BACHRACH MOTORS V. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING
Judgment was
G.R. NO. 35223. SEPTEMBER 17, 1931
FACTS: Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to PNB. To secure the
payment of its debt, it induced its planters, among whom was Mariano Ledesma,
to mortgage their land to the bank. To compensate the planters for the risk,
Talisay-Silay Milling, by a resolution, undertook to credit the planters every
year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt secured. Bachrach filed a complaint
against the Talisay for the delivery of the amount of P13,850 or promissory
notes or other instruments of credit, as bonus in favor of Ledesma. The
complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an
accounting of the amounts it owes
Ledesma, and to pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment
mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by Ledesma be declared null
and void. PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive
any amount which Ledesma might be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as
bonus. Talisay answered the complaint that Ledesma’s credit belonged to Cesar
Ledesma because the latter had purchased it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an
owner by purchase in good faith. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court held
that Bachrach Motor had a preferred right to receive Ledesma’s bonus, and it
ordered the central to deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.
ISSUE Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits.
HELD: SC affirmed the judgment. Bonus is not a civil fruit; not an income of the
land. The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution, is not based upon
the value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but
upon the total value of the debt secured, which something quite distinct is from
and independent of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from
the land, it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of buildings, proceeds
from lease of lands, or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code.
TAYAG vs YUSECO
G.R. No. L-14043. April 16, 1959
FACTS: In 1920’s, Maria Lim offered to Yuseco and his wife, defendant Rosario,
for them to build a house on 2 lots owned by Lim (Hacienda de San Lazaro). The
Yusecos accepted the offer and built a dwelling house and an annex for garage
and servant quarters. To legalize, Lim and the Yusecos executed a contract of
lease covering them, to run for a period of 5 years, with a yearly rental of P120.
Before death, Lim sold the 2 lots to her married daughter, Tayag. In 1946, the
Tayags asked the Yusecos to remove their house, or else pay them monthly rent.
The latter refused. Because of this, the Tayags brought an action of ejection for
the restitution of the lots and the recovery of a monthly rental.
rendered in favor of the Tayags. The defendants appealed.
The court rendered judgment adjudicating to Tayag the possession of the 2 lots,
with right to appropriate the 2 buildings thereon upon payment to Yusecos of
their value, and providing that should the plaintiffs fail to pay within 90 days,
the defendants shall have the right to purchase said lots. The plaintiffs appealed.
CA, finding the defendants as possessors in good faith, affirmed the lower court.
The plaintiffs appealed to SC. SC affirmed the decision of CA to remand the case
to lower court to require plaintiffs to make a choice: "whether they would
purchase the buildings erected on the lots, or allow the defendants to buy said
lots.” Tayag’s choice: “NOT to sell the lot, but to appropriate the building if its
valuation is as it should be and is properly and fairly determined.”
Trial court ordered the next step to adduce evidence in connection with the
value of the buildings. Since the defendants will be the sellers, they have the
burden of proving the value of the buildings, giving the plaintiffs opportunity to
rebut. Plaintiffs: 2 buildings cannot be more than P40,000. Defendants: chalet is
from P45,000 to P50,000; garage and dwelling house, from P5,000 to P6,000.
Trial court fixed them at P50,000. This is the order appealed from.
ISSUE: Whether or not a litigant who has made a choice to sell his property
appeal the price amount fixed by the court.
HELD: NO. If petitioners were allowed to change their mind, repudiate their
choice made in court not to sell the land but to buy the buildings, and then
compel the owners of the houses, respondents herein, instead to buy land, then
what if respondent also claimed inability to pay the price of the land, claiming
that it is also a good and valid reason for not compelling them to make the
purchase? How would this litigation end, if it ever would end? Once a party, in
conformity with a court decision, has made his choice, and has duly informed
the court of said choice, and is accordingly ordered to comply with the same by
buying the building erected on his land and pay the value thereof fixed by the
courts, that duty is converted into a money obligation which can be enforced by
execution, regardless of the unwillingness and alleged inability of the party
concerned to pay the amount.
As to the alleged absence in the order of execution for the houseowners to make
the transfer of the houses, that is to be understood, that upon full payment of
the price, the respondents will execute the corresponding deed of transfer.
DEPRA vs. DUMLAO
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FACTS: Depra, is the owner of Lot in Iloilo. In 1972, when DUMLAO constructed
his house, the kitchen encroached on DEPRA's property. DEPRA’s mother filed
an action for Unlawful Detainer vs DUMLAO. MTC found DUMLAO in good faith,
and applying Article 448, ordered a forced lease on the encroachment between
the parties. But DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO
deposited them with MTC. In 1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of
Title against DUMLAO at CFI involving the same encroachment. Rebutting the
argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the
Decision of MTC was null and void ab initio since such is jurisdiction of CFI. In
the MTC, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the
action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership. CFI upheld
DEPRA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 applies.
HELD: Within the context of their mutual concession and stipulation, the parties
have chosen a legal formula to resolve their dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO
the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of a "landowner in
good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. The fairness of the rules in Article 448
has been explained as follows: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in
good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower
to pay for the proper rent.
It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing. Judgment of trial Court is set aside, and case is
remanded to RTC for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546
as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine:
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 sqm land; b) the amount of the expenses
spent by DUMLAO for the kitchen; c) the increase in value which encroachment
may have acquired, and d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably
more than that of the kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined, RTC shall judge, as follows:
a) grant DEPRA to exercise his option under Article 448, whether to appropriate
the kitchen by paying DUMLAO, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said
area;
b) order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the land
but the latter rejects because the value of the land is considerably more than
that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of DEPRA’s option to sell
the land. If no agreement is reached, the Court shall fix the terms of the lease;
c) DUMLAO shall pay reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's
land from 1952;
d) The periods shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to
tender to the trial Court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such
payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of
payment.
MACASAET vs. MACASAET
GR 154391-92 September 30, 2004
FACTS: The children (petitioners - Ismael/ Teresita) were invited by the
parents (respondents - Vicente/Rosario) to occupy the latters' 2 lots.
Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the
parents asked them to vacate the premises losing their right to remain on the
property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful
improvements in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article
448 applies. MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to
vacate the premises opining that petitioners had occupied the lots, not by virtue
of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of respondents. MTCC dismissed
petitioner’s contention that it was an advance inheritance, on the ground that
successional rights were inchoate.
On appeal, RTC upheld MTCC. However, it allowed respondents to appropriate
the building and improvements, after payment of the indemnity provided for by
Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548. CA upheld the 2 lower courts
ruling that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose
term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the
owner. But CA said that Article 448 was inapplicable. But under Article 1678,
petitioners had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the
improvements made. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 1678 should apply to the case on the matters of
improvements, or is it Article 447 in relation to Articles 453 and 454.
HELD: SC rules out possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners were invited by
respondents to occupy the lots so that they could resolve family problems. By
occupying, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence,
there was a meeting of minds.
That petitioners had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the
duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation, Article 1197 allows the
courts to fix the period. However, Article 1197 applies to a situation in which
the parties intended a period. Here, no period was intended by the parties. Their
mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or
authorize the courts to do so. It can be safely concluded that the agreement
subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the
arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition here. Having been
based on parental love, the agreement would end upon the dissipation of the
affection. Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause for continued possession of
lots.
As applied to this case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything
that is incorporated or attached to the property. Accession industrial -- building,
planting and sowing on an immovable -- is governed by Articles 445 to 456.
Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the
owner of the property uses the materials of another.
HOWEVER, Art 448 is applicable.
The respondents consented to the improvements. In fact, because the children
occupied the lots, the parents certainly approved of the improvements. Thus,
petitioners have been in good faith when they built the structures. Therefore, CA
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The portion requiring respondents to reimburse one half the value of
improvements, and the right of petitioners to remove those improvements (if
the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin to determine the facts applying
Articles 448 and 546:
a) Respondents’ option to appropriate the improvements, after paying the
indemnity, under Article 546 in relation to Article 448; or Petitioners to pay the
value of lots, unless it is considerably more than that of the improvements, in
which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent ;
b) The value of expenses incurred in the improvements;
c.) The increase in value of improvements;
d.) Respondents’ choice of type of indemnity to be paid (whether b or c)
e.) Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the
improvements built thereon.
BERNARDO V BATACLAN
FACTS: Bernardo learned when he entered into the premises of the property
purchased from Pastor Samonte that the latter authorised Catalino Bataclan to
make improvements thereon. In a civil case to secure possession, the court
ruled that Baraclan was a builder and possessor in good faith and was entitled
to reimbursement for the works and improvements,
The court gave the plaintiff 30 days within which to choose between the sale of
the land or to buy the works. Bernardo decided to sell the land to the defendant
but the latter informed the court that he is unable to pay the sum required. The
court then awarded the respondent 30 days to purchase the land or else the
property will be sold in a public auction.
In the auction sale, Toribio Teodoro was the highest bidder. The purchaser
sought judicial remedy for the possession of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant lost his right to retain the property
pending payment for indemnity.
HELD: The court ruled that the right to retain the property has already been
lost. Due to the failure and inability of the defendant to pay the purchase price
the subject property was sold in a public auction which he himself asked for.
Furthermore, he already received his share of the purchase price. Therefore, the
court find no reason to keep the property in the possession of the defendant.
FELICES vs. IRIOLA
FACTS: It appears that Felices was the grantee of a homestead, by virtue of
which he was issued OCT. A month after patent, he conveyed in conditional sale
to Iriola a portion of his homestead with an express stipulation subject to Sec.
119 of Act 141 (PLA), that after the lapse of 5 years or as soon as may be
allowed by law, the vendor or his successors would execute in vendee's favor a
deed of absolute sale over the land in question.
2 years after sale, Felices tried to recover the land, but the latter refused unless
he was paid P2,000 as the value of improvements. Felices deposited the
received price in court and filed this action.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant may recover or be reimbursed the value of his
improvements on the land in question.
HELD: While recognizing Felices' right to "redeem", Iriola insisted that he must
first be reimbursed. But investigation found that improvements were made
after the complaint had been filed.
"He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity" (Art. 449, New Civil Code).
FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.
[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29, 1959]
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated May 10, 1957 (a) declaring the Sheriff’s certificate of sale covering
a school building sold at public auction null and void unless within 15 days from
notice of said order the successful bidders, defendants-appellants spouses Maria
Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang, shall pay to, appellee Maria Gervacio
Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum of P5,750.00 that the
spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; (b) declaring the
other appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934 undivided
interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate of tile No 45970, on which the
building sold in the auction sale is situated; and© ordering the sale in public
auction of the said undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a
aforementioned to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of
appellee Blas and against Filipinas Colleges, Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00
minus the sum of P5,750.00mentioned in (a) above. The order appealed from is
the result of three motions filed in the court a quo in the course of the execution
of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to it in
which the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio
Blaswere the parties. The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each
and all of this motion. In assailing the order of the court a quo directing the
appellants to pay appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made at the
public auction, appellants' counsel has presented a novel, albeit ingenious,
argument. They contend that since the builder in good faith has failed to pay the
price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article
448 of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his right and the appellants as owners
of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto.
ISSUE/S: 1.Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not,
whatare the remedies left to the owner of the land if the builder fails topay?
2.Whether or not the appellants, as owner of the land, may seekrecovery of the
value of their land by a writ of execution; levy thehouse of the builder and sell it
in public auction.
HELD:
NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS.
There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which
would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to
pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter
becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
Although it is true, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the
builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the
builder’s right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there
was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all
rights over his own building. The remedy left to the parties in such eventuality
where the builder fails to pay the value of the land, though the Code is silent on
this Court, a builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. He has right to
retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the
expenses incurred by him.
Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land
chooses not to appropriate the improvement and requires the builder in good
faith to pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to pay the
land, and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of
lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they
can go to the court to fix that amount.
The second contention was without merit.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas
is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the
school building. With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of its
personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the Timbang, this Court
likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a
partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses topay to
the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within ifteen (15)
days from notice of the final judgment, an order of execution shall issue in favor
of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses
not exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the said amount.