Enedina Presley vs. Bel-Air
The private respondents have
Village Association
Petitioner:Enedina Presley
Respondents: Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc and Court of
Appeals
DOCTRINE
Contractual stipulations on the use
of the land even if said conditions
are annotated on the torrens title
can be impaired if necessary to
reconcile with the legitimate
exercise of police power.
FACTS
A complaint for specific
performance and damages with
preliminary injunction was filed by
Bel-Air Vilage Association (BAVA)
against
Teofilo Almendras and Rosario
Almendras (they are now
deceased and substituted by
Enedina Presley) for violation of
the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air
Subdivision that the subject house
and lot shall be used only for
residential and not for commercial
purposes and for
non-payment of association dues
to plaintiff BAVA amounting to
3,803.55
The Almendras were registered
owners of a house and lot in said
Village, and were also members of
BAVA pursuant to the Deed
Restrictions.
Presley, as lessee of the property,
is owner and operator of “Hot Pan
de Sal Store” located in the same
address.
When BAVA came to know of the
existence of Pan de Sal, it sent a
letter to the defendants asking
them to desist from operating the
store.
• Almendras contended that there
was no written contract between
him
and BAVA;
o only a consensual contract
existed whereby Almendras
regularly
pays his dues and assessments to
BAVA for such services as
GRASYA
security, garbage collection and
maintenance and repair of Jupiter
St. When the services were
withdrawn by BAVA, there was no
more reason for the latter to
demand payment od such dues
and
assessments.
• Trial court rendered decision in
favor of BAVA, affirmed by CA.
Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE
W/N Bel-Air Village is considered
residential for the purposes of
enjoining
petitioners from continuing their
Pan de Sal Store – No
RULING & RATIO
1. No, Bel-Air Village is considered
a commercial zone.
a. BAVA assails the Court’s
decision in the Sangalang case,
more
specifically the Court’s
interpretation of Ordinance no 81-
01
passed by the Metro Manila
Commission. It avers that due to
the
multitude of issues raised and
numerous pleadings filed by the
different contending parties, the
Court was misled and erred in
concluding that Jupiter St. was
classified as a “high density
commercial zone” when in fact, it is
still considered as a
residential zone.
i. SANGALANG CASE: the court
found Ayala Corporation not liable
due to the opening of Jupiter
Street to the general public. They
have no liability not only because
of the fact that Jupiter Street is not
covered by the restrictive
easements based on the deed
restrictions, but chiefly because
the National Govt itself, through
the Metro Manila Commission, had
reclassified Jupiter Street into a
‘high density commercial zone’
b. The court has carefully
examined the pleadings but have
found no reason to reconsider the
Sangalang doctrine.
c.
only come up with mere
assertions and allegations.
i. It failed to present any proofs or
convincing arguments to
substantiate its claim that Jupiter
Street is still classified as a
residential zone
ii. No new zoning reclassification,
ordinance, certification was
brought to the attention of the court
d. The court cannot reverse a
precedent and rule favorably for
the private respondent on the
strength of mere inferences.
e. Deed of Restrictions is valid can
be enforced against the petitioner.
However, these contractual
stipulations can be impaired if
necessary to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power.
f. In Sangalang, the court held that
as far as Bel-Air subdivision is
concerned, they are valid and
enforceable. But they are subject
to the overriding demands, needs,
and interests of the greater
number as the State may
determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power, so it
cannot contravene law, morals,
good customs, public order or
public policy.
g. Jupiter Street has been highly
commercialized since the passage
of Ordinance 81-01.
i. The records indicate that
commercial buildings, offices,
restaurants, and stores have
already sprouted in the
area.
ii. We, therefore, see no reason
why the petitioner should
be singled out and prohibited from
putting up her hot pan
de sal store.
SOLID MANILA BIO HONG
TRADING CO. V CA G.R. No.
90596
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation, is the
owner of a parcel of land located in
Ermita, Manila, The private
respondent's (de Guzman) title
came from a prior owner, and in
their deed of sale, the parties
1
thereto reserved as an easement
of way: a portion thereof
measuring NINE HUNDRED
FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS,
more or less, had been converted
into a private alley for the benefit of
neighboring estates, this being
duly annotated at the back of the
covering transfer Certificate of title
per regulations of the Office of the
City Engineer of Manila and that
the thre e meterwide portion of
said parcel along the Pasig River,
with an area of ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, had
actually been expropriated by the
City Government, and developed
pursuant to the beautification drive
of the Metro Manila Governor. (p.
3, Record).
The petitioner claims that ever
since, it had (as well as other
residents of neighboring estates)
made use of the above private
alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until
sometime in 1983, when, and over
its protests, the private respondent
constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Whether or not an easement exists
on the property even after the
property was sold. AFFIRMATIVE.
Easement cannot be separated
from the tenement and maintain an
independent existence.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
It is true that the sale did include
the alley. On this score, the Court
rejects the petitioner's contention
that the deed of sale “excluded” it,
because as a mere right-of-way, it
cannot be separated from the
tenement and maintains an
independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are
inseparable from the estate to
which they actively or passively
belong.
The fact, however, that the alley in
question, as an easement, is
GRASYA
inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioner's
claims, because as an easement
precisely, it operates as a limitation
on the title of the owner of the
servient estate, specifically, his
right to use (jus utendi).
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit
the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property ––
including the disputed alley –– as a
result of the conveyance, it did not
acquire the right to close that alley
or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the
public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to
be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the
opinion, contrary to that of the
Court of Appeals, that no genuine
merger took place as a dated May 24, 1954. (dili gihapon
consequence of the sale in favor of
the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a
merger exists when ownership of
the dominant and servient estates
is consolidated in the same
person. 15 Merger then, as can be
seen, requires full ownership of
both estates.
In the case at bar, the defense of
merger is, clearly, not a valid
defense, indeed, a sham one,
because as we said, merger is not
possible, and secondly, the sale
unequivocally preserved the
existing easement. In other words,
the answer does not, in reality,
tender any genuine issue on a
material fact and cannot militate
against the petitioner's clear cause
of action.
Genoveva Jabonete vs Juliana
Monteverde, Legaspi, DBP, &
Arcilla
March 31, 1966
Facts
On March 11, 1954, the Court of
First Instance of Davao, found that
Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in
question with the knowledge that a
"gravamen" or easement of right of
way existed thereon, promulgated
a decision the dispositive portion of
which reads (dili ma basa kay
spanish)
In view of the March 11 order, the
plaintiffs (Jabonete) immediately
proceeded to the premises in
question and opened in the fence
of the defendant (Antonio Legaspi)
a sufficient opening for the
passage of men and vehicles.
Even then, however, the defendant
filed with the court below on that
very same day, May 21, 1954, a
motion for the reconsideration of
the order granting discretionary
execution.
Thereafter, and upon the lower
court's suggestion, the parties
entered into an amicable
AGREEMENT which was later
embodied in an order or "auto"
mabasa ang AGREEMENT)
Both parties complied with terms of
the AGREEMENT until the
plaintiffs, unable to continue with
their repair shop, transferred to
another place in December 1959
whereupon the defendant
reconstructed his fence and its
footing, closing thereby the
opening previously made by the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by
the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) which, later still,
conveyed it under a conditional
sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla.
On her acquisition of the said lot,
Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the
defendant the re-opening of the
fence in question as it was her
plan to construct her house in the
said lot. When the defendant
refused, the Development Bank
filed with the lower court a petition
to hold the said defendant in
contempt. Mrs. Luz Arcilla later
intervened in the case filed by DBP
and was so allowed by the lower
court.
The Development Bank of the
Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla
contended that the refusal of the
2
defendant to cause or allow the
making of an opening in his fence
was a defiance of the said court's
decision of March 11, 1954 and
was, therefore, contemptuous.
After due hearing, the lower court
sustained the petitioners and found
the defendant guilty of contempt
with orders "to pay a fine of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and to
open the vereda or alley leading to
the lot owned by the Development
Bank of the Philippines and
conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla.
Issue
Whether DBP and Mrs. Arcilla has
the right to the easement granted
to Jabonete
Held
No.
Under the aforesaid order of May
24, 1954, the easement awarded
or secured by the lower court to
the plaintiffs was strictly a personal
one. The right of way granted was
expressly limited to the latter and
their "family, friends, drivers,
servants and jeeps." In the very
language of the agreement the
following appears:
El demandado Antonio Legaspi,
permitira el uso y paso en la calle
privada construida por el en su
terreno a lo largo del terreno de los
demandantes, a estos, su familia,
sus amigos, chofers, servidumbre
y de sus jeeps.
The servitude established was
clearly for the benefit alone of the
plaintiffs and the persons above
enumerated and it is clear that the
lower court, as well as the parties
addressed by the said order, did
not intend the same to pass on to
the plaintiffs' successors-in-
interest. In other words, the right
acquired by the original plaintiffs
was a personal servitude under
Article 614 of the Civil Code, and
not a predial servitude that inures
to the benefit of whoever owns the
dominant estate.
GRASYA
Another evidence that the
servitude in question was personal
to the plaintiffs is the fact that the
same was granted to the latter
without any compensation to the
respondent-appellant.
RONQUILLO vs. ROCO-
Easement of Right of Way
Doctrine: Easements of right of
way may not be acquired by
prescription because it is not a
continuous easement.
FACTS:
Petitioners’ parcel of land was
connected to the Naga Market
Place and Igualdad St. by an
easement of a right of way through
the land of the Respondents,
which they have been using for
more than 20 years. On May 1953,
however, respondents built a
chapel right in the middle of the
road, blocking their usual path to
the marketplace. One year after,
by means of force, intimidation,
and threats, the owners
(respondents) of the land where
the easement was situated,
planted wooden posts and fenced
with barbed wires the road, closing
their right of way from their house
to Igualdad St. and Naga public
market.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a
right of way may be acquired by
prescription?
HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that
only continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by
prescription. The easement of a
right of way cannot be considered
continuous because its use is at
intervals and is dependent on the
acts of man.
Minority Opinion (including the
ponente):
Easements of right of way may
already be acquired by
prescription, at least since the
introduction into this jurisdiction of
the special law on prescription ujn
through the Old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law,
particularly, Section 41 thereof,
makes no distinction as to the real
rights which are subject to
prescription, and there would
appear to be no valid reason, at
least to the writer of this opinion,
why the continued use of a path or
a road or right of way by the party,
specially by the public, for ten
years or more, not by mere
tolerance of the owner of the land,
but through adverse use of it,
cannot give said party a vested
right to such right of way through
prescription.
“The uninterrupted and continuous
enjoyment of a right of way
necessary to constitute adverse
possession does not require the
use thereof every day for the
statutory period, but simply the
exercise of the right more or less
frequently according to the nature
of the use.” (17 Am. Jur. 972)
"It is submitted that under Act No.
190, even discontinuous
servitudes can be acquired by
prescription, provided it can be
shown that the servitude was
actual, open, public, continuous,
under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all
other claimants'."
VELASCO v. CUSI and CITY OF
DAVAO
105 SCRA 616
Easements
Art. 617 Intransmissibility (mere
accessories to the real property)
FACTS:
Fe Velasco is the owner of a
parcel of land in Davao City. She
filed in the CFI of Davao City an
action against public respondent,
City of Davao for the quieting of
her title over Lot 77-B-2, a portion
of which she claims to have been
occupied illegally by Bolton Street,
Davao City.
The court, presided over by Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. dismissed the
case on the ground that the
3
complaint states no cause of
action, filed by the City of Davao.
The allegations in the complaint
that the Bolton Street encroached
on the lot of the plaintiff and that
the defendant had continuously
occupied the portion so
encroached upon do not, contrary
to the conclusion of the plaintiff
found in the complaint, cast '. . a
cloud of doubt on the title of the
plaintiff over said portion which
would justify this action.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Bolton Street is an
easement and a legal
encumbrance on petitioner’s lot?
Whether the encroachment casts a
cloud of doubt over the title of
Velasco?
HELD:
YES. Bolton Street, a public
highway, was already subsisting
when the OCT over the parcel of
land of Velasco was issued. It has
been where it is since time
immemorial. Bolton Street
constituted an easement of public
highway on subject Lot No. 77,
from which petitioner’s lot was
taken, when such bigger lot was
originally registered. It remained as
such legal encumbrance, as
effectively as if it had been duly
noted, notwithstanding the lack of
annotation, on the certificate of
title, by virtue of the clear and
express provision of Section 39 of
Act 496, which states:
Section 39 of Act 496
Every person receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree or
registration, and every subsequent
purchasers of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value
in good faith shall hold the same
free of all encumbrances, except
those noted on said certificate, and
any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way,
private way, … or any government
irrigation.
XX
GRASYA
This fact erases whatever cause of
action petitioner may have to bring
the complaint she filed in the court
a quo for quieting of title on a
portion of the street which she
claims to be part of her lot, free
from encumbrance of any kind.
The case was dismissed.
Valisno vs Adriano, 161 SCRA
398
FACTS:
On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-
appellant file against the
defendant-appellee an action for
damages….
The complaint alleged that the
plaintiff is the absolute owner and
actual possessor of a 557,949-
square-meter parcel of land in La
Fuente, Santa Rosa, Nueva
Ecija…
The plaintiff-appellant Valisno
bought the land from the
defendant-appellees sister,
Honorata Adriano Francisco, on
June 6,1959.
The land which is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the appellee Felipe
Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated
by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about seventy (70)
meters long, traversing the
appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the
appellee levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that the
appellant was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications
a complaint for deprivation of water
rights. A decision was rendered on
March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano
to reconstruct the irrigation canal,
"otherwise judicial action shall be
taken against him under the
provisions of Section 47 of Act
2152 (the Irrigation Act)….
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno
rebuilt the irrigation canal at his
own expense because his need for
water to irrigate his watermelon
fields was urgent.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a
complaint for damages….
On October 25, 1961, the
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications reversed the
Bureau's decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisno's
complaint. The Secretary held that
Eladio Adriano's water rights which
had been granted in 1923 ceased
to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal
collapsed. His non-use of the
water right since then for a period
of more than five years
extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water
rights did not form part of his
hereditary estate which his heirs
partitioned among themselves.
Valisno, as vendee of the land
which Honorata received from her
father's estate did not acquire any
water rights with the land
purchased.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966,
the trial court held that the plaintiff
had no right to pass through the
defendant's land to draw water
from the Pampanga River. It
pointed out that under Section 4 of
the Irrigation Law, controversies
between persons claiming a right
to water from a stream are within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an
appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may
not pass upon the validity of the
decision of the Public Works
Secretary collaterally.
ISSUE:
The principal issue involved in this
case falls under the subject of
servitude of waters which are
governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws
mentioned in the cases of Lunod
vs. Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and
Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380
62773) which are the irrigation law
and the Spanish Law of Waters of
4
August 3, 1866, specifically Article
122 thereof.
RULING:
The deed of sale in favor of
Valisno included the "conveyance
and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to
Honorata Adriano's property.
According to the appellant, the
water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it
the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to
use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although
not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's
land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third
person.
As an easement of waters in favor
of the appellant has been
established, he is entitled to enjoy
it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as
the appellee's act of levelling the
irrigation canal to deprive him of
the use of water from the
Pampanga River.
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is set aside, and a new
one is entered ordering the
appellee to grant the appellant
continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his
land in order to obtain water from
the Pampanga River to irrigate
appellant's land. Let the records of
this case be remanded to the court
a quo for the reception of evidence
on the appellant's claim for
damages.
SO ORDERED.
La Vista Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals
Facts:
The area comprising the
15-meter wide roadway was part of
a land owned by the Tuasons
GRASYA
which was sold to Philippine
Building Corporation by virtue of a
Deed of Sale with Mortgage.
Paragraph three (3) of the deed
provides that ". . .the boundary line
between the property herein sold
and the adjoining property of the
VENDORS shall be a road fifteen
(15) meters wide, one-half of which
shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and
the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the
VENDORS." The land was later
sold to Ateneo de Manila
University with the consent of the
Tuasons. The Tuasons later
developed its 7.5 meter share of
the Mangyan road, while Ateneo
erected an adobe wall on the
entire length of the boundary of its
property parallel to the 15-meter
wide roadway which was later
removed due to an amicable
settlement. Ateneo sold 16
hectares of its property along
Mangyan road to Solid Homes,
Inc. and the deed of sale provided
among others that the vendor
passes unto the vendee the
privileges of such right-of-way.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc.
developed the Loyola Grand Villas.
La Vista, a residential village
developed by the Tuasons,
prohibited the agents and
assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.
and residents of Loyola from
traversing the Mangyan Road.
Solid Homes Inc. then instituted an
action, and prayed that LA VISTA
be enjoined from preventing and
obstructing the use and passage of
LOYOLA residents through
Mangyan Road. The trial court
issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of Solid Homes, Inc. which
was nullified and set aside by the
Appellate Court. In a petition for
review on certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court, Solid Homes, Inc.
assailed the nullification and
setting aside of the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City
rendered a decision on the merits
affirming and recognizing the
easement of right-of-way along
Mangyan Road in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. LA VISTA appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement is a
voluntary one
Held:
Yes. A legal or compulsory
easement is that which is
constituted by law for public use or
for private interest. By express
provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of
the New Civil Code, the owner of
an estate may claim a legal or
compulsory right-of-way only after
he has established the existence
of four (4) requisites, namely: (a)
the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) after payment of the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor's own
acts; and (d) the right-of-way
claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate,
and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public
highway may be shortest. A
voluntary easement on the other
hand is constituted simply by will
or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the
instant case it is very apparent that
the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended
to establish an easement of right-
of-way over Mangyan Road for
their mutual benefit, both as
dominant and servient estates.
This is quite evident when: (a) the
Tuasons and the Philippine
Building Corporation in 1949
stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of
Sale with Mortgage that the
"boundary line between the
property herein sold and the
adjoining property of the
VENDORS shall be a road fifteen
(15) meters wide, one-half of which
shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and
the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the
vendors"; (b) the Tuasons in 1951
expressly agreed and consented to
5
the assignment of the land to, and
the assumption of all the rights and
obligations by ATENEO, including
the obligation to contribute seven
and one-half meters of the
property sold to form part of the
15-meter wide roadway; (c) the
Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint
against MARYKNOLL and
ATENEO for breach of contract
and the enforcement of the
reciprocal easement on Mangyan
Road, and demanded that
MARYKNOLL set back its wall to
restore Mangyan Road to its
original width of 15 meters, after
MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in
the middle of the 15 meter wide
roadway; (d) LA VISTA President
Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and
clarified in 1976, in a letter to
ATENEO President Fr. Jose A.
Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is
a road fifteen meters wide, one
half of which is taken from your
property and the other half from
the La Vista Subdivision. So that
the easement of a right-of-way on
your 7 1/2 m. portion was created
in our favor and likewise an
easement of right-of-way was
created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of
the road in your favor"; (e) LA
VISTA, in its offer to buy the
hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged
the existence of the contractual
right of-way as it manifested that
the mutual right-of-way between
the Ateneo de Manila University
and La Vista Homeowners'
Association would be extinguished
if it bought the adjacent ATENEO
property and would thus become
the owner of both the dominant
and servient estates; and, (f) LA
VISTA President Luis G. Quimson,
in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, received by this Court on
26 March 1997, acknowledged that
"'one-half of the whole length of
(Mangyan Road) belongs to La
Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is
owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and
the Ateneo in equal portions".
These certainly are indubitable
proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary
easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road and, like any other
GRASYA
contract, the same could be
extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of
the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner
LA VISTA that there are other
routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan
Road is likewise meritless, to say
the least. The opening of an
adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar.
The fact that an easement by grant
may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity.
Cid vs. Javier
G.R. L-14116, June 30, 1960
FACTS:
Respondents own a building with
windows overlooking the adjacent
lot, owned by the petitioners.
Allegedly, in 1913 or 1914, before
the New Civil Code took effect, the
predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner were verbally prohibited
by the respondent to obstruct view
and light. When the Court of
Appeals adjudicated the case, it
found out that the two estates are
covered by Original Certificates of
Title, both issued by the Register
of Deeds. The court further
observed that in both of the title,
any annotation does not appear in
respect to the easement
supposedly acquired by
prescription which, counting the
twenty (20) years from 1913 or
1914, would have already ripened
by 1937, date of the decrees of
registration.
ISSUE:
Whether the owners of a building
standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had
acquired by prescription an
enforceable easement of light and
view arising from a verbal
prohibition to obstruct such view
and light, to petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest as owner
of the adjoining lot, both of which
lots being covered by Torrens
titles.
RULING:
Inasmuch as the alleged
prohibition having been avowedly
made in1913 or 1914, before the
present Civil Code took effect, the
applicable legal provision is Article
538 of the Spanish Civil Code
which provides that negative
easements are acquired, from the
day on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, by a formal
act, forbidden the owner of the
servient estate to perform any act
which would be lawful without the
easement.
The law requires not any form of
prohibition, but exacts, in a
parenthetical expression, for
emphasis, the doing not only of a
specific, particular act, but a formal
act. The phrase "formal act" would
require not merely any writing, but
one executed in due form and/or
with solemnity. That this is the
intendment of the law although not
expressed in exact language is the
reason for the clarification made in
Article 621 of the new Civil Code
which specifically requires the
prohibition to be in "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary
public".
Easements are in the nature of an
encumbrance on the servient
estate. They constitute a limitation
of the dominical right of the owner
of the subjected property. Hence,
they can be acquired only by title
and by prescription, in the case of
positive easement, only as a result
of some sort of invasion, apparent
and continuous, of the servient
estate. By the same token,
negative easements cannot be
acquired by less formal means.
Hence, the requirement that the
prohibition (the equivalent of the
act of invasion) should be by "a
formal act", "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary
public."
Conceding arguendo that such an
easement has been acquired by
prescription which, counting the
6
twenty (20) years from 1913 or
1914, would have already ripened
by 1937, it had been cut off or
extinguished by the registration of
the servient estate under the
Torrens System without the
easement being annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title,
pursuant to Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act.
AMOR VS FLORENTINO
FACTS:
It appears that over 50 years ago,
Maria Florentino owned a house
and a camarin or warehouse in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had
and still has, on the north side,
three windows on the upper story,
and a fourth one on the ground
floor. Through these windows the
house receives light and air from
the lot where the camarin stands.
On September 6, 1885, Maria
Florentino made a will, devising
the house and the land on which it
is situated to Gabriel Florentino,
one of the respondents herein, and
to Jose Florentino, father of the
other respondents. In said will, the
testatrix also devised the
warehouse and the lot where it is
situated to Maria Encarnacion
Florentino. Upon the death of the
testatrix in 1892, nothing was said
or done by the devisees in regard
to the windows in question. On
July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion
Florentino sold her lot and the
warehouse thereon to the
petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed
of sale stating that the vendor had
inherited the property from her
aunt, Maria Florentino. In January,
1938, petitioner destroyed the old
warehouse and started to build
instead a two-story house. On
March 1st of that year,
respondents filed an action to
prohibit petitioner herein from
building higher than the original
structure and from executing any
work which would shut off the light
and air that had for many years
been received through the four
windows referred to. The Court of
First Instance found on the 15th of
the same month that the
construction of the new house had
GRASYA
almost been completed, so the
court denied the writ of preliminary
injunction.
"Art. 541. The existence of an
apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established
by the proprietor of both, shall be
considered, if one of them is
alienated, as a title so that the
easement will continue actively
and passively, unless at the time
the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary is stated in
the deed of alienation of either of
them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is
executed."
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not Article 541 applies
to a division of property by
succession. AFFIRMATIVE. there
is an implied contract between
them that the easements in
question should be constituted.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
These two easements necessarily
go together because an easement
of light and view requires that the
owner of the servient estate shall
not build to a height that will
obstruct the window. They are, as
it were, the two sides of the same
coin. While an easement of light
and view is positive, that of altius
non tollendi is negative. Clemente
de Diego states that when article
538 speaks of the time for the
commencement of prescription for
negative easements, "it refers to
those negative easements which
are the result and consequence of
others that are positive, such as
the easement not to build higher,
or not to construct, which is
indispensable to the easement of
light."
It will thus be seen that under
article 541 the existence of the
apparent sign in the instant case,
to wit, the four windows under
consideration, had for all legal
purposes the same character and
effect as a title of acquisition of the
easement of light and view by the
respondents upon the death of the
original owner, Maria Florentino.
Upon the establishment of that
easement of light and view, the
concomitant and concurrent
easement of altius non tollendi was
also constituted, the heir of the
camarin and its lot, Maria
Encarnacion Florentino, not having
objected to the existence of the
windows. The theory of article 541,
of making the existence of the
apparent sign equivalent to a title,
when nothing to the contrary is
said or done by the two owners, is
sound and correct, because as it
happens in this case, there is an
implied contract between them that
the easements in question should
be constituted.
If we do not apply article 541 of the
Civil Code — and we cannot apply
it because Maria Florentino died in
1885 — there is really a gap in the
case for the respondents, but none
in the case for the petitioner. 1
Under the Partidas, or rather in the
absence of an express provision
therein similar to article 541, the
petitioner should win; and since
the parties litigant herein are
entitled to have their case decided
in accordance with the pre-Civil
Code legislation in force in the
Philippines as provided in the
transitory provisions, since that
legislation without any "gap-filling"
is in favor of the petitioner, and
since to "fill the gap" would
prejudice him and unduly favor the
respondents, the Court should
abstain from so doing as a matter
of law and justice.
First, as to the modes of
establishing and acquiring
easements. According to Article
536, easements are established by
law or by will of the owners.
Acquisition of easements is first by
title or its equivalent and secondly
by prescription. What acts take the
place of title? They are mentioned
in Articles 540 and 541, namely,
(1) a deed of recognition by the
owner of the servient estate; (2) a
final judgment; and (3) an apparent
sign between two estates,
7
established by the owner of both,
which is the case of article 541.
Sanchez Roman calls such
apparent sign under article 541
"supletoria del titulo constitutivo de
la servidumbre."
standpoint of justice and public
policy
— When Maria Encarnacion
Florentino, as one of of the
devisees, accepted the camarin
and the lot, she could not in
fairness receive the benefit without
assuming the burden of the legacy.
That burden consisted of the
service in fact during the lifetime of
the original owner, which service
became a true easement upon her
death.
It is not just to allow Maria
Encarnacion Florentino or her
successor in interest to repudiate
her own undertaking, implied, it is
true, but binding nevertheless. This
easement is therefore a burden
which Maria Encarnacion
Florentino and her successor in
interest willingly accepted. They
cannot now murmur against any
inconvenience consequent upon
their own agreement.
During the construction of the new
house by the petitioner, the
respondents filed an action to stop
the work. But petitioner continued
the construction, so that when the
Court of First Instance was ready
to pass upon the preliminary
injunction, the work had almost
been finished. Petitioner, therefore,
cannot complain if he is now
ordered to tear down part of the
new structure so as not to shut off
the light from respondents'
windows.
When petitioner bought this lot
from the original coheir, Maria
Encarnacion Florentino, the
windows on respondents' house
were visible. It was petitioner's
duty to inquire into the significance
of those windows. Having failed to
do so, he cannot now question the
easement against the property
which he purchased.
GRASYA
VI
Recapitulating, we believe the
easement of light and view has
been established in favor of the
property of respondents, for these
reasons:
1. Maria Florentino having died in
1892, according to a finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals, which we
cannot review, Article 541 of the
Civil Code is applicable to this
case.
2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria
Florentino died in 1885,
nevertheless the same principle
embodied in article 541 of the Civil
Code was already an integral part
of the Spanish law before the
promulgation of the Civil Code in
1889, and therefore, even if the
instant case should be governed
by the Spanish law prior to the
Civil Code, the easement in
question would also have to be
upheld.
3. The easement under review has
been acquired by respondents
through prescription.
4. The petitioner was not an
innocent purchaser, as he was in
duty bound to inquire into the
significance of the windows.
5. Justice and public policy are on
the side of the respondents.
JUAN GARGANTOS vs TAN
YANON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-14652
June 30, 1960
Facts:
The record discloses that the late
Francisco Sanz was the former
owner of a parcel of land
containing 888 square meters, with
the buildings and improvements
thereon, situated in the poblacion
of Romblon. He subdivided the lot
into three and then sold each
portion to different persons. One
portion was purchased by
Guillermo Tengtio who
subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy
Veza. Another portion, with the
house of strong materials thereon,
was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon,
respondent herein. This house has
on its northeastern side, doors and
windows over-looking the third
portion, which, together with the
camarin and small building
thereon, after passing through
several hands, was finally acquired
by Juan Gargantos, petitioner
herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos
applied to the Municipal Mayor for
a permit to demolish the roofing of
the oldcamarin. The permit having
been granted, Gargantos tore
down the roof of the camarin. On
May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked
the Municipal Council of Romblon
for another permit, this time in
order to construct a combined
residential house and warehouse
on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed
approval of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal
and district engineer of Romblon
recommended granting of the
building permit to Gargantos, Tan
Yanon filed against Gargantos an
action to restrain him from
constructing a building that would
prevent plaintiff from receiving light
and enjoying the view through the
window of his house, unless such
building is erected at a distance of
not less than three meters from the
boundary line between the lots of
plaintiff and defendant, and to
enjoin the members of Municipal
Council of Romblon from issuing
the corresponding building permit
to defendant. CFI rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint
and ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant to pay damages.
CA set aside the decision of the
CFI and enjoined defendant from
constructing his building unless "he
erects the same at a distance of
not less than three meters from the
boundary line of his property, in
conformity with Article 673 of the
New Civil Code."
Issue:
WON the property of respondent
Tan Yanon has an easement of
8
light and view against the property
of petitioner Gargantos.
Held:
The kernel of petitioner's argument
is that respondent never acquired
any easement either by title or by
prescription. Assuredly, there is no
deed establishing an easement.
Likewise, neither petitioner nor his
predecessors-in-interest have ever
executed any deed whereby they
recognized the existence of the
easement, nor has there been final
judgment to that effect. Petitioner
maintains that respondent has not
acquired an easement by
prescription because he has never
formally forbidden petitioner from
performing any act which would be
lawful without the easement,
hence the prescriptive period
never started.
It is obvious, however, that Article
621, N.C.C. and the doctrine in the
Yu-Tibo case are not applicable
herein because the two estates,
that now owned by petitioner, and
that owner by respondent, were
formerly owned by just one person,
Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who
introduced improvements on both
properties. On that portion
presently belonging to respondent,
he constructed a house in such a
way that the northeastern side
thereof extends to the wall of the
camarin on the portion now
belonging to petitioner. On said
northeastern side of the house,
there are windows and doors
which serve as passages for light
and view. These windows and
doors were in existence when
respondent purchased the house
and lot from Sanz. The deed sale
did not provide that the easement
of light and view would not be
established. This then is precisely
the case covered Article 624,
N.C.C which provides that the
existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates,
established by the proprietor of
both, shall be considered, if one of
them is alienated, as a title so that
the easement will continue actively
and passively, unless at the time
the ownership of the two estate is
divided, the contrary is stated in
GRASYA
the deed of alienation of either of
them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is
executed. The existence of the
doors and windows on the
northeastern side of the
aforementioned house, is
equivalent to a title, for the visible
and permanent sign of an
easement is the title that
characterizes its existence. It
should be noted, however, that
while the law declares that the
easement is to "continue" the
easement actually arises for the
first time only upon alienation of
either estate, inasmuch as before
that time there is no easement to
speak of, there being but one
owner of both estates.
We find that respondent Tan
Yanon's property has an easement
of light and view against
petitioner's property. By reason of
his easement petitioner cannot
construct on his land any building
unless he erects it at a distance of
not less than three meters from the
boundary line separating the two
estates.
Valisno vs Adriano, 161 SCRA
398
FACTS:
On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-
appellant file against the
defendant-appellee an action for
damages….
The complaint alleged that the
plaintiff is the absolute owner and
actual possessor of a 557,949-
square-meter parcel of land in La
Fuente, Santa Rosa, Nueva
Ecija…
The plaintiff-appellant Valisno
bought the land from the
defendant-appellees sister,
Honorata Adriano Francisco, on
June 6,1959.
The land which is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the appellee Felipe
Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated
by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about seventy (70)
meters long, traversing the
appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the
appellee levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that the
appellant was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications
a complaint for deprivation of water
rights. A decision was rendered on
March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano
to reconstruct the irrigation canal,
"otherwise judicial action shall be
taken against him under the
provisions of Section 47 of Act
2152 (the Irrigation Act)….
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno
rebuilt the irrigation canal at his
own expense because his need for
water to irrigate his watermelon
fields was urgent.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a
complaint for damages….
On October 25, 1961, the
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications reversed the
Bureau's decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisno's
complaint. The Secretary held that
Eladio Adriano's water rights which
had been granted in 1923 ceased
to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal
collapsed. His non-use of the
water right since then for a period
of more than five years
extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water
rights did not form part of his
hereditary estate which his heirs
partitioned among themselves.
Valisno, as vendee of the land
which Honorata received from her
father's estate did not acquire any
water rights with the land
purchased.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966,
the trial court held that the plaintiff
had no right to pass through the
defendant's land to draw water
from the Pampanga River. It
pointed out that under Section 4 of
the Irrigation Law, controversies
between persons claiming a right
to water from a stream are within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an
9
appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may
not pass upon the validity of the
decision of the Public Works
Secretary collaterally.
ISSUE:
The principal issue involved in this
case falls under the subject of
servitude of waters which are
governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws
mentioned in the cases of Lunod
vs. Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and
Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380
62773) which are the irrigation law
and the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, specifically Article
122 thereof.
RULING:
The deed of sale in favor of
Valisno included the "conveyance
and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to
Honorata Adriano's property.
According to the appellant, the
water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it
the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to
use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although
not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's
land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third
person.
As an easement of waters in favor
of the appellant has been
established, he is entitled to enjoy
it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as
the appellee's act of levelling the
irrigation canal to deprive him of
the use of water from the
Pampanga River.
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is set aside, and a new
one is entered ordering the
appellee to grant the appellant
continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his
land in order to obtain water from
GRASYA
the Pampanga River to irrigate
appellant's land. Let the records of
this case be remanded to the court
a quo for the reception of evidence
on the appellant's claim for
damages.
SO ORDERED.
SALVADOR BENEDICTO
(deceased). ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and VICENTE
A. HERAS. G.R. No. L-22733
September 25, 1968
FACTS:
The adjoining properties of the
Heras and the defendant
Benedicto formerly belonged to
HEDRICK. On Septebmer 29,
1917, HEDRICK sold a portion of
the above described property,
particularly Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22
and 23 to RECTO. At the time of
the sale, the following buildings
were located on the respective
properties of Claro M. Recto and
Miriam R. Hedrick. The sale to
RECTO as evidenced by the
Escritura de Compra-Venta (Annex
"B") was subject, among others, to
the condition that they would
equally share in providing a 3 to 4
meter easement for vehicles both
at the sides of their properties and
that both parties agree that the
dividing line between the portion
sold to Recto remains in the
domain of Hedrick fall and that line
will be perpendicular to the San
Marcelino street.
RECTO’s properties were subject
to a series of transfers, which
eventually ended up with
SALVADOR
BENEDICTO. HEDRICK’s
properties were subject to a series
of transfers but was ultimately
acquired by VICENTE HERAS.
Sometime in 1941, the Heras
demolished the entire building
situated on his property.
The trial court likewise found that
the easement of way was found
entirely within the property of
Benedicto, contrary to the
stipulation in the deed of sale
between Hedrick and Recto that it
should be between their
properties, with each contributing
an equal portion of his property.
Accordingly, the court directed
both parties to contribute equally to
the maintenance of a three to four-
meter-wide passageway between
their properties, with the property
line running at the middle of the
passageway. It rejected
Benedicto's claim that the
easement had been extinguished
by nonuser and by the cessation of
the necessity for a passageway.
Both parties appealed to the CA,
which rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the
trial court, and denied the MR filed
by
the parties.
Benedicto argues that the
easement was originally
constituted because the buildings
then erected on the
respective properties of Hedrick
and Recto so adjoined each other
that the only way the back portions
of the properties could be reached
by their owners from San
Marcelino street was through the
passageway. He claims that when
the respondent Heras had his
building demolished in 1941 the
property gained direct access to
San Marcelino street since then
there has been no need for the
passageway.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement has
been extinguished by nonuser.
RULE:
Article 631 of the Civil Code
provides in part:
Art. 631. Easments are
extinguished:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) By nonuser for ten years, with
respect to discontinuous
easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which
they ceased to be used; and, with
respect to continuous easements,
from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the
estates fall into such condition that
the easement cannot be used; but
10
it shall revive if the subsequent
condition of the estates or either of
them should again permit its use,
unless when the use becomes
possible, sufficient time for
prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of
the preceding number; . . . .
For the purposes of this decision
we do not find it necessary to
determine whether the appropriate
period of nonuser in this case is 20
or 10 years. For one thing, there is
no indubitable proof of nonuser.
Benedicto merely assumes that
the passageway in question had
not been in use since 1941
because the property of Heras has
since gained direct access to San
Marcelino street with the
demolition of his house. For
another, even if we assume that
the period of prescription based on
nonuser is 10 years, the very
testimony of the petitioner
Benedicto shows that it was only in
1946 that he had the passageway
walled in by constructing a fence,
and
since the present action was filed
in 1955, granting that article 631 of
the Civil Code is applicable, the
prescriptive
period has not yet elapsed.
Nor can presumptive renunciation
by Heras of the use of the said
passageway be inferred. It would
appear from the record that Heras
started the construction of an
apartment building on his parcel of
land after the demolition of his
house in 1941, and that although
interrupted by World War II,
construction was continued in
1955.
Since it is patent from the
stipluation of facts that the
easement in question is mainly a
vehicular passageway, the obvious
need for such passageway to the
rear portion of the projected
apartment building negates any
presumptive renunciation on the
part of Heras. Moreover, the
easement in this case is perpetual
in character (using google
translate: “for all the time and all
the needs of each of the two
properties, sold by the present
GRASYA
Claro M. Recto and which is held
by Miriam R. Hedrick,
this agreement being obligatory for
everyone after acquire by any title
mentioned farms”) and was
annotated on all the transfer
certificates of title issued in the
series of transfers from Hedrick
through to the respondent Heras,
and in the transfer certificates of
title issued in the series of
transfers from Recto through to the
petitioner Benedicto. Since there is
nothing in the record that would
point to a mutual agreement
between any of the predecessors-
in-interest not between the
petitioner and the respondent
themselves with respect to the
discontinuance or obliteration of
the easement annotated on the
titles, the continued existence of
the easement must be upheld and
respected.
The fact that the easement here is
one of necessity does not detract
from the conclusion we have
reached. For even assuming that
with the demolition of the house on
Heras' property the necessity for
the passageway ceased (a point
traversed by Heras who claims
that he demolished his house
precisely in order to build an
apartment building in its place).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.
FRANCISCO VS. IAC-
EASEMENT OF WAY
Category: Property, Ownership
and Its Modifications
Easement of Way
An owner cannot, as respondent
has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway
and then claim an easement of
way through an adjacent estate.
Isolation must not be due to his
own acts.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a
part of Lot 860 of the Malinta
Estate owned by several co-
owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-
owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and
Frisca Dila) executed a deed by
which an undivided 1/3 portion of
the land was donated to a niece,
Epifania Dila, and another
undivided 1/3 portion to the
children of a deceased sister,
Anacleta Dila, and the remaining
portion, also an undivided third,
was declared to pertain exclusively
to and would be retained by
Cornelia Dila. A partition was then
executed.
The former co-owners overlooked
the fact that, by reason of the
subdivision, Epifania Dila’s lot
came to include the entire frontage
of what used to be Lot 860 along
Parada Road, and thus effectively
isolated from said road the other
lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of
the children of Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to
some buyers who subsequently
sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way
through Francisco’s land but
negotiations failed. Francisco's
proposal for an exchange of land
at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to
three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was
supposedly the custom in the
locality, was unacceptable to
Ramos.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded
was able to obtain a 3m wide
passageway through Dila’s lot. Yet
in August, 1973, he inexplicably
put up a 10ft high concrete wall on
his lot, thereby closing the very
right of way granted to him across
Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he
wished was to have a right of
passage precisely through
Francisco's land, considering this
to be more convenient to him, and
he did not bother to keep quiet
about his determination to bring
suit, if necessary, to get what he
wanted.]
11
Francisco learned of Ramos'
intention and reacted by replacing
the barbed-wire fence on his lot
along Parada Road with a stone
wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco
filed a case against him asserting
his right to a legal easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was
entitled to an easement of right of
way through the land belonging to
Francisco
HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that
an owner cannot, as respondent
has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway
and then claim an easement of
way through an adjacent estate.
The third of the cited requisites:
that the claimant of a right of way
has not himself procured the
isolation of his property had not
been met indeed the respondent
had actually brought about the
contrary condition and thereby
vitiated his claim to such an
easement. It will not do to assert
that use of the passageway
through Lot 860-B was dffficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being
to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even
a truck, and also because it has
been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing
right of way does not justify a claim
for a similar easement in an
alternative location.
PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES, 69
SCRA 69- Easement of Drainage
In an easement of receiving
rainwater, the distances prescribed
in the decree of registration should
not correspond to the width and
length of the roof of the house but
on the distance of the rainwater
falling inside the land of the
servient estate.
FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a
piece of residential lot adjacent to
and bounded on the north by the
GRASYA
lot of Paredes. The lot of
Purugganan is subject to an
easement of drainage in favor of
Paredes annotated in the Decree
of registration, which read in part:
“XXX the applicant agrees to
respect an easement or servitude
over a portion of the lots No. 1 and
2 which is EIGHT and ONE HALF
(8-1/2) meters in length…and the
width is ONE (1) meter, in order
that the rainwater coming from the
roofing of a house to be
constructed by the oppositor over
the ruins of her brick wall…shall
fall into the land of the applicant.”
Paredes constructed a new house,
the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer
than the length allowed in the
Decree of Registration, and has an
outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20
meters, protruding over the lot of
Purugganan, which is .20 meters
wider than that allowed, and the
rainwater from the GI roofing falls
about 3 meters inside lots 1 and 2
of Purugganan.
Purugganan filed a case
prohibiting Paredes from
proceeding with the construction of
the roof, which exceeds the
allowed dimensions. Trial court, in
a summary proceeding decided in
favor of Purugganan. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of
drainage refers to the measure of
the roofing?
HELD: No.
Paredes have made a mistake in
applying the distances prescribed
in the decree of registration to the
roofing of their house. They failed
to comprehend the meaning of the
phrase “servidumbre de vertiente
de los tejados” constituted on the
land of Purugganan. Translated, it
means the easement of receiving
water falling from the roof which is
an encumbrance imposed on the
land of Purugganan because the
encumbrance is not the roof itself
but the rain water falling inside the
property of Purugganan. The
report submitted by the court-
appointed commissioner clearly
shows that Paredes exceeded the
dimension allowed in the decree of
registration.
Ongsiako vs Ongsiako
Plaintiff: Caridad Ongsiaco
Defendant: Emilia Ongsiaco
Ponente: Reyes
FACTS:
Mother of Caridad & Emilia
Ongsiako executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, donating to
her children a piece of land.
According to the mother, when she
made the donation, a greater area
was allotted to Ramon & Emilia
because their shares were low
lands through which flowed the
excess water from higher estates.
Later on, she learned that Ramon
& Emilia started constructing dikes
which impeded the natural flow of
water coming from the higher
estates. Hence, she executed a
document revoking the donation in
favor of Ramon and Emilia and
adjudicated their revoked shares to
Caridad as mojera and the rest in
equal shares.
ISSUE (the 3 issues in this case
relate to the 3 causes of action):
(1) WON the donation was
effectively revoked by virtue of the
document drawn by the mother.
(2) (TOPICAL) WON there
exists a cause of action for
violation of right of legal easement
of water.
(3) WON there exists a cause
of action for alleged fraudulent
reduction of Caridad’s share.
HELD:
(1) No, the donation was not
effectively revoked.
(2) No more cause of action
because it had already prescribed.
(3) No, action had already
prescribed.
RATIO:
(1)
• In order to set aside the
donation, the revocation will only
be effective upon court judgment
or consent of the donee. In this
case, there was neither a court
judgment ordering the revocation,
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nor was there a consent of Ramon Gonzales filed a case demanding
& Emilia. for an easement.
(2)
• The legal easement of ISSUES
water is classified as continuous, (1) WON Gonzales has the right to
therefore subject to prescription by an easement of aqueduct? YES
non-user for the period required by (2) WON Gonzales can be granted
law. Under CC 631, easements the easement? NOT YET.
are extinguished by non-user for
10 years, which in the case of HELD
continuous easements, shall be (1) Yes, Gonzales has the
counted from the day on which an right to an easement of aqueduct
act contrary to the same took as provided by Art. 557 (now Art.
place. 642) and is supported by Articles
• In this case, the dike was 118-125 of the Spanish Law of
constructed in 1937/1938 (before Waters.
the war) and the action was only (2) No, Gonzales must comply
brought on 1951, way beyond the with the requirements under Art.
prescription period. 558 (now Art. 643) of the Civil
• Furthermore, Caridad Code. In the case at bar, she has
cannot argue that the dams not obtained the necessary permit
constitute a nuisance and by virtue from the government to use the
of CC 698, lapse of time does not water from the Kay Pateng River.
legalize any nuisance, therefore,
her action does not prescribe.
First, the complaint does not set
forth any fact which shows that the
dam is a nuisance.
Even assuming arguendo that it is
indeed nuisance, CC 631 which is
a more particular law which applies
to easements in particular will
prevail over CC 698 which applied
to nuisances in general (simple
rule in stat con: apply particular
provisions over general ones). In
such a case, action had already
prescribed
(3)
Prescribed because more than 20
years had elapsed since the
partition (prescription: 10 years
after partition only).

JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT FOR

ALL 3 CAUSES OF ACTION ARE
DISMISSED.

GONZALES VS DE DIOS

FACTS:
Gonzales and De Dios’ fishponds
are adjacent to each other.
The Kay Pateng River is the only
source of water for Gonzales’
fishpond, but she has no access to
it. She has repeatedly asked De
Dios for an easement of aqueduct,
but the latter refused. Thus,
GRASYA

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