Logic and Games

Spring Quarter, Stanford 1999, Autumn

Quarter, Amsterdam
Johan van Benthem
Abstract
Games have been a part of logic since
Antiquity. Intuitively, logical validity reflects
winning
strategies in argumentation games. In recent
years, games are becoming a serious
paradigm for
various logical tasks, including proof,
semantic evaluation, model construction, or
model
comparison. The aim of this course is to
understand basic logic games, explore their
general laws,
and then move to linkages with economic
Game Theory. This is an exciting recent
convergence,
which puts the flow of information in games
at centre stage. It involves design of general
logics of
game structure, using ideas from dynamic
logic, linear logic, and epistemic logic.
Full Course Schedule
Part I LOGIC GAMES
1 A Brief History of Games in and Around
Logic
2 Model Comparison Games (Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé)
3 Semantic Evaluation Games (Hintikka &
Sandu)
4 Dialogue Games for Validity (Lorenzen)
Part II GAME LOGICS
5 Process Games & Dynamic Logic (Parikh)
6 Interaction Games & Linear Logic
(Abramsky)
Part III LOGIC AND GAME THEORY
7 Games of perfect information: equilibrium,
equivalence.
8 Imperfect information games and epistemic
logic
9 Contours of a general dynamic-epistemic
logic of games
This material comes from logic, economic
game theory, and also from computer
science. Repercussions also in linguistics and
in philosophy. Great textbook:
M. Osborne & A. Rubinstein, 1994, A Course
in Game Theory, MIT Press.

1 A Brief History of Games in and Around

Logic
1.1 The origins of logic lie
in argumentation, which is a mostly social
activity.
Argumentation is rule-based, it involves
winning and losing, there is commitment,
rights an duties, and other dynamic more-
person features. In this, it is quite unlike
the 'lonesome' standard logical notions of
consequence: whether semantic (|=) or
proof-theoretic (|-). We seem to have strong
intuitions about good practice of
argumentation, which even exert a pull across
cultures (cf. teaching experiences).
General question for the philosophy of logic.
Will games offer a Third Way,
making pragmatics as central as syntax and
semantics?
1.2 Logic games in history. Medieval logic
exams via the Obligatio Game. The
student gets successive abstract assertions
("Socrates is pink", etc.) from the
examiner, and has to accept or reject them,
building up a fund (¬)A1, .., (¬)Ak,
which should remain consistent over some
preset number of rounds (the severity
of the test). Strategy: consistency checking,
or semantic evaluation? Simple logic
games in teaching practical reasoning skills:
cf. Layman Allan's "Wff 'n Proof".
1.3 Attempts at establishing a logical
argumentation theory via procedural
models. Toulmin's critique of logical
inference: static logical 'form' to be replaced
by dynamic juridical 'formalities'. Hamblin's
discourse model: roles, commit-
ments, turns, ... keeping a 'conversational
score' – described more technically (as
navigation through some many-person logical
state space) in D. Lewis 1979
'Score-Keeping in a Language Game'.
Compare the work on 'discourse semantics'
(1980s) in computational linguistics, which
handles stacks of linguistic items plus
discourse moves. 'Discourse representation
theory' (1980s) and 'dynamic
semantics' (1990s) have less elaborate
modelling of discourse moves, but a more
precise description of information changes in
succesful communication.
1.4 Games in areas close to logic: philosophy
of language and science.
Wittgenstein's language games (1950s), now
outdated. Much older: betting
games in the foundations of probability,
since the 17th century, and still going
strong. An early connection with logic (and
perhaps the first significant result) is
Kemeny's & Shimony's characterization of
the probability axioms via betting
games ('Dutch Book Theorem', JSL 1955).
The standard logical interpretations of
negation, disjunction and conjunction on the
interval [0, 1] are enforced, if we are
to avoid systems of bets that are
'systematically unfair'. (Cf. Kyburg, chapter
6.)
General issue: coherence in beliefs, rational
decision making.
1.5 Game Theory and rational behaviour
in economics. Von Neuman &
Morgenstern Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior (1940s). Typical features:
strategies, utilities, choice under uncertainty.
Influential text: Luce & Raifa
Games and Decisions (1957). Search for
equilibrium in selecting strategies by all
the players. Famous example that seems far
away from any concern in 'logic':
Prisoner's Dilemma shows how players may
get stuck in an over-all unfavorable
choice of strategies if they minimize their
risk:
you
arm
disarm
me
arm
-3, -3
-4, +6
disarm
+6, -4
+5, +5
The major classical result is probabilistic.
The Minimax Theorem says that
equilibrium strategies always exist in terms
of playing probabilistic mixtures of
pure strategies. See Binmore's textbook for
an account of modern Game Theory,
and the whole of the book for scattered
results that are closer to logic.
1.6 Logical games from the 50s. See
Lorenzen's Dialogical logic:
valid consequences are those where a
Proponent has a winning strategy
maintaining the conclusion against an
Opponent granting the premises
Key notions: roles, moves (attack, defense),
strategies (one must play well to
win). Novel, very intuitive interpretation of
logical constants in terms of games:
disjunction
defender's choice which component to defend
conjunction attacker's choice which
component to defend
negation
role switch between defender and attacker
Lorenzen's aim: foundation for existing
intuitionistic and classical logic, no
alternatives were taken seriously from an
independent game stance.
1.7 Model comparison games: Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé. Two models are similar up
to degree n when a Similarity player has a
winning strategy against a Difference
player in a game of choosing alternate objects
and comparing the final result.
1.8 Game-theoretical semantics: Hintikka's
alternative for Tarski semantics:
truth of a formula in a model is My having a
winning strategy against
Nature, which puts the claimof the formula
through the severest test
(in terms of potential counter-examples
drawn from the given domain).
Atoms are tests, propositional connectives
behave as before, and furthermore
existential quantifier defender's choice of an
object ('witness')
universal quantifier attacker's choice of an
object ('challenge')
Explanation with Skolem functions: strategy
for ∀x ∃y R(x, y): ∃f ∀x R(x, f(x)).
1.9 Background theory. E.g., all three logic
games described so far are 'zero-sum'
(every outcome is a win for one of the
players, while the other loses) and 'finite
depth' (there is a fixed finite bound to the
length of runs of the game).
Zermelo's Theorem
All zero-sum games of finite depth are
determined:
i.e., one of the two players has a winning
strategy.
Proof via inductive analysis of a node-
colouring algorithm on game trees. General
significance. Even well-known games like
Chess are determined in the broader
sense that at least one player has a strategy
that will guarantee either a win or a
draw. (Very useful once you have become the
World Champion.) If you think
about it, a curious, and not much advertized
open problem: is it White or Black?
1.10 Subsequent uses of games as a technical
tool. Examples in logic. Infinite
games for infinite quantifier prefixes Qx1• ...
Qxk• ... φ(x1, ..., xk, ...) which do
not suggest any sensible Tarski semantics.
Games for bisimulations and other
model equivalences. Also many examples in
computer science. E.g., games
characterize complexity classes, or
interaction between communicating processes
or agents. Our question: can it be more than a
tool?
1.11 The general picture. Games are a
pervasive human activity which can be
viewed as a largely unexplored asset, namely,
a rich cognitive laboratory for
studying deliberation, action, communication,
and information flow. Actual
games, such as Master Mind, card games,
Cluedo, provide a controlled
environment for observing how humans act
intelli-gently, in which one can even
manipulate parameters by modifying the
games. In addition, they have many
other fascinating features. For instance, why
is it that one can become addicted to
games? Is there also a cognitive value to this
(cf. 'addiction to research')?
1.12 General games provide interesting
elaborations of features crucial to logic
games. Example 1: strategies. Compare the
game tree for the Nim example in
Binmore's book, which highlights Zermelo's
Theorem. Example 2: information
hiding and information passing. Simplest
example: stepwise information flow in
Master Mind. More complex examples:
knowledge and ignorance in card games.
(Cf. dissertation Hans van Ditmarsch.) This is
'dynamic epistemic logic'. Some
games have only logical aspects, but allmost
all games have some logical aspects.
1.13 Games have been high-lighted in general
culture through this century.
Huizinga Homo Ludens (1930s), Games
People Play (1960), Hesse's
Glassperlenspiel (1943). Indeed, no single
coherent notion may cover the whole
spectrum from soccer through gambling to
logic. Even for just logic/information
games, no general proposal for a Paradigm
has been made yet comparable to say
what Turing did for computation, or Tarski
for semantics.
Notes
1.1 Cross-cultural teaching experiences with
logic games. Lorenzen thought logical
pragmatics
was a necessary foundation for the usual
systems (1950s). Around 1960, logic courses
were even
being replaced at some departments by game
theory courses! 1.2 C.L. Hamblin, Fallacies,
Methuen, London, 1970. 1.3 S. Toulmin,
1958, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge
Univ. Press,
Cambridge. J. van Benthem, 'Logic &
Argumentation Theory', in F. van Eemeren et
al., eds.,
1996, Proceedings KNAW Colloquium on
Logic and Argumentation, Royal Dutch
Academy of
Sciences, Amsterdam, 27–41. D. Lewis,
1979, 'Score Keeping in a Language
Game', Journal of
Philosophical Logic 8, 339-359. Chapters on
'Discourse in Context' and 'Dynamics' in J.
van
Benthem & A. ter Meulen, eds., Handbook of
Logic and Language, Elsevier Science
Publishers,
Amsterdam, 1997. 1.4 H.E.
Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic,
MacMillan Cy, London,
1967. A. Shimony, Coherence & the Axioms
of Confirmation', Journal of Symbolic
Logic 20,
1–28, 1955. J. Kemeny, 1955, 'Fair Bets &
Inductive Probabilities', ibidem, 263–
273. 1.6 Letter
Lorenzen to Beth on the analogy with
semantic tableaus: whose format admits of
similar two-
person game interpretations: "so entstehen
eben Ihre Tableaux..." 1.10 See
the Handbooks of
Mathematical Logic and Theoretical
Computer Science. 1.11 Cf. J. van Benthem,
'Computation
versus Play as a Paradigm for Cognition',
Symposium for Jaakko Hintikka, Acta
Philosophica
Fennica 49 (1990), 236-251. 1.13 Cf. the
physical-biological panorama presented in M.
Eigen &
R. Winkler, Das Spiel. Naturgesetze steuern
den Zufall, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, München.
Addenda
(1) The title " Logic and Games " covers
three different topics. 'Logic games' in
the narrow sense are special games for logical
tasks like argumentation,
evaluation, communication, or model
comparison. But there is also logical
analysis of actual games. This makes sense as
most games involve information
flow, and reasoning about facts and
knowledge of the other players. Finally, there
are abstract logical systems that model
general game structures. We are interested
in all readings of our title, which show in the
three parts of this course.
(2) Getting ahead of ourselves. Trees of
specific games, say Nim, show Zermelo's
Theorem at work. These do not give
immediate constructive information about (a)
who has the winning strategy, (b) effective
computation of moves prescribed by
that winning strategy. This makes sense, as
(e.g.) semantic games for truth ('M|=
F') cannot have constructive winning
strategies when the model is complex.
Computation of successive game states
in Master Mind shows how information
flows. In general, more complex 'higher-
order' information states are modified in
games, including iterations of what each
player knows or ignores. This is as in
current uses of epistemic logic for
computation (cf. Fagin, Halpern, Moses &
Vardi, 1995, "Reasoning about Knowledge",
MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.)).
(3) How general Game Theory differs from
logic games. (a) General utilities and
preferences, mostly non-zero-sum games, (b)
emphasis = equilibrium strategies
for both players, (c) 'psychologistic'
reasoning about equilibria and strategy choice
involves subtleties of knowledge,
counterfactuals, preferences, etcetera, (d)
rational decision: cf. again Prisoner's
Dilemma, (e) playing probabilistic mixtures
of pure strategies as a way of achieving
equilibria, (f) 'evolution': repeated play.
a brief more concrete summary
(1)
Origins of logic in the analysis of debate
since Antiquity, starting from the
Sophists' teaching of effective reasoning
skills. Argumentation, then and now, has
a game structure, which involves players,
moves, turns, commitments, duties,
timing, winning and losing. And in fact, so
do many other logical activities.
(2)
Evaluation games: Hintikka's alternative to
Tarski. Truth of a statement A
in a model M as (existence of) a winning
strategy for Verifier in the associated
evaluation game game(M, A). Atoms are a
test whose outcome determines who
wins, disjunctions are Verifier's choice,
conjunctions Falsifier's, negations trigger
a role switch between the two players,
existential quantifiers let Verifier pick an
object (play continues w.r.t. that), universal
quantifiers do the same for Falsifier.
These games can be played realistically!
Example 1: Find the 'non-communicator'
in the following network, by playing an
evaluation game for the formula ∀x ∀y
(Rxy ∨ ∃z(Rxz & Rzy)) . Falsifier has a
winning strategy, exploiting the 'counter-
example' of object d, which cannot reach a in
≤2 steps:
a
c
d
e
If you want to play this game with others,
you might exploit the fact that every
finite network in which distinct points always
have at least one directed link
between them, must contain a 'Great
Communicator', which can reach every other
node in at most 2 steps. Example 2: Consider
two objects s, t , with a relation R
holding only of s, t and t, s . (Say, R is
inequality, and the game is 'matching
pennies'.) The evaluation game of perfect
information associated with the formula
∀x ∃y Rxy may be pictured by a tree of
possible runs, just as in Game Theory:
F
x:= s
x:= t
V
V
y:= s
y:= t
y:= s
y:= t
winF
winV
winV
winF
Point: One run versus a whole strategy.
Verifier has a winning strategy in this
game, i.e., a response pattern to Falsifier's
moves, which always lands her in a
winning end position. (Note how this strategy
exploits the truth of the formula:
each object has an R-successor.) But she can
also lose, by playing badly (also a
feature of real games!). Hintikka's Lemma:
a first-order formula A is true in a
model iff Verifier has a winning strategy for
A . The proof is straightforward: the
repercussions are not. The above new
meaning of the logical constants shows in
new game-theoretic interpretations for
routine Tarski validities. In particular,
Excluded Middle: |= A ∨ ¬A now
expresses determinacy of all evaluation
games
game (M, A): one of the two players must
have a winning strategy.
(3)
Game Theory in the background: Zermelo's
Theorem explains the deter-
minacy. (The 'second mathematization' of
games, after that by Pascal/Huygens in
the 17th century.) Later on, we will encounter
non-determined logic games as
well, both finite and infinite. The proof was a
simple induction on the depth of
trees, colouring nodes white if V has a
winning strategy from there on, and black
if Falsifier does – moving these colours
upward to nodes all of whose children
were coloured already. E.g., if V is to move
at a node, and there is at least one
white daughter, colour that node white, too:
otherwise, colour it black.
(4)
Indeterminacy often reflects possible lack of
information about where we
are in a game. Logical analysis of actual
games (e.g., card games) often reveals
such features, as not all moves are public -
unlike those in model evaluation
games of the classical type. A very simple
example, which can be cast either as a
general game or an evaluation game (the
latter are surprisingly 'universal' as a
source of examples). Consider example 2
again, but now assume that Verifier and
Falsifier must move independently (e.g.,
because Verifier has not paid attention to
what Falsifier did in the first round): the dots
indicate ignorance. In Hintikka's
notation: ∀x ∃y/x Rxy . Its associated game is
the non-determined tree
F
x:= s ........................................... x:= t
V
V
y:= s
y:= t
y:= s
y:= t
winF
winV
winV
winF
Some reflection shows that neither player has
a winning strategy! Players' know-
ledge and ignorance are crucial to the flow of
action and information in games,
both in actual board or card games, and in the
final analysis also, logic games.
(5)
Argumentation games: one can reinterpret
(e.g.) semantic tableaus in this
style, as a record of successive moves and
commitments by two players with
opposing aims. Example: try to read game
rules like the earlier ones into the
following informal protocols:
¬A, A∨B implies B:
Proponent defends B, against an Opponent
defending the two premises. We
assume three states of commitment: defined,
attack, and neutral. E.g., so far,
Opponent is neutral w.r.t. B. Games need
procedural conventions. Our two
players shall speak in turn, and they have to
say something relevant, that is,
admissible as an attack or defense.
(0)
automatic switch in attitude: O's 'defending'
¬A => O's 'attacking' A.
(this is just one option out of many: the same
holds for what follows.)
(1)
O:
?B
this challenges P to produce a defense
(2)
P:
?(A∨B)
pressing O to make a choice
(3)
O:
must respond to this, since he has run out of
other things to say:
There are two options for this.
(3.1) O:
A
P:
I win, because you have contradicted
yourself!
(O already attacked A, but now he defends
it.)
(3.2) O:
B
(4)
P:
B: this is my reply to your first attack,
because you say so yourself!
(again P wins, because O has nothing further
to say.)
P can win whatever O does; and so she has a
winnig strategy for this valid
argument form. You might contrast this with
some invalid form, where O may
have a winning strategy. (How does the latter
eventuality relate to a standard
logical status of the argument form?)

Page 10
10
Note the difference with evaluation games.
The 'logical structure' of choices and
switches is roughly the same, but (a) there is
no appeal to external testing, only to
internal consistency (this is very realistic in
debate), (b) outcomes depend on
procedural conventions (just like you can lose
a lawsuit for procedural reasons,
even though you are blatantly in the right).
Another example in class was the
implication from A & (B∨C) to
(A&B)∨(A&C), where the winning strategy
for
P pressed O to reveal his information. What
we saw quite clearly there was how
winning strateges for Proponent are
like proofs. This point will return later.
(6)
Alert: a possible misunderstanding. You
might have the impression that
these games only 'redo' what has already been
proposed in standard logic.
Originally, this may have been true. But by
now, the game paradigm has turned
out to be much richer, so that it brings to light
phenomena that were not
considered in standard logic at all. This will
be the main theme in this course.
But of course, we had to start at some 'point
of identification'.
(7)
Propositional logic: the usual logical
operations now become game-
constructions, satisfying certain laws that
may or may not coincide with those of
Boolean Algebra. New operations arise as
well: parallel versus sequential
conjunctions of games. We gave two
examples in addition to Boolean & where
Falsifier makes a choice right at the
beginning. (a) Playing two games
consecutively (sequential product: say
'attending class' and 'playing tennis'), and
playing two games interleaved (parallel
product: as in combining the 'career' and
'marriage' games). 'Game logics' result that
we will study in Part II of the course.
(8) Connections with actual games. Key
issues emerge in simple settings.
We have both just drawn a closed envelope. It
is common knowledge
between us that one envelope holds an
invitation to a lecture on Ethics
and Society, the other to a night out in
immoral San Francisco. Clearly,
we are both ignorant of the fate in store for
us. Now I open my envelope,
and read the contents, without showing them
to you. Yours remains closed.
Which information has passed *exactly*
because of my action? I certainly
know now which fate is in store for me. You
have also learnt something,
viz. *that* I know – though not *what* I
know. And likewise, I did not just
learn what is in my envelope. I also learnt
something about you, viz. that

you know that I know. The latter fact has

even become common knowledge
between us. And all these 'cognitive
overtones' can be relevant to our
further interactions. Try to formulate
*exactly which information* has
been passed in this one simple move of
opening my envelope, which a
child can understand! Then look for a
general principle behind this. You
may find the challenge much harder than
you'd think.
Our course will provide logical tools for
analysing these issues of information
flow for different players in a systematic
manner.
(9)
Students' question. Why are games so
ubiquitous and important? They are
probably part of a succesful evolutionary
strategy for humans. In particular, they
are efficient ways of simulating real-life
situations, so that we can prepare for
better performance. (Why this also tends to
give pleasure is a mystery, but one
that occurs also with other vital aspects of
life.) Simulation and training purposes
seem highly congenial to logic, which is all
about representing real things
cognitively, and manipulating information
about them abstractly.
The remainder of our material for the 2000
Birmingham ESSLLI course consists
of some further parts of these notes, a few
papers by your teachers elaborating
special topics, and some additional papers on
recent developments to be covered
that we have solicited from their authors.
Please also check the homepages
http://www.cwi.nl/~pauly/games.html, and
http://turing.wins.uva.nl/~johan