MAGALONA VS ERMITA

G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011

Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners,
vs
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.

Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties.

2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.

Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost
points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal
waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.

Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding
the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the
resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting
or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’
under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson
put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim.
In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

People vs Lamahang Digest

Posted on August 15, 2016
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530
August 03, 1935

FACTS:
 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robber
y.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening wit
h an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
 The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall,
when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of attempted tre
spass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances a
nd sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natur
al course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offe
nder clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging
to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in e
ntering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is n
othing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wa
nting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts sub
mitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention
must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injus
tice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under consideration does
not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the accused must be taken into c
onsideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record sh
ows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

February 5, 2013
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997 People vs Ortega
Facts:
Appellants Ortega, Jr. and Garcia were charged with murder. The Information alleged that the accused-
appellants, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery
and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the
different parts of the body of the victim thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death. Appellants Ortega and Garcia pleaded not guilty to the charge. RTC, however, found both accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Appellant Garcia was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Held:
No.
The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of “attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing]
repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
ABLOLA.” The prosecution’s evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was
solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the
crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right. 36 Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly guarantees the following:
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
In People vs. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape on a woman “deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious” where the information charged the accused of sexual assault “by using force
or intimidation,” thus:
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method although the
prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so
is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she
was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the criminal
complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by “Antonio Pailano, being then
provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her will’. No
mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or
otherwise deprived of reason — and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged —
would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [Article IV,
Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every
accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground
not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of
qualified seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People vs.
Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible
for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of — and acquitted
— was not homicide but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114] where
the accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return
the same under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by
means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information.
The Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information
that charges murder by means of stabbing.

People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Estrada

[G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010]

Doctrine:
In order to charge properly an uncle of a rape-victim for qualified rape, the circumstance that accused-
appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in
the information.

Facts:
On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against appellant Edgardo Estrada
charging him with two counts of Rape committed as follows:

That on or about the month of July 1997, at Barangay x x x, in the Municipality of Atimonan, Province of
Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the
uncle of the offended party, with lewd design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA, a minor, 12 years of age, against her
will.

On August 16, 2002, the trial court found the accused guilty of qualified rape on two counts and
sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
 The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification finding the appellant guilty of simple
rape. The Court of Appeals opined that mere allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victim’s
uncle would not suffice to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically
stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not appellant should be held liable for qualified rape.

Held: No. Appellant is guilty only of two counts of simple rape. In the instant case, it was clearly established by
the prosecution that on two occasions in July 1997, the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force
and intimidation, against her will and without her consent.

However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. In the same
manner, it is irrelevant that AAA testified that appellant is her uncle.

The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is
the uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.
Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape.

People vs. Reyes

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE REYES
G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018

TIJAM, J:
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with murder in an Information which alleges that the said accused, with
treachery, attack DANILO ESTRELLA Y SANCHEZ by firing his armalite rifle at said Danilo who was then
walking home and hitting him on different parts of the body, depriving the latter of a chance to defend himself
from the attack thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds which caused his immediate death.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant argued that he was informed by Aelardo that Danilo and four other
men are planning to kill him. Fearing for his family's safety, accused-appellant prepared his Armalite rifle. When
Celia was on her way to accused-appellant's house, she saw a man holding a gun approaching accused-
appellant from behind. When Celia shouted "Ricky," accused-appellant turned towards Celia and saw Danilo
holding a gun in the act of shooting him. Accused-appellant drew and fired his Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo who
fell on the ground.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant can validly claim self-defense.
Ruling: Self-defense cannot be validly claimed. By invoking self-defense, the burden of proof shifted to
accused-appellant to show that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person invoking self-defense.
In this case, accused-appellant claimed that when Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo who was about to
shoot him. However, based on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only approaching accused-appellant while holding
 a gun. Celia did not witness any positive act showing the actual and material unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. The accused-appellant is held guilty of murder.
Ratio Decidenci: Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing for there is nothing to repel.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, modifying accused-appellant PFC Enrique Reyes' conviction from Murder to
Homicide, and the CA's Resolution which denied his Motion for Reconsideration

Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong , G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2011

by Rossville “Aeron” B. Violanta

Article 38 of Void and Voidable Marriages

Facts:

Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her
brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced
Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of
attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment,
transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the
case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal Code. He
cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution.
Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further
counters that the same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of
spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida Carungcong
Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and
son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the
protective mantle of Art 332.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the
relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.

2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita.

Held:

1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children
or not.
2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility
of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right
to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical
and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering that the crime he
committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of public
document and does not anymore concern private relations of family members. He then can be held criminally
liable.