G.R. No.

L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She
left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the
bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto
Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix
and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she
was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that
she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could
freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof
she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera
as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was
set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the prob ate of
the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally
incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate
court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the
oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico
because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to
probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which
declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while
the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. O n his part,
Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which
nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the
former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession
in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and
oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val
Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court
commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be
vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in
the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung
Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al.,
L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an "interested
person." An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir,
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is
well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person
may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-
3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire
any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously
had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the
testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that
oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the
law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is
so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any
right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the
law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumption will of the
interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in
turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a
blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting
parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted
and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the
adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants
and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered
as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not
extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but
the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice
Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp.
312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to
the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should
not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence
and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly
the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with
her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand
margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the
other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and
signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to
the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the
notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood
the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the
instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo
made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to
sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix
from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence
of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact
may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing
could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact
reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was
often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different
occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim
that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in
their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually
isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that
the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than
her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of
the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this
Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
 Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."
(Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even
by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such
provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone.
In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and
must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil.
676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for
the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico
in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should
be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in
this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and
admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter
which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by
the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born
three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H).
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two
children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra
Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia
Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and
Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong,
Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband
died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta
Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving
behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
(Rollo, pp. 2-3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following
described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area
of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina;
and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra
Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with
an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on
the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in
the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees
and having an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma;
on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by
Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
 D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on
the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by
Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit
bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on
the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-
6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties.
However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial
of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid.
Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration
of the same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten
twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of
the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena,
are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty
fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this
decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA
Judge
Record on Appeal, p. 47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land
in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was
limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B and C in the complaint
which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied
by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions.
He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the
sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to
Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was
even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May
9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for
determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the
appellate court certified this case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at
bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter
by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood,
the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance
with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue,
and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs.
Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal
line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of
the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art.
1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a
share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the
deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the
nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she
predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents.
The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November
10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine
years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of
the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the
Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia
and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled
to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption
dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3
Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being
the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case
No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on
February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact
born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became
final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia
and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not,
although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of
Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the
 petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although
the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is
of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and
binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition
for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally,
as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory
compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the
decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the
truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations,
and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be
held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be
sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course
hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must
be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's
legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia
and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the
following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as
to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his
parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone
from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right
to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she
is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it
is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, Petitioners, v. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C.
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF
ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, Respondents.

Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolito, for Petitioners.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; NO RIGHT TO INHERIT AB INTESTATO
FROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF THEIR PARENTS; DIAZ V. IAC (150 SCRA 645) CITED. — The issue in the case at bar,
had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA 645) where this Court ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR PARENTS IN THE INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE PARENT. — "Article 902, 98, and
990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The
descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that ‘the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation.’ Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the
legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable
to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that ‘grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation’ and in Article 902
that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are
subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae’s Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12).
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April
29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C.
Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., Et. Al.", which dismissed the petition
and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being
the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children and was survived by the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista Manuel C. Pascual Jose C. Pascual Susana C. Pascual-Bautista Erlinda C. Pascual Wenceslao C. Pascual,
Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Avelino Pascual Isoceles Pascual Loida Pascual-Martinez Virginia Pascual-Ner Nona Pascual-Fernando Octavio Pascual Geranaia
Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Olivia S. Pascual Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:chanrob1es
Dominga M. Pascual Mamerta P. Fugoso Abraham S. Sarmiento, III Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay Eleuterio P. Sarmiento Dominga P.
San Diego Nelia P. Marquez Silvestre M. Pascual Eleuterio M. Pascual

(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162
(CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p.
47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for Letters of Administration, where
she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio
Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that
they are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the
herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although Paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to
wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual
as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p. 108).

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113114) and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of
Olivia and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and such motion was denied.

Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).

On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive part of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150
SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage
when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious
children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."cralaw virtua1aw library

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and
Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children,
which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves
illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that `the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.’ Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions
of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982
is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation’ and in Article
902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae’s Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12).
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law
may be harsh or onerous. (Nepumoceno, Et. Al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute,
the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly
settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., respondents.
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979,
reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES,
entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and
not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of
Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation,
between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to
render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo
his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the
amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for
ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one
of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant,
private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties
from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with
legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that
petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime
in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier
quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was
filed of the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES,
HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting.
The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos
siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de
Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la
dicha calle Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she
and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax
of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he
had some proprietary right over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which
describes the property as follows:
 . . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea
y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur
con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de
una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up
to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco
Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking
that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof
as the same allegedly represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence
do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties
sought by the plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the
identification of the lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane
Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including
the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now being sought by
the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the tax
declaration is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed between the
deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of
this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the
same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is
no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles
began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review
on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings
of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3
None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters
(Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his
father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the
estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero
Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely
scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes.
However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo
Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare
allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth
certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may
safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is
claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said
finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the
finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
June 17, 1987
G.R. No. L-66574
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of
Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were
the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their
union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate
heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of
Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated
March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as
well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition
and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero a nd Pablo
Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal
to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on
December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of
heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order
dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line
(Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father
Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or
grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate
succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece
Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-
appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and
recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code
denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule
was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil
Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other
civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our
Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of
the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted,
in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976,
Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that
from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated
December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his
order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to
intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of
Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said
orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew.
The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent
Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987,
are being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective
pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument
before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in
Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as amici curiae during the hearing
were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that
Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5)
that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at
the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In connection therewith, We are
tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of
the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate
children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional
rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to
support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of
intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate
children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by
petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate
grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is
dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent.
(941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves
illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions
of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902
that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are
subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon
by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of
resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and
are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted
by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil.
204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child
has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already
abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there
is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change,
Article 992, which was a reproduction •f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to
clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional
rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot
represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the
barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code,
are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate
children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with
the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find support from other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much
so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle
since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate
child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have
to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which
case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first
solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform
of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1,
pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken
of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from
the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are
Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this
to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the
canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the
term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents
us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos
de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los
colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not
warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense,
it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred
of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal history, have
been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and
illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the
gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of
illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights
which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III,
p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there
is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.