Velarde v SJS- challenge it successfully

"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals,
he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. . . .."

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the
case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. 92

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their
decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would
substantially address the issues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts — much
less an assessment or analysis thereof — or of the court's findings as to the probable facts. The assailed
Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then
follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to
achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision
proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.
Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied,
the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct
facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual
findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions? None were stated
or implied. Indeed, the RTC's Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one
cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown?
Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?

Miranda v CA

Republic vs Nolasco
More importantly, the rule is explicit that partial judgment with regards one of the reliefs is warranted
only after "a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out
of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim." Herein, the partial judgment
was sought even before the respondents had the chance to file their answer to the petition. Moreover,
it was prayed for at a point when, at even such a preliminary stage, the claimant was actually somehow
able to already present evidence in support of his claim, but before the respondents had the chance to
rebut this claim or support countervailing evidence.

At bare minimum, the allowance of a partial judgment at this stage would constitute a denial of
constitutional due process. It would condemn before hearing, and render judgment before trial. 52 Had
indeed partial judgment been granted in the assailed Order, it would have been rendered before the
Petitioner were afforded the opportunity to rebut the evidence of Nolasco, or to present their own
countervailing evidence. While the allowance of partial judgments may expedite the litigation of claims,
it cannot be sanctioned at a stage when the trial judge has not had the opportunity to hear all sides to
the claim. In fact, it was highly imprudent for the respondent judge to have concluded, as he did in his
Order, that it was an admitted fact that the BAC had strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws,
Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations, and Bid Tender Documents, considering that the Petitioner had not
even filed an answer or been allowed the opportunity to present any evidence on its behalf.

Briones-Vasquez v CA
As a general rule, therefore, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable except under
the three exceptions named above: a) clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party; and c) void judgments.

In the present case, petitioner claims the second exception, i.e.,that her motion for clarificatory
judgment is for the purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the final and executory
Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized by this Court in the following manner:

The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which
was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to
placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to
make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have
spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has
rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by
ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro
tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as
had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered.In all cases the
exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment,
and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L.,pp. 622-623.)

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment
and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had
been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action
really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have
rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been.(Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co.,28 South.,640, 641; 126
Ala.,268.)

A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously
done, to have effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to
supply an omission in the record of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake.
(Perkins vs. Haywood,31 N. E.,670, 672.) cDCaTH

It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction
occurred, even though the rights of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro tunc will not be
ordered except where this can be done without injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order is
to supply on the record something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the
court.
From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment it is clear that the judgment petitioner
sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is outside its scope. Petitioners did not allege that
the Court of Appeals actually took judicial action and that such action was not included in the Court of
Appeals' Decision by inadvertence. A nunc pro tunc judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply
nonaction by the court.

Navarro v Metropolitan Bank

While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first instance has
already been settled by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings,
the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of laches vis-à-vis the imprescriptibility of
Clarita's cause of action because the said decision is not the one on appeal before us. But more
importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had already become final
without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left
with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability of the said decision.

No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no
longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or
the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is
void. 26 The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at
the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and
satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to
savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.

REMEDIES
Banco Filipino v Campos
Under paragraph (b), Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for the grant of new trial based
on:
"Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result,"

are: (1) that such evidence has been discovered after the trial; (2) that even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, it could not have been discovered and produced at that trial; and (3) that such
evidence is of such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted.

This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally
construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations
are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given
the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice
and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities (Sec. 1, Rule 1, Revised
Rules of Court; Talavera vs. Mañgoba, L-18373, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 837).

Gauged by these standards, we find the evidence proposed to be presented by petitioner in a new trial
are newly discovered evidence within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. The said evidence could
not have been produced during the trial because the subject-matter of the trial was Lot No. 719. Petitioner
correctly searched, discovered and presented during that trial, all documents pertaining to Lot No. 719
only. The evidence sought to be presented in a new trial by petitioner became pertinent and important
only after trial, when judgment was rendered by respondent Judge that private respondents have a valid
and subsisting title to Lot No. 719 on the basis of sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 (Exh. "A") which on its face
does not mention Lot No. 719. Based on the incomplete data appearing on Exh. "A", petitioner conducted
a new search and discovered the evidence it now seeks to present in a new trial, indubitably showing that
sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 refers to a title to Lot No. 640, and not to Lot No. 719 in the name of petitioner .
If admitted in a new trial, these newly discovered evidence will probably alter the judgment of the trial
court.
In making the foregoing conclusions, we do not by any means intend to prejudge the effect of such
evidence on the outcome of the case. We are confining ourselves to the conclusion that the evidence
intended to be submitted, "would probably alter the result."

Bernaldez v Francia
We have previously ruled that a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be
granted when the concurrence of the following requisites is established: (a) the evidence is discovered
after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative,
cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably change the judgment. 19
In order that a particular piece of evidence may be regarded as "newly discovered" for purposes of
granting a new trial, it is essential to show that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

The evidence offered by petitioners, TCT No. 180189 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila not to
respondent, but to "Spouses Nolasco E. Tupaz and Editha L. Tupaz," 21 does not satisfy the
aforementioned requisites. The Court notes that although petitioners found out about the existence of said
TCT only after trial, they could have easily discovered the same before or during the trial of the case had
they bothered to check the TCT of respondent's lot to ascertain whether or not it overlapped with their
own lot. In any case, TCT No. 180189 is hardly material to their case, considering that respondent's TCT
is of a different number: TCT No. 180199. Hence, it is not difficult to see why the two certificates of title
refer to different parcels of land and owners. Such piece of evidence would certainly not have affected,
much less, altered the outcome of the case.

CAPUZ vs CA
We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a motion for new trial. The grounds
alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37,
which are: (1) that petitioner's failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake, accident or excusable
negligence; and (2) that he has a meritorious defense. Petitioner explained that upon receiving the
summons, he immediately saw private respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing his
payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the
complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to be collected by private respondent is a good defense
to the complaint to collect the same loan again. cdll

The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of petitioner as a motion for new trial
was because the said motion did not include an affidavit of merit.

The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to a motion to lift an order of
default or for a new trial need not be embodied in a separate document but may be incorporated in the
petition itself.

Libudan v Gil
But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
"outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes
the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination
of the case."

Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in applying for and obtaining
adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been alloted to
him in the partition; or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector to include in
the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other
claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an
application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing
the former to withdraw his opposition. In all these examples the over-riding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from
presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
The reason for the rule is to put an end to litigations.

Delos Santos v Elizalde

The abovementioned fifteen (15)-day period begins to run upon receipt of notice of the decision or final
order appealed from. Such period has been considered to begin upon receipt of notice by the counsel of
record, which is considered notice to the parties. 29 Service of judgment on the party is prohibited and is
not considered the official receipt of the judgment. 30

Thus, the fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received a copy of
the assailed Decision of the CA, and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been
informed of the CA decision. 31

To reiterate, service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties
themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers. The
reason is simple — the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of
procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also
be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is
best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure — either the lawyer
retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he does not intend to hire a lawyer.

Even assuming that petitioners had replaced Atty. Victoriano prior to his receipt of the assailed Decision,
the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration would still be reckoned from his receipt of
the Decision.

Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that "[i]n case of substitution, the name of the
attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party."

In Republic, 36 cited by petitioners, We ruled that the CA should have admitted the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners to prevent gross miscarriage of justice, as the government stood to
lose close to three hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its name and devoted to
educational purposes; while in Ramos, it was enunciated that a four (4)-day delay "in filing a notice of
appeal and a motion of extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity
and considering that the record on appeal is now with the respondent judge." 37

In the instant case, there is no exceptional circumstance to justify the disregard of the reglementary
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners' position is devoid of merit.

Furthermore, petitioners contend that despite their Motion for Reconsideration had been filed out of time,
this should have been admitted on the ground of equity. However, equitable grounds cannot be sought
when the party is guilty of negligence. Thus, We ruled in Mesina v. Meer that "this Court will not allow
petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence."
However, the Ginete case is not a precedent to the case at bar because in said case, the party had no
participatory negligence, while in the case at bar, petitioners were negligent in not monitoring the
developments in their case. Petitioners' acts are considered inexcusable negligence.

Concurrently, petitioners did not even know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants' brief on their
behalf during the more than one hundred eighty (180)-day extension that he sought from the CA, aside
from their failure to learn of the Decision of the appellate court. Ordinary prudence would dictate that
petitioners must give utmost importance to the case considering that it involves their residences,
presumably their most valued material possession, and considering further that they had already lost at
the trial court. Petitioners' failure to apprise themselves of the status of the case from the time that Atty.
Victoriano received a copy of the notice to file brief on June 15, 1998 up to June 2, 1999, when petitioners
allegedly obtained a copy of the assailed Decision from the CA, is unjustified. Petitioners cannot be
shielded from the repercussions of their counsel's and their own negligence. Petitioners themselves are
as much to blame in losing their appeal.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Tuazon v CA
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert
facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the petition
is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein. 12

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become
final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however
claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He
contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the
evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was
then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial court,
he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug
dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The records, however, show that the former
counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its
decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal
therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client
and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of this right
to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. 16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner's
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's
counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to
present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-
examined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's
motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which have been lost
thru inexcusable negligence.

Sps Que v CA
In their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners contended that judgment was entered
against them through "mistake or fraud" because they were allegedly under the impression that Atty.
Ranot had prepared and filed "the necessary pleading." This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated
under Section 1. As used in that provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to
the case. 15 "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented
the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court. 16 Clearly, petitioners'
mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud.

On the other hand, what petitioners appear to be claiming in this petition is that this Court should reverse
the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for new trial on the ground that their previous
counsels' negligence constitutes "excusable negligence" under Section 1.

This claim is similarly without merit.

Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is
imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. 17 To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to
disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by
the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 18 What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative
sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

Lastly, as an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from judgment is available only as a last recourse,
when the petitioner has no other remedy. 37 This is not true here because petitioners had at their
disposal other remedies which they in fact availed of, albeit belatedly or defectively, such as when they
filed their motion for reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. As the Court of Appeals held:

[A] "Petition for Relief from Judgment" is not a general utility tool in the procedural workshop. The relief
granted under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character and is allowed only when there is no
other available or adequate remedy. It is not regarded with favor. The judgment rendered will not be
disturbed where the complainant has or by exercising proper diligence would have had an adequate
remedy at law. If the complainant lost a remedy at law from an adverse judgment by his . . . negligence,
such inequitable conduct precludes him from relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

Monzon v Sps Relova

Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v Court of Appeals

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be
availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution
sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. 8 Yet, the
remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. 9 The Court has thus instituted safeguards by
limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in
Section 1 10 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner. 11 A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability
of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist. 12 As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the
decision or by the highest court of the land. 13 As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely
because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party in whose favor the
remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no longer
available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being a non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-
2838, could not bring the action for annulment of judgment due to unavailability to it of the remedies of
new trial, reconsideration, appeal, or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief.

The petitioner probably brought the action for annulment upon its honest belief that the action was its
remaining recourse from a perceived commission of extrinsic fraud against it. It is worthwhile for the
petitioner to ponder, however, that permitting it despite its being a non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-2838
to avail itself of the remedy of annulment of judgment would not help it in any substantial way. Although
Rule 47 would initially grant relief to it from the effects of the annulled judgment, the decision of the CA
would not really and finally determine the rights of the petitioner in the property as against the competing
rights of the original parties. To be borne in mind is that the annulment of judgment is an equitable relief
not because a party-litigant thereby gains another opportunity to reopen the already-final judgment but
because a party-litigant is enabled to be discharged from the burden of being bound by a judgment that
was an absolute nullity to begin with.

Sps Arenas v Quezon City Development Bank

Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment
if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief.
17 If petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence. 18
We found no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment.
The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference of Civil
Case No. 072-07-2002 on November 11, 2003, and respondent bank was allowed to present evidence on
its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. Such Order was received by the secretary of petitioner's counsel on
November 17, 2003. Petitioner did not move to set aside the RTC's order of non-suit. While petitioner's
counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift
the order of non-suit was filed. Notably, from December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on January 8,
2004, petitioner did not take any remedial action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity
to do so. In fact, petitioner and her counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing
wherein respondent bank presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the case for decision.
It was only on January 14, 2004 when petitioner and her husband filed a pleading captioned as
Manifestation and Motion, wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of the Orders dated November 11,
2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further pre-trial conference. The RTC denied such Manifestation and
Motion in its Order dated March 9, 2004, as the same was filed beyond the reglementary period, and such
Order was received by petitioner on March 12, 2004. Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for
annulment of order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud. The
CA denied the petition as petitioner failed to avail of the appropriate remedies provided by the Rules to
which we agree.

Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent bank's
counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules
of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an
available remedial measure.

Final judgment versus final and executory judgment

Investment vs CA
Facts: the crux of the controversy is the effective life of the preliminary injunction of the Appellate Court as
regards the auction sale of Investments' cigarette-making machines, dated December 21, 1978 which,
after having been lifted, was reinstated upon the filing by Investments of the increased injunction bond of
P650,000.00 on September 24, 1979. The parties do not dispute the fact that the injunction was to subsist
"until final judgment shall have been rendered in Civil Case No. 116617." The point about which they
differ is the meaning to be accorded to the term, "final judgment" in the context of Civil Case No. 116617.
Investments theorizes that the judgment rendered by the Trial Court in said Civil Case No. 116617 on
December 19, 1980 was not a "final judgment" because it was an appealable judgment and had, in fact,
been appealed seasonably. TIP, for its part, asserts that judgment was in truth a "final judgment" as the
term is used in procedural law, even if appealable and hence, upon its rendition, the preliminary injunction
of the Appellate Court expired, its life having precisely been fixed to endure until such judgment shall
have been rendered.

Issue:

Held: The concept of "final" judgment, as distinguished from one which has "become final" (or
"executory" as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A "final" judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a case, 12 leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g.,
an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription.
Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except
to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and
executory."
Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final (and executory) "upon expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected" 17 or, an appeal therefrom having
been taken, the judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are
returned to the Court of origin. 18 The "final" judgment is then correctly categorized as a "final and
executory judgment" in respect to which, as the law explicitly provides, "execution shall issue as a
matter of right." 19 It bears stressing that only a final judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment or order that
finally disposes of the action of proceeding" 20 can become final and executory.
There is no showing that the parties and their counsel intended to give the term "final judgment" a
special signification, a meaning other than that accorded to it by law and established usage. Their
agreement must therefore be construed to mean exactly what it says, that upon rendition by the Trial
Court on December 9, 1981 of its judgment on the merits, i.e., its "final judgment," the life and effectivity
of the preliminary injunction came to an end, regardless of the appealability of, or the actual taking of an
appeal from, said judgment. The petitioner's theory of the case, founded on its concept of a "final
judgment" is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

execution before finality of judgment, only upon good reasons

BF Corp v Edsa Shangrila
Facts: Pending disposition of the appeal, filed by private respondents, before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed a motion for execution of the decision in its favor which the trial court granted. The Court of
Appeals, acting on a petition for certiorari filed by private respondents, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its order of execution. It held that the reason for
ordering execution pending appeal did not justify such order. In addition, the appellate court found that the
order of execution pending appeal was not in the form of a special order as required by the Rules of
Court. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari raising the issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's order granting execution
pending appeal.

Issue: WON the CA can set aside order of execution pending appeal

Held: Execution pending appeal is not to be granted except for good reason to be stated in a special
order. For the general rule is that only judgments which have become final and executory may be
executed. 5 In this case, the issuance of an order granting execution pending appeal is sought to be
justified on the plea that the "[r]espondents' dilatory appeal and refusal to pay petitioner the amount justly
due it had placed petitioner in actual and imminent danger of insolvency."

The contention is without merit. As we recently held in Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of
Appeals:

It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and not a natural
person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on the verge of facing
civil or even criminal suits, the immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending
appeal cannot be justified as Falcon's situation may not be likened to a case of a natural
person who may be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the
corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are showings of
other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency of the Adverse party or
the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to the latter reason, it was noted in Aquino
vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988], that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit
of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within
competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to rule
that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its basis for finding good
reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of
an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending
appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases
where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in
accordance with Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

Nor does the fact that petitioner filed a bond in the amount Or P35 million justify the grant of execution
pending appeal. We have held in a number of cases 7 that the posting of a bond to answer for damages
is not alone a sufficient reason for ordering execution pending appeal. Otherwise, .. execution pending
appeal could be obtained through the mere filing of such a bond.
discretionary executions, when stayed
City of Manila v CA
Facts:

Issue: WON the filing of supersedeas bond necessary to stay execution

Held: "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the rights of the parties in
the case. But such judgments are not yet "final and executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary
period for appeal. During that period, execution of the judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning
party as a matter of right.

To stay the execution, a supersedeas bond is necessary except where one has already been filed in the
lower court. This bond continues to be effective if the judgment of the regional trial court is appealed. But
during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant-appellant must continue depositing with the appellate
court the payments required in the appealed judgment. The rentals accruing during the pendency of the
appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated, if there is one, and in the absence thereof, on
or before the dates provided for in Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to make such deposits or payments is
ground for execution of the judgment.

Since the private respondent in the case at bar has filed a supersedeas bond and the stipulated rental is
yearly, execution may issue only when it fails to make the yearly deposit of the rental, and after notice and
hearing. Such default has not yet been established.

The Court notes with disapproval the arbitrary manner in which Sheriff Dominador Cacpal and Deputy
Sheriff Reynaldo Cordero acted in delivering possession of the leased premises to the petitioner. The
evidence shows that they enforced the writ of execution on the same date they received it, forcibly taking
out movables from the said premises, including chandeliers, furniture and furnishings, music organs,
stereo components, lighting fixtures and computers. They turned off the water, cut off the electricity and
disconnected the telephones. They also unreasonably prevented ANC members from entering the
premises to get their personal belongings.

The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial court and the
decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the
case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execution. 14
The only exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial court under
Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.

Valencia v CA
Facts: Respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal alleging that Under Section 2 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court a writ of execution may be issued to enforce a judgment before the expiration of the
period to appeal upon showing good reasons. In the cases of Hacienda Navarra, Inc. vs. Labrador, et al.,
65 Phil. 536; The People's Bank and Trust Company vs. San Juan, et al., L-7692, April 27, 1955; and
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, May 23, 1953, it has already been held that the filing of the bond by the
successful party is a good reason for ordering execution.
respondent judge, over the opposition filed by herein petitioner, issued an order 7 granting the motion for
execution pending appeal, the defendants having filed a bond in the amount of P330,000.00 posted by
the Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines. It also granted a period up to April 27, 1989 8 within
which the plaintiff may "file a counterbond to stay the implementation of the Writ of Execution to be
issued."
Issue: WON the mere filing of a bond stays execution

Held: Conformably with Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order that there may be a
discretionary issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal the following requisites must be satisfied: (a)
There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) There must be a good
reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason must be stated in a special order.

In the case at bar, the ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the immediate execution, as stated
in its order of March 20, 1989, is the filing of a bond by private respondents. The rule is now settled that
the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering execution pending
appeal, as clarified in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 which we are constrained to quote for the
benefit of the parties:

"It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a
matter of course. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must exist
to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may
well become a tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the mere posting
of a bond a 'good reason' would precisely make immediate execution of a
judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, once
rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to
answer for the damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to
repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law."

The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, the existence of good reasons is principally what confers such
discretionary power. Absent any such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck down
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Court has had the occasion to explain the
importance of such requirement for good reasons, thus:

". . . If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed, although
there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may arise which cannot be
fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should be granted only when these
considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances demanding
urgency and the provision contained in Rule 39, Section 2, requires a statement of
these circumstances as a security for their existence."

execution before or after death of judgment obligor will depend on the nature of the judgment, i.e.
recovery of property v money judgments
Session Delights Ice Cream v CA
Facts: in the course of the execution of the above final judgment pursuant to Section 3, Rule VIII of the
then NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Finance Analyst of the Labor Arbiter's Office held a pre-execution
conference with the contending parties in attendance. The Finance Analyst submitted an updated
computation of the monetary awards due the private respondent in the total amount of P235,986.00. This
updated computation included additional backwages and separation pay due the private respondent
computed from March 1, 2001 to September 17, 2003. The computation also included the proportionate
amount of the private respondent's 13th month pay.
The petitioner objected to the re-computation and appealed the labor arbiter's order to the NLRC. The
petitioner claimed that the updated computation was inconsistent with the dispositive portion of the labor
arbiter's February 8, 2001 decision, as modified by the CA.

Issue: WON a final and executory decision may be enforced beyond the terms decreed in its dispositive
portion

Held: Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that under the terms of the decision under
execution, no essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that
flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an
original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law — specifically, Article
279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision — that is read into the
decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as
expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal
dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final
judgments.

Cayana v CA GR 125607
Facts: The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. According to
them, the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and allowed them to adduce
evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land.

Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision 22 dated August 21, 1995, held that the
principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there being no identity of the causes of action in Civil Case No.
15298 and Civil Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public documents, the
former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the
corresponding TCTs for the First and Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case covered not only
the annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but also the recovery of
possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos executed by Eulalia Cayabyab.

Issue: WON the decision in a prior civil case operates to bar the defenses and counterclaims in a
subsequent case.

Held: The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment, under paragraph (b)
above and conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) is well-laid. In Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,
28 we held:
There is 'bar by prior judgment' when, between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute
bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including
the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been
adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of
parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case,
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein.
For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court
must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the
third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.

In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and
consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts
essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. If the
same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and covered by the
rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest
upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment
in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.

We find that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No. 15937, which involves the
annulment of the subsequent transactions and TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the
recovery of possession thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily
more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second
Parcels. Furthermore, the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 necessarily turned only upon whether the
Deeds of Absolute Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case No. 15937 will also have to
include a determination of the good or bad faith of the subsequent purchasers. Res judicata, therefore,
does not apply.

Nonetheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment. In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
was explained, thus:

. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a

former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical . If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend
on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not
required but merely identity of issues.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null
and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering
the subject parcels of land precluded the Court of Appeals from further adjudicating on the validity of the
said deeds and titles.

The appellate court's pronouncement that "the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which declares null and
void the deeds of absolute sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 20, 1976 and the corresponding TCT is
not conclusive upon the action in Civil Case No. 15937" 33 is, therefore, flawed.
It is likewise utterly erroneous for the appellate court to have disregarded the final judgment in Civil Case
No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the
corresponding TCTs covering the two parcels of land. It is axiomatic that decisions which have long
become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts and the appellate court is deprived of
jurisdiction to alter the trial court's final judgment.

Stronghold v Felix
Facts: Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000, Stronghold Insurance
moved for the reconsideration of the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court. In an Order 6 dated 23
January 2001, the trial court denied Stronghold Insurance's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In
an Order 7 dated 8 February 2001, the trial court granted Garon's motion for execution pending appeal.
The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of P20 million to answer for any damage that Project Movers
and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by reason of the execution pending appeal. On 14 February 2001,
Branch Clerk of Court Richard C. Jamora ("Jamora") issued a writ of execution pending appeal. On 16
February 2001, Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal. Stronghold Insurance also filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the trial court's 8 February 2001 Order and the writ of
execution pending appeal.

Issue: WON the execution stays by mere posting of bond

Held: The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. According to
them, the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and allowed them to adduce
evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land.

Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision 22 dated August 21, 1995, held that the
principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there being no identity of the causes of action in Civil Case No.
15298 and Civil Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public documents, the
former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the
corresponding TCTs for the First and Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case covered not only
the annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but also the recovery of
possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos executed by Eulalia Cayabyab.

We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon failed to present good reasons to justify execution
pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited by the trial court are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Cañete, 24 Cañete filed an action for compensation for his illness. The
Workmen's Compensation Commission found the illness compensable. Considering Cañete's physical
condition and the Court's finding that he was in constant danger of death, the Court allowed execution
pending appeal. In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al., 25 De Leon, et al. defaulted on an agreement that
was peculiarly personal to Asuncion. The agreement was valid only during Asuncion's lifetime. The Court
considered that Soriano's health was delicate and she was 75 years old at that time. Hence, execution
pending appeal was justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her husband, who was ill.

The posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful
party is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the
dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution. The bond is only an additional
factor for the protection of the defendant's creditor.

Yau v Silverio
Facts: The Order of dismissal became final and executory on December 26, 1991 and an entry of
judgment was made on April 21, 1992. the trial court, upon petitioner Yau's motion, issued an Order
directing the execution of its Decision and, on September 17, 1992, issued the corresponding writ of
execution.

In December 1992, the defendants' bank deposits were garnished by the sheriff. Also, the shares of
Silverio in the Manila Golf and Country Club were sold at public auction for P2,000,000. As the judgment
was only partially satisfied, the writ of execution was enforced against the other defendants,
including Macapagal. Silverio and Macapagal took separate courses of action. On February 2,
1993, Macapagal filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the
validity of the Decision of the trial court, its Order of execution and the writ of execution. The court
dismissed the petition on the ground that the same was barred, under the principle of res judicata, by its
previous Decision, upholding the validity of the trial court's Order of default.
On other hand, Silverio filed with the Court of Appeals (Special Eleventh Division) a petition for
reinstatement of his appeal and annulment of the writ of execution. However, the appellate court
denied the petition on the ground that the Order of the RTC dismissing the Notice of Appeal had become
final and executory. Macapagal then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 110610. Silverio likewise filed with this Court a similar petition. These petitions were
consolidated because they arose out of the same facts. In its Decision dated April 18, 1997, this Court
upheld the rulings of the Court of Appeals and dismissed their petitions. Their motions for
reconsideration were denied with finality by this Court.
Considering that the judgment was not fully satisfied, the sheriff resumed the implementation of
the writ. In 1999, he sent notices of garnishment to several banks in Manila against any existing
account of Macapagal. Thereupon, Macapagal filed with the trial court a motion to quash the writ
of execution on the ground that its lifetime has expired.

Issue: WON writ had become functus oficio and could no longer be enforced since more than five years
have elapsed from the finality of the trial court's judgment

Held: It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from
the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the
statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.

In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that in computing the time limit for
enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or
delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire
facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be
extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.

There had been many instances where this Court allowed the execution by motion even after the lapse of
five years. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26,
1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full
satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the
Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial court's judgment and the writ of execution.
Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.
As stated earlier, on April 18, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in G.R. No. 110610 and G.R. No.
113851 dismissing the petitions of Macapagal and Silverio assailing the trial court's judgment in Civil
Case No. CEB-2058. In 1998, this Court denied with finality their motions for reconsideration. And in the
instant petitions, Macapagal and Silverio are attacking the validity of the writ of execution by the trial
court. Because of their maneuvers, there has been a delay of sixteen (16) years in the enforcement of
such judgment, reckoned from its finality on December 26, 1991 up to the present. Indeed, the
enforcement of the trial court's judgment by motion has been interrupted by the acts of Macapagal and
Silverio the judgment debtors.
Every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant's right to initiate an action in court is fully respected,
however, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should
not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless
litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.
Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of the trial court has attained
finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon
finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for
correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party,
or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final
and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.
In Lim v. Jabalde, this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of
final judgments, thus:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For
just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction
of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing
litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down. 13 The statute of
limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their
control.

Jerome Solco v Provido

Facts: Judgment was entered and became final and executory. Solco then filed a motion for execution
before the trial court which was granted. A writ of execution was issued. Jose Gerardo Y. Garbanzos
served the writ on Solco's counsel who informed him that the balance of the purchase price will be paid
only if all the adverse occupants have vacated the property. Upon ocular inspection of the property on
May 24 and 27, 2005, all adverse occupants had vacated the premises, but the billboard of Trongco
Advertising was still there.

the Sheriff again demanded from Solco payment of the balance of the purchase price less all damages
awarded, but to no avail. the Villaruels sent a letter to Solco informing him of their decision to cancel and
terminate the sale transaction, and the forfeiture of the P1.6M to answer for the damages caused to them.
However, Villaruels' counsel wrote a letter to the clerk of court stating that Solco failed to pay the balance
of the purchase price, and prayed for the full implementation of the writ of execution by garnishing cash
deposits of Solco.

Solco filed a manifestation with motion asking the court to accept the MBTC) cashier's check in the
amount of P1,287,786.00 as full compliance of his obligation under the contract. the RTC accepted the
payment as full compliance of Solco's obligation and ordered the Villaruels to execute the deed of
absolute sale over the property, and appointed the clerk of court to execute the said deed in their behalf
should they fail to comply with the order.
Meanwhile, the Villaruels filed a complaint for Cancellation of Contract, Quieting of Title and Damages.
the Villaruels also filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and to set aside the Order claiming that the
writ of execution was void because it varied the terms of the judgment and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to alter or modify a final judgment. The RTC denied the said motion to quash.

Issue: WON the writ of execution is void

Held: Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious
reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment, upon motion within five years from the date of its entry, or after the lapse of such time and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, by an independent action. Either party can move for the
execution of the decision so long as the decision or any part of it is in favor of the moving party. The rule
on execution of final judgments does not make the filing of the motion for execution exclusive to the
prevailing party.

In the instant case, the Villaruels moved to quash the writ of execution because it allegedly varied the
terms of the judgment. They claimed that the writ directed the sheriff to execute the decision only as
against them, contrary to the dispositive portion of the decision which likewise ordered Solco to pay the
balance of the purchase price. This contention is untenable. Although the portion of the decision ordering
Solco to pay the balance of the contract price was not categorically expressed in the dispositive portion of
the writ of execution, the same was explicitly reiterated in the body of the writ. Villaruels' remedy was not
to move for the quashal of the writ of execution but to move for its modification to include the portion of
the decision which ordered Solco to pay the balance of the contract price.

Under the foregoing rules, a sheriff is under obligation to enforce the execution of a money judgment by
demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment directly to the judgment obligee or his
representative of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. However, if the
judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the rules require the sheriff
to receive the payment which he must turn over within the same day to the clerk of court. If it is not
practicable to deliver the amount to the clerk of court within the same day, the sheriff shall deposit the
amount in a fiduciary account with the nearest government depository bank. The clerk of court then
delivers the amount to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. If the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor.

The Rules do not specify the period within which the sheriffs must implement the writ of execution. When
writs are placed in their hands, it is their mandated ministerial duty, in the absence of any instructions to
the contrary, to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate.
If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after receipt of the writ, they shall report to the
court and state the reason or reasons therefor. They are likewise tasked to make a report to the court
every 30 days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity
expires.

Sheriff Garbanzos served the writ several times on Solco by demanding the immediate payment of the
balance of the purchase price and made the corresponding reports to the trial court of the proceedings
taken thereon. Considering that Solco's obligation to pay is conditioned upon the eviction of all adverse
occupants and removal of all structures found in the subject property, he was justified in not paying the
balance immediately after the May 18 and May 27, 2005 sheriff's demands because the billboard was not
yet removed from the premises. In reciprocal obligations, only when a party has performed his part of the
contract can he demand that the other party also fulfills his own obligation. 38 Assuming all the
obligations of the Villaruels were complied with on June 7, 2005, but Solco still failed to pay his obligation,
sheriff Garbanzos should have levied the properties of the latter to satisfy the judgment as mandated by
the Rules. He should not have waited until August 18, 2005 to institute the garnishment proceedings 39 or
after the Villaruels requested for the "full implementation" of the writ.

Nevertheless, this procedural lapse on the part of the sheriff should not affect the validity of the November
23, 2005 Order of the RTC accepting the MBTC check as full payment of the contract price which was
based on the August 8, 2005 letter of the Villaruels to the clerk of court requesting for the full
implementation of the writ.

Moreover, the fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no moment. Indeed, the Rules
require that in case the judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the
judgment obligor "shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff," who "shall turn over all the
amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court," who in turn shall deliver
the amount to the judgment obligee or his representative in satisfaction of the judgment. However, it
would be defeating the ends of justice to rigidly enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the
payment made directly to the clerk of court just because it was not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty
bound to "turn over all the amounts coming into his possession" to the clerk of court. Rules of procedure
are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided. Besides, payment was made not immediately after the June 7, 2005 demand of the sheriff but
after the Villaruels wrote the clerk of court on August 8, 2005 requesting for the full implementation of the
writ. Considering that there was no chance for Solco to deliver the payment to the respondents or their
representatives, or even to the sheriff, it was only logical for him to make the payment to the clerk of court
who issued the writ of execution.

Hi Yield Realty v CA
Facts: spouses Carawatan, entered into a deed of real estate mortgage with petitioner Hi-Yield Realty,
Inc. Francisco (atty in fact) was the mortgagor and Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. was the mortgagee and the
property of Carawatan was mortgaged as security for the loan. Francisco failed to pay and settle the
amount loaned despite repeated demand by petitioner. Hence, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the property with itself as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale issued in favor of
petitioner was registered on August 13, 1992. Thus, Francisco has a twelve-month redemption period
expiring on August 13, 1993. Private respondent claimed that he offered to redeem the property, but the
petitioner allegedly refused to accept the offer, hence, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court. The
trial court ordered that Francisco should pay the corresponding amount of taxes within thirty days, or on
March 15, 1994. Francisco, however, failed to pay on the scheduled date and instead moved for an
extension of forty-five days within which to pay the redemption price. The Court denied the motion and
recognized the right of petitioner to consolidate the property in its name. On May 26, 1994, Francisco
moved to reconsider the decision of the trial court and offered the amount of P510,000.00 in manager's
check and P38,872.93 in personal check. A complete turn-around of its earlier decision was made by the
court. Thus, the court allowed private respondent to pay the redemption price and petitioner was ordered
to accept the payment offered by Francisco as the full redemption price. After its refusal to accept the
redemption price, petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, which the trial court denied.

Issue: WON the right of redemption may still be exercised beyond the 1 year period

Held: Pursuant to the abovementioned rule, the right of redemption should be exercised within the
specified time limit, which is one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Moreover, the
redemptioner should make an actual tender in good faith of the full amount of the purchase price as
provided above, which means the auction price of the property plus the creditor's other legitimate
expenses like taxes, registration fees, etc.
The rule works well if both parties agree on the amount to be tendered on or before the end of the
redemption period. In this case, however, the parties could not agree on the amount as in fact the private
respondent claimed he twice tried to redeem the property but the petitioner refused — because they could
not agree on the redemption price.

What is the redemptioner's option therefore when the redemption period is about to expire and the
redemption cannot take place on account of disagreement over the redemption price?

According to jurisprudence, the redemptioner faced with such a problem may preserve his right of
redemption through judicial action which in every case must be filed within the one-year period of
redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-
year period. This is a fair interpretation provided the action is filed on time and in good faith, the
redemption price is finally determined and paid within a reasonable time, and the rights of the parties are
respected.

Stated otherwise, the foregoing interpretation, as applied to the case at bar, has three critical dimensions:
(1) timely redemption or redemption by expiration date (or, as what happened in this case, the
redemptioner was forced to resort to judicial action to "freeze" the expiration of the redemption period); (2)
good faith as always, meaning, the filing of the private respondent's action on August 13, 1993
must have been for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price and not to stretch the
redemptive period indefinitely; and (3) once the redemption price is determined within a reasonable
time, the redemptioner must make prompt payment in full.

Conversely, if private respondent had to resort to judicial action to stall the expiration of the redemptive
period on August 13, 1993 because he and the petitioner could not agree on the redemption price which
still had to be determined, private respondent could not thereby be expected to tender payment
simultaneously with the filing of the action on said date.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it resolved to allow private respondent to redeem the property
through its orders dated January 31, 1994 and March 15, 1994. The order dated March 15, 1994 thus
preserved private respondent's right to redeem pending the computation of the taxes to be added to the
total amount of the redemption price.

Private respondent could not be reproached, at least initially, for offering to pay less than the full amount
of the redemption price as the amount of taxes and expenses, at that point, was not yet clearly
determined. Proof of this is the fact that petitioner had to be required by the March 15, 1994 order of the
trial court to submit an updated account of the total capital gains tax and interest added to the purchase
price. Petitioner did not oppose the said order. Instead, on March 17, 1994, it promptly complied with the
directive of the trial court. Which could have only meant that petitioner itself recognized that the
redemption price was uncertain and could not therefore be settled yet at that point.

However, after petitioner, pursuant to the trial court order on March 15, 1994, furnished private
respondent the updated statement of account on March 24, 1994, the latter should have redeemed the
foreclosed property within 15 days, that is, on or before April 8, 1994. The private respondent should have
promptly tendered by then the complete and updated redemption price as computed. "Should the amount
allow redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount already adverted to."

But on April 8, 1994, the deadline set by the trial court, private respondent did not tender any payment.
Instead, he asked for an extension of 45 days because his money was not enough . The trial court was
therefore correct when it denied, on May 4, 1994, private respondent's plea for a 45-day extension for
payment. It was also correct in declaring, in the same order, the right of petitioner to consolidate the
property in its name on account of private respondent's failure to redeem the property on or before April 8,
1994.

Strangely, however, the trial court had a sudden change of heart and reversed itself after private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on May 26, 1994. This is where we draw the line between
the judicious and injudicious use of discretion by the trial court.

On June 13, 1994 and July 16, 1997, it issued two orders which effectively allowed an extension of the
redemptive period and consignation of the redemption price. We raise a quizzical eyebrow, to say the
least.

The trial court resolved to allow private respondent to redeem and pay the redemption price of the
property in the "interest of justice" and on the "ground of equity" way beyond what was reasonable and
contemplated by the law. We cannot upbraid the trial court for sympathizing with private respondent but
this exercise of discretion cannot be allowed to trample upon the other party's rights.

Had private respondent's act of filing a suit for redemption really been in good faith, private respondent
could have at least consigned or deposited what he thought to be the correct amount simultaneously with
the filing of the action to redeem on August 13, 1993 — to show not only good faith but also his intention
and capability of paying in full what he believed to be the reasonable price. But even as he petitioned the
court for the consignation of the redemption price, no actual consignation was made. He instead sought a
45-day extension of the period to pay the redemption price. This was downright reflective of private
respondent's financial inability to redeem from the very start.

Honrado v CA
Facts: the property was sold to Premium, the highest bidder, for the amount of P650,204.10. On May 23,
2001, the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued and annotated at the dorsal portion of the title.
Honrado failed to redeem the property.

In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision declaring the property a family home.

On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155
of the Family Code of the Philippines in Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. It was alleged therein that the
property is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before
he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other real
property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution. 12 Premium opposed the motion
on the ground that Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from claiming the exemption, and
that said claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to redeem the
property. Premium averred that, after the sale at public auction, Honrado and his family even vacated the
property. Honrado re-occupied the property only in April or May 2002. 13 It further averred that the law
does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no showing that its
present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family Code.

Issue: WON a family home is exempted from execution

Held: In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it issued the assailed order. The
petitioner admits to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30
a.m. on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However, he did not bother to object to
the levy and the projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home.
The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale
over the property in favor of the private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after
the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until May
3, 2002, when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the
Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Even then, there was no showing
that, during the hearing of said motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the property
and that it is, indeed, a family home.

Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private
respondent opposed the motion, but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner
never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-
1998-C earlier on April 29, 2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to the
RTC of Quezon City that there was such a case and a decision had already been rendered. The petitioner
has not justified why he concealed such matters for such considerable period of time.

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to
the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be
made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable
time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or
before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority."

Repubic v Antonio
Facts: While the parties were still trying to decide whether a partial compromise agreement or a joint
motion to dismiss should be executed, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the RTC with
the modification that the fair market value of the subject properties should be P1,000 per sq. m. instead of
P1,500 per sq. m. No appeal was taken by either party. Neither did they inform the CA that they had
already entered into a compromise agreement. Hence, the decision attained finality on July 18, 2002.

On October 28, 2002, respondents filed a motion for execution of the final judgment of the CA with
respect to the three parcels of land. In an order, the RTC granted respondents' motion and a writ of
execution was issued Consequently, notices of garnishment were served on the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Lapu-Lapu City Branch which was petitioner's depository bank, for the amount of P6,108,300.
17
On May 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and an urgent ex-parte motion to
lift the garnishment. Both motions were denied by the RTC in an order dated May 21, 2004 on the ground
that, since the deed of absolute sale executed by the parties while the appeal was pending in the CA was
not approved by the latter, the agreement did not bind it and did not moot the decision it promulgated. In
the same order, the RTC ordered the sheriff to implement the writ of execution dated April 24, 2003.

Issue: whether the compromise agreement of the parties constituted res judicata and therefore the June
25, 2002 decision of the CA could not have superseded it
whether or not there was a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment
inequitable

Held: A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to
resolve their differences and thus avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. 28 When it
complies with the requisites and principles of contracts, it becomes a valid agreement which has the force
of law between the parties. 29 It has the effect and authority of res judicata once entered into, even
without judicial approval.

A compromise agreement is a simple contract which is perfected by mere consent. 32 From that moment
of the meeting of the minds of the parties, it becomes binding on them. To be valid, judicial approval is not
required.

When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon
the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is a determination of the controversy and has the
force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of
consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation and coercion. Thus, although a compromise agreement has
the effect and authority of res judicata upon the parties even without judicial approval, no execution may
issue until it has received the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the
terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed.

Corpuz v Sto tomas and OSG

Facts: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.

Issue: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Held: The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read
in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Republic v Gingoyon
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

NATURE OF APPEAL
Dacuital v LM Engineering Corporation
As to the defective verification in the appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies.
After all, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement
is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court or tribunal may order the correction of
the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may thereby be served.

Moreover, no less than the Labor Code directs labor officials to use reasonable means to ascertain the
facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities; while Section 10, Rule VII of
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that technical rules are not binding. Indeed, the
application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of
substantial justice. Thus, the execution of the verification in the appeal memorandum by only two
complainants in behalf of the other complainants also constitute substantial compliance. 32

Exception Sec 1, Rule 41 (a-g) in which cases remedy is by Rule 65

D.M. Ferrer & Associates v UST
Clearly, the NLRC properly took cognizance of the appeal of all the named complainants even though it
was signed by only one of them. While the right to appeal is a statutory and not a natural right, it is
nonetheless an essential part of our judicial system. Courts are, therefore, advised to proceed with
caution, so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. Litigants should have the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of their cause — free, as much as possible, from the constraints of
procedural technicalities. 33 Thus, contrary to respondents' claim, the decision had not attained finality
even as to those who did not sign the appeal memorandum.

Respondent insists that petitioner should have first filed a notice of appeal before the RTC, and the
appeal should have been subsequently denied before recourse to the CA was made. This contention
holds no water.
In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 12 we held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of an action against one of the parties while the main case
is still pending. This is the general rule in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 1 (g). In that case, ruled thus:
Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari from the Order of the RTC
dismissing the complaint against respondent. While Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the
case, it also provides several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final
order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In the foregoing instances, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent is a final order
because it terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since
the case involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint against
Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by petitioner
before the CA was proper and the CA erred in dismissing the petition.

FRESH PERIOD
Neypes vs CA
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal — the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1,
1998 order dismissing the MR?

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners
did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day
left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however,
argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final
order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In
those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine
the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant
be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as
a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.

Discretionary Petition for Review

Ong v Tating
Ong is correct in arguing that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals available to the Tatings from
the adverse judgment of the CFI in the action of certiorari and prohibition instituted by him, was not by
"petition for review" under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, but an ordinary appeal (by writ of error) under
Rule 41, Rules of Court and Section 39, of B.P. Blg. 129 (also, Section 20 of the Interim Rules) A "petition
for review" is the correct mode of appeal from a judgment rendered by a RTC in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, i.e., when it decides a case appealed to it from the inferior court. In such a case,
the appeal is not a matter of right, its acceptance being discretionary on the Court of Appeals, which
"may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed." On the other hand, when a RTC adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the correct mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by
writ of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal — except only if the appeal is taken in
special proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which event
the filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely
questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder) specified in
Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, the appeal to the Supreme Court is by ordinary
appeal on both questions of fact and law. In cases where the death penalty is imposed, there is an
automatic review by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The mode by which the Tatings thus brought up to the Court of Appeals the adverse judgment of the CFI
— i.e., by petition for review — was erroneous. This aspect of the case apparently escaped the Appellate
Court's attention; it did not treat of it at all. This is however of no moment. The need of finally resolve
this case makes this defect inconsequential. In any event, the defect has been waived, no issue
concerning it having been raised in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

QUESTIONS OF LAW
UMC v Velasco
Cheesman vs IAC
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. As everyone knows or
ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as
conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. The creation
of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of
examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the
reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the
factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions, none
of which however obtains in the case at bar.

It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same
conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and
determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately
proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially
impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her
marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman
was the sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact will not be
here disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in his
appeal. They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him. As to
them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions.
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule
38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the petition to
appeal from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as
a waiver of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on
appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to
the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his
right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has made of
record "the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his
grounds therefor."

APPEAL TO SC NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT

Sumbingco v CA
It is axiomatic that appeals from the Court of Appeals are not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion on the part of this Court, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. 1 In other words, appeals from the Court of Appeals are not entertained as a matter of
routine; they may be rejected out of hand in the exercise of this Court's sound judicial discretion. The
prescribed mode of appeal is by certiorari, 2 limited only to issues or questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth in the petition for review on certiorari. 3 The findings of fact of the Appellate Court
are conclusive even on this Court, subject only to a few well defined exceptions (none of which is
present in the instant case). 4 It is incumbent on the appellant to make out a sufficiently strong
demonstration of serious error on the part of the Court of Appeals, and adduced special and important
reasons to justify the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction, 5 failing in which
this Court will decline to wield its invoked power of review and will dismiss the appeal on the ground
that it is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
New York Marine v CA
This petition alleges that the Court of Appeals acted whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding that petitioner's complaint was fatally defective for failing to
allege its duly authorized representative or resident agent in the Philippines. Petitioner argues that there
is no law, substantive or procedural, that requires a foreign corporation engaged only in an isolated
transaction to appoint a duly authorized representative or a resident agent in the Philippines before it
can sue locally. cdtai

The proper remedy available to petitioner from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Mere errors of judgment cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.
Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision — not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision — the same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari. Erroneous findings and conclusions do not render the appellate court vulnerable to
the corrective writ of certiorari. For where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
not correct, they would, at most, constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.

Macawiwili Gold Mining and Devt Co v CA

Thus, judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated
to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises
only questions of law.

This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, §2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which distinguishes
the different modes of appeal from Judgments of regional trial courts as follows:

Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court to Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals, whether the appellant
raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

The rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be
summarized as follows:

(1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:

(a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law,
by filing a mere notice of appeal.

(b) Supreme Court — where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

(2) Appellate Jurisdiction

All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law,
shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.

The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of law
or of fact.

[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a
question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts.

Land Bank of the Philippines v Ramos

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact
is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 18 HCITDc

In this case, petitioner's appeal did not raise only questions of law but also questions of fact. Petitioner
assailed not just the trial court's alleged error in applying the law on the nature of relation of the parties,
particularly on the rights of DPWH to request withholding of release of payment and of petitioner as
depositary bank to comply with such request, but also on the factual basis for the grant of damages
(litigation and attorney's fees) in favor of respondent. The discretion of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture.

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Onate vs. Abrogar (1994)
Petitioners initially argue that respondent Judge erred in granting Sun Life's prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment on the ground that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over them. This
argument is clearly unavailing since it is well-settled that a writ of preliminary attachment may be validly
applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from. The rationale behind
this rule was stated by the Court in this wise:

"A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy
in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of
which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
"Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy 'at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter.' The phrase 'at the commencement of the action,' obviously refers to the date of the filing of
the complaint — which, as abovepointed out, is the date that marks 'the commencement of the action;'
and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced —
by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may
apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid
down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the
defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff
or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other
appropriate pleading (counterclaim cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the
writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form
and substance.

Petitioners then contend that the writ should have been discharged since the ground on which it was
issued — fraud in contracting the obligation — was not present. This cannot be considered a ground for
lifting the writ since this delves into the very complaint of the Sun Life. As this Court stated in Cuatro v.
Court of Appeals: 4

"Moreover, an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is
upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action in the main case since an
anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a
mere hearing of the motion (Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, supra, The
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. (Solidbank) vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).
"In the present case, one of the allegation in petitioner's complaint below is that the defendant spouses
induced the plaintiff to grant the loan by issuing postdated checks to cover the installment payments
and a separate set of postdated checks for payment of the stipulated interest (Annex "B"). The issue of
fraud, then, is clearly within the competence of the lower court in the main action.
The fact that a criminal complaint for estafa filed by Sun Life against the petitioners was dismissed by
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for Makati on April 21, 1992 and was upheld by the Provincial
Prosecutor on July 13, 1992 is of no moment since the same can be indicative only of the absence of
criminal liability, but not of civil liability. Besides, Sun Life had elevated the case for review to the
Department of Justice, where the case is presently pending.

Finally, petitioners argue that the enforcement of the writ was invalid since it undisputedly preceded the
actual service of summons by six days at most. Petitioners cite the decisions in Sievert vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. and BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., wherein this Court
held that enforcement of the writ of attachment can not bind the defendant in view of the failure of the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant through either summons or his voluntary
appearance.

We do not agree entirely with petitioners. True, this Court had held in a recent decision that the
enforcement of writ of attachment may not validly be effected until and unless proceeded or
contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons.

But we must distinguish the case at bar from the Sievert and BAC Manufacturing cases. In those two
cases, summons was never served upon the defendants. The plaintiffs therein did not even attempt to
cause service of summons upon the defendants, right up to the time the cases went up to this Court.
This is not true in the case at bar. The records reveal that Sheriff Flores and Sun Life did attempt a
contemporaneous service of both summons and the writ of attachment on January 3, 1992, but were
stymied by the absence of a responsible officer in petitioners' offices. Note is taken of the fact that
petitioners Oñate and Econ Holdings admitted in their answer that the offices of both Brunner
Development Corporation and Econ Holdings were located at the same address and that petitioner
Oñate is the President of Econ Holdings while petitioner Diño is the President of Brunner Development
Corporation as well as a stockholder and director of Econ Holdings.

Thus, an exception to the established rule on the enforcement of the writ of attachment can be made
where a previous attempt to serve the summons and the writ of attachment failed due to factors
beyond the control of either the plaintiff or the process server, provided that such service is effected
within a reasonable period thereafter.

Several reasons can be given for the exception. First, there is a possibility that a defendant, having been
alerted of plaintiff's action by the attempted service of summons and the writ of attachment, would put
his properties beyond the reach of the plaintiff while the latter is trying to serve the summons and the
writ anew. By the time the plaintiff may have caused the service of summons and the writ, there might
not be any property of the defendant left to attach.

Second, the court eventually acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners six days later. To nullify the
notices of garnishment issued prior thereto would again open the possibility that petitioners would
transfer the garnished monies while Sun Life applied for new notices of garnishment.

Third, the ease by which a writ of attachment can be obtained is counter-balanced by the ease by which
the same can be discharged: the defendant can either make a cash deposit or post a counter-bond
equivalent to the value of the property attached. The petitioners herein tried to have the writ of
attachment discharged by posting a counter-bond, the same was denied by respondent Judge on the
ground that the amount of the counter-bond was less than that of Sun Life's bond.

Davao light & power vs CA (1991)

The question is whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary
submission to the Court's authority.

The Court rules that the question must be answered in the affirmative and that consequently, the
petition for review will have to be granted.

An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that
act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is invoked
or called into activity; and it is thus that the court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature
of the action. And it is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or
other appropriate pleading) — by which he signifies his submission to the court's power and authority —
that jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is obtained, as above stated, by the service of summons or other coercive process
upon him or by his voluntary submission to the authority of the court.

The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the
complaint is filed, summons issues to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff,
and finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant in any of the ways authorized by the
Rules of Court. There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of
the complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant. During this period, different acts
may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are of unquestionable validity and propriety. Among
these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to the plaintiff to
prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of
right without leave of court, authorization by the Court of service of summons by publication, the
dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.

This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary
injunction, receivership or replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted even
before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

In Toledo v. Burgos, 19 this Court ruled that a hearing on a motion or application for preliminary
attachment is not generally necessary unless otherwise directed by the Trial Court in its discretion. 20
And in Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, 21 the Court declared that "(n)othing in the Rules of Court
makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ of
attachment." The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon consideration of "the affidavit of
the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action
exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . . (Rule 57), that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or
the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for
which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims." If the court be so satisfied, the
"order of attachment shall be granted," and the writ shall issue upon the applicant's posting of a bond
executed to the adverse party in an amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the plaintiff's claim,
conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto."

Withal, ample modes of recourse against a preliminary attachment are secured by law to the defendant.
The relative ease with which a preliminary attachment may be obtained is matched and paralleled by
the relative facility with which the attachment may legitimately be prevented or frustrated. These
modes of recourse against preliminary attachments granted by Rule 57 were discussed at some length
by the separate opinion in Mindanao Savings & Loans Asso. Inc. v. C.A., supra.

That separate opinion stressed that there are two (2) ways of discharging an attachment: first, by the
posting of a counterbond; and second, by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.

1.0. The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious mode of lifting an attachment already enforced
against property, or even of preventing its enforcement altogether.
1.1. When property has already been seized under attachment, the attachment may be discharged upon
counterbond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57.
1.2. But even before actual levy on property, seizure under attachment may be prevented also upon
counterbond. The defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking the discharge of
the attachment by a counterbond. This is made possible by Section 5 of Rule 57.
2.0. Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary attachment may also be lifted or discharged on
the ground that it has been irregularly or improperly issued, in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 57.
Like the first, this second mode of lifting an attachment may be resorted to even before any property
has been levied on. Indeed, it may be availed of after property has been released from a levy on
attachment, as is made clear by said Section 13.

This is so because "(a)s pointed out in Calderon v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 531 (1987), 'The attachment debtor
cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing
himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the filing of a
counterbond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the
attaching creditor instead of the other way, which, in most instances . . . would require presentation of
evidence in a fullblown trial on the merits, and cannot easily be settled in a pending incident of the
case.'"

It may not be amiss to here reiterate other related principles dealt with in Mindanao Savings & Loans
Asso. Inc. v. C.A., supra., 28 to wit:

(a) When an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance:

". . . (W)hen the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of actionthe reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ
would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action
would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. Therefore, when the
writ of attachment is of this nature, the only way it can be dissolved is by a counterbond (G.B. Inc. v.
Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886)."

(b) Effect of the dissolution of a preliminary attachment on the plaintiff's attachment bond:
". . . The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given, or a showing of its irregular or
improper issuance, does not of course operate to discharge the sureties on plaintiff's own attachment
bond. The reason is simple. That bond is 'executed to the adverse party, . . . conditioned that the . . .
(applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not
entitled thereto' (SEC. 4, Rule 57). Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's
entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot be withdrawn."

With respect to the other provisional remedies, i.e., preliminary injunction (Rule 58), receivership (Rule
59), replevin or delivery of personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also issue ex
parte.

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, and however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not
and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the court's authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy
of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required
by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicitly directed by Section 3,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the
defendant of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
grounds therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the
posting of a counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to Section
5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the
grounds set forth in Rule 16, or demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.

For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of
attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites
therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on
the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued
may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service on the
defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any),
the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the
order of attachment, and the plaintiff's attachment bond.

Sievert vs CA (1988)
Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching
party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A court
which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind that defendant whether
in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings. The service of a petition
for preliminary attachment without the prior or simultaneous service of summons and a copy of the
complaint in the main case — and that is what happened in this case — does not of course confer
jurisdiction upon the issuing court over the person of the defendant.

Ordinarily, the prayer in a petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied or incorporated in
the main complaint itself as one of the forms of relief sought in such complaint. Thus, valid service of
summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant
both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment. In such case,
notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in attachment. Where,
however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading, such
petition must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main
complaint, or after jurisdiction over the defendant has already been acquired by such service of
summons. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Put a little
differently, jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment proceeding is
ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae in the main action against the defendant. If
a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant in the principal
action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or his
property.
It is basic that the requirements of the Rules of Court for issuance of preliminary attachment must be
strictly and faithfully complied with in view of the nature of this provisional remedy

In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main case against the
defendant is quite clear. It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the complaint
nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had in this case. Yet, the trial court proceeded to
hear the petition for issuance of the writ. This is reversible error and must be corrected on certiorari.

Carlos vs Sandoval (2005)

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035 are concerned with the award of damages on the
attachment bond. They may be treated separately from the petition in G.R. No. 137743, which relates to
the immediate execution of the said award.

We consolidate the main issues in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035, as follows: (1) whether the assailed
judgment on the attachment bond could have been rendered, as it was, prior to the adjudication of the
main case; (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly complied with the hearing requirement under
Section 20, Rule 57 prior to its judgment on the attachment bond; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals
properly ascertained the amount of damages it awarded in the judgment on the attachment bond.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was
issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in
the appellate court with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow
the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.

Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from
recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching obligee
not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully
satisfy the award. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 20 essentially allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes
executory. It should be filed in the same case that is the main action, and cannot be instituted
separately. It should be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the
application. The remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination
of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the court, the claimant loses
his right to damages.

"Such Damages May Be Awarded

Only After Proper Hearing. . . ."
Section 20 of Rule 57 requires that there be a "proper hearing" before the application for damages on
the attachment bond may be granted. The hearing requirement ties with the indispensable demand of
procedural due process. Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting
the applicant's right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is essential. No judgment for
damages may be entered and executed against the surety without giving it an opportunity to be heard
as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ.

From this pronouncement, we can discern that the "proper hearing" contemplated would not merely
encompass the right of the parties to submit their respective positions, but also to present evidence in
support of their claims, and to rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party. This is
especially crucial considering that the necessary elements to be established in an application for
damages are essentially factual: namely, the fact of damage or injury, and the quantifiable amount of
damages sustained. Such matters cannot be established on the mere say-so of the applicant, but require
evidentiary support. At the same time, there was no equivocal statement from the Court in Peroxide
that the hearing required under the rule should be a full-blown hearing on the merits

In this case, we rule that the demands of a "proper hearing" were satisfied as of the time the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed judgment on the attachment bond. The circumstances in this case that we
consider particularly telling are the settled premises that the judicial finding on the wrongfulness of the
attachment was then already conclusive and beyond review, and that the amount of actual damages
sustained was likewise indubitable as it indeed could be found in the official case record in CA-G.R. CV
No. 53229. As a result, petitioners would have been precluded from either raising the defenses that the
preliminary attachment was valid or disputing the amount of actual damages sustained by reason of the
garnishment. The only matter of controversy that could be litigable through the traditional hearing
would be the matter of moral and exemplary damages, but the Court of Appeals appropriately chose not
to award such damages.

Moreover, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to counter the arguments extended by the
respondents. They fully availed of that right by submitting their respective comments/oppositions. In
fine, the due process guarantee has been satisfied in this case.

It should be noted that this case poses a situation different from what is normally contemplated under
Section 20, Rule 57 — wherein the very wrongfulness of the attachment remains one of the issues in
contention in the main case. In such a case, there would be a greater demand for a more extensive
hearing on the application of damages. The modality of hearing should remain within the discretion of
the court having jurisdiction to hear the application for damages. The only demand, concordant to due
process, would be the satisfaction of the right to be heard, to present evidence, and to rebut the
evidence and arguments of the opposing party.
Some disquisition is necessary on whether or not, as petitioners submit, a full-blown hearing in open
court is compulsory under Section 20, Rule 57. To impose this as a mandatory requirement would
ultimately prove too onerous to our judicial system. Perhaps such a demand would be less burdensome
on the regional trial courts, which, as a matter of routine, receive testimonial or documentary evidence
offered de novo, and to formulate conclusions on the admissibility and credibility of the same.

However, a different situation applies if it is the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court before which the
application for damages is filed. Both these courts, which are capacitated to receive and act on such
actions, are generally not triers of facts, and do not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. It is
partly for such reason that Section 20, Rule 57 authorizes these appellate courts to refer the application
for damages to the trial court for hearing and decision. The trial courts are functionally attuned to
ascertain and evaluate at the first instance the necessary factual premises that would establish the right
to damages. Still, reference of the application for damages to the trial court is discretionary on the part
of the appellate courts. The latter, despite their traditional appellate jurisdiction and review function,
are still empowered under Section 20 to rule on the application for damages, notwithstanding the
factual dimension such question presents.

To impose as mandatory on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to hear the application for
damages through full-blown hearings in open court is supremely unwise and beyond the demands of
Section 20, Rule 57. The effect would be unduly disruptive on the daily workflow of appellate courts
such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, which rarely conduct open court hearings. Neither
could the Court see what is so markedly special about an application for damages, fact-oriented as it
may be, that would require it to be heard by the appellate courts in open court when no such
mandatory rule applies to other judicial matters for resolution that are also factual in nature.

". . . And Shall be Included in the

Judgment on the Main Case"
Section 20, Rule 57 does state that the award of damages shall be included in the judgment on the main
case, and seemingly indicates that it should not be rendered prior to the adjudication of the main case.

The language used in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure leaves no doubt that there is no
longer need for a favorable judgment in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued in order
that damages may be awarded. It is indubitable that even a party who loses the action in main but is
able to establish a right to damages by reason of improper, irregular, or excessive attachment may be
entitled to damages. This bolsters the notion that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful
attachment may arise and be decided separately from the merits of the main action. As noted by the
Court in Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals.

Moreover, a separate rule — Section 8, Rule 58 — covers instances when it is the trial court that awards
damages upon the bond for preliminary injunction of the adverse party. Tellingly, it requires that the
amount of damages to be awarded be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure
prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.

In this case, we are confronted with a situation wherein the determination that the attachment was
wrongful did not come from the trial court, or any court having jurisdiction over the main action. It was
rendered by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction in the original action
reviewing the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the private
respondents. Said ruling attained finality when it was affirmed by this Court.

The courts are thus bound to respect the conclusiveness of this final judgment, deeming as it does the
allowance by the RTC of preliminary attachment as improper. This conclusion is no longer subject to
review, even by the court called upon to resolve the application for damages on the attachment bond.
The only matter left for adjudication is the proper amount of damages.

Nevertheless, Section 20, Rule 57 explicitly provides that the award for damages be included in the
judgment on the main case. This point was apparently not lost on the Court of Appeals when it rendered
its Resolution dated 23 March 1998, certifying that the case may now be referred to the Raffle
Committee for assignment to a ponente. The appellate court stated therein: "The Resolution of
defendants-appellants' motion for judgment on the attachment may be incorporated in the decision by
the ponente for study and report," 53 and such observation is in conformity with Section 20.

However, this reasoning was assailed by respondents, who argued that the motion for judgment on the
attachment bond was a pending incident that should be decided before the case can be re-raffled to a
ponente for decision. Respondents may be generally correct on the point that a case can only be
deemed submitted for decision only after all pending incidents are resolved. Yet since Section 20, Rule
57 provides that their application for damages on the attachment bond "shall be included in the
judgment on the main case," it is clear that the award for damages need not be resolved before the case
is submitted for decision, but should instead be resolved and included in the judgment on the main case,
or the decision on the Appeal by Certiorari filed by the respondents.

Thus, the action of the Court of Appeals in resolving the application for damages even before the main
judgment was issued does not conform to Section 20, Rule 57. However, the special particular
circumstances of this case lead us to rule that such error is not mortal to the award of damages.

As noted earlier, the award of damages was made after a proper hearing had occurred wherein all the
concerned parties had been given the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in support
and in rebuttal of the application for damages. The premature award of damages does not negate the
fact that the parties were accorded due process, and indeed availed of their right to be heard.

Moreover, we are compelled to appreciate the particular circumstance in this case that the right of
private respondents to acquire relief through the award of damages on account of the wrongful
preliminary attachment has been conclusively affirmed by the highest court of the land. This differs from
the normal situation under Section 20, Rule 57 wherein the court having jurisdiction over the main
action is still required to ascertain whether the applicant actually has a right to damages. To mandatorily
require that the award of damages be included in the judgment in the main case makes all the sense if
the right to damages would be ascertained at the same time the main judgment is made. However,
when the said right is already made viable by reason of a final judgment which is no longer subject to
review, there should be no unnecessary impediments to its immediate implementation.

And finally, any ruling on our part voiding the award of damages solely for the reason that it was not
included in the judgment on the main case, and remanding the motion to the Court of Appeals for
proper adjudication together with the main case may exhibit fealty to the letter of the procedural rule,
but not its avowed aims of promoting a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding.
After all, if we were to compel the Court of Appeals to decide again on the application for damages and
incorporate its ruling in the judgment on the main action, the appellate court will be examining exactly
the same evidence and applying exactly the same rules as it already did when it issued the assailed
resolution awarding damages on the bond. This would be unnecessarily redundant especially
considering that the Supreme Court had already affirmed that there was wrongful attachment in this
case.

There is also the fact that remanding the question of damages, singly for the purpose of adhering to the
letter of the procedural rule, would further prolong the resolution of the main case, which has been with
the Court of Appeals for more than nine years now. Our Rules of Court precisely requires liberal
construction of the procedural rules to promote the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. 55 With this precept, all the more justification is supplied for
allowing the award for damages despite its apparent prematurity, if it is in all other respects proper.

Scope of Damages
Properly Awardable
Next, we examine the particular award of damages made in this case, consisting of P15,384,509.98, plus
interest, as well as P1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees. There seems to be no dispute that the former
amount constituted the amount drawn against the account of Sandoval by reason of the writ of
execution issued by the trial court on 27 May 1996. This fact was confirmed by the PNB, in its
Manifestation dated 19 July 1996, confirming the garnishment.

The case Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is instructive. It discusses the scope of the bond
executed by upon an application for preliminary injunction, which similarly covers "all damages which
[may be] sustain[ed] by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto." The surety in that case claimed that it could
be liable "only to the amount of damages accruing from the time the injunction bond was issued until
the termination of the case, and not from the time the suit was commenced." In rebutting this claim, the
Court ruled:

. . . . Rule 58, Section 4(b), provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. This Court already had occasion to rule on
this matter in Mendoza v. Cruz, where it held that "(t)he injunction bond is intended as a security for
damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. It is designed to
cover all damages which the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its principal purpose is to protect the
enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of an injunction." No distinction was made as to when
the damages should have been incurred.

Our ruling in Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, relied upon by the Court of Appeals,
squarely applies to this case:

Under the circumstances, too, there can be no gainsaying the surety's full awareness of its undertakings
under its bond: that, as the law puts it: "the plaintiff will pay all costs which may be adjudged to the
defendant(s), and all damages which may be sustained by reason of the attachment, if the same shall
finally be adjudged to have been wrongful and without cause," and that those damages plainly
comprehended not only those sustained during the trial of the action but also those during the
pendency of the appeal. This is the law, and this is how the surety's liability should be understood. The
surety's liability may be enforced whether the application for damages for wrongful attachment be
submitted in the original proceedings before the Trial Court, or on appeal, so long as the judgment has
not become executory. The surety's liability is not and cannot be limited to the damages caused by the
improper attachment only during the pendency of the appeal. That would be absurd. The plain and
patent intendment of the law is that the surety shall answer for all damages that the party may suffer as
a result of the illicit attachment, for all the time that the attachment was in force; from levy to
dissolution. . . .

The fact that the second paragraph of the rule speaks only of "damages sustained during the pendency
of the appeal" is of no moment; it obviously proceeds from the assumption in the first paragraph that
the award for the damages suffered during the pendency of the case in the trial court was in fact
"included in the final judgment" (or applied for therein before the appeal was perfected or the judgment
became executory); hence, it states that the damages additionally suffered thereafter, i.e., during the
pendency of the appeal, should be claimed before the judgment of the appellate tribunal becomes
executory. It however bears repeating that where, as in the case at bar, the judgment of the Trial Court
has expressly or impliedly sustained the attachment and thus has given rise to no occasion to speak of,
much less, file an application for damages for wrongful attachment, and it is only in the decision of the
Court of Appeals that the attachment is declared wrongful and that the applicant "was not entitled
thereto," the rule is, as it should be, that it is entirely proper at this time for the application for damages
for such wrongful attachment to be filed — i.e., for all the damages sustained thereby, during all the
time that it was in force, not only during the pendency of the appeal. . . . 68

The rule is thus well-settled that the bond issued upon an application for preliminary attachment
answers for all damages, incurred at whatever stage, which are sustained by reason of the attachment.
The award of actual damages by the Court of Appeals is thus proper in amount. However, we disagree
that the rate of legal interest be counted from the date of the "unlawful garnishment," or on 27 June
1996. Properly, interest should start to accrue only from the moment it had been finally determined that
the attachment was unlawful, since it is on that basis that the right to damages comes to existence. In
this case, legal interest commences from the date the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39267
became final, by reason of its affirmation by this Court.

Other Issues Raised in G.R. No. 135830

It is clear that under Section 20, Rule 57, the application for damages on the attachment bond cannot be
independently set up, but must be filed in the main case, before the judgment therein becomes final
and executory. Santo Tomas squarely applies in determining that no certification against forum-
shopping was required in the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond. The same reasoning also
sustains a ruling that neither legal fees were required for the filing of the said motion. Section 1, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court provides that legal fees are prescribed upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding. Since the said application for judgment on the
attachment bond cannot be considered as an initiatory pleading, as it cannot be independently set up
from the main action, it is not likewise chargeable with legal fees.

As to the issue relating to the other Resolution dated 26 June 1998 denying the motion to dismiss appeal
on the ground of forum-shopping, we find Carlos's arguments as unmeritorious. Forum-shopping
allegedly existed because petitioners had filed two cases before the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. CV No.
53229, and the Petition for Certiorari with Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 June 1996 attacking the
allowance of execution pending appeal. Evidently, the two causes of action in these two petitions are
different, CA-G.R. CV No. 53229 being an appeal from the Summary Judgment rendered by the RTC, and
the second petition assailing the subsequent allowance by the RTC of execution pending appeal. There is
no identity between these two causes of action that would warrant a finding of forum-shopping.

Issues Raised in G.R. No. 137743

To recount, respondents, having obtained a favorable decision on their Motion for Judgment on the
Attachment Bond, filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of the award of damages. This was granted by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 16 October 1998, said resolution now specifically assailed by
SIDDCOR in G.R. No. 137743.

In their Motion for Immediate Execution, respondents' theory in seeking the immediate execution of the
award of damages was that said award was not subject to appeal, the ruling thereupon being an
interlocutory order. This position was not adopted by the Court of Appeals in its 16 October 1998
Resolution, which was otherwise favorably disposed to respondents. Instead, the Court of Appeals
predicated the immediate execution on the following grounds: (1) that the judicial finding that the writ
of preliminary attachment was wrongful was already final and beyond review; (2) there were no
material and substantial defenses against the motion for the issuance of the judgment bond; (3)
Sandoval was elderly and sickly, without means of livelihood and may not be able to enjoy the fruits of
the judgment on the attachment bond; (4) that immediate execution would end her suffering caused by
the arbitrary garnishment of her PNB account.

There is no doubt that a judgment on the attachment bond is a final and appealable order. As stated
earlier, it is, under normal course, included in the main judgment, which in turn is final and appealable.
Respondents admit that they had erred in earlier characterizing the said judgment as an interlocutory
order. Still, SIDDCOR argues that such earlier error is fatal, and that the Court of Appeals abused its
discretion in ruling on the motion on a theory different from that urged on by respondents.

Spouses Yu vs Ngo Yet Te

To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant
must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount
thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on
specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers
unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by independent
evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.

Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing standards. They point to the lists
of their daily net income from the operation of said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs issued to
their passengers. They also cite unused ticket stubs as proof of income foregone when the bus was
wrongfully seized. They further cite the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that, in the day-to-day
operation of their passenger bus, they use up at least three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily
income of P1,500.00.

In ruling that Spouses Yu failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their counterclaim for actual
damages, the CA stated, thus:

In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on
supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and
unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus and the
average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports
regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount
of actual damages were presented. Thus, the Court a quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor
of defendants-appellants.

Spouses Yu's claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00 per day was based on their computation of their
average daily income for the year 1992. Said computation in turn is based on the value of three ticket
stubs sold over only five separate days in 1992. By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket
sales for five days sufficient evidence of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its
mean income. Not even the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for
the testimony itself lacks corroboration.

Besides, based on the August 29, 1994 Manifestation filed by Sheriff Alimurung, it would appear that
long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93, the
same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case and
that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation, Cebu City. Thus, Spouses Yu cannot
complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the
subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93. Nor can they also attribute to the
wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus.

Moreover, petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the
wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11.

Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties
were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained. Hence, an
award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.

As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful
attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a
false affidavit to his application.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Bacolod City Water District vs Labayen
Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain
from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident
in the main action.

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a
judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until
the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date
of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction
is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken
by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the
temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.

Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining order
granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court
merely ordered "the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop,
desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on
March 1, 2000" without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining
order to a preliminary injunction.

The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix a
period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-
permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period
provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission
to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that
hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of
this omission by respondent trial court.

China Banking vs Co (2008)

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners must establish the following
requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of
the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the
status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or
dispute. When the complainant's right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right
and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

. . . The ocular inspection showed that [petitioners] will not lose access to their residences. As a matter
of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as an access road to their residences and there is an existing
secondary road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access road to the highway. 29
With respect to the blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps. Castro, suffice it to state
that they are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of the defendants is situated on
the left side of the garage and its front entrance is still open and freely accessible,
and the absence of a showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
Estares vs CA
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not
deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their
own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was
secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.

Rosenda's testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary injunction. She admitted
that: they did not question PLCC in writing why they only received P637,000.00; they did not question
the figures appearing in the Statement of Account when they received it; and, when they received
PLCC's demand letter, they went to the former's office not to question the loan's terms and conditions
but merely to request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. She acknowledged that they
only raised the alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount received, as well as the blank
documents which they allegedly signed, after PLCC initiated the foreclosure proceedings.

It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination. As such, a trial court's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses
its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its
determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper
factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or
misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.

In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that they have a right protected and that
the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. Hence, the Court of Appeals
did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioners' petition for certiorari.

Buyco vs Baraquia (2009)

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the
status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon
respondent's showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject
road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of
right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence, the
writ was lifted.
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the
appeal therefrom notwithstanding.

Unionbank v. Court of Appeals 13 enlightens:

". . . a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction,"
regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case
or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken
from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence
the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the
action." (italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The lower court's citation of Lee v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the present case, the
original complaint for specific performance and cancellation of real estate mortgage was not yet decided
on the merits by the lower court. Thus, the preliminary injunction therein issued subsisted pending
appeal of an incident.
There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondent's favor, the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.

Heirs of the late JBL Reyes vs CA

The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction is but a
mere incident to the actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the
parties in this case over the disputed premises. In order to determine whether private respondents are
entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of
discord.

Due to the fatal infirmity in the City's exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for
expropriation must necessarily fail. Considering that the consolidated cases before us can be completely
resolved by the application of our Filstream ruling, it is needless to discuss the constitutionality of
Ordinance 7818. We herein apply the general precept that constitutional issues will not be passed upon
if the case can be decided on other grounds.

In view of the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation and the favorable adjudication of petitioners'
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals on the expropriation of the subject properties, the
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the Court of Appeals resolutions (allowing respondent
occupants to intervene and granting their motion to enjoin the execution of the executory judgments in
the ejectment cases) becomes moot and academic.

Brocka vs Enrile
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other
issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting
to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
action
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied

In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention
(before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28,
1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release).
Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
(outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy
also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely
presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).

The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found
petitioner's plight "deplorable".The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal
charges against Brocka, et al.
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal
charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until
such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,
charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

Medina vs Greenfield Development

Hence, petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the
properties subject of the present dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on
the parties' allegations in their respective pleadings and the documents attached thereto. We have on
one hand, petitioners' bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties sold by their
predecessors to respondent, and on the other, respondent's claim of ownership supported by deeds of
conveyances and torrens titles in their favor. From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the
complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should not have relied on respondent's allegations
regarding the circumstances surrounding the sales and the transfer of the titles. Petitioners point out
that trial on the merits of the case is still ongoing and respondent is yet to adduce evidence in support of
its contention. The same, however, applies to petitioners' cause of action. They only have their own
allegations and are yet to prove their claim. And as stated earlier, the only bases from which the
propriety of the injunction can be determined are their respective pleadings and documents. What tilt
the balance in respondent's favor are the notarized documents and the titles to the properties. The well-
settled rule is that a document acknowledged before a notary public enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To overcome this presumption, there
must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must
be upheld. In addition, the titles in the name of respondent, having been registered under the Torrens
system, are generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein, and a
strong presumption exists that the titles are regularly issued and valid. Therefore, until and unless
petitioners show that the documents are indeed spurious and the titles invalid, then the presumptions
must prevail at this juncture.
Petitioners, however, argue that the presumption of validity of the notarized documents and titles
cannot be applied in respondent's case as it is not an innocent purchaser . According to petitioners,
respondent is fully aware that at the time that the Contract to Sell was entered into in 1962, Leon
Medina who is a co-owner of the property then covered by TCT No. 21314, was already dead. Suffice it
to say that these arguments already involve the merits of the main case pending before the trial court,
which should not even be preliminarily dealt with, as it would be premature.
Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, which in
effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. The ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt over the acquisition of the properties by
respondent. Such basis would be virtually recognizing petitioners' claim that the deeds of conveyances
and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of
validity in favor of these documents. There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a
reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners
are inceptively duty bound to prove.

RECEIVERSHIP
National Investment and Development Corp v Judge Aquino
Moreover, the prevention of imminent danger to property is the guiding principle that governs courts in
the matter of appointing receivers. Under Sec. 1 (b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, it is necessary in
granting the relief of receivership that the property or fund be in danger of loss, removal or material
injury.
In the case at bar, Batjak in its petition for receivership, or in its amended petition therefor, failed to
present any evidence to establish the requisite condition that the property is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured unless a receiver is appointed to guard and preserve it.

Traders Royal Bank vs IAC

Nobody questions the right of TRB to receive compensation. Section 8, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court,
however, explicitly provides for the manner in which it shall be paid for its services, to wit:
"SEC. 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver. — Whenever the court, of its own
motion or on that of either party, shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists, it
shall, after due notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the
delivery of the funds and other property in his hands to the persons adjudged entitled to receive them,
and order the discharge of the receiver from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such
reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs against the
defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires." (Emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, clear that when the services of a receiver who has been properly appointed terminates,
his compensation is to be charged against the defeated party, or the prevailing litigant may be made to
share the expense, as justice requires. Consequently, the trial court's order approving TRB's
compensation to be charged solely against the funds under its receivership is without legal justification;
hence, it was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals.

REPLEVIN
Yang vs Valdez
Petitioner Yang now argues before us that, firstly, respondent judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the replevin bond of respondent
spouses. It is contended by petitioner that replevin bond was merely an undertaking of the bondsmen
Milagros Morante and Atty. Calonzo to pay the sum of P560,000.00, that no tangible security, such as
"cash, property or surety," was placed thereby at the disposal and custody of the court. It is argued,
secondly, that the replevin bond was defective considering that it had been filed by only one of the two
(2) private respondents and that the bondsmen thereon had failed by its terms to undertake to return
the cargo trucks to petitioner should he (the petitioner) be adjudged lawful owner thereof.
We are not persuaded by petitioner's arguments.
A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or
undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. It is not indispensably necessary, however, that the
obligation of the bond be secured or supported by cash or personal property or real property or the
obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. Most generally understood, a "bond" is an
obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee under specified
conditions. At common law, a bond was merely a written obligation under seal. A bond is often, as a
commercial matter, secured by a mortgage on real property; the mortgagee may be the obligee,
although the mortgagee may also be a third party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the
principal obligor under the bond.
The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must
approve the bond. In the case at bar, the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses was
properly secured by the sureties themselves who declared their solvency and capacity to answer for the
undertaking assumed, through an Affidavit of Justification
The above sworn declaration of solvency which was submitted to the judge together with the bond, in
effect secured the replevin bond. We note also that the sureties or bondsmen under the bond included
not only Milagros Morante who was party-plaintiff below, but also a third person, Atty. Bayani L. Calonzo
who was not a party-litigant. Petitioner Yang never put in issue the financial capability of these two (2)
sureties. It follows that the approval of the replevin bond by respondent judge, before whom it was
presented and who was in a better position than this Court to appreciate the financial standing of the
sureties, can scarely be questioned as a grave abuse of discretion.
The other objections to the replevin bond are equally lacking in merit. The fact that the other
respondent, Ricardo Morante, did not act as surety on the same bond as his wife did, does not affect the
validity or the sufficiency of that bond. It would appear to the benefit of petitioner that Atty. Bayani L.
Calonzo signed up as the other or second surety or bondsman on that bond, since petitioner thereby
acquired a right of recourse not only against the respondent spouses but also against a third person, not
a party to the replevin suit. Further, the failure of the replevin bond to state expressly that it was
"conditioned for the return of the property to the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged," is not
fatal to the validity of the replevin bond. The replevin bond put up by Milagros Morante and Bayani L.
Calonzo stated that it was given "under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs, which may be
adjudged to the said defendants and all damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the
order of replevin, if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiffs were not entitled thereto." We
believe that the condition of the bond given in this case substantially complied with the requirement of
Section 2, Rule 60. Moreover, the provisions of Rule 60, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court under
which the replevin bond was given may be regarded as having become part of the bond as having been
imported thereunto. All the particular conditions prescribed in Section 2, Rule 60, although not written
in the bond in printer's ink, will be read into the bond in determining the scope and content of the
liability of the sureties or bondsmen under that bond.
Petitioner also contends that since the respondent spouses are not the registered owners of the cargo
trucks involved, the writ of replevin should not have been issued. We do not think so. The provisional
remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate
possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at
the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the
possession thereof."
Petitioner further urges that the dropping of Manuel Yaphockun as party-defendant in the amended
complaint was fraudulently intended to deprive him (Yaphockun) of the right to demand the return of
the vehicles in dispute. The difficulty with this argument is that it is merely question-begging. A person in
actual or constructive possession of the goods sought to be replevied, should of course be made a party-
defendant. At the same time, however, the respondent spouses, as complainants in the suit for replevin,
were entitled, for their own convenience and at their own peril, to exclude or strike out the name of a
party previously impleaded from the complaint. In excluding Manuel Yaphockun as party-defendant
from the complaint, the respondent spouses were well within their rights; no leave of court was needed,
no responsive pleading having been previously filed.
Petitioner would finally challenge the order of respondent judge dated 28 February 1985 rejecting his
counter-replevin bond for having been filed out of time. Petitioner received summons on the amended
complaint on 25 January 1985 and on the same day, filed his counterbond. It is his contention that his
redelivery bond was not filed out of time since he was served with summons only on 25 January 1985.
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff' require
the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in character. Thus, a lower court which
approves a counter-bond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction. In the
instant case, the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner Yang's
counter-replevin bond was filed on 25 January 1985. The matter was treated at length in the trial court's
order of 28 February 1985:
We agree with the conclusion of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a counterbond had
already prescribed.
Adoma vs Gatcheco
As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession
of the vehicle after five days from the implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the
whole amount he promised. Since the adverse party did not object to the complainant's bond nor
posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the vehicle taken under the writ of replevin,
respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it took respondent
sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides —

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. — If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the
sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's bond or
approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is
objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall
be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff
must return it to the adverse party.

Paat vs CA
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of
action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by
the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
custody," and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with
the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in
replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession
of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention,
that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. Private respondents
miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the
instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.
705 as amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the
confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of
the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible,
hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as
amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

Citibank vs CA
In its second assignment of errors, petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it
did not comply with Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court requiring the replevin plaintiff to attach an
affidavit of merit to the complaint.
Petitioner is correct insofar as it contends that substantial compliance with the affidavit requirement
may be permissible. There is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of merit to
support the complaint for replevin if the complaint itself contains a statement of every fact required to
be stated in the affidavit of merit and the complaint is verified like an affidavit . On the matter of
replevin, Justice Vicente Francisco's Comment on the Rules of Court.
And similarly, in the case of an attachment which likewise requires an affidavit of merit, the Court held
that the absence of an affidavit of merit is not fatal where the petition itself, which is under oath, recites
the circumstances or facts constitutive of the grounds for the petition.
The facts that must be set forth in the affidavit of merit are (1) that plaintiff owns the property
particularly describing the same, or that he is entitled to its possession; (2) wrongful detention by
defendant of said property; (3) that the property is not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine
pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or, if it is so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure; and the (4) the actual value of the property.
Then too, petitioner stated the value of subject properties at a "probable value of P200,000.00, more or
less". Pertinent rules require that the affidavit of merit should state the actual value of the property
subject of a replevin suit and not just its probable value. Actual value (or actual market value) means
"the price which an article would command in the ordinary course of business, that is to say, when
offered for sale by one willing to sell, but not under compulsion to sell, and purchased by another who is
willing to buy, but under no obligation to purchase it".

It should be noted, however, that the private respondent interposed the defense of lack of affidavit of
merit only in his Reply to the Comment of Citibank on the Petition for Certiorari which respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals

Thus, although respondent's defense of lack of affidavit of merit is meritorious, procedurally, such a
defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus
motion rule.
III
Petitioner also faults the Court of Appeals for finding that the bond posted by the petitioner is
questionable and/or insufficient. It is averred that, in compliance with Section 2, Rule 60 requiring the
replevin plaintiff to post a bond in double the value of the properties involved, it filed a bond in the
amount of P400,000.00 which is twice the amount of P200,000.00 declared in its complaint.

It should be noted that a replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he
may suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property
pending trial of the action. The same may also be answerable for damages if any when judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin was issued and such
judgment includes the return of the property to him. Thus, the requirement that the bond be double the
actual value of the properties litigated upon. Such is the case because the bond will answer for the
actual loss to the plaintiff, which corresponds to the value of the properties sought to be recovered and
for damages, if any.

Petitioner also maintains that, assuming for the sake of argument that its replevin bond was grossly
inadequate or insufficient, the recourse of the respondent should be to post a counterbond or a
redelivery bond as provided under Section 5 of Rule 60.

The Court held in a prior case that the remedies provided under Section 5, Rule 60, are alternative
remedies. ". . . If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff
restored to him, he should, within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the
value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements — as well as
compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned — being mandatory." This course of action
is available to the defendant for as long as he does not object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond.

Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property
replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as
stated in the plaintiff's affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6.

Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a counter-
bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6.

In the case under consideration, the private respondent did not opt to cause redelivery of the properties
to him by filing a counter-bond precisely because he objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted by
plaintiff. Therefore, he need not file a counter-bond or redelivery bond. When such objection was not
given due course in the court below — when, instead of requiring the plaintiff to post a new bond, the
court approved the bond in the amount of P400,000.00, claimed by respondent to be insufficient, and
ordered the seizure of the properties — recourse to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing such order is proper under the circumstances.
V
In light of the foregoing, the answer to the fifth assignment of errors is in the negative. For erroneously
issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the sufficiency of the replevin bond and for
allowing petitioner to assume receivership without the requisite oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dealing with the situation.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession
and may not be deprived of it without due process.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
"The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess himself of the mortgaged property with
violence and against the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the creditor's right of
possession is conditioned upon the fact of default, and the existence of this fact may naturally be the
subject of controversy. The debtor, for instance, may claim in good faith, and rightly or wrongly, that the
debt is paid, or that for some other reason the alleged default is nonexistent. His possession in this
situation is as fully entitled to protection as that of any other person, and in the language of Article 446
of the Civil Code, he must be respected therein. To allow the creditor to seize the property against the
will of the debtor would make the former to a certain extent both judge and executioner in his own
cause — a thing which is inadmissible in the absence of unequivocal agreement in the contract itself or
express provision to the effect in the statute."

Smart Communications vs Regine Astorga

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may
recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully
detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover
property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer
either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally
associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained
during the pendency of the action.
That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was one for replevin
hardly admits of doubt.
In reversing the RTC ruling and consequently dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the CA made the
following disquisition.
We do not agree. Contrary to the CA's ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit
and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga's motion to dismiss. SMART's demand for
payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but
a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, 34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit,
explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary
relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is
an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The
question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so,
whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its
return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues
raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the
NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free
ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of
the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners' right to picket. But
the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and
whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to
possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid
down by pertinent laws.
The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the
dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction.

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

Reyes vs Ines- Luciano
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support. However, the alleged
adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that the wife has
committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente lite Adultery is a good
defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano, the petitioner
did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-
Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife when the
action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City. It is to be noted, however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the
"private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or
wherewithal, but from the conjugal property — which, was her documentary evidence . . .". It is,
therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana vs.
Lerma, the action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private respondent
support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by the allegations of the
complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no merit.
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000.00, the respondent Judge did not act
capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of P5,000.00 a month, the
respondent Judge considered the following:
"On record for plaintiff's cause are the following that she and defendant were married on January 18,
1958; that she is presently unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her father
with whom she resides; that defendant had been maltreating her and tried to kill her; that all their
conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also president, Manager and Treasurer of
their corporation.

The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children are in the
custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the amount of
support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the
merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it
may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to
pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

Lam vs Chua
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of
support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, we held that another action for support
could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support
filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case that:

. . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance
is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana,
as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for
voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of
their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as
embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the
Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject
to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give
support.

The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the decision
rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with
the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child.
Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the case for
decision as of May 12, 1994. But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set
the case for reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present
evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the marriage
between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing
that respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in open court.

The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission of the additional evidence.
The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to
that of existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim for
support of the child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court,
as no formal amendment was ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase
"And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just
and reasonable" found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is
nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of
Adriana.

A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially amended or supplemental
pleadings. Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there
can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Article 48 of
the Family Code, it is with more reason that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all
proceedings.
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the present petition for review
on certiorari which is the award of support for his child, John Paul.

The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded, such
amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code

It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support
their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred
for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.

In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding her claim for support of the
child is her testimony, which is quoted below in verbatim:
Atty. Lorbes:
Q After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages prior to your marriage, how
do you feel about it?
A I felt it is unfair to my life.
Q Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you, what do you want to request
to the Honorable Court?
A I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my little boy.
Court:
Q How much support do you want?
A P20,000.00 to P25,000.00
Q Is there a prayer for support?
Atty. Lorbes:
A None, Your Honor.
Court:
Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the support of the boy.
A Yes, Your Honor. 23

Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the
parents are reasonably able to give.
We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in the decision of the Makati
RTC, portions of which read as follows:

8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their son. In
the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights
by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party
shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as required, to be used
solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered
by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches majority age.
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not being contrary to law, morals
or public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing
between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is established in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined
to faithfully comply with the conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same
shall, as between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated in the
aforesaid settlement.
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the proper local civil registries
and registries of property at the expense of the herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila. 24

The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out before the Makati RTC as it was
the court that approved the Compromise Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly administration of
justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on support should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where
the claim for support of the child was initiated by Adriana.

The trial court's action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6, 1994 hearing that a prayer for
support be written and inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper
amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of due
process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to re-open and render judgment
without giving Jose the requisite notice and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him.

Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support awarded to John Paul was
whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.