(1) Aratuc vs. COMELEC 88 SCRA 251
Energy Regulatory Board
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the
Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar
concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the
provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and
Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc
sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board
of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial
results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio
S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein
of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On
July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the
objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan
ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates
to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having
obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of
Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the
voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is
none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in
Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any
supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and
control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to
have done.
(2) Maceda vs.
G.R. No. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted
by public no. the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed
the petition and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase without hearing pursuant to
Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted
but the petitioner failed to appear at said hearing. The petitioner contends that the
provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due process for having
been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior
notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final
disposition of whether or not: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further;
to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin to temporary restraining order. It
outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment,
subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price
increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the
proceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of
provisional authority; however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct
one.
(4) Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.
GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid
for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the
last day for submission of pre- qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2
December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12 December 1988 at 3
pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December
1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered
late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988.
On 12 December, petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman
and PBAC members, claiming that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time,
the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date,
respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants
filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was
prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary
mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which provides: “Section 1. No court in the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order… in any case,
dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project… of the government…
to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding
with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project…” Plaintiffs
argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was
a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of
the national government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No.
1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government
project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989,
the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality
such that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality
as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. The same Code
describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from
the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present controversy did not arise
from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural
rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies
such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order
was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary
injunction should not have been denied.
(8) De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883
FACTS: Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed, providing for
the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals
to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents
from implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that the
reorganization was done in lack of good faith. However, the Solicitor General
denies his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good faith is
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, and that BP 129 was a legitimate
exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the
judiciary.
ISSUE: Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?
HELD: No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary.
Citing the separate opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La
Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith
seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great public
need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure of
judges or any particular judge. While it is possible that the legislature could
deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good faith,
the Court is unconvinced that such was the case in this situation. Thus, where the
Court holds that the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was done
in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is
valid and constitutional.
(9) Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic
Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean
that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction
to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as
the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns
and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails
over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special
law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for
the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to
the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing
permits for revenue purposes. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
(10) Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208
FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality
of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also
reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The
amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie
industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio
countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President
of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation
of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to
"solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies
and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of
the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter,
no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period"
with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control
of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality
occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
(11) US vs. ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122 - February 27, 1922
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution
of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive
Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was
found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power
to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected
by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here
involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which
palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic
law. Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left
to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may
be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of
the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the
sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any
cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to fix the
price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or
what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it
specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was
made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53.”
(12) Ynot vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74457- March 20, 1987
FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-
A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose)
and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of
carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal
Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of
the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained
the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed
the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the
executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On
appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty
suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present:
(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio,
the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is,
the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven
years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works
for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of
their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it
fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of
the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios
make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the
between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of the
confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power
here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government.
Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs.
However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law,
pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard —
are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a
instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption. such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
(13) Pelaez vs. Auditor General whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the
15 SCRA 569 case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character
not administrative.
FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines
may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-
province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision,
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province
into one or more subprovinces. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a
special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are
unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by
Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can
he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are