IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H.

MEDIODEA,
12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to
resign from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and
on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf
of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge
Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law
amounting to grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.2
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with
a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and
damages3 covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the
clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus,
Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil
case to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent
judge scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation5 on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of
ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing
to September 28, 2001.6 Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition7 to
complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was
held in abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to
appear on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave the defendants
ten days9 to file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and
thereafter to complainant to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants Motion11 to
disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 praying for judgment to be rendered on the
civil case. In an Order13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainants
Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension of time to file an
answer.14 Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for
Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment15 on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a
Petition for his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that
the mere filing of administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying
them from hearing cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may
voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited
himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol
of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him,
considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every
motion presented before him.16 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary
injunction.17 Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to
question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision
on the case.18
Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she appeared as counsel on her
own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was
allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were
more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.19 He further alleges that she did not
secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave
of absence every time she appeared in court.20
Evaluation and Recommendation of the
Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed
for in the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the
principal action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should
have been decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion
for preliminary injunction and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved
even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount
of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with
more severely.21
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another
round of investigation, the subject of which was complainants appearance in court as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full
time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
Although they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession,
they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that [e]ngaging
in any private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is
tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.22
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for
appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also
recommended that she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days
she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to
conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.23 These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as
promptly as possible.24 Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules
on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided.26 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved. Both are time procedures designed to bring
immediate relief.27
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are
entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to
refrain from doing a particular act or acts.28 It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.29 Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree
with both the OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first
be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within
30 days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may,
within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty
(30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word shall to
evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since
there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible
entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter
how long it took. If that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary
nature of the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a
preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing.
Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the
speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from
further damage during the pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly
and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.30 To a large extent,
the publics faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and
prompt disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof.31 Judges are thus
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
obliges judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.32 To avoid sanction,
they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion,
he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be
decided within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of
motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of
Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the
original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main
case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges
should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.33 They should
not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters
convenience that should be the primordial consideration, but the administration of
justice.34
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide
cases within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and
dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court
in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:35
We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the
clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has
launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and
undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost
diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties.36
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial
court is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As
eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge
Joven:[37
x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge,
more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that
trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can
likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper
disposition of cases before the courts.38
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is
appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence39 and Rule 140.40
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount
of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior
approval of the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a
species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when
she appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in
the practice of law. We clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination.41 When they, however, act as their
own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded.42 Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their
own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of
law.43 One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself.44
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.45 Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.46 (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to the
members of such a vocation.47 In turn, vocation is defined as a persons regular calling or
business; ones occupation or profession.48
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in
court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from
her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to
proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise
of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion
of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her
co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply
when a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already
defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be
argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be
interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact
remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be
impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith and confidence in
the judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in
court, that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a
fee. Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged
with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.50 Given these
circumstances, the penalty of reprimand51 is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the
peoples faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate
to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial processes,52 and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.53
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of
gross inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and
is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda
Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-
plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay G.R. No. 154464
City,
Present:
Petitioner,
TINGA, J.,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,
Acting Chairperson,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City,
Metro Manila, VELASCO, JR.,*
Public Respondent. NACHURA, and
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay REYES, JJ.
City,
Promulgated:
Private Respondent.
September 11, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10,
20021 and July 31, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay
City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein
petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla
Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his
appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth
year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a
written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to
appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for
Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not
allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku,
masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Inhibit,4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged
that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the
trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the
pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.5
In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition
stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is
not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even
prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration7 of the
said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.8 In the same
Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the
promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance
was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the
two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated
July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition
and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE
PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO.
01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A
PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE
ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court
may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance
of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from
trying the case.
This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application
therefor will be directed.11 A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the
RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and
only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.13
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule
138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein
petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of
filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can
be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants
who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more
important concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and
Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on
his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s
appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18,
1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and
the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s
clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of
Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded
that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state
that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and
that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the
Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of
proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation.14 Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law,15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares
and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance,
can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be
acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student
and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule.
It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section
34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may
appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a
party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of
Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it
released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as
an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was
incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused
to be heard by himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the
right to counsel cannot be waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in
People v. Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence."
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The
solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal
prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil
case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake
the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the
competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident
to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here,
we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court.
We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed
manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary
inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said:
"Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by
denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith
and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative
case19 against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s
findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the
trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a
particular trial,20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should
inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21 Absent clear and convincing
proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in
favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution
and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry
of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8096 July 5, 2010

REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY.
RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-3351 passed on
July 17, 2008 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in
CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case
filed by the complainants against the respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1)
year effective April 17, 2006.2 The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of
Atty. Ignes.3 However, controversy later erupted when two (2) different groups, herein
referred to as the Dela Peña board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the legitimate
Board of Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Peña board filed Civil Case No.
17934 for Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors,
Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D.
Yaphockun whose hostility to the "present" Board of Directors, the Dela Peña board, is
supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Peña board also adopted Resolution No. 0095 appointing
respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private
collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case
No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of Court6 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD),
represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V.
Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction
and Damages7 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its
General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. On March 9, 2007,
KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint8 in Civil Case No.
1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 0799 dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had
approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of
KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14,
2007.
In its letter10 dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s
insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The
OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime
without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s grant of authority to private counsels is a
privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty.
Ignes’s contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration
had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said
board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and requested to hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority,
complainants filed a disbarment complaint11 against the respondents before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953.
Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in their position
paper12 that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had
confirmed the expiration of Atty. Ignes’s contract in its April 4, 2007
manifestation/motion13 in Civil Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District
(KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme
Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly
represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contract’s
pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17,
2007 in deference to the OGCC’s stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty.
Mann’s defense.15
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation16 before the IBP with the
following attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008
in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the
January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that
Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of
appeal.
In his report and recommendation,17 the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1)
year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his
contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in
February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that they be fined ₱5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to
do so, per Santayana v. Alampay.18 The Investigating Commissioner found that they
failed to secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their engagement as
collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case
because respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear
as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1796-25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired
on January 14, 2007; that the "Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al." in Civil Case
No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
"for being filed by one not duly authorized by law;" and that the authority of Attys.
Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution No. 009 of the
Dela Peña board lacks the conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to
complainants, respondents are liable for willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on
April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after that
date. He submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In
their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say
that their fees were paid from private funds of the members of the Dela Peña board and
KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not from the public coffers of
KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties’ submissions, we find respondents
administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA
conformity if a GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal
basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs.
And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,19 issued by President Estrada on August
27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle
their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases,
the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall
first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. In
Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,20 we listed three (3)
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel
can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be
secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as
collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799.
Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating
counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and
Atty. Ignes "presently stand as KWD legal counsels," there is no proof that the OGCC
and COA approved Atty. Nadua’s engagement as legal counsel or collaborating counsel.
Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating
counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of
Phividec Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private
counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the
expropriation case in Phividec’s behalf considering that the requirements set by
Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.21 Thus, Resolution No. 009 did
not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating counsels
of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own retainership
contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as
collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after
his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his
retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as
true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still
disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the
IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic notes22 in
Civil Case No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely
urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano
Office. The RTC was compelled to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if
he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not
appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms.
Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a motion
for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No.
1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept any motion for reconsideration in behalf of
KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of
appeal23 dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal signed
by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC, in its
Order24 dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely
as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba
represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return
of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a
motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799
further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as
counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the
notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and
deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have
admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware
of our ruling in Phividec.25 Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our
ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private
counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular
No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC.
Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the rule
requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves
voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid
authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents’ authority as counsels of KWD which question
was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to
disqualify KWD’s counsels26 dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on
February 23, 200727 respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on
March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to
be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended motion for
reconsideration in behalf of KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of
the charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be
sure, the facts were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and
not merely as counsels of the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel in
their private suits.
Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority
to do so, there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only
for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing
and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as
a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired.28 In
Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of ₱5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent therein also
appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a GOCC,
without any approval from the OGCC and COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of ₱5,000 on each respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had
happened after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007
in Civil Case No. 1799.30 As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were
nullified by the Court of Appeals.31 We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code
of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor
and good faith to the courts.321awphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335
passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr.,
and John Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a
party to a case without authority to do so and FINED ₱5,000 each, payable to this Court
within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that
a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents’ personal records in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of
cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against
him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when
his real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure
and a punishment for contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for
dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the
entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including
the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus
officio." It is claimed, inter alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the
contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly issued because
respondent Court had already accepted a property bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly
assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II,
and that he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the
different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal
Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias
Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging
petitioner with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised
Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given
his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of
respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan
v. Court of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of
respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30
June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p.
99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not
show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General,
p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M.
Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V.
Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC,
Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is
this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case,
which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and
CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of
Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and
abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require
respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court."
In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the
non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not
covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal
Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971
such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was
denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of
conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the
bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing
the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the
warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979,
shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for
petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case
"on the ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of
the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino,
deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision
promulgated on 29 November 1982, Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit
inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been sought
before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no
judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10
February 1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal
and termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly
died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the
case closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he
posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant
issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served
upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino
A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983
denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and
the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino
Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss
that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in
CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be
litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus
Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19
November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until
such time that the accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds
that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy
of being convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to
Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit.
Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and should
have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had
evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there
any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by
respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not
"stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10)
days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is
effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court
arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely rectified. In the final analysis,
respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already been
arraigned and tried, let alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again,
therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds water
considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau
of Lands, Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the
service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands, who found him, with the approval of
the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of
office CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/Motion to Strike
Out" the present petition for being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should
be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused
from filing a Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to
grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal
shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in
Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on
September 29, 1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on the
spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter's
death, assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon
Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually
practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon
Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise,
[Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal Officer I in the Bureau of
Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out
of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that
there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the
ground of prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also
disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February
1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose
City Branch, for the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In
that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school
records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres
Culanag, the latter being his real name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme
when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court, his
supposed heirs alleged that accused had died before the filing of the Information on 29
September 1971, the exact date of death of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner
also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings
filed in connection with the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also
committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he
filed a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc.
Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is
"really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres
Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two
false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained
that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he
apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused
and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his explanation
unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6)
months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re
Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled
"Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court
Resolved "to direct that petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from
the National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind
of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still
has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on
hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued
fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede,
obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3
[d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon
Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those
statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon
Manangan, long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts
continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are
hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court,
severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of
the subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal
Case No. 639 from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate
dispatch; (4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing himself as
Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5)
petitioner's real name is declared to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,
vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.
D. Ignacio Castillo for petitioners.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one Felipe Lopez in
possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to petitioners, and of the decision
rendered by the same court on August 24, 1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage
executed on said property to satisfy the payment of an obligation.
The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta,
Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power
of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber,
mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang,
Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned,
Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore said
property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300,
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the
obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to
foreclosure the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers
and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon
Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of
Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and
submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his
obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August
9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the
foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within
ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on
August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein
specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the
mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the
provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was
confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the
properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in
possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners
did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no
be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which
they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was
issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the
sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served
with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners
having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to
punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision rendered by
the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of
the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question; and (2) to the
validity of the order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a
writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent
Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee.
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be
sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which
on its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that
a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action
brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717).
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with
summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when
the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of
record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an
Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been
authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The
security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and tergiversations
of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to overcome such
presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is specially so when, as in the
instant case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment has
been rendered that petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple reason that the
issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of
judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a
ministerial and complementary duty of the court can undertake even after the lapse of
five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not
intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct
interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the properties
mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the
court, and purchaser thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be
placed in their possession. In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the
litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court
cannot issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of the
property.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the
court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven
to an action at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and
place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to
enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero
de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).
It has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor
continues in possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a
necessary remedy to put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) provides that the
confirmation of the sale by judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action
of their respective rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal
provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may
be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public auction sale
and become his by virtue of the final decree confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61
Phil., 201). Emphasis supplied.
The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the order of the
lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the foreclosure of the
mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has
authority to put the purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to
resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases there cited.) (Bold types
and emphasis supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court which has exclusive
authority to foreclosure the equity of redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the
parties in interest before it, and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be
able even to put the purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to the suit,
and who is bound by the decree. When the court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, and
has investigated and decided upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of justice
merely to declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was to be understood that
after a decree and sale mortgaged premises, the mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or
perhaps, those who have been let into possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could
withhold the possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and compel the
purchaser to resort to a court of law, I apprehend that the delay and expense and
inconvenience of such a course of proceeding would greatly impair the value and
diminish the results of sales under a decree. (See Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D.,
151). (Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.

SPOUSES FRANKLIN AND LOURDES OLBES VS. ATTY VICTOR V DECIEMBRE

(April 27,2005)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2013
FACTS:
Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes
renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00. She
issued and delivered 5 PNB blank checks, which served as collateral for the approved
loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes paid respondent P14,874.37 intended to the
loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt.
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up the blank checks
entrusted to him by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all
and deposited the same checks which were dishonored upon presentment because the
account is already closed. Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants for
estafa and for violation of B.P. 22. Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the
disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the respondent with willful and deliberate
acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES.

Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank
checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite full
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His
was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material
gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He
committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly
unbecoming a member of the bar. His propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the
detention of one petitioner is loathsome.

Respondent is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

[A.C. No. 2841. November 12, 2002]
RE:ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Courtdated12 NOV 2002.
A.C. No. 2841(Re:Administrative Case No. 44 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV,
Tagbilaran City, against Atty. Samuel C. Occeña.)
For resolution is the motion of Samuel C Occeña, respondent, seeking a reconsideration
of this Court's Decision dated July 3, 2002 which disbarred him from the practice of law.
In essence, respondent claims that the Decision was "rendered without due process On a
fabricated charge." He thus prays that this Court (1) suspend the execution of its
Decision; (2) refer the complaint for disbarment against him to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and recommendation; and (3) after such investigation,
set aside the Decision.
Respondent's prayer that the complaint against him be referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. had long been denied by this Court in its En
Banc Resolution dated September 28, 1989, as stated in our Decision.
Contrary to respondent's claim that the charges against him were fabricated and that the
was denied due process, our Decision specifies factual instances showing that he
deliberately delayed the disposition of the estate proceedings subject of the case by: (a)
disobeying lawful court orders; (b) willfully prolonging the litigation through his various
maneuvers with malice and for money; (c) filing civil actions for damages, criminal
charge and administrative complaints against the presiding judge, which were found to be
utterly baseless; and (d). interposing groundless, frivolous and unmeritorious
appeals.These facts, it must be stressed, are based on documentary evidence which he
cannot feign ignorance.
The trial before the court below was postponed many times at his instance. In fact, he
waived his right to be heard.After the ex parte proceedings, the trial corn found him
guilty of the charges and suspended him from the practice of law for three (3)
years.However, his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, which manifested a glaring
mockery of the judicial system, constrained this Court, in its Decision, to expel him from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.He became an apostate to his calling as an officer of
the court. He allowed himself to be an instigator of controversy instead of a mediator for
concord, a "master of technicality" in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent
of the truth and justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from
the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since
then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not
in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer
of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met
at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right
to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is
of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in
the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted
to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the
law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney
is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice
than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant
passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to
his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon
or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not
be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had
failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered
by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]
EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No.
0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine
National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client.
Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will
be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she
would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed
upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as
a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the
release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee
bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to
respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.1 However, his demand
was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the
Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers
Oath.3cräläwvirtualibräry
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on
the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.4 However, it was returned unserved with
the notation Moved.5 The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest
address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was
again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7cräläwvirtualibräry
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous
found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath.
Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554
which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal
check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the
assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing
so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in
exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be
accordingly penalized.8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for
such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good
moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter
upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which
puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.9cräläwvirtualibräry
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment,10 because it is important that members of the legal
brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.11 Any wrongdoing
which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well
of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times
be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served
on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of
the legal profession.13 Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for
authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche
which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a
defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer.
How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she
disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the
Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at
her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no
compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that
tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon
receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.