ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP)

vs.

Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (2003)

Facts:

Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental

organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to
Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct
seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office
of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA)
to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government
to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because
said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

Issue:

Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion

Held:

The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community"
and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not
intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause
and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection
and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in
existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how
to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived
danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally
avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations
come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim
consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and
selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious
purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church,
but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’
and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation
of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and
is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino
people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization

composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral
grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged
that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application
was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of
the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be
for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
“detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The
Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to
Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally
vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our
own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

Stone v. Graham, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on November 17, 1980,
ruled (5–4) that a Kentucky statute requiring school officials to post a copy of
the Ten Commandments (purchased with private contributions) on a wall in every
public classroom violated the First Amendment’s establishment clause, which is
commonly interpreted as a separation of church and state.

In addition to the posting of the Commandments, the Kentucky statute (1978)

required that this notation was to be placed, in small print, at the bottom of each
display: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its
adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States.” Opponents of the statute claimed that it
violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
Sydell Stone, among others, sued, and James B. Graham, the state’s
superintendent of education, was named as the respondent. A trial court upheld
the statute, ruling that its purpose was secular. The case then went to the
Kentucky Supreme Court, which was divided, thereby leaving the lower court’s
ruling in place.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On

June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated
from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious

institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and
the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary
and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will
not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in
a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to
the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation
of a civil right in the present case.

Estrada vs. Escritor

Facts:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation
of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and
has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of
and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed
by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of

“gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.

Held:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is
nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of
the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free
Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment
of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
“compelling state interest” test.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

Facts:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or
a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes
by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of
July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious

worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to
compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of
Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions.
Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted
from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline
and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the
great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

Held:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not
justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest

protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate
in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

Facts:

· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,

missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898

· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be

exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialect

· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was

violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and
license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees
covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953

· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of
Manila its permit and license fees under protest

· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and

legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment
made to the City of Manila. They contended:

a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay
any license fee or sales tax

b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the

constitutionality of the Ordinances in question

· Trial Court dismissed the complaint

· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether or not American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution
and sale of bibles

Ruling:

NO. Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or
entity engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under
Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and license from the City Treasurer. American
Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated

However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses,
trade or occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not
empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the
City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.

· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the
exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of
the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those
who do not have a full purse

· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal
Revenue Code,Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That
the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not
be taxed

· The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit

· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair

American Bible Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
 US v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL., GR No. 12592, 1918-03-08

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga

assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary
through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The justice of
the peace was notified and denied the charges.

Issues:

Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga.

Ruling:

Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution, further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed
to be true by the... petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from
office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no... way did they abuse
the privilege.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Criticism does not authorize
defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good.
As a general rule... words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty
or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are
actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple
case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged

Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

Facts:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three
resolutions which aim to:

• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members
(First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second
Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional
Convention without forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on
June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First and Third
Resolutions. Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing
Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional. Petitioner PHILCONSA, as
a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not
only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

Issues:
 1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines

violate the spirit of the Constitution – NO.

Held:

1. Yes, RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the

amendments are sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not
forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
certain conditions.

2. No, the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do

not violate the spirit of the Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are

apportioned among the provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those
who are interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading
copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter
of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so
long as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to
the Convention.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

Facts:

Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004
elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson
Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before
the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations
between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings
as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc
had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to
Garcillano. However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the
woman’s voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3
Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine
copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate
media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press
release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a ”
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of
the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued
a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom On 21 June 2005,
petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents)
on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of
expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires
when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

Issue:

Whether or not the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Held:

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society.

Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all
other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and
check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make
informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law
curtailing freedom of expression: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship
because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be
abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined
exceptions to this rule out of necessity. Only unprotected expression may be
subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on unprotected
expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint.

ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a
Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain
from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however
proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing
him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect
discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and
defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and
small offenders.

Issue:

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

Held:

Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt

and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It
is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Courtbetrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly
debase anddegrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

Facts:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to

stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN
(Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results
of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that
such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed
to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution
or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were
actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue:

Whether or not the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit
polls.

Held:
No. The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. The issuance thereof was
"pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest,
orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and
maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of
exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys
were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who
are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence
and anarchy." “Press freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a
clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It
then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering
the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll
highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in
harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In
other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

Policarpio Vs Manila Times.

Facts :
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages,
P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages,
and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the
publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of
August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se
defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized
her integrity, good name and business and official transactions, and caused her
grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish
and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The
defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The
Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E.
Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article and
the managing editor, the associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of
said newspapers
Issue:

Whether or not it is constitutional.

Held:

It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion
in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the
public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish
news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are
not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with
respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are
open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made
in good faith and without any comments or remarks In the case at bar, aside from
containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August
11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact,
was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings
there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON
FRAUD" — is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the
defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious".
We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But,
this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from
the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez
vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all
parties concerned would be served if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the
sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees

Espuelas vs People

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of
the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local
periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed
to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay
and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon
and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and
Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against
the Government of the Philippines?
Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written
bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the
seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to
persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom
and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers
not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only
all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously
refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom
the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score
alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and

tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence
from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and
substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people
to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order
to repress the evils which press upon their minds

Borjal Vs CA

Facts :

During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September

1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who
attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport
industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means
to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was
to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy
for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private
respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded
through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private
organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28
February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote
numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the
conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner
Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt
with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without
naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the
conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles
of petitioner together with the dates they were published Issue :

Issue :

Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel
Held :

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly

privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec.
11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks To
reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of
public interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against
respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's
official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the
FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds,
dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the
conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of
the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence.
These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into
account the very public character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can
be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice.

Cabansag v Fernandez

Facts:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana
Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay in the disposition
of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge ordered Cabansag and his
lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending
such letter which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President
(Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision
finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine.

Issue:
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice?

Held:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of
the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had
taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his
letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would
not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat
to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous
tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the
writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for
redress of a legitimate grievance.

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Facts

:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that
the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and
again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and
"sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was
required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo said
that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and
"bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been
decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not
pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.

Issue:

Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt

Held:

:Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been
decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the
CA. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of
ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings
disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished
for contempt: (a) those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
(b) those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful
language was used, but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is
clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them.
Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting.

IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company (PLDT)

Facts:

Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the “Manila

Standard.” He describes himself as a columnist, who “incidentally happens to be
a lawyer,”, had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At
the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated,
by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts.
And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors
of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar. The seed of the
proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August
27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374.
In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the
petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority

Court proceeding for the determination of

Issue:

Whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

Held:

Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might
cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute
contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them,
he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times
to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any
right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective
of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the most
dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges
or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor
and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no
need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The public interest
involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that
matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and
reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is
precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges
or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the
truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard
of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without
any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

GONZALEZ VS KALAW KATIGBAK

Facts:

Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain
deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought
an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.

Issue:

Whether or not this violated their freedom to expression.

Held:

Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas
and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed
an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not
enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there
were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically
dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians.

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie

entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis
of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which
dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend.
Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to
the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount
to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement"
whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing
the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the
amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters all
over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts
pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against
him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and 2) to render
an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding
2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that
the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became
and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration
and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00
only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim,
petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial
court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an

intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.
2. Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over
the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public figure.
3. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD

1. YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto
a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present
a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a
little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of
torture and brutality.
 2. YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As
held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the
benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of
their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
3. NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had
the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies
a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however,
without limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom
of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern

PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]

Facts:

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production

company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional
characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have
developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However,
acomplaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or
his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile.
Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held:

Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or
to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence
not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent
trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in
other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy.
Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which
the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film
were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to
have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in
the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposedmotion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN

Facts:

Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The

Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade
of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar
in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.

MTRCB alleged that respondents

1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review

2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and
some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:

1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-
political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of expression and of the press

2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating

committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the
program

MTRCB affirmed the ruling

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered
a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and
resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD
1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public
affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper

Hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior
its exhibition or broadcast by TV.

Held:

Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No.

1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.” It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni
Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present,
“designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs x x x.” Yet despite the fact that freedom
of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did
not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there
has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo,
did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom
“The Inside Story” which, according to respondents, is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status.

Soriano vs. Laguardia

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members
of the Iglesia niCristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in
petitioner‟s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Are Soriano‟s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the reli
gious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering
the adverse effect of petitioner‟s utterances on the viewers‟ fundamental rights
as well as petitioner‟s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‟s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to freespeech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re
theparamountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster‟s role and the power of the State toregulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
form, ratherthan the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use ofless offensive language.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the

religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing
– by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner
INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary
religious beliefs. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent
Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the
CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction
and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the
ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA
also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

Held:

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986
that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not
include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.”

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the
airing of petitioner’s religious program. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled
by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Facts:

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant

Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition,
the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence,
it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue:

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations

(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held:

Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,I n the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization

for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established

that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either

Friedman v. Rogers case

Facts:
Plaintiff optometrist filed suit against defendants, the members of a state
optometry board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement
of a state statute proscribing the composition of the board and prohibiting the
practice of optometry under a trade name. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality of the statute governing the composition of the board, but held
that the prohibition of the practice of optometry under a trade name ran afoul
of the constitutional protection of commercial speech.

Issue:

Whether or not it is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the state's interest in protecting the public from the
deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names was substantial and
well demonstrated. The statute did nothing more than require that commercial
information about optometric services appear in such as form as necessary to
prevent its being deceptive. It was also reasonable for the state legislature to
require that a majority of the board be drawn from a professional organization
that demonstrated consistent support for the rules that the board would be
responsible for enforcing.

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts:

An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue
a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe,
basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on
the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well
to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes
as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending
to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged
in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue:

Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for
two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly
or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First
construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets.
Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result
in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

REYES VS BAGATSING

Facts:

Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought to permit a

rally permit from Luneta Park to front gate of the US Embassy in Manila. Mayor
Bagatsing denied the petition. He issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit
rallying 500 meter radius around the Embassy.

Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor violated the petitioners' constitutional right.
Held:
Yes, the mayor's ordinance which prohibit the petitioners to rally violates their
constitutional right to free speech and peaceable assembly. It is settled law that
as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit,
whether an individual or a group.

Pita v. Court of Appeals

.

Facts:
Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of Manila (Ramon
Bagatsing) on December 1 and 3, 1983, members of the Metropolitan Police
Force of Manila seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. The said
materials included “Pinoy Playboy” whose co-editor and publisher is the petitioner
(Leo Pita). The said materials were burned in public along the University Belt along
CM Recto Avenue, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations. Petitioner, on December 7, 1983,
prayed for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing
and the superintendent of the Western Police District of Manila (Narciso Cabrera),
restraining them and their agents from confiscating Pinoy Playboy magazines or
from preventing the sale of the said magazine for it, according to Pita, is a decent,
artistic, and educational magazine. Five days later, petitioner filed an urgent
motion for issuance of a TRO against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and
burning of the said magazine pending hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction. In opposing petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
Mayor Bagatsing pointed that during the anti-smut campaign, the materials
confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers, who
voluntarily surrendered their reading materials and that petitioner’s establishment
was not raided. The trial court denied the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction
and dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal to the CA, RTC’s decision was
affirmed.
Issue:

Whether or not it is constitutional.

Held:
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. Pertinent
provisions state that the search must have been incident to a lawful search, and
the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. In the case at bar, no party
has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy
campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila
are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). The NBI conducted
surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video
outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired
search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants. Private
respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
Issue:

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
Held:

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier. The lower court
lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause
that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses
during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of
the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the
offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who
was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge
that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes
taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the
warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have much
credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
shown to the court during the application. The presentation of the master tapes
of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary
as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether
or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not
meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of a
copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is
an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films
to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano,

Facts:

Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the

Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking
officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon
of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a
search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office
merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials.
Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was
illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general
warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject
of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant was valid?
Held:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically
provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions
are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles
they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden
boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized.
In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.

EJO VS CA
Facts:
A SW was applied for and subsequently issued by respondents to be served in the
Registry of Deeds, provincial capitol of Isabela in which it enumerated the things
to be seized:

1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's

Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other
pertinent documents related therewith;

2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees
of the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding
payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps.

A motion to quash the SW was filed by the respondent contending that the things
to be seized were not described with particularity and was in a nature of a
general warrant, therefore, is a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures but was denied by the RTC and the
CA. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. (The OSG in its comment agreed
with petitioners.)
Issue:
Whether or not the warrant issued by the RTC was valid.

Hed:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision

of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for
and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is
sufficient. Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly
described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other property(test of
particularity).
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used
in the warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all
the records pertaining to all the transactions of the petitioner's office at the
Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant
contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular
description of the things to be seized.

Luz v. People

Facts:
PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3
Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he
told the Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it. Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2)
to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and
one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container, he asked Luz to open it. After
Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2)
of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was
later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there was
no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found
that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Issue:
Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city
ordinance, and such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?
Held:
No, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is
the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody
of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties
to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part
of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the
police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent
to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.

ANTIQUERA vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they
saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that
there was a crime, the police officers approached the house. When they peeked
through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a
pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a
jewellery box which contained shabu and unused paraphernalia. The RTC found
them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The court
affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:

Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out
a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not
notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no
activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to
the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was
illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:

Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner
selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The
search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he
had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen
went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged of possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely
under the afore cited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust
operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw
petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
 People v. Doria

Facts:

Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun”
[Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and
arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not
find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the
house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her
house. The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun”
identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked
money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house].
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table.
One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic,
and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion
aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the
box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The
bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425
[Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21
[Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Held:
No. It was a warrantless arrest. Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because
she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria.
Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person
with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean
that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the
person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating
the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
 Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person
and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot
be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT

Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command
(NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon the
bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the
bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer
asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused
opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer
inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the
accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy
each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure
Held:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are
in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time
to obtain a search warrant.
PEOPLE vs. LIBNAO

Facts:
This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga guilty of violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972). The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began
conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion
from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On
Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a
passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused. In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when
asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual
to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Captain arrived,
the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused
and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in
plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The seized articles were later brought
to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu conducted a lab
exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part,
both accused denied the accusation against them. Libnao argued that her arrest
was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She also takes
the issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues
that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.
Issue:

Whether both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecutions

evidence.
Held:
Yes. The above contentions deserve scant attention. The warrantless search in
the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence
Division had been conducting surveillance operation for 3 months in the area. The
surveillance yielded information that once a month, appellant and her co-
accused Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. It is also clear that at the time Libnao
was apprehended, she was committing offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under
the ROC, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime
in flagrante delicto.
Appellant also faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the
object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure
to formally offer them. She argues that absent any formal offer, they must be
deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by
the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the
case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly
identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. Even without their formal offer; therefore, the prosecution can still
establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their
testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined
the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants
defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
People v. Bolasa y Nakoboan

Facts:
PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon were informed by an anonymous
caller that a man and woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain
house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela. Together with SPO1 Fernando
Arenas, they proceeded immediately to the house of the suspects. As they
walked toward their quarry’s (prey) lair, the three were accompanied by their
unnamed informer. When they reached the house, they “peeped through a small
window and saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana.” They
entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants
and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some paraphernalia. Examination
of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags
contained marijuana. As such, Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were
charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Both denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and
drug implements. De los Reyes claimed that he and his wife were merely tenants
in Bolasa’s house and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work.
He added that when he learned that Bolasa was repacking marijuana inside their
room, he immediately ordered her to leave. As for Bolasa, she claimed that she
was about to leave the house when she met a certain “Rico” and conversed with
him for some time. The trial court, upon finding the version of the prosecution to
be plausible, convicted both accused Bolasa and delos Reyes
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was valid.

Held:
An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. The manner by which accused were apprehended
does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. From the above,
the arrest is illegal. It cannot be said that the objects were seized in plain view.
First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused were illegally
arrested. Second, the evidence later on found to contain marijuana was not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the
window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants
inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be recognized as a search of
a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search or a stop
and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for
evidence at hand is deprived of any such showing. It indicates that the
apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering
that the entities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained.
After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause for arresting accused, they (the police) should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio,
the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence obtained during
the illegal search cannot be used against accused; hence, they were acquitted.
People v. Johnson

Facts:
Defendant drove his car into and killed victim, who was in her car as well.
Defendant had earlier robbed two men and fled in the stolen vehicle which struck
the victim. Defendant was driving 58 mph at the time of collision. After collision,
defendant fled the scene into a nearby marsh where he was eventually captured.
Defendant told police that he fled “just because I heard the sirens.” In the
defendant’s car police found a gun. Defendant’s murder charge was enhanced
by use of a firearm and that he killed the victim in the commission of two felony
robberies. Defendant later testified that he sped up because he saw a police
car, but the car did not have lights or sirens on. He later denied hearing sirens.
Defendant primarily argues that he had found a place of safety after the crime
where he was not being chased by police before the homicide occurred.
Jury convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances. “He pled guilty
to charges of assault with a firearm, vehicle theft, being an ex-felon in possession
of a deadly weapon, and two counts of robbery.”

Issus:
Whether based on the facts there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that murder occurred in the commission of two felony robberies.

Held:
Yes. “When an officer or citizen is murdered while in immediate pursuit of a robber
who flees from the scene of the crime with the fruit of that offense, the killing is in
perpetration of the robbery-a crime that is not legally complete until the robber
has won his or her way even momentarily to a place of temporary safety. When
the robber is still in flight, he or she has not yet achieved a place of temporary
safety.” There is evidence to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was in
constant flight. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant did not
have time to change into the suit he carried, nor did he have time to dispose of
his weapon and that it was impossible in terms of timing to have reached the
neighborhood he claimed to be the temporary place of safety. “A fleeing
robber’s failure to reach a place of temporary safety is sufficient to establish the
continuity of the robbery within the felony-murder rule.
Terry v. Ohio
Facts:

Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat that he had

been patrolling for many years when he observed two strangers (Terry and
another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back
and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was
followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they
were joined by a third man (Katz) who thereafter left swiftly. Suspecting the two
men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’, the officer followed them and saw them rejoin
the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached
the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men
mumbled something, whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his
outside clothing, and felt in his overcoat pocket – but was unable to remove – a
pistol. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to
face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did
not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing
in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry’s or Chilton’s
outer garments until he felt the guns. Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons, which was
denied by the trial court. Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court to
question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting conviction.
Issue:

Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him and thus his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper?

Held:.
Yes, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against him; thus, his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper. First, in assessing the
reasonableness of stop-and-frisk as a valid form of warrantless search, the U.S.
Supreme Court held: The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFadden’s taking steps to investigate [Terry’s] suspicious behavior, but rather,
whether there was justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry's personal security
by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now
concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in
addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Next, on the
distinction between protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk on one
hand, and arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other hand, it was
declared: An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom
from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are
likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is
inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that
because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension
of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information
to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to seizures constituting arrests and searches incident
thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests sought to be vindicated
and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and
thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular
types of conduct under the [right against unreasonable search and seizure].

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote

Facts:

A telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo
Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They
saw two men “looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife.
The weapons were taken from them.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure is violated
Held:
The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires
that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of
the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at
bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was merely “looking
from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense
that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s
no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
 PAPA VS. MAGO

Facts:

Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the
goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search
conducted by them since it was made without any search warrant and whether
the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.
Issue:
Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect
the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff
and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person
on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that
except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful
for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or
otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into
the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for
trial and forfeiture.
 SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE

Facts:

Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable
goods (branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were observing their conduct
and found it to be suspicious during a special mission given to them to make a
routine surveillance to check on reports of alleged trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by PAL employees. Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.
Held:
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission
of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the
airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly
effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.

In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who
are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized
to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other
movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items
have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs
law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person
suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent
schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The
Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be
reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which
the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as
an individual’s private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply
this State policy which we have continued to affirm.
 Valmonte v. De Villa

Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.

Issue:
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?
Held:
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
 VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA

Facts:
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Issue:

Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
Held:

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal

right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to
be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner Valmonte’s general
allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e.,
without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle,
or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting
up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
 PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ

Facts:

Dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal
(victim, San Antonio’s ex-live-in partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun
(9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was
demanding him to go out Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that
Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately went back to the room
and closed the door. The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a
gun (.35 caliber revolver). The two immediately grappled each other and not long
after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor. Appellant told San
Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he used
and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self defense. According to the
autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating
(upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his
life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the heart. Dela Cruz had no
license to carry the firearm.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-
defense in order to extenuate him from the crime.
Held: No.

Three conditions must concur to extenuate him: Unlawful aggression by the

person injured or killed presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude – but most importantly at the time the defensive action was
taken against the aggressor. In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door
with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a gun at him was
able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He
could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim. Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression
The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of
self defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill. Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself When the
appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures,
appellant could no longer argue that there was no provocation on his part
 Camara v. Municipal Court

Facts:
On November 6, 1963, a Housing inspector (Health Department) entered an
apartment building for a routine annual inspection. The building manager told
him that Camara, who leased the ground floor, was living in part of the space,
which was not authorized for residential usage. The inspector confronted Camara
and was refused entry to the space. Two days later, the inspector returned, and
was again denied entry. A citation was mailed to Camara, and he failed to
appear at the district attorney’s office, as ordered. Two weeks later, two more
inspectors again visited Camara and informed him that he was in violation of the
law. Camara was charged with violating a California law requiring him to permit
warrantless inspections of his residence by housing inspectors. He was arrested
and filed a writ of prohibition on the charge. The lower courts, basing their opinion
on earlier Supreme Court rulings, upheld the charge against Camara.
Issue:
May the law require warrantless inspections of property?

Held
No. While the Court held that allowing such warrantless inspections to be a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court agreed that the needs of the
community for safety might outweigh the blanket prohibition on such searches.
The Court agreed that “area inspections” might be appropriate, and defined that
search as designating an area in need of inspection services and requesting a
blanket warrant for that area. The appropriate standard may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building or the condition of the entire area. The
Court stated that: “The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a
decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental
interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a
suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-
honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the
probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the
competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills
the historic purposes behind the consituational right to be free from unreasonable
government invasions of privacy.”
 Umil vs. Ramos

Facts:
Dural shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers. He was charged with double murder without bail.
Later, Bernardo Itucal was included as defendant. A petition for habeas corpus
was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. Umil
and Villanueva were charged for violating the Anti-subversion Act but
subsequently posted bail and were released. The double murder case filed
against Dural and Itucal proceeded to trial. The two were found guilty and were
serving their sentences at the time the petition was filed. Hence, the writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural. Rogelio Ramos was a former NPA
member but surrendered to the authorities. He informed the military regarding
Communist Party’s operations in Manila. He even identified several NPA members
and pointed to Renato Constantino’s house as a safe house by the CPP-NPA. A
search warrant was issued, where numerous firearms, ammunition, and other
communications equipment were found. Constantino was apprehended and
brought to the CIS headquarters where he admitted being a member of the CPP-
NPA.On the same evening, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s house to
deliver letters to the rebels. He also had a piece of paper with the jumbled
telephone number of Amelia Roque’s sister. Buenaobra was also apprehended
and upon questioning, admitted to being a member of the CPP-NPA. Amelia
Roque was also found using the leads the military got. Her house was searched
where subversive documents, ammunition and a fragmentation grenade were
found. Roque and her companions were taken to Camp Crame. However,
Roque admitted that the articles belonged to her and her companions were
consequently released. Buenaobra and Roque were charged of violating the
Anti- subversion Act. Roque was also charged of violating PD 1866. A petition for
habeas corpus was filed on their behalf, but Buenaobra later withdrew his petition
and preferred to stay in Camp Crame.
Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid – YES

Held:
In all the cases above, criminal charges have been filed against the petitioners.
Hence, habeas corpus is not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such
person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue.

The court refused to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile, where it was held that
the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed after an information has been filed. The
remedy would be that the Court inquires into every phase of detention and that
all cases of deprivation of liberty be brought to the courts for immediate scrutiny
and disposition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in
the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after
the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and
seizure is violated

Held:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules
of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was
about to be committed or had just been committed. A vessels and aircraft are
subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured. In the present case, from the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause,
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team had determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not
necessary. The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge
and not law enforcement agents.

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

Facts:

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10,
1984. The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the search
found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which
they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his
application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the
company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of
whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn
to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before him.

Issue:
Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in
issuing the Search Warrant.

Held:
Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
(See Rule 126, Sec 4) The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need
to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying
for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses
whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned. In other words,
the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by
settled jurisprudence.
 Vivares vs STC
Facts:

This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the students
involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of them wearing wearing no
shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were taken while they were
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos were reported to
the STC’s computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked
several of her students to show her other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-
mentioned graduating students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of
Cebu wearing clothing which shows their black brassieres (duh, Sinulog? Hello?);
them drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar (Private property
OUTSIDE school premises); and that their Facebook accounts were accessible to
any Facebook user. Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the
school authorities. The poor students involved were investigated and were barred
to attend their highschool graduation rites which is experienced by a person once
in their lifetime. Heartless. A case was filed against the STC and its officials for
Injunction and Damages. Injunction as to the order of the school not to allow the
poor children to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students involved)
assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully invaded. Since the
Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That the photos were
owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital copies and subsequently showed
them to the STC’s officials.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?

Held:
No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
 The Disini Case
Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act

(RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The
cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for greater information
and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not
filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself
of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read. And because linking
with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated
can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in
sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the
internet. For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the
use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government
certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening
and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. But
petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
Issues:
The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny
standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people.
Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is
seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these
guaranteed freedoms.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal
protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his
real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due
process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of
the press.
Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution.

Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a
sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child
pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be.

Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited

commercial communications?

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel
as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?
Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA
10175 constitutional?
Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?

Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and

constitutional?
Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional?

Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and

constitutional?

Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?

Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid
and constitutional?

Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional?

Held:
No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds
nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemnable act.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech.
Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law,
have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step
beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating
criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.

No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is
reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of
the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one
uses the name that the law condemns.

No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these
zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who
acquire or use identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity
theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The
Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established
through overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking
of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the
quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special
circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended.

The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law

makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is
a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty.
Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person
the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which us not accorded
the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob
him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the
offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There is actual
malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with
the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. The reckless disregard standard used here required a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to
establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public
official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the
accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement
even if it was in fact true.
A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace
communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind,
cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of
fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise
robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law
that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed
through the use of information and communication technology and similar crimes
committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender
often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm.
The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of
Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the
crimes of:
Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under

both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription,
and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission
of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement
authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of
the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law
enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.

Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that
data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue
deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve on orders
of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of
the issuance of such orders.
Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the
enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after
judicial intervention.
Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and
use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court
warrant.
Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable
right to require the service provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely
for him in its storage system.
Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial
intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech.

Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which

are not struck down by the Court.
and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself
when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.

GANAAN V IAC
Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning,
Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the

telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant
called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where
to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife
at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed
with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or

arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200
Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone
line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
 Pollo vs David
Facts:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office

No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division
(PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC.
On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an
unsigned complaint letter which was marked “Confidential” and was sent
through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City. The letter contain allegations that the petitioner have been
helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender pleas
that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good
behaviour of their office. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four
personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo
directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the
files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of
computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several
employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and
the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of
the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair.
Issue:
Legality of the search conducted in the petitioner’s office computer and the
copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a
transgression of his constitutional right to privacy.
Held:

Yes. In sum, we conclude that the “special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable,” x x x
for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of
work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly
burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under
all the circumstances

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act
fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on
the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office.
That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since
these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files,
that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic
and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the
probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless
search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the
regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified,
through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from
his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on
computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality.
It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the
evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily
fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also
untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions
into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities.
 People vs. Albofera,

Facts:
Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro
Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but
did not participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of
the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The
accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial
confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was
forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered
the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the
victim) to die by stabbing.” Esma testified against the accused during the trial.
While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter
introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking
Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.
Issue:

Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of

alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?
Held:

No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an
unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion
into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its
recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the
course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in
the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated
in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his
culpability.

ZULUETA VS. CA
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic
without the latter's knowledge and consent. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife
of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;
Held:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

Facts:
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A.
9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of
secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with
an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

Issues:
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution?

3. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
4.
Held:

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution. In essence, Pimentel
claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County,
et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following
principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have
a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
 duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia,
supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, G.R. NO. 120915

Facts:
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling
Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume
of marijuana. Acting on said tip, Abello assembled a team. Said team
proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon
1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank building along
Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner
Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same
day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the
informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then carrying a travelling
bag. Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello
asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the
former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.” The team confiscated the bag
together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature.
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation
where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana
leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to
Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby
violating accused-appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence. RTC convicted accused-
appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana
from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant
violated the latter’s constitutional rights.

Held:
Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-
appellant’s bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:

Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was
she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-
appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger
of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court
could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search
was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as
evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
 MMDA vs Garin

Facts:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
driver’slicense was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA
ChairmanProspero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his
preference for hiscase to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the
chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec
5 (f) of RA 7924 violates theconstitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowingMMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited
fines and penalties. RTC rule in hisfavor, directing MMDA to return his license and
for the authority to desist fromconfiscating driver’s license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be heard inan appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and
regulations constitutional.

Held:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is nota
local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power
and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police
power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the
commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that
empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, People’sOrganizations, NGO’s and
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions
are administrative in nature.
 SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts:

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027
reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down
the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period
of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the
MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues:

1. W/N respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. W/N the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to
the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are
citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it
has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G. R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Facts:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.

2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En
Banc or any if its divisions.

3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.

5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-

neutral regulation.

6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.

7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Held:

FIRST ISSUE:

No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this
court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective
right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to
choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally

imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE:

No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in
this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

THIRD ISSUE:

No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court
held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE:

Yes.The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,

being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law
and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution

to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE:

Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to

restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court

has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be

substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’”
“Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE:

Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public,
the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their
property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE:
No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members
of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose
or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . .
to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
A regulation is constitutional when:

It has a secular legislative purpose;

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. ... Under
the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First Amendment is
that freedom to carry out one's duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right,
not one dependent on the grace of legislature.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills

Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Hierarchy of rights
Facts:

Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for
allegedly violating the no strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacañang. PBMEO
was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 against
abuses of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third shifts
will participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the said
demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day
before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office
operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to
report for the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their
CBA. However, union officers said there was no violation because the
demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company. They added
that the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned
by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM.
PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for
passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue:

Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. Violated PBMEO’s freedom of expression
and assembly on the grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for
participating in a mass demonstration.

Held:

VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no
violation of the “no strike-no lockout” provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of
bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom of
speech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig police’s
abuse of
power, went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized
material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion for
reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and may be
overruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free speech.

Alde, Elyzaldy B.Balacuit et al., vs. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City G.R. No. L-38429 June 1988

Facts:

This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April
21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged
in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions,
games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and
12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should
charge only one-half of the said ticket.Petitioners who are managers of theaters,
affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June
30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan
is valid and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinema to graphs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in
the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to
invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of
the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the
guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not
final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.The Court likewise
ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid
exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling
subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they think most for their
own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs.THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge, RegionalTrial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as
City Fiscal of Manila. G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986
Test of Police Power
Fact:

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the
alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the
inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt
or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22
is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is
presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than
a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act
of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to
coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against

imprisonment for debt.
Held:

BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.Checks have
become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce.Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes
the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished. Any
practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the
banking community.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL

Facts:

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating

drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known
as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to
the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as
tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further,
That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall
be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended.

The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations
to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug
Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax
deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other
deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was
computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax
credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was
deducted directly from the tax due amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall
include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or
generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of
medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the
senior citizens.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount
would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide
a scheme to justly compensate the discount.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional
or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the
equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

Held:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding

to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a
just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters,
concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a
form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending
the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable
of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the
great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila

Facts:

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same
was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord. 4760 sought to regulate hotels
and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed
at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone
who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned
the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-
Malate.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is against the due process clause.

Held:
 The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation
of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of
facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the
revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as
well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact
definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the
ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason
enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the
said ordinance alleged to be vague.

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

Facts:

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and
are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he
earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is
constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare.
De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

Issue:

Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the

exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord. 84 which is further
in pursuant to RA 938.

Held:

The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals,
a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized
by over breadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the
title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the
business of cabarets.

Velasco vs. Villegas

Facts:

Respondents-appellants Villegas et al, through the city of Manila, promulgated

Ordinance No. 4964 prohibiting for any operator of any barber shop to conduct
the business of massaging customers or any persons in any adjacent rooms
of said barbershop or in any room or rooms within the building where the
barbershop is located. As long as the operator of the barbershop and the room
where the massaging is conducted is the same person.

Petitioner’s Velasco et al, a member of Sta. Cruz Association, in own behalf and
representing the other owners of the barbershop in the city of Manila filed in the
lower court a suit of declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance which they contented that it deprives the property of the petitioners
of their means of livelihood wihout due process. The lower court dismissed the
petition thus prompted the petitioners to file an instant petition before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not city of Manila Ordinance 4964 is unconstitutional and therefore an

improper exercise of Police Power.

Held:

No. SC declared that the ordinance is not unconstitutional. SC held that the
power vested in the city of Manila is an exercise of Police Power as embodied on
Sec. 16 of RA7160 or the Local Gov’t Code of 1991 where the general welfare
clause assails the statutory grant of police power to local gov’t units and thus the
city of Manila passed such ordinance for the protection of public morals.

The respondent-appellants are correct in their argument that the objective of the
ordinance is to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinics and not to regulate the business of barbershop or to forestall the
possible immorality as a consequence in the construction of separate rooms the
massage of customers. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court
through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause,
which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above
stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.”

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

Facts:

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end,
it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmas season.Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.
The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and
the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The
media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare
of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the
Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.On the other hand, the respondents
invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid.

Held:

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16. General Welfare .
— Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute
CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v. JUDGE LAGUIO

Facts:

Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), contends

that the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that
the Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the
legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected.The petitioners, on the other
hand, argues that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
[Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code] and that the Ordinance
was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in conjunction with its police powers [Article III, Section
18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409].Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. He also granted the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. Hence, the appeal by the
petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance No. 7783 is constitutional

Held:
 NO. There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case
of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels
and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to
those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to
prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations;and it may even impose increased license
fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of
we reiterate our support for it. But in spite of its the judiciary virtuous aims, the
enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand
on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the
operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion
without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guise of due
process and equal protection of laws of police power.The petition is DENIED and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance void is AFFIRMED.

Ortigas& Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust

Facts:

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal. On
March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and
6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff
executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon
payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale
thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of
the deeds of sale “shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes”.
The restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering
the said lots issued in the name of Chavez. Eventually, defendant-appellee
acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also annotated in their
corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez “free from all liens
and encumbrances” while Lot No.6 was acquired through a “Deed of Exchange”
from Republic Flour Mills. Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part
of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development
of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where
commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. Defendant
maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to
the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
Resolution No.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff
“completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing
EDSA” and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it “only on June 23, 1962
or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone”.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee.

Held:

1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was
impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not
dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-
appellant cannot now change its position on appeal. However, assuming that it
is not yet too late to question the validity of the said resolution, the posture is
unsustainable.

Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy

Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it
certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word “regulation”
under the provision.

An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a
municipality should be “liberally
construed in its favor” and that “any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government
and it shall be presumed to exist.” An exception to the general welfare powers
delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will conflict with
vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at
bar.

2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not

absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Invariably described as the “most essential, insistent
 ENEDINA PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC

Facts:

A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction

was filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short)
against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and
substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed
Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only
for residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of
association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55. Presley, as lessee of the
property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same
address. At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from
Makati Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was already
annotated in their title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot must be
used only for residential purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2"). When BAVA came to know
of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a letter to the defendants asking
them to desist from operating the store (Exh. "D"). Under the existing Deed
Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a purely
residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered in the
name of BAVA. During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner
Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two
daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson. The issues
raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the consolidated
cases decided by this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988 entitled
Sangalang Doctrine.

Issues:

1. W/N the Sangalang Doctrine can be consider in the case at bar.

2. W/N the Deed of Restrictions entirely wrong.

Held:

We have carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to

reconsider the Sangalang doctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private
respondent has come out with mere assertions and allegations. It failed to present
any proofs or convincing arguments to substantiate its claim that Jupiter Street is
still classified as a residential zone. (See Filinvest v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 664
[1990]) No new zoning re-classification, ordinance, certification to the effect or
jurisprudence for that matter was brought to the attention of this Court which
would necessarily compel us to take a second look at the Sangalang Case. The
Court cannot reverse a precedent and rule favorably for the private respondent
on the strength of mere inferences.

The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding
the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the
provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations
freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be
enforced against the petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the
use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens title can be
impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.
(Ortigas& Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).

Knights of Rizal Vs. DMCI Homes, Inc

Facts:

DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila. The said lot
was earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila Condominium project.
After having acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI
was ready to commence the intended project. However, the City of Manila
Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the Building Permit until such
time that issues had been cleared. Consultations after consultations had he been
initiated both by the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City
Council of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and confirming all previously
issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City for Torre de Manila.

Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO, and
later a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project. The KOR
argued that the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the
monument, an endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a
construction borne out of bad faith.

Issue:

Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials
to stop the construction of Torre de Manila.

Held:

No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project.
It was not even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order. The
project was way well from the Park where the monument was located. The SC
ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It is
categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act,
and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of
such act.” In the case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it found
in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the construction of such building
outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building was within the background
sight line or vision of the Rizal Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit
and, thus dismissed.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc.

vs. The Board of Transportation et al

Facts:

On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its purpose the phasing out of
old and dilapidated taxis which are 6 years older. The law is set to be immediately
implemented in Metro Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere.
Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Circ 52
which is the IRR of the law in the NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the
law. It avers, among other things, that the Circular in question violates their right
to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro
Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should
be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by the

implementation of the said circular.

Held:

The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOT’s reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places,
are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation

services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the
object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection
clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical
or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.

Philippine Ports Authority vs Cipres Stevedoring

Facts:

Cargo handling operations in Dumaguete City were granted to respondent

Cipres Stevedoring since 1976. On 1990, petitioner Philippine Ports Authority issued
Administrative Order 03-90 outlining the guidelines and procedures in the
selection and award of cargo handling contracts in all government ports as well
as cargo handling services. Respondent was able to continue with its business by
virtue of hold-over permit granted by PPA. While the second hold-over permit was
in effect, PPA issued AO 03-2000 expressly provides that all contract for cargo
handling services of more than three years shall be awarded through public
bidding. Cipres filed for TRO contending that substantial number of workers in the
port of Dumaguete City faced the risk of displacement. Moreover, the possibility
existed that the contract for cargo handling in Dumaguete City would be
awarded to an incompetent and inexperienced participant in the bidding
process unlike respondent which had already invested substantial capital in its
operations in the port of said city. RTC decided in favour of Cipres. PPA filed
petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance and implementation of PPA AO 03-2000 violated the
constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract.

Held:

Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. Stevedoring services are
imbued with public interest and subject to the state’s police power. The Manila
South Harbor is public property owned by the State. The operations of this
premiere port of the country, including stevedoring work, are affected with public
interest. Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public
good and in the interest of general welfare.

PPA is empowered, after consultation with relevant government agencies, to

make port regulations particularly to make rules or regulation for the planning,
development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and management
of any port or port district in the country.51 With this mandate, the decision to bid
out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country is properly within
the province and discretion of petitioner which we cannot simply set aside absent
grave abuse of discretion on its part.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THECHIEF OF THE PNP,et al

Facts:

Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
“Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence” (Guidelines)issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief
of the Philippine National Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed
gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,requested the DILG to reconsider
the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied.
Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, asChief
of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of
the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

Issues:

1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;

2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police

power.

Held:

1. Authority of the PNP Chief.

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments:
the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of
the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

The power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
“delegata potestas non potest delegari” – “delegated power may not be
delegated.”

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power
to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the
power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the
authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to
deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other
lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him
to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of
the Act.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary
(PC).Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and,
therefore,assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as
one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s
“power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters
as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of
the PNP.

2.Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right
protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to
be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state
is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:(1)The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class,require the exercise of the police power; and(2)The means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the
need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,
particularly those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose
a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably,the motivating factor in the issuance of the
assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are
appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and are not unduly oppressive In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying
of firearms outside of residence
. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may
re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry
their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam
around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to
apprehend them. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila

Facts:

On Dec. 11 1916 presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain
lands used by the Chinese Community as their cemetery be expropriated for an
extension of Rizal Avenue. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if
expropriation would take effect, it would disturb there sting places of the dead,
and would require a large sum of money to transfer the bodies; furthermore,the
expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement. Plaintiff’s theory
however is that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority
to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only
function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in
question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the
land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.

Issue:

W/N the City of Manila may expropriate the lands used as cemetery for extending
Rizal Avenue.

Held:

Under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the City of Manila), the city has
the authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. However, said
charter contains no procedure by which the authority may be carried not effect,
and how eminent domain may be exercised. The Court the no pines that the
power of the court is not limited to determining WON a law exists permitting the
plaintiff to expropriate. The right of expropriation is not inherent in municipal
corporations, and before it can exercise such some law must exist to confer such
power. When the courts determine the question,they must find only that a law
exists for such a reason, and that the right or authority being exercised is in
accordance with the law. In the present case, there are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: 1, the land must be private,
and 2,the purpose must be public. If the court upon trial finds that neither exists or
either fails, it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law.

The necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not a
judicial question. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity of appropriating private
property for a particular improvement for public use, and may select the exact
location of the improvement. The questions of utility of proposed improvement,
the extent of public necessity for its construction, the expediency f constructing it,
the suitableness of its location and the necessity of taking the land for its site are
all questions exclusive for the legislature to determine. The taking of private
property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of
the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent
domain,and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.

WON the cemetery is private or public is immaterial. The Court opines that it is
difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law providing expressly
that such places under such circumstances should be violated. To disturb the
mortal remains of those endeared to us in life becomes sometimes the sad duty
of the living, but except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, the sanctity
of the grave should be maintained. In the present case, even granting that a
necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record shows no proof
of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows
that the adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of
charge, which should answer every purpose of the plaintiff

Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the

Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to
initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land.
Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The
mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the
expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan
that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the
expropriation nonetheless.

Issue:

Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a

municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Held:

Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in
the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers
conferred upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case
in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for
the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as
invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

LAGCAO V. LABRA

Facts:

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover
that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued.
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City
Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of
the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for
the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners,
during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant
to RA 7279. In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose
of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use
contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people.
Issue:

Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

Held:

It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent.
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation
of the right to exercise eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case,
there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular
choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of
petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs.

MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METROMANILA

Facts:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a

municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
The residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square
meter property of the Ching Cuancos which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal
mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners
were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use
as an access road but they rejected the offer.The municipality filed a complaint,
against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19
of the Local Government Code.

The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention
to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell
the same portion. The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property.
On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought
to be expropriated. The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens
at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord
Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property. Plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with called Damayan
Street.JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention,
which motion the RTC granted. During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiff’s
messenger, testified on direct examination that on February 23, 1993, he served a
letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure,
to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store. The plaintiff offered in evidence a
photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco
to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property
to the co-owners.

However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.RTC:
plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for
which the same is expropriated. As gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance
No. 21, there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer
requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is
the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.CA: affirmed the
order of the RTC. Plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be made to the
owner.

The letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to

discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial
compliance with the “valid and definite offer” requirement under said Section 19.

Issues:
1. WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the
Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property
prior to the filing of the complaint
2. WON property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may
still be expropriated by the respondent
Held:
1. NO. The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a
valid and definite offer (Art 35 IRR of LGC) to the owner of the property before
filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon
the condemn or to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by
agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will
result in the dismissal of the complaint.An offer is a unilateral proposition which
one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power
of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the
offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation. The offer must be complete,
indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely
stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require,
among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or
consideration of the envisioned contract.The respondent failed to prove that
before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire
the property for public use as an access road. - Even if the letter was, indeed,
received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase
a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for
only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss
the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.

2. Yes. Court rejected the contention of the petitioner that its property can no
longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the
construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members.

SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(through the Armed Forces of the Philippines)
G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
Eminent Domain

Facts:
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally
owned by Ismael D.Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject
parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject of an
expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines
docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of
P9,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated.
On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of
land.However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government.

Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new
titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T.
Nos. 128197 (Lot No.933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by
defendant-appellee. In 1995,defendant-appellee begun construction of
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is the
owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the
expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos.128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued
that defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because
it was not its lawful owner.
In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also
claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the
executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the
expropriation was never consummated because the government did not
actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation.

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding
SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual
possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. It also found that there was no
valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that consideration
was paid for the subject properties.

Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute
ownership over the subject properties.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI
Decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of
the subject properties, and thus,the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and
binding on the original owners, and SRRDC,which merely stepped into the latter's
shoes, is similarly bound.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings;
(b)respondent had a better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is
not guilty of laches

Ruling:

The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among
which is thatwhen the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the
CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long become final and executory. However,
this assertion would compound the

Republic’s predicament, because the Republic could not adequately explain its
failure to register its ownership over the subject property or, at least, annotate its
lien on the title. Trying to extricate itself from this quandary, the Republic belatedly
presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July
9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933
effectively prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even only
annotating its lien, over the property.

The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as
no appeal was perfected by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore,
contradicted by the Republic’s own allegation that an appeal had been filed by
the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue of
the Republic’s failure to register the property in its name, it also did not give any
explanation as to why title and continuous possession of the property remained
with SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for fifty-six years. The CA ruling that
disregards these established facts and neglects to reconcile the contradiction
mentioned above does not deserve concurrence by this Court.

In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid. Without
FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just
compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be
expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the
unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the
expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.

Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly
construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private
property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the
State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is
to ride roughshod over private rights.

From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the
Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full
payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More
importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation,
in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at
least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of
title.

The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from
the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land
Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the
aforesaid registration requirement.

From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause
the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of
expropriation on the title. Yet, not onlydid the Republic fail to register the subject
properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.
LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions.
One exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the
effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.

Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer
negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings
before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on a number of
expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was still registered in
the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that
legal action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot
remained registered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its
transferees. This silence and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly
constitute laches.

The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice
to the whole world. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go
beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the
property.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title,
bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PLDT

Facts:

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System

by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT tenable government offices to call private parties. Their subscription
agreement prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone
subscriber for his private use.
The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the
same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the
Bureau's) own schedule of rates. On 7April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which
their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities,
referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only
for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general
public, in competition with the business of the PLDT. Soon after, it disconnected
the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint for
judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the
Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout
the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant
company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or
restore those severed.

ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the
Republic.

HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter
into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal
terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and
conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or
undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the
court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel
the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the
needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property,without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation,be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use
of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII,
of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer
utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no
reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone
systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC vs COMELEC

Facts :

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, filed by Philippine Press Institute Inc for the court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and
any of if its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter
directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at
the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions
of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No.
2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the
press and of expression.

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf
of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-
compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the
questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection
with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of
allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for
the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time,
however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and
its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections

is valid.
Held :

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec
in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to
"donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case
or controversy.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the
related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and
void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The
Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor

Facts:

In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay.
The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have
jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the
power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then
Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected
title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.
Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the
value of the subject property was less than P20,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.

Held:

Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniaryestimation; . . . . .” The present action involves
the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and thatsuch right is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.What are the two phases of expropriation cases? The first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It endswith an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawfulright to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
thecomplaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the filing of thecomplaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained,
would be a final one, of course, since it finallydisposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, wouldan order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedingsbefore the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the proprietythereof) shall be filed or heard.”

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.” This is done by the Court with theassistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on thebasis of the evidence
before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finallydispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding theissue. . . .It should be stressed that the primary
consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the governmentor any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence,the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity
of the expropriation, and theobservance of due process. In the main, the subject
of an expropriation suit is the government’sexercise of eminent domain, a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation

Republic vs. Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi

Facts:

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in1947 refused to extend the lease, Castellvi commenced
expropriation proceedings in 1959. During theassessment of just compensation,
the government argued that it had taken the property when thecontract of lease
commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that
thedisputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy
the said land as lesseebecause the essential elements of the “taking” of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely(1) entrance and occupation by
condemner upon the private property for more than a momentaryperiod, and (2)
devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
allbeneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

Issue:

Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemner has
entered andoccupied the property as lessee.

Held:

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in1959. The essential elements of the taking are:(1) Expropriator must
enter a private property,(2) for more than a momentary period,(3) and under
warrant of legal authority,(4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such away as(5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.In the case at bar,
these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied
theproperty under a contract of lease. The “taking of the Castellvi property should
not be reckoned from1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant
to the contract of lease, and that justcompensation to be paid for the Castellvi
property should not be determined on the basis of the valueof the property as of
that year. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the
"justcompensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruledthat when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminentdomain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. The"taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paidmust, therefore, be reckoned as of
June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.In expropriation
proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which
itwould bring the most in the market. 17 The owner may thus show every
advantage that his property

possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in
the market may besatisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that the
property is suitable for division intovillage or town lots. The decision: (1) Castellvi’s
lands are declared expropriated for public use; fair market value is at P5/sqm;(3)
Republic must pay Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her
one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of
P151,859.80 that she withdrew outof the amount that was deposited in court as
the provisional value of the land, with interest at the rateof 6% per annum from
July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (4)
theRepublic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just
compensation for hertwo parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square
meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00that she withdrew out of the amount that
was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands,with interest at the
rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made
ordeposited in court; (5) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced;
and (6) costs againstappellant

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the

regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to
the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents
of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or
confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power,
since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not
for the benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private
property.

Held:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private
property. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemeteries.
State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking
of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for
the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward
and not the police power of the state.
 People vs. Juan Fajardo

Facts:
On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7,
series of 1950,providing that “any person or persons who will construct or repair a
building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor,” that “a fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each
building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued,” and that any violation of
the provisions of the ordinance shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not
less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more
than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building
destroys theview of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. 4 years later, after
the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired,he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia,
filed a written request with the incumbent municipalmayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
landregistered in Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway and
separated from the publicplaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was
denied, for the reason among others thatthe proposed building would destroy
the view or beauty of the public plaza. On 18 January 1954,Fajardo and Babilonia
reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request wasturned
down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their formerhouse having been destroyed by a typhoon
and hitherto they had been living on leased property.On 26 February 1954,
Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before and convicted by the justice of the
peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and
Babiloniaappealed to the Court of First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the
conviction, and sentenced bothto pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well
as to demolish the building in question because itdestroys the view of the public
plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealedto the Court of
Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because
theappeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

Issue:

Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the ground
that theproposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an undue
deprivation of the useof the property in question, and thus a taking without due
compensation.

Held:
The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and
Babilonia waspredicated on the ground that the proposed building would
“destroy the view of the public plaza”by preventing its being seen from the public
highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance isunreasonable and oppressive, in
that it operates — to permanently deprive the latter of the rightto use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to
ataking of the property without just compensation. But while property may be
regulated in theinterest of the general welfare such as to regard the
beautification of neighborhoods asconducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibitstructures offensive to the sight,
the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanentlydivest owners of
the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely
topreserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case
now stands, everystructure that may be erected on Fajardo’s land, regardless of
its own beauty, stands condemnedunder the ordinance in question, because it
would interfere with the view of the public plaza fromthe highway. Fajardo would,
in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused forthe obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve
thatresult, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On

June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated
from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious

institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and
the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary
and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will
not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in
a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to
the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation
of a civil right in the present case.

Estrada vs. Escritor

Facts:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation
of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and
has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of
and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed
by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of

“gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.

Held:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is
nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of
the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free
Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment
of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
“compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the
opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed
religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30)
days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

Facts:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or
a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes
by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of
July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious

worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to
compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of
Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions.
Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted
from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline
and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the
great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

Held:

YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not
justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest

protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate
in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

Facts:

· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,

missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898

· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be

exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialect

· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was

violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and
license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees
covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953

· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of
Manila its permit and license fees under protest

· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and

legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment
made to the City of Manila. They contended:

a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay
any license fee or sales tax

b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the

constitutionality of the Ordinances in question

· Trial Court dismissed the complaint

· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether or not American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution
and sale of bibles

Ruling:
NO. Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or
entity engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under
Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and license from the City Treasurer. American
Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated

However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses,
trade or occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not
empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the
City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.

· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the
exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of
the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those
who do not have a full purse

· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal
Revenue Code,Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That
the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not
be taxed

· The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit
· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair
American Bible Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

US v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL., GR No. 12592, 1918-03-08

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga

assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary
through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The justice of
the peace was notified and denied the charges.

Issues:

Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga.

Ruling:

Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution, further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed
to be true by the... petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from
office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no... way did they abuse
the privilege.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Criticism does not authorize
defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good.

As a general rule... words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty

or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are
actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple
case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Malicious and untrue communications are not privilege

Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

Facts:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three
resolutions which aim to:

• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members
(First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second
Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional
Convention without forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on
June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First and Third
Resolutions. Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing
Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional. Petitioner PHILCONSA, as
a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not
only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

Issues:

2. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines

violate the spirit of the Constitution – NO.

Held:

5. Yes, RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the

amendments are sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not
forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
certain conditions.

6. No, the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do

not violate the spirit of the Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are

apportioned among the provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those
who are interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading
copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter
of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so
long as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to
the Convention.
 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

Facts:

Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004
elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson
Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before
the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations
between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings
as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc
had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to
Garcillano. However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the
woman’s voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3
Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine
copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate
media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press
release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a ”
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of
the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued
a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom On 21 June 2005,
petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents)
on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of
expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires
when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.
Issue:

Whether or not the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Held:

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society.

Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all
other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and
check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make
informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law
curtailing freedom of expression: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship
because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be
abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined
exceptions to this rule out of necessity. Only unprotected expression may be
subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on unprotected
expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint

ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a
Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain
from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however
proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing
him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect
discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and
defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and
small offenders.

Issue:

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

Held:

Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt

and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It
is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Courtbetrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly
debase anddegrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

Facts:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to

stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN
(Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results
of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that
such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed
to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution
or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were
actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue:

Whether or not the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit
polls.
Held:

No. The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. The issuance thereof was
"pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest,
orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and
maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of
exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys
were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who
are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence
and anarchy." “Press freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a
clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It
then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering
the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll
highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in
harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In
other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

Policarpio Vs Manila Times.

Facts :

Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages,

P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages,
and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the publication
in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956,
of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory,
libelous and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity,
good name and business and official transactions, and caused her grave
embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and
incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The defendants
are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror and
The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio
Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article and the managing editor, the
associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said newspapers
Issue:

Whether or not it is constitutional.

Held:

It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion
in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the
public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish
news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are
not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with
respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are
open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made
in good faith and without any comments or remarks In the case at bar, aside from
containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August
11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact,
was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings
there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON
FRAUD" — is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the
defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious".
We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But,
this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from
the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez
vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all
parties concerned would be served if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the
sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees

Espuelas vs People

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of
the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local
periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed
to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay
and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon
and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and
Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against
the Government of the Philippines?

Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written
bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the
seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to
persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom
and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers
not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only
all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously
refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom
the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score
alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and

tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence
from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and
substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people
to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order
to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
 Borjal Vs CA

Facts :

During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September

1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who
attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport
industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means
to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was
to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy
for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private
respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded
through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private
organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28
February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote
numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the
conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner
Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt
with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without
naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the
conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles
of petitioner together with the dates they were published Issue :
Issue :

Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel
Held :

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly

privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec.
11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks To
reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of
public interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against
respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's
official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the
FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds,
dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the
conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of
the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence.
These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into
account the very public character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can
be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice.

Cabansag v Fernandez

Facts:

Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana

Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay in the disposition
of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge ordered Cabansag and his
lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending
such letter which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President
(Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision
finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine.

Issue:
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice?

Held:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of
the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had
taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his
letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would
not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat
to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous
tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the
writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for
redress of a legitimate grievance.
.

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Facts

:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that
the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and
again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and
"sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was
required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo said
that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and
"bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been
decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not
pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.

Issue:

Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt

Held:

:Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been
decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the
CA. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of
ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings
disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished
for contempt: (a) those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
(b) those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful
language was used, but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is
clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them.
Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting.
 IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT)

Facts:

Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the “Manila

Standard.” He describes himself as a columnist, who “incidentally happens to be
a lawyer,”, had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At
the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated,
by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts.
And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors
of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar. The seed of the
proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August
27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374.
In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the
petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority

Court proceeding for the determination of

Issue:

Whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

Held:

Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might
cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute
contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them,
he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times
to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any
right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective
of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the most
dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges
or other public officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as
voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more
stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly
required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept
appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited
any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all
save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of
judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And
the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate
interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom
of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges
or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the
truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard
of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without
any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

GONZALEZ VS KALAW KATIGBAK

Facts:

Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain
deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought
an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.

Issue:

Whether or not this violated their freedom to expression.

Held:

Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas
and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed
an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not
enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there
were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically
dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians.

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie

entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis
of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which
dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend.
Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to
the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount
to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement"
whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing
the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the
amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters all
over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts
pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against
him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and 2) to render
an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding
2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that
the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became
and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration
and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00
only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim,
petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial
court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.

Issues:

4. Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an

intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.
5. Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over
the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public figure.
6. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD

4. YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto
a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present
a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a
little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of
torture and brutality.
5. YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As
 held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the
benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of
their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
6. NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had
the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies
a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however,
without limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom
of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern

PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts:

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production

company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional
characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have
developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However,
acomplaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or
his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile.
Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held:

Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or
to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence
not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent
trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in
other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy.
Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which
the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film
were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to
have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in
the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposedmotion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN

Facts:

Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The

Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade
of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar
in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.

MTRCB alleged that respondents

1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review

2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and
some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations

ABS-CBN averred:

1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-
political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating

committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the
program

MTRCB affirmed the ruling

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered
a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and
resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD
1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public
affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper

Hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior
its exhibition or broadcast by TV.

Held:

Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No.

1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.” It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni
Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present,
“designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs x x x.” Yet despite the fact that freedom
of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did
not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there
has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo,
did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom
“The Inside Story” which, according to respondents, is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status.

Soriano vs. Laguardia

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members
of the Iglesia niCristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in
petitioner‟s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Are Soriano‟s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the reli
gious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering
the adverse effect of petitioner‟s utterances on the viewers‟ fundamental rights
as well as petitioner‟s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‟s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to freespeech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re
theparamountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster‟s role and the power of the State toregulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
form, ratherthan the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use ofless offensive language.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the

religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing
– by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner
INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary
religious beliefs. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent
Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the
CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction
and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the
ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA
also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issues:

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

Held:

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986
that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not
include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.”

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the
airing of petitioner’s religious program. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled
by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Facts:

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant

Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition,
the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence,
it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue:

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations

(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held:

Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,I n the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization

for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established

that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either

Friedman v. Rogers case

Facts:
Plaintiff optometrist filed suit against defendants, the members of a state
optometry board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement
of a state statute proscribing the composition of the board and prohibiting the
practice of optometry under a trade name. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality of the statute governing the composition of the board, but held
that the prohibition of the practice of optometry under a trade name ran afoul
of the constitutional protection of commercial speech.

Issue:

Whether or not it is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the state's interest in protecting the public from the
deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names was substantial and
well demonstrated. The statute did nothing more than require that commercial
information about optometric services appear in such as form as necessary to
prevent its being deceptive. It was also reasonable for the state legislature to
require that a majority of the board be drawn from a professional organization
that demonstrated consistent support for the rules that the board would be
responsible for enforcing.
 PEOPLE vs. LIBNAO

Facts:
This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga guilty of violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972). The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began
conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion
from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On
Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a
passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused. In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when
asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual
to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Captain arrived,
the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused
and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in
plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The seized articles were later brought
to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu conducted a lab
exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part,
both accused denied the accusation against them. Libnao argued that her arrest
was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She also takes
the issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues
that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.
Issue:
Whether both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecutions
evidence.
Held:
Yes. The above contentions deserve scant attention. The warrantless search in
the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence
Division had been conducting surveillance operation for 3 months in the area. The
surveillance yielded information that once a month, appellant and her co-
accused Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. It is also clear that at the time Libnao
was apprehended, she was committing offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under
the ROC, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime
in flagrante delicto.
Appellant also faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the
object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure
to formally offer them. She argues that absent any formal offer, they must be
deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by
the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the
case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly
identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. Even without their formal offer; therefore, the prosecution can still
establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their
testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined
the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants
defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
People v. Bolasa y Nakoboan

Facts:
PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon were informed by an anonymous
caller that a man and woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain
house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela. Together with SPO1 Fernando
Arenas, they proceeded immediately to the house of the suspects. As they
walked toward their quarry’s (prey) lair, the three were accompanied by their
unnamed informer. When they reached the house, they “peeped through a small
window and saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana.” They
entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants
and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some paraphernalia. Examination
of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags
contained marijuana. As such, Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were
charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Both denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and
drug implements. De los Reyes claimed that he and his wife were merely tenants
in Bolasa’s house and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work.
He added that when he learned that Bolasa was repacking marijuana inside their
room, he immediately ordered her to leave. As for Bolasa, she claimed that she
was about to leave the house when she met a certain “Rico” and conversed with
him for some time. The trial court, upon finding the version of the prosecution to
be plausible, convicted both accused Bolasa and delos Reyes
Issue:

Whether or not the arrest was valid.

Held:

An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. The manner by which accused were apprehended
does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. From the above,
the arrest is illegal. It cannot be said that the objects were seized in plain view.
First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused were illegally
arrested. Second, the evidence later on found to contain marijuana was not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the
window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants
inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be recognized as a search of
a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search or a stop
and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for
evidence at hand is deprived of any such showing. It indicates that the
apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering
that the entities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained.
After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause for arresting accused, they (the police) should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio,
the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence obtained during
the illegal search cannot be used against accused; hence, they were acquitted.
 People v. Johnson

Facts:

Defendant drove his car into and killed victim, who was in her car as well.
Defendant had earlier robbed two men and fled in the stolen vehicle which struck
the victim. Defendant was driving 58 mph at the time of collision. After collision,
defendant fled the scene into a nearby marsh where he was eventually captured.
Defendant told police that he fled “just because I heard the sirens.” In the
defendant’s car police found a gun. Defendant’s murder charge was enhanced
by use of a firearm and that he killed the victim in the commission of two felony
robberies. Defendant later testified that he sped up because he saw a police
car, but the car did not have lights or sirens on. He later denied hearing sirens.
Defendant primarily argues that he had found a place of safety after the crime
where he was not being chased by police before the homicide occurred.
Jury convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances. “He pled guilty
to charges of assault with a firearm, vehicle theft, being an ex-felon in possession
of a deadly weapon, and two counts of robbery.”
Issus:
Whether based on the facts there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that murder occurred in the commission of two felony robberies.
Held:

Yes. “When an officer or citizen is murdered while in immediate pursuit of a robber

who flees from the scene of the crime with the fruit of that offense, the killing is in
perpetration of the robbery-a crime that is not legally complete until the robber
has won his or her way even momentarily to a place of temporary safety. When
the robber is still in flight, he or she has not yet achieved a place of temporary
safety.” There is evidence to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was in
constant flight. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant did not
have time to change into the suit he carried, nor did he have time to dispose of
his weapon and that it was impossible in terms of timing to have reached the
neighborhood he claimed to be the temporary place of safety. “A fleeing
robber’s failure to reach a place of temporary safety is sufficient to establish the
continuity of the robbery within the felony-murder rule.”
 Terry v. Ohio

Facts:
Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat that he had
been patrolling for many years when he observed two strangers (Terry and
another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back
and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was
followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they
were joined by a third man (Katz) who thereafter left swiftly. Suspecting the two
men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’, the officer followed them and saw them rejoin
the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached
the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men
mumbled something, whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his
outside clothing, and felt in his overcoat pocket – but was unable to remove – a
pistol. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to
face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did
not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing
in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry’s or Chilton’s
outer garments until he felt the guns. Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons, which was
denied by the trial court. Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court to
question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting conviction.
Issue:

Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him and thus his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper?
Held:.

Yes, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against him; thus, his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper. First, in assessing the
reasonableness of stop-and-frisk as a valid form of warrantless search, the U.S.
Supreme Court held: The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFadden’s taking steps to investigate [Terry’s] suspicious behavior, but rather,
whether there was justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry's personal security
by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now
concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in
addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Next, on the
distinction between protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk on one
hand, and arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other hand, it was
declared: An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom
from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are
likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is
inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that
because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension
of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information
to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to seizures constituting arrests and searches incident
thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests sought to be vindicated
and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and
thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular
types of conduct under the [right against unreasonable search and seizure].
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote

Facts:

A telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo
Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They
saw two men “looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife.
The weapons were taken from them.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure is violated

Held:
The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires
that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of
the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at
bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was merely “looking
from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense
that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s
no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
PAPA VS. MAGO

Facts:
Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the
goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search
conducted by them since it was made without any search warrant and whether
the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

Issue:
Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect
the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff
and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person
on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that
except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful
for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or
otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into
the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for
trial and forfeiture.

SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE

Facts:
Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable
goods (branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were observing their conduct
and found it to be suspicious during a special mission given to them to make a
routine surveillance to check on reports of alleged trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by PAL employees. Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Held:
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission
of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the
airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly
effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.
In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who
are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized
to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other
movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items
have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs
law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person
suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent
schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The
Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be
reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which
the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as
an individual’s private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply
this State policy which we have continued to affirm.

Valmonte v. De Villa
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

Held:
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA

Facts:
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Issue:

Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
Held:

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal

right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to
be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner Valmonte’s general
allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e.,
without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle,
or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting
up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.