his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22
revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the
manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just
barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the
barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
acquits petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No.
1866. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain
view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's
house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the
seizure is illegal. True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in
plain view. However, "the seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is
justified when there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are.(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.
CASE 367
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Moving vehicle
Hizon v. CA (265 SCRA 517, 1996)
FACTS: On the strength of the report submitted by the Task Force Bantay Dagat, the
PNP Maritime Group boarded and inspected a big fishing boat with the acquiescence
of the boat captain. In the course of the inspection, the police discovered a large
aquarium full of live fishes. Some of the fishes were tested to contain cyanide.
ISSUE: Whether the search of the fishing boat was lawful.
RULING: Yes. Search and seizure without warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations
of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement
of a search warrant. It is rooted in the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like
motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
search warrant must be sought and secured. The same exception ought to apply to
seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are
normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of
the Philippine Navy, the Coast guard and other government authorities enforcing our
fishery laws. Moreover, in this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with
poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish
specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find
any sodium cyanide or any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find
any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself.
However, this findings does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in were
caught with the use of cyanide.
MAIN POINT: Search and seizures without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant.
CASE 368
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Moving vehicle
Bagalihog v. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614)
FACTS: A politician was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the airport.
Witnesses said that one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day,
petitioner’s house was searched with his consent of the killers but the search was
proved fruitless. 2 days later, members of the Philippine constabulary seized sans a
search warrant petitioner’s motorcycle and impounded the same on the suspicion that
it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the motorcycle was lawful.
RULING: No. The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of
“the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. The
necessity for the immediate seizure of the motorcycle without the prior obtention of a
warrant has not been established. The vehicle cannot even be detained on the ground
that it is a prohibited article the mere possession of which is unlawful.
MAIN POINT: The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative
of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
CASE 369
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Moving vehicle
Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (237 SCRA 424, 1994)
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution Number 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on
bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing fire arms by members of security agencies or
police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period. COMELEC also issued RN. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gun running, using and transporting
of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the HOR, wrote petitioner
for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the HOR. Petitioner then instructed
his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them
to Congress. The PNP had a check point. When the car driven by Arellano approached
the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was
apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also
explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not
a security officer or a bodyguard.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search conducted by PNP at the checkpoint was valid.
RULING: No. There was no probable cause. A valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. In the case at bar, the guns were
not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed
in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances,
the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package
without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not
have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search
cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts
that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in
the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process.
Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in
the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding
against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional.
MAIN POINT: A warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
 People V Aminuddin – Baird
FACTS ; Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting
for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. According to the
prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank
after the informer had pointed to him. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket,
two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
ISSUE; Whether the arrest was valid
RULING ; No, In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations
of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
MAINPOINT; Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin,
the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should
never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana
was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not
come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
371. People V Malmstedt – Baird
FACTS; Accused Mikael Malmstedt is a Swedish national, At around 7:00 am of 11 May
1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first trip to
Baguio City. From There, accused planned to take a afternoon trip to Manila to catch
his flight out of the country. At about 8: 00 am in the morning Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region, prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 PM, the bus
where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus
when they started their inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer metamphetamine. Appellant Peter Lo and Lim Cheng Huat were charged with a
asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to violation of Sec 15, of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist. When accused opened the same bag,the officer noticed 4 suspicious objects
ISSUE; Whether the trial court erred in not declaring the search and seizure on the
wrapped in brown packing tape which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
accused as illegal.
marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two 2 travelling bags from the
luggage carrier. A teddy bear was found in each bag where officer noticed that there RULING; As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be supported
were bulges inside the same. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized
accused finally presented his passport. During the arraignment, accused entered a plea exceptions thereto. these are: a search incidental to an arrest, [a search of a moving
of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal vehicle, and seizure of evidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly
effects. show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a
ISSUE; Whether the Search was valid valid warrant was not necessary to affect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
RULING; Yes, The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
persons, houses, papers however, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. While it is true that the NARCOM
officers were not armed with a search warrant however, under the circumstances of MAINPOINT; a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
was then and there committing a crime. Warrantless search of the personal effects of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
MAINPOINT; When faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act 373
quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant. To deprive the NARCOM Moving vehicle
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without People v. Saycon – 236 SCRA 329
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and FACTS:
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. ISSUE:
RULING:
372. People V Lo ho Wing- Baird MAIN POINT:
374
FACTS; In July 1987, A unit of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Moving vehicle
Constabulary received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group People v. CFI – 101 SCRA 86
engaged in the importation of illegal drugs. As part of the operations, the recruitment FACTS:
of confidential men was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those ISSUE:
recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia. Lim expressed a desire to hire a RULING:
male travelling companion. Tia offered his services and was hired. Tia was introduced MAIN POINT:
to Peter Lo whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu
of Lim. As a "deep penetration agent," Tia submitted reports of his undercover 375
activities. On October 4, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong. Before they departed, Moving vehicle
Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of People v. Barros – 231 SCRA 557
return. The day after they arrived, They boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, FACTS:
China. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room. He saw two other men One was ISSUE:
fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil. RULING:
Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning MAIN POINT:
substance. The next day, the two returned to Manila.The plane landed at the NAIA,
Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab. Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the
airport, the operatives followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives Case No. 376– Cruz
overtook the taxicab and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The Instances of Warrantless Arrests & Seizures – Moving Vehicle
operatives approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage Mustang Lumber v. CA
compartment. 3 pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the 257 SCRA 430
vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their
luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Main Point: Instances of warrantless arrests & seizures: (1) search as an incident to a
Cayabyab, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag, pressed it and some lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) consented
crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. They warrantless search, and (5) search of a moving vehicle.
contained a total of 56 paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside Tests
conducted yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was Facts: Acting on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside petitioner’s lumberyard, a team of foresters and policemen was
organized and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded the.
Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure of the truck and its cargo was valid.
Ruling: Yes. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause.
Case No. 377 – Cruz
Instances of Warrantless Arrests & Seizures – Moving Vehicle
People v. Lacerna
278 SCRA 561
Main Point: Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition
of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstance. In such cases,
however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause that a vehicle
contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
Facts: A taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at a police checkpoint. The
police officers asked permission to search the vehicle and the occupants readily
agreed. The police officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle and found
marijuana. Appellant was found guilty for violation of Section 4 of RA 6425.
Issue: Whether appellant’s right against warrantless arrest and seizure violated
Ruling: No. Defense argues that the appellant was not committing any crime as he
were merely riding a taxicab while OSG disagrees, contending that the search and
seizure were consistent with recent jurisprudential trend liberalizing warrantless
search and seizure where the culprits are riding moving vehicles. Court held that both
are wrong.
In the case at bar, the search which is normally permissible in the instance of the police
checkpoint is limited to routine checks -- visual inspection or flashing a light inside the
car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body searches. A search of
the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause. In the
case at hand, probable cause was not evident.
Nonetheless, the court held that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not
because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the
search. True, appellant was stopped by the police on mere suspicion -- not probable
cause. But the police expressly sought appellant’s permission for the search. Only after
appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search
commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.
Case No. 378 – Cruz
Instances of Warrantless Arrests & Seizures – Moving Vehicle
De Garcia v. Locsin
65 PHIL 689
Main Point: To constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that
the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. And being a personal right, such cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized
to do so in his or her behalf.
Facts: An agent of the Anti-Usuary Board obtained a search warrant commanding any
officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Tarlac, for
“evidence relating to her activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an
affidavit given by the said agent. This agent, accompanied by a captain of the
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Tarlac and, after showing the
search warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper and without the presence of the
petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof.
The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the
Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who
subsequently filed criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law. The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the
petitioner in the criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. The
respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for the reason that though the
search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ruling: No. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or
object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. The waiver may
be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time to a search and seizure
illegally made. However in the case at bar, the delay in making demand for the return
of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.
CASE NO. 379
Art. III, Sec. 2. Consent or Waiver
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, GR 136292, Jan 15, 2002
MAINPOINT:
While the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived, the consent must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
FACTS:
Sgt. Noceja and Castro, while on a routine patrol, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with “kakawati” leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by
appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared
nervous.
With appellant’s alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked where the wires came from,
appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Theft. Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the
flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
“suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does not constitute probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search without consent is valid?
RULING: In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable searches.
CASE NO. 380
Art. III, Sec. 2. Consent or Waiver
People v. Agbot, 106 SCRA 325
MAINPOINT:
The taking of appellant's gun from his house by two barrio councilmen with appellant's
acquiescence and consent would not constitute a violation of an accused's
constitutional right against admissibility of illegally seized objects.
FACTS:
Charged with murder of his sister in the CFI of Davao Oriental, Antonio Agbot was,
after due trial, convicted of the crime charged, and sentenced to death and ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Leona Agbot Subat, in the sum of P12,000.00. In
the mandatory review, the petitioner contented that there is a violation of his rights
against admissibility taking of his gun from his house by two barrio councilmen with
appellant's acquiescence and consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is violation of constitutional right of the accused.
RULING:
The verity of appellant's admission of guilt having been firmly established, the
contention that the confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search
warrant and its use as evidence is not permissible, clearly becomes devoid of factual or
legal basis. With his confession, his voluntarily surrendering the weapon with which he
committed the offense would be but a natural consequence of his having admitted
guilt. The taking of the gun from his house was, therefore, with consent and
acquiescence that would not constitute a violation of the constitutional guaranty
against the admissibility of illegally seized objects as evidence against an accused.
CASE NO. 381
Art. III, Sec. 2. Consent or Waiver
Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
MAINPOINT:
A search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as unreasonable and thus offensive to the
Constitution if consent be shown.
FACTS:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which arose from
the seizures made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of 1,480 sacks of copra and 86
sacks of coffee which came from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the
Philippines in violation of our laws and, therefore, subject to forfeiture. Petitioner
contended that the said seizure of the hotel room is illegal because of the absence of
search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure is unreasonable and offensive.
RULING:
No. It does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. Such a
view is implicit in People vs. Malasugui. For this immunity from unwarranted intrusion
is a personal right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
In the case at bar, although petitioner Velasco was not inside the hotel room,
respondent Reynolds, after identifying himself as a police officer and after explaining
his purpose, was allowed to enter the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco, the wife, who
subsequently volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of petitioner Velasco
and delivered the documents and things contained therein to respondent Reynolds.
The said police team did not search the room; neither did the members thereof
forcibly open the luggages and boxes nor seized and confiscated the documents and
things contained therein, since that was not necessary because Mrs. Tomas Velasco
voluntarily opened the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of documents
and things to respondent Reynolds.
382. People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457
Facts : The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members
in Dagupan City. They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie,
sister of someone whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.
Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz
Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant
when the latter was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they
confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters
for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house
and owned the items confiscated. Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal
possession of firearms.
Issue : Whether the evidence is admissible?
Ruling : NO. The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless
search is present in this case.
Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are
invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. Being a
helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in
representation of her employer.
Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is
inadmissible. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2)
one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
383. People v. Asis, GR 142531, October 15, 2002
FACTS: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an
Information; the information stating "That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then
and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the
different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:
Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; 1 wristwatch' 1 gold necklace; and
undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging
to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of
the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death." When arraigned, both accused pleaded not
guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but
also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9
witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and
substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused
to the crime.
After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. RTC of Manila
held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294,
No. 1 of the RPC," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery
were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained
clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) committed the crime,"
and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior
strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of
death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not
question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the
arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly
recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done,
making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them
as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was Formento's
wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of
the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search
without a warrant.
ISSUES: Whether or not Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of
the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search?
RULINGS NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the
present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the
bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and
mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent.
Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other
person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was
not present when the search was made.
Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists;
second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first
place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There was no
interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. The
point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more pronounced in the present
case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him
what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may
be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of
shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and
seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in
its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for
conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or
even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.
384. Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632, June 18, 1992
Facts : The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker who
had keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house.
Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel soldiers are
allegedly hiding there.
With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the yard since the
owner was not around and they did not have a search warrant.
They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was reportedly being used as
a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to
search the house with the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend,
must be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the
children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the
basis of the charge of illegal possession of firearms against them.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them,
petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS
Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to
receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their
warrants of arrest.
The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue : Whether the evidence is admissible?
Ruling : NO. Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their
house, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to
room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence against them.
The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless
search. The reason for searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to
enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant
and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for
a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted
the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs.
Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but
they did not.
The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a
malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized
were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against
them for illegal possession of firearms. The permission to enter a house and search for
persons and effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in excess of
the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does
not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary in the context of this case.
385. LIM
People vs Omaweng GR 99050
Main Point: the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
As this Court stated in People v. Malasugui: 17 ". . . When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.)
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."
FACTS: a checkpoint was put up and all vehicles that went through it were stopped and
checked. The officers flagged down the car driven by the accused and asked
permission to inspect the vehicle to which he acceded. When they peered into the rear
of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a
spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. The officers again
asked permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request.
Inside, the officers found fourty-one plastic packets of different sizes containing
pulverized substances which was later identified as marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure was unreasonable and a violation of the
appellants Constitutional right
RULING: No. accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted
on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Since in the course of the valid search forty-one
packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant
was necessary for such seizure.
386. LIM
People vs Correa GR 119246, 30 January 1998
Main Point: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on
his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly.
FACTS: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by
the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports received in
said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police
surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On
17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain
quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the
operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3
vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and waited for
the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives
tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a
cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in
the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team
seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3
suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. \
The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in
Camarin D, Caloocan City
ISSUE: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part.
RULING: Yes. Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong,"
and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their
actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested when the police officer
opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles,
nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to
the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. Further, they
effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of
not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
387. LIM
People vs. Ramos 222 SCRA 557
Main Point: recognized exception is when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable search and seizure. As this Court stated in People vs. Malasugui:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly.
FACTS: Following a tip from an informer, police operatives patrolled Miranda
Subdivision for a possible engagement with the suspects of a series of armed robbery
incidents. Accompanied by one of the victims, the lawmen chanced upon petitioner
Felimon Ramos who the victim identified as one of the armed men he encountered
during the robbery. When accosted and frisked by the lawmen, Ramos yielded in his
waistline a .38 caliber snub nosed “paltik” revolver loaded with 2 live bullets. At the
police headquarters, Ramos admitted involvement with the aforementioned robbery
incidents and identified all his cohorts, one of who is Antonio Contreras.
ISSUE: Whether the frisking and seizure of the gun tucked on the petitioners waitsline
were illegal for lack of a valid search warrant.
RULING: No. the evidence for the prosecution discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily
allowed himself to be frisked and that he gave the gun to the police officer. Thus, there
was deemed a valid waiver
388 MUSA
People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept 26, 2003
FACTS:
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. For 5 days,
they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.
According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
The Police went to seize Tutud. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of
the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as his
companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two
bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his
companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The
two did not resist. The confiscated items examined. It was confirmed that the plastic
bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained
another 890 grams.
Tudtud claims the marijuana leaves were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all
right” when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a
waiver?
RULING:
No. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and
requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing
the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and opened the box
himself.
Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of
his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a
valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be
sustained.
MP:
There is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if
the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
(3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution
failed to establish the second and third requisites.
389 MUSA
People v. Tabar – 222 SCRA 144
FACTS:
Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew, for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which provided that: That on or about the 8th
day of February 1989, at about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
sell and deliver, without authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a
(sic) prohibited drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Violation of Sec. 4,
Art. 11, of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Act of 1972.
The accused were then convicted of the offense charged against them in the trial
court.
On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower court erred in
admitting the evidence against her when there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore,
violating the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
NO. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of
marijuana sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time
she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked
to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the package containing the packs of
marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of the team. A crime
was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113
and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested
and searched for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense without the corresponding arrest and search warrants.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were without a warrant,
the appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by
voluntarily submitting to the seach and seizure. In People vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court
ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person
or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure
from unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. (MP)
390 MUSA
People v. Encinada – 280 SCRA 72
FACTS:
SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip from an informant that
Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City in the morning of May
21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him marijuana. Bolonia was then
Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police. After receiving the tip,
Bolonia notified the members of his team as well as his colleague. Because the
information came late, there was no more time to secure a search warrant.
The police officers followed Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle at Borromeo
Street, holding plastic chairs. As the tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia chased it
and ordered the driver to stop after identifying himself as a police officer. When the
vehicle stopped, Bolinia identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from
the tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs, to which the latter
complied. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana.
Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the what
appeared to be marijuana. Encinada was brought to the central police station. The trial
court further emphasized that appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante
delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following his lawful arrest was valid and the
marijuana obtained was admissible in evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Encinada’s compliance to the police order to surrender the plastic
chair is considered a valid waiver hence warrantless search was valid
RULING:
No. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
we believe that appellant—based on the transcript quoted above—did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonia’s search of his belongings. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly
taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was
conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based
merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.
MP:
Where the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, the Court cannot
appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance
of duty.
391 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Consent or Waiver
People vs. Aruta
FACTS:
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving
from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next
day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio,
when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
ISSUE:
Whether such constituted a consented warrantless search allowed by law.
RULING:
No. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
we believe that Aruta did not voluntarily consent to the search of his belongings.
Aruta’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity
of the performance of duty. Thus, Aruta’s lack of objection to the search is not
tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search.
MAIN POINT:
To constitue a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
392 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Customs Search
Papa vs. Mago
FACTS:
Acting upon reliable information, it was believed that a certain shipment of person
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day
from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the
Bureau of Customs. When the trucks left, elements of the counter-intelligence unit
went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle. The load of the two
trucks consisting of nine bales of goods and the two trucks were seized on instructions
of Papa. On the other hand, Remedios Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized,
questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made without
any search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether a warrant is required to search and seize a moving cargo or vehicle.
RULING:
No. It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs
laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs
in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
In the present case, the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require any search warrant
issued by a competent court before police authorities can effect the seizure. But the
Code requires it in the search of a dwelling house. Therefore, except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs laws
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws. The seizure made by Alagao and his companion policemen is in accordance with
law.
MAIN POINT:
Customs search is an allowable warrantless search under the Tariff and Customs Code.
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs laws may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
393 REYES
Section 2, Article III: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Customs Search
Pacis vs. Pamaran
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of an automobile which he brought into the
country without payment of customs duty and taxes because its original owner,
Donald James Hatch, was tax-exempt. He paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.
Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed that the automobile was a “hot
car.” The amount collectible was P2,500.00, and not just P311.00. Based on such
discrepancy, Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
detention. The automobile was also taken by the Department of National Defense
agents and brought to the General Affairs Administration for compound.
Santos filed a criminal complaint against Pacis for usurpation of judicial functions
alleging that Pacis did not have authority to issue such warrant of seizure and
detention. Manuel Pamaran, the Assistant City Fiscal, proceeded with the charge
against Pacis.
ISSUE:
Whether the Collector of Customs can issue a warrant of seizure and detention.
RULING:
Yes. The Collector of Customs has the requisite authority to issue a warrant of seizure
and detention for an automobile whose duties and taxes have not been paid for. In
exercising this authority, the Collector has not committed a violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure and he may not be
prosecuted for the criminal offense of usurpation of judicial function.
MAIN POINT:
For the enforcement of customs duties and tariff laws, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to effect searches and seizures conformably with the provision of said laws.
He may order the seizure of untaxed goods without being liable for usurpation of
judicial function.
CASE NO. 394 - SABTALUH
PEOPLE V. GATWARD, 267 SCRA 785
FACTS:
Appellant Gatward was found guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 when heroin was found in his luggage, appellant
contained that he checked in a different bag when he boarded KLM Flight No. 806,
explaining that upon his apprehension by the agents of the NAIA Customs Police, he
threw away the claim tag for the said luggage. He alleged that the said bag contained,
among other things, not only important documents and papers pertaining to his
cellular phone business in the pursuit of which he came to the Philippines but also
money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not gatward suitcase maybe searched without warrant
RULING:
Yes.While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant
checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. 806 he
thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and
regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to
a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag,
or in flagrante delicto.
MAINPOINT:
when appellant checked in his bag as his personal luggage he thereby agreed to the
inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international
practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search.
CASE NO. 395 - SABTALUH
PEOPLE V. SUSAN CANTON, GR 148825, DECEMBER 27, 2002
FACTS: Appellant Susan Canton was charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 After (998.2809) GRAMS of drugs was found in her luggage in NAIA. SUSAN
asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was violated her
right because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest could not be said to have
been made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the arresting
officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her
body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could
not have determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip
search was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition and that it is erroneous to say
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated
drugs was valid.
RULING: Yes. the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows: Every
ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among
others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall
constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. This
constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures.
MAINPOINT: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.
CASE NO. 396 – SABTALUH
PEOPLE V. JOHNSON – 348 SCRA 526
FACTS:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession
more than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by some security
personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something hard in
respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles
because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor.
Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu were seized
from her. respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that
her constitutional rights were infringed when such search was conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in
either paragraph (a) or (b).
MAINPOINT:
Ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not
apply to routine airport procedures.
SALINAS- 397. Terry v. Ohio
Facts: The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street
corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would
periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to
a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the
Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer
decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the
officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick
frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
 Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade drugs. The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer
Issue: Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an firearm which is a product of an unlawful warrantless search to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable
(“Constitution”)? Ruling: No, Solayao and his companion’s drunken actuations as well as the fact that he cause to make an actual arrest.
attired in camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and the flight of his companion aroused
the suspicion of the police officer’s group. Therefore, it can be admissible as evidence. Main Point: A Stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of
Ruling: The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for
400. SALVADOR weapon(s).
weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Instances of warrantless searches and seizures;
beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals
Stop and frisk situation
that the officer suspects to be armed.
Malacat vs. CA 402. SALVADOR
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Instances of warrantless searches and seizures;
SALINAS- 398. Posadas v. CA
Stop and frisk situation
Facts: Malacat was charged violating P.D No. 1866 (Illegal possession of firearms). As People vs. Aruta
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar
searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s Facts: Aruta was arrested and cahrged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Having
conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of
“front waistline.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul ascertained that was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and introduced
Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed
Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified
then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash
away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they
Katutak.” The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2)
Issue: Whether stop and frisk situation is valid in this instance. which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. The defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence”
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two
alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-
(2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police
Ruling: NO. The court ruled that a mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their
station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
and frisk". A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and inadmissibility in evidence.
show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom
concealed about him. Issue: Whether search and seizure is valid in this instance.
office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy
the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
Main Point: “Stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of Ruling: NO. The court ruled that the right of a person to be secured against any
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a
Ruling: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person
be used against the police officer.
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of
Main Point: The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the
401. SALVADOR sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time
arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Instances of warrantless searches and seizures; prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
Stop and frisk situation unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it
Manalili vs. CA The exceptions should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
was affected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
Facts: Anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in response to information against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right
that drug addicts were roaming the area fronting the city cemetery of Kalookan and must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. warrant issued by a judge after
chanced upon Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a conducted.
determination of a probable cause. Therefore, it is unlawful.
wobbly manner. Because his appearance was characteristic of a person “high on
drugs,” the lawmen approached him, introduced themselves and inquired as to what CASE 415
SALINAS- 399. People v. Tudtud
was in his hands. He subsequently challenged before us the legality of his search and ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Arrests; In flagrante delicto
arrest, and the admission of the marijuana as evidence. He contended that the latter People v. Alolod (266 SCRA 154)
Facts: While conducting an intelligence patrol, the arresting officers met appellant who
two were products of the illegal search.
was drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. After introducing
FACTS: Alolod was found guilty by the RTC of Kalookan City of Robbery with Homicide
himself as PC, the police officer seized the dried coconut leaves which the appellant
Issue: Whether stop and frisk situation is valid in this instance. and Illegal Possession of Firearm. The Information for Robbery with Homicide alleges
was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known
that on December 1991 in Kalookan City the accused Alolod forcibly took from Romeo
as latong. Thr latter has no permission to possess the same. The firearm was
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the search was akin to a stop-and-frisk. The police had de Vera one blue plastic bag containing cash amounting to P17, 800.00 and inflicted
confiscated and he was turned over to the custody of the Caibiran police who
sufficient reason to stop Manalili, who “had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk in serious physical injuries upon the victim which caused the latter’s death. The
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm,
a popular hangout of drug addicts,” in order to investigate if he was actually “high” on Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm charges that on the same occasion the
accused had in his possession a .38 cal. paltik revolver marked S & W without serial
number, with four live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license
and/or permit to possess the same. The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the
morning, a jeepney driven by Alberto Juan was cruising along Quirino Highway. On
board the jeepney were four passengers: Jose Caamic, Marcos Nobio, Romeo de Vera
and accused Alolod. While inside the vehicle Alolod pushed Caamic and took a seat
facing Romeo de Vera. All of a sudden Alolod grabbed the plastic bag which de Vera
was holding. The latter resisted. Alolod then pulled out a gun and shot de Vera. Despite
his wound, he insisted on wrestling with Alolod for the possession of the bag until the
latter fired a second shot. As they grappled they fell from the jeepney while passengers
Caamic and Nobio jumped off and ran for safety. As Alolod and de Vera continued to
struggle, SPO1 Eduardo Liberato arrived but Alolod succeeded in running away with
the bag. After trial, the court a quo found the accused guilty as charged. He now comes
to us on appeal contending that the trial court erred: (a) in convicting him on the basis
of testimonies which were ostensibly concocted; (b) in upholding the theory of the
prosecution which resulted from a bungled police investigation; and, (c) in appreciating
evidence for the prosecution that were manifestly "fruits of the poisonous tree."
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
RULING: Yes. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. Rule 113 sec. 5 of the Rules of Court,
provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and
holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed
or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence.
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand
and its discovery inadvertent. When the runner wrenched himself free from the grasp
of Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of Elamparo. The members of the
buy-bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house without a
search warrant for they were pursuing a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the
police officers cornered the runner and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They
also caught Elamparo in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in
full view on tap of a table.
MAIN POINT: When police officer see person repacking marijuana, the former are not
only authorized but also duty bound to arrest the latter even without a warrant.

ISSUE: Whether the police have in their favor the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.
RULING: Yes. The gun SPOI Liberato arrived when accused Alolod and victim Romeo de
Vera were still wrestling with each other. As the officer approached them Alolod was
actually committing a crime in the presence of the police officer had personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that Alolod had committed the crime. in this case,
the warrantless arrest being legal, any evidence gathered as a result thereof cannot be
considered "fruit of a poisonous tree"; consequently, it is admissible.
MAIN POINT: The person may be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence
of the arresting officer. No offense was involved in looking from side to side and
holding the abdomen.
CASE 417
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Arrests; In flagrante delicto
People v. Elamparo (329 SCRA 404)

MAIN POINT: A peace officer may effect a warrantless arrest when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense or, an offense has just in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
CASE 416
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2: Warrantless Arrests; In flagrante delicto
People v. Mengote (210 SCRA 174)
FACTS: The Western Police District received a call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to
the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding
his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-
appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion
had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the
police headquarters for investigation. Information was filed before the RTC convicting
the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon
was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm
or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was
planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of PD.1866. In
his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
FACTS: Joel Elamparo has been convicted with Illegal Possession of Drugs. The case
was raised for automatic review. Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police
received a report from an informant that "some people are selling shabu and
marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City." Thus, Baldonado organized a
buy-bust team and deployed at a known "market" for buyers of marijuana. Thereafter,
a runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The runner then left and
returned with the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy-bust team member
then handed over the marked money and arrested the runner who freed himself and
ran. The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type house
with steel gate. Having trapped the runner inside the house, the police officers frisked
him and recovered the marked money. The police officers likewise found Joel
Elamparo repacking five bricks of "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the
round table inside the house. Elamparo was then arrested.
ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
RULING: Yes. Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless
searches and seizures have been judicially formulated: (1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches,
and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully