RULE 130 SEC 39- DEAD MAN STATUTE RULE

Garcia vs Veda Caparas

DARAB Case, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro's death in 1984, has no leg to stand on
other than Amanda's declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented to
Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that when she confronted
him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and petitioners, Pedro
allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it and he did not
have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights." Petitioners have no other
evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such arrangement.
No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually
cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the
landowners of the latter's share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward.

What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda's declaration in
her Affidavit covering Pedro's alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming
scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man's Statute, which provides that "[i]f
one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased,
and Amanda's declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and
which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro's surviving spouse
and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used
against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro's prior
death.

Razon vs IAC
petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of
the dead man's statute rule under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to
him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private
respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chidian that the ownership of the shares of
stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that
the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of
the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,5000 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the
rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondents' counsel.
Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled
in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):

RULE 130 SEC 40- DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

Lazaro vs Agustin
Facts: The MTCC ruled that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by
Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her
siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand,
such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC held that two
credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and straightforward manner that at the time the affidavit
was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa was already
bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also
gave credence to the testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly signed
and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete and thumbmarked when the same was
presented to him by a person who claimed to be Basilisa.

Petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed
property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court
without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and
physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized
document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so
would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.

Issue: Whether the sworn statement is a declaration against interest 

Held: At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged
sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an
admission against interest.

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest.
Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party
nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present
case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal
interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as
an admission against interest.

RULE 130 SEC 41- DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE

Nepomuceno vs Lopez
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel
prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support
pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly
financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that
he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the
National People's Army.

The appellate court found that from petitioner's payment of Araceli's hospital bills when she
gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support,
the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencel's father; that petitioner
merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to
provide financial support; and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for
Arhbencel's subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.

His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, 6
petitioner comes before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. 7
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an
explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or
acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative parent;
that the supposed payment made by him of Araceli's hospital bills was neither alleged in the
complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel's claim of paternity and filiation was
not established by clear and convincing evidence.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case. petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must
be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative
father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism
nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel's filiation
to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172 (2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the
child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial
agreement must be accompanied by the putative father's admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of
Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the
same.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner's handwritten undertaking to provide
financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is
mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be
advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits
cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father's legitimate family.

RULE 130 SEC 44- PART OF RES GESTAE

Manulat vs People
Petitioner is the husband of the deceased Genebe Manulat. They have two children, Vince Earl
and Leslie Kate, aged three and two years old, respectively. In the afternoon of September 4,
2005, Mary Jane Soriano, neighbor of the spouses, heard the spouses quarreling. She heard
petitioner telling Genebe "Day, if I get hurt I would box you." She also heard sounds of breaking
ceramics and a thud, then there was silence.

Around 6:40 in the evening of the same day, petitioner, with his two children left their home
and went to the house of his mother-in-law, Carmen Abarquez. Petitioner confided to Carmen
that Genebe scolded and shouted at him for arriving late. He said that Genebe was throwing
things. He quipped that "had the children been hit, he could have killed her (Genebe)." Carmen
ignored it and advised petitioner to just do his best since Genebe was not difficult to deal with.
After dinner, petitioner left his children with Carmen and went home at 11 o'clock in the
evening.

The following morning, September 5, 2005, Carmen bathed the two children and asked them
what happened to their parents. Leslie Kate answered, "Father threw the cellphone, mother's
mouth bled," while Vince Earl said, "Father choked mama" and "Mama was left home dead."
Carmen did not mind what the children told her and instead told them that their mother was
on duty at Gold City.
Around 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Nilda Cañabiral rushed to the house of the
spouses upon hearing the petitioner's shout for help. She saw Genebe hanging from the ceiling
on top of the bed. 8 Her body was somewhat bent with her feet touching the bed. 9 Then,
petitioner slipped out the knot and laid the body of his wife on the bed while crying. 10
Petitioner did not do anything but cry and asked his wife why she had done it. The neighbors
began gathering in the house.

In order to discredit the evidence of the prosecution, petitioner claims that the testimony of
Carmen was purely hearsay and not reliable since the prosecution never presented the children
as witnesses to testify as what was told by them to Carmen, their own grandmother. Hence,
inadmissible in evidence being hearsay and not statements as part of the res gestae. Said
argument is untenable.

The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have been
"voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of
the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."

There are three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

In People v. Salafranca, the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestae rule: (a) the act,
declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself; and (b) the said
evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of
factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement , (2)
the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is
given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the
statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.

In the case of People v. Villarama, the Court held that the ability or chance to invent a story is
a critical factor in determining the spontaneity of a statement. In the said case, the four-year-
old victim, at her age, could not have had the sophistication or malice to fabricate statements
and invent a story of rape. It was also settled in the case of People v. Bisda that children of
sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than
older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons.

In this case, this Court finds that the statements of the petitioner and victim's three-year-old
son and two-year-old daughter were spontaneously made. They had no opportunity or chance
to invent a story although they made the statements the morning after the occurrence while
being bathed by their grandmother Carmen. Their statements were unreflected and instinctive
since a three-year-old and a two-year-old children, given their age, do not have the capability,
sophistication or malice to fabricate such an incredible story of a violent altercation between
their parents and to impute their own father to the killing of their mother.
Thus, this court finds the above requites* of res gestae present. First, the principal act, which by
any measure was undoubtedly a startling occurrence, was the violent altercation between
petitioner and the victim, as witnessed by their young children, which led to the killing of his
own wife of which he is being charged. Second, the statements were made spontaneously to
which we ruled that given the tender age of the children, they could not have contrived or
concocted such a story. Lastly, the statements refer to the violent altercation that led to the
killing of the victim.

People vs Garcia
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence clearly shows that the
appellant admitted committing the crime in several instances, not just during the custodial
investigation. First, he admitted having killed his employer to the security guard, Campos, and
even sought Campos' help in disposing of Keyser's body. This admission may be treated as part
of the res gestae and does not partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to
the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said statement is admissible as evidence against the appellant.
Second, the appellant's statements before members of the media are likewise admissible in
evidence, according to the OSG, as these statements were made in response to questions by
news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer. The OSG stresses that appellant was
interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he made free and voluntary
statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. He even supplied the details on how
he committed the crime. Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed to the
killing even before the police could enter the premises and even before any question could be
posed to him. Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the factory, the appellant
pointed to the place where Keyser's corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in
time, appellant was not yet under custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the police at
the crime scene were spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and hence
must be treated as part of the res gestae and thus, says the OSG, admissible in evidence.

The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just
to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard,
Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had
killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos' testimony was
not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellant's statements to
Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Rules of Court, a declaration
is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been
through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to
Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and
before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos
concerned the circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellant's spontaneous
statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are
not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.

Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be
interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even
supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA
Channel 7, who testified in court,

People vs Tiozon
Facts: A friend of her husband came by.  She saw the accused holding a gun immediately before
shooting incident happened. The accused was the last person seen in the company of the victim
immediately before the latter was shot to death. They were already aslept (sic) inside their house when
or the aforesaid time accused knocked at their door. She testified that after hearing two successive
gunshots, accused went back to her house and informed there (sic) that he accidentally shot her
husband.

Issue: Whether the testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took
place admitted to her having accidentally shoot  the victim is admissible evidence against the accused
declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the hearsay rule.

Held: The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-
appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional
observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the
accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally
shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant
case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that
a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perceptions." Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard other
persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact
hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be
deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof.
Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may
also be received as part of the res gestae.

In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She
testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-
examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res
gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagon, We declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia
Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in
her testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.

People vs Palmones
Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res
gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 58

In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is
critical. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether
statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the
time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant
when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the
statement itself.

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim,
we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly
uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed
from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered
the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly
made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought
for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an
intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These
circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by
Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res
gestae.

Finally, after a thorough reading of the testimonies presented by both sides, it is even doubtful
that the victim ever uttered these alleged ante mortem statements in the first place. We note
that the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Investigator Alexander Tagum are contradicted
not only by the witnesses for the defense but also by the prosecution's own witnesses.

People vs Raquel
People vs Sace
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol (Abelardo), was on
her way home when she and her companions heard AAA scream. They hurried towards the
house and searched it but found it to be empty. As they searched further, appellant came out
from somewhere in the kitchen area of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied and he
told them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then joined in the search for AAA. Before
long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on the ground nearby. AAA was half-naked
and she appeared to have been ravished when they found her. Immediately, Abelardo called
the barangay officials and the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other barangay officials and tanods,
including Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival, they noticed the bloodstains
on appellant's clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant denied any
knowledge of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and again
asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point, appellant admitted to the
barangay officials and tanods that he was the one (1) who committed the crime. He admitted
that he raped and killed AAA. 6 Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also obtained the same
confession from appellant when he interviewed him infront of other people, namely,
Abelardo, Carmelita, and Bonifacio Vitto, as well as Arnaldo Mawac, Conchita and Iboy
Serdeña, and Salvador and Julieta Motol. Appellant was then photographed by the police and
Maribeth, who at that time had a camera on hand.

the RTC also took into consideration the confession of appellant that he was the one (1) who
raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the confession was made voluntarily and
spontaneously in public, and witnessed by prosecution's witnesses, who were not shown to
have any ill motive against appellant. Thus, appellant's declaration was admissible as part of res
gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made immediately subsequent to the
rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise.

Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime to
the prosecution's witnesses. According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped
and killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellant's statements
infront of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this
case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAA's death. His
admission was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and
before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the
influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellant's spontaneous
statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not
covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae,
admissible in evidence against him.

People vs Esoy
Facts: The victim Lorenzo Coro and Andrea Pabalan, rode a jeepney bound for Buendia Avenue at Taft
Avenue corner T.M. Kalaw Street in Manila. Upon reaching Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street, Ermita,
Manila, appellants boarded the jeepney. Bolalacao sat beside the victim while Esoy and Ciano sat on the
opposite side. Pabalan noticed that Esoy and Ciano were staring at all the passengers. Feeling
apprehensive, she moved beside the victim and whispered to him that she did not like the way the two
(2) were staring at them. Esoy and Ciano also seemed to be high on drugs, so she told the victim not to
look at them. When she again looked at Esoy and Ciano, the two (2) suddenly drew out their balisongs
and swung the same at them. In the ensuing commotion, the other passengers including appellants
alighted from the jeepney. When Pabalan told the victim that they should go down, she saw the victim's
bloodied chest. She then shouted for help and that they be taken to the hospital. The jeepney driver,
however, told them to alight from the vehicle. Fearing that the victim might run out of blood, she told
him that they should go down. The victim then told her that his cellular phone was snatched and asked
her where appellants fled. Pabalan just insisted that they alight from the vehicle and not to worry about
his cellular phone. Upon alighting from the jeepney, the victim fell down after a few steps. But with the
help of two (2) motorcyclists, they were able to hail an FX taxi and the victim was immediately brought
to the nearby Philippine General Hospital (PGH) where he was operated on. Unfortunately, however,
the victim died at 11:00 p.m. that same night.

Issue: Whether Pabalan’s testimony as to the victim’s utternace this his cell phone was taken is part of a
res gestae

Held: Though Pabalan's testimony as to the victim's utterance that his cellular phone was taken is only
hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay rule, the victim's spontaneous
utterance being part of res gestae.

Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victim or
spectator to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In the instant case, all the elements of res gestae are
sufficiently established insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned: (1) the principal
act (res gestae) — the robbery and stabbing of the victim — is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, that is, within minutes after the victim
was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances — his cellular phone was stolen during the
startling occurrence. The testimony being an exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not err in
admitting the same.

Talidano vs Falcon Maritime

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax messages to support
the validity of his dismissal from employment. He maintains that the first fax message
containing the information that the vessel encroached on a different route was a mere personal
observation of the ship master and should have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that
these fax messages cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship
master embodied therein is just a report. He also contends that he has not caused any
immediate danger to the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would
have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify his unceremonious
dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal from employment stemmed
from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his superiors resented. 34
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct in considering the fax messages as
res gestae statements. It likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is justified
as the same could no longer be retrieved because Hansu has already ceased to be its principal.
Furthermore, it refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed because he filed a
complaint with the ITF in behalf of his fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner's
allegation is a hoax because there is no showing that the alleged complaint has been received
by the ITF and that no action thereon was ever taken by the ITF.

Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res
gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
accompanying the equivocal act. 41 We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances. 42

Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its
course — is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the
fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have
been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted
as part of the res gestae of the first kind.

Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the
principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to
the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a
legal significance to the equivocal act.
Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be
one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not
accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were
made simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the Japanese
port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.

Zarrate vs RTC
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res
gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. The hospital records showed that the
operation started at 5:00 a.m. and ended at 7:30 a.m. of April 2, 1994. SPO1 Alecha testified
that it was also in the morning of April 2, 1994 that he took the statement of Guiritan, who
stated that it was petitioner who stabbed him.

SPO1 Alecha testified that he had to put his ear near Guiritan's mouth so that he could hear
Guiritan's answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal that the
statement was taken a few hours after the operation when he regained consciousness. His
statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the
shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or
contrive the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, the statement was signed by Guiritan and its date was established by
SPO1 Alecha.
Petitioner erred in stating that Guiritan's statement, which was admitted as part of the res
gestae, was the sole basis for his conviction. Apart from the written statement, Guiritan, who
survived the stabbing incident, positively identified appellant in open court and testified that
petitioner was the one who stabbed him and that he knew petitioner even before the stabbing
incident. Conviction of the accused may be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness.

RULE 130 SEC 45- RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Security Bank vs Gan
The plaintiff submits that the ledger cards constituted the best evidence of the transactions
made by the defendant with the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section 43 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. There is no question that the entries in the ledgers were
made by one whose duty it was to record transactions in the ordinary or regular course of the
business. But for the entries to be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded, the Rule
interpose[s] a very important condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to the
probative worth of the entries as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant
must be "in a position to know the facts therein stated." Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a
position to know the facts of the check deposits and withdrawals. But the transfers of funds
through the debit memos in question?
Let us be clear, at the outset, what the transactions covered by the debit memos are. They are,
at bottom, credit accommodations said to have been granted by the bank's branch manager
Mr. [Q]ui to the defendant, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which competent
testimonial or documentary evidence must be presented. In the fac[e] of the denial by the
defendant of the existence of any such agreement, and the absence of any document reflecting
it, the testimony of a party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui, or of any witness to the same,
would be necessary. The plaintiff failed to explain why it did not or could not present any party
or witness to the transactions, but even if it had a reason why it could not, it is clear that the
existence of the agreements cannot be established through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for
he was [not in] a position to [know] those facts. As a subordinate, he could not have done more
than record what was reported to him by his superior the branch manager, and unless he was
allowed to be privy to the latter's dealings with the defendant, the information that he received
and entered in the ledgers was incapable of being confirmed by him.

There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in business
records which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts occurring in the
ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a
badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they purport to record what were
independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a client. In this case, the entries
become mere casual or voluntary reports of the official concerned. To permit the ledgers,
prepared by the bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the agreements
with third parties, is to set a dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as an exception
to the hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being used as a source of undue advantage for the
party preparing them.

RULE 130 SEC 46- ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

People vs Bernaldez
Facts: The trial court gave weight to the medical certificate issued on 3 September 1990 by Dr. De la Paz,
who was a government doctor at the time. In considering the medical certificate despite the failure of
Dr. De la Paz to testify thereon, the trial court reasoned that such document, being an act done by a
public officer, was presumed to be done regularly unless proved otherwise. It concluded that the finding
of "[o]ld lacerations at 3:00 and 9 o'clock" and "newly-healed lacerations at 11 o'clock" on the hymen of
MARIA TERESA proved that someone had carnal knowledge of her. Nevertheless, a medical examination
was not an indispensable requisite in the prosecution for rape. 

Issue: Whether medical certificate issued by a government doctor an exception to the hearsay rule

Held: The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. De la Paz despite the
failure of the latter to testify. The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it
could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be presented in court to show his
qualifications. Here, a distinction must be made between admissibility of evidence and probative value
thereof. Nevertheless, a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone
testimony of the victim is sufficient if credible.

People vs Divina
A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the police. Entries in
official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. They are not conclusive. It is undisputed that the alleged time of the
commission of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the
parish priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor
presented as a witness during the trial. The information supplied is therefore hearsay and does
not have any probative value.

People vs Leones
Irene, a salesgirl in the store owned by appellant's parents, accused appellant of having
allegedly raped her one afternoon after he and his sister had forced her to take three tablets
which rendered her semi-conscious. Charged with rape in the Court of First Instance, appellant
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Medical examination conducted on Irene about two
or three hours after the alleged rape disclosed healing lacerations of the hymen, absence of
sperm cells and unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity. On the other hand, complainant testified
that on the date of the alleged rape she was having her menstrual period. The trial court
convicted the appellant of rape

The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the
hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing
lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the
Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a
physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr.
Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a
witness for the government.

People vs Crisostomo
the appellant claims that as no autopsy was performed on the body of the victim the
prosecution has not established the actual cause of death of the victim. He contends that the
death certificate of the victim (Exhibit A) to which he offered no objection is admissible only to
establish the fact of death not the cause of the death of the victim. He further avers that the
testimony of Dr. Juan Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not perform an
autopsy shows that he did not qualify as an expert witness; and even if he were an expert
witness there was no basis for him to render an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim.
Further, appellant alleges that Dr. Santos mentioned two (2) wounds of different sizes but
otherwise with exactly identical characteristics from which the possibility may be deduced that
the victim may have been shot twice, the second time by a person other than the appellant.
In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim

Feria vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Feria had been under detention by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide for the hold-up and killing of a United States Peace Corps Volunteer. He sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City after having been
detained for about twelve years. However, the transfer could not be effected without submitting some
requirements, which led to discovering that the entire records of his case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing. Petitioner thus filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
the Supreme Court praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued
detention without a valid judgment was illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process. 

The Court ordered the lower court to conduct proper hearings on the case. The Public Respondent
presented in evidence the records containing a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985; and  a certified true copy of People's Journal
dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life
imprisonment." .After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the case stating that mere
loss of the records does not invalidate the judgment nor authorize the release of the prisoner. The
proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records, which should be filed with the court that
rendered the decision. 

Issue: Whether monthly report and newspaper articles are admissible under exception to hearsay rule

Held: Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on
record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.
Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".

Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under
Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, particularly with respect to such
grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule
129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake
nor does he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of
then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official
records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence
of facts therein stated. cdtai
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People's Journal dated January
18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment."
However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for
a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the
reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, the general law governing
reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the
records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. Judicial
records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished
cases. There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important
as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. Petitioner belabors the fact
that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We
reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense."

RULE 130 SEC 49- TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

Republic vs Sandiganbayan
the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the
provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner claims that in light of the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others, the "former case or
proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.

the petitioner's motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident cases drew individual oppositions
from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with
the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 112 and, in fact, again presented some of
the witnesses. The petitioner's about-face two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan's
own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or
deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or
deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay
evidence is the adverse party's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony
or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination 119 afforded an adverse
party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith."
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether
actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former
case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be
introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the
same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been -
sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so. (The requirement of similarity
though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same. Although some
issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which
is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of
depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or
disregarded.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under
Section 4 (c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a
different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4 (c), Rule 23
cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as
hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is
whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition
can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, 125 i.e., the
party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible
evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.

De Leon vs People