G.R. No.

L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

An appeal for Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, said taxes collected under THE Republic Act No. 590

Under the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552,
the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines,
and so ordered the refund of said taxes

The Legislature in its in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of
his compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, is unconstitutional

[STATCON question: May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise?.]

Held:

Yes it is unconstitutional.

Sec 9, Article VIII of our Constitution provides thus:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand
pesos.

Construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial
officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof
by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office,
a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor
General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590 to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. In the case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court (US) declared "that they
(fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

In this case, when a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and
secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure
and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.

We reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
STATCON QUESTION/more

The fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will
have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution,
it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it
without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said,
whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the
courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am.
Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as
to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to
violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on
a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.