RA 7610 CASES

PEOPLE v. SALVADOR TULAGAN

GR No. 227363, 2019-03-12

Facts:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision[2] dated February 10, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-
6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in
relation to Article 266-B. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse
of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old minor in a cemented
pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his finger
into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211,
Tulagan was charged as follows: That on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against
her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.

Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged

For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived
barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added
that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering
dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother
cut the banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to
AAA's house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011.
Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a
misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he
raped her granddaughter.

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof
in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and
statutory rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive
declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim
in the amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of fifty
thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this Court finds
the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime
of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the
amount of thirty thousand (Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of
twenty thousand (Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[4]

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and
statutory rape.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February
10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. In Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
12 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The award of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, are likewise granted. 2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory
Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00
each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted. 3. All damages
awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per annum] from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.

Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC and the CA found
AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she testified that
Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for
statutory rape, both the RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were present,
to wit: (1) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and (2) said act was accomplished
when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo
found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for
the crime of rape. We find no reason to deviate from said findings and conclusions of the
courts a quo.

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies

does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance
in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness'
credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what
remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the
crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of
the same.[8] As correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to by AAA
did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual assault did not
happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she suffered in
Tulagan's hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as well as her positive
identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a
conviction of rape. As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's
grandmother, absent any concrete supporting evidence, said allegation will not convince us
that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the victim and her supporting witness
was tainted with arbitrariness or blindness to a fact of consequence. We reiterate the
principle that no young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or
through the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo an invasive
medical examination then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.

We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense of denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses, like AAA, who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA testified in a
categorical and consistent manner without any ill motive, her positive identification of
Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi. Here, the
courts a quo did not give credence to Tulagan's alibi considering that his house was only 50
meters away from AAA's house, thus, he failed to establish that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place. "Physical
impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. There must be a demonstration
that they were so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene
and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this regard, Tulagan failed to
prove that there was physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene when the rape
was committed.[11] Thus, his alibi must fail.

Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately reported to
the police, such delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other
circumstances that show the same to be mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile the
provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis Sexual Intercourse and
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to fortify the earlier decisions of
the Court and doctrines laid down on similar issues, and to clarify the nomenclature and
the imposable penalties of said crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.
[13] Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22,
1997, acts constituting sexual assault under paragraph 2,[14] Article 266-A of the RPC,
were punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article No. 336[15] of the RPC or Act No.
3815 which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused to be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness, the confluence of the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under
any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the
offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age.

Issues: WON Tulagan is guilty as charged.

Ruling:

The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime,
the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual
assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for
statutory rape, are in order. Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and
respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed
on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the
trial court in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
affect the result of the case.

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of
protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title
used in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean
that it is only applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other
sexual abuses as additional offenses, the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the
imposition of the penalty provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses
committed by the offenders on the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which requires statutory
construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because
it was alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his finger
into her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is
prision mayor, the proper penalty should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below
twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of
inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious
conduct."[129] Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the
minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate
sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We
affirm that Tulagan should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated
February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-
6211, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06679, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador
Tulagan: 1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) month... and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. 2. Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with modification as to the award of damages.
Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages... ation as to the
award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

People vs Abello

G.R. No. 151952

25 March 2009

Sec 6: A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omission complain of as construing
the offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the
offense, and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by
more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Facts: Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one count of rape by
sexual assault and two counts of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law committed
against his step daughter, AAA. The following information for rape was filed against the
appellant: (note there are three Informations filed, one for rape and two for sexual assault).

1. “That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro

Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being a stepfather (sic) of victim AAA,4 with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside the
mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her consent”

The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months.
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in
Navotas with her sisterinlaw and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast
of AAA under the same situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA
was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside. Then on July 8,
1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim
on the same date reported the incident to her sisterinlaw and mother.
 The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Informations. The CA affirmed Abello’s
conviction on appeal and increased the penalties imposed. Abello now appeals his
conviction for rape on the ground that the mode of commission provided for in the
information is different from that proven during the trial. He also questions his conviction
for sexual abuse since AAA does not fall under those protected by RA 7610 (Child Abuse
Law).

Issue:

1. WoN the appellant shall be acquitted due to the difference between the
modes of commission provided for in the Information for rape and that
proven at the trial.
2. WoN appellant is guilty of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. If he’s
not, if he can be liable for an offense other than that stated in the information.
3. WoN the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship
should be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
4. WoN aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the Information can be
considered to increase the penalty.

Held:

1. NO, variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon

the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was
committed in a different manner than what was alleged. The Information
alleges “force and intimidation” as the mode of commission. However, AAA
testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only
awoke to find Abello’s male organ inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal
to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of
commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to
evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than
what was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the
presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed in a
different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance
is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

2. NO, appellant cannot be held guilty under the Child Abuse Law but he
can be held for Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA cannot be considered a child
under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which states that “Children” refers to
person below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. AAA
was neither below 18 nor was she fully unable to take care of herself. Though
Abello cannot be held liable under RA 7610, he is still liable for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information. In the present case, although
the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated;
 the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article
336 of the RPC whose elements are:
a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
b. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
c. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
i. By using force or intimidation; or
ii. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
iii. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.

3. NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating

circumstance. Though the three Informations all alleged the stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello, this modifying
circumstance, was not duly proven in the present case. The prosecution
failed to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother. If
the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was only via an
admission by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission is
inconclusive. The court is strict on considering relationship as an aggravating
circumstance because it increases the imposable penalty, and hence must be
proven by competent evidence.

4. NO, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and knowledge of

disability cannot be considered. Although not alleged in the information,
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was proven during the trial.
Additionally, Article 266B (penalties for rape) of the RPC recognizes
“knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime” as a qualifying circumstance. This knowledge by Abello of AAA’s
polio was also proven during the trial but not alleged in the Information.
Though these aggravating and qualifying circumstances of dwelling and
Abello’s knowledge of AAA’s physical disability were not considered in
imposing the penalty, they may be appreciated in awarding exemplary
damages.

Therefore, appellant is found guilty of rape by sexual assault and acts of

lasciviousness.

1) For the crime of rape, he is sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate

prison term of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years
of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered to pay P30,000.00 as civil
liability; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
2) For each count of acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is
further ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;
 P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
each case.

PEOPLE VS DELANTAR

G.R. No. 169143

February 2, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 138328]

FACTS:

 On 25 February 1999, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Section 5(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male

or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

 The testimony of AAA shows that appellant procured her as a child prostitute for at
least two clients: the first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the second,
then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.

 From her testimony, it could easily be gleaned that AAA did not
consent to the acts of lasciviousness and the sexual intercourse.

 Appellant claimed that sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to

him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAA’s real mother, who could not support her.

 the birth certificate indicates that AAA was born on "11 May
1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and "Simplicio R. Delantar" (father), nowhere
on the face of the birth certificate can the signature of appellant be found

 According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did not get married to
each other on the date indicated in the birth certificate, or impliedly at least, not
ever.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Certificate of live birth presented by respondent may
serve as proof of filiation and justify the imposition of the higher penalty on him
RULING: Appellant SIMPLICIO DELANTAR y REDONDO is found guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a), R.A. No. 7610

o Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states:

xxxx

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its

maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent,
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of
an establishment which has no license to operate or its license
has expired or has been revoked. (Emphasis supplied.)

 While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, 80 yet the rule is where the birth
certificate presented was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted,
such may not be accepted as evidence of the alleged filiation.

 We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact
of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that
appellant is not AAA’s biological father.

 At best, appellant is AAA’s de facto guardian. Now, would this circumstance justify
the imposition of the higher penalty on him? We think not. We apply, by analogy, the
ruling of this Court in People v. Garcia, 85 where we held that the restrictive concept
of guardian, legal or judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659. Said provision,
by way of amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, ordains that where the
victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender is, inter
alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed.

 The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation
or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the
lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives.
Such considerations do not obtain in appellant’s case or, for that matter, any person
similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another’s property. The
fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should
he betray the trust

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

Facts:

The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was
peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father.
Because the complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several
acts of lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate occasions..The accused was then
CongressmanRomeo Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the
trial court for statutory rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional office. On December
16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime ofstatutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of
lasciviousness, were filed against accused-appellant

The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care
of SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and
accepting boarders at his house.He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay
City Police where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to thefiling of criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also
convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.

Issue/s

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

SIGNIFICANCEOF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRIVATECOMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN
THECLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE
WASCOMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of penalty.

1. TESTIMONY OF VICTIM; DOCTRINE OFFALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS;

APPLICATION THEREOF NOT AN ABSOLUTERULE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The contention
is without merit. Falsus in unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact
rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any
witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions,
according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth . . .
Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars,
the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may
credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief.

2. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY SOMEAMBIGUOUS ANSWERS ON

WITNESS STAND, WHICH REFERS TO MINOR ANDPERIPHERAL DETAILS; CASE AT BARA
reading of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact
firm and consistent on the fact of rape and lascivious conduct committed on her by
accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural words customary of children
of her age.

3. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; DEFECT IN OUT-OF-COURT

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED CAN BE CURED BY AN

IDENTIFICATIONSUBSEQUENTLY MADE IN COURT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively
and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification
during the trial cannot be

diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant
as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced
and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellant's office.

4. AGE OF THE VICTIM IN RAPE CASES MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE; PRESENT INCASE AT

BAR. — It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by
the presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that
the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because
said birth certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated
April 11, 1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and
ample proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can
likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or
in lieu thereof.

5. WHEN CONSUMMATED; SUFFICIENTLYESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — True, in

People v. Campuhan, we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. The inevitable contact between accused-appellant's penis, and at the
very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside
her vagina when the "idiniin" part of accused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.

6. STATUTORY RAPE; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — At the time of

commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalized
under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit: When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2.
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman
is under twelve years of age or is demented
PEOPLE VS LARIN

CABALLO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R NO. 198732

JUNE 10, 2013

FACTS:
Christian 23 years old, a dancer, met AAA a 17 years old, his choreographer’s niece, in
her uncle’s place. When she stayed in her uncle’s place, AAA and Christian became
sweethearts. He succeeded in convincing her to have repeated sexual intercourse because
of his promise to marry and an assurance that they will use the withdrawal method so she
will not get pregnant. AAA, however, became pregnant, and Christian, was shocked with the
development, proposed that she had an abortion. She acceded to the request but failed.
Hence a child was born out of the relationship. When confronted by her mother, Christian
promised to marry AAA. The mother later filed a case for violation of Section 10(a) of
Republic Act 7610.  He argues that his promise to marry and use of the withdrawal method
are not inducement or persuasion as to make the case within the purview of the offense.
The phrase “due to the coercion or influence of any adult” is the relevant phrase for
interpretation. According to him, it must be accompanied by some form of coercion or
intimidation to constitute child abuse.

ISSUE:Whether or not Christian may be convicted for violation of Republic Act 7610. 

HELD: Christian is convicted for the violation of Republic Act 7610. The Supreme Court:
“Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be
classified as “coercion” and “influence” within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610:

First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17
years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under
the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and
deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo
were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA
7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish “[t]hose who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.”
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious
conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that
she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take
care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely
more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the
harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child
should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender
herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her
special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view
her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo
was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older
than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a
stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.

Third, Caballo’s actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Records
reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry
her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be
using the “withdrawal method” for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA
to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he
succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties’ first sexual encounter, it is observed that the
brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on
her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress..
An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo’s incipient advances and in fact, asked him
to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived bf the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court
observes’ that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA ‘s
minority as above-discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo’s acts constitute “coercion” and “influence” within the
context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct
with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a “child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse”; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo’s conviction for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.”

BONGALON VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors,
joined the evening procession for the Santo Niñ o at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose,
also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner confronted
Jayson and Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”; that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the
petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father,
to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando
later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that
Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting
that Jayson suffered contusions.

Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only
talked with Jayson and Roldan after his minor daughters had told him about Jayson and
Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied
shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told
Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

Crime charged: child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610

RTC: found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged

CA: affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of the crime charged and that even
assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted
to protect her two minor daughters (ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES; PENALTY IS
MITIGATED)

HELD:

Although the Court affirms the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect
that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, it
disagrees with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being,
or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the
laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger,
indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his selfcontrol, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo, every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all
possible circumstances in his favor. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five
to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries
under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6) of the Revised
Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the
offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding
one year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner
Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner
asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded
to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up
by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a
result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried.

After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael
Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went
home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his aunt reported the
incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael
Ryan examined by a doctor.

Crime charged: violation of Anti-Child Abuse Law (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610)

RTC: convicted petitioner of child abuse

CA: affimed the conviction

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section
10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 (YES)

HELD:

The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit. She is guilty of child abuse, a
violation of R.A. 7610. Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary,
violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She
could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher
or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco
parentis), viz:

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon
of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his injuries.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: (b) “Child abuse” refers to
the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give
medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the
petitioner “went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old
boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing
him to lose consciousness but instead of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor.”