G.R. No. 182839 June 2, 2014
and Ligaya produced the following
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE
GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and
HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO
GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA
and JANE GARCIA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari assailing the
1 the subject property as additional collateral security for the latter’s
decision2 dated September 26, 2007 and the resolution3 dated
May 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela,
dismissing Civil Case No. Branch 23-500-96 for lack of cause of
action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with
all its improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango,
Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-44422 under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.)
who acquired the subject property during his marriage with Ligaya
Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
The marriage of Jose Sr.
children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia,
who are the respondents in the present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia
(Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner,
Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank), initially for
₱150,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The spouses
Garcia increased their loan to ₱220,000.00 and eventually to
₱600,000.00. As security for the increased loan, they offered their
property covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject property
covered by TCT No. T-44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering
increased loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) dated April 14, 1992 and October 6,
1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to
apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank,
and to convey and transfer the subject property by way of
mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on TCT
No. T-44422. All of these transactions, however, were without the
knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.’s children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20,1994, the spouses Garcia
failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated
demands.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage,
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia
and the petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the
contract.
The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal
property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they
acquired the subject property during their marriage; that upon
Ligaya’s death, Jose Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners pro indiviso of the
subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not
including Jose Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan
despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real
estate mortgage; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose
Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their consent
or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real estate
mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted
from the loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was
indebted to them in the amount of ₱133,800.00. To settle this
indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property
as additional security for their (the Garcias’) loan to the petitioner
bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage
was made in good faith and for value, and maintained that the
respondents’ complaint stated no cause of action against it. It
alleged that the real estate mortgage over the properties was duly
registered and inscribed on their titles and was thus binding on
the whole world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr.
to act as their attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The
court held that the subject property was a conjugal property since
it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his marriage with his now
deceased wife. As a conjugal property, it is presumed that upon
the death of his spouse, one-half of the property passed on to
Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as co-
owners and as forced heirs of his deceased spouse. Without the
consent of the children, the trial court ruled that the conjugal
property could only be transferred or encumbered to the extent of
Jose Sr.’s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an
heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased
spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA
executed by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in this suit, they
are already estopped from questioning the mortgage and from
alleging lack of consent or knowledge in the transaction. It held
Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation party and upheld the
petitioner bank’s right to collect the debt.
The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the
case to the CA via an ordinary appeal.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial court’s finding
that the subject property was conjugal, but reversed and set aside
its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the Amendment
of Real Estate Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one
hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other hand,
with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy.
Relying on the Court’s ruling in Nufable v. Nufable,4 the CA ruled
that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal
property, without his children’s conformity, was null and void
because a mere part owner could not alienate the shares of the
other co-owners.
The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be
liable to the extent of Jose Sr.’s shares; Jose Sr.’s acts could not
affect his children’s pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It
disagreed with the trial court’s estoppel theory and held that their
execution of the SPA should not be construed as acquiescence to
the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not
escape liability from the mortgage since he voluntarily bound
himself as the Spouses Garcia’s accommodation mortgagor.
The petition
The petitioner bank disputes the CA’s finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned
from TCT No. T-44422, the subject property was registered in the
name of Jose Sr. alone, who was described in the title as
"widower" and not "married." The petitioner bank posits that as a
mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to rely on the mortgagor’s
certificate of title; in the absence of any indication that could
arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further
investigation and verify whether the property was conjugal or was
acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as
petitioner bank as mortgagee was concerned, Jose Sr. had the
right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to mortgage it without the
consent of his children. Accordingly, the mortgage in its entirety
should be declared valid.
The Comment
The respondents state that the issues raised by petitioner bank
are essentially factual; hence, they are beyond the competence of
this Court in a petition for review. They submit that in a certiorari
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be entertained because the Court is not a trier of facts.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and of law.
Whether petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith and for
value and whether the subject property was conjugal, are factual
issues that this Court cannot look into as our examination would
entail going into factual matters and records of the case. In Rule
45 petitions, only questions of law may be put into issue.
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.5
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for certiorari, the petitioner bank
failed to show that this case falls under any of the established
exceptions. Too, since the CA partially affirmed the findings of the
trial court and absent any indication that these courts committed a
serious error in its findings, this Court is bound by these courts’
findings.6
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised by
the petitioner bank, we still find no reason to depart from the CA’s
ruling.
The Subject Property is Conjugal
a. All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, their property relations were governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife."
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired
the land through sale, he was already married. The material
portion of his testimony is as follows:
Q: Upon the death of your wife did you and your wife ever own a
piece of land?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is that land situated?
A: In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.
Q: Is that land titled in your names?
A:Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You and your wife acquired that piece of land?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire
this parcel of land presently embraced and covered by TCT No.
T-44422?
A: I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued Family during
my incumbency as Municipal Mayor, sir.
Q: What was your civil status at the time you purchased that
piece of land?
A: I was already married, sir.(Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997,
Jose Garcia Sr.)7
Because of the petitioner bank’s failure to rebut the allegation that
the subject property was acquired during the former’s marriage to
Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this
property. Proof of the subject property’s acquisition during the
subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative.8
b. Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the
subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr.
alone. Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose Sr.’s change of
1a\^/phi1
status in the subject property’s title from "married" to "widower"
prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage showed that
the property was no longer conjugal.
We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does
not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or
the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the
name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage.10
It retains its conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property,
the petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.11 The burden of
proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the
husband rests upon the party asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject
property is no longer conjugal and its assertion that it is a
mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered no evidence,
convincing to this Court, that the subject property exclusively
belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the petitioner bank failed
to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property was
conjugal. Thus, the conclusion of both lower courts that the
1âwphi1
subject property was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of
the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court
unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary
co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal
partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant
to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code,13 and the successional rights of
her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code,
which states that"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This
resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his
part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate,
assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved.
Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property
itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the
extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of
Appeals,16 the Court said:
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate
a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to
the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the
thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate
to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or
judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an
Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners.4 What a co owner may
dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition.
[emphasis supplied].
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the
entire subject property after the death of Ligaya, but before the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of
the Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even
sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not
dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children’s
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.’s
right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the
conjugal partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other
half of the estate which is his deceased spouse’s share.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to
the undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the
transaction.17
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted
by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners'
consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the
petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion
which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and
liquidation of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the
Decision dated September 26, 2007of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71356. Costs against petitioner Philippine
National Bank.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO,
CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO
FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON
TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-
IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO
IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES
AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND
PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA
VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedent’s heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March
14, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006 Resolution3 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the
owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in
Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071)
RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without issue.
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and
Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also
both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes
and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-
Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children:
petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon
(Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is
survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen
Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz.
Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales
and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel
Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora),
Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo
Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio
Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is
survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando
died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if
he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s
grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property
belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No.
52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended
Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs
refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a
court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole
ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold
to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and
included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs;
that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of
herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of
the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration
covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora
have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of the property
estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred
expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo
thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject
property; that the same be partitioned after collation and
determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria’s
heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or
agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages
in the amount of ₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of
₱50,000.00, and lawyer’s appearance fees of ₱500.00 per
hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo,
Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause
of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of
the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same
in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and
exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they
have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s
claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have
suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result of
Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275
be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right
to the property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the
certificate of title to the property; and that they be awarded
₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as temperate and
nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double
costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera
were declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic
Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds
of the property.10 The resulting Commissioner’s Report and
Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioner’s
Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties then
submitted the following issues for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by
estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly
substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional
relevant facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case
No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case
was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and
declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the
partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez
through an unnotarized document dated April 4,
1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to
Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private
sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for
more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of
OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit
of Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of the
property which he utilized to secure in his name Tax
Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and
to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to
the exclusion of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a
Decision,22 which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of
action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil
Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be
the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by
virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled
and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to
issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining,
one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of
Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered
dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943
deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold
the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the
property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part
of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings,
Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in
equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to
Romana’s share as the latter’s successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years
from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file
the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only
in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held that
under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real
action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In
addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo
was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should
go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was
denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of
the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of
Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs
exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned
Decision,27 which contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan
Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of
the portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) to the herein
plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
in the name of Leon Roldan and the Register of Deeds of
Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates of title to the
plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
sketch plan as embodied in the Commissioner’s Report
(Supplementary) and the remaining portion thereof be
adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April
4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was
settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from
the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property was
made by its owner Leon and that the property – which remained
part of his estate at the time of his death – passed on by
succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus
makes the parties herein – who are Romana’s and Gregoria’s
heirs – co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate
court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were
needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that
Leonardo’s action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA
declared that prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in
1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of
his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was
only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the
property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his
co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation
effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive
period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the
property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and
the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either,
stating that his exclusive possession of the property and
appropriation of its fruits – even his continuous payment of the
taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers, may not be
deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and
conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming
exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that
this was effectively made known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v.
Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court held that
as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be
adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and
that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-
indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-
heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is
the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the
issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove
ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover,
petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves to
the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be
considered a repudiation of the co-ownership as it has not been
shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as
against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is
controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to
defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to
deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted
respondents’ prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioner’s
Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s
Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA
denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the
present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO
FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP
ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.33
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s
purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that
Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon
petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits
of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s
taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil
Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo – amounted to
laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of
Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943; this
notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against
Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No.
4983 – which was eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC.
They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo
Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for himself.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that –
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that
eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case
for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard
before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to the
offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not
furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse
parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so
that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs,
memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to comply with
the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F.
OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent
[sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division,
Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of
Court Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the
requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party
[sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had
long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court
is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr. The trial court,
1âw phi 1
examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez
and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that
no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite
this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts
regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus,
petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the
property to reinforce their claim over the property must be
ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place,
the subject property clearly remained part of Leon’s estate upon
his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and
Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana
and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In
turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein –
became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject
property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof.
As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common,
provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate,
assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in
their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.38 Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.39 Finally, no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the
others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-
owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court
erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo
may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141
and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall
begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-
owners only from the time he positively renounces the co-
ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-
owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property
only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration
exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property.
These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by
Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his
Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or
even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him
that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed
sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the
filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years
counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is
that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that
may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the
fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an
heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married
to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family
relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the
property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For
this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo,
and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and
acknowledgment in his pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in
possession of the property since 1943 – should be taken against
him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of
the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to
Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens
system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property
passed on to his heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of
the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the
property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14,
2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B.
CALALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-
SABILE, and CARLITO S. CALALANG, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution2dated July
25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 72531. The CA modified the Decision3 dated
July 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of
Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of
Property filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10,
1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora
Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership
over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an
area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot
1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd,
Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly
acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion
Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang
contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage
was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the
subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the above-
mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the
land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June
7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of
Encarnacion Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second
marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the
respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed
an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the
Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such
application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the
land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three
children with his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974,
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of
land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No.
P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321
in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27,
1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two
grounds. First, the respondents argued that the sale of the land
was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of
the respondents who were co-owners of the same. As
compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio, the
respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over
the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro
Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the
property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was
absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have
the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of
Sale.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was
acquired during the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with
Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself
stated that it was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married
to Elvira Berba [Calalang]." Thus, the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B.
Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the
sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-
Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale.
Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did not have a valid
cause of action against them and that their cause of action, if any,
was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By way
of counterclaim, the petitioners also sought the payment to them
of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of
the clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants in the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the
plaintiffs, their rightful share to three-fourth (3/4) of one-
 half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square meters at 158.25
square meters for each of the three plaintiffs, namely:
Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all surname[d] Calalang, of
the real property covered by TCT No. 283321 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their
shares in the conjugal estate of the late Encarnacion S.
Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of
₱50,000.00 for moral damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s
fees and another ₱50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired
by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from
the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property
of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was
dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7,
1942,the corresponding shares to the disputed property were
acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of
succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the
disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal
partnership and allocated the other half to the three respondents
and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial
court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled
that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro
Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro
Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the
case to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision on
December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision
dated July 10, 2001of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, and against the defendants in the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the
plaintiffs, their rightful share to the property owned by their
common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one
half(1/2) portion of the whole area or 633 square meters
to be divided equally by the three plaintiffs, namely:
Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all surnamed
Calalang, each getting an area of 211 square
meters of the property covered by TCT No.
2883321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
corresponding to their shares in the property of
their late father Pedro Calalang;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of
₱50,000.00 for moral damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s
fees and another ₱50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held
that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the
subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly
acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first
marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No.
P-2871. It held that although the free patent was issued in the
name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this
phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro
Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed property.
Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not
acquire any successional rights to the parcel of land which was
exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the
rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-
Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang,
succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death.
Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the
respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that
the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was
fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the
respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares
over the disputed property. As regards the issue of prescription,
the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten years. Since the
property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and the
action for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet
prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion in its
Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its
December 21, 2007 Decision modifying the July 10, 2001
Decision of the trial court, and in issuing its July 25, 2008
Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 23, 2008.11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang
was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its
transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang
with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which
was issued to Pedro Calalang during the subsistence of his
marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On the other hand, the
respondents claim that the disputed property was transferred by
their maternal grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their parents,
Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latter’s
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with
Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case
requires a reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties in order to trace the title of the disputed
property. What is involved is indeed a question of fact which is
generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve in a
petition for review on certiorari.12 However, a recognized
exception to the rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting
findings of fact as in this case.13 Here, while the trial court ruled
that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio,
the court a quo declared that the evidence proved the sole and
exclusive ownership of the disputed property of Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain
the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and
exclusive owner of the disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish
that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated from the parents of
Encarnacion, and therefore said property "either became property
of Encarnacion in her own right or jointly with her husband Pedro
Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the trial court relied on the
testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents built a nipa
house on the subject lot and lived there before and after World
War II. The trial court further noted that Rosario’s testimony was
corroborated by her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo
Calalang.14
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of
the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of
any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed
belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence
respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence
such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they
have been staying on the property as far as she can remember
and that the property was acquired by her parents through
purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was
unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor
was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the
tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents.
Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the
name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30
years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we
cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject
property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and
was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that
the disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the
ground that the title was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang,
married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. –
Every certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons
whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the names of their respective
spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and
postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal
partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both spouses. 1âwphi1
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that
the phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]"
merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the
registered owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean
that the property is conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera,15 we declared:
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the
paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens
Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are
registered in the name of "Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael
Litam." This circumstance indicates that the properties in question
belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her
paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
covering the same should have been issued in the names of
Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words "married to Rafael
Litam" written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the
above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
by said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free
patent,16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first
occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had
planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana
plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot.
But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free
patent while already married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having
possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period
required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and
before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure
became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s
exclusive property.17 It was therefore excluded from the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage.18
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to
convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by
executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA
therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of
their respective shares over the disputed property when he
alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at
the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons,
Inc.,19 we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's
death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related
articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time
the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as
of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of
the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit
and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding
at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after
that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December
27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances,
entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At
the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the
succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale
was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in
effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have
no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the
ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares.
Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not
even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment of
Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated
July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10,
1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y
AMADO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the
53, Lucena City, Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for following assignment of errors:
violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 under an information which reads: I

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Tiaong, Province of WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each II
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING
Hemp, a prohibited drug to one Francisco Manalo y
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE WHICH WERE
Arellano, without authority of law.
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL
Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8) SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as III

accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the dispositive
portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is entitled
to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment.
The case against Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this
case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived until the
arrest of said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest
issued against her is hereby ordered reiterated.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT ACCUSED NEVER DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT
SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES
FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO
MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND THAT WHICH WAS
USED BY PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE
LATTER'S DRUG DEPENDENCY
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED GLORIA 1, GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF
MERE CONJECTURES AND NOT ON FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN
V
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DID
NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo,
p. 49)
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court
are as follows:
On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat.
Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen
discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime
against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As
Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the
presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor
was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about
the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators
if something could be done to determine the source of the
marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other
minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan
was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated
by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for
which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed
against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said
case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other
charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes
against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong
Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told
him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like
marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo
although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to
him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of
the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to
help him in some cases pending against him. He did not
negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has
entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of
Judge Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of
the Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to
buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of
the money was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was
(sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by
him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic),
Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie
allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he
was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the
manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two
(2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of
Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of marijuana. the
Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the
issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search
the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street.
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police
operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the
search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of Gloria
Umali were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943,
DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in
the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills
were the letters T which were placed by the police investigators to
further identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic)
in the house was made in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan.
The search resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo,
containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were
placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was
being stored. The return of the search warrant reads as follows:
DATE: 22 April 1985
WHAT: "RAID"
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE: In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was
221410H Apr '85 charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp on April
5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of Republic
SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the Dangerous Drugs
MR. EMILIANO UMALI Act of 1972. The Court in rendering against him disposed
the case as follows:
PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY
SEIZED/RECOVERED In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds
the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of the crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp"
penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as
amended otherwise known as the Dangerous
Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves
Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of two
TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85 (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day
WITNESSES (sic) BY: of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). Let the period of
1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal detention of the accused be credited to his
sentence.
2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion that the marijuana found in his possession on April 5,
1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to
4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino him by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did
not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the
investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator
Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were
came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the
submitted to the PC Came Laboratory for examination.
marijuana leaves which he used and smoked resulting in
Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory took
his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
the witness stand, testified and identified the marijuana
submitted to her and in a written report which was marked
as Exhibit "G" she gave the following findings: The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court
and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in
Qualitative examination conducted on the convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not
specimen mentioned above gave POSITIVE result reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should
to the tests fur marijuana. not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said
witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said
that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal
charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify
him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and
probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material
respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police
officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the
marijuana were confiscated for no other purpose than using them
as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued is
illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no
other plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a
frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is
not true that the evidences submitted by the prosecution were
obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal
search and seizure.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements
of the crime of which she was charged were never established by
clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the
court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of
conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures.
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who had
personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical
evidence submitted clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from
casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's factual findings.
Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with
great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of
directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial
and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore
better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on
the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29
December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight, and should not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged
that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during
the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies
(People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163
SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708,
December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of
any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial
facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed
are binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
known their perception to others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states
that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
(Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p.
44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this
case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact
that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he
testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in
the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive
(People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA
718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness
Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
testimony must be accorded full credence.
Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is
devoid of merit. "Courts must be vigilant. A handy defense in
1âwphi1
such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to
extort from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in
appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a
frame-up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts
must be always on guard against these hazards in the
administration of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No.
82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119)
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot
also be given any merit. "Where marked peso bills were seized by
the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the
admissibility of these marked peso bills hinges on the legality of
the arrest and search on the person of the appellant" (People v.
Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since
the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any
showing that such was procured maliciously the things seized are
admissible in evidence.
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on
surmises and conjectures, hence the essential elements of the
crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation.
A conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and
positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA
20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of
witness Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the physical
evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the two (2)
foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing sixteen (16)
aluminum foils of dried marijuana.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it
consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence
of proof to the contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21
February 1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, full credence should be accorded to the
prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently
established that Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness
Manalo for which she was given and received four (4) marked five
peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing
in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did
not err in finding, on the basis of the evidence on record, that the
accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the
penalty for selling prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos
(People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984, 133
SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
life imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
modification that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be
imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased.
MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE
BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for
appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of
Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez,
claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and
nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the
same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will
of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in
favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and
testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my
property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter
Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care
of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four
days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez
died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25,
1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez
had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such
accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the
decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested,
has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres
and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with
article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with
certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary
provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his
guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been
approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the
situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas
Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general
incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the
accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the
parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of
accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place
in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of
the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us
we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special
designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons
named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being
also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at
the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also
of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to
the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half
which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he
had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which
pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the
order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to
the whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has
supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the
estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half
has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin
and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention
is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared,
among other things, that a will may be valid even though the
person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is
next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other
things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the
testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to
succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted
conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez
was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals
named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a
consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of
said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the
appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of
the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as
far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict
between two provisions the more general is to be considered as
being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and
983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two,
dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession
while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions
under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore,
the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by
the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with
respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to
article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of
accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not
found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood,
in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the
more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this
interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing
the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code
affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant
portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that,
under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article
982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit
under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de
recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to
succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the
disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under
article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case
cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the
language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which
Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to
succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a
consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for
intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed
themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of
accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by
the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation
of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being
limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions
of the Code relative to intestate succession
(Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 4th ed., vol. VII,
pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287;
16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood
that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the
time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or
legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition be not
fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . .
(Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)
lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always
existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal
intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial
intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems
a presumption against it, — a presumption which has its basis in
the supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered,
with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD,
PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, petitioners,
vs.
ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido
Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad
(Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675,
676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin
died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.1
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled
"Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"2(Deed of
Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six
lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed
of Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted
and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by
these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION,
unto the DONEE the property above-described, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that
the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force
and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of
the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could
use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels
of landherein donated.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.5
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will
and testament,6 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to
Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to
respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September
24 of the same year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,8 for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot
Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land
above-described until January 1991 when defendant entered and
possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted
son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until
Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession
thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the
plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded
by inheritance by right of representation from their deceased
mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde
Aluad[.]9
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.10
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was
adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde
Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde
Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners
thereof.11 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Already Filed to Conform to Evidence12 to which it annexed an
Amended Complaint13 which cited the donation of the six lots via
Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the
RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.14
Respondent filed an Amended Answer15 contending, inter alia,
that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners’
change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at
the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by them
after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only
daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by
them";16 and that if ever said document does exist, the same was
already revoked by Matilde "when [she] exercised all acts of
dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant
and until her death with respect to the other lots without any
opposition from Maria Aluad."17
The trial court, by Decision18 of September 20, 1996, held that
Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated
them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots
Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject
lots to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income
from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the
legal rate until fully paid;
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income
from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said
lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the
legal rate until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendant’s counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 19
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal.20 Possession of the subject lots
appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.
By Decision21 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it
had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it
found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two
witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in
accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left
margin and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator,
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful
owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No.
674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been
probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the
same is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in
Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery of
ownership and possession, and damages
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant
as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre.
Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the
possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to
defendant-appellant as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration23 having
denied, petitioners
24 filed the present Petition
Review,25contending that the Court of Appeals erred
I (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT
BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE
DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS’ MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE
RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE
BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR
WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE
RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED
WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED
OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF
PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF
COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN
POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
COST[S] OF SUIT.26
been As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to
for petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:
death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that
the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer
the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her
(Matilde’s) lifetime.28
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during
the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or
even all the parcels of land herein donated"29 means that
Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of
ownership.30 The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of
them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed
of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death
of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the
donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase
does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor,
because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the
donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband –
Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975.31
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos,
reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or
period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions,
"but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR,
the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no
further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the
"DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the
logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the
subject donation, the same became effective immediately and
shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect"
upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of
the donee which shall occur before that of the donor.
Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period
cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly
what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further
force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period
if there was no donation which was already effective at the time
when the donee died?32 (Underscoring supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court,
however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in
case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a
resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation
as inter vivos.
Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.33
xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the
donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners
predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes
v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended
that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that
the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not
have expressed such proviso in the subject
deeds.34 (Underscoring supplied)
As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation
is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she
continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained
under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free
patents for which OCTs were issued under her name."35
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observed36 but they were not, as it was
witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following
Article 805 of the Civil Code.37
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation
clause38 the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the
affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the
will. So the Court has emphasized:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the
requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to
the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to
the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed,
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition
of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the
left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation
clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear
on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed
the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the
witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their
signatures on the attestation clause.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before
the notary public,40 which is not in accordance with the
requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page was not also followed.41
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of
mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void
and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it
was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was
transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No.
674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of
course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as
mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August
26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of
Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis
causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot
should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they
had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession
of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.43
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription
before the lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on
the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule,
points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.44 For a
contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would
have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the
new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at
the time of the hearing before the trial court.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.