Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

 The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
 the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
 MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
 Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
 principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
 vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition
but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the

Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
 (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
 Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.  Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
1

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly
2

decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda.   The
3

said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish

the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of

the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support

services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts

contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question

are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a

man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message

being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers

do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at

members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law."
7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of

study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 
8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give

the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar.  10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
 charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice
of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an
agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he
is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales
are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client,
and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to
the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF
A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
 in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 
11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.  12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.  13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law.  14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law.   One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
15

to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.   Giving
16

advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law.   One who renders an opinion as to the proper
17

interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 
18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,   after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
19

down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,

associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
 clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained

paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
 country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services.  20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
 kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case.  21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.  22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.  23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 
24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide.   The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
25

who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law.   The
26

justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines.   As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
28

United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association.  29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law.   That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
31

persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.   He is not supposed to use or permit
33

the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.   Nor shall he pay or give something of value
34

to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business.   Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
35

Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.  36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods.   The prescription against advertising of legal services
37

or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot   an
38

advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,   was
39

held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
 "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.  40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.  41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented."  42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.  44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,   which is repeatedly invoked and
45

constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state."   This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
46

invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly   with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
47

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances   or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
48

of law.   Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
49

and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action,   after due
50

ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176278               June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by
legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment
of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. 1 However, for lack
of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness, 2 we dismiss
the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question
raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in
March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section
23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute
rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA
ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question
petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial
interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition,
contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender
for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated retirement
age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as
respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit.
We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
"transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution. 5 Three factors are relevant in our
determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues
raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters.
Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement
of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a
"clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of
personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to
leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial
and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. 1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are
claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the
funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in
the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office
under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to
draw salary,8 negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds." 9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 10 Certainly,
preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the
proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on
each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1)
day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation
had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as
a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he
still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since
they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this
case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to
his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984

CARMEN E. BACARRO, complainant,
vs.
RUBEN M. PINATACAN, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M.
Pinatacan a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper
character required of a member of the Bar.

In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and became
engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she
became pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his
promise to marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a baby girl; that because of
respondent's betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral
distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the
Bar. 1

Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that complainant had been his sweetheart for several years prior
to 1971 but denied that he was the father of complainant's child. He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in
January of 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He
returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City,
but in June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the other
hand, as far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied that he ever
promised marriage to complainant and that he ever cohabited with her. 2
On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, report
and recommendation.   Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request prompted by financial
3

difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to present her evidence before the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.   Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City
4

Fiscal on August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented her evidence,
both oral and documentary.  5

In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts: After about a
year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while they were
students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on
March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where
they stayed for about a week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant
allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their
intended marriage. Respondent came back in May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they
could not get married because of his parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she
was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel
Thereafter, she did not see or hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named
Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or
sweetheart during the time that she had a relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought
the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child.
However, respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see him
again, and once more respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until he
finished his law course and married a singer by the name of Annie Sarabillo.  6

Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the birth certificate of her child,
numerous letters written by respondent covering the period from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971
professing his everlasting love for complaint with assurances of his sincerity and loyalty, a letter
dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom complaint Identified as the sister of respondent,
and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan.  7

In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977,   respondent argued that based on the evidence
8

adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out
to bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with
respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that "the intimacy between the parties in
this case is neither so corrupt or so immoral as to warrant the respondent's permanent exclusion
from the Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath.  9

On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among others that he is to
recognize and give support or financial assistance to complaint 's child Maria Rochie although he
cannot make assurance that he could give such support or financial assistance immediately since he
is without a source of income. 10

Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant submitted a sworn statement expressing her adamant stand
that respondent "is unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a word of honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on several occasion in
the past he had made the same promise to support our child ..., he did not even give something to the child to buy a candy during our
several meetings ... when I tried to see him every now and then for the fulfillment of his promise." Moreover, according to complainant,
respondent's insistence that the child be aborted proves his "utter disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or
unsuitable for the legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was notmotivated by revenge, for she was aware that whatever fortunes
respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an heir, but that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she
was of the opinion that "respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession." 11

By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in
a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the
original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On October 19, 1979,
respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above Resolution. 13
From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears no question that the complainant and respondent had
been sweethearts for several years, that during the said period they have been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan is the result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent, however, maintains that even admitting the truth of
complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other do not justify his disqualification from the practice of law.

One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be
of good moral character. 14 This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal
profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to
be honest and to possess good moral character. 15 "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a
model citizen" 16 He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. 17 Thus,
becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of
becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the qualifications,
ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness
required by his chosen vocation.

In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan 18 against successful 1971 Bar examinee
Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar"for violating the honor
of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.

As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high
moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically
submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her to
another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion When complainant
refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child
born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely
made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the
audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by
complaint.

These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are indicative of
his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were
truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough.
Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's
child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to
the said child, 19 We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf.
Likewise, We reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro 20 that "in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man
alone."

In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and
continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral
and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

EN BANC

December 7, 1928

In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf.

City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:

The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing
with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is
recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of
attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report
has been permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the
setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore ordered by the court.

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925.
He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain
the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of
his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting
in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being
conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and
Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del
Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.

The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The
court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public
documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit
Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional
purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of
the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas
[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex
parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.) 1awphi1.net

The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved,
and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's
certificate to the clerk of this court.

EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with

the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required
by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn
or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard
would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet
that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found
the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions

upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979

EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a successful
bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in the Bar is
pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he should not be
cited and punished for contempt of court.

The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the
persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's
admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of
respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language.

The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres,
Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral
character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of
being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing
baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.

It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the
administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one,
Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region
IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the
charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at
the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator.

Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty.
Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as
shown in the following excerpts:

9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product of moronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and
unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent
search tor the aforesaid document when according to the moronic excuse of the
Chief of the said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering
that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a
diligent search unless both are morons with regards to their public office ...
(emphasis supplied).
 10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).

... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured
evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of
her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed
to affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and
Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to
the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied)

The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases
against the petitioner such as the following:

Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator

another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public

functions moronically failed to affix her signature

said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by

respondents

idiotic receiving clerk of CAR

unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent

On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him
from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-taking be held in abeyance
until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's
Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to
the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable
motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from
being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that "Atty.
Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions by
complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."

The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978
for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August
17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court
does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus — "A victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."

We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for investigation,
report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said report, the Court
resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and
has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on
September 3, 1979 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to
reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before
the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.

On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the
Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false
and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation
impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion,
he states:

2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is
a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of
legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of
law; (emphasis supplied).

We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:

4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a
degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla,
whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by
his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of
this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral
impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis
supplied).

We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him in
praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the
humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent-movant suffered and still suffering from
this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty."

It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's
admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the
Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried
to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous
and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October
16, 1979.

Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and
answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:
 3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27,
1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent
charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the
administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority.
nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was
an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's
inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the
illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator
Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of
the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by
Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted; (emphasis supplied).

We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of
polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word
of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the)
Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such
apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth
contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of respondent's inability
to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the illegalities perpetrated
by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."

Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold
thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law
already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to
the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is
likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath
solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.

The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as
well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect
for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the
reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such
guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.

Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words,
phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in
their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on
the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily
bestowed" upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the
Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering
"humiliation and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are
false, sham and unfounded.

'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring
oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent
language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt
of this Court.

WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced
to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of fifty (50) days.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III
of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule)   — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
1

provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to

be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise
of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.  2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.   The
4

practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397   authorizing the Supreme Court to
5

"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for,
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5
(5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If
he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.   All that integration actually
7

does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.  8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.  10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.  11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.  12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege,   and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
13

with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in
the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 37386           September 19, 1933

ANDRES JAYME, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUALAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Cornelio Reta and Romualdo C. Quimpo for appellants.

Jayme and Jayme for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This case furnishes eloquent proof of how clients, in this instance ignorant Bagobos, can be passed
on from lawyer to lawyer in a seemingly endless treadmill of litigation without ever reaching finally
and a vindication of legal rights. The particular judgment appealed from by the Bagobos purported to
award their former attorney P15,000 for professional services.
In 1921, Bagobo Bualan and companions secured Attorneys Juan A. Sarenas and Domingo
Braganza to represent them in a case against one Ciriaco Lizada for the possession of land. The
action was successfully maintained in the Court of First Instance and in Supreme
Court.1 Nevertheless the attorneys appear to have taken over control of the land presumably to
protect their attorney's fees. In view of this situation Bagobo Bualan and others engaged the services
of Attorney Andres Jayme to institute another action to recover possession of their land and
confirmed this in writing. Issues were joined, but an amicable settlement was entered into by
Attorney Jayme and Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, whereby the Bagobos were to be given the
land, they to pay to Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza the sum of P6,000, and this agreement was
judicially confirmed. In this connection it should be stated that the amount of P6,000 was apparently
received from Japanese tenants to cancel the indebtedness of Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, but
for reasons known to the attorney for the Bagobos, the major part of this money went into his pocket
instead, thus necessitating the execution of a mortgage in order to cancel this claim. As a matter of
fact, Attorney Jayme received P1,270 as proved by the receipt Exhibit 3 and P5,750 as proved by
the receipt Exhibit 4, or a total of P7,020. About the same time, Bagobo Bualan signed by a mark a
promissory note in the amount of P15,000 in favor of Attorney Jayme. As related to the foregoing
facts, it is the contention of the appellants that the services of the attorney are only worth P1,270
which he had received, and that he should be ordered to return to them the sum of P5,750 which he
secured as a loan and not in payment of his fees.

The relationship of attorney and client is here evidenced by a written contract for services which, in
accordance with section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should ordinarily control the amount of
the recovery by the lawyer if found by the courts not to be unconscionable or unreasonable. With an
attorney as one party to a contract stipulating the amount of the compensation he is to receive, and
a client of ordinary intelligence and business acumen as the other party agreeing to this amount, the
courts should give effect the contract and if the attorney has performed the task assigned for him,
should determine his compensation on the basis of the contract. But the situation is not the same
when on one side there is an attorney with professional knowledge of his rights and of the
technicalities of the law and on the other side an ignorant non-Christian of whose rights the law
takes tender care. In this instance, to do justice to Attorney Jayme, it should be explained that he
does not rely entirely on the contract between him and the Bagobos, but is considerate enough to
ask for the valuation of his services on the basis of quantum meruit.

The elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
lawyer are generally: (1) The importance of the subject matter of the controversy, (2) the extent of
the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
29; Code of Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12; Delgado vs. De la Rama [1922], 43 Phil., 419.) Speaking to
these elements, there is evident a wide difference of opinion as to the value of the property involved
in the case which Attorney Jayme handled, the attorney claiming that it is worth P200,000 and this
being the finding of the trial judge, and the appellants claiming that the land is worth something like
P30,000. All facts considered, probably a happy medium, or approximately P100,000, would be a
fair approximation of the total value of the land and its improvements. As to the services rendered by
Attorney Jayme, they consisted in drafting and filing a complaint and bringing the suit to an amicable
conclusion and in drafting and acknowledging a mortgage, although this latter document may have
been unnecessary. Finally, except that it was alleged in the complaint and not denied that Attorney
Jayme has exercised the duties of his profession since 1908, and is an attorney with sufficient
business to be known to the courts, we have no other data like expert testimony to go on. All
elements considered, and it being admitted that the attorney has already received P7,020, although
the proper application of P5,750 is challenged by appellants, we think that Attorney Jayme has been
sufficiently compensated by the receipt of these P7,020, and that the Bagobos should not be made
to pay anything more. Before concluding, may we be permitted to express the hope that present
counsel for the Bagobos, Messrs. Reta and Quimpo, will not follow in the devious path of their
predecessors, necessitating further litigation to settle their fees, and that as counselled in the Code
of Legal Ethics, "in fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the
administration of Justice and not a mere money-making trade."

In consonance with the foregoing pronouncements, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed,
and the plaintiff will take nothing on his complaint and the defendants will take nothing on their
counterclaim, neither party to recover costs from the other, So ordered.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
— which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but
he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to
a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his
army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 
1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

EN BANC

July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit  filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
1

(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations
and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio  R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
2

Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.  Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High
3

School where complainant graduated in 1993  and respondent in 1991.  Upon his graduation,
4 5

complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business

Administration in 1997.  He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
6

Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.  In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
7

with whom he has two (2) daughters.  Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in
8

2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa. 9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.  In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their
10

father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana,
and their three (3) children.  Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college
11

degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had
enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the
Bar Examinations.  Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
14

consequences to him. 15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's
office in Taguig City.  Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was
16

pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support. 17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to
report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue,
Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-
18

Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from
the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's
driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's
University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's
photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."  Complainant later learned that the reason why he
19

was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft
and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at
respondent's wedding. 20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful
activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.  However, problems relating to
21

respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC
received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent.  On the other hand, a fellow church-member had
22

also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his
(church-member's) relatives.  Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L.
23

Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to
sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.  Further, he learned that respondent
24

was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22. 25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security.  He also became the subject of conversations
26

among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.  Hence, 27

complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's
name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

In his Answer,  respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a
29

defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed  the administrative30

case  filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
31

terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.  Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used
32

by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against
them before the Ombudsman. 33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties
failed to appear.  Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.  On such date,
34 35

however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order  directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties
36

submitted any. 37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,  finding respondent guilty of illegally and
38

falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.  He observed that respondent
39

failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his
identity.  On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the
40

real "Patrick A. Caronan." 41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  However, based on the Marriage Certificate
42

issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G.
Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  These, 44

according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's
identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.  Since respondent falsely assumed the name,
45

identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the
bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.  He also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
46

from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial
institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent. 47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,  adopting the
48

Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St.
Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.  Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  This
49 50

diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G.
Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.  Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
51

arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."  Meanwhile, complainant submitted
52

numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;  (b) a copy of his high
53

school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;  and (c) NBI
54

clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013. 55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick
A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be
barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM
in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.  Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
56

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name.  However, his false assumption of his
1âwphi1

brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it.  Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.  In In the
57 58

Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, the Court
59

explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.  (Emphasis supplied)
60

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar
when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter
into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where
he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be
lawyers.  This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
61

between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and
his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is
to uphold its integrity and dignity.
63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick
A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly,
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves
that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations
as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued
in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A.
Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of
his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
1 

a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
2 

profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is so delicately affected with public
1âwphi1

interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents
in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the

condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with

the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
 held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required
by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn
or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated,
but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard
would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet
that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found
the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions

upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where
the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a
retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court
of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. 1

After an answer  and a reply  were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its
2 3

Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice
Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent,
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the
contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of
attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent
facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City,
while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti
Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced
Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo
Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil
wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977,
when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila,
was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then,
respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After
the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception
over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the
 afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8,
Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time,
she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with
insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such
caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number".
What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point
when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto
ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it
burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave
in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and
respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her
expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for
what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible
Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news,
complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6,
1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against

respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was
offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a
marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as
SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and
indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also
presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and
Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her
(complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant
on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in
fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge
Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher,
Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his
marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with
Librada Peña, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of
such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was
not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña
having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect
was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding
respect and dignity.  He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the
4
decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained
finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman,
Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that
his previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his
actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes
and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety
and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary
lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with
all the necessary legal requisites.
5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice
Purisima which we quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a
Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to
solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he
could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law
and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage
under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who
must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer;
authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a
"sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent,
he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of
immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I
do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were
present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by
law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to
contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of
argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the
marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to
non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance,
alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage
between complainant and respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage
with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took
Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle
 of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second
marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not
respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a
crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the
Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with
complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible
conclusion is — that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a
member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the
immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against
her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in
resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge.
Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong
cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said
administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.
complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery
thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the
sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the
defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7,
1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability
for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness
for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.  Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
6

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct
during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably
ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of
commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty
in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a
punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING
that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense
hereafter.

EN BANC

 
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed
against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the
oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of
which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he
shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the
highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and
Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989.
These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready
reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant
Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had
deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of
course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent
had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
 On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin
Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed
away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take
his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29
December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been
careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in
CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any
testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr.
Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the
IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the
former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had
not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board
of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it
is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to
entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to
submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25
August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not
aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the
Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747
entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff,
versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural
Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a
swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed
 and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until
the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990,
signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of
Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr.
Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending
derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does
not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the
Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to
Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in
BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August
1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court
resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required
Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil
Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case
against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his
admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make
him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter
stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable
Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution
of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and
Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990,
stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition
which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate
and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and
finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should
not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the
 changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter
having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December
1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according
to him, was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached
between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for
the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the
mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant
Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and
the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of
29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge
Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case
with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated
8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion
pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to
comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment,
dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's
sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and
that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of
his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not
received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of
the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement
of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as
security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the
Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC
dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with
respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the
mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo,
Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the
approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance
therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra).
It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take
the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this
Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning
the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but
have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be
erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his
guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor
General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What
is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage
of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until
the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of
honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion
filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration
before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government
against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and
lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619)
have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have
already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn
her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as
well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves
are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who
are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82
Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification
for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this
Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
 represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage
- PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"  in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
3

Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,  Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
5

comment thereon.  He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
6

confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.  He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
7

he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);  and 8

as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."   He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
10

and friend.   He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
11

completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated;   He says Alawi somehow got his
12

GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.  13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.  14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.  15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.   Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all
16

times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."   More than once has this
17

Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary." 
18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."   Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
19

downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.   As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
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of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts.   While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
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one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,   the record contains
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no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.