Professional Documents
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06
HUMR 5120:
International Human Rights Law: Substantive Rights
Readings:
Eide, pp. 407-421
Ovey, pp. 218-240, 432-458
Cases:
Brannigan och McBride, Judgment of 26 May 1993, A. 258-B,
Belilos, Judgment of 29 April 1988, A. 132, p. 24).
Slivenko v. Latvia, (App. 48321/99), Judgment 9 October 2003 (Grand Chamber)
Silver, Judgment of 25 March 1983, A. 61
Handyside v. the UK, Judgment of 7 December 1976, A. 24
Recommended reading:
Human Rights Committee General Comment 29, on states of emergency.
In accordance with international human rights law there are essentially three ways in
which the State may limit or restrict the scope of its obligations:
These fields illustrate the ways the State may strike a balance between the rights and
interests of different individuals, the legitimate State interests and concerns and the
individuals’ rights. The interests of the society as a whole overrides those of individuals.
Derogations are only permitted in exceptional circumstances, when the “life of the nation
is at stake”, while limitations to rights may be made to serve certain legitimate aims.
Reservations may be made at the time of ratification/accession to the treaty
Limitations: “core of the right” may not be affected
Derogations: only in exceptional circumstances, and only as far as the situation requires
Reservations: the “object and purpose” of the treaty may not be destroyed
I. Limitations
NB. The grounds for legitimate restrictions may vary between the different treaties.
1. Strict interpretation
“It follows from the nature of paragraph 2 of article 10 as an exception clause that this
provision must, according to a universally accepted rule, be strictly interpreted. This is
especially true in the context of the Convention the object and purpose of which is to
safeguard fundamental human rights. Strict interpretation means that no other criteria
than those mentioned in the exception clause itself may be at the basis of any restrictions,
and these criteria, in turn, must be understood in such a way that the language is not
extended beyond its ordinary meaning (cf. paragraph 44 of the Court’s judgment of 21
February 1975 in the Golder case ...)”
“In the case of exception clauses such as … the principle of strict interpretation meets
certain difficulties because of the broad meaning of the clause itself. It nevertheless
imposes a number of clearly defined obligations on the authorities of the High
Contracting Parties …” (Sunday Times case, Report of the Commission, B. 28, paras.
194-195)
2. Permissible limitations
Criteria:
a. Lawful: “in accordance with the law” or “prescribed by law”
b. Legitimate: aims listed in the provisions
c. Necessary in a democratic society
“clear, accessible, precise and foreseeable” without being “excessive rigidity” (The
Sunday Times, Judgment of 26 April 1979, A.30, para. 49).
The ECHR relies on the State’s “margin of appreciation” to a larger or lesser extent
depending on the nature of the rights or on the balancing of the competing claims.
Handyside v. the UK, Judgment of 7 December 1976, A. 24, paras.26, 48
For the different interpretations of the extent of the “margin of appreciation” in the case
law, see Ovey and White, pp. 234-239.
II. Derogations:
Exceptional circumstances
Non-derogable rights
Strictly required – proportionality
Temporary
Procedure – international and domestic
Applicable law during emergencies: Humanitarian law and international criminal
law and parts of international human rights law
See:
Art. 4 ICCPR, Art. 15 ECHR, ECHR Protocol 6, Art. 3.
1. WHEN?
“an exceptional situation or crisis of emergency which affects the whole population and
constitutes a threat to organised life in the community of which the State is composed”
See kommissionens rapport, 19 Dec 1959, B.1 (1961), p.. 82, and, Judgment of 1 July
1961, s. 56)
In Greece v. the UK the Commission and the Court developed the criteria for scrutiny:
2. HOW?
i. Art. 15 ECHR: Art.2 (life), Art. 3 (torture), Art. 4.1 (slavery), art.7 (no
punishment without law)
ii. No exceptions to Art. 3 and Art.4.1.
iii. Qualified in relation to life,”lawful acts of war”, see also Protocol 6, Arts. 2
and 3
iv. NB. The content of Art. 6 ICCPR and Art. 2 ECHR should be compared
2.b. Non-discrimination is included in Art. 4.1 “on the grounds of race, colour, sex,
language, religion and social origin”. However, art 14 ECHR is an integral part of all
rights (Ireland v. the UK, s. 86-88, para.228-232 )
2.c Derogations may not contradict other human rights obligations, whether contained in
national or international law, see Art. 53 ECHR
Take note of the obligations under ICESCR, international humanitarian law and
international criminal law . See Eide, pp. 407-421
States which are bound by both the ECHR and the ICCPR Brannigan och McBride,
Judgment of 26 May 1993, A. 258-B, s.56-57; Lawless, s. 60, Ireland v. the UK, s.84 och
i förklarat att inga bevis har funnits på att avvikelserna strider mot andra folkrättsliga
bestämmelser.
Ireland v. the UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, A. 25, s. 78-79, 81-82, 92-93; Lawless,
Merits, Judgment of 1 July 1961, A. 3, s. 55-56.)
See also Brannigan och McBride, Judgment of 26 May 1993, A. 258-B, s. 29, 33, 40-42
for critique of the wide margin of appreciation
Lawless, Judgment, s. 58, para. 36, Ireland v. the UK, Judgment, s. 80-81, para. 212,
Brannigan and McBride, s.53-54, para. 56-60..
2.e. Proportionality
“the rule of law”,
Lawless, s.58, para.36; Ireland v. the UK, s. 81, para. 212; Brannigan v. McBride, s. 53-
54, para. 56-59.
The validity of the derogation cannot be called into question for the sole reason that the
Government had decided to examine whether in the future a way could be found of
ensuring greater conformity with the Convention obligations. Indeed, such a process of
continued reflection is not only in keeping with Article 15 para. 3 which requires
permanent review of the need for emergency measures but is also implicit in the very
notion of proportionality.
4. LAWFUL or NOT?
Brannigan och McBride, Judgment of 26 May 1993, A. 258-B, s.56-57; Lawless, s. 60,
Ireland v. the UK, s.84
4.b A balance between State discretion and the supervisory organs’ competence
The requirements for a permissible derogation under ECHR and the ICCPR are tested by
the Court or the Committee despite the recognized margin of appreciation of states to
determine their situation and which necessary measures to adopt.
See Ireland v. the UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, A. 25, p. 78-79, 81-82, 92-93;
Lawless, Merits, Judgment of 1 July 1961, A. 3, p. 55-56. and cf. Gen. Comment 29, on
states of emergency, para. 5)
See the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment Comment No.29, on states of
emergency.
…..
III. Reservations
1. The ECHR
Addresses reservations in Art. 57 ECHR:
2. The ICCPR
Art. 19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the general rules
applicable to reservation
See also Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports
1951, for a discussion on the possibilities of making reservations to the Genocide
Convention