68. Ortego vs.

People - August 20, 2008

151085 - 562 SCRA 450
FACTS:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case was pending when the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among others the age of criminal
irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority.

Additional Info

2 information: for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse on August
1996 and December 1 1996.

Prosecution: The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and
son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights
because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. During the first night Petitioner woke
AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at
the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped
her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances,
petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her
ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. While AAA's siblings were busy watching,
petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed and in a standing position inserted his penis into
the vagina of AAA. AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She,
likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen, as he
was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of
sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to
stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.

Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial
written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at
the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and
that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in
her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an
organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their
house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality.

Defense:

Petitioner denied all accusations and on the night of December 1996,he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room,
but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of
washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus;

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68. Ortego vs. People - August 20, 2008
151085 - 562 SCRA 450

The RTC's Ruling

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional
liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES AND RULINGS:

1. Criminal Law; Rape; In rape, actual penetration of the victim’s organ or rupture of the hymen is not required-

—the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.—In sum, we
are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s
candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can
be convicted solely on that basis. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA’s credibility, and found no ill motive
for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts
also accorded respect to BBB’s testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA’s poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no
mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s psyche and
mar her life if the charge is not true. We find petitioner’s claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in
the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in
most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the
victim’s organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the
victim’s organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner
succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.

2. Same; Statutory Construction; Courts; The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the
manifest intendment and language of the law-

—its task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts.—The Court is fully
cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed
against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who
deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No.
9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court. Any perception that the result reached herein appears
unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying
the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.

3. Same; Rape; Damages; Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim’s injury necessarily resulting from the
odious crime of rape.-
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68. Ortego vs. People - August 20, 2008
151085 - 562 SCRA 450
—The RTC erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim.
AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted
in recognition of the victim’s injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.

Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the resolution of the
case?

4. Same; Same; Same; Same; While R.A. No. 9344 exempts children 15 years old and below from criminal liability,
Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.-

—While the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section
6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains
the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for
rape.

5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.-

—Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344’s
unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers’ intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other
interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
CICL.

6. Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Intent is the soul of the law.-

—The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.: The intent of a statute is
the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital
part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away
from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes
in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.

7. Same; Exempting Circumstances; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) ; By virtue of R.A. No. 9344,
the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old; Penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect.-

—Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of
the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old. Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law—
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect. This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: Art. 22. Retroactive effect of
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68. Ortego vs. People - August 20, 2008
151085 - 562 SCRA 450
penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the personsguilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

8. Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; One who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he
commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act,
no criminal liability arises-

—while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.—For one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will
or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476 (1989), we held: [I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind
the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence,
freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence
as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated: “The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.” It is for this reason, therefore,
why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F.
Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the
locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two
Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

JJWC - March 22, 2006. + 15DAYS EFFECTIVITY DATE