G.R. Nos.

99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
respondents.

FACTS: On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation
of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail
for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. On even date, petitioner filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam
Defensor-Santiag”, petitioner states that, as a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered
extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her
injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic)
because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet
because she is still in physical pain. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing
petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet
permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a
cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees.
On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the
Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his
office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied
by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said
to be a physician. She came and left unaided. on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent
addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of
Manila from proceeding . Considering the information in media to the effect that accused
Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study
purposes, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner.
Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never
personally appeared before said court.

ISSUE: A. Whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner.
B. Whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court.
Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order
it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for
reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent
court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction
shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution
of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal. The general rule applies that a temporary injunction
terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.
Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon
such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.
Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu
propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies
therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing
of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and
requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of
supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on
jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the
same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2015

Heirs of Bertudlo Hinog
Vs.
Hon. Achilles Melicor

FACTS. The Balanes, the private respondents in this case, filed a complaint for the
recovery of ownership and possession as well as removal of construction and damages
(moral & exemplary) against Bertuldo Hinog. It was alleged that the Balanes are the
owners of a parcel of land in Bohol, which they have rented to Bertuldo for 10 years with
an annual rental of 100php. Bertuldo, thereafter, constructed a house of light materials in
the said lot.However, after the expiry of the 10 years, Bertuldo refused to surrender the
lot and even claimed ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of absolute sale
executed by one Tomas Pahac, with the alleged conformity of the Balanes.
Trial on the merits ensued but Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
Consequently, Bertuldo III designated Atty. Petalcorin to be his new counsel. The latter
filed a motion to expunge the complaint and nullify all proceedings on the ground that the
amount of damages claimed is not stated so the proper docket fee was not paid by the
Balanes hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Under the Manchester Ruling, Non-
payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court granted the motion but
later on reinstated the case after the payment of the correct docket fee. Instead of filing
for an MR, a supplemental pleading was filed by Atty. Petalcorin appending therein the
Deed of Sale of the lot in question. The trial court denied the supplemental pleading on
the ground that the Deed is a new matter, never mentioned in the original answer
prepared by Bertuldo’s original counsel. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners may challenge the court’s jurisdiction?

HELD: NO. After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief
in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction
in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not raise the
issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees. Instead, he based his
defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
It was only in September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after filing the answer, and
under the auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first
time in the motion to expunge by Bertuldo's heirs.
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and
even invoked the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners,
considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively
barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Although the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by
law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches
or estoppel.

G.R. No. 174385, Feb 20, 2013

Republic of the Philippines
Vs.
Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et at.

FACTS: On March 14, 2005, Indigo Distribution Corporation and thirteen other petitioners
(collectively referred to as lower court petitioners) filed before the respondent judge a
petition for declaratory relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Honorable Secretary of Finance, et al. The
petition sought to nullify the implementation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334,
otherwise known as "AN ACT INCREASING THE EXCISE TAX RATES IMPOSED ON
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS
131, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1997, AS AMENDED," as unconstitutional. Congress enacted, in 1992, R.A. No.
7227, otherwise known as "The BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1992," which provided, among others, for the creation of the SSEFZ, as well as the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Pursuant to this law, the SBMA granted the lower
court petitioners Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption. The certificates allowed
them to engage in the business of import and export of general merchandise (including
alcohol and tobacco products) and uniformly granted them tax exemptions for these
importations. On January 1, 2005, Congress passed R.A. No. 9334. Based on Section 6
of R.A. No. 9334, the SBMA issued a Memorandum on February 7, 2005 directing its
various departments to require importers in the SSEFZ to pay the applicable duties and
taxes on their importations of tobacco and alcohol products before these importations are
cleared and released from the freeport. The memorandum prompted the lower court
petitioners to bring before the RTC their petition for declaratory relief. The petition
included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a TRO to enjoin
the Republic (acting through the SBMA) from enforcing the challenged memorandum. On
May 11, 2005 the respondent judge granted the lower court petitioners’ application for
preliminary injunction despite the Republic’s opposition.
The Republic filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition. to annul the
respondent judge’s order and the writ issued pursuant to this order. The petition asked
for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondent judge
granted on August 11, 2005 the private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-
intervention.
The petitioner contends that, respondent judge acted with manifest partiality and with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued his August 11, 2005 and July 5, 2006 orders.
In particular, the Republic contends that the respondent judge violated its right to due
process when he peremptorily allowed the private respondents’ motions and complaints-
in-intervention and proceeded with their hearing ex parte despite the absence of any prior
notice to it. The Republic maintains that it never received any notice of hearing, nor any
copy of the questioned motions and complaints-in-intervention.
While that private respondents point to the procedural defects in the petition, specifically:
first, the petition was filed out of time, arguing that the Republic only had 53 remaining
days to file the petition from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
maintaining that the 60-day period within which to file the petition is counted from the
notice of the denial of the August 11, 2005 order; second, the petition did not comply with
the rules on proof of filing and service; third, the Republic failed to properly serve their
counsel of record a copy of the petition; and fourth, the Republic did not observe the
hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition.

ISSUE: A. Whether or not petition was filed within the reglementary period?
B. Whether or not the principle of hierarchy of courts is absolute?

HELD: We find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary
to the private respondents’ position, the 60- day period within which to file the petition for
certiorari is counted from the Republic’s receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the
latter’s motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this
point – "In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion."
While the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourses should be
made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts, this principle is not
an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several
cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;
when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy; when demanded
by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our
immediate and direct handling of the case. In light of these supervening events, the Court
sees no reason to resolve the other matters raised in this petition for being moot. The
Republic was denied due process; the respondent judge issued the assailed orders with
grave abuse of discretion
Due process of law is a constitutionally guaranteed right reserved to every litigannt. Even
the Republic as a litigant is entitled to this constitutional right, in the same manner and to
the same extent that this right is guaranteed to private litigants. The essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard, logically preconditioned on prior notice, before
judgment is rendered.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We GRANT
the writ of certiorari and accordingly SET ASIDE the orders dated August 11, 2005 and
July 5, 2006 of respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa in Civil Case No. 102-0-05 for being
NULL and VOID. We DISMISS the prayer for writ of prohibition on the ground of
mootness. Costs against Metatrans Trading International Corporation and Hundred
Young Subic International, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

Villamor
Vs.
Salas

FACTS: In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of
ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala of
the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was pending there, respondent
Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified
theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to the
sala of Judge Villamor. After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in
favor of Naval who was declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land.
Carlos was ordered to vacate the land.
Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived criminal
cases. Having declared Naval the lawful owner and possessor of the contested land in
Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases against her and her
co-accused. Carlos filed an administrative case, against Judge Villamor, charging him
with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On
November 21, 1988, this Court, in an En Banc resolution, summarily dismissed the
administrative case. Calros filed another civil action for damages against judge villamor.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge Villamor on
December 10, 1987. The next day (December 11, 1987), instead of answering the
complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of
direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for
degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and
contemptous language before the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
On November 13, 1989, the court annulled the contempt orders.
Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for
damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for
damages was docketed as Civil Case and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City presided over by Judge Bernardo LL. Salas. On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation
was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas to dismiss Civil Case but the motion was
denied by respondent Judge on July 2, 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for
damages against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct
contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this Court subsequently annulled.

HELD: No. Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less
declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge
thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the principle that only the higher
appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with
authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.
The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being
co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs.
Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has
found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge
of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against the latter. A judge is not
liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering
it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are GRANTED, Civil Cases Nos.
CEB-8802 and CEB-8823, respectively, pending in the salas of respondents Judge Peary
G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby dismissed. The temporary
restraining orders issued by this Court in these cases are hereby made permanent. No
costs.
G.R. No. 93262, December 29, 1991
Davao Lights and Power Corporation Inc.
Vs.
Court of Appeals

FACTS: The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against
Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an
Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12
May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served
upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the
attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment
were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and
over the persons of the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

HELD: Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The court may validly issue a writ of
preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between the commencement of the
action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons
to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or
the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy
of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from
granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest
Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not prerequisites to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings
& Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the
defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity
to dispose of his properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any
case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched
by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a
showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a
preliminary attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a
ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not
binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.

G.R. No. 127536, February 19, 2002

Jaro
Vs.
Court of Appeals

FACTS: On November 12, 1992, Rosario Vda. de Pelaez filed a complaint for prohibition
under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Provincial Adjudicator Board,
Lucina City, Quezon. Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late Rosenda Reyes
y Padua was the original owner of a parcel of coconut land covered by TCT No. T-79099
with an area of 3.0896 hectares, situated in Barangay Mangilag Norte, Candelaria,
Quezon. Rosenda allegedly instituted respondent and her husband, the late Igmedio
Pelaez, as tenants of the land. In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes, the heir of Rosenda, sold
the land to petitioner who, respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the
land. On October 6, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision 3 in favor of
petitioner. In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the Provincial Adjudicator noted that
the affidavits presented as evidence were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were
material to the resolution of the case. The affidavit executed by Ricardo in November,
1992, presented by respondent as evidence, contradicted an earlier affidavit of Ricardo,
executed by him on May 15, 1978. In the affidavit dated November, 1992, executed 14
years after he had sold the land, Ricardo stated that respondent is a tenant of the land.
However, in his 1978 affidavit, Ricardo declared that the land is not tenanted and is not
covered by the agrarian reform program since it is neither rice nor corn land. The
Provincial Adjudicator also held that the joint affidavit executed by respondent with her
husband on May 15, 1978 was an admission that they were not tenants of the land. In
that joint affidavit, the spouses stated that they are mere occupants by virtue of the
landowner’s generosity, and they are willing to vacate the same in case it is sold to
another person.

ISSUE: Whether petitiOner is entitled to an annulment pf the impugned decision and

resolutions of the DARAB and the honorable CA?

HELD: The petition has merit. Without in any way implying that the DARAB decision and
resolution are void, we agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the
amended petition on purely technical grounds was unwarranted. Petitioner’s contention
that the DARAB decision and resolution are void because of respondent’s alleged failure
to pay the appeal fee when respondent appealed the decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator to the DARAB. The non-payment of the appeal fee would have rendered the
decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, which was favorable to petitioner, as the final
adjudication of the case. The DARAB then would have no jurisdiction to rule on the case
and the eventual dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would amount to nothing
because the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision would still stand as final judgment.
the decisions of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB are in sharp conflict with each
other. The Court of Appeals could have broken this impasse by giving due course to
petitioner’s appeal. The Court of Appeals is in a better position to fully adjudicate the
instant case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative value of the
evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB. 33 After
all, the Court of Appeals is empowered by its Revised Internal Rules 34 to require parties
to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of
substantial justice. Moreover, the Court of Appeals could order that the original records
of the case be elevated to it for the full adjudication of the case. Thus, the remand of this
case to the Court of Appeals is necessary for it to decide the appeal on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated October 23, 1996,
November 15, 1996 and January 6, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition
for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 42231, and to decide the same on the merits.

G.R. No. L-27145, November 29, 1968

Luna
Vs.
Carandang

FACTS: On March 6, 1962, Mariquita Luna and Geranimo Carandang entered into a
contract of lease for a period of 10 years involving a parcel of agricultural land containing
an area of 158.7713 hectares situated at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The stipulated rent
was P4,500 a year payable semi-annually for the first five years and P5,000 yearly
beginning January, 1967, to the end of the period of the lease. The lessee, Carandang,
failed or refused to pay in full the stipulated rent during the first two years of the contract
such that as of March 26, 1964, he owed the lessor unpaid rents in the amount of
P4,156.63.
On May 26, 1964, the plaintiff-lessor commenced an action in the Court of First Instance
of Batangas against the defendant-lessee for rescission, with damages, of the contract of
lease.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision holding that plaintiff had made out a case
for rescission with damages, but that the court could not order the defendant to vacate
the leased premises because the land is situated at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, where it
had no jurisdiction. Accordingly, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff granting
rescission of the contract of lease with damages, consisting of unpaid rents as well as
future rents. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of law and in due time
filed her brief as appellant. No brief was filed for the defendant-appellee.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding that since the leased land is
situated at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, it had no jurisdiction to order the defendant,
appellee here, to vacate the leased premises.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has a jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title to, or possession
of, real estate wherever situated in the Philippines, subject to the rules on venue of
actions. Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action involving real
property shall be brought in the Court of First instance of the province where the land lies
is a rule on venue of actions, which may be waived expressly or by implication. The
judgment of the lower court granting rescission of the contract of lease is affirmed with
the following modifications: 1. The appellee is ordered to vacate and return the leased
premises to the appellant; 2. The appellee is ordered to pay the appellant the unpaid rents
from January 1, 1962, to May 26, 1964, in the sum of P4,156.63 with legal interest from
the time of judicial demand until fully paid and, thereafter, the sum of P4,500 annually as
reasonable rental value of the land up to the time the land is vacated by the appellee and
returned to the appellant.