G.R. No.

148004 January 22, 2007

VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and GEORGE I.
LAGOS, Respondents

Facts:

Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils.,

Inc., filed a complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati against private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc..

On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the

prosecution of private respondent, and on the same day, respondent was charged with
the crime of estafa before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati City.

On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to recuse praying that

Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala inhibit himself from hearing the case.

On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings

on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.

The trial court, in an order dated September 8, 1999, denied respondent’s

motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse. Respondent filed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) the petition for certiorari assailing the aforesaid orders. But the CA
dismissed the same because of the existence of a prejudicial question which calls for
the suspension of the proceedings of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the

criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was
originally filed with the SEC.

Ruling:

Yes, there is an existence of a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is

defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799
involves facts that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
is based.

Finally, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will
determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed
against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one
of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended party to the
offender. So long as the money that a person is under obligation to deliver is not
demanded of him, and he fails to deliver it for having wrongfully disposed of it, there
is no estafa, whatever be the cause of the debt.

Therefore, the Court finds no substantial basis in petitioner’s contention that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Absent a showing of a despotic, whimsical and arbitrary exercise of power by the CA,
the petition must fail.

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.

Facts:

This petition stemmed upon a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by private
respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges
that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996 he was
dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating funds which was
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).

On the other hand, petitioner claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's
Funeral Home. In 1995 private respondent asked for financial assistance from the
mother of Amelita. As a sign of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the
mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. In 1996, after the death of her mother,
Amelita took over their business and made some changes in the business operation
and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.

On October 1996, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner

declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.

On appeal to the NLRC, it rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned

decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari alleging that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has the jurisdiction to try and decide petition for certiorari.

Ruling:

No, NLRC does not confer jurisdiction on certiorari petitions. Rather, certiorari
petitions falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. R.A 7092 effective
March 18, 1995 amending B.P No. 129 provides to wit:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,

prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;

Therefore, with references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 (R.A 7092)
to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Accordingly, all
such petitions should now be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate medium for the relief
desired.

G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
FERNANDO CALION, respondents.

Facts:

This petition for certiorari stemmed from an order of the Judge of RTC of Baguio
City and Benguet Province dismissing petitioner’s instant complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.

The order appealed from states two causes of action against two respondents:
the first cause of action was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay
the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second
cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay
the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.

On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to

Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against
said respondent was only P11, 643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional
trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20, 000.00). And although another person,
Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10, 212.00,
his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.

Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following
the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim
Rules and permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court

Issue:

Whether or not permissive joinder of parties following the totality rule is

applicable in the instant case.

Ruling:

Yes, permissive joinder of parties following the totality rule is applicable.

Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules
is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of
Rule 3 which provides as follows:

Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any

right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series
of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders
as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the

court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall
be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of
interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are
owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a
civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or

as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish
the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded
in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
G. R. L-48117 November 27, 1986

BRICCIO B. TENORIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO (District Judge, CFI-Rizal, Branch XVIII), LAGRIMAS
C. LAGDAMEO, SOL C. LAGDAMEO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ALFREDO C.
LAGDAMEO, Namely: MILAGROS R. LAGDAMEO, MARILOU LAGDAMEO, ELLE
ROSE LAGDAMEO, SENONICA LAGDAMEO, SOL CARMEN LAGDAMEO, and
MARIA TERESA LAGDAMEO, respondents.

Facts:

On September 9, 1977, the private respondents filed their complaint for

accounting, breach of contract and damages and termination of contract against the
petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, Quezon City, alleging
that petitioner-developer failed to comply with his obligations stated in the subdivision
contract, specifically, petitioner failed (a) to construct avenues and roads 10 to 15
meters wide with water and electrical facilities and an adequate drainage system; (b)
to pay the tax assessments, fees and impositions on the property and (c) to render full
accounting of the sales made for the determination of the 40% share of the plaintiffs
to the gross cash receipts that will accrue to them.

Because of the alleged breach, private respondents requested the termination

of the contract and the turnover of all torrens titles to the lots, all contracts of sale,
records and other pertinent papers and claim P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P16,000.00 as compensatory damages
including attorney's fees andP30,000.00 for unrealized profits. (Rollo, pp. 22-23).

The defendant filed a responsible pleading filed his Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) venue is improperly laid; (2) no valid cause of
action; and (3) the action is barred by estoppel and laches. But the respondent Judge
in his first assailed Order deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss until the trial on
the merits.

The petitioner, filed his motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order which
motion was denied by respondent Judge. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is a real action as contended by the petitioner or a

personal action as held by the respondent court.

Ruling:

The case is a real action. This issue has already been decided by this Court in
an analogous case, De Jesus v. Coloso where the Court ruled that where it is alleged
that the contract has been breached, a reason for which the other party demands its
resolution and the return of the property subject thereof, the action is an action for the
recovery of the possession of land and in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the action should be filed where the property is situated.
 Accordingly, the rules of venue are dictated by convenience. They are precisely
constituted to forestall conflicting decisions by different courts on the issue of
ownership and possession.

G.R. No. L-4472 May 8, 1952

ESPIRIDION RONE, CLUADIA AGUZAR, DIONISIA GORDOLAN, GUILLERMO

AND AMABLE, both surnamed VENTURA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICTOR CLARO and SIMEON BAQUIRING, defendants-appellees.

Facts:

On and before 1929 the plaintiffs were or claimed to be the owners of lot 4651
of the Cadastral Survey of Asingan, Pangasinan, described in Original Certificate of
Title No. 6288. In that year, the defendants or one of them, through fraud, deceit and
breach of faith, succeeded in getting the Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of Title
from one of the plaintiffs. About the year 1932, the defendants, it is alleged, again with
the use of fraud, deceit, breach of faith, and other machinations, succeeded in having
the plaintiffs execute a deed of sale of the lot in question in defendants favor, but it
was only until 1941 that this fraud, including the possession and enjoyment of the lot
by defendants, was discovered by the plaintiffs. Because of poverty, plaintiffs were
unable to take the necessary steps to recover the land. The complaint was filed in the
lower court only on February 20, 1950.

The action herein is to annul the deed of sale by the plaintiffs in favor of the
defendants on the ground of fraud and the trial court was correct in applying Section
44, paragraph 3 of Act 190 and in ruling that the action had prescribed, since more
than four years had elapsed since the discovery of the fraud.

Appellants however now insist that their action was not to annul the deed of
sale on the basis of fraud, but to recover the title and possession of land. This change
of front is, obviously, calculated to avoid the fatal effects of Section 44 above quoted
by now invoking Section 40 of the same Act which prescribes ten years as the period
within which an actin to recover title to land may be instituted.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is barred by prescription after the lapse of four years
from discovery of fraud.

Ruling:

Yes the action is barred by prescription.

The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period
of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made
in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and the prayer
for relief.

It may be that the recovery of title and possession of the lot was the ultimate
objective of plaintiffs, but to attain that goal, they must needs first travel over the road
of relief on the ground of fraud; otherwise even if the present action were to be
regarded as a direct action to recover title and possession, it would, nevertheless, be
futile and could not prosper for the reason that the defendants could always defeat it
by merely presenting the deed of sale, which is good and valid to legalize and justify
the transfer of the land to the defendants, until annulled unless the action of annul had
been filed within four years after the discovery of the fraud in 1941. So, from whatever
angle we view the case, the claimed of plaintiffs-appellants must fail.

G.R. No. 139539 February 5, 2002

CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.

Facts:

On March 16, 1994, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
a complaint against defendant Santiago for "damages and injunction, with preliminary
injunction." In the complaint, Ceroferr prayed that Santiago and his agents be enjoined
from - claiming possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate
Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-90200 (334555); that Santiago and
his agents be prevented from making use of the vacant lot as a jeepney terminal; that
Santiago be ordered to pay Ceroferr P650.00 daily as lost income for the use of the
lot until possession is restored to the latter; and that Santiago be directed to pay
plaintiff Ceroferr moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, plus
expenses of litigation.

In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the
complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT
No. RT-78 110 (3538); that he was not claiming any portion of Lot No. 68 claimed by
Ceroferr; that he had the legal right to fence Lot No. 90 since this belonged to him,
and he had a permit for the purpose; that Ceroferr had no color of right over Lot No.
90 and, hence, was not entitled to an injunction to prevent Santiago from exercising
acts of ownership thereon; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

After a careful examination of the factual antecedents of the case and upon
presentation of the evidences, it has been found out that the case would not merely
involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main
objective of the complaint – but the review of the title of both the defendant and plaintiff
as to who has the valid certificate of title over the disputed land. At this point, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based primarily on his contention that the trial
court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing over the conflicting
claims of ownership of the parties over the disputed portion.

On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal
which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack
of jurisdiction. The court cited the old rule that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
the subject of collateral attack but can only be challenged through a direct proceeding.
It concluded that it could not proceed to decide plaintiff’s claim for damages and
injunction for lack of jurisdiction because its judgment would depend upon a
determination of the validity of defendant’s title and the identity of the land covered by
it.

Issues:

(1) Whether Ceroferr’s complaint states a sufficient cause of action;

(2) Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location
of the vacant lot involved in the case.

Ruling:

(1) Yes, Ceroffers complaint states a sufficient cause of action, because of the
following reasons:
First, a complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three
indispensable elements, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violating
of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action. These elements are present in the instant case.
Finally, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of cause of action, as in this case, hypothetically admits all the
averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint
as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged
the court can render a valid judgement upon the same in accordance with
the prayer thereof. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the
defendants.
(2) Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. While the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless,
the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken
 part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the
court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him.
In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to
question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in the
case.
Finally, after the land has been originally registered, the Court of
Land Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over contests concerning
the location of boundary lines. In such case, the action in personam has
to be instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696 June 20, 2002

MELISSA DOMONDON, ALMIRA BASALO, and CLEO VILLAREIZ, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE PERCIVAL MANDAP LOPEZ, respondent.

Facts:

On December 7, 1996, complainants who were students of the AMA Computer

College in Quezon City and members of the editorial board of the official school
publication called Dataline published a spoof edition of the Dataline, which they
called Amable Tonite. After conducting an investigation, the student Disciplinary
Tribunal of the college recommended the expulsion of complainants from the school.

On March 14, 1997, complainants and other members of the Dataline editorial
board filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against AMA Computer College and Mauricia Herrera, Dean of
Student Affairs. They allege that they were expelled in an oppressive manner in
violation of their constitutional rights to due process and to free speech as well as the
provisions of R.A. No. 7079, otherwise known as the Campus Journalism Act of 1991.

In its opposition, defendants contends that the articles in the spoof edition which
complainants had published were slanderous and derogatory; that R.A. No. 7079 itself
enjoins student publications to observe the pertinent laws and school policies in the
selection of articles for publication; that complainants had been given the opportunity
to controvert the charges against them before they were expelled and they were guilty
of unauthorized disbursement of Dataline funds in the amount of P25,000.00.

On reply, complainants contends that the issue in the case was not the alleged
defamatory nature of the questioned publication but the legality of their expulsion
because they were expelled solely on the basis of their activities as members of the
editorial board of Dataline and claiming that they were deprived of their right to due
process.

On June 14, 1997, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, respondent
judge issued a resolution dismissing the case itself after finding that the expulsion of
the complainants from the school was for cause and was effected only after an
investigation during which they were duly heard.

Complainants then sought the disqualification of respondent judge on the

following grounds: (a) that he had deliberately delayed the resolution of the injunctive
writ which tended to arouse suspicion as to his ability to decide the case with fairness
and integrity; (b) that he dismissed their complaint without legal or procedural basis
and thus deprived them of their day in court; and (c) that they filed an administrative
case against him with this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial judge deprived the complainants of their right to due
process.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent judge deprived the complainants of their right to due
process. It is undisputed that no trial was ever conducted by respondent judge before
issuing his resolution, dated June 14, 1997, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 for lack of merit. The defendants did not file a motion to dismiss. What
they filed was an opposition. The fact that the defendants filed a responsive pleading
seeking affirmative relief and setting up defences negates the intent on their part to file
a motion to dismiss.

It is apparent that respondent judge failed to distinguish between a motion to

dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and a motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16, 1(g), while the
second by Rule 33 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Only ignorance of basic procedure can account for the strange proceedings
before respondent judge. When the law is basic, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.

Therefore the Court finds the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and undue delay of the proceedings and he will be ordered to pay a fine with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more
severely.