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Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
Author(s): Robert C. Oberst

Source: Publius, Vol. 18, No. 3, The State of American Federalism, 1987 (Summer, 1988),
pp. 175-193
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3330279
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Federalism and Ethnic Conflict
in Sri Lanka
Robert C. Oberst
Nebraska Wesleyan University
A transfer of central governmental authority to regional governments is being tried in Sri

Lanka in an attempt to resolve ethnic conflict. In November 1987, Sri Lanka established a system
of provincial councils. This system will allow regional autonomy in the country's nine provinces.
It is hoped that this council system will resolve complaints by the nation's largest ethnic minori
ty, the Sri Lanka Tamils. The system falls short of being a true federal arrangement, however,
because it leaves extensive power in the hands of the president and the national legislature. In
addition, the plan is opposed by important groups in the society. The more militant Sri Lanka
Tamil leaders have opposed the plan because it transfers too little power to the councils. Also,
long-standing fears among the nation's largest ethnic group, the Sinhalese, have generated
violent response from militant members of this ethnic group. The government and moderate
Sri Lanka Tamil leaders are now seeking to implement the provincial council system.
Third World experiences with federalism have generally been a disappoint-

ment. Daniel J. Elazar has noted that one-half of the ninety-two nations which
have received independence from colonial powers since World War II, at
one time, had federal arrangements. Only six of these nations still maintain
true, functioning federal systems.' The failure of federalism to take hold in
the developing world has been attributed primarily to factors related to the
political integration of ethnic minorities.2 The integration of divers
minorities into a nation-state has been a difficult task for many developing
societies. During the last twenty years, several multi-ethnic nations have
descended into an intractable civil war. Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and
Cyprus, for example, have all faced this problem since at least the early 1970s.
In the 1980s, the previously stable and democratic Indian Ocean island-nation
of Sri Lanka was added to this list.
This article will examine the causes of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and
the role that federalism has played in the conflict. As Elazar and others have
noted, very little research has been done on the relationship between political
integration and federalism.3 Donald Horowitz has gone so far as to note
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Cheri Thomas in the preparation
of this manuscript and Sara Sheffield in the preparation of the maps.
'Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987),
pp. 238-239.
2See Elazar, Exploring Federalism, pp. 240-244; Ivo D. Duchacek, "Federalist Responses
to Ethnic Demands," Federalism and Political Integration, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 1984), pp. 59-72; and Benjamin Neuberger, "Federalism and
Political Integration in Africa," Federalism and Political Integration, pp. 171-190.
3Daniel J. Elazar, "Introduction," Federalism and Political Integration, p. 1; Donald L.
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Summer 1988)

175
176 Publius/Summer 1988
that "there is little more than dogma av

to reduce conflict.4 Sri Lanka offers
From the mnid-1950s until the mid-1
ethnic minority in Sri Lanka (the Fed
tion to the nation's ethnic problem. Fe
over the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. Th
other Tamil factions into the Tamil U
vocate independence for Tamil region
political leaders of the majority ethnic g
federalism will be the first step toward
flict evolved into a bloody civil war i
the government finally agreed to dev
thereby creating what appears to be a ty
for the first time in a decade, a program
BACKGROUND
Sri Lanka is a nation of about 15 million people in an area approx

the same size as Massachusetts. Despite its small geographic and p
size, there is a large amount of ethnic diversity in the country (see T
Sri Lanka received its independence from Great Britain in 1948. Its f
stitution, the Soulbury Constitution, established a unitary state, w
maintained in the constitutions promulgated in 1972 and 1978.5
1948 and 1977, Sri Lanka established an impressive record as a pa
tary democracy. In seven consecutive elections beginning in
culminating in 1977, the governing party lost the election. The highl
petitive party system established a strong record of political st
However, since 1977, the Tamil insurgency in the North and Ea
referendum to put off elections for six years have tarnished the
democratic record.6
The largest ethnic group on the island is the Sinhalese, who comprise over
72 percent of the population. They are of north Indian heritage and trace
their arrival on the island to about 500 B.C.E. They speak an Indo-Aryan
language, Sinhala, and are predominantly Buddhists, although a significant
minority are Christians. The Sinhalese are located in the southern and western
portions of the island (see Map 1). The second largest ethnic group on the
island is the Sri Lanka Tamils. They are descendants of migrants who came
to the island from South India, beginning around the same time as the
Sinhalese. They speak a Dravidian language, Tamil, and are predominantly
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp.
601-602; and Ivo D. Duchacek, "Federalist Responses to Ethnic Demands."
4Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 602.
5Sri Lanka, administratively, is divided into nine provinces and twenty-four administrative
districts.
6For a thorough discussion of the 1982 elections, see W. A. Wiswa Warnapala and L. Dias
Hewagama, Recent Politics in Sri Lanka: The Presidential Election and the Referendum of 1982
(New Delhi: Navrang, 1983).
Sri Lanka 177
TABLE 1
Ethnic Population of Sri Lanka
Percent of
Ethnic group Number population
Sinhalese 10,985,666 74.0

Sri Lanka Tamils 1,871,535 12.6
Sri Lanka Moors 1,056,972 7.1
Indian Tamils 825,233 5.6
Malays 43,378 5.6
Burghers 38,236 0.3
Others 28,981 0.1
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of

Republic of Sri Lanka-1982 (C
Census and Statistics, 1982), p
Hindus, though, again, a signif

number of Sri Lanka Tamils l
sider the northern and easter
A third sizable group in Sri La
tiated from the Sri Lanka Tam
They are the descendants of So
to work on the tea and coffee
centuries. The Indian Tamils ar
try of central Sri Lanka. The
They believe that they are cu
fact, both groups consider th
of their backwardness and geog
area of the island, the Indian
the ethnic conflict. All future r
will refer to the Sri Lanka Tamils.
The final large ethnic group is the Sri Lanka Moors. They are Tamil-
speaking Muslims who are found primarily along the eastern coast, and in
the major cities, and such southwest coastal towns as Beruwala. There are
also a number of smaller groups of less numerical significance, such as the
Burghers who are descendants of Sri Lankans with either Dutch or Portuguese
ancestry, the aboriginal Veddas, and the Malays who are descendants of
Malay traders.
Sri Lanka's ethnic diversity is compounded by the geographic diversity
of the island. Despite its small size, Sri Lanka can be divided into three
geographic regions. The first of these is the Dry Zone of the North and East.
It is dry for about nine months a year, with heavy monsoonal rainfall occur-
ring in November and December. This area is separated from the other regions
by sparsely inhabited jungle. Most of the population of the dry zone is found
MAP 1
Largest Ethnic Group by Administrative District
SSinhalese
Jafn
] Sri Lanka Tamil
Mullaitivu Indian Tamil
MannaMoor
'07q$ Vavuniya
Anuradhapura ATrincomalee
Puttalam
Polonnaruwa
Batticaloa
Kurunegala Matale
Kandy
Gampah Kegalle
Ampar
Badulla
Colomb
Nuwara
Eli a Moneragala
Kalutara
Kalutara Ratnapura
Galle Hambantota
Matara
Sri Lanka 179
along the coastal region

and southern portions o
region. It has dense for
although the main mon
the third region. It is fo
tains rise to over 8,000
southwest monsoon of J
helped to isolate the inha
ment of separate cultur
The political system of
political parties.7 The fir
is the United National P
ty grew out of the anti
the first two elections in
wing" party of Sri Lank
J. R. Jayawardene, has at
prise on the island by s
welfare programs. It ha
over the years. It curren
Indian Tamil party, the
political arm of the large
Indian Tamils.
The "left-wing" opposition to the UNP has been led by the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP). The SLFP first came to power in the elections of
1956 as a populist coalition of leftist parties supporting the rights of the
Sinhalese peasants. Since then it has emerged as one of the two dominant
parties on the island. It espouses social democratic policies and has often
made electoral alliances with two other leftist parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja
Party (LSSP), a Trotskyite political party, and the Communist Party of Sri
Lanka (CPSL), a pro-Moscow party.
In addition to these parties, the Sri Lanka Tamils have supported their
own political parties. None of the parties mentioned above have very much
support among the Sri Lanka Tamils. The main party of the Sri Lanka Tamils
is the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which is an outgrowth of the
Federal Party (FP). The FP was formed in 1949 and became the dominant
Tamil party replacing the Tamil Congress (TC) in the 1956 elections. The
Tamil Congress still exists as the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), but
it is not a major political force in the Tamil areas.
In addition to these legal parties, a number of political organizations
representing militant Tamils have emerged since the late 1970s. The most
important of these is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). All of
these organizations have resorted to violent action to achieve their ends, and
all are, or had been, illegal prior to the 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. These
7For a more thorough discussion of the party system, see Robert N. Kearney, "The Political
Party System in Sri Lanka," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Spring 1983): 17-33.
groups have been carrying on the gue

the northern and eastern parts of the
The Sri Lankan civil war emerged out o
across the country in the 1960s and 1970
led insurrection in 1971 by the Janatha
political group made up largely of Sinha
youths did not join the rebellion. Ho
organizing in the early 1970s. At first t
against government supporters and sy
By the early 1980s, the youths had form
rilla organizations, which varied in id
However, all of the groups were fight
in the society. The conflict turned int
Tamil riots in 1983. Between 1983 and
lives in the ethnic violence and the insur
was precipitated by the Indo-Lanka A
Tamil discontent has largely been ca
language of government. The use of
by the Tamil leadership. Briefly, they in
tion against Tamil-speakers in governme
collar jobs in the society), discontent wi
action program that has protected Sin
sion to the university, and a need for
regional autonomy are a response to p
officers against Tamil civilians, governm
Tamil, the settlement of Sinhalese colon
of Tamil inhabitance, and a lack of d
The discontent of the Tamil populatio
with a significant number of young peo
to rise up in armed rebellion.
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SRI LANKAN FEDERALISM
The large percentage that the Sinhalese comprise in the total popul
complicated the creation of a national identity in Sri Lanka. Alth
Sinhalese are in the majority, they do not have the mentality of a ma
S. J. Tambiah has called them "a majority with a minority comple
8A. C. Alles, Insurgency-1971 (Colombo: Colombo Apothecaries, 1976) provid

description of the insurrection.
9The estimate presented in the text is from violence data gathered by the author from
ment sources or news reports supported by at least two news sources. The results inc
from communal rioting and the JVP. A breakdown based on a preliminary analysis
by year is as follows: 1972-1982: 296 deaths; 1983: 539; 1984: 869; 1985: 1,859; 19
and 1987: 3,731. Official government statistics on the number of deaths due to the ethni
do not include the ethnic riots of 1977, 1981, and 1983. They also appear to be lower
9,000 killed.
1oS. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy
Sri Lanka 181
Sinhalese culture and la

As a small ethnic group r
of their cultural identity
them. The Portuguese ac
ing the British era, the f
island, the Kandyan kin
of the people. In addition
number of Tamils in the
greater proficiency in E
special position in the g
The greatest threat to th
the Dravidian culture of
180 million people of Dra
Palk Strait. As a result,
as cultural infiltrators
Sinhalese fears and feelin
policy shortly after ind
laws that th first denied
right to vote in election
development of decentr
Prior to the arrival of
the seventeenth centur
kingdoms existed, one in
Southwest. There appea
kingdoms, but geographi
ern kingdom on the Jaf
and the Southwestern kin
sula known as the Vann
by the mountains that
more than 8,000 feet abo
dyans from the Europea
in 1815, and added its l
A united Sri Lanka wa
trolled kingdoms constitu
began in the late eighte
administratively. Conflic
allowed to get out of han
Questions about the natur
and regions in Sri Lanka
to see the end of British
with the debate over ethn
by the colonial administ
University of Chicago Press,

"'See ibid., pp. 6-7 and K. M.
Sri Lanka 1880-1985 (Lanham
In 1937 G. G. Ponnambalam, the fou

posed what is known as the fifty-fift
proposals intended to prevent any single
other groups.12 The plan was ultimately
of the Ceylon National Congress, the
the period. The Soulbury Constitution, p
created a system of single-member electo
tation for large underpopulated distri
majoritarian constitution that gave the S
jority, the ability to dominate the pol
be able to have enough support in the
tion. The governmental arrangement cou
minorities in Sri Lanka as long as the
not enact policies that specifically ben
not happen.'3
One of the first actions of the indep
to deny the Indian Tamils citizenship.
Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tam
politician at the time of independence
of Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake, th
ty, when he led most of his Tamil Co
UNP in 1948. The denial of citizenship
the coalition with the UNP motivated a
to form their own political party in 194
Arasu Kadchi, known in English as the
the 1952 general elections with very l
emerged as the dominant party among
in the Tamil community coincided wit
Party to dominance in national politic
In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party e
jority in Parliament and passed the Sinh
as the official language of governmen
English and Tamil to be used in govern
all civil servants and government edu
Tamil opposition to the act led to the
Act of 1958, which allowed civil servi
tions in Tamil as long as they later de
permitted the use of Tamil in higher
bureaucrats reasonable time to learn S
until 1966 when a new UNP governme
12De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, pp. 10

13Robert C. Oberst, "Policies of Ethnic Prefe
Public Policy in Developing States, eds. Neil Ne
Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 144-145.
14The communal policies of the majority are
Sri Lanka 183
Provisions) Regulation
used in official correspo
ern and Eastern provin
been slow, however, bec
fortable conversing in E
of government. The T
plemented fully, even
Front government of
came to power in 1977
In 1972, a United Fro
and the LSSP promulg
language status of Sin
turned to power in 197
with one of its own. T
Constitution not only
but also failed to make a
language. Although th
language, it did make
not spell out what rig
language status did not
it satisfy the Tamil lead
tion for their language
These constitutional act
dhist culture as the do
saw the actions as a thre
sought to protect the
threatened by the go
"cultures, habits, cust
munal party meant to p
ple. At the party's fir
the Tamil-speaking peopl

the Sinhalese by every fun
historical past in this isl
Singalese [sic], secondly,
different from that of
ritorial habitation of def
island. 16
The Tamils saw themselves as culturally distinct from the Sinhalese, and
because they inhabited a specific geographic region of the country, they saw
'5 The Case for a Federal Constitution for Ceylon: Resolutions Passed at the First National
Convention of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (Colombo: Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, 1951)
as cited in Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University, 1967), p. 96.
16Ibid., pp. 94-96.
the creation of an autonomous political u

way to preserve their culture.
The Federal Party's response to the p
was to demand the creation of a feder
1956 election manifesto stated the first
tion on federalism." The party sought
similar to that of Switzerland, with s
areas. At the party's 1956 convention, de
of a Tamil linguistic state incorporatin
in which the Tamil-speaking people are
in the country was to be made on the
policies in support of federalism were
policies of the Sinhalese majority.
The Federal Party was not successful in
ment to change its structure. After the U
the new constitution in 1972 that failed to answer the Tamil demands for
federalism, the Federal Party attempted to unite the Tamil factions in a Tamil
United Liberation Front. The TULF replaced the demand for federalism with
a demand for the creation of an independent Tamil nation-state of Eelam.
(See Map 2 for the proposed territory of Tamil Eelam.) At the TULF's first
national convention at Vaddukoddai on 14 May 1976, the party stated that:
the Tamils of Ceylon, by virtue of their great language, their religions, their
seperate [sic] culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a
seperate [sic] state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they were
conquerred [sic] by the armed might of the European invaders and above all
by their will to exist as a seperate [sic] entity ruling themselves in their own
territory are a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese ... (who) are using
the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its ter-
ritory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and
education thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil peo-
ple. This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free,
Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of TAMIL EELAM ... has become inevitable
in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this country.2
The Sinhalese community reacted very negatively to the new demands, and
the United National Party promulgated a new constitution in 1978 that fur-
ther enshrined the unitary system of Sri Lanka, the Buddhist religion, and
the Sinhala language.
The Tamil leaders initially hoped that the Muslims in the Eastern province
would join the TULF. They did not. Traditionally, the Muslims have sup-
ported the UNP and the SLFP, though some Muslim support has been given
to the Tamil parties. The Eastern province Muslims have very low levels of
'7A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "The Tamil Federal Party in Ceylon Politics," Journal of Com-
monwealth Political Studies 4 (July 1966): 117-137.
"8Ibid., 124.
19Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 96.
20Resolution Unanimously Adopted at the First National Convention of the Tamil United
Liberation Front held at Vaddukoddai (Jaffna: Tamil United Liberation Front, 1976).
Sri Lanka 185
MAP 2
Proposed Territory of Tamil Eelam
Jaffna
Mullaitivu
Mannar
Vvuniya
Anuradhapura Trincomale
Puttalam
Polonnaruwa
Batticaloa
Kurunegala Matale
Kandy
Gampah Kegalle
Amara
Badulla
Colomb Nuwara,
Eliya
aMoneragala
Ratnapura
Kalutara
Galle Hambantota
Matara
education and income. They are one o

the island. Some Muslim leaders have
TULF would result in the domination of
and wealthier Jaffna peninsula Tami
After the 1977 elections and the anti-T
Tamil youths began to grow dissatisfied
their guerrilla attacks against Tamil-s
the government. These attacks were
thefts. The violence once again escalated
daily assaults against government secur
the escalation came the proliferation
are generally referred to as "tigers," al
petition between the "tiger" groups as t
government.
As the 1980s progressed, the "tigers" a
sophisticated in their military attacks an
ment passed the Sixth Amendment to
members of Parliament to recite an
sixteen TULF MPs were expelled from
oath or for failing to return to the
deteriorated into increased violence unt
Federalism, or at least serious decen
government until the government b
culminated in an offer to devolve powe
cils in the Tamil areas in 1987.21
A series of negotiations between Tamil leaders and the government began
in 1984. At first, the negotiations were between the government, other
Sinhalese dominated parties, and the nonviolent Tamil United Liberation
Front. However, it soon became apparent that any settlement would require
the participation of the more militant "tigers." The leaders of the major
"tiger" groups were eventually invited to the negotiations and a conference
was held in Thimpu, Bhutan during the summer of 1985.22
In late 1984, the Sri Lankan government began to make a series of con-
cessions that culminated in the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 and the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution in November 1987. The accord was
signed between India and Sri Lanka. India had become involved in the con-
flict because of the "tigers'" establishment of bases in Tamil Nadu and the
concern of the Indians with the plight of the Tamil-speakers in Sri Lanka.
Throughout the negotiations, India had acted as an intermediary between
the Sri Lankan government and the "tigers." At first, the Indians clearly
211n December 1985, the government made a similar offer which was rejected by the TULF
at the All-Party Conference.
22The five groups involved in the negotiations were the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, the Popular Liberation Organization of
Tamil Eelam (later known as the Popular Liberation Organization of Tamils), the Eelam Popular
Revolutionary Liberation Front, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization.
Sri Lanka 187
sided with the "tigers";

the LTTE and tried to fo
ing of the Indo-Lanka A
require them to agree t
The Indo-Lanka Accord
17 August 1987), a gener
ing the accord, and offici
dian government was exp
the "tiger" groups. The
as long as there was a ne
to ensure that the "tigers
repatriate Indian Tamils t
between India and Sri L
with India its use of fore
the port of Trincomalee
restore the Trincomalee
and to ensure that the United States' Voice of America transmitter in Sri
Lanka would not be used for any military or intelligence purposes.
In November 1987, the Sri Lankan government passed legislation to im-
plement the Indo-Lanka Accord. This legislation included the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution and a law setting up the provincial coun-
cils. The constitutional amendment called for the creation of a provincial
council in each of the country's nine provinces (see Map 3). However, it also
allowed for the consolidation of provinces so that some provinces would share
councils. In any case, there would be no more than nine councils. The Indo-
Lanka Accord called for the consolidation of the Eastern and Northern prov-
inces under a single provincial council.25 According to the accord, the two
provinces would have the opportunity to vote in a referendum before 31
December 1988 on whether to remain in the united council or to organize
their own separate councils.26
The legislation establishes a five-year term for the provincial councils. In
addition, a governor for each province is to be appointed by the president
for five years. However, the president has the power to remove the governor
at any time. The governor is to have the power to dissolve the council, and
23The Thirteenth Amendment changed this provision to make English a "link" language.
Tamil was left as an official language with apparently the same status as Sinhala.
2The port of Trincomalee on the east coast of Sri Lanka is one of the world's largest natural
harbors. As a result, the United States has been interested in establishing naval docking facilities
there. India is concerned about the intrusion of a major power into the subcontinent.
25The last major point of contention between the government and the Tamils has been the
consolidation of the Eastern and Northern provinces. The Eastern province has been the site
of large-scale Sinhalese colonization schemes, which have reduced the Tamil percentage of the
total population. The Tamils believe that the Eastern province would have a Tamil majority
if this colonization had not gone on and want to protect the Tamils in this area. The govern-
ment is concerned about the Sinhalese and Muslims in the province being controlled by the Tamils
in a united council.
26The accord called for provincial council elections before the end of 1987. Because the
violence has continued into 1988, this stipulation has yet to be met.
MAP 3
Provinces of Sri Lanka
Northern
North Central
North West
Eastern
Central
Western
Uva
Sabaragamuwa
Southern
Sri Lanka 189
in performing his duties

than four other minister
nor on the basis of who
the council. If the presi
tively, the president ca
ment will act as the pr
its own judiciary.
The relationship betwe
ment is, not surprisingly
tween its states and the
Lanka is the power of t
of Sri Lanka acts as the h
the regional governmen
the president's represent
them. In addition to this
elections in order to ob
governor.
If the provincial councils are allowed to exercise their own authority, the
new system will operate as a federal system. However, the president's exten-
sive power over the councils may restrict the ability of the councils to operate
independently of the national government. In addition, there is a serious ques-
tion about whether the provincial governments will be able to raise adequate
revenue to carry out their actions or be required to rely on the national govern-
ment for revenue.
THE SINHALESE OPPOSITION TO FEDERALISM
The Sinhalese community in the past has overwhelmingly oppo

tion of a federal system in Sri Lanka. Much of this opposition
the Sinhalese fear of the Dravidian culture to the north in India. A
outpost of Aryan culture at the tip of India, the Sinhalese fear th
tion of a federal state would become the first step to the creation
dependent nation of Tamils in Sri Lanka or union with the Tam
Nadu in India. In addition, many Sinhalese have felt that the
separate units of government structured around ethnic or linguisti
lead to more communalism that will not be beneficial to a presum
state. The current president of Sri Lanka, J. R. Jayawardene,
1940s in response to Ponnambalam's fifty-fifty plan that:
the large majority, whatever race they may belong to, are, however,
effected [sic] and their conditions not improved, by racial representa
problems that face most of us today are mainly economic ones .... Wh
have we if we break up into fragments and hide behind narrow racial
27See also, Amal Ray with John Kincaid, "Politics, Economic Development
Generation Strain in India's Federal System," Publius: The Journal of Federal
1988): 147-175.
28J. R. Jayawardene, "Communal Representation," Documents of the Ceylon
Opposition to federalism in Sri Lanka

position can be said to be based in the
The Sinhalese constitute an ethnic grou
the island of Sri Lanka. They are of no
are surrounded by the numerically large
people of south India. During the colo
speaking people a disproportionate nu
bureaucracy. This policy increased the
deprivation. However, the Sinhalese ange
as they ruled the island. Even before the
to reassert their culture and religion, Bu
during British rule.29 In 1956, the All
a report entitled The Betrayal of Bud
Buddhism on persecution, discriminat
lonialism.30 The Sinhalese became ver
culture.
The Sinhalese response to this situat
Reconquest" by Donald E. Smith.3' Sm
not new but ancient. Sacred values cling
face extinction when the land is overrun
to reconquer the land and restore the
As a result of this myth, the Sinhales
legislative measures that would help to e
The most important of these measures w
in 1956. The Tamil response to the act
government give Tamil a protected statu
Sinhalese Buddhists to see the Tamils as a threat to their culture. This new
threat was fueled by age-old concerns about the impact of Dravidian people
on the island. On numerous occasions, south Indian empires had attempted
to establish outposts on the island or to conquer it.34
As a result of these concerns, the Sinhalese have seen the establishment
of federalism as a step toward Tamil political union with the Dravidian peo-
ple of south India. The fact that the areas of the island inhabited by the Tamil-
speaking people are those which are the closest to south India has not
alleviated this sentiment. The Sinhalese-led leaders of the SLFP and the UNP
refused to consider federalism until the 1980s and continue to be reluctant
to implement it.
gress and National Politics in Ceylon, 1929-50, ed. Michael Roberts (Colombo: Department
of National Archives, 1977), pp. 2814-2816.
29De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, Chapter 3.
30Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 79.
31Donald E. Smith, "Religion, Politics, and the Myth of Reconquest," Modern Sri Lanka:
A Society in Transition, eds. Robert N. Kearney and Tissa Fernando (Syracuse: Maxwell School,
Syracuse University, 1979), pp. 83-85.
32Ibid., p. 85.
33Oberst, "Policies of Ethnic Preference."
34De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, pp. 12-16.
Sri Lanka 191
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM IN SRI LANKA
The concept of federalism has generally referred to the power-s

established by constitutional provisions protecting the power of r
governments.35 This differentiates federalism from decentralization,
is a transfer of authority and power without constitutional safeguards
scholars, such as Horowitz,36 have not distinguished between the t
cepts and tend to treat them as a single concept. The Thirteenth A
ment to the Sri Lankan Constitution establishes the powers of the
governments, but the extensive power of the president raises question
the independence of the regional governments from the national gove
In addition, the current government in Sri Lanka has a large
parliamentary majority to make any constitutional amendment re
the powers of the regional governments that it might want.
The Indo-Lanka Accord and the Thirteenth Amendment are the first ma-
jor concessions toward regional rule ever made by the Sinhalese majority
in Sri Lanka. For this reason, it will be an important milestone if successful-
ly implemented.
There are several serious threats to successful implementation of the pro-
vincial council system. The first is the opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord
and the Thirteenth Amendment by some prominent members of the Sinhalese
community, including many opposition leaders and some bhikkhus (Bud-
dhist clergy). The antipathy to the Accord by the largest opposition party,
the SLFP, the riots that followed the Accord, and the violent attacks against
government personnel by the JVP, have all made the opposition appear to
be a formidable force. The actual sentiments of the majority of the Sinhalese
people are unknown.
The leader of the SLFP, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and two other political
parties, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna and the Eksath Lanka Mahajana
Pakshaya,37 challenged the constitutionality of the provincial council system
before the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. The court rejected Bandaranaike's
arguments in a 5-4 vote.38 One can only expect that she will try to disman-
tle the system if her party comes to power in national elections required to
be held in 1989. These elections will be the first parliamentary elections since
1977. In 1982, the government held a referendum to continue the current
Parliament in office for another term. The elections generated widespread
allegations of fraud39 after the government won support to continue the
35Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Chapter 2.

36Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
37The Mahjana Eksath Peramuna is a leftist political party with one representative in Parlia-
ment. The Eksath Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya was founded by Rukman Senanayake, who was
the loser to J. R. Jayawardene in a power struggle for leadership of the United National Party
in the 1970s after the death of UNP party leader Dudley Senanayake (Rukman's uncle).
38Sirimavo Bandaranaike, leader of the SLFP, argued in a challenge to the Thirteenth
Amendment before the Sri Lankan Supreme Court that the amendment requires the approval
of the people in a referendum before it can be implemented.
39Wiswa Warnapala and Hewagama, Recent Politics.
Parliament. With national elections re

tion of the council system, there is very
suade the leaders of SLFP to change t
fectiveness of the system.
The JVP responded to the Indo-Lanka Accord with a campaign of
assassination aimed at government and UNP party officials. The JVP
militants have also set off a number of bombs which have indiscriminately
killed a large number of civilians. Although JVP support appears to be limited
to perhaps a thousand dedicated supporters, JVP partisans have had a serious
impact on the society and government. Security measures have been
strengthened, and the casual open attitude of Sinhalese society has been
replaced with fear.
The second threat to the provincial council system is the failure of the na-
tional bureaucracy to implement the devolution of powers to the councils.
Earlier research has indicated that there is resistance by the bureaucratic
departments to yielding their authority over development projects.4 The
departments were found to resist the transfer of authority in earlier decen-
tralization schemes. If this happens in the current situation, it may jeopar-
dize the acceptance of the plan by the Tamils. The Sri Lankan bureaucracy
is highly centralized. The major line departments are centered and controlled
from their main offices in Colombo. The provincial council system will place
the provinces in charge of some of the activities of these departments. Because
hiring, promotion, and transfer decisions for the employees are made by the
central offices of the departments, there may be some resistance to responding
to the requests or demands of the provincial governments. In addition, the
influence of the members of Parliament, who now command a great deal
of control over matters in their constituencies, may also threaten the ability
of the provincial governments to exercise their authority.41
The third threat is the opposition to the plan by the militant Tamils. The
strongest "tiger" group, the LTTE, has opposed the plan and is currently
hiding out in remote jungle areas while continuing sporadic attacks against
Indian peace-keeping troops. In September and October 1987, the LTTE suf-
fered a serious defeat at the hands of the Indian peace-keeping forces, but
the LTTE survived, and their leader, Velupillai Prabakharan, escaped into
the jungle. The LTTE must agree to the plan voluntarily or be forced militarily
to agree before the plan can go into effect. Already the government has
postponed the provincial council elections until peace is restored in the North-
ern and Eastern provinces. Several of the weaker "tiger" groups, such as
the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students and the People's Libera-
tion Organization of Tamils, which both suffered serious military defeats
40Robert C. Oberst, "Administrative Conflict and Decentralization: The Case of Sri Lanka,"
Public Administration and Development 6 (April/June 1986): 163-174.
41Robert C. Oberst, Legislators and Representation: The Decentralization of Development
Planning in Sri Lanka (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1985) describes the local influence and
power of the members of Parliament.
Sri Lanka 193
at the hands of the LTT

plan. In addition, the T
to oppose the council sy
The fourth threat is th
of thought among the S
tions in Sri Lanka. Some
island and may continue t
Part of the SLFP opposit
Although there is no evid
a potential threat.
As of April 1988, the p
government has been w
On the east coast, strong
has persisted. Until the
power-sharing arrangem
and a significant segment
transfer of power to th
years, a peaceful settlem
of the Sri Lankan peopl
It is still too early to det
as a federal system or hel
ment to implement the s
as the government is un
be able to generate supp
and Tamil people. It is sti
Indo-Lanka Accord is mer
Sri Lanka since the early
to be brought to an end
governments.

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Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka

Author(s): Robert C. Oberst

A transfer of central governmental authority to regional governments is being tried in Sri

Third World experiences with federalism have generally been a disappoint-

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Summer 1988)

that "there is little more than dogma av

Sri Lanka is a nation of about 15 million people in an area approx

Sinhalese 10,985,666 74.0

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of

Hindus, though, again, a signif

Largest Ethnic Group by Administrative District

Mullaitivu Indian Tamil

along the coastal region

groups have been carrying on the gue

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SRI LANKAN FEDERALISM

8A. C. Alles, Insurgency-1971 (Colombo: Colombo Apothecaries, 1976) provid

Sinhalese culture and la

University of Chicago Press,

In 1937 G. G. Ponnambalam, the fou

12De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, pp. 10

the Tamil-speaking peopl

the creation of an autonomous political u

Proposed Territory of Tamil Eelam

education and income. They are one o

sided with the "tigers";

Provinces of Sri Lanka

in performing his duties

THE SINHALESE OPPOSITION TO FEDERALISM

The Sinhalese community in the past has overwhelmingly oppo

Opposition to federalism in Sri Lanka

THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM IN SRI LANKA

The concept of federalism has generally referred to the power-s

35Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Chapter 2.

Parliament. With national elections re

at the hands of the LTT

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