EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court’s
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of
a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
an appointive office.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). ( Emphasis
supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and havi ng no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D.
Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the
provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take
it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice,
or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sol e
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case,
the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining
the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as
an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor
in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving
to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment.
(Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by
the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice,
a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action
in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because
of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-
time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does.
For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one’s
work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of hi s
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas
jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations
of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-
on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel’s
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate
counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s
aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the
modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years
in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma
for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with
an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with
the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3
and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:chanrobles.com : virtual
law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis
supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition
of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean
by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase
itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be
brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since
he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission
in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise
clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly
relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that
there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments — that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to
all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess
the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement
of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to
judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have
been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty of this Court to ensure th at such
standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession
actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to
be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession
as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than
as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice
of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ."
(Emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901)
and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, `all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within
the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship,
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets
the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior
to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar
to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice
of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to
such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points
on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are
barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between
two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said
could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications,
I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding
that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be
examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters
that are likely "to become involved in litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets
and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation
Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source
of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the
rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
"because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."cralaw virtua1aw library

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if
only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as
a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the
petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be
settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of
these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.chanrobles law library

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency
in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the
public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law
for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice
of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme
Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate,
managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments,
the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never
practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father’s law
firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough
attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having
engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of
giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an executive but not as a
lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with
the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations,
agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar
and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know,
follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few.
And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with havin g
been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.’Practicing
law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is
the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that definition, we
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank,
344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).

For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a
lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his
business, he said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.’
Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of
instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made
a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he
was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for an answer
as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: ‘I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.’
x x x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is
no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
x x x

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent;
more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’
but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without
being an attorney at law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a
court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and
integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. . . .
His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as
defined by Webster, means ‘to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the
case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning
of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).
x x x

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of
doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination
of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissents.

Endnotes:
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 89591-96 January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these
cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained
at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence
of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence of
Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262, 1 the
latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification
on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana
from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained
Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which
warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?" 2

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique,
a motion seeking the revocation of the trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in
the provincial jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify
whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor
on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as
the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal
custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus, the trial court's order dated
August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail
of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private
respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practi ce
law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent
would appear in court to defend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense.3 He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
be released on bail or on recognizance. 4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases
with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San
Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior
written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique
and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. 1 While
respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885,
sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. 3

In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without
prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle
the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other
hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he
rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did
not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by
the presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel
and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless family"
from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga
had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for
falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
"seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband,
SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres
and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge
against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms.
Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also
pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and
now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that
he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
"humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances
were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative matter to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel
likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not
receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he
agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family
who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore,
his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that
he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing
permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance
was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that
he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under
Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise
to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is
prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said section,
to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning
and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
 Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his
cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain
a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June
18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning
that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the
present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born
in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed
an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed
to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the
said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents
evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship
which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2)
conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself
a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was
held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to
taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his
Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other
official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao
La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected
Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time
he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January
17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government
of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of
citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning
for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the
present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constituti on and
C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because
he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act
would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs.
Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic,
 L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act
of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts
of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only
have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in
the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such,
he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to
elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine
Bar.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered
moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases
Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter
which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good
faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving
the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
"Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against
Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court
to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not
be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.
Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may
have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in
Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt
of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be
suspended until further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member
of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to
aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the
form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a
Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked.
In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of
the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice
law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice la law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering
justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee,
must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short
of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a
public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations
and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as
a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract
prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa &
Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at
the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been
typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit
& Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me.
 And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996,
in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head
of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from
his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage.
and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint
dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and
attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He
claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank
contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

14
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once
has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that
he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-
calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While
one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of
the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her
account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant
refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee
bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was
prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness
in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed.
On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.1 However,
his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036.
On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.2cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyers Oath.3cräläwvirtualibräry

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue,
Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. 4 However, it was
returned unserved with the notation Moved. 5 The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of
respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.6cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her
was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was
referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7cräläwvirtualibräry

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the
civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for
payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check
which she drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted
a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the
penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this
qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers
moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, 10 because
it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality. 11 Any wrongdoing
which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action.
Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does
not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond
reproach and above suspicion.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. 13 Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack
of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of
her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of
the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold
the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of
Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation
for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage
of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to
their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack
upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
 d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty
of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but,
also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room
for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date
to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.
 law in this jurisdiction.12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering
justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee,
must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short
of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a
public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations
and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as
a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract
prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa &
Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at
the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been
typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit
& Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me.
 And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996,
in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head
of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from
his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage.
and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint
dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and
attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He
claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank
contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

14
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once
has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that
he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-
calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While
one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of
the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her
account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant
refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee
bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was
prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness
in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed.
On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. 1 However,
his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036.
On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. 2cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyers Oath.3cräläwvirtualibräry

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue,
Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.4 However, it was
returned unserved with the notation Moved. 5 The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of
respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her
was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was
referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7cräläwvirtualibräry

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the
civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for
payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check
which she drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted
a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. 8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the
penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since thi s
qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers
moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, 10 because
it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.11 Any wrongdoing
which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action.
Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does
not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond
reproach and above suspicion.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. 13 Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack
of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of
her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of
the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold
the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of
Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation
for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage
of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to
their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack
upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
 d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty
of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but,
also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room
for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date
to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment against the respondents
Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my
husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me
that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the
prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea.
He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided
his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty.
Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children
were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course.4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten
(10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979,
with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea
was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between
her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house
for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she
kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of
action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared
the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also
alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this
motion.9

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.11

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her
Report and Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment. 12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty.
Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under
Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already
in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido
took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous
marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject
its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. 13 We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through
this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is
not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his
continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent
judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before
he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission
to the Bar.19

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law.
Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings.
As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed
her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of
compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. 20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. 21 We make these distinctions as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies
to sever them. We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family –
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival
and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting.
We held that the respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly contracted a second
marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that
demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of
gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible
to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had
romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. 26 This
was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage.
This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free
to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to
accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2)
women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more
than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia
A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt,
using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar
admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. 27 As a lawyer, he
violated his lawyer’s oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the
crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal
needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools
of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the
law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession
by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are
at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33 Needless to state, those whose conduct – both
public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable
under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford
them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x
x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good moral character, a
person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the
opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she
is known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido
was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted
confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with
him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential
advice was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into
a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection
from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took
a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty.
Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him,
upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third
marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.1avvphi1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid;
hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed
belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage
transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage
a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted
to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use
her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband
did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty.
Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so
corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with
whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty.
Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point
of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second
family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his
second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court,
must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before
she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P.
Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the
parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea
after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court
and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of
character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in
her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without
placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances,
but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154464, September 11, 2008]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Petitioner, v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, METRO MANILA, PUBLIC, Respondents.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Private Respondents..

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and
July 31, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff
Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to
voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before
the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth
year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 3 that a non-lawyer may appear before
any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel
for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected
alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku,
masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the
next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, 4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be
inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled
for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. 5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations
of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even
prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure
of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34
of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent
judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic]
CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-
LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY
INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE
THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and
when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of
the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should
be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of
filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of
Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important
concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply
with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18,
1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record
that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has
merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a
party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal
or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings
from commencement to the termination of the litigation. 14 Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, 15Petitioner, not being a lawyer
himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or
lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is
Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter
rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court
never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended
as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court
through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, 16 this
Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. 17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated
in People v. Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution
accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case,
who insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be
given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the
competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have
a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that
there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she
said: "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent
judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of
faith and confidence in the respondent's impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case 19 against the respondent for violation
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court's
findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares
when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to
disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, 20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. 21 Absent clear and convincing proof
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109149 December 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should be set
aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held
liable for indirect contempt of court.

Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than nine (9) years old, committed on
December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as its witnesses the
victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim.

For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied committing the rape and claimed
that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from quarreling.

On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision 2 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another amount for costs, without
subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.

If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he has
agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with
the full duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 In his brief, 4 appellant made the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON MATERIAL POINTS.

II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE
DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue of proper representation
by a member of the bar raised by appellant.

Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and
purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On
appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto
C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this
fact. 5 Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime charged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during
trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard
and the records reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and
in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner." However, the right of the accused to be
heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of
our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual may collide with the awesome forces
of the state, we need a professional learned in the law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused by all means
fair and reasonable.

On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issue in the case
of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 In Delgado, petitioner and two others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of
estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her
remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her co-accused.
After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry
of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The
Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that —

This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal
case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great
danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. 7

Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was represented by three successive
counsels from the Public Attorney's Office, the Court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused
was given mere perfunctory representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively
accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court,
speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused and for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar.
Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not even duly represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no
matter how zealous his representation might have been.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. 8 Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 9 The right of an
accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. 10 Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. 11

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares
the right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for th e
requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral char acter
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 13 a Bar candidate who has
already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who
was caught in the unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial.

With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with this case,
the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough
investigation regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this,
order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their
appropriate action.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23959. November 29, 1971.]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENEZA, Petitioners, v. BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS &
QUINTIN MUNING, Respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates, for Petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ATTORNEY’S FEES; SHARING THEREOF WITH NON-LAWYERS, UNETHICAL AND
IMMORAL. — Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et. Al. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a
contract, as in the present case.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-LAWYER REPRESENTING A PARTY IN LABOR CASES, NOT ENTITLED THERETO. — The
provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that — "In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof,
the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification for a ruling that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees: for
the same section adds that — "it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence," thus making it clear that
the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY THEREOF IMPORTS EXISTENCE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. — The
permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of the party-litigant
does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules
of Court, providing — "Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . ." imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the
client’s representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney’s fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being
subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR DISALLOWING NON-LAWYERS TO RECOVERY THEREOF, CITED. — The reasons are
that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt
of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person reap the fruits or benefi t
of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside
from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. "And the general rule above-stated (referring to
non-recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking
to recover as an ‘agent’ and not as an attorney."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR UNIONS; LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION MAY APPEAL AWARD
OF ATTORNEY’S FEES WHICH ARE DEDUCTIBLE FROM BACKPAY OF ITS MEMBERS. — We hold that a union or
legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, on behalf of its members;
and the union was organized "for the promotion of the employees’ moral, social and economic well-being" ; hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6,
Republic Act 875, which provides: "Sec 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines . . .," since more often than not the individual unionist is
not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. —
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations,
and many others like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing
daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by position action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the
court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons
alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review
of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations,
in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney’s fees for professional services
in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et al, v. Binalbagan-Isabela
Sugar Co., Et. Al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final On 18
October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney’s hen
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-
objection to an award of attorney’s fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition
for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio
Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by
Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates 10%

Quintin Muning 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present
petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was
overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that
go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as
respondent’s answer to the petition for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent’s brief.
3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-
lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as
in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by
legal counsel . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is
not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees: for the same section adds that —

"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the
parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant
does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules
of Court, providing —

"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney’s agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition h the recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship
cannot exist unless the client’s representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish
an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney’s fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only
to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well
as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar
from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly
legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction
where the service were rendered." 5

"No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice
. . . and is an attorney in good standing at the time." 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney without authority
constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to
reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar
in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

"And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented
when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an ‘agent’ and not as an attorney." 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney’s fees should suffice to refute
the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the
ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons
and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the
backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of
time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contented that, as to them (Entila and
Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the
backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court,
12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the employees’ moral, social and economic
well-being" ; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved
party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines . . .",

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations,
and many others like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing
daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the
court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons
alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney’s
fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepaion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.

Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's
fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon
the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small
wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for
the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such,
they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned
taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for
unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took
all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to
recuperate.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when
he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day.
However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his
taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he
adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount
spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the
washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor
Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the
labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be
interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence
showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that
Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with
other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the
awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times,
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by
the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of
discretion. 4

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is
covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that
there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently,
the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which
deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment
supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business
where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by
the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which
the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners,
the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance
due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.

However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:

YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00

1988 720.00 760.00 200.00

1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

———— ———— ————

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he
incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's
deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be
reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal
deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the
driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents
(petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for
washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this
practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words
in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be
noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save
their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry,
and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members
thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a
non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to
attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by
deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to
order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's
deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126625. September 18, 1997.]

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES,
NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO
QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO,
JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY
ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILA, DIOSDADO
SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the
merits.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan
St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct
residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner
as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the
project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its other
employees.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan
City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment
of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.

Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter
Nicodemus G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served on the two engineers
and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on
June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s right to file its position paper .
1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints
as their position paper. 2

On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao
denied this request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay
private respondents’ claims. Arbiter Siao held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

"Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed, and what the complainants might think as to
how this branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or
recourse but to order the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the
Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of Respondent. The Supreme Court ruled: ‘Contracts
though orally made are binding on the parties.’ (Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).

"Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that ‘a court cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed
upon by the parties or proved by evidence.’ (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named
complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
"The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein complainants.

"SO ORDERED." 3

On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative
manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at
10:30 a.m.

"However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear
without any valid reason.

"Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues
raised herein have become moot and academic.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the
respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10)
days from receipt hereof based on the employment record on file with the Respondent.

"SO ORDERED." 4

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner’s appeal was filed by one Atty.
Arthur Abundiente.

In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.

Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent Commission was rendered without jurisdiction
and in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I

"THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN
ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II

"PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON
FACTS AND EVIDENCE BUT ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND CONJECTURE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law when it was adjudged by the NLRC liable without
trial on the merits and without its knowledge;

B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are
not strictly bound by the rules of evidence;

C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC’s ruling that petitioner is already in estoppel to disclaim the authority of its
alleged representatives.

D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private respondents’ unsubstantiated complaints to hold
petitioner liable for damages." 5

In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the following
reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no
authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission;
(3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and
were rendered in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.

Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC. They provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions
shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from
receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative,
service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in cases of decision and final
awards, copies thereof shall be served on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the parties
are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be practicable, which
shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
x x x

"Section 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by
registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the
party himself. If the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be
served on such person.

It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The
complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City.
The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.

To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or "agent" of parties on whom summons may
be served, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to. 6

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon its
officers such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so
integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers
served on them. 8

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project. 9
According to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and
supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the
importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner.
Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private respondents is
another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases
before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the
rule, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 6. Appearances. — . . .

"A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) he represents himself as party to the case;

"(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or

"(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . ." 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the case;
(b) he represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from them; or (c) he is a duly-accredited member
of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
to by the latter 11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their
appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the
rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the
arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not
bind petitioner.

The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer
Estacio’s representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the respondent Commission.
The appellants’ brief he filed was verified by him, not by petitioner. 12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into
the merits of Atty. Abundiente’s appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio was duly authorized to make such promise.
It dismissed the appeal on the ground that notices were served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped from denying
its promise to pay.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of
petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s
liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence. 13 This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients
in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise
agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim."cralaw virtua1aw library

The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the preliminary conference and constituted an offer
to settle the case amicably. The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim of
the Solicitor General. 14 A defendant’s promise to pay and settle the plaintiff’s claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal
obligation from the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant from liability. 15 In effect, the offer to pay
was an offer to compromise the cases.

In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror. 16 If this rule were otherwise, no attempt to settle litigation could safely be made. 17 Settlement of disputes by way
of compromise is an accepted and desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals. 18 In fact the Labor Code
mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute within
his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. 19

Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not
only based on unauthorized representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.

Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement,
in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and
agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.

"x x x"

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan
did not order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits
without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their
right to file position papers but petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have
paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its "promise,"
there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their
position papers.

Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they "shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor
Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the
fundamental and essential right of due process. 20 And this right is satisfied, at the very least, when the parties are given
the opportunity to submit position papers. 21 Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in dispensing with this requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific
provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of labor disputes. 22

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth
Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further
proceedings.chanrobles

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 8096 July 5, 2010

REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR., AND ATTY. JOHN
RANGAL D. NADUA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-3351 passed on July 17, 2008 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed
the disbarment case filed by the complainants against the respondents.

The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:

Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael
A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006.2 The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes. 3 However, controversy
later erupted when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Peña board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as
the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.

On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Peña board filed Civil Case No. 1793 4 for Injunction and Damages,
seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with
Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the "present" Board of Directors, the Dela Peña board, is supposedly of
public knowledge.

On January 18, 2007, the Dela Peña board also adopted Resolution No. 0095 appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U.
Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors,
under the direct supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.

Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of
Court6 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v.
Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages7 entitled
Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas.
On March 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint8 in Civil Case No. 1799.

Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079 9 dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the retainership contract of
Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired
on January 14, 2007.

In its letter10 dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that the retainership contract
of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the
contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable
under justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s contract was justified by the fact that the Local
Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said
board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and requested to hire another counsel.

Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment
complaint11 against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-
1953. Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD
without legal authority. They likewise stated in their position paper 12 that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after
the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Ignes’s contract in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion 13 in Civil Case No.
1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v.
Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since
Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contract’s pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after
April 17, 2007 in deference to the OGCC’s stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Mann’s defense. 15

On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation 16 before the IBP with the following attachments: (1) the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008
of the January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as
counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.

In his report and recommendation,17 the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Ignes be
dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for
one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings
in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.

As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that they be fined ₱5,000 each for
appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per Santayana v. Alampay. 18 The Investigating Commissioner
found that they failed to secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for
KWD.

As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed
the case for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case because respondents had no authority
from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and
Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14,
2007; that the "Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al." in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) "for being filed by one not duly authorized by law;" and that the authority of Attys. Viajar,
Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Peña board lacks the conformity of
the OGCC. As a consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable for willfully appearing as attorneys for a
party to a case without authority to do so.

In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow
respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without
authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were
paid from private funds of the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation,
not from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.

After a careful study of the case and the parties’ submissions, we find respondents administratively liable.

At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires private
lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of
Memorandum Circular No. 9,19 issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring
private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional
cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer
or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, 20 we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before
a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first
secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.

In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?

We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA
Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as
collaborating counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes "presently
stand as KWD legal counsels," there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Nadua’s engagement as legal
counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating
counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.

Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority in
Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to
file the expropriation case in Phividec’s behalf considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were
not complied with.21 Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as
collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own retainership contract
cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.

In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had
expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if
we assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he
stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.

Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached
therein was the transcript of stenographic notes22 in Civil Case No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued
the extremely urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was
compelled to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the
RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba
per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing
Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept any motion for reconsideration in behalf
of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of appeal 23 dated February 28, 2008, in
Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC,
in its Order24 dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.

As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He
indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent
motion sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with
the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as
counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the
notice of appeal.

Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?

The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD
without authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they
are aware of our ruling in Phividec. 25 Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that there
are indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements
set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still,
respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the rule requires. They signed pleadings as counsels
of KWD. They presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority
to do so.

Two, despite the question on respondents’ authority as counsels of KWD which question was actually raised earlier in Civil
Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWD’s counsels 26 dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing
on February 23, 200727 respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the
pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an
intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.

With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the charge even if they insist that
the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers
of KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as
counsels of the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel in their private suits.

Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a valid ground to
impose disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so.

Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would
accomplish the end desired.28 In Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of ₱5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent therein also appeared as private counsel of the
National Electrification Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.

Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of ₱5,000 on each respondent.

On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened after the RTC issued four
(4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1799.30 As willingly revealed by complainants, all four
(4) orders were nullified by the Court of Appeals. 31 We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts. 321awphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are found
GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so and FINED ₱5,000 each, payable
to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents’ personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 176530 June 16, 2009

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners,

vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G. GARCIA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007
in CA–G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of
title, reconveyance and damages.

The case stems from the following antecedents:

On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through
their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint
against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo
Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it
appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a
result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners.
Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly
executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.

On the day set for the presentation of the respondents’ (plaintiffs’) evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing
the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs
had been awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the period
for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the complaint, and that the
DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no tenancy relationship.

In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some portions
of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion. 4

Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal 5 with the RTC, which gave due course to the same. 6 The records reveal that on
December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan,
Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of
appeal was ready for disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as
to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still in America. 7

On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the subject complaint is reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.8

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the
allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale an d
reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations
between the parties.

Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed
the notice of appeal without respondents’ knowledge and consent;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitang’s appellants’
brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the
contents of an appellants’ brief; and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint. 9

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before the appellate court.
Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de parte
in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang’s
authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would
pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly.
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and validates the action taken by him.10 Implied ratification
may take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing
therefrom.11 Respondents’ silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they
have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.

Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and diligence." 12 Consequently, a lawyer is entreated
not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. 13 In
light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do
so was understandable, if not commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, therefore,
essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 14

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 15 Respondents’ complaint did not contain
any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners.
We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is
for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering
their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-
appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could
have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as
parties in this case nor the latter’s entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein
dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants’ brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that the
requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the
case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants’ brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive
at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime
objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. 16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated February 6, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 82760. August 30, 1990.]

FELIMON MANANGAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, Respondent.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the
smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as
Filemon Manangan when his real name is Andres Culauag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and
a punishment for contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.

The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being
stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear
that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly
issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property bond.

In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau
of Lands, Region II, and that he had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.

Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner,
we recite the relevant ones below.

On 7 November 1977, Petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in
Region II (p. 98, Rollo).

On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition,
Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District,
Bayombong, charging petitioner with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the
Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by than Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p.
21).

On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction entitled `Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance, Et Al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction
of respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was
dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).

On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for
about a year.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On 31 July 1973, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time identifying
the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross
V. Pangilinan)."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through alleged counsel posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).

On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged
herein.

On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent
Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP
entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision
of the Director of Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of
office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case
No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition
for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for
execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision). 1

On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through
counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already
died on 29 September 1971 such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was
denied.

On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court
reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex
A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest
issued by this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F,
Petition).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428)
filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the
Criminal Case "on the ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was
rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through
counsel . . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982, Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch
as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the
Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation
before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused
had allegedly died.

On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed and terminated
inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated
that the "alias warrant issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the
accused as in full force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs
of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral
of 25 March 1983 denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the
Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision), 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that
case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan
Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may
take."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which
was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case
archived until such time that the accused is brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that:" (1) the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted
or in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged." cralawnad

It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was
instituted.

The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending
Motion to Quash before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution thereon. The had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner’s pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from
the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner
accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and
petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a search
warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest i s
effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that
said Warrant is in full force and effect.

Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision,
that was timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already
been arraigned and tried, let alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.

Petitioner’s argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal
Officer I in the Bureau of Lands, Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on
27 March 1980 by the Director of lands, who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of
extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office (CA-GR No. 11588-SP, p. 2).

The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.

However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being
fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed
that he be excused from filing a Comment on petitioner’s Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.

The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows that:chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;

"b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971 in the vicinity of
his residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and

"c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter’s death, assumed the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off
as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon Manangan
which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining
a position as Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands."cralaw virtua1aw library

In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino
Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer
prosper on the ground of prescription.

Petitioner’s posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German Decision,
petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he
claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that
he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real name. The impersonation was carried to the extreme
when, in petitioner’s Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that
accused had died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of the real Filemon
Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings filed in
connection with the Criminal Case.

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed impersonation when, representing
himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc.
Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;"
dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing
the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court
would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the
same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory,
we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V.
Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena v. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court
Resolved "to direct that petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after
noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner’s present liability
for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in
truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been
sufficiently heard, amply establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent
misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the
administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag
is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real
Filemon Manangan, long since dead.

The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.

WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack
of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months
imprisonment, the same to be served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of
the subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives and
to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing
himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner’s real name is
declared to be Andres Culanag.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003.]

DANIEL LEMOINE, Complainant, v. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified complaint 1 against respondent
Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as
CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan Insurance),
the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his claim which was initially
rejected, 2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondent’s services.

By letter 3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine," under whose care
complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal services
he was charging "25% of the actual amount being recovered . . . payable upon successful recovery;" an advance payment
of P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully collected;"
P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearings, conferences outside our law office and
meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal
expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related
expenses," to be charged to complainant’s account which would be reimbursed upon presentation statement of account.

The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s conformity, he not having agreed
therewith.

It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant’s claim, for by letter 4 of December 9, 1998
addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of
75% of his policy coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."cralaw
virtua1aw library

A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France, 5 he, on the advice of respondent, signed
an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney 6 authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against
Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of complainant’s claim as well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and
receive payment" from it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date
Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as
full settlement of the claim. 7 The check was received by Respondent.

In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the same month.
8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what respondent had written him (Garcia) in
respondent’s letter 9 of March 26, 1999 that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was still
subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof.
In the same letter to Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.

On December 6, 1999, on complainant’s personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that his
claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before. 10 Complainant lost no
time in going to the law office of respondent who was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by telephone
during which he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his claim. 11

Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter 12 wherein he acknowledged having in his
possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as attorney’s lien pending complainant’s
payment of his attorney’s fee, equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the entire amount collected. In the same letter, respondent
protested what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior" complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at
respondent’s office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our attorney’s fees will be
forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric and uncivilized with your approached, we will not
hesitate to make a proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa,
Department of Labor and Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation compliance
and the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good network . . .

While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case against you. We will
rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us for the peaceful settlement of this matter. (Italics
and Emphasis supplied)

As despite written demands, 13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to acknowledge
the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the administrative action at bar on
December 17, 1999.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that" [i]t appears that there was ‘irregularity’ with the check," it having been
issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was therein intercalated after his (complainant’s) name. 14

Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees, 15 complainant decried respondent’s
continued possession of the proceeds of his claim 16 and his misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught with
difficulties. 17

In his Counter-Affidavit 18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of the proceeds of
complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorney’s fees. He expressed readiness, however, to account
for and turn them over once he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of
"no cure, no pay" adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his attorney’s fees,
19 which to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract between him and complainant, the latter having
rejected respondent’s letter-proposal of October 21, 1998. 20

Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainant’s claim and the expenses
he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to contact complainant whose whereabouts he
did not know prompted him to encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power of
Attorney executed in his favor. 21

During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit and
stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent’s proposal in his October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of
the actual amount collected for his legal services. 22 And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26,
1999 letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and suggesting
acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainant’s claim at P350,000.00.

Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that it was made
upon Garcia’s request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcia’s business partner. 23

Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement 24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his explanation that it was
on Garcia’s express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which was directed to the fax number of
Ramiscal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he had talked to
complainant about respondent’s retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds for professional fees less
expenses, 25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the
amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less attorney’s fees and expenses. 26 Thus, respondent
claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt, Makati; the
amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his (respondent’s) former address through
his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondent’s) former employer
Commonwealth Insurance Company through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and
at Manila Intercontinental Hotel’s coffee shop sometime in October 1999. 27 Respondent submitted the separate sworn
statements of Leonardo and Roxas. 28

Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent alleged that
there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really
dealt with regarding complainant’s claim. 29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainant’s offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his services, insisting that
since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees and it was through him that Metropolitan Insurance
favorably reconsidered its initial rejection of complainant’s claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds
thereof. 30

Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred representation
expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and
transportation and gasoline expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00; 31 and that his retention of complainant’s money was
justified in light of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the Philippines, might
leave the country anytime without settling his professional fees. 32

The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation 33 of October 26, 2001, found respondent guilty of
misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn over to complainant the sum of
P475,000.00 representing the amount of the P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondent’s professional fees of
P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigator’s Report, issued Resolution No.
XV-2002-401 34 on August 3, 2002, reading:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" ; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,
and considering respondent’s dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which
caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession to which he belongs, Respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty
Five Thousand. (P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant without prejudice to respondent’s right to claim attorney’s fees
which he may collect in the proper forum. (Emphasis supplied)

The records of the case are before this Court for final action.

Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and
its remand to the Investigator so that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondent’s) confrontation.

There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted or documented.

This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the following provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

RULE 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
x x x

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

RULE 15.06 — A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
x x x

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

RULE 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

RULE 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.

RULE 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
x x x
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
x x x

RULE 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client’s request for information.
x x x

RULE 21.02 — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Filipino
lawyer’s principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific
acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client 36 as
well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand. 37 Respondent breached this Canon when
after he received the proceeds of complainant’s insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address
in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.

In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March 26, 1999 to
Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer . . .
which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcia’s express request is
nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere
request of a friend.

By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed
professional misconduct. 38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose
through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check,
until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.

A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion
to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession. 39

That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of his duty to account for it. 40
The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees
to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the
lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. 41 He can file, if he still deems i t
desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees. 42

In respondent’s case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial determination
so that his and complainant’s sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly
and in bad faith held on to complainant’s funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of
attorney’s fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney’s retaining lien which by no
means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when
due or upon demand.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney’s fees. After he received the check and after
complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant
communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while
he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say
the least.

As for respondent’s claim in his June 2001, Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions from May
1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for
complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a lawyer
like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially at a time
when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms. 43 Not only that. As stated earlier, respondent’s
Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant unequivocally contained his express
admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only
aggravates his misconduct. Respondent’s claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for
him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit no
consideration.

The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

The intercalation of respondent’s name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable solely in favor of complainant as
twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance 44 is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document which
respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.

Respondent’s threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain government
agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.

It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainant’s funds in the amount of
over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about
a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good
moral character. Worse, by respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to
complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to,
he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a
refusal to remit complainant’s funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them. 45

In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble profession
that is the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike
out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.

Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from
notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his attorney’s fees and purported expenses
incurred in securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115908-09. March 29, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY GODOY, Accused-Appellant. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z.

GACOTT, JR., * Complainant, v. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR., and EVA PONCE DE LEON, Respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review by the court, is a complaint
1 filed by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to
cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the
editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso,
Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation
in Puerto Princesa City. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced, with the alleged contemptuous statements
italicized for ready identification as the particulars equivalent to the innuendo in a libel charge:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng
kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang
pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na lamang sila sa magiging resulta ng review
ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy.
Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito
rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO
pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.

Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-
live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding "balita" ewan kung totoo, na
noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha at kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang
Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National
Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa.
xxx xxx xxx

Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka
kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa
Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw ang mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang.
Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo
at masentensiyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid ang laban diyan.

The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice;
that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does
not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice
objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the
article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.

Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment 2 that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the
administration of justice because the same was published after complainant had promulgated his decision in the case; that
such publication will not affect or influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the
Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princesa and some parts of Palawan; that the comments made therein
were made in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may contain
unfavorable comments about complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the
administration of justice; and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneousl y
filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment 3 and Supplemental Comment 4 asserts that the article is merely in
reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show, "Magandang Gabi Bayan," last June 18, 1994 wherein
the latter defended his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled "People vs. Godoy;" that the article is no longer
sub judice as the same was published only after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction
over the case; that the article cannot be considered contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear and present
danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; that it constitutes a
valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading of the subject article in its entirety will
show that the same does not constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which did not intend to malign nor
place him in disrepute in the performance of his functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon cannot be held liable for
contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or personal connection with, the authorship or publication
of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had just returned from the United States when the same was published.

On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature, we are inclined, based on an
overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative. We have read and reread the article in
its entirety and we are fully convinced that what is involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements
have been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual care, there
would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding.

In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to favorably consider the following explanation of respondent
Ponce de Leon in her Supplemental Comment:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt, but
at most, merely constitutes fair criticism.

The first portion of the article reads:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya
ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang
pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR
ay totoong pinagbantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo
ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR.
O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa."

The foregoing does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the public accusations being made by Complainant
that he is being given death threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The article only makes a justifiable query
as to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his accusations are true.

"Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-
live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding "balita" ewan kung totoo, na
noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha at kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang
Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National
Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused Danny Godoy. They are not presented as facts by
respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. In fact, he even goes to the extent of acknowledging that he himself does not know if the
rumors are true or not.

The subject article then offers the following analysis:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa dalawang tao, kay Danny Godoy at Judge Gacott. Kung babaliktarin
ng Supreme Court ang decision ni Gacott, lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott naman ang masisira, ang kanyang aspirations na
maitaas sa Court of Appeals at eventually makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte suprema ng bansa. Kung papaboran
naman si Gacott ay sigurado na ang kamatayan ni Godoy, at double pa pero si Gacott maitataas pa ang puwesto. Tayo
naman, hintay lamang tayo ng ano mang magiging developments ng kaso."

The foregoing is nothing more than a fair analysis. For indeed, if the Honorable Court affirms the Decision of Complainant,
the accused Danny Godoy would be meted the death sentence. On the other hand, if the Decision is reversed, this may
adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be promoted to the Court of Appeals, and eventually to the Honorable
Court.

Finally, the subject article reads:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Pero mayroong payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at
baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa
Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw ang mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang.
Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo
at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid ang laban diyan."

Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. allegedly said. But more importantly, the foregoing
is merely a reaction not so much to Complainant's Decision, but to the public statements made by Complainant in the
national television show "Magandang Gabi Bayan.

Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it
could not conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and
criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree
of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.

It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and
unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides
for one party, he decides against another; and oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The
disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling, which often
reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything
which appears as but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed
of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence. 5

Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that there are two primary issues presented in this incident
which deserve a more extended disquisition, firstly, because of their importance and frequent involvement in contempt
proceedings filed in the courts, and, secondly, by reason of the fact that there are numerous and variant pronouncements
on the subject of contempt which need to be clarified. The principal issues are (1) whether or not there can be contempt of
court in case of post-litigation statements or publications; and (2) which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed
against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal. Other cognate and related issues must also be discussed so as
to provide judicial guidance on the present state of our statutory and case laws thereon. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Before we go into a more intensive analysis of said issues, however, it may be beneficial for purposes thereof to preliminarily
revisit and expound on the nature and implications of a special civil action for contempt or of any initiatory pleading therefor
filed as an incident in the main case. That exercise will further explain and justify our disposition of the contempt charge
herein.

Prefatorial Considerations

The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for
his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty required of him by the court
and which he refuses to perform. Due perhaps to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts
are classified as civil or criminal. 6 However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal contempt, as
distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct. The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is due
to the fact that there are contempts in which both elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor
altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same act may constitute both a
civil and criminal contempt.

A. As to the Nature of the Offense.

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is
an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. 7 On the other
hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of t he
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. 8
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society
and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the
accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are
remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither
a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court. 9

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a
criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority
indicating that since the purpose of. civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the
contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil
contempt. 10

B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised

A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where
the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal.
Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt
is civil. A criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court;
private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the
refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action
pending before the court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature
of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party
in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt
proceedings, the contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. 11

C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding

It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose,
and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose
is primarily compensatory or remedial. 12

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive
in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve
the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking,
however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime.
The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal
proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance
with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature
of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution
for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to
take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. 13

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the
enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed,
a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to
compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt,
regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf
of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement
of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil
action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court order in a civil action, it i s not
necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order. It
has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case,
it is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and
service of new process. 14

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a
pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real
prosecutor. 15

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption,
although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must
amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden. 16

On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be safely concluded that under paragraph
(d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.

II

Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of

Contempt Proceedings

A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties

In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the courts and the press, quoting
therein the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, 18 thus:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither
should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold
the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The
right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear
case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise
its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in
an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon
as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve
its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing writings which are clearly
opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by
means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the
liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.

Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently couched so as to impu te
responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes recognized that with respect to whether an allegedly
scandalous publication or utterance is to be treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn between those speeches or writings
which are protected by the privilege of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse of it.

The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of speech; persons engaged in
the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed by persons not in that business. 19

B. Different Doctrines or Schools of Thought

In the case of In re Francisco Brillantes, 20 Justice Perfecto explained in his dissenting opinion that "as to whether contempt
may be committed for criticising a tribunal after the same has rendered decision or taken final action on a matter which is
the subject of criticism, there are two schools of thought represented, respectively, by what we may call the English doctrine
and the American doctrine, the first for the affirmative and the last one for the negative. The question now is to determine
which of the two doctrines is more conformable to reason and justice and, therefore, should be adopted and applied by our
tribunals.

1. The English Doctrine

According to Justice Perfecto, the rule in England is that there can be contempt of court even after the case has been
terminated. He then proceeded to ramify:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In England comments upon the court's action in a concluded case, where libelous or calculated to bring the court into
disrepute, were freely punishable as contempt under the early common law. Distinction between pending and concluded
matters does not seem to have been made. Any comment impairing the dignity of the court was punishable as contempt
regardless of the time at which made.
xxx xxx xxx

The whole theory of the early common law of contempt is admirably delivered by Wilmot, J., in King vs. Almon, . . . . The
publication there complained of was a volume containing a diatribe against Lord Mansfield for allowing an amendment of
pleading as of course, and apparently from corrupt motives, in a concluded case, and further charging him with having
introduced a practice to defeat the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus. It is there said: "The arraignment of the justice of
the judges is arraigning the King's justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his judges,
and excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to
obey them; and, whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous
obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatever
— not for the sake of the judges as private individuals, but because they are the channels by which the Kings' justice is
conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be universally thought so, are both absolutely necessary for giving justice
that free, open, and uninterrupted current which it has for many ages found all over this Kingdom, and which so eminently
distinguishes and exalts it above all nations upon the earth . . . . The constitution has provided very apt and proper remedies
for correcting and rectifying the involuntary mistakes of judges, and for punishing and removing them for any voluntary
perversions of justice. But, if their authority is to be trampled upon by pamphleteers and newswriters, and the people are to
be told that the power given to the judges for their protection is prostituted to their destruction, the court may retain its power
some little time; but I am sure it will instantly lose all its authority, and the power of the court will not long survive the authority
of it: Is it possible to stab that authority more fatally than by charging the court, and more particularly the chief justice, with
having introduced a rule to subvert the constitutional liberty of the people? A greater scandal could not be published . . . . It
is conceded that an act of violence upon his person when he was making such an order would be contempt punishable by
attachment. Upon what principle? For striking a judge in walking along the streets would not be a contempt of the court.
The reason, therefore, must be, that he is in the exercise of his office, and discharging the function of a judge of this court;
and, if his person is under this protection, why should not his character be under the same protection? It is not for the sake
of the individual, but for the sake of the public, that his person is under such protection; and, in respect of the public, the
imputing of corruption and the perversion of justice to him, in an order made by him at his chambers, is attended with much
more mischievous consequences than a blow; and therefore the reason of proceeding in this summary manner applies with
equal, if not superior, force, to one case as well as the other. There is no greater obstruction to the execution of justice from
the striking a judge than from the abusing him, because his order lies open to be enforced or discharged, whether the judge
is struck or abused for making it.

2. The American Doctrine

In American jurisprudence the general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a judge with respect to past
cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even though libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the
judge and the court. 21 It has been said that the power to punish as a contempt a criticism concerning a case made after
its termination is denied under the theory that such a power is not necessary as a safeguard to the proper functioning of the
court as a judicial tribunal. And it has been said that comments, however stringent, relating to judicial proceedings which
are past and ended are not contempt of court even though they may be a libel against the judge or some other officer of the
court. There is even the view that when a case is finished, the courts and judges are subject to the same criticisms as other
people and that no comment published in connection with a completed case, however libelous or unjust, is punishable as
contempt of court. Thus it is said that the remedies of a judge who suffers abuse at the hands of the press, not amounting
to contempt, are the same as those available to persons outside the judiciary. 22

To the same effect was the holding in People ex rel. Supreme Court vs. Albertson, 23 where it was declared that -

The great weight of authority is to the effect that — in so far as proceedings to punish for contempt are concerned —
comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully determined in the particular court criticized is unrestricted under our
constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press and free speech, especially in the absence of a statute of direct application to
the contrary. This view in brief is based upon the theory that — keeping our constitutional guaranties in mind — libelous
publications which bear upon the proceedings of a court while they are pending may in some way affect their correct
determination, and are properly the subject of contempt proceedings. On the other hand, such publications or oral utterances
of entirely retrospective bearing come within the sphere of authorized comment unless they affect a judge personally, when
he has his remedy in an action of libel or slander, as does any other individual thus offended. He has the right to bring an
action at law before a jury of his peers.

Along similar lines, in Ex Parte McLeod, 24 the court ruled that:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The right of a court to punish, as for contempts, criticisms of its acts, or even libels upon its officers, not going to the extent,
by improper publications, of influencing a pending trial, . . . would not only be dangerous to the rights of the people, but its
exercise would drag down the dignity and moral influence of these tribunals. Such criticism is the right of the citizen, and
essential not only to the proper administration of justice, but to the public tranquility and contentment. Withdrawing power
from courts to summarily interfere with such exercise of the right of the press and freedom of speech deprives them of no
useful power.

Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Montana in State ex rel. Metcalf vs. District Court, 25 pointed out that the legal
proceeding involved therein was not pending when the alleged libelous article was published, then referred to the guaranty
of freedom of speech and the press, and eventually held that the publication involved was not punishable as contempt. It
declared that so long as the published criticism does not impede the due administration of the law, it is better to maintain
the guaranty of the Constitution than to undertake to compel respect or punish libel by the summary process of
contempt. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, in holding that persons who had published newspaper articles alleging that a designated judge had been intentionally
partial and corrupt in the trial of certain causes which had been decided and were not pending when the publication occurred
could not be punished as for contempt the court, in State ex rel. Attorney General vs. Circuit Court, 26 cited a number of
cases supporting the view that a libelous newspaper comments upon the acts of a court in actions past and ended do not
constitute contempt. It pointed out that some of such decisions took the position that to punish such publications would
constitute a serious invasion of constitutional guaranties of free speech and a free press.

It ratiocinated in this manner: "Important as it is that courts should perform their grave public duties unimpeded and
unprejudiced by illegitimate influences, there are other rights guaranteed to all citizens by our Constitution and form of
government, either expressly or impliedly, which are fully as important, and which must be guarded with an equally zealous
care. These rights are the rights of free speech and of free publication of the citizens' sentiments on all subjects. It seems
clear to us that so extreme a power as to punish for contempt because of libelous publications as to past litigation, is
inconsistent with, and would materially impair, the constitutional rights of free speech and free press."

However, even under American jurisprudence, as shall hereafter be demonstrated, the aforesaid rulings are not without
exceptions. There is ample authority that, under proper circumstances, constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
liberty of the press do not protect contemptuous publications relating to court proceedings even though such publications
are not made until after the pendency of the litigation in question. 27

3. The Philippine Doctrine

In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views on this issue which have to be analyzed and, if
possible, reconciled. On that exordial indication, we have digressed into these aspects of the law on contempt and seized
upon this incident in the criminal cases at bar in order to essay a rapprochement of such views into what we may call the
Philippine doctrine.

In the early cases decided by this Court involving contempts through newspaper publications, the rule was that
contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed with respect to pending suits. Apparently, the weight of
authority then was to the effect that criticism of the conduct of a judge or a court with regard to matters finally disposed of
does not constitute contempt, even though it may be libelous.

That rule first found application in the case of In re Lozano, et al. 28 and was reiterated in the subsequent cases of In re
Abistado, 29 and People vs. Alarcon, et al., 30 where this Court, speaking through Justice Malcolm, tersely
stated:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the
courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. . . . (6 R.C.L., pp. 508-515).cralaw

It will be noted that the aforequoted conclusion was arrived at after a short discourse presented by the ponente on the
existing divergence of opinions on the matter between the English and American courts. But the learned justice,
notwithstanding his preference for and application of the American doctrine, nonetheless thereafter made the
recommendatory observation that "(w)ith reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked first
of all that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly. What is best for the maintenance of the
judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion."

It seems that this view was shared by then Associate Justice Moran when he dissented from the majority opinion in the
aforecited case of People vs. Alarcon, et al., which upheld the doctrine enunciated in Lozano and Abistado, in this wise: "I
know that in the United States, publications about courts, after the conclusion of a pending case, no matter how perverse
or scandalous, are in many instances brought within the constitutional protection of the liberty of the press. But while this
rule may find justification in that country, considering the American temper and psychology and the stability of its political
institutions, it is doubtful whether here a similar toleration of gross misuse of liberty of the press would, under our
circumstances, result in no untoward consequences to our structure of democracy yet in the process of healthful
development and growth."

Such perception could have probably impelled Justice Moran to deviate from the then accepted doctrine, with this
rationalization:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Contempt, by reason of publications relating to courts and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends
to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the
majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the
language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind
of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them
into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as
there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

That dissenting opinion was impliedly adopted in the subsequent case of In re Brillantes, 31 where the editor of the Manila
Guardian was declared in contempt of court for publishing an editorial, stating that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner, even after the case involving the validity of said examinations had been terminated. This
was followed by In re Almacen 32 where the Court stated categorically that the rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated had lost much of its validity, invoking therein the ruling in Brillantes and quoting with approval
the dissenting opinion in Alarcon. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court, the general rule that there can be no contempt in
post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. From the shift in judicial approach in
Brillantes to the position announced in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded that the termination of the case is not a
guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libelous, depending
on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended,
where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended
or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court.

This qualified distinction is not without justification and, in fact, was also foreshadowed by the concurring opinion of Justice
Briones in Brillantes wherein, after noting the conflicting views on the amenability of the contemnor during the pendency or
after the termination of the judicial proceeding in the court involved as illustrated by the English and American doctrines
thereon, he advanced the proposition that -

. . . esta distincion no tiene mucha importancia. Lo importante para mi es ver si la critica lanzada por el recurrido es falsa y
esta concebida en terminos tales que "tiende directamente a degradar la administracion de justicia," . . . es indiferente si
versa sobre un asunto o negociacion totalmente terminada o no; el desacato existe entonces y debe ser castigado.

. . . Se trata simplemente de la facultad inherente en los tribunales de reprimir y castigar todo acto que tiende a embarazarles
y obstruirles en su funcion de administrar justicia, . . . .

The rationale for making a qualification to the rule generally considered as the American doctrine, which rule as herein
qualified we now adopt and refer to as the Philippine doctrine on this issue, is profoundly and eloquently explicated by
Justice Moran in Alarcon, to wit:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that freedom
should not be confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing vigilance against
abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As important as is
the maintenance of a free press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of a judiciary
unhampered in its administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. "The administration
of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and distinct are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the
other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the
Constitution and the laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." (U.S. vs. Sullens,
36 Fed., 2d., 230.) Democracy cannot long endure in a country where liberty is grossly misused any more than where liberty
is illegitimately abridged.
xxx xxx xxx

If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were directed to this Court in connection with a case already
decided, the effect of the rule laid down by the majority is to deny this court the power to vindicate its dignity. The mischievous
consequences that will follow from the situation thus sought to be permitted, are both too obvious and odious to be stated.
The administration of justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption.
Litigants, discontented for having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and
obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and, as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear.

It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public confidence should be a tribute to judicial worth,
virtue and intelligence. But compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying the courts the power to vindicate
themselves when outraged is another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes with impunity a discontented citizen to
unleash, by newspaper publications, the avalanche of his wrath and venom upon courts and judges. If he believes that a
judge is corrupt and that justice has somewhere been perverted, law and order require that he follow the processes provided
by the Constitution and the statutes by instituting the corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. As Mr.
Justice Palmer, in speaking of the duty of courts and court officers, has wisely said:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Would it be just to the persons who are called upon to exercise these powers to compel them to do so, and at the same
time allow them to be maltreated or libeled because they did so? How would a suitor like a juryman trying his case who
might expect he would be assaulted, beaten, his property destroyed, or his reputation blasted, in case he decided against
his opponent? Apply the same thing to judges, or the sheriff, and how long could organized society hold together? With
reference to a judge, if he has acted corruptly, it is worse than a mere contempt. But it is apparent it would not be right that
the court of which he is a member should determine this, and consequently the law has provided a plain and easy method
of bringing him to justice by a petition to Parliament; but, while the law authorizes this, it does not allow infamous charges
to be made against him by persons, either in the newspapers or otherwise, with reference to how he has or shall discharge
the duties of his office. It must be apparent to all right thinking men that, if such were allowed to be indulged in, it must end
in the usefulness of the court itself being destroyed, however righteous its judges may act. From what I have said it must
not be supposed that I think that the decisions of the court, or the actions of the judges, or other persons composing the
court, are not to be discussed; on the contrary, I would allow the freest criticism of all such acts if done in a fair spirit, only
stopping at what must injure or destroy the court itself and bring the administration of the law into disrepute, or be an outrage
on the persons whose acts are discussed, or when such discussion would interfere with the right decision of the cause
before the court."

We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted opinion which, we fully believe, conforms to basic
dogmatic teachings on judicial and professional conduct requiring respect for and the giving of due deference to the judicial
system and its members — ethical standards which this Court has, time and again, been trying to inculcate in the minds of
every member of the Bar and the public in general.

4. Cautela on the Balancing of Interests.

On the bases of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that a line has to be drawn between those utterances or writings
which are protected by the privileges of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse thereof, in
determining whether an allegedly scurrilous publication or statement is to be treated as contempt of court. But to find the
line where the permissible right of free speech ends and its reprehensible abuse begins is not always an easy task. In
contempt proceedings, it was held that this line must usually be defined by the courts themselves, and in such cases its
location is to be established with special care and caution. 33

In so doing, it becomes necessary to give the subject that careful examination commensurate with its importance, mindful
that, on the one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained, while, on the other, free speech, a free
press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. If the court is shorn of its power to
punish for contempt in all proper cases, it cannot preserve its authority, so that even without any constitutional or statutory
guaranty this power is inherent in the court. But the Constitution itself, in the Bill of Rights, guarantees free speech and
liberty of the press. Of course, it was never intended, under the guise of these constitutional guaranties, that the power of
the court should be trenched upon. 34

How to determine whether an act or utterance is covered by the protective mantle of the constitutional guaranty of liberty of
the press or whether it is already outside or an abuse thereof, is an altogether different matter. We have perforce to draw
from tenets in American jurisprudence, although with discriminating choice, since after all our present doctrines on contempt
vis-a-vis constitutional limitations trace their roots in the main to the lessons laid down and born of the social and judicial
experience in that jurisdiction.

The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends,
whether it respects governments or individuals; the right freely to publish whatever the citizen may please and to be
protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or
scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing,
reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals. The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to
publish his opinions; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to
distinguish between those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those
which are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible that any good government should
afford protection and impunity.

The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. If
he does this by scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be punished for contempt. In other words, the abuse of
the privilege consists principally in not telling the truth. There is a right to publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood
to the injury of others with impunity. It, therefore, does not include the right to malign the courts, to libel and slander and
utter the most flagrant and indecent calumnies about the court and its officers, nor to invade the sanctuaries of the temples
of justice. Such practices and such miscreants ought to be condemned, and the courts would deserve condemnation and
abolition if they did not vigorously and fearlessly punish such offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the liberty of the
press, and if the slander relates to the courts, it concerns the whole public and is consequently punishable summarily as a
criminal contempt. It is therefore the liberty of the press that is guaranteed, not the licentiousness. It is the right to speak the
truth, not the right to bear false witness against your neighbor. 35

This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended
and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which
case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. 36

It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a vast difference between criticism or fair comment on
the one side and defamation on the other. Where defamation commences, true criticism ends. True criticism differs from
defamation in the following particulars: (1) Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call for public
comment. (2) Criticism never attacks the individual but only his work. In every case the attack is on a man's acts, or on
some thing, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in personalities. (3) True criticism never imputes or
insinuates dishonorable motives, unless justice absolutely requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic
never takes advantage of the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of
matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste. 37

Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted after a case has been finally
disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions
of the court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line and
charge that judicial conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by
political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts. 38

Moreover, it has been held that criticism of courts after a case is finally disposed of, does not constitute contempt and, to
this effect, a case may be said to be pending so long as there is still something for the court to do therein. But criticism
should be distinguished from insult. A criticism after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the court, and on
that ground it does not constitute contempt. On the other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case is decided,
can under no circumstance be justified. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; but to hurl the false charge
that the Supreme Court has been committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice, and it constitutes contempt. 39

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its
proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into
disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; 40 or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually
resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings.

On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution and must be sacredly
guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that instrument and must not be permitted to destroy or impair
the efficiency of the courts or the public respect therefor and the confidence therein. 41
Thus, in State vs. Morril, 42 the court said that any citizen has the right to publish the proceedings and decisions of the
court, and if he deems it necessary for the public good, to comment upon them freely, discuss their correctness, the fitness
or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in
them; but he has no right to attempt, by defamatory publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it,
and dispose the community to disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are an
abuse of the liberty of the press; and tend to sap the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing
the course of justice. Courts possess the power to punish for contempt libelous publications regarding their proceedings,
present or past, upon the ground that they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public confidence and respect for their
judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to the good order and well-being of society, and most effectually obstruct
the free course of justice.

Then, in In re Hayes, 43 it was said that publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than others, to bring
to public notice the conduct of the courts, provided the publications are true and fair in spirit. The liberty of the press secures
the privilege of discussing in a decent and temperate manner the decisions and judgments of a court of justice; but the
language should be that of fair and honorable criticism, and should not go to the extent of assigning to any party or the court
false or dishonest motives. There is no law to restrain or punish the freest expressions of disapprobation that any person
may entertain of what is done in or by the courts. Under the right of freedom of speech and of the press the public has a
right to know and discuss all judicial proceedings, but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation,
groundless charges of unfairness and stubborn partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency.

Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, 44 it was ruled that the freedom of speech may not be exercised in such a manner
as to destroy respect for the courts, the very institution which is the guardian of that right. The dignity of the courts and the
duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice. Denigrating the court by libelous
attacks upon judicial conduct in an ended case, as well as one which is pending before it, may seriously interfere with the
administration of justice. While such an attack may not affect the particular litigation which has been terminated, it may very
well affect the course of justice in future litigation and impair, if not destroy, the judicial efficiency of the court or judge
subjected to the attack.

Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that false and libelous utterances present a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice. 45 To constitute contempt, criticism of a past action of the court must pose
a clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice, that is, the publication must have an inherent tendency to
influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court's administration of justice. 46 It is not merely a private wrong
against the rights of litigants and judges, but a public wrong, a crime against the State, to undertake by libel or slander to
impair confidence in the judicial functions. 47

Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., 48 held as follows:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair
administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words
may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and
present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "Clear
and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high. . . . The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published
criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and press." . . .

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and
press. We quote: "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of, court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him
unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision
is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the free speech to
determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public
comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." . . .

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. . . .

Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the pendency of a case, no compelling reason exists why the
doctrines enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative publications made after the termination of the
case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is the constant and ever growing need to protect the courts from a substantive
evil, such as invective conduct or utterances which tend to impede or degrade the administration of justice, or which
calumniate the courts and their judges. At any rate, in the case of In re Bozorth, 49 it was there expressly and categorically
ruled that the clear and present danger rule equally applies to publications made after the determination of a case, with the
court declaring that a curtailment of criticism of the conduct of finally concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of
some serious substantive evil which it is designed to avert.

Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra, let it here be emphasized that the protection and
safety of life, liberty, property and character, the peace of society, the proper administration of justice and even the perpetuity
of our institutions and form of government, imperatively demand that everyone — lawyer, layman, citizen, stranger,
newspaperman, friend or foe — shall treat the courts with proper respect and shall not attempt to degrade them, or impair
the respect of the people, or destroy the faith of the people in them. When the temples of justice become polluted or are not
kept pure and clean, the foundations of free government are undermined, and the institution itself
threatened. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

III

Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is Committed Against a Lower Court while the Case is
Pending in the Appellate or Higher Court

In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner
as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy.
Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor,
the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. 50

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court
contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the
contempts are charged; 51 the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due
decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: 52 and in order that a
court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof,
for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.
53

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine
and American jurisprudence, viz.:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. Indirect contempt committed against an inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of
the imposable penalty. 54

2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge
may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where
the charge involves questions of fact. 55

3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated
judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court,
and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the
appeal."

The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded
as the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of
justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement,
regardless of the court which may have made the order. 56 However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction
to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal,
jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. 57

4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case
of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 58

5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred
from the contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is
improper venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a
contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some
jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances. 59

6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor,
although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an
affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 60

7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt against the trial court
has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt
committed after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such
contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 61

8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may
require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not
disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the
regular judge is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper
court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered. 62

9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that
there is also a contempt against the other. 63

10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view
is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional
practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another
court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. 64

11. Some contemptuous acts are also crimes, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than those
against which the contemptuous act was done. 65

12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the
defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the court actually contemned. 66

The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has already been
appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the
proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.

IV

Appropriate Remedies where the Alleged

Contemptuous Statement is also

Claimed to be Libelous

Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority is that in so far as proceedings to punish for contempt
are concerned, critical comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully determined by it is unrestricted, under the
constitutional guaranties of the liberty of the press and freedom of speech. Thus, comments, however stringent, which have
relation to judicial proceedings which are past and ended, are not contemptuous of the authority of the court to which
reference is made. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the
court's authority. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate and effective remedy. 67 The force of
American public opinion has greatly restrained the courts in the exercise of the power to punish one as in contempt for
making disrespectful or injurious remarks, and it has been said that the remedy of a judge is the same as that given to a
private citizen. 68 In such a case, therefore, the remedy of a criminal action for libel is available to a judge who has been
derogated in a newspaper publication made after the termination of a case tried by him, since such publication can no longer
be made subject of contempt proceedings.

The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine doctrine earlier discussed wherein there may still be a
contempt of court even after a case has been decided and terminated. In such case, the offender may be cited for contempt
for uttering libelous remarks against the court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power to punish for contempt
does not and will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after the institution of contempt proceedings.
In other words, the fact that certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel against the judge of the
court contemned does not necessarily require him to bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt proceedings. 69

The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and punishable by indictment or other method of criminal
prosecution does not prevent the outraged court from punishing the contempt. 70 This principle stems from the fundamental
doctrine that an act may be punished as a contempt even though it has been punished as a criminal offense. 71 The defense
of having once been in jeopardy based on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not lie in bar of the contempt
proceedings, on the proposition that a contempt may be an offense, against the dignity of a court and, at the same time, an
offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the State. 72 But more importantly, adherence to the American
doctrine by insisting that a judge should instead file an action for libel will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may
even cause more harm than good.

Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to descend from the plane of his judicial office to the level
of the contemnor, pass over the matter of contempt, and instead attack him by a civil action to satisfy the judge in damages
for a libel, would be a still greater humiliation of a court. That conduct would be personal; the court is impersonal. In our
jurisdiction, the judicial status is fixed to such a point that our courts and the judges thereof should be protected from the
improper consequences of their discharge of duties so much so that judicial officers have always been shielded , on the
highest considerations of the public good, from being called for questioning in civil actions for things done in their judicial
capacity.

Whenever we subject the established courts of the land to the degradation of private prosecution, we subdue their
independence, and destroy their authority. Instead of being venerable before the public, they become contemptible; and we
thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society, and to overturn those institutions which have
hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty. 73

Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for libel, has been assailed as
being without rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a private individual but
to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of justice. In the second place, public interests will
gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face
his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy
which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to
confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force. 74

Whether or not the Same Contemptuous

Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be the

Subject of both a Contempt Proceeding and an

Administrative Disciplinary Action

With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge, we feel that this issue with respect to proper
remedies against an erring member of the Bar should consequentially be addressed, by way of reiteration, since conflicting
and erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.

The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the
exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. 75 A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed
to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of
the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations or
persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. 76 The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is
to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. 77 The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for
orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. 78

Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata
to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. 79 In the same manner, an attorney's conviction for contempt was not
collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially
the same facts leading to conviction. 80 It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof. 81

Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent
in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court's basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice
and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.: 82

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here: the Court's inherent
power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers,
both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does
not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

With this rounding out of the subordinate and principal issue in resolving this incident, we feel that the guidelines we have
laid down will provide assistive references for the lower courts in disciplinary matters arising before them. Coming back to
the incident for resolution, arising as a spin-off from the criminal cases at bar, we reiterate what we have declared at the
outset, absolving respondents from the charges proferred by complainant judge for the reasons therein
stated. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents Mauricio
Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 146783 - July 29, 2002

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MAXIMINO GAMIDO; MAXIMINO B.
GAMIDO, Petitioner, vs. NEW BILIBID PRISON, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg.,
Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as "counsel" for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido. Two issues were tendered during
the hearing of said motion today, attended by Dela Cruz and the counsels for respondent led by the Assistant Solicitor
General Rodolfo Urbiztondo, OSG, to wit:

1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against forum-shopping; and

2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in this case, considering allegations that he
is not a member of the Philippine Bar.

It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February 12, 2001, personally his Motion to Withdraw
Petition, and that the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the withdrawal of his petition for habeas
corpus, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for Relief, which was filed without authority of the petitioner
and clearly without merit, should be and is hereby DENIED.

Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he, Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer
with a law office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the
title of attorney and indicated in his pleadings filed before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be spurious, it
having been shown and admitted by him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, after he was made to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this
case without license to practice law, and although he asked the Court for forgiveness for the wrong he had done, the Court
RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY of indirect contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE, he is hereby
sentenced to pay a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days from notice
hereof, OR suffer IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue, Manila, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24864 November 19, 1985

FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style HALILI TRANSIT (substituted by Emilia de Vera de
Halili), petitioner
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), respondents.

G.R. No. L-27773 November 19, 1985

EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), respondents.

G.R. No. L-38655 November 19, 1985

FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, et al., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-30110 November 19, 1985

EMILIA DE VERA. VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,

vs,

HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Ruben C. Asedillo counsel for Manila Bank.

Pedro A. Lopez counsel for Halili Bus Drivers Transport Hall.

RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, C.J.:

On April 30, 1985, We resolved an urgent motion to cite Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank (Cubao
Branch) in contempt for their continued failure to comply with this Court's temporary mandatory restraining order issued on
September 1, 1983 and with Its resolution dated September 13, 1983 which required compliance with the aforesaid
restraining order. WE disposed of the above motion in the following terms:

WHEREFORE, ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF

COURT FOR WHICH HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL
UNTIL THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 1 AND SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 ARE
COMPLIED WITH.

ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS ALSO DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE
DISBARRED UNDER RULE 138 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND THE RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 18,1983 BE FURNISHED
THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND THE TANODBAYAN FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION (p. 424, L- 27773
rec.).

Atty. Benjamin Pineda moved for reconsideration of the aforecited resolution on May 13, 1985, therein stating, among other
things, that he could not comply with Our resolution of September 1, 1983 since after withdrawals and disbursements, only
P 2,022.70 remained from his account with the Manila Bank (Cubao Branch); that he admits the wrong he has committed,
apologizes for the same and promises that he will do his best to make restitution; that as evidence of his act of repentance
and restitution, he delivered to the NLRC on May 10, 1985 TCT No. 181023 covering his registered real estate property
consisting of 633 square meters and the amount of P30,000.00 in cash, in partial compliance with this Court's resolution of
April 30, 1985; that he helped in facilitating the sale in order to pay the accumulated real estate taxes; and that his retainer's
contract was annotated at the back of the title of said property (TCT No. 205785) as attorney's lien, Movant Pineda now
prays for a reconsideration of Our April 30, 1985 resolution (p. 426, L-27773 rec.).

On May 21, 1985, movant Pineda filed his supplement to motion for reconsideration therein stating, among other things,
that in compliance with this Court's resolution of October 18, 1983, remanding these cases to the NLRC for further
proceedings, Labor Arbiter Antonio Tria Tirona conducted a hearing on May 20, 1985 where the union, Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, Atty. Pedro Lopez and herein movant appeared; and, that the aforenamed parties agreed on these terms:

1. that movant is still answerable for the uncontested amount of P407,424.00 representing the 10% excess
attorney's fees in the amount of P203,712.00, to be refunded to the Union and the 10% attomey's fees due
to Atty. Espinas and Atty. Lopez in the amount of P203,712.00, as per NLRC order dated April 24, 1985.
Said order awarded 7% attorney's fees to Atty. Espinas; 3% to Atty, Lopez and 10% to movant Pineda,
which apportionment corresponds to the 20% attorney's fees as adjudged in subject resolution.

2. that the real property covered by TCT No. 181023 which movant delivered to the NLRC plus the amount
of P30,000.00 remitted to the NLRC shall answer for his obligation; and he will sell the said property and
deposit the proceeds therefrom to the NLRC, for further proceedings.

In the aforesaid supplement, movant reiterates his averments that he negotiated the sale of the union property in 1983
under the impression that the NLRC had the authority to allow the questioned transaction and that it was as honest opinion
that when the CIR was abolished and replaced by the NLRC, the jurisdiction, power and functions of the former were
transferred to the latter agency which, he presumed, had the authority to authorize the purchase. Finally, he claims that his
acts were all done in good faith and reiterates his contrition and is making restitution for the same (p. 435, L- 27773 rec.).

On May 21, 1985, this Court issued a resolution denying movant's motion for reconsideration of April 30, 1985 for lack of
merit (p. 431 L-27773 rec.).

Movant counsel filed on June 6, 1985 his second motion for reconsideration of Our original subject resolution and the
aforecited minute resolution dated May 21, 1985 denying his first motion for reconsideration and the supplement thereto for
lack of merit. In this motion, movant alleges that his accountability as of June 5, 1985 (date of motion) has been reduced to
P377,424.00 and not anymore P710,969.30 as originally computed; that he restates that his accountability to Attys. Jose
C. Espinas and Pedro Lopez and the union is P407,424.00 only which amount was arrived at and agreed upon by the
parties in the proceedings held on May 20, 1985 and which represents the 20% attorney's fees due the three lawyers on
record (Pineda, Espinas and Lopez). The aforesaid attorney's fees were awarded in the order of the NLRC issued on April
24, 1985; that per NLRC records, Atty, Espinas has already been paid P50,000.00 and Atty. Lopez has already received
P20,000.00 as partial attomey's fees; that movant's accountability remains at P377,424.00 after deducting the amount of
P30,000.00 (remitted on May 10, 1985) from the above amount of P407,424.00; that movant has been doing his best to
comply with this Court's order and purge himself of the contempt citation in these cases; and, not being able to produce
immediately the amount of P 407,424:00, he initially remitted the said amount of P30,000.00 and delivered to the NLRC the
title to his property as aforesaid; that in the hearing before the NLRC on June 3, 1985, movant manifested on record in the
presence of Atty. Espinas and the union officers that he is selling as other properties to satisfy his remaining obligation and
that Atty. Espinas and the union officers gave him reasonable time within which to sell said other properties; and, that in the
June 3 hearing at the NLRC, movant submitted a xerox copy of Cashier's Check No. 340573 dated June 23, 1983 of the
Manila Bank -in the amount of P101,856.00 paid by him to the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors Union, for the account of the
payee only. Movant now prays for the necessary correction of his accountability from P710,969.30 to the reduced amount
of P377,424.00 and for a chance to sell his properties, as agreed upon by the parties, to enable him to pay the remaining
amount of P377,424.00 (p. 444, L-27773, rec.).

On June 19, 1985, Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela filed his manifestation and/or comment wherein he contends, among other
things, that sometime in the second week of August, 1982, the Office of the Executive Labor Arbiter Benigno L. Vivar of the
NCR, NLRC endorsed to him a pleading entitled "Motion and/or Manifestation" under caption of "Halili Bus Drivers and
Conductors Union (PTGWO), complainants, versus Fortunato F. Halili doing business under the name and style Halili
Transit, "Respondent, CIR Case No. 1099-V"; and, that said motion was signed under the heading "B.C. Pineda, Counsel
for the Complainant, c/o North Harbor Labor Federation-TUCP 1106-1005 Marcos Road Fronting Pier 6, North Harbor,
Tondo, Manila." Also, he claims that the aforecited motion with three attached documents (Notice of Judgment dated May
3, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
L-38655 and L30110; TCT No. 205755 and Order dated February 9, 1983 of herein movant) were the only records endorsed
to him for the resolution of Atty. Pineda's motion and that he was verbally informed by the former that the records of CIR
Case No. 1099-V could not be located anymore at the NLRC offices. He furthere alleges that since there were no other
records except the aforesaid motion of Atty. Pineda with the three annexes and, for the reasons that Atty. Pineda is a brother
in the profession and an officer of the Court and that this case started in 1958 and transferred from the defunct CIR to the
NLRC, he had reasonable ground to believe that the records of the case could not be found anymore. Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela also claims Chat as labor arbiter, he has the power, under Article 300 of the labor Code, to execute and
implement final and executory judgments. Finally, he avers that since the motion of Atty. Pineda filed on December 1, 1982
with this Court praying for authority to dispose of subject property was merely "Noted" by said Court, such action bolstered
his belief that his office possesses the jurisdiction to authorize the questioned sale (p. 491, L-27773 rec.).

On June 25, 1985, Atty. Jose C. Espinas submitted his comment on the motions for reconsideration of Atty. B.C. Pineda
and on the manifestation and/or comment of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, On the latter's manifestation and/or comment, Atty.
Espinas points to the following inaccuracies in the aforesaid pleading of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela:

1. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, in citing the inscription at the transfer certificate of title, omitted some words which would show
that there are other counsel in these cases. He quotes the acurate notation thus:

PE-1101/T-205755—Attorney's Lien—This property is subject to attorney's lien and other counsel in CIR
Case No. 1099-B pursuant to their retainer contracts. (Doc No. 75, Page No. 16, Book I of the Notary Public
of Rizal, A.G. Gatmaytan).

2. It is not correct to say that in the "Notice of Judgment" by this Court in Cases L-38655 and L-301 10, the counsel named
therein for the union was only Atty. Pineda when the fact is that the decision of this Court in the aforecited cases dated
February 27 1976, acknowledges the representation of other lawyers in these words of its dispositive portion: "subject to
attorney's lien in favor of Atty, B.C Pineda and other counsel in said case pursuant to their retainer contracts. (Emphasis
supplied).

3. It is inaccurate for Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allege That he did not determine attomey's fees in his orders when it
appears that in his order of February 9, 1983, the following was ordered:

(b) The Attorney's Lien equivalent to Thirty-Five percent (35%) of the total purchase price of said parcel of
land covered by TCT No 205755, as annotated at the back of said Title per Entry PE-1101/T-205755 in
favor of Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda. ...

4. While Labor Arbiter Valenzuela manifests that in cases L-38655 and

L-30110, Volume 69 of the SCRA which published the decision, carries the name of Atty. B.C. Pineda as counsel for the
union, he nevertheless avoids pointing out that in L-24864 which was previously published in Volume 22 of the SCRA, Atty.
Jose C. Espinas was named as the lone counsel.

5. Before Labor Arbiter Valenzuela acted on the motions of Atty. B.C. Pineda, he should have first exerted all efforts to
reconstitute the records since he very well knew that the records were not complete. He should have informed the Executive
labor Arbiter, who assigned to him the case that the records thereof were missing. He committed an act of omission.

6. It is incorrect for Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to state that Atty. J.C. Espinas sought for a reduction of attorney's fees from
35% to 20% when the evidence would have shown, if a hearing on the two motions was conducted, that the contract for
services was contingent (20%) only for all lawyers of the firm per resolution of the union's general membership) as found
by Arbiter Tirona in his decision of April 24, 1985.

Atty. Espinas submits the following comment on Atty. Pineda's motion for reconsideration:

1. Atty. Pineda has never complied with this Court's three resolutions dated September 1, September 13 and October 18,
1983. Except for the check he issued on June 23, 1983 in the amount of P2,022.70 in favor of the union, he allegedly spent
P710,959.30 within a period of 2 months and 7 days (between June 23 and September 1, 1983). The declaration of Atty.
Pineda that the temporary mandatory restraining orders have become moot and academic by reason of exhaustion of the
funds imply that said orders are unimportant to him.

2. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion requesting for authority to sell the property on August 9, 1982, he attached a zerox
copy of the certificate of title thereto. The notation on the said title showed that he was not the only lawyer in his case, Yet,
he represented before Arbiter Valenzuela that he alone and the latter readily believed him. one was the counsel
3. Atty. Pineda's apologetic stance and allegation of good faith are negated by the fact that the additional cash payment
P25.000.00 to the union when the property was transferred to them intended for the payment of taxes, was never accounted
for; and, the fact that in alienating subject properly which was held in trust by the union, the consent of the members workers,
not only their leaders, is legally required.

4. The reduction of Atty. Pineda's accountability to P377,424.00 is premature since the proceedings for the determination
of his liability is still pending consideration before Arbiter Tirona. The determination of his liability for P101,856.00 given to
the union through Domingo Cabading and legal interests and damages claimed by the anion members against him are also
pending resolution.

5. In his order dated April 24, 1985, Labor Arbiter Tirona directed Atty. Pineda to deposit 25% of the 35% attorney's fees
collected by him (minus P2,022,70) previously deposited with the Commission for proper disposition, because Atty. Pineda
did not comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order of this Court (p. 538, L-27773 rec.).

The Solicitor General filed on July 28, 1985 his comment on the two motions for reconsideration and the supplement hereto
of Atty. B.C. Pineda. The Solicitor General submits that the attorney's fees of P 203,712.00 is deductible since Atty. Pineda
is entitled to said fees as per order of Arbiter Tirona: that the amount of P30,000.00 may also be deducted since it
corresponds to partial restitution of his liability; and, that the alleged donation of P101,856.00 may not be deducted because
it amounts to a rebate or a commission as already noted by this Court. He also submits that such donation is a violation of
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics. Furthermore. he reports that there was nothing in the hearing of May 20, 1985 which authorizes
Atty. Pineda to deduct the above donation and that after deducting all amounts the latter has deposited including the
P20,000.00 on June 19, 1985, his accountability remains at P457,257.30 The Solicitor General finally submits that
contemnor Pineda's repeated protestations of good faith have no basis considering that he responded in cavalier fashion
to this Court's resolutions by simply stating in effect that since he has already spent the money, the orders should be deemed
moot and academic; that he maintained an arrogant attitude towards the proceedings in the NLRC; and that he utterly failed,
as union counsel, to protect the rights of the workers when he allowed realty taxes on the lot to accumulate for 8 years,
when he did not exert utmost diligence in causing the sale of the lot and when he charged excessive attorney's fees
amounting to over half a million pesos and spending the amount in over two months. The Solicitor General thus prays for
the denial of the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit (p. 225, L-38655, rec.).

On August 7, 1985, contemnor Atty. B.C. Pineda filed his comment on the comment of Atty. Jose C. Espinas dated June
25, 1985. He substantially alleges that Atty. Espinas continues harping on the "scheme" allegedly employed by the former
In this case: what Atty. Espinas file his urgent motion of August 25, 1983 when they failed to agree on the "balato" or token
payment which said lawyer asked of am; that contemnor Atty. Pineda is not running away from his obligations to the parties
concerned, which obligation is the reduced amount of P355,401.30; and, that he be given time, up to September, 1985, to
dispose of his property in Mindoro, to enable him to pay his accountability, aside from his property in Quezon City which is
also for sale (p. 237, L-38655, rec.).

The Solicitor General filed its manifestation and motion in lieu of reply on August 30, 1985 in compliance with Our resolution
of June 27, 1985. In the above pleading, the Solicitor General submits that reply to the manifestation and or comment of
Arbiter Valenzuela should be referred to the Ministry of Labor and Employment since the said ministry, has direct supervision
and control over Valenzuela and it possesses the resources the veracity of his explanations. The Solicitor General further
resources with which to conduct an exhaustive investigation her manifests that with respect to the comment of Atty. Jose
Espinas on the two motions for reconsideration of Atty. Pineda he received a copy of such comment as early as July 1,
1985 and hence, he was then able to incorporate some of Atty. Espinas' observations to which he concurs in his
consolidated comment on the same two motions which was later filed on July 23, 1985. With regard to the comment of Atty.
Espinas on the manifestation of Atty. Pineda, he reiterates his submission that the MOLE is in a better position to investigate
the veracity of Valenzuela's claim, and also to appreciate the observations and conclusions of Atty. Espinas on such claims.

He therefore prays to be excused from filing a reply (p. 243, L-38655 rec.).

We will first tackle the two motions for reconsideration of B.C. Pineda. WE intend to treat separately the manifestation and/or
comment of Labor Arbiter Raymundo

The two motions for reconsideration of Atty. B.C. Pineda And the supplement thereto seeking a reconsideration of Our
resolution dated April 30, 1985 and praying for relief from contumacy are without merit.

In the aforecited resolution We have clearly established the continued defiance by contemnor Pineda of Our previous
resolutions of September 1 and 13, 1983. and adjudged him guilty of the indirect contempt charge.
WE stand firm on Our pronouncements in the April 30, 1985 resolution which We restate hereunder:

For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of court explicitly provides:

Sec. 7, Rule 71—Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is vet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.'

Thus, in the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (L-234981 Phil. 741 [Oct. 22, 1948]), where petitioner
was confined in prison for contempt of court, this Court, in denying the petition and resolving the question
of petitioner's indefinite confinement, had the occasion to apply and clarify the aforequoted provision in tile
following tenor:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler 136
U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life.

The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to
its objective: and it accords with Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is vet in the power of
the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs
it.

If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner,
vet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying
with the orders of the court, and in to manner put an end to his incarceration. In these circumstances, the
judgment cannot be said to be excessive or unjust (Davis vs. Murphy [1947], 188 P. 229-231). As stated in
a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147), "to order that one be imprisoned for an
indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a remedial measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemnor to
do an act within his or her power to perform, He must have the means by which he may purge himself of
the contempt." The latter decision cites Staley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq., 300, 90 A., 1042,
1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:

In a civil contempt the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one
party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the order of the
court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercion in character, and to that
end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he may discharge himself,
As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket" (pp. 747-748).

Likewise, American courts had long enunciated these rulings:

The commitment of one found in contempt of a court order only until the contemnor shall have purged
himself of such contempt by complying with the order is a decisive characteristic of civil contempt, Maggio
v. Zeitz 333 US 56, 92 L. ed, 476, 68 S Ct 401.

Civil or quasi-criminal contempt is contemplated by a statute providing that if any person refused to obey
or perform any rule, order, or judgment of court, such court shall have power to fine and imprison such
person until the rule, order or judgment shall be complied with. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss 468, 9 So 2d.
641. [17 Am. Jur. 2d] (pp, 418-420, L-27773 rec., emphasis supplied).

This Court takes note of the fact that in compliance with its resolution dated October 18, 1983, Labor Arbiter Antonio Tria
Tirona of the NLRC, after due hearing where all the parties concerned were present, issued an order on April 24, 1985
definitely fixing the percentages to which the union and the lawyers should be entitled. The dispositive portion of the said
order thus provides:

Wherefore, based on the records and the participation of all the lawyers in the case, Atty. Espinas is entitled
to attorney's fees equal to 7% of the total proceeds of the sale; Atty. Lopez—35% and Atty. Pineda—10%.
The excess of 15% fees on the 35% fees charged should be refunded to the union for distribution to its
 members. Not having complied with the mandatory restraining order of the Supreme Court on September
1, 1983, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda is directed to deposit 25% out of the 35% collected by him as fees (minus
P2,022.70 previously deposited by the Manila Bank for his account) with the commission for proper
disposition.

The aforesaid apportionment is fair and reasonable. Atty. Pineda collected the amount of P712,992. 00 or 35% of the selling
price of P2,037,120.00.

Since his share in the fees is only P203,712.00, which is 10% of P2,037,120.00, Atty. Pineda is now accountable for and
should return the following amounts to:

1. Atty. Jose Espinas—P14259840 or 7% of P2,037,120.00

2. Atty. Pedro Lopez—P61,113.60 or 3% or 3% P2,037, 120.00

3. Union P305,568.00 or 15% of P2,037,120.00

The total amount, therefore, which contemnor Pineda should account for is P509,280.00 (before any remittance or payments
were made). By far lie has only paid or remitted thru NLRC P2,022.70 plus P50,000.00 (to Atty. Espinas) plus P20,000.00
(to Atty. Lopez) as per as allegation in his second motion for reconsideration filed on June 6, 1985, or a total or P72,022.70.

Evidently, it appears from the within records that contemnor Pineda is still far from returning the remaining accountability of
P437,257.80, exclusive of interests. He has not even satisfied 15% of the original accountability of P509,280.00. Deliberately
or inadvertently, contemnor failed to include in his accounting (reflected in his second motion for reconsideration? the
amount of P305,568.00 which corresponds to the 15% Secs collected beyond the 20% allowed for attorney's fees. Likewise,
the within records bring out the fact that the amount of P101,856.00 which contemnor Pineda allegedly donated to the.
Union was actually taken from the purchase price of P2,037,120.00 and not from P712,992.00 which he originally collected.

From the foregoing, contemnor Pineda has miserably failed to commonly with Our resolution dated April 30, 1985. For such
non-compliance or better still, for not fully performing the act required of him, he cannot as yet purge himself of contumacy

For, it is clear from the provision of Section 7, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court that the rationale behind the punishment
of the contemnor is for him to make complete restitution to the party injured by the violation of an order. Thus, if the
contumacious act consists in the failure to perform an act or obligation which is yet in the power of the contemnor to do, he
may be imprisoned indefinitely until full and complete compliance with our order or resolution.

The essence of the imposition of an indefinite imprisonment on the contemnor is the ultimate and total performance of an
obligation required by an order of a superior court. This is why contumacy should be indivisible it cannot be the subject of
piece-meal compliance; otherwise, the very reason for which it is imposed, which is the complete compliance with an order,
would be defeated. Court orders and injunctions would be easily defied or ignored by litigants if, every time a contemnor
partially satisfies the same, he would be released from the contempt charge. This premature purging of contumacy would
not prevent the other party from filing another motion for contempt and this would naturally result in endless litigations.
hence, unless and until our courts show they mean business in exacting. full compliance with their orders, the contempt of
court might, become a futile exercise of judicial power. And eventually, litigants and their counsel might lose respect for our
courts.

Significantly, some American courts have the following pronouncements on the matter. Thus:

Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been restricted by statute,
and subject to constitutional prohibitions, where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court
for the payment of money lie may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.—Revell v.
Dishong 175 So. 129 Fla. 9; Va Branch v. Branch, S.E. 303; 144 Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).

xxx xxx xxx

...It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as means of coercion for civil purpose cannot be resorted
to until all other means fail [Mich.—Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the
court's power to order the contemnor's detention continues so long as the contumacy persists [Ark.—Lane
v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).
Even as contemnor Atty, Pineda pleads good faith in having committed the contumacious acts and offers contrition,
apologies and restitution, such posture is not enough to purge himself of his legal and moral obligations particularly so
because he is a counsel for the workers whose interests he is duty bound to protect. Instead, he exploited their ignorance.

What really comes to Our minds now is this question: After all that the contemnor has done, could he still be considered a
competent, trustworthy and decent member of the Bar? Thus, in the case of Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals (L-39253, 87
SCRA 67 [November 24, 1978]), this Court had the candor to say that good faith alone is not a ground for exoneration of
the contempt charge.

Nevertheless, We are constrained to point out certain observations on and assessment of the manifestation and/or comment
of Arbiter Valenzuela which has been addressed to this Court. Offhand, his allegations therein suffer from flaws and
unwarranted assumptions, even misrepresentations.

Thus, when Arbiter Valenzuela quoted the inscription at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title relative to attorney's lien,
he did not put the complete wording which should include the words "and other counsel in CIR Case No. 1099-B" after the
words "attorney's hen." Without the complete inscription, one would get the impression that there were no other lawyers in
the transaction.

Then again, Arbiter Valenzuela did not reveal the fact that in this Court's decision in L-38655 and L-301 10 dated February
27, 1976, said Court recognized the presence of other lawyers by stating therein thus: "subject to attorney's liens in favor
of Atty. B.C. Pineda and other counsel in said case pursuant to their retainer contracts" (please see paragraph one, page 6
of manifestation; underlining supplied).

Arbiter Valenzuela also disclaims that he never determined the extent of attorney's fees in his questioned order dated
February 9, 1983, when the fact is that in letter (b) of said order's dispositive portion, he specifically fixed the attorney's lien
equivalent to 35% of the total purchase price of the parcel of land in favor of Atty. B.C. Pineda,

It is indeed quite revealing for Arbiter Valenzuela to say that "on the basis of the available records then in the possession
of the undersigned Labor Arbiter, and the non-disclosure by A Atty. B. C Pineda that there are other lawyers involved" he
awarded attorney's fees in favor of contemnor Pineda only. This shows that Arbiter Valenzuela issued the two questioned
orders on the basis of patently wrong assumptions. He assumed that even without the intervention of the NLRC, as
successor of the CIR, the property could be disposed of. He forgot that there are still existing laws which should be
considered. Again, he erred in assuming that when the motions of Atty. Pineda with annexes were indorsed to him for
resolution in 1983, there were no other records which he could dig up. He wrongly assumed that just because Atty. Pineda
was a "brother in the profession and an Officer of the Court", the latter's verbal representation that the other records of Case
No. 1099-V could not be found, should be accepted readily. Finally, when contemnor Pineda's motion filed on December 1,
1982 before this Court seeking authority to sell the subject property was merely "noted" by said Court, Arbiter Valenzuela
likewise wrongly assumed that his Office had the jurisdiction to authorize the sale of the same. As a lawyer, he should have
known that the word "noted" did not mean approval or inaction. He should have filed a motion with this Court for the
necessarily clarification. Instead he acted with precipitate haste.

All the foregoing facts indicate his connivance with Atty. Pineda.

Arbiter Valenzuela now assumes that as such labor arbiter, is empowered under Article 300 of the Labor Code, as amended,
to execute final judgments. But a thorough reading of said article does not show any such provision, which reads thus:

Art. 300. Disposition of pending cases—All cases pending before the Court of Industrial Relations and the
National Labor Relations Commission established under Presidential Decree No. 21 on the date of
effectivity of this Code shall be transferred to and processed by the corresponding labor relations divisions
or the National Labor Relations Commission created under this Code having cognizance of the same in
accordance with the procedure laid down herein and its implementing rules and regulations. Cases on labor
relations on appeal with the Secretary of Labor or the Office of the President of the Philippines as of the
date of effectivity of this Code shall remain under their respective jurisdiction and shall be decided in
accordance with the rules and regulations in force at the time of appeal.

All workmen's compensation cases pending before the Workmen's Compensation Units in the regional
offices of the Department of Labor and those pending before the Workmen's Compensation Commission
as of March 31, 1975, shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the law, rules and procedure
existing, prior to the effectivity of the Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund.
It is very sad to note that for a lawyer who has served the government for 29 years, Arbiter Valenzuela puts up the defense
that when he acted on the two motions of Atty. Pineda, he was primarily guided by his conscience. Then all of a sudden he
says that if there was an error, it was an error of the mind and not of the heart,

From the foregoing, it appears that Arbiter Valenzuela failed to observe the degree of prudence expected of him as a
government lawyer of 29 years. When the motions of Atty. Pineda were indorsed to him for proper action, he should have
first exhausted all efforts in locating or reconstructing the records upon as discovery that the same were incomplete. He
should have informed as superior officer or the one who assigned to him the motions that the records were lacking. He
should have initiated a reconstitution of the records by requiring all the lawyers in the case to produce their own records or
have sought their assistance in locating the records,

It took Atty. Espinas and some workers to locate and produce such records. Arbiter Valenzuela's acts may be treated as
nonfeasance and gross neglect of duty.

WHEREFORE, THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ATTY. BENJAMIN C. PINEDA ARE HEREBY DENIED
FOR LACK OF MERIT. FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT, HE IS ORDERED IMPRISONED IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL
HE COMPLIES FULLY WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THIS COURT DATED APRIL 30,1985.

EIGHT (8) MEMBERS OF THE COURT VOTED TO DELETE THE THIRD PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 30 OF THE
RESOLUTION OF APRIL 30,1985, WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

LABOR ARBITER RAYMUNDO VALENZUELA SHOULD BE MADE TO ANSWER FOR HAVING ACTED
WITHOUT OR BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES, HE COULD ALSO
BE PROSECUTED BEFORE THE TANODBAYAN UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI GRAFT
LAW, INDEPENDENTLY OF HIS LIABILITIES AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICER ' HE COULD BE THE
SUBJECT OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 27, RULE 138 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT.

LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE
TANODBAYAN FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION,

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

Aquino and Plana, JJ., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., took no part as regards Atty. Pineda.

Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

ESCOLIN, J., concurring:

I concur but not on the findings as to Labor Arbiter Valenzuela.

CUEVAS, J., concurring:

I concur but vote to reconsider that portion adversely affecting Arbiter Valenzuela.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

I vote to reconsider the portions of our Resolution of April 30, 1985, adversely affecting Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela.

In the Manifestation and/or Comment [dated 17 June, 1985] of Labor Arbiter Raymundo F. Valenzuela, he prays that this
Court reconsider and set aside that portion of our Resolution promulgated on April 30, 1985 wherein it is stated that "Labor
Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela should be made to answer for having acted without or beyond his authority in proper
administrative charges. He could also be prosecuted before the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the Anti -Graft Law.
Independently of his liabilities as a government officer, he could be the subject of disbarment proceedings under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court." (pg. 30, Resolution of April 30, 1985).

The dispositive portion of the aforestated resolution does not carry any mandatory directive that disciplinary action should
be formally taken against him. Nevertheless, said Labor Arbiter felt impelled to submit to this Court a "Manifestation and/or
Comment" to the said Resolution of April 30, 1985, wherein he endeavored to explain the issuance of his assailed order in
Case No. 1099-0 before the NLRC which apparently led to the sale of the property awarded to satisfy or answer for the
claims of the Union members in the labor cases involved. Significantly, said Labor Arbiter was not even a party in these
cases where these adverse observations against him were made by this Court. I now realize that he was chastised without
being even priorly asked to offer his explanations regarding his official actuations.

The crux of the matter would seem to be that Labor Arbiter Valenzuela was considered by this Court as mistaken in
considering Atty. B.C. Pineda as the only counsel for Union. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela was misled because in Cases L-
38655 and L-30110, 69 SCRA 507, only the name of Atty. B.C. Pineda appears as counsel for the Union and he overlooked
the fact that in another case, L-24864, 22 SCRA 785, the name of Atty. Jose C. Espinas, is indicated to be also the same
counsel for the Union. It was also stated that Arbiter Valenzuela should have informed the Executive Labor Arbiter who
assigned him to the case, that case records were not complete and/or missing. Arbiter Valenzuela was faulted for his
supposed inadvertence and mistaken assumptions. Absent however, any indication of personal gain or benefit to said Labor
Arbiter or any attendant malice or bad faith on his part and considering the explanations tendered by him the suggestions
of drastic disciplinary actions against him in the Resolution of the Court do not appear to be warranted. The greater harm
would arise with a referral of the matter to the stated government entities as our resolution would then be construed as a
compelling directive or a forceful suggestion of this Court that Arbiter Valenzuela is necessarily accountable and should be
punished.

In the Manifestation and/or Comment dated 17 June, 1985, submitted by Arbiter Valenzuela are contained as laborious
efforts to explain his side of the matter. I find correct the view taken by the Solicitor General, who after being required b y
the Court to reply to the Comment and Manifestation of Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela, significantly submitted a
manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Reply dated August 29, 1985, stating on page 2 thereof, and We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The manifestation and/or comment of Valenzuela contains explanations of his actuations in this case. In
view of the foregoing observations of this Honorable Court, undersigned counsel submits that reply to the
manifestation is better deferred to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for the following reasons:

(a) It has direct supervision and control over Valenzuela and

(b) It possesses the resources with which to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the veracity of
his (Arbiter Valenzuela's) explanations. (Emphasis supplied)

In the light of said observations of the Solicitor General's Office, our earlier resolution of April 30, 1985, precipitately ascribing
certain faults and necessity of drastic action against said Labor Arbiter would seem to have been rash unwarranted or, in
the very least, premature. As our Court is not sufficiently prepared to assess whether the explanations of Arbiter Valenzuela
are adequate and acceptable or not, it would be unfair at this point of time to pronounce said Labor Arbiter at fault and/or
that the degree of his alleged negligence warrant any drastic action.

The uncontroverted fact is that there is no showing of any anomalous connivance on the part of said Labor Arbiter with
anyone and what is indicated by the records is that he had then determined the proceedings on the basis of the available
records endorsed to him. Blame is imputed to him on the premise that as a government lawyer for 29 years, he should have
first exhausted all efforts in locating or reconstructing the records upon as discovery that the same were incomplete; that he
should have informed his superior officer or the one assigned to him the motions that the records were lacking that he
should have initiated a reconstruction of the records by requiring all lawyers to produce their own records or have sought
their assistance in locating the records. The conclusion was then quickly reached that his acts must be treated as
nonfeasance and gross neglect of duty.
I am not prepared to take such a harsh view against a government employee who has devoted continuously twenty-nine
(29) years of his life in the service of the government, rising steadily to his present position and possibly nearing his age of
retirement. With his uncontradicted assertion that during such long period, his reputation and integrity was unblemised, it
seems to me it would be unjustified to pass judgment on such a person and recommended him at once for drastic disciplinary
action when the Solicitor General's Office which was asked by the Court to comment on this matter points to the fact that it
is the Ministry of Labor and Employment which possess the resources with which to conduct an exhaustive investigation on
the veracity of his (Labor Arbiter Valenzuela's) explanations. Consequently, without any such prior and satisfactory
investigation by the office which has been pointed to as singularly possessing the resources to ascertain the veracity of the
arbiter's explanations, the immediate conclusion in our Resolution of April 30, 1985, suggesting administrative and drastic
disciplinary punishment including disbarment proceedings against said Labor Arbiter would be too swift, unjudicious and
possibly unfair to said Labor Arbiter.

I therefore, vote that the portion in the said Resolution of April 30, 1985 (3rd paragraph of page 30 thereof) which states
that Labor Arbiter Valenzuela should be made to answer in proper administrative charges, or that he be prosecuted before
the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, or that independently, he should be the subject of disbarment
proceeding, be set aside and considered as now deleted therefrom.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ESCOLIN, J., concurring:

I concur but not on the findings as to Labor Arbiter Valenzuela.

CUEVAS, J., concurring:

I concur but vote to reconsider that portion adversely affecting Arbiter Valenzuela.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

I vote to reconsider the portions of our Resolution of April 30, 1985, adversely affecting Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela.

In the Manifestation and/or Comment [dated 17 June, 1985] of Labor Arbiter Raymundo F. Valenzuela, he prays that this
Court reconsider and set aside that portion of our Resolution promulgated on April 30, 1985 wherein it is stated that "Labor
Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela should be made to answer for having acted without or beyond his authority in proper
administrative charges. He could also be prosecuted before the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the Anti -Graft Law.
Independently of his liabilities as a government officer, he could be the subject of disbarment proceedings under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court." (pg. 30, Resolution of April 30, 1985).

The dispositive portion of the aforestated resolution does not carry any mandatory directive that disciplinary action should
be formally taken against him. Nevertheless, said Labor Arbiter felt impelled to submit to this Court a "Manifestation and/or
Comment" to the said Resolution of April 30, 1985, wherein he endeavored to explain the issuance of his assailed order in
Case No. 1099-0 before the NLRC which apparently led to the sale of the property awarded to satisfy or answer for the
claims of the Union members in the labor cases involved. Significantly, said Labor Arbiter was not even a party in these
cases where these adverse observations against him were made by this Court. I now realize that he was chastised without
being even priorly asked to offer his explanations regarding his official actuations.

The crux of the matter would seem to be that Labor Arbiter Valenzuela was considered by this Court as mistaken in
considering Atty. B.C. Pineda as the only counsel for Union. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela was misled because in Cases L-
38655 and L-30110, 69 SCRA 507, only the name of Atty. B.C. Pineda appears as counsel for the Union and he overlooked
the fact that in another case, L-24864, 22 SCRA 785, the name of Atty. Jose C. Espinas, is indicated to be also the same
counsel for the Union. It was also stated that Arbiter Valenzuela should have informed the Executive Labor Arbiter who
assigned him to the case, that case records were not complete and/or missing. Arbiter Valenzuela was faulted for his
supposed inadvertence and mistaken assumptions. Absent however, any indication of personal gain or benefit to said Labor
Arbiter or any attendant malice or bad faith on his part and considering the explanations tendered by him the suggestions
of drastic disciplinary actions against him in the Resolution of the Court do not appear to be warranted. The greater harm
would arise with a referral of the matter to the stated government entities as our resolution would then be construed as a
compelling directive or a forceful suggestion of this Court that Arbiter Valenzuela is necessarily accountable and should be
punished.

In the Manifestation and/or Comment dated 17 June, 1985, submitted by Arbiter Valenzuela are contained as laborious
efforts to explain his side of the matter. I find correct the view taken by the Solicitor General, who after being required b y
the Court to reply to the Comment and Manifestation of Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela, significantly submitted a
manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Reply dated August 29, 1985, stating on page 2 thereof, and We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The manifestation and/or comment of Valenzuela contains explanations of his actuations in this case. In
view of the foregoing observations of this Honorable Court, undersigned counsel submits that reply to the
manifestation is better deferred to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for the following reasons:

(a) It has direct supervision and control over Valenzuela and

(b) It possesses the resources with which to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the veracity of
his (Arbiter Valenzuela's) explanations. (Emphasis supplied)

In the light of said observations of the Solicitor General's Office, our earlier resolution of April 30, 1985, precipitately ascribing
certain faults and necessity of drastic action against said Labor Arbiter would seem to have been rash unwarranted or, in
the very least, premature. As our Court is not sufficiently prepared to assess whether the explanations of Arbiter Valenzuela
are adequate and acceptable or not, it would be unfair at this point of time to pronounce said Labor Arbiter at fault and/or
that the degree of his alleged negligence warrant any drastic action.

The uncontroverted fact is that there is no showing of any anomalous connivance on the part of said Labor Arbiter with
anyone and what is indicated by the records is that he had then determined the proceedings on the basis of the available
records endorsed to him. Blame is imputed to him on the premise that as a government lawyer for 29 years, he should have
first exhausted all efforts in locating or reconstructing the records upon as discovery that the same were incomplete; that he
should have informed his superior officer or the one assigned to him the motions that the records were lacking that he
should have initiated a reconstruction of the records by requiring all lawyers to produce their own records or have sought
their assistance in locating the records. The conclusion was then quickly reached that his acts must be treated as
nonfeasance and gross neglect of duty.

I am not prepared to take such a harsh view against a government employee who has devoted continuously twenty-nine
(29) years of his life in the service of the government, rising steadily to his present position and possibly nearing his age of
retirement. With his uncontradicted assertion that during such long period, his reputation and integrity was unblemised, it
seems to me it would be unjustified to pass judgment on such a person and recommended him at once for drastic disciplinary
action when the Solicitor General's Office which was asked by the Court to comment on this matter points to the fact that it
is the Ministry of Labor and Employment which possess the resources with which to conduct an exhaustive investigation on
the veracity of his (Labor Arbiter Valenzuela's) explanations. Consequently, without any such prior and satisfactory
investigation by the office which has been pointed to as singularly possessing the resources to ascertain the veracity of the
arbiter's explanations, the immediate conclusion in our Resolution of April 30, 1985, suggesting administrative and drastic
disciplinary punishment including disbarment proceedings against said Labor Arbiter would be too swift, unjudicious and
possibly unfair to said Labor Arbiter.

I therefore, vote that the portion in the said Resolution of April 30, 1985 (3rd paragraph of page 30 thereof) which states
that Labor Arbiter Valenzuela should be made to answer in proper administrative charges, or that he be prosecuted before
the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, or that independently, he should be the subject of disbarment
proceeding, be set aside and considered as now deleted therefrom.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court
of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the
Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on
himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco
M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973,
for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents
of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by
respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter
"stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782
in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in
Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075,
the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the
City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred
pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The
case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed
therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence
favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some
words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is
a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a
reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the
Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered
an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to
remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del
Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that
"with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171,
204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law,
the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct.
24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate
Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10,
1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not
be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would
follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them
that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take
into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content
with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein
he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000
for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so
if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers
as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice
whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and
individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in
accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict
the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into
reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting
lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division
of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the
Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering
unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be
threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether
the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in
his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the
Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse,
worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including
the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt
and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule
139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and
gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973,
the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending
Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio
and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages
(R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the
defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the
Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in
the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that
his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement
reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against
the three Justices of the Appellate Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on
May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25,
1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names
of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices
favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated
June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at
this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the
Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I
would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of
Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court
and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and
to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial
acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity
and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973,
respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements
contained in his manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No.
L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which
drove him to make his contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the
statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done
without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo
should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and,
therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid),
thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate
Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate
Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his
statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he
stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex
"A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices
Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as
extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced
that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to
a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the
manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to
deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his
explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court,
wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is
this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to
God the filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation
of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing
what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our
act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete
loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the
pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred
or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and
those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts
concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar
filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated
December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to
submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed
submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated
strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and
his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might
have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted
in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal
Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his
school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old
age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could
have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the
contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:

The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for
damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in
the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now
independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and
fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental
ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he
has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever
penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in
complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for
contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty.
del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court).
But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer
of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he
has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may
suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
 ... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the
Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect
(17 C. J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance
with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge
in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis,
were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his
disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute
a serious disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high
esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis
supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52
0. G. 6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence
on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because
We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals
and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act
of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision
and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the
law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the
law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot
but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly
invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in
seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to
him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that
respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We
view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice
of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating
events and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity
and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his
choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action
with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes
it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from
the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-
27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regardi ng
the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 June 30, 2009

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2255-RTJ)

VALERIANO F. NUÑEZ, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Sinumpaang Salaysay 1 dated April 22, 2005 filed by complainant Valeriano F. Nuñez with the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, charging the latter with grave abuse of authority.

Complainant alleged the following in his complaint:

Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005, at around five o’clock in
the afternoon, he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L-300 van with plate number SFN-767, at the
basement of the Makati City Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles
home. After the flag ceremony on April 4, 2005, complainant went to the Office of the Engineering Department where he
received an Order2 from respondent Judge, directing the former to appear before the latter on that same day at ten o’clock
in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for respondent Judge.

When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer. Although complainant replied
in the negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the complainant. Complainant apologized and explained that he
did not intend to park in respondent Judge’s space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent
Judge.

However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainant’s apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt
of court for using the former’s parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one
thousand pesos (₱1,000.00).3 Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio,
where the latter was incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for
Reconsideration4 and paying the fine of ₱1,000.00.

In his Comment5 dated June 27, 2005, respondent Judge alleged that judges were assigned their respective parking spaces
in the basement of the City Hall of Makati City. Respondent Judge, in particular, placed a marker with his name at the space
allotted to him, facilitating the orderly parking which allowed him to work as early as seven o’clock in the morning, almost
daily. He stated that he already programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking
judge for the year 2004 among the RTC judges of Makati City.

Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time in question, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the
weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that
criminal case. However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the
intended disposition of his cases.

In addition, respondent Judge recounted that there were similar incidents which happened to him. Sometime in August
2002, Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales, and Redeem Ongtinco caused an overflow of water into the chambers of
respondent Judge, damaging his computer system at the old RTC. On March 18, 2005, Venancio P. Inonog, security-driver
of the Chief of the Business Permit Section of Makati City, also parked his vehicle at respondent’s parking slot. On April 12,
2005, John Panaligan, electrician of the Makati City Hall, erroneously switched off the electrical outlets of respondent
Judge’s sala.

Respondent Judge cited Macrohon, Gonzales, Ongtinco, Inonog, and Panaligan in contempt on the ground that they
disrupted respondent Judge’s performance of official duties. In turn, Macrohon et al., Inonog, and Panaligan all filed their
respective administrative complaints6 against respondent Judge.
On November 25, 2005, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative matter,
and that respondent Judge be fined ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) for grave abuse of authority.7

In its Resolution8 dated March 15, 2006, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate Justice Renato Dacudao
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. On
June 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice issued an Order setting the said case for hearing.

The Investigating Justice submitted a Partial Report on September 6, 2006 in which he stated that he had just finished
receiving the evidence for the parties and required them to submit their respective memorandum. He also asked for an
extension of two months from September 20, 2006, or until November 20, 2006, within which to submit his Final
Investigation, Report and Recommendation.

In his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice concluded:

Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned Investigating Justice believes that the
complainant was not the person who parked the van on respondent judge’s parking slot, but rather that it was Oscar de los
Reyes. Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L-300 van in the middle, and not on the side, which
was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although the witness, Oscar de los Reyes testified that, after buying
"merienda" (on April 2, 2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to explain where exactly he parked the van.
Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have parked the van at the same place, meaning the
basement parking, but not necessarily on the very same spot or slot.

But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van, it would not change or alter the fact that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot.
Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who parked the van he would not have
asked complainant to explain, but instead De los Reyes. x x x In addition, why still subject complainant to further humiliation
by having him handcuffed, like a common criminal, after citing him for contempt of court? Obviously, respondent judge was
really bent on citing for contempt of court the person responsible for doing the parking in the parking slot which he believed,
(perhaps erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or
meanness, in respondent judge’s character, as it would seem that he could not refrain from exhibiting such excesses as
causing the manacling (apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional offender like the complainant herein, who had
the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as a judge.

xxxx

In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why complainant’s act of parking on the parking slot of
respondent judge would constitute contempt of court. It may have caused respondent judge some delay in immediately
parking his car that morning of April 4, 2005, but to say that the "one-hour disruption" delayed the administration of justice
would be stretching the logic of the situation too much. According to respondent judge, "time is of the essence" in his
decision-making program. But the irony of it is that the amount of time respondent judge allotted in hearing the explanation
as well as the motion for reconsideration of complainant in this case must have cost him more than the one hour he claimed
he lost.

As justification for his actions, respondent judge said that because of the "prior or previous incidents" he was convinced that
the particular incident was intentional and deliberate. Such reasoning is unacceptable. There was no showing that
complainant or Oscar de los Reyes intentionally or deliberately parked the van on respondent judge’s slot in order to
purposely annoy or irk him. And, even if it did annoy or irk respondent judge, he should remember that, the power to cite
persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are strictly impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the official functions that they exercise or perform.

Besides, it was unfair for respondent judge to assume that complainant knew of the prior or previous incident, where
respondent judge cited a driver for contempt of court for parking on his parking slot, just because both drivers are employees
of the Makati City Hall; this is clearly a non-sequitur. And, assuming that complainant knew of the said incident, this alone
would not prove that what he did was intentional or deliberate.

Neither would respondent judge’s allegation, that someone, "an unknown person inside," is orchestrating the filing of these
cases against him for the chief or sole purpose of harassing him, exonerate him of the charge. To begin with, he failed to
present any proof to substantiate this allegation. All he could point to are mere coincidences or speculations. What is more,
respondent judge seemed to have taken some kind of pleasurable satisfaction in citing these complainants in contempt of
court simply for parking on the slot which he assumed was allot(t)ed to him; or for switching the lights off in his office; or for
accidentally drenching his computers. He, in fact, even admitted having issued all these Orders to punish the complainants
in these cases for disrupting or disturbing him in performing his duties; hence, he cannot blame these persons for filing a
case or cases against him, as these persons must have felt aggrieved by his actuations in precipitately citing them for
contempt. Nor can he accuse "an unknown person" of orchestrating all of these. All the cases or incidents he mentioned
only strengthened the undersigned Investigating Justice’s perception that respondent judge has an unseemly propensity for
abusing the power granted to him by law.

Respondent judge ought to be reminded that as a member of the bench, he is expected to take recourse to the contempt
power only as a last resort, when all other alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect
for the court and its processes; and that when a less harsh remedy can be availed of by the judge, he should at all times
hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy.

Thus, if respondent judge wanted to "teach complainant a lesson," he could have done so by merely reprimanding or
admonishing him considering that when complainant appeared before respondent judge he immediately begged for
forgiveness.

Respondent judge’s act of citing complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot is a violation of Rule 2.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

xxxx

For the reasons heretofore stated, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of
authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure – aggravated in this case by a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or
meanness, in respondent’s character, as elsewhere indicated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the finding of guilt of the respondent judge, the undersigned Investigating Justice deems that certain
circumstances must be considered in imposing the proper penalty.

It must be noted that respondent judge has a very good performance record. His strong adherence to the Supreme Court’s
reminder that, "members of the judicial branch – judges and judicial personnel alike – to be conscientious, diligent and
thorough in the performance of their functions. At all time(s) they must observe the high standard of public service required
of them." is quite admirable and commendable. Also, he already admitted his error in declaring complainant in contempt of
court. All these may be taken as mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his culpability.

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the undersigned Investigating Justice hereby recommends that the
respondent Judge be fined in the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (Php5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2007, the Court referred the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation, within thirty (30) days from notice, on the propriety of consolidating the instant case with the other
administrative cases filed against respondent Judge.

In its Memorandum dated March 30, 2007, the OCA observed that:

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office agrees with the Investigating Justice’s findings
that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in citing complainant in contempt of court. Respondent wrongly argues
that complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the van on respondent’s assigned slot
which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondent’s reaction to the complainant’s mistake is exaggerated.
The complainant’s act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it could not delay the administration of justice.

There is no evidence to show that complainant Nuñez parked the van at respondent’s slot purposely to annoy him or he
was aware of the previous similar incident which involved Venancio Inonog. In fact, complainant explained that his mistake
was not deliberate and he asked for respondent’s forgiveness. Respondent likewise failed to substantiate his allegation that
someone is orchestrating the filing of administrative cases against him for the sole purpose of harassing him. The other
complainants cannot be faulted for filing the said cases as they may have felt aggrieved by respondent’s actuations in citing
them for contempt for flimsy and personal reasons.
xxxx

Respondent’s order dated April 4, 2005 citing complainant Nuñez in contempt of court betrays not only his ignorance as
regards the Rule on Contempt of Court, but it also shows his despotic nature. The fact that respondent had also declared
Inonog, Panaligan, Macrohon and two others in contempt of court shows that he does not possess the judicial temperament
which a judge should possess. x x x

The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional
rights of the individual. It should be exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and its proceedings. In
the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner and for purposes that
are purely personal.

The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary
itself.

After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office finds the recommended penalty not
commensurate to respondent’s offense. This is not respondent’s first offense. He had been administratively sanctioned for
grave abuse of authority and was ordered by the Court to pay a fine on June 21, 2006 in the case of Panaligan v. Ibay
docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972. In the case filed by Allan Macrohon, et al., docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970,
respondent was ordered by the Court to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority and was also warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent has another pending case
filed by Venancio Inonog for the same charge. In the said case of Allan Macrohon, et al. against respondent, the Court
stated that "the similarity of the charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a deplorable proclivity for
the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation."

Taking into consideration that the instant complaint is a third transgression of a similar offense, this Office recommends that
respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay be SUSPENDED for FOUR (4) MONTHS with STERN WARNING that a repetition of
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In its Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted within 30 days from notice.

In its Resolution dated November 21, 2007, the Court deemed as served upon the complainant the copy of the Resolution
dated July 25, 2007 which was sent to complainant, but was returned unserved with postman’s notation "RTS-Unknown."

In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, after failure of respondent Judge to manifest whether he was willing to submit the
case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted as required in the Resolution dated July
25, 2007, the Court deemed the case for decision.

The issue which lies before this Court is whether respondent Judge can be held administratively liable for grave abuse of
authority in citing complainant for contempt of court.

The power to hold a person in direct contempt is provided for under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be a lower court.

In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,9 the Court held that the power to declare a person in contempt of court, however plenary as it may
seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties.

Respondent Judge averred that someone was out to harass and embarrass him, which was why six different complaints
were simultaneously filed against him, prompting him to cite the complainants for contempt of court. He explained that the
individual acts of the complainants were contemptuous, including herein complainant’s improper parking, because they
disrupted the speedy administration of justice.

The Court disagrees. Aside from the fact that respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see
how the improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest manner, disrupt the
speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does
not fall under any of the aforementioned acts for which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from
the records, nor from the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In fact,
upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake.1avvphi1

In Oclarit v. Paderanga,10 the Court held that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindicative, principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons,
but for the functions that they exercise.

By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for contempt, including herein
complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the
remedies provided under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, cited as follows:

SEC.2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail
himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will
abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor. 11 In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary12 state that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer.1avvphi1

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. "Gross" has been defined as
flagrant and shameful, while "misconduct" means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. 13 Under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is classified
as a serious offense punishable under the sanctions enumerated under the same Rule, Section 11 of which provides that:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months;
or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

In previous cases wherein judges cited persons for contempt without legal basis, the Court has found respondents guilty of
grave abuse of authority and usually imposed a penalty of reprimand with a warning, or a fine of ₱5,000.00 with a warning. 14

However, respondent Judge has been twice administratively sanctioned by the Court for the same offense. In Panaligan v.
Ibay,15 respondent Judge was found to have abused his authority in citing a person for contempt without sufficient legal
basis, for which he was sentenced to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Macrohon v. Ibay, 16 he was again found liable for the same offense
and sentenced to pay a fine of ₱25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
In view of respondent Judge’s penchant for citing persons for contempt even without legal basis, the Investigating Justice
recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00 with a stern warning, while the OCA recommended that he be
suspended for four (4) months with a stern warning. Considering that respondent Judge had opted to avail himself of the
Optional Retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1438, effective at the close of office hours of August 18, 2007, which was approved by the Court (First Division) per
Resolution dated November 14, 2007,17 provided that the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (₱400,000.00) Pesos shall
be retained/withheld from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may later impose upon
him in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (herein case) and OCA IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ, the Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to
impose a fine of ₱40,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt
with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant
Valeriano F. Nuñez for contempt without legal basis, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos
(₱40,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits, which in this case shall be deductible from the Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) withheld from his retirement benefits, per Resolution dated November 14, 2007.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,

vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor
of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that
he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City."2 However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant 3 and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines4 showed that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer
was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which
was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking
incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly
alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant
petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5
of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred
to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit 8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-
affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-
affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had
no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful
statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the
unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the
acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration
of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one
can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 11

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer
to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting
to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-
affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and
cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for
the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
client;12 appearing before court hearings as an attorney; 13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being
previously denied admission to the bar; 14 or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so. 15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice
law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney
and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future
actions.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P.
SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE
KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and
₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached
a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977,
the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was
held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. 5 Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987,
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano
Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay
Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons
by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among
others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all
these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who
has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity
as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation
and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK
which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement
or separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth
Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed
that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent
Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith
resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of
Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected
in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards
the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation
to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic
duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation
context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a
single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but
the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation
fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American
legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York
"Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory
duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such
as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's
duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to
a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer
behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in
some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core
duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice — the
bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar
association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development
of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during
the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations
began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most
notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of
Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public
respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons
1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life
and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client
in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the
interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted
to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the
ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could
be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in
a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and
1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful
revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and
effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part
because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful
in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their
employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary
Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-
101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by
DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct
standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance
and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the
rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the
hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s
indefinite nature.38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It
is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has
no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains
the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the
metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar
Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he
was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where
he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure
of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central
Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor
and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to
the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro,
Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who
advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure
should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made
since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or
placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of
its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken
and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the
petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency
of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an
official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same
for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.
...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve
a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court
shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate
court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued
by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond
executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions
of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section
shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however,
That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by
a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial
community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall
be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding.
(As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as
daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws,
or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
"matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
"matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied
Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does
not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points
of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie
between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where
the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government
lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated
or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude,
hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that
"a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial.
We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of
respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None
of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank
in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office
of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR
9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of
various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation
offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not
inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return
for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. 45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman
warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can
only make it less appealing to enter." 47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as
well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of
motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to
prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the
Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under
which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only
the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of
knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official
positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this
assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new
job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar
involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence
that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the ri ght to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise
his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy
of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to untoward results. 57 No less than
Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect
on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably,
the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and
some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists,
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch
sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee may compromise
confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-
discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is
nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central
Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered
no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is
no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example given by the proponents
of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting
might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
"The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through
the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as
"probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had
just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want
the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et
al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the
above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for
his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant
decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-
worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it
ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot
apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and
(2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify
as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period
and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee
on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division
of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.

Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.

Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family Group and the
directors and officers of GENBANK.

2
Rollo, pp. 240, 242.

3
Rollo, p. 7.

4
Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.

5
Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.

6
Rollo, pp. 217-218.

7
Rollo, p. 143.

8
Rollo, pp. 216-220.

9
Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.

10
Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.

11
Rollo, p. 63.

12
Rollo, p. 61.

13
Rollo, pp. 57-63.

14
Rollo, p. 178.

15
Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The "Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners" in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division. However, the motion was ultimately resolved by
the Sandiganbayan’s Fifth Division in its proceedings held on July 11, 2001.

16
Rollo, p. 42.

17
Rollo, p. 43.

18
Rollo, pp. 2-40.

19
Rollo, pp. 12-14.

20
Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).

21
Ibid.

22
Ibid.

23
Ibid.

24
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).

25
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).

26
Id. at 457.
27
Ibid.; The use of the word "conflict" is a misnomer; "congruent-interest representation conflicts" arguably do not
involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the
former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.

28
Supra, note 20.

29
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1963),
DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).

30
Supra, note 25 at 458.

31
Supra, note 20.

32
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).

33
Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly encompassing." ABA
Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."

34
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary Rules ... are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action."

35
DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility
while he was a public employee.

36
Supra, note 20.

37
Ibid.

38
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): "The other rubric formerly used for dealing
with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any
new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted,
disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since
‘impropriety’ is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized
that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the very general concept of appearance of
impropriety."

39
Supra, note 32.

40
See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.

41
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993).

42
Id.

43
Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of "intervene" which is "to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events."

44
Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of "intervene" which is "to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification," and the second definition of "intervention" which is "interference that may affect the interests of
others."

45
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).

46
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
 47
Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger Lawyers, 1976
Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).

48
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education of New York City v.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326,
331 (D.D.C. 1980).

49
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).

50
Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in August 1986. The
motion for disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.

51
United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).

52
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746
F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

53
Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, Duke L.J.,
Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.

54
Ibid.

55
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).

56
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986).

57
Id. at p. 321.

58
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).

59
Supra, note 38.

60
United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.
1983).

61
Supra, note 53 at 44.

62
Ibid.

63
Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.

64
Ibid.

65
Id. at 45.

66
Id. at 42.

67
Id. at 42-43.

68
Id. at 43.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his ponencia. Motions to disqualify counsel from representing their clients must be
viewed with jaundiced eyes, for oftentimes they pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process. 1 Such motions
are filed to harass a particular counsel, to delay the litigation, to intimidate adversary, or for other strategic purposes. It
therefore behooves the courts to always look for the parties’ inner motivations in filing such motions.

This case illustrates the sad reality that the filing of motions for disqualification may be motivated, not by a fine sense of
ethics or sincere desire to remove from litigation an unethical practitioner, but to achieve a tactical advantage.

The facts are undisputed.

Subsequent to the downfall of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, came the first edict 2 of President Corazon C. Aquino
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
subordinates, and associates.

PCGG’s initial target was Lucio Tan and the above-named private respondents (Tan et al., for brevity). It issued several
writs of sequestration on their properties and business enterprises. To nullify such writs, Tan et al. filed with this Court
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On February 15, 1990, after comments thereon were submitted, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to it Fifth Division, docketed as
follows:

(a) Civil Case No. 0095 - Sipalay Trading Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24,
1986 sequestering Lucio Tan’s shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Hotel);

(b) Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo
Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19,
1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio
Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings,
Inc.;

(c) Civil Case No. 0097 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.
and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stocks in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

(d) Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tabacco Corp. v. PCGG., which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order
dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and /or in the name of Lucio Tan,
Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings,
Inc.; and

(e) Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of
stocks in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio
T. Santos and Natividad Santos.

(f) Civil Case No. 0100 – Allied Banking Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order
dated August 13, 1986, issued on bank documents of Allied Banking Corp.3

Civil Cases Nos. 0096 and 0100 involve Tan, et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank).

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1987, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al. This time, the case was
raffled to the Second Division, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0005. Among the properties sought to be reconveyed
were Tan et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank.

Since 1987, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza has been the counsel for Tan et al. in all the above cases. But it was not until
February 5, 1991, or after four years, that the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. In
Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a motion to disqualify him. It filed another similar motion in Civil Case No. 0100.
The last motion was filed in Civil Case No. 0005. His disqualification was sought under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

In each motion, PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, then Solicitor General of the Marcos Administration, "actively intervened"
in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), subsequently acquired by Tan et al. and became Allied
Bank. PCGG’s allegations are similar in every aspect, thus:

(1) He was the former Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines for almost 14 years appearing on behalf of the
Republic in multitudes of cases.

(2) The records show that, as then Solicitor General, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
of the Philippines in Special Proceedings No. 107812, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in connection with
the Central Bank’s Petition for assistance in the Liquidation of General bank and Trust Company (herein called "Genbank",
for brevity). The records also show that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group were the same persons who acquired Genbank’s
assets, liabilities and interest.

(3) Consequently, Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Defendant herein runs counter to the long-cherished
ethical canon of the legal profession which prohibits a counsel to appear in litigation adverse to the interests of his forme r
client. Interpreting this sanction, jurisprudence has held, that:

‘The lawyer’s obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to keep his confidences, also forbid the lawyer
from accepting retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed in him. (Canon of Professional Ethics, 6). The prohibition stands even if the adverse
interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest. (5 Am. Jur.
296).’

(4) The reason for the prohibition is obvious. Apart from the obligation to keep inviolate the prior relationship between
counsel and his former client, such counsel obtains material information in confidence. Consequently, he should not be
allowed to represent a party with adverse interest to his former client, arising out of the very transaction subject of the former
relationship.

(5) In the case at bar, it should be stressed that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group acquired the assets and liabilities of
Genbank. This manner of acquisition has been alleged to have been fraudulent, arbitrary and a product of collusion between
them and the Central Bank officials. (Refer to Criminal Case No. 005 pending before this Honorable Court.) Atty. Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for Defendants, clearly violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:

‘A lawyer shall not after leaving the government service accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service." (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Rule 6.03)’

(6) In the liquidation of Genbank and its eventual acquisition by Lucio Tan and his group, Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor–
General, personally advised the Central Bank officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank’s liquidation. In the
Memorandum for the Governor of the Central Bank dated March 29, 1977 (signed by the following subordinates of then CB
Governor Gregorio Licaros, namely: Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas (deceased), Deputy Governor Jaime C.
Laya, Deputy Governor & General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, Special Asst. to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, Asst.
to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and Director Antonio T. Castro, Jr.), the following portion disclosed Atty. Mendoza’s
participation:

‘Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General (atty. Mendoza) and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

‘(1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank cannot be reorganized
or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.
‘(2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner
of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

(3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

(4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."

Plainly stated, it was Atty. Mendoza who was the legal author of the closure of Genbank and the eventual sale to
Mr. Lucio Tan and his Group. Clearly, Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified in this case."

On April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 4 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza.

On May 7, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 5 in Civil Case No. 0100 also denying PCGG’s similar motion.

Motions for reconsideration were filed but to no avail. The PCGG took no further action. These Resolutions, therefore,
became final and executory.

Subsequently, in a Decision dated August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan jointly granted Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil Cases
Nos. 0095 and 0100. On March 29, 1996, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 112708-096 affirmed the said Decision. The PCGG
neither assigned as error nor mentioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0100.

In the interim, the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 remained pending with the
Sandiganbayan. It was only on July 11, 2001, or after ten (10) years, that it denied the PCGG’s motion by merely adopting
its Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying a similar motion, thus:

"Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONER" dated February 5,1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and
it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact,
Atty. Mendoza in his ‘OPPOSITION’ dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the same
motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7,1991, the herein incident was
taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp.134-135,Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this
Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division
(pp.1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar." 7

The PCGG moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but was denied. In the Resolution dated December
5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

"Acting on respondent PCGG’s ‘MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION’ dated August 1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration
of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for
petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an ‘OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1,
2001’ dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s ‘REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration)’ dated
November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was
exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005
(re:Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying
the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG
failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. 8

Hence, the PCGG’s present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., in his Dissent, granted the petition. On the procedural issues, he ruled that the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza are interlocutory
orders, hence, in challenging such Resolutions, certiorari is the proper remedy, not appeal, as invoked by Tan et al. Based
on the same premise, he likewise rejected Tan et al.’s claim that the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005
constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata.
On the substantive aspect, Mr. Justice Callejo’s Dissent states that Atty. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. According to him, Atty. Mendoza’s acts of (a) advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with
the liquidation of GENBANK, and (b) filing Special Proceedings No. 107812, a petition by the Central Bank for assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, constitute "intervention." And that
while it may be true that his posture in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 is not adverse to the interest of the Central Bank, still,
he violated the proscription under the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine.

Crucial to the resolution of the present controversy are the following queries:

(1) Is certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying
the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099?

(2) May Sandiganbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 be considered a bar to similar motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata?

(3) Does Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK constitute intervention?

There are some important points I wish to stress at this incipient stage. I believe they should be considered if we are to
arrive at a fair resolution of this case. The scattershot manner in which the PCGG filed the various motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza shows its intent to harass him and Tan et al. It may be recalled that the PCGG filed three (3)
identical motions, one in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, another in Civil Case No. 0100 and the last one in Civil Case No.
0005. Of these cases, only Civil Cases Nos. 0096, 0100 and 0005 actually involve Tan et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied
Bank. Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099 have entirely different subject matter. Thus, insofar as these cases are
concerned, the motions to disqualify lack substantive merit. Why then would the PCGG file identical motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in these unrelated cases? Its intention is suspect. To subject Tan et al.
to numerous and baseless motions to disqualify their lawyer is, no doubt, a form of harassment.

As this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not bound by
stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of his own choice, an
attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and any tactical
abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding. 9

I. Whether the PCGG’s proper

remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan

Resolutions dated July 11 and

December 5, 2001 is appeal, not

certiorari.

The bottom line of this issue lies on how we categorize an order denying a motion to disqualify an opposing party’s counsel.
Is it interlocutory or final?

An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower
court.10 On the other hand, an interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of
the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy. 11

In Antonio vs. Samonte,12 this Court defined a final judgment, order or decree as "one that finally disposes of, adjudicates,
or determines the rights, or some rights or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and
separate branch, thereof and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside x x x." In De la Cruz v. Paras,13 it
was held that a court order is final in character if "it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely
the matter therein disposed of," such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the
order. In Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City,14 this Court ruled that an order which decides an issue or issues
in a complaint is final and appealable, although the other issue or issues have not been resolved, if the latter issues are
distinct and separate from others.
With the foregoing disquisition as basis, it is my view that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and,
therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et
al. is separable from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is
separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari, to my mind, is dismissible.

II. Whether the Resolution dated April

22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005

constitutes a bar to similar motions to

disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the

doctrine of res judicata.

I am convinced that the factual circumstances of this case justify the application of res judicata.

The ponente refuses to apply res judicata on the ground that the Sandignbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil
Case No. 0005 is just an interlocutory order.

Assuming arguendo that an order denying a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is indeed an intelocutory order, still, I believe
that res judicata applies.

It will be recalled that on August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision granting Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil
Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. Such Decision reached this Court in G.R. Nos. 112708-09.15 On March 29, 1996, we affirmed
it. The PCGG could have assigned or raised as error in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
May 7, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0100 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza but it did not. The fact that a final
Decision therein has been promulgated by this Court renders the Resolution dated May 7, 1991 beyond review. The PCGG
may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-
09.16 To rule otherwise is to encourage the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings on the basis of the same set of facts. This
should not be countenanced. Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well
as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judicial rulings and that controversies once
decided shall remain in repose, and that there be an end to litigation. 17

III. Whether Atty. Mendoza’s

participation in the liquidation of

GENBANK constitutes intervention.

As stated earlier, Atty. Mendoza is sought to be disqualified under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

In determining whether Atty. Mendoza committed a breach of this Rule, certain factual predicates should be established,
thus: (a) in connection with what "matter" has Atty. Mendoza accepted an engagement or employment after leaving the
government service?; (b) in connection with what "matter" did he intervene while in government service?; and (c) what acts
did he particularly perform in "intervening" in connection with such "matter"?

The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor General, "actively intervened" in the closure and liquidation of GENBANK.
As primary evidence of such intervention, it cited his act of filing Special Proceedings No. 107812 with the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila; and the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 of certain key officials of the Central Bank
stating that he (Atty. Mendoza) advised them of the procedure to be taken in the liquidation of GENBANK and that he was
furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to such liquidation.
Tan et al. denied Atty. Mendoza’s alleged "intervention," claiming that when he filed Special Proceedings No. 107812 with
the CFI of Manila, the decision to prohibit GENBANK from doing business had already been made by the Central Bank
Monetary Board. Also, Atty. Mendoza, in appearing as their counsel in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, does not take a position
adverse to his former client, the Central Bank.

The first concern in assessing the applicability of the Rule is the definition of "matter." The American Bar Association
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated in its Formal Opinion 342 that:

"Although a precise definition of "matter" as used in the Disciplinary Rule is difficult to formulate, the term seems to
contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions between identifiable parties. Perhaps the
scope of the term "matter" may be indicated by examples. The same lawsuit or litigation is the same matter. The same issue
of fact involving the same parties and the same situation or conduct is the same matter. By contrast, work as a
government employee in drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations, or
laws, or in briefing abstract principles of law, does not disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101 (B) from subsequent
private employment involving the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the same "matter" is not involved
because there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and
specific parties.

In the case at bar, the Court’s task is to determine whether Special Proceedings No. 107812 falls within the concept of
"matter." This must be analyzed in relation with Civil Case No. 0096. Anent Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099, there is
no doubt that they do not involve the shares of stocks of Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Thus, only Special Proceedings No.
107812 and Civil Case No. 0096 must be considered.

Special Proceedings No. 107812 is a "petition by the Central Bank for Assistance in the Liquidation of General Bank and
Trust Company" filed by Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General. The parties therein are the Central Bank of the Philippines and
Arnulfo B. Aurellano, on the one hand, and the Worldwide Insurance & Surety Company, Midland Insurance Corporation,
Standard Insurance Co., Inc and General Bank & Trust Company, on the other. The issues, among others, are whether or
not the Central Bank acted in good faith in ordering the liquidation of GENBANK; and, whether the bidding for GENBANK
is a sham.

Civil Case No. 0096 is for the annulment of various sequestration orders issued by the PCGG over Tan et al.’s properties.
The parties therein are Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corporation, Iris Holdings & Development Corp.,
Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., and Jewel Holdings, Inc., as petitioners, and the PCGG, as respondent. The issues
here are "whether the Sequestration Order issued by the PCGG on June 19, 1986 over the shares of stocks in Allied Bank
of Lucio C. Tan and his co-petitioners in Civil Case No. 0096 was issued without notice, hearing and evidence."

A careful perusal of the above distinctions shows that the two cases are different in all aspects, such as the parties, issues,
facts and relief sought. Special Proceedings No. 107812 cannot therefore be considered a "matter" in connection with
which Atty. Mendoza accepted his engagement as counsel in Civil Case No. 0096. The connection between the two cases,
if there be, is very minimal as to give rise to the application of the proscription.

As aptly stated by Justice Puno:

"But more important, the ‘matter’ involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the ‘matter’ involved in Civil
Case No. 0096. Again the bald facts speak for themselves. It is given that Atty. Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The ‘matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject ‘matter’ Sp. Proc. No. 107812, however, is not the same nor related to but different from the
subject ‘matter’ in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by Tan, et
al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill- gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK.
Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stocks of the reorganized Allied Bank are
ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096."
As Solicitor General, Atty. Mendoza represented the Republic of the Philippines in every case where it was involved. As a
matter of practice and procedure, he signed every pleading prepared by his Associates. Taking this into consideration, will
it be just to disqualify him in all the cases containing pleadings bearing his signature? The answer must be in the negative.
His disqualification might be too harsh a penalty for one who had served the government during the best years of his life
and with all his legal expertise.

Webster Dictionary18 defines "intervene" as "to come or happen between two points of time or events;" "to come or be in
between as something unnecessary or irrelevant;" or "to come between as an influencing force. The ponencia
defines "to intervene" as "to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance." "Intervention" is
interference that may affect the interest of others. Corollarily, the counterpart of Rule 6.03 is the Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-
101 (B) of the American Bar Association (ABA), thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a manner in which he had "substantial responsibility" while he was a public
employee.

Substantial responsibility envisages a lawyer having such a heavy responsibility for the matter in question that it is likely he
becomes personally and substantially involve in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the matter. 19 Since the
word "intervene" has two connotations, one affecting interest of others and one done merely in influencing others, Rule 6.03
should be read in the context of the former. To interpret it otherwise is to enlarge the coverage of Rule 6.03. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility.

Further, that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent papers relative to the liquidation of GENBANK is not sufficient
to disqualify him in Civil Case No. 0096. In Laker Airway Limited v. Pan American World Airways,20 it was held that:

"Like the case law, policy considerations do not support the disqualification of a government attorney merely
because during his government service he had access to information about a corporation which subsequently
turned out to become an opponent in a private lawsuit. If the law were otherwise, the limiting language of the Disciplinary
Rule could be bypassed altogether by the simple claim that an attorney may have viewed confidential information while
employed by the government, and government lawyers would face perpetual disqualification in their subsequent practices."

In fine, I fully concur in Justice Puno’s Dissent that "Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an
intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.

Footnotes

1
Gregori v. Bank of America, 207 Cal.App. 3d 291 (1989); McPhearson v. Michaels Co., No. CO34390, March 4,
2002.

2
Executive order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986.

3
Resolution, at 3-4. See also Memorandum for Respondents, rollo, at 397-398.

4
Attachment "F" of the Petition, rollo, at 57-63. Civil Case No. 0005 involved the PCGG’s and the OSG’s complaint
for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al.’s shares of stock in Allied
Bank.

5
Comment on the Petition, rollo, at 148. Civil Case No. 0100 involved Allied Bank’s petition seeking to nullify
PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order against Tan, et al.’s shares of stock.

6
Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good Government, petitioner, vs.
Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, respondents. 255 SCRA 438, March
29, 1996.

7
Attachment "A" of the Petition, rollo, at 42.
 8
Attachment "A-1" of the Petition, rollo, at 43.

9
7 Am Jur 2d §197 citing Higdon v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 227 Cal App 3d 1667, 278 Cal Rptr 588, 91 CDOS
1622, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2595.

10
Mejia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 573, 1905, Insular Government v. Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil. 487,
(1910); People v. Makaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 1930.

11
Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA 785 (1968).

12
111 Phil. 699 (1961).

13
69 SCRA 556, G.R. No. L-41053. February 27, 1976.

14
191 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 79119. November 22, 1990.

15
Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good Government, vs.
Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

16
46 Am Jur 2d § 516.

17
46 Am Jur 2d § 515

18
Second Edition, New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, 183.

19
ABA Formal Opinion 342 (November 24, 1975.

20
103 F.R.D. 22; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15513, June 26, 1984.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

While I concur in the scholarly and ably-written dissent of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I feel compelled to write a separate
dissenting opinion to reflect the additional reasons behind my position.

Justices Artemio V. Panganiban and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez are of the opinion that the petition can be dismissed on
procedural grounds, they contending that the Presidential Commission on Government (PCGG) is precluded from filing a
motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0096 since the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division) had already denied PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case No. 0005. In short, they
are invoking the doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and law of the case.

I believe Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato1 penned by the distinguished Justice Vicente V. Mendoza is instructive.

To recall, Kilosbayan, Incorporated (Kilosbayan, Inc.), et al. filed on January 28, 1994 a petition with this Court challenging
the validity of the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) on the ground that the same was made in violation of the charter of the PCSO. This
Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.2 invalidated the contract.

One of the issues raised before this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. was the standing of petitioners to
maintain the suit. On that score, this Court held through Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that
petitioners had standing to sue.
As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., PCSO and PGMC entered into negotiations for a
new agreement which would conform to the Court’s decision.

On January 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).

On February 21, 1995, Kilosbayan, Inc, et al. filed a petition against then PCSO Chair Manuel Morato seeking to declare
the ELA invalid on the ground that it was substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in Kilosbayan, Incorporated
v. Guingona, Jr.

Its ruling in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. notwithstanding, this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato ruled
that the therein petitioners did not have standing to sue.

It explained that the doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do not pose a barrier to the determination
of petitioners’ right to maintain the suit:

Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think
this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation:
The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. Thus in People
v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 999 (1958), it was stated:

"‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)

"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially
the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal
are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or re-adjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)

"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite determination, the court has remanded
the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such
determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has
proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second
appeal . . .

"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or
wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77)

"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent
appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts
in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the
opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87)"

As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely
expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the
conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not universally, not final,
It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979))

It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there
cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment."3 According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit cannot
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v.
Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 [1960])

It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does
not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was
determined that the money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable
income, this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another
deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract
is not conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
collateral estoppel it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even
though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the second case.
Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with but in a form separable form, the one
dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)

This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in Restatement of the Law 2d, on
Judgments, as follows:

§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following
circumstances:

....

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination
is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
inequitable administration of the laws; . . .

Illustration:

....

2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain B's defense of sovereign
immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings the second action against B for an unrelated
tortious injury occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive on the question
whether the defense immunity is available to B. Note: The doctrine of stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to
reconsider the question of sovereign immunity. See §29, Comment i.

The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will presently
be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993
Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375)
that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude
determination of their standing in the present suit. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

The doctrine of law of the case does not, I believe, apply to the present case for this is the first time that the issue to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before this Court. It is the decision in this case which will be the law of the case.
A reading of Republic v. Sandiganbayan4 cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez shows that the issue currently before this
Court was not passed upon. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan stated:

The key issues, in query form, are:

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss proper?

(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it as part of the
judgment?

(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and seizure order issued
against ALLIED correct?
(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to bring an action in court
against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period?5

I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question of whether
the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Moreover, Civil Case No. 005
and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims.

Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0005
denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is not an interlocutory order but a final order, and that as a result, the
principle of res judicata applies.

With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a
final order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines interlocutory in the following manner:

Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order or decree is one
which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the
cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the
merits.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Oscar M. Herrera, an authority in remedial law, distinguishes between a final judgment and interlocutory order in
this wise:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or executory as of right (final and
executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking
of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final, or to use the
established and more distinctive term, final and executory. (Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals cited in Denso [Phils.], Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280; see also Bank of America NT & SA, G.R. No. 78017, June 8, 1990 186
SCRA 417)

An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point
or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.7 (Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123553, July
13, 1998, 96 SCAD 205) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Florenz D. Regalado is of the same view:

An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the
trial court on the merits of the case. An order is final, for purposes of appeal, if it disposes of the entire case.

Where the order is interlocutory, the movant has to wait for the judgment and then appeal from the judgment, in
the course of which appeal he can assign as error the said interlocutory order. The interlocutory order cannot be
appealed from separately from the judgment. The general rule is that where the interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus depending on the facts of the case.

Where the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appellate court can dismiss the appeal even if no objection thereto was
filed by the appellee in either the trial or appellate court. 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Another respected scholar of remedial law, Justice Jose Y. Feria, has formulated this guideline in determining whether an
order is final or interlocutory:

The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final: Does it leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test
to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.9 (Emphasis and
underscoring)

In fact, this same test was used in Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,10 cited by Justice Panganiban to determine whether the
trial court’s order was interlocutory or final:

In this particular instance, the test to determine whether the order of 06 January 1995 is interlocutory or final would be: Does
it leave something else to be done by the trial court on the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it does not, it is
final. Evidently, the trial court would still have to hear the parties on the merits of the case…

xxx

Indeed, the word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." An interlocutory order does not terminate
nor does it finally dispose of the is (sic) case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Applying the foregoing test, it is clear that the order denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case.

Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court is in agreement with Justice Callejo’s conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is an interlocutory order. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v.
Risjord,11 the American Court ruled that an order denying motions to disqualify the opposing party’s counsel in a civil case
are not appealable prior to final judgment in underlying litigation since such an order does not fall within the collateral order
exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,12 which is cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.

Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ...
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." We have consistently interpreted this language as
indicating that a party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been "a decision by the District Court that
‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’" Coopers s & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,
233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). This rule, that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal
following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of important purposes. It emphasizes the deference that appellate
courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in
the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the
special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of
"avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of
separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of
judgment." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). See DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962). The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting
efficient judicial administration. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732
(1974).

Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await final
judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, we held that a "small class" of orders that did
not end the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a shareholder's derivative
action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff in such a suit to post security
for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final judgment on the merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered
the trial court to require that costs be posted. We held that the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal
pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court's order constituted a final determination of a claim "separable from, and
collateral to," the merits of the main proceeding, because it was "too important to be denied review," and because it was
"too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated." Id., at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225. Cohen did not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a
"practical rather than a technical construction." Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S.
411, 413-414, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339 (1926); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 67 U.S. 524-531, 2 Black 524,
530-531, 17 L.Ed. 347 (1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203, 6 How. 201, 203, 12 L.Ed.2d 404 (1848); Whiting v.
Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15, 13 Pet. 6, 15, 10 L.Ed. 33 (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of
final "collateral orders" in these terms: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (footnote omitted). See Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 658, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

[1] Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final judgment at the time the notice of
appeal was filed. [FN11 the order denying petitioner's motion to disqualify respondent is appealable under §
1291 only if it falls within the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 of the other 10 Circuits
have also reached the conclusion that denials of disqualification motions are not immediately appealable "collateral orders."
[FN12] We agree with these courts that under Cohen such an order is not subject to appeal prior to resolution of
the merits.

FN11. Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the case was, at that time, in the discovery
stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.

FN12. See n. 10, supra.

An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the "collateral order" test. It "conclusively determine[s] the
disputed question," because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation.
In addition, we will assume, although we do not decide, that the disqualification question "resolve [s] an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action," the second part of the test. Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to
demonstrate that an order denying disqualification is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment"
within the meaning of our cases.

In attempting to show why the challenged order will be effectively unreviewable on final appeal, petitioner alleges that
denying immediate review will cause it irreparable harm. It is true that the finality requirement should "be construed so as
not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In support of its assertion that it will be irreparably
harmed, petitioner hints at "the possibility that the course of the proceedings may be indelibly stamped or shaped with the
fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions prompted by a divided loyalty," Brief for Petitioner 15, and at "the
effect of such a tainted proceeding in frustrating public policy," id., at 16. But petitioner fails to supply a single concrete
example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The only ground that petitioner urged in the District Court was that
respondent might shape the products-liability plaintiffs' claims for relief in such a way as to increase the burden on petitioner.
Our cases, however, require much more before a ruling may be considered "effectively unreviewable" absent immediate
appeal

[2] To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must constitute "a complete, formal and, in the
trial court, final rejection," Abney v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040, of a claimed right "where
denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever," United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530,
533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). Thus we have permitted appeals prior to criminal trials when a defendant
has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supra, or a violation of
his constitutional right to bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) because those situations, like the
posting of security for costs involved in Cohen, "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would
be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 56
L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). By way of contrast, we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United
States v. Ryan, supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has been that in the rare case when appeal after
final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be
entered against him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United States,
supra, at 327, 60 S.Ct. at 542. We have also rejected immediate appealability under § 1291 of claims that "may fairly be
assessed" only after trial, United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860, and those involving "considerations that are
‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.’" Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S., at 469, 98 S.Ct., at 2458, quoting Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 522, 9
L.Ed.2d 523 (1963).

An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders that are indeed reviewable on
appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller class of those that are not. The propriety of the district
court's denial of a disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be
evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. The decision whether to disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the
peculiar factual situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such a decision will rarely, if ever, represent a
final rejection of a claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be reviewed following judgment on the merits. In the
case before us, petitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for meaningful review will perish unless immediate
appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the Court of Appeals conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing
representation was prejudicial error, it would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a
new trial. That remedy seems plainly adequate should petitioner's concerns of possible injury ultimately prove well founded.
As the Second Circuit has recently observed, the potential harm that might be caused by requiring that a party await final
judgment before it may appeal even when the denial of its disqualification motion was erroneous does not "diffe[r] in any
significant way from the harm resulting from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders requiring
discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the trial judge." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
F.2d 433, 438 (1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431. But interlocutory orders are not appealable "on the mere ground that
they may be erroneous." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275, n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967).
Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not only would constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources, but
also would transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed
by Congress in § 1291. This we decline to do. [FN13]

FN13. Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until final resolution of
the underlying litigation before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing counsel, it is not
necessary, in order to resolve those situations, to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all such orders. In the proper
circumstances, the moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification, such as a protective order limiting counsel's
ability to disclose or to act on purportedly confidential information. If additional facts in support of the motion develop in the
course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the trial court to reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the
result in the District Court and absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to have the question
certified for interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see n. 7, supra, and, in the exceptional
circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals might be available. See In re
Continental Investment Corp., supra, 637 F.2d, at 7; Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C.,
at 262, 546 F.2d, at 1028. See generally Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not be concerned with the availability of
such extraordinary procedures in the case before us, because petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might
suffer if forced to await the final outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its disqualification motion is any
greater than the harm suffered by any litigant forced to wait until the termination of the trial before challenging interlocutory
orders it considers erroneous.

III

[3][4][5] We hold that a district court's order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable under §
1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. [FN14

FN14. The United States in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner's standing to attack the order permitting
respondent to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. In light of our conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was without
jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal, we have no occasion to address the standing issue. 13 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; italics in the original)

The ruling in Firestone was subsequently reiterated in Flanagan v. United States14 and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller.15

Justice Panganiban further suggests that the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is not
perpetual but merely lasts for five years primarily relying on the Civil Code provisions on prescription and the doctrine that
the right to practice law is a property right protected by the Constitution.

I do not agree with this framework of analysis. Carried to its logical conclusion, Justice Panganiban’s proposal would mean
that after five years from the termination of the attorney-client relationship, all lawyers would be able to represent an interest
in conflict with that of the former client and that they would no longer be bound by the rule on privileged communication.

It bears emphasis that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble profession at that.

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted only to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. If the respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the legal profession
is to be retained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the legal profession is a profession and not a
trade, and that the basic ideal of that profession is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. It
is not a business, using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those who conduct it. From the professional
standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals – organization, learning and public service. The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration. The professional spirit – the spirit of public service – constantly curbs the urge
of that instinct.
The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
and carries with it the responsibility to live up to its exacting standards and honored traditions. A person enrolled in its ranks
is called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the state – the administration of justice. That the
practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers repute and of eminence welcome their designation as counsel de oficio,
as an opportunity to manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a profession.

The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The lawyer’s conduct is to be measured not by
the standards of trade and counting house but by those of his profession. The Code of Professional Responsi bility,
particularly the ethical rule against advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests on the fundamental postul ate
that the practice of law is a profession.

In the matter of fixing his fees, an attorney should never forget that "the profession is a branch of the administration of justice
and not a mere money-making trade" and that his standing as a member of the bar "is not enhanced by quibbling relative
to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the market before a sale is
made." Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It
is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed
with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. However, while the practice of law is a profession and an
attorney is primarily an officer of the court, he is as much entitled to protection from the against any attempt by his client to
escape payment of his just fees, as the client against exaction by his counsel of excessive fees.

To summarize, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: (a) "a duty of public
service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;" (b) "a relation as officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
reliability;" (c) "a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;" and (d) "a relation to colleagues at the bar characterized
by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

These characteristics make the law a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. Its basic ideal is to render service and to secure justice for
those who seek its aid. If it has to remain a noble and honorable profession and attain its ideal, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. And
because they are the vanguards of the law and the legal systems, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves in their
professional and private dealings with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 16

Moreover, the relation of attorney and client is, however, one of trust and confidence of the highest order. It is highly fiduciary
in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.

… A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points
of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets.

The rule is a rigid one designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct but as well to
preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting
duties, and to protect him from unfounded suspicion of professional misconduct. The question is not necessarily one
of right of the parties but of adhere to proper professional standards. An attorney should not only keep inviolate his
client’s confidence but should likewise avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.17 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in Nakpil v. Valdes,18 this Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno held that the test to determine whether there is a
conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict.19

Justice Panganiban justifies his theory on the ground that in 5 years time, the lawyer will develop a mild case of amnesia
such that "in all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer’s
memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein." He thus cites his own personal
experience as a member of this Court:

Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand cases in full-length ponencias
and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include the thousands of other
cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part during their deliberations. In all honesty, I must
admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each of these cases, especially in their earlier
ones.

While it is true that over time memory does fade, the ravages of time have been mitigated with the invention of the paper
and pen and its modern offspring – the computer. It is not uncommon for lawyers to resort to note taking in the course of
handling legal matters.

The proposition that "a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees" is
not unqualified. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 20 which Justice Panganiban relies on, this
Court held:

A profession, trade or calling is a property within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of
the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted
deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always
been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public
health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be
within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own
property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)

Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a valid and proper regulation.

In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then Solicitor General in the liquidation of General
Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), saying that "it is indubitable from the facts that Atty. Mendoza had no iota of
participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK" and that his only involvement was "advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila." Justice Puno observes that "the procedure of liquidation is simple and is given in black and white in Republic Act
No. 265, section 29."

Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is to me not material. What
is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank,
Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer
known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law
with a view to successfully liquidate the bank.

Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a strict interpretation would cause "a chilling
effect on government recruitment of able legal talent."

With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the premise that this is "the only card that the
government may play to recruit lawyers." Effectively, this is likely to result in the compromising of ethical standards which
this Court must never allow. While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify
the disturbance of our mores.

The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed. Admittedly the salary for
serving in government often pales in comparison to that of the private sector. I submit, however, that while financial
considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would
like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know
that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial
success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in
government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal
coil than the pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts it: "What is the use of living if it be not to strive for noble
causes and make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone?"

ACCORDINGLY, concurring in the dissenting opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I vote to grant the petition insofar as
Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned, thus granting the motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza in the said case.
Footnotes

1
246 SCRA 540 (1995).

2
232 SCRA 110 (1994).

3
The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" is also called "collateral estoppel" or "preclusion of issues," as
distinguished from "preclusion of claims" or res judicata. In the Rules of Court, the first (conclusiveness of judgment,
collateral estoppel or preclusion of issues) is governed by Rule 39, §49 (c) while the second (res judicata or
preclusion of claims) is found in Rule 39, §49 (b).

4
255 SCRA 438 (1996).

5
Id. at 448-449.

6
Black’s Law Dictionary 815 [1991], 6th ed.

7
II O. Herrera, Remedial Law 528 (2000).

8
F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 492 (1997), 6th ed.

9
2 J. Feria & M. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 152 (2000).

10
365 SCRA 359 (2001).

11
449 U.S. 368 (1981).

12
337 U.S. 541 (1949).

13
449 U.S. 368, 373-380 (1981).

14
465 U.S. 259 (1984).

15
472 U.S. 424 (1985).

16
R. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct 3-5 (2004).

17
Id. at 165.

18
286 SCRA 758 (1998).

19
Id. at 773.

20
260 SCRA 319 (1996).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial "bad man" who wants to know just how
many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn
for the "good man" as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of
professional conduct.1

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves the Court to strictly apply the
Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the profession, often
find themselves in the unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without exception, no profession
in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult
questions of duty are continually arising. 2 The Code of Professional Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and
ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its
provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the ethics
of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesar’s wife – to be pure and appear to be so.3

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 4 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG,
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian, 5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong (represented by Tarciana C.
Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo,
Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp.,
Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and Development Corp.
(collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to,
among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein as follows:

a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo
Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19,
1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan,
Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order
dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan,
Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings,
Inc.; and

d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of
stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos and Natividad Santos.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the
Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos.
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to the Central Bank, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated properties are the
sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).

The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as follows:

1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The Central Bank then extended
an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of ₱310 million. In extending this loan, the Central Bank, however, took
control of GENBANK with the execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK’s outstanding shares in favor of the
Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of Directors of GENBANK.
Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a Resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it under receivership.

2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March
28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued by a bank
acceptable to Central Bank to guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a 2-year
period to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a Monetary Board
Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among other things, offered to
pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets estimated at ₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of
₱25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required letter of credit was also
not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O. Domingo, as PNB President, promising to
open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the advances of the Central Bank in the amount of ₱310 million. Without this
letter of commitment, the Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud because
it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo conspired together in giving
the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the doing away with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the
term of payment from two years to five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances
which was deficient by more than ₱90 Million, and many other concessions to the great prejudice of the government and of
the GENBANK stockholders.

3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and
Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they are also the major shareholders of this new bank. 6

Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. since Atty. Mendoza, in his
capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s
liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812. 7

The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving
the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
proscribing former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service."

Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Resolution dated July 11, 2001 stating:

Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER"
dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing
that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in
his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the same motion filed by
PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7, 1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly
with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby
reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418-1424,
Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar. 8

The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated December 5,
2001, which reads:
Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration
of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for
petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1,
2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s "REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) dated
November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly
the same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic
vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as
well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said
resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. 9

The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005, which was adopted
by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence, that the PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an inconsistency between
Atty. Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group." 11 The
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:

... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is not whether the attorney
has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but whether his accepting the new retainer will require
him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in
which he formerly represented against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use against his former
client any knowledge or information acquired through their former connection. Nor does the rule imposing disability on the
attorney mean that he, having once been employed by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but
merely forbids the attorney’s appearance or acting against the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment of such
client, the information and confidences acquired during the existence of their relation as attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp.
828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGG’s "Reply" does not controvert Atty.
Mendoza’s claim that in appearing in the instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of
the Central Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty. Mendoza’s claim that the position he
took as Solicitor General in behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been
maintained by his successors in office. In fact, even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no
objection to Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as long as he maintains the same position
he has taken on behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position refers to the various
resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank in regard General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular
and in accordance with law (Annex "A", Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12

The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to
be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said provision prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office.

As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was adopted by the Fifth Divi sion
in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG.

Procedural Issues

The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final and executory; hence, the PCGG should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 thereof; and (2) whether the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution
dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.

In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant petition for certiorari, respondents Tan, et
al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975, likewise, states:
Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above-mentioned rules do not preclude the
resort to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 13

In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order; hence, not appealable. The word "interlocutory" refers to
"something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a
final decision of the whole controversy." 14 An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the case;
it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
against each other but leaves something yet to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. 15

Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,16 we took
cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the
petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San Miguel
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions for certiorari of several resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of stock in the San Miguel Corp.

To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant petition is already barred by
the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res
judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph
(c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness of judgment. 19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit,20 Justice Artemio
Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments or final orders in the above section has two accepted
interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or
because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an
order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. 22 The phrase refers to a final
determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising
in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give
rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category. 23
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one
on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. 24 When there
is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment.25

In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier discussed, leaves nothing else to be done. As
explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party
is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. 26 To reiterate,
the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising
in an action.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the PCGG’s
similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order
as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein.
As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases because, strictly
speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating interlocutory motions. 27

Substantive Issue

The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted from the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA). 28 Rule 6.03, in particular, is a restatement of Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:

36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in
a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private
interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. 29 Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows that the interdiction
(1) applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to former government lawyers is called
the "revolving door" – the process by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life then leave it for
large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.30 To address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice may be
sought based either on "adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict."

In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a client in private practice if the
matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and if the interests
of the current and former clients are adverse. 31 It must be observed that the "adverse-interest conflict" applies to all lawyers
in that they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the interests of the
former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the same or substantially related. 32 On the
other hand, in "congruent-interest representation conflict," the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all,
because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government
client and the new client are entirely parallel.33 The "congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the "adverse-interest
conflict," is unique to former government lawyers.

I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096, which
involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our
Code of Professional Responsibility, which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest representation conflict."

Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject

matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with

or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation

of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had

intervened as the Solicitor General

The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any matter" and (2) "he had intervened"
thereon while he was in the government service. 34

The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a precise definition of "matter" as
used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested that the term "contemplates a discrete and isolatable
transaction or set of transaction between identifiable parties." 35

There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about
the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI
of Manila, the petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No. 107812). 36 GENBANK was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks have been
sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.

The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely advised the Central Bank on the
legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which procedure is "given in black and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29." This
procedural advice, according to the majority opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."

On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the contemplation of the term
"matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central Bank on the procedure
to go about GENBANK’s liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No. 107812 did not merely
involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly
considered "matter" within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does not only apply if precisely
the same legal issues are involved in each representation.38 The Comments of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
that drafted our Code of Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers "engagement or employment,
which means that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which
he intervened as a public official." 39 The sequestration of the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. in the names of
respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No. 0096, necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of
GENBANK upon its liquidation, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s liquidation is sufficient to place his present
engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was
significant and substantial. The Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials 40 of the Central Bank,
is revealing:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made
since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or
placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of
its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken
and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. 41

The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies
of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency
of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.

for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."42

By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and, more significantly, by filing
the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK and its
subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al.

I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having intervened as it describes the
participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK."
That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank, without the participation of Atty.
Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in the proceedings taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e.,
his giving advise to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his filing of the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 29 43 of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes "intervention" as to place him within
the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means –

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between points of
time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie
between two things …44

Further, "intervention" is defined as –

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;

2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45

With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank on how to proceed with
GENBANK’s liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with the court, Atty. Mendoza "had intervened," "had come
in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al. of the said
banking institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its stockholders.

Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not

take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if

no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s

former government client (Central Bank) and

his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)

As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics, now superseded
by the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA’s Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:

A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–101(B) commands, thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.

The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is –

"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s] action as a public legal official might be influenced
(or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he
had done.46

The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy consideration that an attorney must
seek to avoid even the appearance of evil. 47

Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and the ABA has persuasive effect
on the interpretation of Rule 6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case of General Motors Corporation v. City of New York,49 where
the pertinent ethical precepts were applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The
said US court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case it filed against the
General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US Department of Justice, had not only participated
in the latter’s case against General Motors Corp. but signed the complaint in that action.

George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a trial attorney assigned at the
General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954,
he participated in the investigation of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the city and intercity bus
business. The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors Corp. in 1956.
Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time that he left the Department of Justice in
1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.

In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft "has not changed sides" – i.e. "there
is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA
Commission on Professional Ethics, the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of the side chosen
in private practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in
following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of governmental resources." 50

The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the complaint in that action and
admittedly had "substantial responsibility" in its investigatory and preparatory stages. It thus concluded that "where the
overlap of issues is so plain and the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the appearance of i mpropriety
must be avoided through disqualification." 51

The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine. It bears stressing that
this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been distinguished from the normal rule applicable for
non-government lawyers in this wise –

To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has represented passenger A and has
recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the lawyer from
later representing passenger B against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the benefits of
the lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B’s advantage information and strategies
developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the interest of A and B do not conflict.

The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is arguably more connected with
the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents Small Soap Company in its suit for damages under the
federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing Medium Soap
Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The congruence
of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly mean that the lawyer could represent both
clients. In the absence of a conflict – an opposing interest between the two clients – the existence of a substantial
relationship between the matters involved in both cases is irrelevant.

Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap Company to force divestiture of an
acquired company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an industry in conflict with
antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving government service and while in private practice, represent Medium Soap
Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of opposing
interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former government client similarly mean that there should be no
disqualification?

At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal former-client conflict rules: the
lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in private practice, despite the fact that the interests of the
client and the lawyer’s former government client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.52

The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been explained, thus:

The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would have upon the decisions
and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the earlier representation of the government. Both courts
and commentators have expressed the fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government client that later
could be to the advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers that a government lawyer’s largely
discretionary actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private practice employment or to favor
parties who might later become private practice clients …
The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers who represent the
government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client who oversees the lawyer’s work. For that
reason a special rule is needed to remove the incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with an eye
cast toward advantages in future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes that and,
particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with which the former government
lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging lawyers from entering temporary public service. 53

The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse interests is required for the interdiction to apply.
If it were so, or if conflict of interests were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule 15.03)54 would apply.
Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility had construed
this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in
which he intervened as a public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he served during his public
employment."55

In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank but respondents Tan, et al.
Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former government
client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.

Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

temporal limitation because cases have to be

resolved based on their peculiar circumstances

Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the provisions therein. That Rule 6.03,
in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to
consider in determining its applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For example, in Control Data
Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of Minnesota held that the lawyer who, 15 years earlier,
while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge of negotiations in antitrust case against a corporation,
was not disqualified from acting as counsel for the plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose
conduct was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself 10 years removed from the matter over which
he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at the time he accepted the private engagement relating to the same
matter.57 Clearly, it is the degree of involvement or participation in the matter while in government service, not the passage
of time, which is the crucial element in Rule 6.03.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of principles by which the conduct of
members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and practically considered, legal ethics may be defined as
that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients, to the courts, to the
bar, and to the public."58 In this connection, the Court has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings, including
disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal, thus:

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice… 59

For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in disqualification cases against lawyers.

In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is not sufficient to consider it
far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096.
In fact, the validity of the said liquidation is still pending with the Court. 60 The validity of the sequestration of the shares in
Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily intertwined with Special Proceeding
No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues
presented in the two proceedings are so overlapping and the involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is
so plain, direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0095 is warranted
under Rule 6.03.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application

of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a "chilling effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests." This concern is similar to that raised by the City of New
York in the General Motors case where it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill the ardor for
Government service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ." 61 It appeared that the City of
New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v. Standard Oil Co,62 known as the Esso Export
Case, thus:

If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long a time, or will prevent him
from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has devoted years in acquiring, and if that sterilization will
spread to the firm which he becomes associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be too great for most men
to make.63

Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F. Kaufman, also the ponente of
the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the said court denied the motion to disqualify the former
government lawyer in Esso Export Case because the lawyer therein "never investigated or passed upon the subject matter
of the pending case … never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to the regulations
involved in the litigation."64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high ethical standards for former Government
employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, was struck under far different
circumstances of the Esso Export Case.

In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former Government Attorney and the
Canons of Professional Ethics65 was considered more to the point:

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney, although he did not
"investigate" or "pass upon" it, …, there would undoubtedly be an appearance of evil if he were not disqualified.66

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the cautious application of the
"appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former Government lawyer’s connection with the matter at issue was the tenuous
one of mere employment in the same Government agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and preparatory stages, but also signed the
complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US court, where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while
in Government employ so direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving former government lawyers will have
to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending each case. A balance between the two seemingly conflicting
policy considerations of maintaining high ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and
encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the relationship between the
former and the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer. Likewise, as already discussed, the degree
of his involvement in the matter while in Government employ is a crucial element in determining if his present representation
is within the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of GENBANK while he was
the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly influenced while in
government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I am
constrained to vote for his disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint
both the public and private segments of the legal profession.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED
insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.

Footnotes

1
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (1974).

2
Foreword of Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics.

3
Abragan v. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 (2001).

4
EO No. 1, promulgated on February 29, 1986, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.

5
Mariano Tan Eng Lian in some pleadings.

6
Memorandum of the PCGG, pp. 7-9.

7
The case is now pending with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152551.

8
Rollo, p. 42.

9
Id. at 43.

10
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (retired), with Associate Justices Jose S. Balajadia and
Nathanael M. Grospe, concurring; Id. at 57.

11
Rollo, p. 61.

12
Id. at 61-62.

13
People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672 (2003).

14
Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA 785 (1968)
citing BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd Revision, Vol. I, p. 1651.

15
Ibid.

16
396 SCRA 443 (2003).

17
340 SCRA 289 (2000).

18
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715 (2000).

19
FERIA, II CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 2001 ed., p. 123.

20
344 SCRA 838 (2000).

21
Ibid.

22
Id.
23
Id.

24
Id.

25
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, supra.

26
Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, supra.

27
Id.

28
The ABA first adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics on August 27, 1908. Canons 1 to 32 thereof were
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association (PBA) in 1917. In 1946, the PBA again adopted as its own Canons 33 to
47 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics. The ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics were superseded by the
Code of Professional Responsibility on January 1, 1970. In 1980, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted
a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, which it later submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. On
June 21, 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the present Code of Professional Responsibility. (AGPALO, infra.)

29
AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
2001 ed., p. 52.

30
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986), p. 456.

31
Ibid.

32
This prohibition is restated in Rule 15.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

33
WOLFRAM, supra.

34
AGPALO, supra.

35
WOLFRAM, supra.

36
MEMORANDUM for Respondents Tan, et al., p. 56; Rollo, p. 446.

37
According to the ABA Formal Opinion No. 342, these acts do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and do
not disqualify a lawyer under DR 9-101(B) from subsequent private employment involving the same regulations,
procedures or points of law. WOLFRAM, supra.

38
In United States v. Trafficante (328 F.2d 117 [1964]), the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) held that,
under Canon 36, the attorney who was formerly employed in the office of the Regional Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service and who handled the tax claims against Trafficante which resulted in stipulated settlement in the
tax court was disqualified from representing the latter in subsequent suits for foreclosure of liens for balance due
on those income taxes and for other federal taxes. The court therein rejected the lawyer’s claim that disqualification
should be ordered only if precisely the same issues were involved in each representation.

39
AGPALO, supra.

40
Then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor
and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then
Assistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of the Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.

41
RoIllo, p. 109.

42
Id. at 113. (Emphasis supplied.)
43
The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising
or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect
and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary
for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, orders its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a
petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of
the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over
the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall,
with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for
the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate
court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only
if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board
is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in
which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court.
The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank
of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and
dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business:
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & PD No. 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

44
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p. 1183.
 45
Ibid.

46
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

47
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 657 (1957).

48
See Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259 (2000).

49
Supra.

50
Id. at 650.

51
Id. at 652.

52
WOLFRAM, supra.

53
Ibid.

54
See note 32.

55
See note 39.

56
318 F.Supp. 145 (D.Minn.1970).

57
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

58
MALCOLM, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ADAPTED FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1949
ed.), p. 8.

59
Heck v. Santos, 423 SCRA 329 (2004) citing In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).

60
See note 7.

61
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

62
136 F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.1955).

63
Quoted in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

64
Id.

65
See note 42.

66
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of judgment;
and (2) prescription.
In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,1 because after leaving his post as solicitor general, he appeared as counsel in a "matter
in which he had intervened while he was in said service" (as solicitor general). He postulates that the Code of Professional
Responsibility should be a beacon to assist good lawyers "in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky
waters of professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of impropriety." He adds that the Code should be strictly
construed and stringently enforced.

On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in his ponencia that Rule 6.03 of the Code has
been incorrectly applied by Justice Callejo, because the "procedural advice" given by Atty. Mendoza is not the "matter"
contemplated by the said Rule. The ponencia explains that an "ultra restrictive reading of the Rule" would have "ill-effects
in our jurisdiction."

With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully submit that there is no need to delve into the question of
whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan
Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution
issued by the same court resolving the very same issue on the "disqualification" of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving the
same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can no longer be altered or changed.

I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from representing
these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground for disqualification involving the
same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a sufficient period of time from the
date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the Code) was raised.

Conclusiveness

of Judgment

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the relevant part of which I quote as
follows:

"Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

"(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity; and

"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."

The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata serves as an absolute proscription of a subsequent
action when the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged the pertinent issue
or issues on their merits; (3) it was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
between the first and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.2

In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only an identity of issues, res judicata exists
under the second concept; that is, under conclusiveness of judgment. In the latter concept, the rule bars the re-litigation
of particular facts or issues involving the same parties but on different claims or causes of action.3 Such rule, however, does
not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action.
In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction; it has thus been conclusively
settled by a judgment or final order issued therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them) are
concerned, and while the judgment or order remains unreversed or un-vacated by a proper authority upon a timely motion
or petition, such conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different
cause of action. Thus, the only identities required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is that
between parties and issues.4

While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes subsequent actions, conclusiveness
of judgment nonetheless operates as an estoppel to issues or points controverted, on which the determination of the earlier
finding or judgment has been anchored. 5 The dictum laid down in such a finding or judgment becomes conclusive and
continues to be binding between the same parties, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no l onger be
re-litigated, since the said issue or matter has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. 6

Relevant Antecedents

Showing the Application of the

Conclusiveness Doctrine

Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case of res judicata, specifically the principle
of conclusiveness of judgment.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) issued sometime in June to August 1986 several Writs of Sequestration over certain properties of Respondents
Lucio Tan et al., properties they had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of their close relationship with former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint against the same respondents for
"reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" vis-à-vis their sequestered properties. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN).

Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration Writs was questioned by herein
respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the Court to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were
raffled to the SBN Fifth Division and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil Case No. 0096, in
particular, involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG over herein private respondents’ shares of
stock in Allied Banking Corporation (formerly General Bank and Trust Company or "GenBank").

In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan et al.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion 7 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for therein
Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution8 dated April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied that Motion.
The anti-graft court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCGG. 9 Because the latter did not appeal
the denial, the Resolution became final and executory.

Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion10 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for Respondents
Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court, "the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil
Case No. 0005"; in fact, both incidents were taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan.11 Indeed, a perusal of both Motions reveals that, except as to their respective captions, the contents of the
Motions are identically worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same ground: that by virtue of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was prohibited from acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pending
cases. During his tenure as solicitor general, Atty. Mendoza had allegedly "intervened" in the dissolution of GenBank, Allied
Bank’s predecessor.

Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to reiterate and adopt "the Resolution dated
April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division x x x denying the motion."
Resolution in Civil Case

No. 0005 a Final Order

As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts an end to (or disposes of) a case or
a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else -- except its execution -- is left for the court to do. Once that judgment or
order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court on the particular matter involved is likewise ended.12 Such an order may
refer to the entire controversy or to some defined and separate branch thereof. 13 On the other hand, an order is interlocutory
if its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial proceedings to be further conducted by the issuing
court in order to put the issue or controversy to rest. 14

I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, in the Dissenting Opinions of Justices
Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for determining whether an order is interlocutory. Such test, however, applies to
orders that dispose of incidents or issues that are intimately related to the very cause of action or merits of the case. The
exception lies when the order refers to a "definite and separate branch" of the main controversy, as held by the Court
in Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant.15

Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents is a "defined
and separate branch" of the main case for "reversion, reconveyance, and restitution" of the sequestered properties. This
matter has no direct bearing on the adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal controversy. The final judgment
resolving the main case does not depend on the determination of the particular question raised in the Motion. The April 22,
1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 had finally and definitively determined the
issue of Atty. Mendoza’s disqualification to act as counsel for Tan et al. Since that Resolution was not appealed, it became
final and executory. It became a conclusive judgment insofar as that particular question was concerned.

Applying the Doctrine of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096. Neither has the
jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter raised in
the two Motions to Disqualify, though separately filed at different times in those two cases, are likewise the same or identical.
Also undisputed is the fact that no appeal or certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Second
Division in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG’s Motion.

To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the said April 22, 1991 Resolution was
merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an incidental or collateral matter x x x; it cannot operate to bar the filing of another
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains. I beg to disagree.

True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of "reversion, reconveyance and restitution."
However, I submit that the question with respect to the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had nonetheless been conclusively
settled. Indeed, the April 22, 1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the Motion to Disqualify on its merits. Since
no appeal was taken therefrom, it became final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period. 16

While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the Resolution should be differentiated
from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves an incident arising from the very subject matter or cause of action, or one
that is related to the disposition of the main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an order is not appealable, but may
still be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds adduced before final judgment. Verily, res judicata would not apply
therein.17

But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is separate from and independent of the
substantive issues in the main case for "reversion, reconveyance and restitution." This particular question, in relation to
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution of April 22, 1991, issued by the
SBN Second Division. In fact, I submit that this question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded, so as not to
prejudice the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious. Otherwise, the Motion would be rendered naught.

In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 finally came
up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Fifth Division correctly noted that the pending Motion
was "exactly the same in substance as that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it resolved to reiterate and adopt the
Second Division’s April 22, 1991 Resolution denying the Motion. Interestingly and understandably, the Fifth Division of the
anti-graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion before it, because the Second Division’s Resolution
disposing of exactly the same Motion and involving the same parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That
Resolution became a conclusive judgment between the parties with respect to the subject matter involved therein.

Exception to Application of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,18 in which the Court19 said that "the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims
are involved." Explaining further, the Court cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the exception in Restatement of
the Law 2d, on Judgments, thus:

"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following
circumstances:

xxxxxxxxx

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination
is warranted in order to take account or an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
inequitable administration of the laws; x x x. [Emphasis and omissions in the original.]"

In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment
does not apply to this case, because the issue at bar -- disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a legal question" and
"Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims."

I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the exception. I believe that the two cases
involve substantially related claims. Civil Case No. 0005 seeks to recover alleged ill-gotten shares of stock of respondents
Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Civil Case No. 0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ over the same shares of stock
involved in Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate analysis, both cases refer to the determination of who has a valid ownership
claim over said stockholdings.

In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues.20

Similar Motions in

Other PCGG Cases

Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum,21 Respondents Tan et al. aver that similar Motions to
Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former case, Sipalay
Trading v. PCGG, involved shares of stock of Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation; the latter case, Allied
Banking Corporation v. PCGG, sought the invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure of certain documents of Allied
Bank.

In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well as the Motions for Reconsideration.
No further actions were taken by the PCGG on such denials, which thus became executory. Consequently, Atty. Mendoza
was allowed to represent Lucio Tan in those cases.

On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan granted both Petitions on August 23, 1993,
by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration questioned in Civil Case No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure Order assailed
in Civil Case No. 0100. On March 29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN’s Decision in the aforementioned
consolidated cases.22 Consequently, now deemed res judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100 --
principal, incidental and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged disqualification of Atty. Mendoza.

Presence of Identities of

Parties and Issues

As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel
are those of parties and issues. In the case before us, both identities are clearly present. Hence, the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment applies and bars the present Petition.

From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of conclusiveness of judgment.
Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July 11, 2001 and the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The certiorari
proceeding before this Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, deserving only of outright dismissal. 23 In any event,
contrary to the allegations of petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.

Proscription

Time-Barred

True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or
enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer that, ergo, the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent.

All civil actions have a prescriptive period. 24 Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the
action is subject to a bar by prescription five (5) years after the right of action accrued. 25 Criminal offenses -- even the most
heinous ones -- as well as the penalties therefor, likewise prescribe. 26 Relatedly, even so-called perpetual penalties and
multiple sentences have maximum periods. 27

Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers and employees from practicing their
profession for only one year after their resignation, retirement or separation from public office, in connection with any matter
before their former office.28

Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions or facts that have been obscured
by defective memory or the lapse of time. 29 It was designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until relevant proofs are lost, memories faded, and witnesses no longer
available.30 Consistent with law and jurisprudence and the purpose of statutes of limitations, the prohibition on former
government attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part long ago, pursuant to their official functions while
in public service, should likewise have an expiry or duration.

In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly participated as then solicitor general,
took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a century ago. Since early 1986, he has ceased to be solicitor general and has
since engaged in the private practice of law. In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents Tan et al. in Civil Case No. 0005
and, since 1990, in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to 0100. 31 At the time, at least ten (10) years had passed since his alleged
involvement in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions to Disqualify were filed by PCGG in
these aforementioned cases, he had been outside government service for about five (5) years, and fifteen years had gone
by since the said liquidation.

Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the individual participation of government
officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed "have become so obscure from the lapse of time," if not from "defective
memory."

It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases simultaneously or within overlapping periods
of time. This is in fact a common remonstration, especially among prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors, government
corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even trial and appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful public servants, they cannot reject or
shrink from assignments even if they are already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private practice, whether by
themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.

It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in government service would have handled
or interfered in hundreds of legal matters involving varied parties. 32 Thousands of attorneys who have chosen to dedicate
their service to the government for some years are in such a situation. Hence, to perpetually and absolutely ban them from
taking part in all cases involving some matter in which they have taken part in some distant past, pursuant to their official
functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It would be tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of
the exercise of their profession. Be it remembered that a profession, trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property
right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. 33
Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule because of participation in a matter
that has been forgotten in good faith due to the lapse of a long period of time and does not involve interest adverse to the
government would likewise be harsh, unreasonable and unfair.

Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their long careers, would wish to serve the
government. Would their fine and wide-ranging practice and experience, which would otherwise be beneficial to the
government, likewise forever bar them from getting involved in matters that concern a party with whom they have had
dealings several years ago and whose interests are not adversely affected? In the case of acknowledged experts in specific
fields of law, of what use would their needed expertise be to the government if they have to inhibit themselves from every
case involving a party they have served in the distant past, considering the limited number of parties that may actually be
involved in a specific field (for instance, intellectual property or bioethics law)?

I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one’s profession, or right of employment including that of attorneys formerly in
government service, must survive the test of fairness and reasonableness. The restriction should not be as pervasive and
longer than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the government. After all, the
disqualification of government attorneys is a drastic measure, and courts should hesitate to impose it except when
necessary.34

Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers -- specifically with respect to subsequent engagement or
employment in connection with matters falling under the "congruent-interest representation" -- should be allowed to expire
after a reasonable period when no further prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The duration of this prohibition
should be no more than five (5) years from retirement or separation from government service. Five years is the prescriptive
period for suits for which no period is prescribed by law. 35

It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, one would most likely have lost the
loyalty of one’s former personal contacts, if not the loyal associates themselves, who may be able to facilitate the acquisition
of important information from the former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to
a reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein.
This principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other legal matters as is so common among lawyers in
government offices.

Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed to take up cases involving matters that
were brought before them during their incumbency in public office, so long as such matters do not come within the "adverse-
interest conflict" doctrine and the conflict-of-interest rule36 applicable to all lawyers in general.

For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section 5(b) and (d) 37 of Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct38 should also prescribe in five (5) years from the time they assumed their judicial position; or from
the time they retire from or otherwise end their government service.

I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to many members of the bar who have served, or who aspire to serve, the
government.

On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by discouraging attorneys in government
from so shaping their practice as to give unfair advantage to their future private clients, or from jeopardizing confidential
information learned while in government service. On the other hand, government service should not be discouraged by
overly strict ethical rules that perpetually prohibit government lawyers from later making reasonable and appropriate use in
private practice of the expertise or experience they have gained. 39

The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector sooner or later, and the government will
hardly be able to attract them if they would later be unreasonably restricted from putting their government experience to
some use.40 After all, government service should afford lawyers the opportunity to improve their subsequent private
employment. The nature of the job brings such lawyers into inevitable contact with clients interested in their fields of
expertise. Because the practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the likely consequence of a wholesale approach
to disqualification would be encouragement of a two-track professional structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The
suspicion, and the reality, of ethical improprieties unrelated to particular government cases would be eliminated -- but at the
cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy. 41

Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from entering government service, to the
detriment of the public.42 The Court must strike a balance. I believe that the adoption of the aforementioned period of
limitation would achieve the purpose behind Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 5 of
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, because the April 22, 1991
Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 -- which resolved on the merits the very same ground for the
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza, and which involved essentially the same parties and the same subject matter as the
present case -- constituted a final and executory order, no timely appeal having been taken therefrom.

Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent-interest representation under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be effective only for a period of five (5) years from the retirement or the
separation from government service of the official concerned. The purpose of such prescriptive period is to prevent undue
restraint on former government lawyers from the private practice of their profession, especially in the field of expertise that
they may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of members of the judiciary, under Section 5 (b)
and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should end five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position.

Implications of the

Dissenting Opinions

Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by the opinion of the dissenters that the
April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the filing of another
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza from other cases between the same parties. Such a holding would effectively allow
herein petitioner to file exactly the same Motion in each of other and future cases involving the same parties or their privies
and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving the same question or issue will have already been finally
resolved in one of like cases.

Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one case become final through petitioner’s
withholding recourse to a higher court in order to await a possible favorable ruling in one of the other cases. As it is, absurdity
already surrounds the handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which involve the same parties and the same
subject matter.

In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired properties consisting of shares of stock of
Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty. Mendoza is allowed to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case No. 0096,
which merely questions the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the shares of stock in Allied Bank of the
same respondents, he is prohibited, per the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is preposterous.

Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no appeal or certiorari has timely been taken
therefrom, would allow the questioned counsel to act as such throughout the trial period until final judgment by the court a
quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the other party as an issue. If the appeals
court or this Tribunal ultimately finds that the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground of conflict of interest or
"congruent-interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial court’s ruling, the case would necessarily be
remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire proceedings would become naught and thereby unnecessarily waste the
precious time, effort and resources of the courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence (or defense) adduced by the
"disqualified" counsel through his prior connections with the government (or the adverse party) could have already created
bias in the court or in the public mind.

These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res judicata, the fundamental principle of due
process and of the rule proscribing forum shopping.

Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this point for his alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, due to res judicata and prescription, I submit that there is no more need to discuss
on the merits whether indeed there was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be merely academic and moot.

May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap, who was himself a former PCGG
commissioner, on the soundness of upholding final judgments even "at the risk of occasional errors":

"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law,
pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive
determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than an important principle of public policy: and that it is not too much to say
that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of the jural sytem. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 43

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Footnotes

1
"Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

2
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715, June 19, 2001.

3
Ibid.

4
Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732, February 7, 1991 (reiterated in Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231
SCRA 88, March 11, 1994; and in Intestate Estate of San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733, December
18, 1996).

5
Camara v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608, July 20, 1999.

6
Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302, February 11, 1986; Vda. De Sta. Romana v. Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, 118 SCRA 330, November 15, 1982.

7
Rollo, pp. 216-220.

8
Penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal (chairman) and concurred in by Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Nathanael
M. Grospe (members); rollo, pp. 57-63.

9
Resolution dated July 24, 1991; rollo, pp. 233-237.

10
Rollo, pp. 221-225.

11
Resolution dated July 11, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), referring to the Record of Civil Case No.
0096, Vol. I, pp. 134-135; rollo, p. 42. This unsigned Resolution was unanimously approved by Justices Minita V.
Chico-Nazario (Division chairperson, now a member of this Court), Rodolfo G. Palattao and Ma. Cristina Cortez-
Estrada (members).

12
Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 355 Phil. 804, August 17, 1998 (citing Investments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 147 SCRA 334, January 27, 1987; and Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
280, February 27, 1987). In this case, the Court held:

"The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim was a final order since the dismissal, although
based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the court with respect to that specific subject
except only to await the possible filing during the reglementary period of a motion for reconsideration or the taking
of an appeal therefrom."

The Court further said that errors of judgment, as well as procedure, that do not relate to the jurisdiction of the court
or involve grave abuse of discretion are reviewable by timely appeal, not by a special civil action for certiorari, unless
for valid and compelling reasons.

13
Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683, September 17, 2001 (citing Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant, 258
SCRA 145, July 5, 1996; and Dela Cruz v. Paras, 69 SCRA 556, February 27, 1976).

14
Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, supra (citing Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235, December 28,
1966).
15
Supra, p. 155.

16
Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214, December 16, 1998; Navarro v. NLRC, 327 SCRA 22, March 1,
2000; Testate Estate of Manuel v. Biascarr, 347 SCRA 621, December 11, 2000; People v. Alay-ay, 363 SCRA
603, August 23, 2001; Vda. de Sta. Romana v. Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, supra.

17
Manila Electric Co. v. Arciaga, 50 Phil. 144, March 18, 1927 (citing Reilly v. Perkins, 56 Pac 734).

18
246 SCRA 540, 561, July 17, 1995, per Mendoza, J.

19
Voting here was close (5 justices fully concurred in the ponencia, 2 wrote separate concurring opinions, while 5
dissented.)

20
Nabus v. Court of Appeals, supra.

21
Rollo, pp. 391-471.

22
GR Nos. 112708-09, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

23
Spouses Morales v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 337, January 28, 1998; Cabellan v. Court of Appeals, 304
SCRA 119, March 3, 1999; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81, January 18, 2000.

24
See Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code.

25
Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66, June 10, 1988.

26
Arts. 90 & 92 of the Revised Penal Code provide as follows:

"Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall
prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by
arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months."

"Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five
years;

4. Light penalties, in one year."

See also Act No. 3326, as amended.

27
"Art. 70 [Revised Penal Code]. x x x.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall
not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period.

"Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

"In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at
thirty years."

28
"Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. x x x.

"These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b); (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply."

29
Ochagabia v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 233, March 11, 1999; Peñales v. IAC, 229 Phil. 245, October 27, 1986.

30
Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342 (1944); Alcorn v. City of Baton
Rouge, 2004 WL 3016015, December 30, 2004.

31
Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 399-400.

32
Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand cases in full-
length ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include
the thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part during their
deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in
each of these cases, especially in the earlier ones.

33
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, August 5, 1996.

34
Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp 551, 1995.

35
Art. 1149, Civil Code.

36
Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility:

"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."

37
"Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

xxxxxxxxx

(b) The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

xxxxxxxxx

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or
a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein;

x x x x x x x x x"

[Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the old Code of Judicial Conduct.]

38
AM No. 03-05-01-SC, promulgated on April 27, 2004 and effective June 1, 2004.

39
In re Sofaer, 728 A2d 625, April 22, 1999.

40
Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A2d 37, December 21, 1984.

41
Ibid. (citing Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1244, 1428-30 [1981]).

42
Ibid.

43
Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194, February 26, 1988, per Yap, J. (later CJ).

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They pertain to a significant and material
dimension to this case which deserves greater illumination.

To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be disqualified as counsel in Civil Case No.
0096, as the dissenters are wont to hold, there should be a clear legal basis that would mandate such
disqualification. The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, while the ponencia disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed transgressed.
I maintain that Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be
violative of his right to due process.

I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, in connection with acts that they may have engaged in as government officials before the enactment
of the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty. Mendoza entered the government service he had no idea of the kind
of inhibition proposed to be foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for representing the respondents in
Civil Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor General and in the discharge of his official functions,
he had advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of General Bank and Trust
Company, which was subsequently acquired by the respondents. However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor
General Mendoza participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987
when he agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been
promulgated.

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. 1 Prior to its
official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other than
the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.

I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza’s culpability on the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that the Code of Professional Responsibility has application even as to
acts performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown upon the prospectivity of statutes. Article 4 of the Civil Code
declares that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no declaration in the
Code of Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its canons and rules. It is settled that the
presumption is that all laws operate prospectively absent clear contrary language in the text, 2 and that in every case
of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. 3
The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on the scope of the rule on the prospective
application of statutes:

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment
made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613,
as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not
be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that
Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application;
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending
the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519,
adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be
given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling
that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v.
Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (See also Bonifacio v.
Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the
holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled
that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system .
. .’"4

I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal liabilities against its infringers. It is well entrenched that generally,
penal laws or those laws which define offenses and prescribe penalties for their violation operate prospectively. 5 The
Constitution itself bars the enactment of ex-post facto laws.6 I do not think it necessary to flirt with the constitutional
issue whether the Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute within the definition of an ex-post
facto law, but I am satisfied with the general rules, affirmed by jurisprudence, that abhor the retroactivity of statutes
and regulations such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be necessary to ascertain whether his accession
to represent the respondents violated any binding law or regulation at the time of the engagement. It is but proper
to frame the question in such manner, for only then could it be ascertained whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should
have known that his professional representation of the respondents was illegal. It would also be unfair to ascribe
liability to any lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in government service, was not guided by any definitive rule
prescribing the possible subsequent restrictions on the lawyer’s professional activity as a consequence of the
exercise of public office.

Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza’s actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some authorities
deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7 Canon 36 states:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza. However, a thorough review should
first be examined on whether Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics may be used as legal basis in resolving
this case.

The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar Association. 8 They were adopted by the
Philippine Bar Association as its own in 1917 and in 1946.9 There is no denying the high regard enjoyed by the
Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly one hundred years of existence. However, there is
also no denying that the Philippine Bar Association, a civic non-profit association,10 is a private entity of limited
membership within the Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted are per se binding only on its members,
and the penalties for violation of the same could affect only the status or rights of the infringers as members of the
association.

At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of Professional Ethics in deciding
administrative cases against lawyers, especially prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Ethics. Hence,
the belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve as a source of legal ethics in this country.
However, I think it would be grave error to declare that the Canons of Professional Ethics, on their own, serves as
an indisputable source of obligations and basis of penalties imposable upon members of the Philippine legal
profession. This would violate the long-established constitutional principle that it is the Supreme Court which is
tasked with the promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice of law, as well as the pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts.11 The task of formulating ethical rules governing the practice of law in the Philippines
could not have been delegated to the Philippine Bar Association by the Supreme Court. Neither could such rules
as adopted by the private body be binding on the Supreme Court or the members of the bar.

If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar Association have jurisprudentially been
enforced, or acknowledged as basis for legal liability by the Supreme Court, they may be recognized as a binding
standard imposable upon members of the bar, but not because said Canons or the Philippine Bar Association
itself said so, but because the Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line with the entrenched rule, as evinced
by Article 8 of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system."

Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza when he deigned to represent the
respondents if at such time, this Court had expressly acknowledged Canon 36 as a rule or standard which deserves
obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be through such process of judicial recognition that these
guidelines adopted by a private entity could be considered as a normative rule compulsory on all practitioners.
Unfortunately, no such case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.

It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36 or even as stated in American case
law, subsisted within that penumbra of ethical standards from which the Court could have derived a jurisprudential
rule had one been called for by a particular case. However, it remains that none such was pronounced by this Court
in jurisprudence, and indeed the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a
norm until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty.
Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such
engagement or penalizing him for such representation.

I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, and not just mere error in fact or law, in denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. The absence of
a definitive disqualificatory rule that would have guided Atty. Mendoza when he undertook the questioned acts
sufficiently justifies the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.

We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising as they do from an understandable
concern that the line dividing the professional activities and the government services rendered by lawyers should
remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that there is no unanimity on prevalent legal thought on the
matter, and a healthy debate on the issue will result in no harm. Still, the due process dimension, as highlighted by
the absence of a definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza could have been held accountable, proves determinative
to my mind. The Court is the enforcer of the constitutional guarantees of due process to all persons, and my vote
is but a consequence of this primordial duty.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious
Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but
later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of
San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of
City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al.
vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then
argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on
the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private
law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability,
the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right
to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the
accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party.
It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could
be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as
private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal
case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly
instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the
apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible,
the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims
that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the
isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-24548. October 27, 1983.]

WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appellees,
RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors.

Camito V. Pefianco, Jr. for Petitioner-Appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent Director.

Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm’l Co.

Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.

Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; WHEN TRIAL COURT CAN PROPERLY DISMISS A
COMPLAINT THEREON DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN WITHOUT A HEARING. — In Llanto v. Ali
Dimaporo, Et. Al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can
properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into
consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto.

2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL. — Petitioner appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for
reconsideration. This omission means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from
raising this question for the first tune on appeal. "Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal" (Matienzo v. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).

3. ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE; NOT TO BE APPLIED IN A VERY RIGID, TECHNICAL SENSE. — Petitioner-appellant
cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its
sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigi d
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are
made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a
party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; FAILURE TO APPEAL ORDER OF

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, A
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. — Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No.
238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL. — This being a special
civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego v. The
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner-appellant’s speedy and adequate remedy
is an appeal to the President of the Philippines. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court
(People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 463), "it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress,
a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies available’’ (Garcia v. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).

6. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; WHEN STATE’S IMMUNITY MAY BE VALIDLY INVOKED. — "The
rule establishing State exemption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State
instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State’s immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as
it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the offi cer
nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Politicial Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724 and other
cases cited).
7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; TIMBER LICENSE; CON- STRUED. — A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

8. ID.; LICENSE; GRANT THEREOF DOES NOT CREATE IRREVOCABLE RIGHT, NEITHER IS IT PROPERTY OR A
PROPERTY RIGHT. — "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right nor, does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J., 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).

9. POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER; PROPER EXERCISE THEREOF CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY ANY FRANCHISE
OR RIGHT. — The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The
State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481, Oct. 24, 1970).

10. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF CONTROL; SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES HAS AUTHORITY TO REVOKE, ON VALID GROUNDS, TIMBER LICENSES ISSUED BY DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY. — The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director
of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (Sec, 79 [c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers
of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry v. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 3, 1981). The power of control of the
Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials
(Province of Pangasinan v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano v.
Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant’s timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent-appellee
(Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil
Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2, rec.), which
dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause
of action, and upon the respondents-appellees’ (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI
rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation compri sing
7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (p. 99,
CFI rec.).

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting the required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p.
29, rec.).

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be
awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of
the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes.
Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for
Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license
in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as
above stated . . .

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA"

(p. 98, CFI rec.)

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is
made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Respectfully forwarded to the Honorable, the Executive Secretary, Malacañang, Manila, inviting particular attention to the
comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the preceding indorsement in which this Office fully concurs.

"The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest conservation and
watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to declare
the forest area involved as a forest reserve rather than open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do
more harm than good to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest protection
force, would make of it a ‘Free Zone and Logging Paradise,’ to the ever ‘Problem Loggers’ of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an
open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the other hand, to award
the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging operations therein under the
selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the
forest conservation and watershed protection.

"Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the most
qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry
to dispose of the area thusly, was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to
do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be announced. To be
sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin
forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau
of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

"In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the announcement of
the results of the bidding for the subject forest area" (p. 13, CFI rec.)

The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer,
"respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate
action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14,
CFI rec.)

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposals, the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on
December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who succeeded Secretary
Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which
state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"SUBJECT: . . .

(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.

"1. . . .

"2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby
is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000
hectares each;
"3. This Order shall take effect immediately" (p. 267, CFI rec.)

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing Secretary
Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office, he immediately promulgated on December 19, 1963 General Memorandum
Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum Order No. 46, to
grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said
Order read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963 —

"1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and nature of the work of the Department, the authority delegated
to the Director of Forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber
licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of new licenses
and renewals of licenses, including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.

"2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked" (p. 268, CFI rec.; Italics supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-
’64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry
Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order
of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, O.T.L. No. 20-’64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be
cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws,
rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-’64 issued in the name of
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of said order reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-’64 in the name of
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect whatsoever from
the issuance thereof.

"The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the
area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon pending the
disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick in this case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.)

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied
the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964,
that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo Watershed
Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed for a
watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in relation to
wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas
influenced by the watershed, etc . . ." (pp. 38-39, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.)

On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao
Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the
same area, promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to
grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount
to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity
of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case
is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.)

On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before the court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil
Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI
rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally, whimsically, capriciously and
arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and
existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving
him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts"
(p. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents-appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March
25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the
proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to
renew O.T.L. No. 20-’64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-
appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000,00) as attorney’s
fees and costs. The respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were
granted, and they too opposed the writ.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has
no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all
available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative
and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus;
(2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without
its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of
petitioner’s license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in
intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors, and extensive
discussion was held both orally and in writing.

After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the question on
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a
sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing
the petition, stated that "the court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this question
but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and
evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner -appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I.

Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action; and

(2) dismissing the petition [p. 27, rec.]

He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of
action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of
action wherein he contended that the three essential elements thereof — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative
obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments
of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause
of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot
consider other matters aliunde. He further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of
action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.)

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant’s contentions are untenable. As already observed, this
case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner-
appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This moti on
supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, all facts which are
well pleaded. However, while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of
which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts
inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol.
1, Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).

It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence introduced.
In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of the allegations in
his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency
of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no
hearing held, as in the case of Cohen v. U.S. (C.C.A. Minn., 1942, 129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District
Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the court could properly consider in passing
upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court judicially knew.

In Llanto v. Ali Dimaporo, Et. Al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that
the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing,
by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is
hereby quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the motion, dismissed
the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.

"1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued ‘without any hearing on the motion to dismiss’? Is it
void?

"WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10 following.
On February 8, 1961 petitioner’s counsel telegraphed the court, ‘(r)equest postponement motion dismissal till written
opposition filed.’ He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition thereto, we find
that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board’s power to abolish petitioner’s position minutely discussed the
problem and profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at length the said arguments and
concluded that petitioner made no case.

"One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in
support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of a cause
of action or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The question raised in
the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In this posture,
oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly so,
because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., `to avoid surprises upon the opposite party
and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,’ has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do
not exalt form over substance" (Emphasis supplied).

Furthermore, "even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of action
will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the
court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint" (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International
Longshoremen’s Association v. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of granting
or denying petitioner-appellant’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence
in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the
trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their
stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor
presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said
observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. "Issues
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo v. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA
276).

Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states
no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If
a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary
in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the
substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973,
p. 157, citing cases)

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the
inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by
forest denudation.chanrobles law library

The are covered by petitioner-appellant’s timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI
rec.). It is of public knowledge the watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply
of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper
utilization of natural resources, which includes the country’s watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected
to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were
wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timer cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason
why, in paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timer license it is stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this
license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.)

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on
April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant’s timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, I, Diosdado Macapagal,
President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be, under the
administration and control of the Director of Forestry, . . . the following parcels of land of the public domain situated in the
municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: . . ." (60 O.G.
No. 23, 3198)

Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-’64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in
question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered
by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and
respect the very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the
timber license of the petitioner without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber
license issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p. 32, rec.).

In the light of petitioner-appellant’s arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity
of his timber license.

WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner-appellant’s timber license was signed and released without
authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such
findings:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to
grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of
public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B; Exh.
B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority
given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that
the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the
license states, ‘Please see attached sketch and technical description,’ gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state
what is the area covered of commercial and operable forest (Exh. 1-Ravago). Also Annex B of the petition, which was
marked as Exhibit B, states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared
available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there were received bid proposals from the following
persons: . . .
"‘Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is
hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: . . .’

"In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to
grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released to the
petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. 1-Ravago). The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary
timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general
memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had
no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio" (pp. 479-480,
CFI rec.)

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on
which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant’s timber license might have
been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on
the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-’64 (NEW). Thus,
in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Macrohon, Et. Al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held
that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties
it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the
said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held
that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where i t clearly appears
that the claim of the plaintiff to be the owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly,
petitioner-appellant’s petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II.

Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-
appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the
area covered by his timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the
respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above
after denying petitioner-appellant’s motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on
the case of Demaisip v. The Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of
the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking
court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption
is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter
(Villena v. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.)

To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power
to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal
is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo v. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399,
400, June 29, 1962), held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At any rate, the appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the
President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former
to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.

"The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In 1912, in the case of Lamb v. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the
courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. (Jao Igco v. Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu v. U.S.,
142 U.S. 651; U.S. v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253; Chiu Yow v. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The
administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the
administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely
and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers
exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their
judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or
decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them" (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and
adequate remedy (Diego v. The Court of Appeals, Et Al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner-appellant’s
speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either
want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" (F.S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April 21, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity,
albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the Respondents-Appellees.Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held
time and again by this Court (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well known principle that
before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies available" (Garcia v. Teehankee, 27
SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).

"Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action
for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be
deemed fatal to their case [Calo v. Fuertes, Et Al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29, 1962]. To place petitioners’ case beyond the
pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls — which it does not — within the cases where, in accordance with our
decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law
[Tapales v. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat v. Osmeña,
G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio v. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual v. Provincial
Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. v. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May
31, 1963; Alzate v. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-13000, Sept.
25, 1959]" (Ganob v. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).
III.

Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit
against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent
to be sued (Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren v. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution)

The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant’s timber license, were acting within the scope of their
authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle
of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens
against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant’s action is
just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit
at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the
inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State
exemption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead of against the
State itself. In such cases the State’s immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that
the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party
defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers’ Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil Phil. v. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees’ Association, 1 SCRA
340, 341, 343).

Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of
the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a
timber license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of
its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant’s action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to
be sued.
IV.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant’s timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his
timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license
states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that
this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber
license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract, within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, n or
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro v.
Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived
without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of
police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent
power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct.
24, 1970)
V.

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization
and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while
Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from
any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Sec. 79[c],
Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate
officer" (Director of Forestry v. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over
bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan
v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144,
147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on
valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of
petitioner-appellant’s timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent-appellee (Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged
right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so
again" (Director of Forestry v. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national
patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim
is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries,
Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations
ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda,
Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have
inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of
January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April
1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for
defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his
sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish
lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit
without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February
1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted
by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal
interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of
the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant
but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy
services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking,
intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all
show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with,
the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January
1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner
Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner
Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report
and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report
reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will
conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of
Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of
Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues,
therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the
periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that
he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that
he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related
and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were
of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with
Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter
had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The
act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v.
Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints,
we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules
of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject
to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency
of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period
since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent
used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential
information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-
client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self
to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel
of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government
prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly
pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless
the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP
has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received
from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from
the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s
violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street,
Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, 6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties.
The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was
then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As
there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings
and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared
and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: 8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

 (2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with
a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that
Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not
covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit
of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law
with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Secti on
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex
specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the
vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors,
city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to
practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need
for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation,
no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is
supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The
Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government
can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty
to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined
as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20 and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He
is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty.
Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. P-07-2337 August 3, 2007

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-P]

ROLLY PENTECOSTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kabacan,
North Cotabato, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint1 filed on November 11, 2004 by
Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of M’lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for carnapping,
Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who
acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order 2 of November
15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and
come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

In his Comment3 filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M’lang chief of police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a
utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police station for which he (respondent) prepared
a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When the
court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it,
claiming that it was already "cannibalized" and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be responsible for reconditioning the vehicle.
During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police
station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a letter-
complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes
refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where
the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of Pedroso 4 and SPO4 Alex
Ocampo5 who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondent’s averments, Pentecostes, in his "Rejoinder," 6 contended as follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by police operatives 7 of M’lang.

Respondent’s act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of hand washing as the records showed
that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused
to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no
entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,8 this Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato,
for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his
findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.9

In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP
of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of M’lang,
North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over to
the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes’ claim that the vehicle was "cannibalized"
from the time it was under respondent’s custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.

In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a
suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise decision in turning over the custody of
the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang’s report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 in which he assailed the
conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already "cannibalized" when it was delivered to the office
of the clerk of court from the M’lang police station.

Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant
because the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be held responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judge’s recommendation to be sufficiently supported by
the evidence.11

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang’s recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against respondent,
subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent and the
latter’s lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned
over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the investigation supported a finding that the
vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes’ witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a
service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not run
by itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned over
to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer
its custody. Only when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the attention of the
executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior authority from the court before evidence
is turned over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be warned to be more careful to prevent any
similar incident from arising in the future.
The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent’s lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account of which
respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge.12 Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI
of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have
been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. — The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody
and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that
would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was,
respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial
court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case No. 1010, 13 with nary a lead as to who was
responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty
entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still serviceable
when it was delivered by the M’lang police to respondent and at the time it was turned over by respondent to the Kabacan
police station. The Joint Affidavit14 of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo Banaybanay categorically stated that
the motorcycle was in "good running condition" when they delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe
narrated that he was the "the driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle" when the
vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1, 1995. 15

Even respondent’s following testimony that:

"x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately delivered together with Alex Pedroso
[sic] because it could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex
Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan"16 (Italics supplied)

suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently transferred its custody to the
Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who
perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. 17 Their duties include the efficient
recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public
property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one
pretext or another.18 They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient administration of justice. 19

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith. 20 The
exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are reflective of the premium placed on the image
of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of court personnel. 21 It
becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest
clerk, to maintain the courts’ good name and standing as true temples of justice. 22
By transferring Pentecostes’ motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping
it under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to
misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by
the public officer.23 The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999)
classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and One Day to Six Months.
Considering that this is respondent’s first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown by his actuations, a 15-day
suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He
is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 5095 : November 28, 2007]

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER
R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR
G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. AGATEP, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin
Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc.
No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same
as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry
therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized
Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents
on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn
Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission.
Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court
a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not
due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification. 1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion. 2

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the
utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor,
87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx
xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to
the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded.
No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded
in his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty.
Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a
dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No.
1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document
Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are,
therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints,
a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his
own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's
affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the
CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be
sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA
409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining
to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity.
The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the
performance of their duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a
period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument
of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding
his duties as a notary public.

In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some
of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another
infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it
being the respondent's first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty
of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous
misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA,
if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months." 3

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office
of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his
Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. 5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v.
Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six
months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month
suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His
notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

JBC No. 013 August 22, 2007

Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI,
Davao City.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on
May 17, 2003.1 Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that
administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain
declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against
him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his
PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court
Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases. 3 On even
date, letters4 were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative
complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service.
Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before
the JBC.5

In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O.
No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or
altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183
partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to
Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondent’s direct participation, as it
was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The
subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows his complete disregard for the truth
which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly
shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and
public service demands of every government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest
degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce
evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is
serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction
regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondent’s continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:

(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Executive Secretary7

In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation
before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal
cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case simultaneously filed
against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS,
which was sworn to before a notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the fact of
his dismissal from the service.9

In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of his
administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from
the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable
resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993 11 which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief" that he
had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic
dismissal" of his administrative case considering that "the issues raised therein became moot and academic"; and that had
he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew
he would never be appointed.

Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum12 dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of
the subject administrative case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order
No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the records of said administrative case on file with the
NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.

After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain,
this Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.

An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that he
concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered "yes" to Question No. 24, but without disclosing
the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are hereunder quoted
as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree,
ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or
in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If
your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions, give particulars.
But all dismissed (acquitted)

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439

Date of [Dismissal] – August 2, 1995

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814

Date of [Dismissal] – July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full
knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government
service. Based on the certified documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:

1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado,
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his
Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the "Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr.
Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April
1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily
Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as follows:

Mindanao Times:

Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal

Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for
understanding to those allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the guests in
yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from government
service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991,
a series of administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional employees.

"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process," Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.

"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance
to clear my name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children," Quitain said in his statement.

"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case," he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the
recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear
his name in court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against the
group that plotted his ouster from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael
Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.

"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them," Quitain said.

"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of
Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said
Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal and protest
to said Administrative Order.

xxxx

Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was administratively charged
and was consequently dismissed from the service since he will not be considered. But this may be the reason why he
deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet
because of his honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that would be filed against him by reason of his
resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is
rather absurd for him to state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever
administrative case filed against him because when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein
became moot and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the administrative case
because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself from administrative culpability in concealing
facts relevant and material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation
from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to
the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged
administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service.
Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of his
administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on
the alleged assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.

On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had
a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record,
which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact,
it could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him
unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM
for misconduct and dishonesty.

Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an administrative
matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.13

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution respondent filed his Comment 14 contending that before he filed his application for
RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as
the case was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in
Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis T.
Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Region
XI;

2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who were
the same followers involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly pressing for his
(Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;
 3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing criminal
charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the
dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the
DILG central office in Manila;

5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated with his
detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral
congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases filed against him,
consisting of criminal cases only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he
submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge,
he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed
against you pending before any court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against him that he
knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted from applying as
a judge and would have given his full attention to the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing
embarrassment; and

8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered
therein, without his knowledge, could have probably occurred during his "exile period" when he was detailed
indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative case are null and void since he was denied
due process.

Respondent’s Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.15

OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained
in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied that at the time
Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from government service.
Considering that Judge Quitain’s explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the previous
letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice
to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his
fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. 17

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that
on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his
administrative case had become moot and academic.

Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he
deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper
items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,18 Judge Quitain
stated in one of his interviews that "I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process." It also reads: "Quitain,
who was one of the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from the government service." Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process.
The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad
Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been filed against
him and required him to file an answer.19 Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo,
filed an Answer.20 In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.21 Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his
resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service
nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. 22 Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation
and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr., 23 this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending
criminal charges against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was
seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important information in question because he
deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a
vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed."

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty" means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack
of integrity."24

Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides
the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or

3. A fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube, 26 we held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken
into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be
appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the
Judiciary.27 We have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be
free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 28lavvphil
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of
dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he
is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Davao City. Acting on said letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain
effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case." 29

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance – without
prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to
pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice
and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. 30 Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 31

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the
penalty of a fine of ₱40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any,
the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be
entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality
or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitain’s 201 File.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[Adm. Case No. 2984 : August 31, 2007]

RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law
filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.

The antecedent facts that led to Mejia's disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative
offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo,
situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; andcralawlibrary

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the registration
of title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51,
complainant's affidavit dates October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); andcralawlibrary

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo's favor (Annex Q,
par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the
amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. 1

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision PER CURIAM, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and
hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the
Bar Confidant's Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator
who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the
Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present Petition for Review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition. 2

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.
The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration
of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant's reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to
practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. 3

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.chanrobles virtual law library Fifteen years had
already elapsed since Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for
forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through
his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also
organized a religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe
penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which
he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to
him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted
long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed
not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to
the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law. 4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831 February 2, 2007

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-796-RTJ)

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE A. PACQUING, Presiding Judge, Branch 28 and MARIO ANACLETO M. BAÑEZ, JR., Clerk of Court,
RTC, San Fernando City, La Union, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed ₱4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the
amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it
emerged as the highest bidder.

In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 1 to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner
to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision
and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of the replacement value of the
properties should petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and executory on February 10, 1988.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge Vicente
A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that
it be permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court directed petitioner to pay Bengson
₱31 million as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL
and never informed it of respondent judge’s order.2 This motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by respondent
judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997. 3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but respondent judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.

Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 476694 assailing the
court a quo’s denial of its petition for relief from judgment. The CA, however, dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for having
been filed out of time as three years had elapsed since the order awarding Bengson ₱31 million as costs of suit became
final and executory.5

Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge, on December
16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the ₱31 million. 6 Pursuant thereto, respondent
Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ and levied on petitioner’s shares of stock
in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth ₱6.2 million. The garnished shares were later sold at public auction with Bengson
as the only bidder.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt from garnishment,
levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291. 7 Respondent judge denied the motion stating that only funds and
properties that were necessary to maintain petitioner’s actuarial solvency, like contributions of GSIS members, were exempt
from garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291. 8

Petitioner filed its MR of the trial court’s denial of its motion to quash the writ but this was rejected as well.

Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the garnishment and sale on execution of its SMC shares. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 136874.9
We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669.10

Later, the CA dismissed both petitions.11

Petitioner questioned the CA’s dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669 via a petition for review in this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 137448,12 the ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds for relief from the ₱31 million costs of suit judgment
by respondent judge.

Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for certiorari in this Court, this time contesting the CA’s dismissal
of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No. 141454,13 the petition ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA for upholding the trial court’s issuance of the alias writ of execution and the subsequent garnishment and
sale of its shares in SMC.

Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint 14 against respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and for
violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:

In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39, RA 8291]. He refused to await an authoritative and
definitive resolution of the issues [on the exemption of GSIS’s funds and properties] from execution or the issue of whether
GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his [₱]31 million peso cost[s] of suit. …[H]e was in a hurry, as Bengson, to
execute the ₱31 million costs of suit…[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, seemed to have the same
objective when he refused to take heed of [GSIS’s request] to hold in abeyance the execution sale on the basis of Section
39 (RA 8291).

The foregoing only shows [respondent judge’s] deliberate disregard of the express provisions of [RA 8291], specifically
Section 39…and his bias, given his exorbitant award for cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal basis. It evidently reveals
a malicious scheme that seriously undermines the very integrity and impartiality of his court.

The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Bañez in garnishing and selling [GSIS’s shares of stock in SMC] to Bengson,
characterized by an unusual swiftness and in clear disregard of the express provision of Section 39, RA 8291… 15

We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation. In
its report16 to the Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioner’s accusations against both respondents.
According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute
gross ignorance of the law. It added that the records also failed to prove malice, fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part
of respondent judge in issuing the assailed alias writ of execution.

On petitioner’s allegations against respondent Atty. Bañez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him liable for failing
to defer the execution of the writ.

The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against respondents. 17

On petitioner’s motion, we referred the case to the CA for further investigation. It was assigned to Associate Justice Roberto
A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a hearing on the case could be conducted, respondent judge
died.18 The hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion of the investigation of his case by Justice
Barrios.

Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report 19 to us agreeing with OCA’s findings that petitioner’s complaint against
respondents was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:

Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the Order of 16 December 1998 without awaiting the
resolution of [petitioner’s motion for reconsideration], and in holding that [its] properties are not exempt from execution,
these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has
not presented proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would call for administrative sanctions against [respondent
judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of the judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge. 20
He added that the filing of the administrative charges against respondents was premature because this Court at that time
had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus recommended the dismissal of the administrative charges
against respondents.

On January 31, 2002,21 we handed down our decision in the above cases nullifying the CA’s resolutions dismissing G.R.
Nos. 5113122 and 47669.23 In the same decision, we set aside respondent judge’s January 16, 1997 order dismissing
petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment and his April 23, 1998 order denying the MR. 24

Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judge’s orders, we are adopting the findings and recommendations of the
OCA and Justice Barrios.

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. 25 To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also
motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.26 That certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioner’s
complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to the
legal issues and applicable laws involved. 27 Petitioner also proffered no evidence that respondent judge’s acts were imbued
with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against petitioner when he issued the alias
writ of execution. Petitioner’s assertion that respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the
records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the finality of the order
directing petitioner to pay Bengson ₱31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In the
exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a
matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled
to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty. 28

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act would still not merit administrative
sanction absent malice or bad faith.29 Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest
purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.

Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent judge’s
decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other than what he had learned from his study
of the case.30 Decisions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous, are not necessarily
partial as long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the parties. 31 The party who alleges partiality must
prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect.

Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, nullified the orders of respondent judge only to
give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross negligence and mistake of its then counsel, Atty. Terrado.
We did not at all declare respondent judge’s orders as erroneous or tainted with malice or bad faith. In our decision, we
said:

It is readily apparent that part of [petitioner’s] predicament stemmed from the negligence or mistake, to put it mildly, of its
former counsels.

Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity, [petitioner’s] counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut
BENGSON’s evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least, verify the schedule of costs and cross-examine BENGSON’s
witnesses. Much worse, he allowed the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON ₱31 million costs of suit to attain finality by
not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial court or a petition with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he went AWOL
without informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts constituted gross negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the
deprivation of petitioner of an opportunity to move to reconsider or appeal the adverse order.

…[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client for otherwise there would be never be no end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the former counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto
and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of
the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.1awphi1.net

Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived
to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. 32 The actions against judges should not be
considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in
a case.33

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Bañez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for executing the
assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. 34 Charged
with this task, he must act with considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if not executed at once,
would just be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party.35 In executing the writ, Atty. Bañez merely carried out a
ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ or not.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against the late Judge
Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, is hereby DISMISSED.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the benefits due the late respondent
judge can be promptly released to his heirs, unless there exists some other lawful cause to withhold the same.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.

x-------------------------x

Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

x-------------------------x

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY
REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive
Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral
fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath
taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP
by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject
case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment
of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the
State Bar of California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491
dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to
have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San
Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent
was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence
necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.
 Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in
Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent
failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He
surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned
Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him.
In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this
Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle
of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in
support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence
showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.
Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that
the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and
even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that
the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking
as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National
President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005,
removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the
IBP in general.2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of
Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved
the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase
filing fees.3

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were
herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez. 4

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-
mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution. 5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was filed.
The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention
Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act
No. 9227.7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as
IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal
of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3
vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice
President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is

REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical
to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention
of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the
decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that "A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors
in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of
the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution,
dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression
that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with
respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP
as a whole.11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the
Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process;
Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera
from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal
Investigation."12

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board.
He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel
him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent
portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when,
as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President
of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me was in
writing.
 2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the
complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera
to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be
questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and
judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to expel
me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so
he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me. 13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14 In their Reply, the IBP Board
explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect
itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to
condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling
or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President
in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the
fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the
Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to
provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose
the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the
IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because
"nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."
He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to
"influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.15

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke the camel's
back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove
him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP
Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the
EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought
about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared
as IBP EVP.17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. 18 On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. 19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its
last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace
Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court
Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be
approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this
Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar. 22

In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis
to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his
removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise
executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the
Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their
language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary
Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to
remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the
withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such
remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was
contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two
years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall
have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive
Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President
shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or
disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the
consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix. 24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are
disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP
was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern
Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-
Laws.

In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27
January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement
with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to
be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because,
as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
 (iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process.
As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May
2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished
a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws
to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation
rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera,
who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same
will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National
President.25

The Court's Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE

WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY
LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS
FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052] 27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with
the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded
on the following:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the
State Bar in California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491
dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the
respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052
(In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that
it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge,
as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and
the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California
administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"

"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law
in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint
affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM
IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining
the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice,
thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become
a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose
the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference
that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only
proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter
at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on
1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to
Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of
IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make
the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective
 sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP
Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP
By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday
of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of
the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996),
this Court declared that:

"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
the [Court's] administrative powers."

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial
to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only
P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this
does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court
qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's
supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary
authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases.
Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986),
this Court ruled that:

"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial
justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.";

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes
and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be
deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the
same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or
some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious
trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes
rights and promotes the rule of law."

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved
by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would
not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to
note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it
prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the
respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election"
and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties
in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues
presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4)
there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No.
6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first
administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-
laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty.
de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in
his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties'
rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as
Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which
the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement,
therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum.
Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from
the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that –

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual
judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is
free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For
another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which
involves moral turpitude.30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every
lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will
not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and
substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not
barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera
can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were
confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of
the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in
a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice
in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law
before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was
based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension
if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension.33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of
the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or
disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. 35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special
and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." 36 That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business.37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession. 38

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case
No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by
the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account;39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of
law for three years;40 and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. 41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's
father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this
explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money
for a few days."

By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust
account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. 42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 43 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred.44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith,
loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of
the client.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled
with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics;
it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly
sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de
Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's
son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the
administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed
Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the
document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of
his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by
itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and
using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence.48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution. 49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not
be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing
the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v.
Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their
clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients
without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to
his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution.
Considering the amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is
appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension
or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa
(PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole
purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur
nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his
disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical
conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case,
we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP
EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility
as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor
and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume
the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members
pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution
of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority
vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to
serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-
thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He
argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative
cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf,
the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov.
Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor
and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his
own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be
mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and
heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and
heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against
him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting
on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to
be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 55 It cannot be
said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security
of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a
resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of
law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting
a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general
statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the
subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential
to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings
since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are
not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination
if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may
differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ. 60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.61 Nor is an actual hearing always
essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders
the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter
was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed,
it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also voted
for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that
Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary
2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty.
Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

 Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences
from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of
the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the
respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable
to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which
means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted
for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not been
defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors
and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by
the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or
arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of
an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing
body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and
cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free
it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface
conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is
bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly
contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board. 63

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th National
IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not
seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce
the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on
bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be
faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by
a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he
could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary
action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section
47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal from
the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered
without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP, 64 it is axiomatic
that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by
the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and
functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its
officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry
on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors.
The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By -
Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules
serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members.
Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption 66 of validity, which
shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court.
In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or
with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 67 of
the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove
Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal
from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion
granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in
accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a
special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a
purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of
the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also
removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in
the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, 68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44
(Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72 and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of
the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies
after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of
the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-
Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-
2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section
47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the
next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next
succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in
A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June
2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and
EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set
forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among
the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar
Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII,
Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office
of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One
who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors.
The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the
Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession
rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of
the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the
supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de
Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession
rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition
seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend
valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a
sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual
succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from
among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at
large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed
to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume
the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors,
the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have
served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005
will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes
that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-
2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for
two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule
is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be
assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the
intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one
who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as
IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would
have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from
the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de
Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for
the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in
accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article
VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging
the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty.
Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated
December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the
complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner,
respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed
her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue,
Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride,
which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in
fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her
face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded
in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with
another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her
cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of the
at 6:17:59 pm situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t have
Sent by complainant relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put
At 6:32:43 pm it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry.
Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it
is an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u
by respondent my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you still
at 6:42:25 pm see me so I can show you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know
wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really
sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano
k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear
manifestation of admission of guilt.2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with
complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant
was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both
occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her
lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy
street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by
complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for
the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant
never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and
ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP
Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification,
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or
relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.

xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve
their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition
for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in
the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts
from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got
off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand
slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation
made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction
from her except saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent
candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because
it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then she went inside
so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is
along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her,
would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing
matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s
go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told
her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we
had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face
towards me and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down
the car, that’s it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and
I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door
of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her
face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x. 14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to speci fy the
moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained
an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence
of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with
him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she
refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured
an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign
land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them.
There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survi val
and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate
that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he has
been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and
subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from
being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We
held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of
the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship
and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree
to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish
the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as
to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies,
must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. 31 In the case at bar,
complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing
does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We
come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent
through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone
text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could
have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the
primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the
integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a
particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to hi s
brethren in the profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with
great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of
moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character
of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation
which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some
minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly
reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand
would suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was
difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her
own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more
objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his
clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING
ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

DECISION

TlNGA, J.:

This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the
disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th
Intergrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") Regional Governors’ elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the
Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President,
respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.

The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National
Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By
Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one month before the national convention, the delegates
from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among
the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31,
2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along
with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter 3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the
IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the
mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national
convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates
into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for
the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in
Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement
of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor.
Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.4

On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners
filed a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional
Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected
Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for regional governors and,
second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the postponement of the elections
especially considering that preparations and notices had already been completed.

WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature
considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional governor.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition.6

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners
filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and
desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. 7

Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers from the Chapter
Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the
underlying dynamics, to wit:

IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect
their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central
Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western
Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the
30th of June of the second year.

From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation
basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give
everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.

Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will automatically be the
National President for the following term.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2) National Presidents
each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th
Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next
term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post
of IBP National President.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP
presidency.8 The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of
the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there
is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP. 9

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and
national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them,
respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during
the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States
for misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him
of having actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on
May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.10

After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment 11 on the Petition.

In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present
controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those
who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively
regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners’ legal standing, pointing out that
the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional
governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only
a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further
that following the rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to
run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and
Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees. 12

Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or
transfer his chapter membership.13 He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the
IBP By-Laws, thus:

Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence
thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member
shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer
is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence
thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred
his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership
transfer was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship. 14

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members
during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by
one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license
to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the
position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge,
as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory
in character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the
review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative
case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant’s money, but unfortunately the retraction was
not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he
declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the
petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from
his region at the Century Park Hotel.15

On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003,
filed an Answer and Rejoinder.17

In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to file its comment
on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the
position stated in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination
has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors." 20

Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:

(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the
resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and

(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;

(3) whether the present Petition is premature;

(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature, whether respondent De
Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP,
including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.

The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.

The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded provision in the intervening
1973 Constitution21 through all the years have been the sources of this Court’s authority to supervise individual members of
the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys." 22 Pursuant to
this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the
Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. 23 Not long after,
Republic Act No. 639724 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter of the
Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A,
of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.

The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court,
ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 7725 of
the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, 26 the Court is authorized to send observers in
IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 4427 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the
members of the Board of Governors.

On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the irregularities which attended the
1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results
of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election
committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct
of special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the
irregularities in the elections, in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering."

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election by the House of
Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second,
it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from
among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP
to the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39
by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that
the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its
jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.

In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him, respondent De Vera
argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it
authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement
of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor.
Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not
available to just anybody.

Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the position of regional
governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior to
the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to
the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands.
The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors
may be had in accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before,
members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every
other year.29 The election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote,
not less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees,
arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete
mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates. 30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his
alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for each Region. 31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest
number of votes was declared and certified elected by the Chairman. 32

In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the
nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor
is nominated and elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following
provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated
among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The grounds for
disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is
diminished as the rotation process operates.

The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-political33 and effective
in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and
contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine society. 34

The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on disqualification proceedings.
Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.

Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not
the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern
Mindanao. He argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members
from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.

Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to
bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest
setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members
from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional
Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of
the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from
the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming
election.

On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of
respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected
governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post.
In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao.
Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His
place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP
Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency.
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter
of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no
case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of
the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where
he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter
of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering one’s preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed
as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall
maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar,
or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is
made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to
the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001.
One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter 35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr.,
Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent De Vera’s transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is
a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Vera’s transfer was
made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP
Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De
Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of
governor of Eastern Mindanao.

We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he
cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a
member in good standing of the IBP; 37 2) he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the
Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does
not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new
season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship.
For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members
of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member’s standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of
a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by
this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.

Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme
Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Court’s Decision dated
29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in
the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Vera’s statements written in italics.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to
declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices
still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups
to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.

"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that it has a P500 million
slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law
either unconstitutional or vague," the group said. 42

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for
All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass
actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to be
true.

"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. " 43

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but denied to have
uttered the same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute."44 He explained that
he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the
Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. 45

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect
contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude
as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." 48 The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue
and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation of the statute. 49

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity.1âwphi1 Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm
to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. 50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the
administrative case as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he
explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He
surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical
to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on
evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. 51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how
the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the
Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the
same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our
Rules of Court.52

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in
Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with
proper notice and with deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission
on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent
for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,
informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4 After that hearing,
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. 5 Accordingly,
the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. 6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in
his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in
this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his
trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not
knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio
community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to
make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by
his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked
elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and
was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second
time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi
driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got
his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle
when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused.
But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and
shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident
was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case,
Roberto Soriano."8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital.
Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of
hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as
a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application
for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities
imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking,
even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice
of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken
him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and
two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of
justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and
he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no
longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for
homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the
employer’s contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have
been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore,
it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of
incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the
victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa
pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend
his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of
respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant.
Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot
the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already
over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him.
To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In
so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated
and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in
any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a
person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact
revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through
his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four
years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing
to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to
their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. 23

We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. 24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had
sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this
effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by
complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his
allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained
were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating
him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x." 28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness.29 The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Hence, lawyers must
not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral
turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the
depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we
shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be
decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend
that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession.
We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -
- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only
as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent
has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the mere fact of their
conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of
the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003.]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, v. EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is
a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the
bar examinations.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine
Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Muni cipal
Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for
a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent
to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May
2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
"motivated mainly by political vendetta."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found
that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also
believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for
Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the"
(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and
similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court elucidated that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
. . .

In Cayetano v. Monsod, 2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. 3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice mayor and presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that
respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June
5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1,
2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34
of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the
issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does
the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June
10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said
court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the
herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN
IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO
CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO
[sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO.
730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the
ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits
the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal
case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member
of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus: 8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000.
No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these
Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of
a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when
a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the
fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used
by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule
138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether
or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of
Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and
supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features
of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines
was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority
of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining
to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice,
or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative
Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners."
The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge
of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline
or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare
to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected
with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of
the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated
May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of
the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely
to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform
to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership
fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It
is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right,
in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It
is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice
... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit
in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility,
to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the
public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should
be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[B.M. NO. 1370 : May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty.
Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00
as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961,
he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in
December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the
actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member
of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court;
that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated
Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what
is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was
to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board
of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy
of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in
active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that
compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment
of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that
non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he
was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?cralawlibrary

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach
of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership
and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed
to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he
left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the
situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime,
petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice
a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of which
is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00,
the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already,
as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
Br. 224, QC.

Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br.
259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the
bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October
28, 1981 (in SCRA).

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM
(see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address
and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was
even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals
and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside
and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only
a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His
30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in
any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill
and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues
despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision,
but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of
Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

 On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers
in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for
at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.

xxx xxx xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in
the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income
tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by
using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and
the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
 Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
in the land.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct
and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru
falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the
notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in
his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy.
San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and
undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was
tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton. 6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a
foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation
of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and
assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon
the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report
and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76
years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law
is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more
jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound
to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an
act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11 Yet, in
his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by
preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized
the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law
to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing
an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was
suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after
nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice
of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them
to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange
for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card: 6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. 7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents
or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation
of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are
to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. 18

Complainant presented substantial evidence 19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by
Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the
CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits
from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office. 21 Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take
care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. 24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well -merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. 27 For this reason, lawyers are
only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent
was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4984 - April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA
DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
FELINA DASIG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, 1 an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used
her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed
with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, 2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which
was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to
Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. 3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless,
and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed. 4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 5 of Presidential Decree No.
807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and "Novas Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced
by the dishonored checks she issued,6 the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent. 7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As
a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No.
86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36. 8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair
report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her
ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. 10 A copy of said resolution
was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be
returned to this Court with the notation "Unclaimed." 11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent
at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said mail
matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on
August 27, 1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the
Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said
order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with
the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint
and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a government official
and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests.
Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum
period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering
that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED,
may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was
"Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. 15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money
as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 17 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of
Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating
in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 19 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions
of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 20 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well
as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken
off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 6252 : October 5, 2004]

JONAR SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest.
They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate
to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 2 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02
and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this
wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the
affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of
his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8 He
admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed,
however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was
not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the
latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates
of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija - - some of whom were older practitioners - - indicate the
affiants' residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor
conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients
"on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged
respondent's clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime
occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice."

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by
the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the
following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the
fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel
of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against
complainant.

After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on
June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the
scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because
he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply 14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latter's Rejoinder
was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainant's Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings.
Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order 17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case
was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant's Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBP's Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting the
Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant's residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of
the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."

The other charges - - violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08
of the CPR - - were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to
every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or
pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded." 22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of
their commission as notaries public.23

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these
elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary
public and appended to a private instrument."

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in
their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us - - and respondent has readily admitted - - that he violated the Notarial Law by failing
to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial
registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases
pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently
irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so.
Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent's clients
Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
murder, filed by complainant's brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the
present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly requires respondent as notary - - in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer the oath - - to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-
Affidavits in the belief that - - as counsel for the affiants - - he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the
laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions
of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution. 29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction
and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the
defense of alibi proffered by respondent's clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid
testifying in behalf of his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during
his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in certain cases pertaining to
privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as
witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction,
advocates are partisans - - those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness
and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of
competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave
many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people
will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer's client, they will have an opportunity,
not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer
becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful." 33

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot
hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the
client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter's life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is the fundamental right of the
accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable
doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according
to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to
save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present - - by all fair and honorable means - - every defense
and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact
that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed
the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or
suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. 37 Not
being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from
the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in
which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in
future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require
him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. 39 It is not the self-
serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter's allegations are
corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The
Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation
of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. 4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June 29,
2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with
more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. 7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No.
XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March
4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings
and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty
to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication
of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he
had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do
so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. 21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992

B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.

Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.

Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10
November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal,
earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.

Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner
herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R. 1

On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants. 2

Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3

During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the respondent
Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne
Marie N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition.

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from
receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said
counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary
period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Resolution
this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:

It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5,
1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by
said counsel on July 17, 1974; . . . 6

On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the
resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of
Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu,
the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the
Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that:

Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein stated,
that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that appellant be granted
a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since
the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received
copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to
file brief; Motion Denied. 8

No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the same
became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution.

The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy
Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of
Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the auction sale thereof. 10

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following allegations:

1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes,
in the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely
death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).

2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty.
Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear
and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.

3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking
for, is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set
aside and reversed.

12
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975:

. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while
Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief
on February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was
shown; . . .

Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. 14

On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on
the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for
him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt
of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. 16

In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it
attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.

This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from
notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. 20
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21

L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). — Considering the allegations,
issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, respondents' comment thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court
Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right
to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course.

23
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment to said Motion for Reconsideration.

On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to
submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November
1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision. 27

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and
cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 28 Indeed, in said
case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by
the appellants therein to file their brief, and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and
cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's
brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the
relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino,
said:

We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a
miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld.

That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it
because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their
brief.

But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants
Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there
was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into
dismissing the appeal.

Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to
file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure
to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court.
Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the
Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted
a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
728). Since counsel did none of those things, his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of
interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe.

If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza
vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo,
62 Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).

But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower
court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower
court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Such
 a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded, the appellate court
has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So.
176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).

In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither
excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.

29 30
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, We
said:

Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied
from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a
showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate
court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call for,
prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.

To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed
confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31

Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to
handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case
as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas &
Associates." Hence, the Answer to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party
Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates"
represents petitioner in the action.

After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its
firm name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm
"Baizas, Alberto & Associates."

On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In consequence (sic)
of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused state of affairs. In effect,
said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the
dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased
Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office, it appearing
that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon
its dissolution.

But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required
appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. No notice
was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's
brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved
and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner.
...

The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the
associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who
could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court,
constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other
hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim
for relief since, in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act constitutes fraud
and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. In the
abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will
always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court.

We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between
said firm and petitioner.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on
behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court; the
excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that:

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to
Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing
Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating
with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As
revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file
Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the
respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure
to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court
to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28
September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court
denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November
1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the
records for the respondent Court.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure
to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was
the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate
who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in
the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to
another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner
could contract the services of a new lawyer.

In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable.
Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices,
whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they
will always be informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence
of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for
reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied
said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter
has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.

33
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As
pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas;
hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the former. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant
with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded
the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the
reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.

Costs against petitioner.

IT SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007

(Formerly, CBD 382)

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Complaint

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal
actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. 2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter
issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never
allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform
her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. 4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court,
respondent charged her ₱350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her
cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case
against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 5

Respondent's Defense

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he first
met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of
Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter. 6

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was
with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined. 8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant
to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the
complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. 10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's
refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend"
the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.11

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her
to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. 12 Because the complainant was a friend,
he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992. 13

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. 14 A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again
asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed
to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant. 15

Recommendation of the IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the
complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. 18 It also noted that
respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For
these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The
CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty
of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who
is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately
return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.21

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return
the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.22

The Court's Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service
are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members
of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. 24

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private
practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict with their official function.25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to
the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still
connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.26 Respondent's
admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while
he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing
free legal assistance to indigent litigants. 27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal,
civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with
the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration
of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first
place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance
fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one
occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. 321avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees.
He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a
judgment obligation in favor of the client) 33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing
fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them. 35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the
Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the
BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year.
Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions
from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands.
After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would
be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was
a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999,
respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World
Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March
1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks
postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the
postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same.
Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the
checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled
promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to
respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never
physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said
the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent
explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was
introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines,
herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were still minors then. Their
problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of
missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the
government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they could no longer
extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent visa under
Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list
of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in
 the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount
of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be
included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further
requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty.
Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and
the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was
given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between
the processing of the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by
the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the
vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself began
to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding the matter and the
following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really her money but
money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her son
Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration
Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made
to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to undersigned and my
family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly they want to
recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of money is now
being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the same
and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present my standby loan
application has not been released and was informed that the same would only be forthcoming second week of
August. The same should have been released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount
to be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25
August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings)
were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception
of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear,
despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report5 recommending the
disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from
complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his
receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but
that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering
the documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the
World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the
thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of then Commissioner
L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all
on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started
though some important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through the
normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress
of the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time before the Bureau could release
the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner
Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as
all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to
complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also,
why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really
officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted
that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There
is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant
has also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the
reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties."

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with modification,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds
a responsible public office.7

It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in
the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainant’s
application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that
he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the
BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in
shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious.
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show
that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of
his evidence despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense.
To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving
and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions
were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March
1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal money on said date.
No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on that day and the amount would be given to you
wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal money.

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are still being
compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is
just a bureaucratic delay.

xxxx

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated
April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates the peso equivalent
to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have
postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already
provided me the means.

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early return of your
money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment
of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact
that I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I
must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of which are on the
following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their
due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t
call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments
to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I requested for stop
payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to me and
discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank.
However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place considering that its quite
a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would
be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed
by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially
deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is violative
of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating
in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions
of his office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several
worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation
of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment,
is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.22

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall
to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve
to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the
legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment. 23 More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 25 These pronouncement gain practical
significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID.
It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As
such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye. 26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards
of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court
for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.27

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted
from a certain person.

Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and
thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he
received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of
Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, 2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and
Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. 3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved
respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all
against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. 4

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and
manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the
latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently
questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming
that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show
that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order."7 Respondent thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent.
Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the
duties of an attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession." 9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of
the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented
by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted
suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation
in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to
produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the
Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that
he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, 11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this
disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer
of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case
be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed.
Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation
for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the
local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation. 13 The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue
of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the
local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996
addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence
in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter 15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but
respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the
Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's
Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's
motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the
records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this
case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the
IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of
the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by
Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors. 20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-
96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to
investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings
conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also cl aims that
respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a
member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible.
Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which
had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices
for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received
by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished
Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997. 24 Attached to said order was Registry
Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation
reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline
for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the
approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. 25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case.
According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was
requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on
Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an
investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July
2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato
City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied.
The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10)
days from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative
Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by
respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a
denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way,
was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative
Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the
Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the
Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the
professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
 In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. 29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-
quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from
the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation
of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the
matter had already been endorsed to this Court. 30

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed
while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government
service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined
as a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. 32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground
of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
we declared –

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities.
He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a
rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full
candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. 34

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein
for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher
Education. As we had explained in that case –

… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is
a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed
by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi
City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had
clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in
the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt
on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing
less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we
cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."37 As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr.
Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the
Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and
declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No.
172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to
purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from
1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his personal
interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land
for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates,
sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the
respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is
the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his
rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the
rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his
sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-
year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee
on Awards.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the
complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation
of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land
(between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought.
In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land
was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by
the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.

(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that
he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject
land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter
asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject
land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent
insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved
the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding
what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August
2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the
complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s
application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.

(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject
land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the
complainant had no rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during
his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting
claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This
office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary
of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision
applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active
practice of law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the
Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Court’s Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. 9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard
ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards;
and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was
previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss
the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No.
6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting
than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor
of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following
restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction
extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. 12

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v.
Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting
money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an
employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas
before his office.18

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from
the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused
his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the Committee on
Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land
Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its
decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which
expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards
when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal
benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by
the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify
how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither
was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s
disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s
favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR
Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; 22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the
respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same
time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay
but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than
what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of
the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her
affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of
money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was
limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he
and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land. 26

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money
were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when
the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money
were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the
respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from
the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government
service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document
entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless,
the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
separation from the service.

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. 30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to
the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" whi ch we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to
fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to
sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by
the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 32 we specifically
described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence
are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was
intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty
in this regard against the respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already
struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as
a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) 33 of
Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that
his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in
the decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are,
at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals 35 and,
finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed
the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, 38 until the burden shifts to him/her
because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted
in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 7054 : December 4, 2009]

CONRADO QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the
following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondent's abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before
the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the
final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court 2 (MeTC) and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the
respondent's clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC
knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
attacked the complainant's and his siblings' titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondent's commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate
the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to
execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondent's lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued
by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case.
The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his
clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood. 4

(4) The respondent's willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of
the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondent's clients.

(5) The respondent's deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment
for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondent's willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when
no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles
pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro
Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful
detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the
respondent's present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in
filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The
respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds - the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC
over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud
committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not
really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition
for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all
parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of
judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based
on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he
immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the
rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second
petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that
the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case. 6

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the
complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was
consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainant's counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy
(Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping
considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-
1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint
was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are
marginalized members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent
meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor
and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority
and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly
engage in forum-shopping.9

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the
respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer
case against his clients.10

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for
annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent
the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the respondent
was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and
attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondent's explanation that he had no
intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment
of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-
forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondent's argument regarding
his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General
can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent
solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case
No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 13 On reconsideration, the Board
of Governors reduced the respondent's suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year. 14

The Issue

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.

The Court's Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the
Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another
complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the
court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency
subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months. 16

Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing
court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the
unlawful detainer case against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondent's petition, the CA held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of
petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over
the ejectment case.17

Second, notwithstanding the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTC's and
the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed. 18

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-
46885) for annulment of the complainant's title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that
these petitions were both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the petition.19

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent
this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his
siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based
the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainant's title because the property is a part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several cour ts -
the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainant's title and
the petition for declaratory relief - reveal the respondent's persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondent's repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional
ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of
final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy
and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.20

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,21 as
well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same
objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 23

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts' jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but
substantively erroneous) move, the respondent's subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties
not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is
most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing
the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.

Willful, intentional and deliberate

falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed
with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic
fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition,
as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after
receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration - thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants
therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and
fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing
party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) ' 24

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new trial,
or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC
are null and void."25 These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition
for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another
violation we shall separately discuss below.

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which
was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings
of public lands26 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the
Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the
proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a
plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In thi s
underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized
and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petiti on for
annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June
28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing
distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN
THE REMAINING PERIOD.27 [Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondent's application
for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse party's motion to dismiss. 28 The records also show
that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondent's application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion
to dismiss filed by the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.

'how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by
the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts,
and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his
position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their
affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing.30

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for
violating the lawyer's duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31 The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the
court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly
and truthfully in his work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court
in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. 34 In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield
to his duty to deal candidly with the court.35

In defending his clients' interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor.36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. 37 The
recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above)
the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance
with the counsel for the adverse party.

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico.
The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter
died. At the same time, the respondent's petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason
that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty.
Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to
"conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because he imputed
wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now
dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan's finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper
authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title. 38

In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49
individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent's
off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping
in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of
lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law
for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the
Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously associated. 39 As Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondent's explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum
shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly
represented.

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the
Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed
an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a
surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs
- his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or
from the latter's representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. 40 The willful unauthorized appearance by
a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the
erring lawyer for professional misconduct. 41

The Respondent's Defenses

We find no merit in the respondent's defenses.

"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly,
in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief
of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." 42 Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. 43 As both concepts are
states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements
of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion
from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the
Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases
that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting
conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and
honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful
detainer judgment against his clients.

On the respondent's allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the
same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. 44 As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer's discretion
in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's case with
the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must
always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he 'will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.' Needless
to state, the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and
it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.45

We cannot give credence to the respondent's claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the
complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who
filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own
separate disbarment case against the respondent.

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with very
little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as
an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice - an issue where the complainant's personal motives
have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information
of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not -
and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.46 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to file
the present disbarment case.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby
failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the
originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent's multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which
shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe
and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession
and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public
that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save
him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administrati on
of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent's first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating
with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past
experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent's professional legal
career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer's
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 89591-96 January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these
cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained
at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence
of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence of
Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262, 1 the
latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification
on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana
from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained
Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which
warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?"2

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique,
a motion seeking the revocation of the trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in
the provincial jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify
whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor
on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as
the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal
custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus, the trial court's order dated
August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail
of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private
respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice
law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent
would appear in court to defend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense.3 He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
be released on bail or on recognizance. 4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases
with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San
Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior
written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique
and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,

vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:

Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar
charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been
appearing in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized
to do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes
with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good
government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal
court in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court
employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would
commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed
influences to urge persons to commit crimes.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the
CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as
present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted
and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is
prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because
he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive
Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service
to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because
we believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)

After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge,
Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent,
Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the
alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also
been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this
Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law,
but for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much
less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous
as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality,
said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now
resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon
the attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate,
et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits',
as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and answer to District Judge
Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and
after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:

Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a
resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious
person

Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his complaint
against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel
Avestruz of Daram, Samar.

Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent
appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita,
Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for
illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case
No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for
forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus
Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.

From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the following entries in
his daily time record:

1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;

2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;

3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1
hour;

4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;

5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and

6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.

Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his
daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present
in his office although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on
December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the
respondent appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his daily time
record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible
explanation for this irregularity.

xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it
appear that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970
when as a matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza
versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to
Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge
respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
 With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended,
again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta.
Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)

We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the
evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges before whom
respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts
without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service
by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts
appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We,
therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified
his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that
respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic
sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service,
with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are
allowed to practice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of
First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,

vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor
of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that
he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City."2 However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant 3 and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines4 showed that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer
was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which
was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking
incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly
alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant
petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5
of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred
to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-
affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-
affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had
no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful
statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the
unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the
acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration
of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one
can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 11

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer
to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting
to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-
affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and
cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for
the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
client;12 appearing before court hearings as an attorney; 13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being
previously denied admission to the bar; 14 or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so. 15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice
law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney
and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future
actions.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent
Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.

According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist
in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and
registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end
LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was
payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case
No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.

The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On
September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01
and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.

In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of
a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a
case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely
for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:

1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;

2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide
a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise
agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed
property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 4

The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal profession from
his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will
be severely dealt with.5

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.6

We agree with the findings of the IBP.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and moralit y,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct 8 and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence. 9 They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in
connection therewith shall render them liable. 10

Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s
Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the
compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he
explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. 11

Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where
the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired
thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it. 12 As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still
redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests
commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. 13

Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from
liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases.15

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following
grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and
7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a
basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer
should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not
enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his
legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause. 18

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is
directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence. 19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice,
and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006

PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth and justice above everything
else, even above their own and their client's interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their convictions against
all odds; to carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and
the marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be sanctioned.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:

"On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, DARAB
CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De
Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez
and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called [tenants/farmers] x x x.

"On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor
of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.

"[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging
under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties,
acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred
to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.

"On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca,
filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course
to the same x x x.

"On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who
represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the [Kalayaan Development Cooperative]
(KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the Decision on March
14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x x.

"On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of
Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction
of Caption and Amendment of Judgment' (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November 15, 1999
x x x) with a prayer 'x x x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION representing
the following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading.' Also, a Contract of Retainership
dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC represented by Respondent, [the] retained
x x x 'counsel on record' x x x.

"After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a Petition for
Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution
 with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x before the DARAB Central Office,
Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas). x
x x.

"On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, was
issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated August 24,
2001, as a result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.

"Emboldened by the two (2) TRO's coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an Indirect Contempt
case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo Garcia and [its] counsel
Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.

"Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB Central Office
refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TRO's, Petitioners decided to elevate the
matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
on [December] 20, 2001 stating that:

'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees no impediment
for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial adjudicator.

'SO ORDERED.'

"This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a Petition, but said Petition
was dismissed with finality x x x.

"Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and maliciously stop
the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999.
x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as [KDC] LEGAL
SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on
the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent
before the PARAD of Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on record
for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients
in the practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to become "counsel on record [sic] x x x.

"On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and dismissed the
case on the ground of 'res judicata' because the Court of Appeals ruled that, 'x x x the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x' and that, prescription does not run
against registered land. x x x."2

In his Answer3 dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the action to
quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients. According to
him, they sincerely and honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened into ownership. He
explained thus:

"Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner in the decisions of
PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE
NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99) the
said farmers, are not precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief that
they could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely because of the undisputed fact that
they have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted possession for more than fifty
(50) years. x x x.
 "It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the land through
prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03,
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in DARAB CASE
No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99,
[i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did not in any way, involve [the] question
of ownership of the subject property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title),
filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.

xxx xxx xxx

"As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion [of] what legal strategy or cause
of action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right to interfere
with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights and interests of said farmers under the applicable
law and jurisprudence.

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC, Imus,
Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the
Ombudsman), as a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to
defend his client and protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if they are poor and
uneducated like the said farmers." 4

In a Reply5 dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession of the subject land by
respondent's clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants maintained that the
PARAD Decision, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, clearly stated that these clients
were mere tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good faith, especially when
he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as landowners.

On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina, commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties were directed to submit
their respective Memoranda.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7 Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of his clients in
the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," 8 in order to secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC
of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15,
1999.

Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law
was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so led to the
presumption that the allegation was true.

Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the investigating commissioner. In
Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,9 the board of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Espina.

The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, 10 pursuant to Rule 139-
B Section 12(b).

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal
system,11 protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. 12 They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings,
especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to
any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.13 Moreover, they are obliged to observe the
rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 14

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession. 15 Thus, while lawyers owe
fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has
repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse
judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath. 16

In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show, however, that his
course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision dated November 15, 1999.

It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a different
forum to pursue his clients' lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and
acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently
repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership.
Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision.

Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of ownership of the land, he
cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and complainants,
as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.

The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his clients were pauper litigants. His
prayer for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income, 17 was granted by the trial
court. Earlier, however, he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in addition
to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged that they were willing to post a bond to
answer for damages, in the event that the court ruled in favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his
clients could not afford to pay the appropriate court fees.

In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the
law. This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice, 18 as explained in Choa v. Chiongson:19

"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do
so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of his client's case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he 'will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same';
and that he 'will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued
at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and
common sense. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course
of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party." 20

Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to challenge the
allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of the
truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself
out as a law partner of the "KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was rendering legal services together with
persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had
every chance to deny it.21
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:

"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'"

The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,22 which we quote:

"The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law."23

Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line with
jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. 24

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two years from
the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the court
administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.