Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan
Sources of Legal Research
Primary Authority is the ONLY authority that is
BINDING on the courts.
Classification by Authority
“Authority is that which may be cited in
support of an action, theory or hypothesis.”
Legal of materials primary authority are those
that contain actual law or those that contain
law created by government. Each of the
three branches of government: Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary, promulgates laws.
The legislature promulgates statutes, namely:
Act, Commonwealth Act, Republic Act, Batas
Pambansa. Executive promulgates presidential
issuances (Presidential Decrees, Executive
Orders, Memorandum Circular, Administrative
Orders, Proclamations, etc.), rules and
regulations through its various departments,
bureaus and agencies. The Judiciary
promulgates judicial doctrines embodied in
decisions. We however need to clarify that the
Presidential Decrees or law issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos during Martial
Law and Executive Orders issued by Aquino
President Corazon C. Aquino before the
opening Congress in July 1987 can be classified
as legislative acts, there being no legislature
during these two periods.
Primary Authority or sources may be further
subdivided into the following:
 Mandatory primary authority is law
created by the jurisdiction in which the
law operates like the Philippines;
 Persuasive mandatory authority is law
created by other jurisdictions but
which have persuasive value to our
courts e.g. Spanish and American laws
and jurisprudence. These sources as
used specially when there are
no Philippine authorities available
or when the Philippine statute or
jurisprudence under interpretation is
based on either the Spanish or
American law;
It is in this regard that the collections of law
libraries in the Philippines include United
States court reports, West’s national reporter
system, court reports of England and
international tribunal, important reference
materials such as the American Jurisprudence,
Corpus Juris Secundum, Words and Phrases and
different law dictionaries. Some of these law
libraries subscribe to the Westlaw and/or
LexisNexis. The Supreme Court , University of
the Philippines, University of Santo Tomas and
a number of prominent law libraries also have a
Spanish collection where a great number
of our laws originated.
Secondary authority or sources are
commentaries or books, treatise, writings,
journal articles that explain, discuss or
comment on primary authorities. Also included
in this category are the opinions of the
Department of Justice, Securities and
Exchange Commission or circulars of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. These materials are not
binding on courts but they have persuasive
effect and/or the degree of
persuasiveness. With regards to commentaries
or books, treatise, writings, journal
articles, the reputation or expertise of the
author is a consideration. Some of the authors
of good reputation and considered experts in
the field are Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
and Justice Carolina Grino Aquino on Revised
Penal Code or Criminal Law, Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino on Civil law, Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin Bernas on
Constititional Law, Prof. Perfecto Fernandez on
Labor Law, Vicente Francisco, Chief Justice
Manuel Moran on Remedial Law, and Justice
Vicente Abad Santos and Senator Jovito Salonga
on International Law, etc.
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081|July 15, 1936
Facts: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935,
Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et
al. were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7,
1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district.
On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office. On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly
in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had
thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission (EC) a “Motion of
Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 1
9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of
which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
Legal Research | 1-Wigmore

confirmation made by the National Assembly.
Angara filed a Motion to dismiss arguing that by
virtue of the National Assembly proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and
that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a
writ of prohibition from the SC.
Petitioner here then wants to Prohibit the
Electoral Commission (respondent) from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by a
Pedro Ynsua (another respondent) against the
election of the petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district
of Tayabas. The controversy lies on the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
controversy.
Issue: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral commission as the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.
Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest number
of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." It is imperative,
therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and
inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly
Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan
appreciate its full meaning, import and
significance.
The Electoral Commission did not exceed its
jurisdiction. It has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly". Thus,
entertaining the protest of Ynsua must conform
to their own prescribed rules and the National
Assembly cannot divest them of any such
powers.
The Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer
for purposes of classification to the legislative
than to any of the other two departments of
the government. The Electoral Commission is
also the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly. BUT as far
as the Electoral Commission is concerned the
constitution invests in it the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of
the limited and specific function assigned to it
by the Constitution. Such transfer of power
from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied
power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of
filing protests.
The confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member
of the National Assembly should be filed.
Although it is not included in the tripartite
system it is acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. The power
vested in the Electoral Commission is complete
and unimpaired as if originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power
in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. Wherefore, petition is
DENIED.
2
Legal Research | 1-Wigmore

In the matter of the Petitions for Admission to
the Bar
94 Phil. 534|1954
DOCTRINE: The ultimate power, however, to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to the Supreme Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.
FACTS
This case concerns Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission
to the bar,
Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court(R126-S14): 
 they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
"in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject." the court, however, has lowered
the passing rate in the past. (exact term used:
their grades were “raised to 75”)
1946: 72; 1947: 69; 1948: 70; 1949: 74; 1950-
1954: 75.
 Ruling: RA 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to
practice law as those reconsidered and passed
by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar lobbied in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which,
among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the SC on
the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of
the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan
Although the members of the SC reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on
June 21, 1953 without his signature. This
became RA 97215
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission.
There are also others who have sought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
revise their grades.
If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must
be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not.
ISSUES: Is RA 972 unconstitutional?
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision
have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial
system from which ours has been derived, the
admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the
judicial and legislative departments of the 3
government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
Legal Research | 1-Wigmore

passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities
may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in
effect a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated
the Constitution. 3. That congress has
exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar
(since the rules made by congress must elevate
the profession, and those rules promulgated
are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a
class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the
entire law is void.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME
SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
INC.
GR No. 167614|March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by
respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-
approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic
monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave
per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure,
Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days
of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims
in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on
the computation of $2590/month from June
Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan
1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998,
and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and
exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner’s dismissal
illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing
his salaray for three (3) months of the
unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
employment, plus $45 for salary differential
and for attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the
total amount; however, no compensation for
damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision
and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus
445 salary differential and 10% for attorney’s
fees. This decision was based on the provision
of RA 8042, which was made into law on July
15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the last clause in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which
reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of
the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner
Serrano.
ISSUES:
W/N the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as
protected sector
RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
guarantees:
Legal Research | 1-Wigmore

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII
accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment,
full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed
under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed
by workers of similar category, while all
monetary obligations should be borne by them
in equal degree; none should be denied the
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or
spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to
afford protection to labor,” the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict
judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause
appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals
that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against, and an invidious impact on
OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; and it is for
that precise reason that the clause violates not
just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but
also her right to substantive due process under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles
G.R. No. 170139|Aug. 5, 2014
DOCTRINE: When a law or a provision of law is
null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or
a similar law or provision. A law or provision of
law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
FACTS
Joy C. Cabiles applied for a quality control job
in Taiwan with petitioner Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc., a recruitment and
Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan
placement agency.
Joy was later asked to sign a one-year
employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that petitioner
required her to pay a placement fee of
P70,000.00 when she signed the employment
contract.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal,
Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. While her
employment contract stated that would work
as quality control, in Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter
On July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that she should
immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport. She was asked to “prepare
for immediate repatriation.”
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26
to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila
Upon her return, Joy filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed
that she was illegally dismissed and asked for
the return of her placement fee, the withheld
amount for repatriation costs, payment of her
salary for 23 months as well as moral and
exemplary damages.
Petitioner Sameer Agency alleged that Joy's
termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her “failure to
comply with the work requirements of her
foreign employer.” The agency also claimed
that it did not ask for a placement fee of
70,000.00 and showed Official Receipt No.
14860 bearing the amount of 20,360.00.23
Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation
with petitioner had already been transferred to
the Pacific Manpower & Management Services,
Inc. as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by
Pacific Manpower.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint
ruling that her complaint was based on mere
allegations.It also found no excess payment of 5
placement fees.
The NLRC, however, declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed. It found that Sameer Agency
failed to prove that there were just causes for
Legal Research | 1-Wigmore
 Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan

termination. Furthermore, procedural due recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas

process was not observed in terminating Joy. worker to three months is both a violation of
The NLRC awarded Joy only three months due process and the equal protection clauses of
worth of salary in the amount of NT$46,080, the Constitution.
the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld
from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300.46 The reinstated clause does not satisfy the
requirement of reasonable classification. A
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of reasonable classification “(1) must rest on
the NLRC but remanded the case to the NLRC substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
to address the validity of Sameer's allegations the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
against Pacific. limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same
Dissatisfied, Sameer Agency filed a petition class.”
with the Supreme Court.
The classifications made by the reinstated
ISSUE: W/N Reinstated clause in RA 10022 is clause distinguished between fixed-period
unconstitutional (for being violative of the overseas workers and fixed period local
equal protection and due process clause) workers. It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less
Ruling: Yes. than one year and overseas workers with
employment contracts of at least one year.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
Within the class of overseas workers with at
supreme. No branch or office of the
least one-year employment contracts, there
government may exercise its powers in any
was a distinction between those with at least a
manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
year left in their contracts and those with less
regardless of the existence of any law that
than a year left in their contracts when they
supports such exercise.
were illegally dismissed.
o The Constitution cannot be trumped by any
We noted in Serrano that before the passage of
other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with
illegally terminated overseas and local workers
it is a nullity.
with fixed-term employment were computed in
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
the same manner. Their money claims were
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
computed based on the “unexpired portions of
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation
their contracts.”The adoption of the reinstated
or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the
provision.
money claims of illegally dismissed overseas
o A law or provision of law that was already
workers with an unexpired term of at least a
declared unconstitutional remains as such
year to a cap of three months worth of their
unless circumstances have so changed as to
salary.There was no such limitation on the
warrant a reverse conclusion.
money claims of illegally terminated local
workers with fixed-term employment.
When a law or a provision of law is null because
it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
Moreover, illegally dismissed overseas workers
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
whose employment contracts had a term of less
reenactment of the same or a similar law or
than one year were granted the amount
provision. A law or provision of law that was
equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
already declared unconstitutional remains as
employment contracts. Meanwhile, illegally
such unless circumstances have so changed as
dismissed overseas workers with employment
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
terms of at least a year were granted a cap
equivalent to three months of their salary for
We are not convinced that the situation has so
the unexpired portions of their contracts.
changed so as to cause us to reverse binding
precedent. The new law puts our overseas
These classifications do not rest on any real or 6
workers in the same vulnerable position as they
substantial distinctions that would justify
were prior to Serrano.
different treatments in terms of the
computation of money claims resulting from
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
illegal termination. The rights violated when a
Maritime that limiting wages that should be
fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated

Legal Research | 1-Wigmore

 Legal Research
Atty. Karla Josee Ilagan

are neither greater than nor less than the rights
violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is
illegally terminated. It is state policy to protect
the rights of workers without qualification as to
the place of employment
1. A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates.

The reinstated clause also violates due process
rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas
workers of their monetary claims without any
discernable valid purpose.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS (1997)
G.R. No. 122156 | 1997-02-03
2. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force and effect.

Facts
3. Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
The controversy arose when Government paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to deemed written in every statute and contract.
the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). In a close
bidding, only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as

the winning bidder, Manila Prince matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad.

Perhaps apprehensive that the sale will

consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Manila Prince invokes Sec. 10, second

paragraph, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument of
Philippine heritage and culture. it has become
a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner
also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of GSIS being a part of the
7
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy.

Constitutional Supremacy

Legal Research | 1-Wigmore