As to the issue of prescription:

The action has prescribed. The running of the prescriptive period was not tolled by the
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor. The crime involved in this case falls under the
coverage of the Rules of Summary Procedure which provide:

Section - 1 : Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:

XXX

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

Section 11 provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

In this case, the action had already prescribed when the information was in court on
June 1, 2015. The filing with the prosecutor on March 7, 2014 and the subsequent
appeal to the Secretary of Justice did not have the effect of tolling the prescriptive
period. A preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is not necessary in this
case. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which apply in a suppletory manner,
provide that if the penalty is at least four years, two months, and one day regardless of
the amount of the fine, then there must be preliminary investigation. In this case, the
crime involved is unjust vexation where the penalty is arresto menor or a fine ranging
from 5 to 200 pesos, or both. Since the crime involved has a penalty lower than those
crimes which require preliminary investigation, then the institution of the action for unjust
vexation may be either through filing a complaint or information subject to the last part
of Section 11 under the Rules of Summary Procedure that states that in Chartered
Cities such as Baguio City, cases falling within the Rule shall be commenced only by
information.

As held in the Jadewell case, “There is no distinction between the filing of the
Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of
Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint
before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the
Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the
period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the
petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before
it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.” Although
what is involved in the Jadewell case is a violation of a city ordinance, it also falls within
the coverage of the Rules of Summary Procedure as in the case involved here. In order
to commence the action in Chartered Cities an information must be filed in court. Upon
the filing of the information in court, then the prescriptive period for the action is tolled.
In this case, the act of filing a complaint with the prosecutor's office did not have the
effect of tolling the prescriptive period; it continued to run and had already prescribed
when the information was filed in court.

As to the issue of dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as a result of the

defect in the date of the information:

The case cannot be dismissed on this ground. Rule 112, Section 11 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
Information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual fate of its commission.” Since the date is not an
element of the crime committed in this case and the parties have agreed that the actual
happening is February 22, 2014, then the fact that the wrong date of the commission of
the crime was alleged in the information is immaterial.

Section 6 of the Rules provide: Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint

or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.

It has been held that “In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element,
like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty
in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing
an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the
allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually
established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed
supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a
formal amendment of the information.

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of
commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence
becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In
this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the
evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right
of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.”1

In this case, the general rule applies. Since the date of the commission of the crime had
been established in the course of the trial, then the discrepancy does not amount to
insufficiency of evidence.

1
​People v Delfin G.R. No. 201572 July 9, 2014