Mmcadv 20120111 Votinglecture Ernestodiaz

Math Circle
Lecture on
Mathematics of Voting
and Apportionment
Ernesto Diaz
Assistant Professor of Mathematics
Department of Natural Sciences and
Mathematics
Slide 1.1-1
1 The Mathematics of Voting
The Paradoxes of Democracy
•  Vote! In a democracy, the rights and duties

of citizenship are captured in that simple
one-word mantra.
•  We vote in presidential elections,
gubernatorial elections, local elections,
school bonds, stadium bonds, American Idol
selections, and initiatives large and small.
Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Excursions in Modern Mathematics, 7e: 1.1 - 2
The Paradoxes of Democracy
•  The paradox is that the more opportunities

we have to vote, the less we seem to
appreciate and understand the meaning of
voting.
•  Why should we vote?
•  Does our vote really count?
•  How does it count?
Voting Theory
•  First half is voting;

•  Second half is counting.
•  Arrow’s impossibility theorem:
A method for determining election results
that is democratic and always fair is a
mathematical impossibility.
1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference

Schedules
1.2 The Plurality Method
1.3 The Borda Count Method
Example 1.1 The Math Club Election
The Math Appreciation Society (MAS) is a student
organization dedicated to an unsung but worthy cause, that
of fostering the enjoyment and appreciation of mathematics
among college students. The Tasmania State University
chapter of MAS is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Alisha,
Boris, Carmen, and Dave (A, B, C, and D for short). Each of
the 37 members of the club votes by means of a ballot
indicating his or her first, second, third, and fourth choice.
The 37 ballots submitted are shown on the next slide. Once
the ballots are in, it’s decision time. Who should be the
winner of the election? Why?
1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference

Schedules
Plurality Method
•  Candidate with the most first-place votes (called
the plurality candidate) wins
•  Don’t need each voter to rank the candidates -
need only the voter’s first choice
•  Vast majority of elections for political office in the
United States are decided using the plurality
method
•  Many drawbacks - other than its utter simplicity,
the plurality method has little else going in its
favor
(Plurality)
Under plurality:
A gets 14 first-place votes

B gets 4 first-place votes
C gets 11 first-place votes
D gets 8 first-place votes
and the results are clear - A wins (Alisha)
Majority Candidate
The allure of the plurality method lies in its
simplicity (voters have little patience for
complicated procedures) and in the fact that
plurality is a natural extension of the principle
of majority rule:
In a democratic election between two
candidates, the candidate with a majority
(more than half) of the votes should be the
winner.
Problem with Majority Candidate
•  Two candidates: a plurality candidate is

also a majority candidate - everything
works out well
•  Three or more candidates: there is no
guarantee that there is going to be a
majority candidate
Problem with Majority Candidate
In the Math Club election:
•  majority would require at least 19 first-
place votes (out of 37).
•  Alisha, with 14 first-place votes, had a
plurality (more than any other candidate)
but was far from being a majority candidate
•  With many candidates, the percentage of
the vote needed to win under plurality can
be ridiculously low
Majority Criterion
One of the most basic expectations in a
democratic election is the notion that if there
is a majority candidate, then that candidate
should be the winner of the election.
THE MAJORITY CRITERION
If candidate X has a majority of the first-
place votes,then candidate X should be
the winner of the election.
The Condorcet Criterion
The plurality method satisfies the majority

criterion-that’s good!
The principal weakness of the plurality
method is that it fails to take into
consideration a voter’s other preferences
beyond first choice and in so doing can lead
to some very bad election results. To
underscore the point, consider the following
example.
Example 1.3 The Marching Band Election
Tasmania State University has a superb
marching band. They are so good that this
coming bowl season they have invitations to
perform at five different bowl games: the Rose
Bowl (R), the Hula Bowl (H), the Fiesta Bowl (F),
the Orange Bowl (O), and the Sugar Bowl (S).
An election is held among the 100 members of
the band to decide in which of the five bowl
games they will perform. A preference schedule
giving the results of the election is shown.
•  Under the plurality method, Rose Bowl wins
with 49 first-place votes
•  Bad outcome - 51 voters have the Rose
Bowl as last choice
•  Hula Bowl has 48 first-place votes and 52
second-place votes
•  Hula Bowl is a far better choice to
represent the wishes of the entire band.
Condorcet Criterion
A candidate preferred by a majority of the
voters over every other candidate when the
candidates are compared in head-to-head
comparisons is called a Condorcet candidate
THE CONDORCET CRITERION
If candidate X is preferred by the voters
over each of the other candidates in a
head-to-head comparison,then candidate
X should be the winner of the election.
Insincere Voting
The idea behind insincere voting (also
known as strategic voting) is simple: If we
know that the candidate we really want
doesn’t have a chance of winning, then rather
than “waste our vote” on our favorite
candidate we can cast it for a lesser choice
who has a better chance of winning the
election. In closely contested elections a few
insincere voters can completely change the
outcome of an election.
Gets Manipulated
Consequences of Insincere Voting
•  Insincere voting common in real-world
elections
•  2000 and 2004 presidential elections:
Close races, Ralph Nader lost many votes -
voters did not want to “waste their vote.”
•  Independent and small party candidates
never get a fair voice or fair level funding
(need 5% of vote to qualify for federal funds)
•  Entrenched two-party system, often gives
voters little real choice
1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference Schedules

The Borda Count Method
•  Each place on a ballot is assigned points

•  With N candidates, 1 point for last place, 2
points for second from last, and so on
•  First-place vote is worth N points
•  Tally points for each candidate separately
•  Candidate with highest total is winner
•  Candidate is called the Borda winner
(Borda Method)
Let’s use the Borda count method to choose

the winner of the Math Appreciation Society
election first introduced in Example 1.1. Table
1-4 shows the point values under each
column based on first place worth 4 points,
second place worth 3 points, third place worth
2 points, and fourth place worth 1 point.
(Borda Method)
Tally the points:
A gets: 56 + 10 + 8 + 4 + 1 = 79 points
B gets: 42 + 30 + 16 + 16 + 2 = 106 points
C gets: 28 + 40 + 24 + 8 + 4 = 104 points
D gets: 14 + 20 + 32 + 12 + 3 = 81 points
The Borda winner of this election is Boris!
(Wasn’t Alisha the winner of this election under
the plurality method?)
What’s wrong with the Borda Method?
In contrast to the plurality method, the Borda
count method takes into account all the
information provided in the voters’ preference
ballots, and the Borda winner is the candidate
with the best average ranking - the best
compromise candidate if you will. On its face, the
Borda count method seems like an excellent way
to take full consideration of the voter’s
preferences, so indeed, what’s wrong with it?
The next example illustrates some of the
problems with the Borda count method.
What’s wrong with the Borda Method?
The Borda Method violates two basic criteria
of fairness:
•  Majority criterion
•  Condorcet criterion
Despite its flaws, experts in voting theory consider
the Borda count method one of the best, if not the
very best, method for deciding elections with
many candidates.
Borda count method in Real Life
•  individual sports awards (Heisman Trophy

winner, NBA Rookie of the Year, NFL MVP,
etc.)
•  college football polls
•  music industry awards
•  hiring of school principals, university
presidents, and corporate executives
2 The Mathematics of Power
2.1 An Introduction to Weighted Voting

2.2 The Banzhaf Power Index
Weighted Voting
In a democracy we take many things for
granted, not the least of which is the idea
that we are all equal. When it comes to
voting rights, the democratic ideal of
equality translates into the principle of one
person-one vote. But is the principle of one
person-one vote always fair? Should one
person-one vote apply when the voters are
institutions or governments, rather than
individuals?
Weighted Voting
What we are talking about here is the exact
opposite of the principle of one voter–one
vote, a principle best described as one
voter–x votes and formally called weighted
voting. Weighted voting is not uncommon;
we see examples of weighted voting in
shareholder votes in corporations, in
business partnerships, in legislatures, in the
United Nations, and, most infamously, in the
way we elect the President of the United
States.
Electoral College
The Electoral College consists of 51
“voters”(each of the 50 states plus the
District of Columbia), each with a weight
determined by the size of its Congressional
delegation (number of Representatives and
Senators). At one end of the spectrum is
heavyweight California (with 55 electoral
votes); at the other end of the spectrum are
lightweights like Wyoming, Montana, North
Dakota, and the District of Columbia (with a
paltry 3 electoral votes). The other states
fall somewhere in between.
Electoral College
The 2000 and 2004 presidential elections
brought to the surface, in a very dramatic
way, the vagaries and complexities of the
Electoral College system, and in particular
the pivotal role that a single state (Florida in
2000, Ohio in 2004) can have in the final
outcome of a presidential election.
In this chapter we will look at the
mathematics behind weighted voting, with a
particular focus on the question of power.
Notation
Thus, a generic weighted voting system with
N players can be written as:
GENERIC WEIGHTED VOTING

SYSTEM WITH N PLAYERS
[q: w1, w2,…, wN]

(with w1 ≥ w2 ≥ … ≥ wN)
Example 2.6 Unsuspecting Dummies
Four college friends (P1, P2, P3, and P4)
decide to go into business together. Three of
the four (P1, P2, and P3) invest $10,000 each,
and each gets 10 shares in the partnership.
The fourth partner (P4) is a little short on
cash, so he invests only $9000 and gets 9
shares. As usual, one share equals one vote.
The quota is set at 75%, which here means
q = 30 out of a total of V = 39 votes.
Mathematically (i.e., stripped of all the
irrelevant details of the story), this partnership
is just the weighted voting system
[30: 10, 10, 10, 9].
Example 2.6 Unsuspecting Dummies
Everything seems fine with the partnership
until one day P4 wakes up to the realization
that with the quota set at q = 30 he is
completely out of the decision-making loop:
For a motion to pass P1, P2, and P3 all must
vote Yes, and at that point it makes no
difference how P4 votes. Thus, there is never
going to be a time when P4’s votes are going
to make a difference in the final outcome of a
vote. Surprisingly, P4–with almost as many
votes as the other partners–is just a dummy!
2 The Mathematics of Power
2.1 An Introduction to Weighted Voting

2.2 The Banzhaf Power Index
Weighted Voting
In weighted voting the player’s weights can
be deceiving. Sometimes a player with a
few votes can have as much power as a
player with many more votes (see Example
2.4); sometimes two players have almost an
equal number of votes, and yet one player
has a lot of power and the other one has
none (see Example 2.6).
Coalitions
A coalition is any set of players who might
join forces and vote the same way. In
principle, we can have a coalition with as
few as one player and as many as all
players. The coalition consisting of all the
players is called the grand coalition. Since
coalitions are just sets of players, the most
convenient way to describe coalitions
mathematically is to use set notation. For
example, the coalition consisting of players
P1, P2,and P3 can be written as the set
{P1, P2, P3} (order does not matter).
Example 2.8 The Weirdness of
Parliamentary Politics
The Parliament of Icelandia has 200
members, divided among three political
parties: P1, P2, and P3, with 99, 98, and 3
seats in Parliament, respectively. Decisions
are made by majority vote, which in this case
requires 101 out of the total 200 votes. Let’s
assume, furthermore, that in Icelandia
members of Parliament always vote along
party lines (not voting with your party is very
unusual in parliamentary governments).
We can think of the Parliament of Icelandia as
the weighted voting system [101: 99, 98, 3].
In this
weighted
voting
system we
have four
winning
coalitions.
In the two-party coalitions, both parties are
critical players (without both players the
coalition wouldn’t win); in the grand coalition
no party is critical–any two parties together
have enough votes to win. Each of the three
parties is critical the same number of times,
and consequently, one could rightfully argue
that each of the three parties has the same
amount of power (never mind the fact that
one party has only 3 votes!).
4 The Mathematics of Apportionment
4.1 Apportionment Problems

4.2 Hamilton’s Method and the Quota Rule
4.3 The Alabama and Other Paradoxes
4.4 Jefferson’s Method
4.5 Adam’s Method
4.6 Webster’s Method
Apportionment
Without a doubt, the most important and
heated debate at the Constitutional
Convention concerned the makeup of the
legislature. The small states wanted all states
to have the same number of representatives;
the larger states wanted some form of
proportional representation. The
Constitutional compromise, known as the
Connecticut Plan, was a Senate, in which
every state has two senators, and a House of
Representatives, in which each state has a
number of representatives that is a function
of its population.
Apportionment
While the Constitution makes clear that seats
in the House of Representatives are to be
allocated to the states based on their
populations (“According to their respective
Numbers”), it does not prescribe a specific
method for the calculations. Undoubtedly, the
Founding Fathers felt that this was a
relatively minor detail–a matter of simple
arithmetic that could be easily figured out and
agreed upon by reasonable people.
Apportionment
Certainly it was not the kind of thing to clutter
a Constitution with or spend time arguing
over in the heat of the summer. What the
Founding Fathers did not realize is that
Article I, Section 2, set the Constitution of the
United States into a collision course with a
mathematical iceberg known today (but
certainly not then) as the apportionment
problem.
Apportionment Problems
Obviously, the word apportion is the key word
in this chapter. There are two critical
elements in the dictionary definition of the
word: (1) We are dividing and assigning
things, and (2) we are doing this on a
proportional basis and in a planned,
organized fashion.
We will start this section with a pair of
examples that illustrate the nature of the
problem we are dealing with. These
examples will raise several questions but not
give any answers. Most of the answers will
come later.
Example 4.2 The Intergalactic
Congress of Utopia
It is the year 2525, and all the planets in the
Utopia galaxy have finally signed a peace
treaty. Five of the planets (Alanos, Betta,
Conii, Dugos, and Ellisium) decide to join
forces and form an Intergalactic Federation.
The Federation will be ruled by an
Intergalactic Congress consisting of 50
“elders,” and the 50 seats in the Intergalactic
Congress are to be apportioned among the
planets according to their respective
populations.
Example 4.2 The Intergalactic
Congress of Utopia
The population data for each of the planets
(in billions) are shown in Table 4-2. Based on
these population figures, what is the correct
apportionment of seats to each planet?
We’ll get back to this later . . .

Apportionment: Basic Concepts and
Terminology
The basic elements of every apportionment
problem are as follows:
The “states”
This is the term we will use to describe the
parties having a stake in the apportionment.
Unless they have specific names (Azucar,
Bahia, etc.), we will use A1, A2,…, AN, to
denote the states.
Terminology
The “seats”
This term describes the set of M identical,
indivisible objects that are being divided
among the N states. For convenience, we will
assume that there are more seats than there
are states, thus ensuring that every state can
potentially get a seat. (This assumption does
not imply that every state must get a seat!)
Terminology
The “populations”
This is a set of N positive numbers (for
simplicity we will assume that they are whole
numbers) that are used as the basis for the
apportionment of the seats to the states. We
will use p1, p2,…, pN, to denote the state’s
respective populations and P to denote the
total population P = p1 + p2 +…+ pN).
Terminology
The standard divisor(SD)

This is the ratio of population to seats. It
gives us a unit of measurement (SD people =
1 seat) for our apportionment calculations.
Terminology
The standard quotas
The standard quota of a state is the exact
fractional number of seats that the state
would get if fractional seats were allowed.
We will use the notation q1, q2,…, qN to
denote the standard quotas of the respective
states. To find a state’s standard quota, we
divide the state’s population by the standard
divisor. (In general, the standard quotas can
be expressed as fractions or decimals–round
them to two or three decimal places.)
Terminology
Upper and lower quotas
The lower quota is the standard quota
rounded down and the upper quota is the
standard quota rounded up. In the unlikely
event that the standard quota is a whole
number, the lower and upper quotas are the
same. We will use L’s to denote lower quotas
and U’s to denote upper quotas. For
example, the standard quota q1 = 32.92 has
lower quota L1 = 32 and upper quota U1 = 33.
Apportionment Methods
Our main goal in this chapter is to discover a

“good” apportionment method–a reliable
procedure that (1) will always produce a valid
apportionment (exactly M seats are
apportioned) and (2) will always produce a
“fair” apportionment. In this quest we will
discuss several different methods and find
out what is good and bad about each one.

4.2 Hamilton’s Method and the Quota
Rule
Hamilton’s Method
Hamilton’s method can be described quite

briefly:
Every state gets at least its lower quota. As
many states as possible get their upper
quota, with the one with highest residue
(i.e.,fractional part) having first priority, the
one with second highest residue second
priority, and so on.
A little more formally, it goes like this:
HAMILTON’S METHOD
Step 1 Calculate each state’s standard

quota.
Step 2 Give to each state its lower
quota.
Step 3 Give the surplus seats (one at a
time) to the states with the
largest residues (fractional
parts) until there are no more
surplus seats.
Example 4.4 Parador’s Congress
(Hamilton’s Method)
As promised, we are revisiting the Parador
Congress apportionment problem. We are
now going to find our first real solution to this
problem–the solution given by Hamilton’s
method (sometimes, for the sake of brevity,
we will call it the Hamilton apportionment).
Table 4-6 shows all the details and speaks for
itself. (Reminder: The standard quotas in the
second row of the table were computed in
Example 4.3.)
Example 4.4 Parador’s Congress
(Hamilton’s Method)
Hamilton’s method (also known as Vinton’s

method or the method of largest remainders)
was used in the United States only between
1850 and 1900.
Hamilton’s Method
Hamilton’s method is still used today to
apportion the legislatures of Costa Rica,
Namibia, and Sweden.
At first glance, Hamilton’s method appears to
be quite fair. It could be reasonably argued
that Hamilton’s method has a major flaw in
the way it relies entirely on the size of the
residues without consideration of what those
residues represent as a percent of the state’s
population. In so doing, Hamilton’s method
creates a systematic bias in favor of larger
states over smaller ones.
Hamilton’s Method
This is bad–a good apportionment method
should be population neutral, meaning that it
should not be biased in favor of large states
over small ones or vice versa.
To be totally fair, Hamilton’s method has two
important things going for it: (1) It is very easy
to understand, and (2) it satisfies an
extremely important requirement for fairness
called the quota rule.
QUOTA RULE
No state should be apportioned a
number of seats smaller than its lower
quota or larger than its upper quota.
(When a state is apportioned a number
smaller than its lower quota, we call it
a lower-quota violation; when a state
is apportioned a number larger than its
upper quota, we call it an upper-quota
violation.)

4.2 Hamilton’s Method and the Quota Rule
Alabama Paradox - Hamilton’s Method
The most serious (in fact, the fatal) flaw of

Hamilton’s method is commonly known as
the Alabama paradox. In essence, the
Alabama paradox occurs when an increase
in the total number of seats being
apportioned, in and of itself, forces a state to
lose one of its seats. The best way to
understand what this means is to look
carefully at the following example.
Example 4.5 More Seats Means Fewer
Seats
The small country of Calavos consists of
three states: Bama, Tecos, and Ilnos. With a
total population of 20,000 and 200 seats in
the House of Representatives, the
apportionment of the 200 seats under
Hamilton’s method is shown in Table 4-7.
Seats
Now imagine that overnight the number of

seats is increased to 201, but nothing else
changes. Since there is one more seat to give
out, the apportionment has to be recomputed.
Seats
Here’s the new apportionment (Hamilton’s
method) for a House with 201 seats. (Notice
that for M = 200, the SD is 100; for M = 201,
the SD drops to 99.5.)
The Population Paradox
Sometime in the early 1900s it was
discovered that under Hamilton’s method a
state could potentially lose some seats
because its population got too big! This
phenomenon is known as the population
paradox. To be more precise, the population
paradox occurs when state A loses a seat to
state B even though the population of A grew
at a higher rate than the population of B. Too
weird to be true, you say? Check out the next
example.
Example 4.6 A Tale of Two Planets
Part I. The Apportionment of 2525.
The first Intergalactic Congress was
apportioned using Hamilton’s method, based
on the population figures (in billions) shown in
the second column of Table 4-10. (This is the
apportionment problem discussed in Example
4.2.) There were 50 seats apportioned.
Part I. The Apportionment of 2525.
Part II. The Apportionment of 2535.
After 10 years of peace, all was well in the
Intergalactic Federation. The Intergalactic
Census of 2535 showed only a few changes
in the planets’ populations–an 8 billion
increase in the population of Conii, and a 1
billion increase in the population of Ellisium.
The populations of the other planets
remained unchanged from 2525.
Nonetheless, a new apportionment was
required.
Part II. The Apportionment of 2535.
Here are the details of the 2535
apportionment under Hamilton’s method.
The New-States Paradox
In 1907 Oklahoma joined the Union. Prior to

Oklahoma becoming a state, there were 386
seats in the House of Representatives. At the
time the fair apportionment to Oklahoma was
five seats, so the size of the House of
Representatives was changed from 386 to
391. The point of adding these five seats was
to give Oklahoma its fair share of seats and
leave the apportionments of the other states
unchanged.
Example 4.7 Garbage Time
The Metro Garbage Company has a contract
to provide garbage collection and recycling
services in two districts of Metropolis,
Northtown (with 10,450 homes) and the much
larger Southtown (89,550 homes). The
company runs 100 garbage trucks, which are
apportioned under Hamilton’s method
according to the number of homes in the
district. A quick calculation shows that the
standard divisor is SD = 1000 homes, a nice,
round number which makes the rest of the
calculations (shown in Table 4-12) easy.
As a result of the apportionment, 10 garbage
trucks are assigned to service Northtown and
90 garbage trucks to service Southtown.
Now imagine that the Metro Garbage
Company is bidding to expand its territory by
adding the district of Newtown (5250 homes)
to its service area. In its bid to the City
Council the company promises to buy five
additional garbage trucks for the Newtown
run so that its service to the other two districts
is not affected. But when the new calculations
(shown in Table 4-13) are carried out, there is
a surprise: One of the garbage trucks
assigned to Southtown has to be reassigned
to Northtown!
Notice that the standard divisor has gone up
a little and is now approximately 1002.38.
Hamilton’s Method
There are two key lessons we should take
from this section:
(1) In terms of fairness, Hamilton’s method
leaves a lot to be desired; and
(2) the critical flaw in Hamilton’s method is
the way it handles the surplus seats.
Clearly, there must be a better
apportionment method.

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Math Circle

• Vote! In a democracy, the rights and duties

• The paradox is that the more opportunities

• First half is voting;

1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference

1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference

A gets 14 first-place votes

• Two candidates: a plurality candidate is

The plurality method satisfies the majority

1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference Schedules

• Each place on a ballot is assigned points

Let’s use the Borda count method to choose

• individual sports awards (Heisman Trophy

2.1 An Introduction to Weighted Voting

GENERIC WEIGHTED VOTING

[q: w1, w2,…, wN]

2.1 An Introduction to Weighted Voting

4.1 Apportionment Problems

We’ll get back to this later . . .

The standard divisor(SD)

Our main goal in this chapter is to discover a

4.1 Apportionment Problems

Hamilton’s method can be described quite

Step 1 Calculate each state’s standard

Hamilton’s method (also known as Vinton’s

4.1 Apportionment Problems

The most serious (in fact, the fatal) flaw of

Now imagine that overnight the number of

In 1907 Oklahoma joined the Union. Prior to

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