Section 27

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

(Section 27 and 29)

Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed
and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot
be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of
public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant
to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific
Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy.
As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not
in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when
the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and
maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the
“one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30%
by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed
by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to
Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the
case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative
veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of
on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed.
 Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for
by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government
itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another
law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing
laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there
is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they
are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to
take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guideline

BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired
justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos
which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was
restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in
1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992
GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto
now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication,
thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous
because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297
did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to
constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the
ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are
declared valid and subsisting.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig (G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990)

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and
Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by President Aquino was that
both of these sections restrict or prevent the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House, the heads of the constitutional commisions and the Chief Justice of the SC from restoring
or increasing items of appropriation recommended by the President, which recommendations
have already been reduced or disapproved by Congress through the assailed GAAs. In effect,
these sections nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials to
augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto on Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989
and Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, the presidential veto on Section 55 of GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of
the GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional. These sections were vetoed because they
violate Section 5(5) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
CJ of the SC the authority to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations.
This constitutional mandate, also known as the power of augmentation, finds statutory
basis in Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, which authorizes the President to use savings to
augment any appropriation in the Executive Department.
Congress had the power to override the veto on both sections by having a 2/3 vote of
approval by members of each House, but Congress did not choose to do so. At the same time,
Section 55 of GAA 1989 and Section 16 of GAA 1990 should not be construed as having repealed
PD 1177, mainly because implied repeals are frowned upon.

Section 28
Lung Center vs. Quezon City (G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004)
Facts:
The petitioner Lung Center is a non-stock and non-profit entity.
It is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Erected in the middle lot is a hospital known as the
Lung Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties,
for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the
same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services.
Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant
and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner, is being leased for commercial
purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-
patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner
receives annual subsidies from the government.
Both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in
the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City.
The petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the City Assessor,
predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner’s request was denied,
Issues
Whether the petitioner is a charitable institution
Whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes
Ruling
First issue: petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which
should be considered include the
Statute creating the enterprise,
Its corporate purposes,
Its constitution and by-laws,
The methods of administration,
The nature of the actual work performed,
The character of the services rendered,
The indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and
The use and occupation of the properties.
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in
life or otherwise lessening the burden of government.
The word “charitable” is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test of a charity and a
charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is
whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is
maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino
people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the
Philippines.
Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any
and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all,
any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a
subject of charity.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-
patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the
money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution.
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the
subsidies from the government for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It even
incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Second Issue: those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule
and exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation.
Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language
in the law too plain to be mistaken.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides
that the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges: The Lung Center of the
Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees imposed by the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment
purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.

It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions
were otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges
under Section 2.
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus: Charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. What is
exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.”
In light of the changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot rely on our ruling in Herrera v.
Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was promulgated on September 30, 1961
before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took effect.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used
for charitable purposes.
“Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment; and “exclusively” is defined, “in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a
privilege exclusively.” If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not
exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used
exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.
Accordingly, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the
hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the
portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients,
whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan v Tan (1988)

FACTS:
EO 372 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue Code,
adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective January 1, 1988. Four petitions assailed the validity
of the VAT Law from being beyond the President to enact; for being oppressive, discriminatory,
regressive and violative of the due process and equal protection clauses, among others, of the
Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers Association particularly contend that it unduly
discriminate against customs brokers (Section 103r) as the amended provision of the Tax Code
provides that “service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except custom brokers)
subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code and professional services performed by
registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.
ISSUE:
Whether the E-VAT law is void for being discriminatory against customs brokers

RULING:
No. The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but
to avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The
distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation
tax under the Local Tax Code is based on material differences, in that the activities of customs
partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage
tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the
percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification
of customs brokers then, there is no reason why it should protest now.

Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)

FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare
void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued,
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of
Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was
issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used
and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the
property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes. ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as
incidental to education (residence of the director).

Province of Abra vs. Hernando (G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981)

Facts:
The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for
declaratory relief. A summary judgment was made granting the exemption without hearing the
side of the Province of Abra.

Issue:
Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.

Held:
The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property
from taxes as tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for
religious purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of
demonstrating that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an
exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which
should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the
case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never
presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There must be
proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious (or
charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.
The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.

Section 29
Osmeña vs. Orbos (G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993)

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as

amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of
fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies
in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products
establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the
petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the
special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by
the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to
the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring
the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of
the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of
the Fund.

Guingona vs. Carague (G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991)

FACTS:
For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as the GAA Act of 1990.
The said budget contained an automatic appropriation of P98.4 billion, of which P86.8 billion
was for debt service. This automatic appropriation was made pursuant to three Marcos-era
issuances: PDs 81, 1177, and 1967.
The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significantly lower than the
appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as opposed to education violates
Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having been issued during
the Marcos era.
3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD:
1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should go to education does
not mean that the hands of Congress are so humstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and the attainment of other state policies/objectives.
One of these policies is to ensure that the President can take advantage of favorable economic
conditions, such as situations where interest rates are low.
2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked upon the ouster of
Marcos. The Court held that these laws remain operative until they are amended, repealed, or
revoked, and so long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court
dismissed petitioners' argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art.
VI pertaining to "all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question
are considered enacted laws and not bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative power because the assailed
PDs are complete -- they set out a policy and are complete in their terms, such that the President
doesn't have any choice but to implement them.

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works

Legal Standing

Facts:
1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which
contains an item providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of
a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by the President.

2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is however owned by Sen.
Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was
made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the
said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is
inside a private subdivision.

3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail the validity of RA 920,
due to the public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not have a standing
with respect to the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said
donation, hence it dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition

YES.

1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of Rizal
which is considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers
bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the country.

2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of
a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether it is used to promote public interest.
Moreover, the validity of a stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed subsequent thereto, unless it
is an amendment of the organic law.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic.
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does
not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an
event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its
provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious
freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people
‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides
the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects and denominations.’