25. G.R. No.

149453 October 7, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent

Lacson and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the death of eleven
(11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG).

The respondent sought for the reconsideration for the following motions: (1)
Omnibus Motion, (2) Motion for Reconsideration, (3) Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration, and (4) Motion to Set for Oral Arguments.

Lacson argued that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and the time-bar
in said rule should not be applied retroactively as it would violate the right of
the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

The Omnibus Motion was denied for lack of merit since grounds cited by Lacson had
already been passed upon and resolved by this Court.

The Court also denied the motion of the respondent to set the case for oral
arguments. The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved in
the case. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral arguments.

The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to
determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant.

It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court.

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. It ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems
of due process or impair the independence of the Court.

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to

enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings
may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such
as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the
retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought
to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of
criminal laws in particular

Issues:

Whether or not the time-bar for two years under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Penal Code should not be applied retroactively.

Ruling:

Yes, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so
that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of
giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so.

If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one
year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal
cases.

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and
the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to
do so would cause an

"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of

justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.

Hence, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.