Abuse of superior strength

To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is
not parricide or infanticide. ( People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743,2012).

One of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, which qualifies the killing of the victim to
murder, is abuse of superior strength.

After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the evidence
presented by the prosecution amply demonstrate that Enrico was killed and that it was the accused-
appellants and Valencia who killed him. Prosecution eyewitness Bañaga was able to identify the
accused-appellants and Valencia who killed Enrico. He actually witnessed what exactly happened on
that fateful day and was able to narrate the individual participation of each of the accused-
appellants and Valencia in killing Enrico. They simultaneously attacked Enrico while he was standing
at the tricycle terminal. Villanueva punched Enrico twice on the face while Sayson hit the latter with
a rock. Thereafter, Valencia stabbed Enrico in the chest, twice, which ultimately caused his death.

Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Both the lower courts concluded that the accused-appellants and Valencia, having the
intent to kill Enrico, employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution and success of the
crime. The RTC concluded that the facts that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked by the
accused-appellants and Valencia, who were armed by a knife and a stone, are clear indicia of the
abuse of superior strength employed by the accused-appellants and Valencia against Enrico.23 The
RTC's conclusion was entirely adopted by the CA.24

The foregoing conclusion is baseless. The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia, armed with
a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not automatically merit the conclusion that the
latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In People v.
Beduya, et al.,25 brothers Ric and Elizer Beduya (Elizer) were charged for the death of Dominador
Acope, Sr.; it was shown that Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed the latter. The Court,
elucidating on the proper appreciation of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, ruled that:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact
that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the
age, size, and strength of the parties.26 (Citations omitted)

In Valenzuela v. People,27 brothers Ramie and Hermie Valenzuela (Hermie) were charged with the
crime of frustrated murder committed against Gregorio Cruz (Gregorio). It was shown in that case
that when Gregorio was walking, Ramie and Hermie suddenly appeared behind him; that Ramie held
his shoulder, while Hermie stabbed him twice at the left side of his back. The Court ruled that the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not sufficiently established in the said
case, viz.:
Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that abuse of superior strength was present because
the petitioner "held the arms of [Gregorio] to facilitate the stabbing by his brother (Hermie) and to
limit the degree of resistance that [Gregorio] may put up." The trial court, in particular, held that
"there is no doubt that accused took advantage of their combined strength when one held
[Gregorio] by the shoulder and armpit and the other inflicted two stab wounds on the left side of his
back." We find this reasoning erroneous.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. Evidence must
show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in age,
size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed with a knife,
attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, is not per
se indicative of abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the
presence of this circumstance. Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely from the victim's possibly
weaker physical constitution. In fact, what the evidence shows in this case is a victim who is taller
than the assailants and who was even able to deliver retaliatory fist blows against the knife-
wielder.28 (Citations omitted)

In this case, the prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in age, size,
strength or force between the accused-appellants and Valencia, on one hand, and Enrico, on the
other. Indeed, the lower courts merely inferred the existence of qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength on the facts that Enrico was attacked by three assailants, the accused-appellants
and Valencia, who were armed with a knife and a stone. However, mere superiority in numbers does
not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.29 22 People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743
(2012).
23
CA rollo, p. 46.
24
Id. at 102.
25
641Phil.399 (2010).
26
Id. at 410-411.
27
612 Phil. 907 (2009).
28
Id. at 916-918.
29
See People v. Escoto, 313 Phil. 785, 800 (1995).
30
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 6.
31
Quidetv. People, 632 Phil. 1, 12 (2010).
32
CA rollo, p. 48.
33
People v. Tan, 649 Phil. 262, 277 (2010).
34
Republic Act No. 4103, as amended.
35
CA rollo, p. 49.
36
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

Clearly, the incident was unplanned and unpremeditated. When the quarrel between the victim and
his assailants arose unexpectedly, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior- strength could
not be appreciated43 as the same requires some degree of prior deliberation or meditation.44

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the commission of the
felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority was purposely sought by the
assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that there was blatant disparity in strength
between Leon and his assailants.

Penalties

In the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by Cresencio is
homicide and the penalty should be reclusion temporal as provided in Article 249 of the RPC.
Considering that there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Cresencio should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
offense, that is, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years); and the maximum of which should be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months). Accordingly, the Court imposes the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is "present if the accused purposely uses
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength.23 23 People v. Del Castillo, supra note 13 at 255. However, as none of
the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot
be appreciated in this case. December 13, 2017

G.R. No. 218958

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
EDILBERTO NORADA y HARDER, and AGUSTIN SEVA y LACBANES, Accused
EUGENE VILLANUEVA y CANALES, Accused-Appellant

No abuse of superior strength.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is "present if the accused purposely uses
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength.23 However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing
was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case.
The crime committed was homicide.

Considering that none of the circumstances alleged in the information, i.e., treachery and abuse of
superior strength was proven during the trial, the same cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing
to murder. Appellant can only be held liable for homicide. Under .Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty
prescribed for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the absence of any mitigating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period which has a duration of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, appellant should suffer an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

Anent appellant's civil liability, the Court finds a need to modify the same to conform to recent
jurisprudence.24 The court modifies awarded amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity by the CA by
reducing it to ₱50,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount
of ₱50,000.00. The award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted in view of the failure of
the prosecution to prove that the killing was attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength.

With respect to actual damages, the parties stipulated the amount of ₱40,000.00 for the funeral,
burial and other incidental expenses and dispensed with the presentation of proof thereof: However
prevailing jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in
court.25 Hence, we award ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

As to the deletion of the indemnity for loss of earning capacity by the CA, we restore the award by
the RTC of the sum of ₱1,950.967.26 as unearned income as appearing from the Pay Slip26 submitted
in evidence which the CA plainly overlooked. The figure was arrived at based on the net earning
capacity of the victim, to wit:

Net earning 2/3 x (80-age of the victim at the time of death) x

capacity = (Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable and
Necessary Living Expenses27

The victim was 42 years old at the time of his death. His annual gross income was ₱154,044.00
computed based on his monthly income of ₱12,837.00.1âwphi1 His necessary living expenses is
deemed to be 50% of his gross income. His life expectancy is assumed to be 2/3 of age 80 less 42, his
age when he was killed. Thus using the above formula, the indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the victim is ₱1,950,967.26.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLYGRANTED. The Decision dated January 14, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00686 is hereby VACATED and SETASIDE. A new one is entered as
follows:

1) appellant Eugene Villanueva y Canales is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

2) appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts:
a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages; and,

d) ₱1,950,967.26 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity.

In conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all the monetary awards for damages at the
rate of 6% perannum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated as additional member per October 18, 2017 raffle vice J, Jardeleza who recused from
the case due to prior participation as Solicitor General.
1
CA rollo, pp. 213-23 i; penned by Associcite Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred
in by Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luis:J C. Quijano-Padilla.
2
Id. at l5-38; penned by Judge Roberto S. Chiongson.
3
Id. at 18.
4
Id. at 21-22.
5
Id. at 23-24.
6
Id. at 36-37.
7
Id. at 37-38.
8
Id. at 230.
9
See People v. Mamantak, 582 Phil. 294, 302 (2008).
10
Id. at 103.
11
CA rollo, p, 35.
12
See REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 11, Section l.
13
People v, Del Castillo, 679 Phil. 233, 250(2012).
14
CA rollo, p. 35.
15
People v. Nueva, 591 Phil. 43l, 446 (2008).
16
REVISED PFNAL CODE, Article 14, paragraph 16.
17
People v. Garcia, 577 Phil. 483, 503 (2008).
18
See People v. Pat, Nitcha, 3 l 0 Phil. 287, 303-304 (1995),
19
390 Phil. 989, 1017 (2000).
20
467 Phil. 1044, 1081-1082 (2004).
21
People v. Robelo, 699 Phil. 392, 401 (2012).
22
Id.
23
People v. Del Castillo, supra note 13 at 255.
24
People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA .13 l, 386-337.
25
Id. at 388.
26
Records, p. 154.
27
People v. Garcia, supra note 17 at 508.

T The CA held that the killing of David should be characterized as one of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength. The Court finds no fault in this ruling. There is abuse of superior strength when
the aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering the victim unable to defend himself.33 The
notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor.

Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a stick and
Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as he fled from them.
And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed barangay tanods, Nazareno and
Saliendra exploited their superior advantage and knocked the defenseless David unconscious. He
evidently died from head fracture caused by one of the blows on his head.1âwphi1

On the matter of penalty, the Court affirms the imposition of reclusion perpetua.34 The Court retains
the amount of P141,670.25 as actual damages.35 But, consistent with current jurisprudence, 36 the
Court is awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
01308 dated December 17, 2010, that found Chito Nazareno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength in Criminal Case 94-133117.

The Court also AFFIRMS the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused Nazareno but
MODIFIES the award of damages to P141,670.25 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez, per Special Order 1343 dated
October 9, 2012.
1
Records, p. 1
2
RTC Decision, id. at 399.
3
TSN, July 30, 1998, pp. 225-226.
4
Id. at 226-227.
5
Id. at 231.
6
TSN, August 13, 1998, p. 262.
7
Id. at 263.
8
Id. at 233.
9
TSN, August 13, 1998, p. 265.
10
TSN, July 30, 1998, pp. 234-235.
11
TSN, August 13, 1998, p. 263.
12
Notes of the Post-Mortem Examination, records, p. 62.
13
Certificate of Death, id. at 61.
14
TSN, September 24, 1998, pp. 186-187.
15
TSN, December 14, 1998, pp. 200-201.
16
TSN, April 11, 2000, pp. 286-288.
17
TSN, March 2, 2000, p. 315.
18
TSN, February 14, 2000, pp. 366-368.
19
Supra note 2, at 404-405.
20
Rollo, pp. 3-14.
21
Serra v. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012.
22
Miranda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012.
23
Revised Penal Code, Art. 8.
24
People v. Bustamante, G.R. No. 172357, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 203, 216.
25
TSN, July 30, 1998, p. 231.
26
People v. Esoy, G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 552, 564.
27
People v. Rollan, G.R. No. 175835, July 13, 2010, 625 SCRA 57, 63.
28
People v. Pajes, G.R. No. 184179, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 147, 161.
29
People v. Miguel, G.R. No. 180505, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 210, 227.
30
People v. Leonardo, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 166, 197.
31
People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222, 233.
32
TSN, April 11, 2000, p. 295.
33
People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284.
34
Republic Act 9346: "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,"
approved on June 24, 2006.
35
Supra note 2.
36
People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255.

The fact that accused and his companions took advantage of the superiority that their number and
arms afforded them is shown by the five stabbed wounds and assault the victim at will (Rollo, pp. 58-
59.)