PRACTICE OF LAW
However, a majority thereof, including
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his
own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene
Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy
of far-reaching proportions While
ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this
case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in
Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections.
the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten
years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is
patterned after Section 1(1), Article
XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent
Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for al least ten
years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems
to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law"
as:
"The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he
is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black’s
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages
in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in
a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine
Lawyers Association v. Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern
conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law
Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in
following any line of employment in
the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr D.
Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission show that
it has adopted a liberal interpretation
of the term "practice of law."
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the
session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission
on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by
Section 1 is that ‘They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am
quoting from the provision — ‘who have
been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which
would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA. We
have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they
are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the
Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the
floor so that this interpretation may be
made available whenever this provision
on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at
least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz
yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that
service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact
that the work of COA although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the
construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, provides, among others, that
the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should
either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private
practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define
private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are
the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional
corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms,
there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneys
called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by
looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologies,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as
"the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation
in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well
as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue
to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image
and the self-perception of the legal
profession.
(Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of
litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there
are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts.
The members of the bench and bar and
the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as
the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner will engage
in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties.
Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice will usually
perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or
role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as
representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra,
p. 687).

By no means will most of this work
involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation
and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-
litigation legal work or in litigation work
that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent
is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’
work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star,
a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly
may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-
policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major
corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of
information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends,
the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information
flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making
process, wherein a model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof
is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal
profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in
the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for
productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction
to multi-variable decisional contexts and
the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly
with either a master’s or doctorate
degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now
have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving
corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a
corporate lawyer is assiduously referred
to as the "abogado de campanilla." He
is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.
Despite the growing number of
corporate lawyers, many people could
not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and
purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas
of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may
assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one
may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding
how one’s work actually fits into the
work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In
short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services
may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate
lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because
working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, this is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,
1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the
role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law
practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues
deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2)
an introduction to usable disciplinary skills
applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and
management of the
legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be
thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel’s total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and
policy sciences affect the counsel’s
role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization
process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a
corporation’s strategy at multiple levels.
The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other — often with those
who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s
participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modern corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stockholder — in some
cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize
for global operations. (Emphasis
supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar
as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and
Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary
spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to
be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge
of the environment, coordinating work
with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-
a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the
corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of
systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of
flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming
techniques now make the systems
dynamics principles more accessible
to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables
users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be
used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved
in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation
Management. Computer-based models
can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all kinds of negotiations.
All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization
and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by
lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing
the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional
or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation’s
evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory
of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in
trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the
Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate
counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm’s strategic issues,
including structuring its global
operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions
with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the
thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer’s aim is not the
understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution" or make-up of
the modern corporation. "Business
Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10,
1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the
bar and the bench) is to have more than
a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast
tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?;
or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of
the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law
(U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years
in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws
of member-countries, negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank
and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s
work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its
accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen’s Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform
law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-
1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system
for the House of Representative." (pp.
128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a
negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a
negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned,
there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members
of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p.
11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like
a country’s Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of
default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an
important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries’ sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers
for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of
the United States Agency for
International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises,
perhaps even more so than purely re
negotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in
the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with
the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel.
(See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
(Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for
a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either
party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a complete debt
restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements — an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and
4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).
Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v.
Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
"Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the
only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can
decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in
the case of Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the
appointee is qualified, as in this case,
and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law."
(Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular
appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President
issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C,
Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years
without re appointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for
five years, and the last Members for
three years, without re appointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s
separate opinion, suffice it to say that
his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly
what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition
would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practiced two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate
opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states
that in my written opinion, I made use of
a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition
says that law practice." . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in
substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising
others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of
the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has
been practicing law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons
practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme
Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he
is indeed disqualified, how can the
action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.
Additionally, consider the
following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments
rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is
in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the
Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which
is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court
would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal
maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter
that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson
and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition
that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his
veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by
Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two
or three inches away from in front of
Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man.
Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself
with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin?
Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the
letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is
hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in
the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to
dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no
part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority
written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only
in the result; it does not appear to me
that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on
Appointments — that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the
basis of his stated qualifications and
after due assessment thereof, be
confirmed — was attended by error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance
with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I
therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that
when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on
the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated
on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO
was to prevent the inconvenience and
even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod’s
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of
the Petition then in relation to
established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent
Monsod’s comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional
requirement of" practice of low for at
least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by
respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the
core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman
thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions
are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear
and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." It is the bounded duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is
met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As
commonly understood, "practice" refers
to the actual performance or application
of knowledge as distinguished from
mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated
or customary action. 1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter,
means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is
employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine."
A certified public accountant who works
as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as
a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney
of a Legal Department of a corporation
or a governmental agency, cannot
be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case
of People v. Villanueva: 2
"Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the
respondent Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice
of law." It states:
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’
implies customarily or habitually holding
one’s self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or
when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice
law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law
implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available
to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence,
charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the
use of legal knowledge and skill is within
the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176
N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, and receives pay for it, is to
that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, `all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are
practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al.,
v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
3. Application of law, legal principle,
practice, or procedure which calls for
legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term `practice of
law’. (Martin supra).
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging
in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice
of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I
believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may
be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform
any of the tasks which are peculiar to
the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such
tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any
of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of
respondent Monsod as appears from
the records, I am persuaded that if ever
he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he
performed tasks and activities which
could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law,
like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice,
such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past
endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law,
there must be a continuity, or a
succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People v.
Villanueva: 4
"Essentially, the word private practice of
law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT
the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position
of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the
ponencia of my brother Paras but find I
must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with
him while of course respecting his
viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are
inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred
from resolving. Determination of the
appointee’s credentials is made on the
basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were,
the exercise of that discretion would
still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia,
what was involved was the discretion of
the appointing authority to choose
between two claimants to the same
office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of
discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the
sovereign people may be ousted by
this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we
cannot disqualify an appointee simply
because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines
may be declared ineligible by this Court
in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the
enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether
or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the
private respondent, I fear that the
ponencia may have been too sweeping
in its definition of the phrase "practice of
law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the
numerous activities accepted as
embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not
even have to be a lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock
broker and the insurance adjuster
and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give
advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the
practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as
an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the
SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there
is hardly any activity that is not affected
by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and
observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to
be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so
deemed when, on his own, he rents a
house or buys a car or consults a doctor
as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility
vehicle as his main source of livelihood,
he would still be deemed engaged in the
practice of law because he must obey the
Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory
Board.
The ponencia quotes an American
decision defining the practice of law as
the "performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes
on to say that "because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the
ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living,
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is
enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are
impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he
has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that
he has occupied the various positions
listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-
law whose principal attention is focused
on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied
in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and
the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the
Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He
is doubtless eminently qualified for
many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent
Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,
dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was
hope that engaging in the practice of law
as a qualification for public office would
be settled one way or another in fairly
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was
not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5
are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his
vote behind while on official leave but
not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he
did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part
in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our
task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely
to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to
set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive
ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and
instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr.
Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional
duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is
a member of the bar but to say that he
has practiced law is stretching the term
beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar
examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has
not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement
I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a
qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except
that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase
"engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the
result of one’s decisive choice. It means
that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to
carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on
the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been
engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. In fact, if appears that
Mr. Monsod has never practiced law
except for an alleged one year period
after passing the bar examinations
when he worked in his father’s law firm.
Even then his law practice must have
been extremely limited because he was
also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University
of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United
States while not a member of the Bar
there?
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission
1 In September, 1971, Congress passed
on Bar Integration submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the
"earnest recommendation" — on the
basis of the said Report and the
proceedings had in Administrative Case
2
No. 526 of the Court, and "consistently
with the views and counsel received from
its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine
Bench and Bar" —
that "this Honorable Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526
formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after
due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar
associations. On August 16, 1962,
arguments in favor of as well as in
opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written
3
oppositions were admitted, and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to
4
file written memoranda.
Since then, the Court has closely
observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of
the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary
surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the
purpose of ascertaining the advisability
of unifying the Philippine Bar.
House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep.
Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two
years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the
integration of the
Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit
in order to raise the
standards of the legal
profession, improve the
administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to
discharge its public
responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five
hundred thousand pesos
is hereby appropriated, out
of any funds in the
National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of
this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be
necessary for the same
purpose shall be included
in the annual
appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
 SEC. 3. This Act shall take
effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds
with argument on the constitutionality of
Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the
advisability (practicability and necessity)
of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions,
sentiments, comments and observations
of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar
integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission and presented to them by
that body in a national Bar plebiscite.
There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate
the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have
the power to integrate
the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the
integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court
ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at
the outset, a statement of the meaning of
Bar integration. It will suffice, for this
purpose, to adopt the concept given by
the Commission on Bar Integration on
pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the
entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This
requires membership and
f inancial support (in
reasonable amount) of
every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to
the practice of law and the
retention of his name in
the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to
the collectivity of all
persons whose names
appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated
Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include
all lawyers.
Complete unification is not
possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State.
Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by
Government authority of a
national organization of
the legal profession based
on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the
position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion
among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own
organized action and
participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the
principle of
maximum Bar autonomy
with minimum supervision
and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an
integrated Bar, in general,
are:
(1) Assist in the
administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on
the part of its members
high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional
competence, public
service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the
professional interests of
its members;
(4) Cultivate among its
members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for
the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and
procedure, and the
relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public,
and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster
legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing
program of legal research
in substantive and
adjective law, and make
reports and
recommendations thereon;
and
(8) Enable the Bar to
discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will,
among other things, make
it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective
assistance in maintaining
the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and
litigants against the abuse
of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and
properly, its responsibility
in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and
prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary,
which traditionally cannot
defend itself except within
its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at
it, and assist it to maintain
its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice
in the selection of judges
and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the
unauthorized practice of
law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice
maintained through
influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds
for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement
services, and establish
legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services
throughout the country so
that the poor may not lack
competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational
and informational
materials that are difficult
to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain
a program of continuing
legal education for
practising attorneys in
order to elevate the
standards of the
profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical
standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers
and establish law libraries
for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns
to educate the people on
their legal rights and
obligations, on the
importance of preventive
legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of
the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and
maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide
involvement of the
lawyer population in the
solution of the
multifarious problems
that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the
view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under
Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
"to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice
of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is
an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In
providing that "the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar,"
Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new
power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the
Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue —
whether the unification of the Bar would
be constitutional — hinges on the
effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom
of association and freedom of speech,
and on the nature of the dues exacted
from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the
following pertinent discussion made
by the Commission on Bar Integration
pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
 Constitutionality of Bar
Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the
validity of Bar integration
measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have
upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial
pronouncements support
this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent
power to supervise and
regulate the practice of
law.
— The practice of law is
not a vested right but a
privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with
public interest, because
a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also
to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and
takes part in one of the
most important functions
of the State, the
administration of justice,
as an officer of the court.
— Because the practice of
law is privilege clothed
with public interest, it is far
and just that the exercise
of that privilege be
regulated to assure
compliance with the
lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public
responsibilities can best
be discharged through
collective action; but there
can be no collective action
without an organized
body; no organized body
can operate effectively
without incurring
expenses; therefore, it is
fair and just that all
attorneys be required to
contribute to the support of
such organized body; and,
given existing Bar
conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so
is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that
requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be
a member of an integrated
Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to
associate (or the corollary
right not to associate).
Integration does not make
a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not
already a member. He
became a member of the
Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does
is to provide an official
national organization for
the well-defined but
unorganized and
incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses.
The body compulsion to
which he is subjected is
the payment of annual
dues.
Otherwise stated,
membership in the Unified
Bar imposes only the duty
to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of
compelled financial
support of group activities,
not involuntary
membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified
Bar activities serves the
function of elevating the
educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the
end of improving the
quality of the legal service
available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's
legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of
professional services, may
require that the cost of
improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by
the subjects and
beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the
lawyers.
Assuming that Bar
integration does compel a
lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as
an exercise of the police
power of the State. The
legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper
subject of legislative
regulation and control.
Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the Bar
includes the authority to
integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe
dues to be paid by the
members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the
Integrated Bar is an
exaction for regulation,
while the purpose of a tax
is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose
a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be
possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray
the concomitant expenses.
The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily
includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon
the State's power to
regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest
promoted by the
integration of the Bar far
outweighs the
inconsequential
inconvenience to a
member that might result
from his required payment
of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has
always been, to voice his
views on any subject in
any manner he wishes,
even though such views
be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to
use a member's due to
promote measures to
which said member is
opposed, would not nullify
or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may
constitutionally condition
the right to practice law
upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult
to understand why it
should become
unconstitutional for the Bar
to use the member's dues
to fulfill the very purposes
for which it was
established.
The objection would make
every Governmental
exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even
the income tax would be
suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths
that have never been
dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if
his liberties were to be
thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes
in furtherance of war or of
any other end condemned
by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment
has never yet been
exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair
to lawyers already
practising because
although the requirement
to pay annual dues is a
new regulation, it will give
the members of the Bar a
new system which they
hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper
work, they will receive
benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and
discharge their public
responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they
have been able to do in
the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is
a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the
 Court, because it will apply
equally to all lawyers,
young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect,
and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue —
whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time —
requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as
the advantages and disadvantages
of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in
England, Canada and the United States,
Bar integration has yielded the following
benefits: (1) improved discipline among
the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation
of the individual lawyer in the activities of
the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of
costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the
Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and
(9) better and more effective discharge
by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than
these salutary consequences are
envisioned and in fact expected from
the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been
variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations
will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will
not be possible; the Bar will become an
impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these
and other evils prophesied by
opponents of Bar integration have failed
to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England,
Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar
has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence
in the Bar, enlarged professional
consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly
improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves
regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission
on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by
the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45
per cent) voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per
cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04
per cent) are non-commital. In addition,
a total of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups all over
the Philippines have submitted
resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support
for Bar integration, while not a single
local Bar association or lawyers' group
has expressed opposed position
thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots
on the proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or
93.14 per cent) voted in favor
thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote
against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are
5
non-committal. All these clearly indicate
an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a
thoroughgoing conscientious study of
all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that
the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of
contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility
fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue
of the power vested in it by Section 13
of Article VIII of the Constitution,
hereby ordains the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines in accordance
with the attached COURT RULE,
effective on January 16, 1973.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17,
2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition
of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for
leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine
bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical
attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine
1
citizenship. On that day, he took his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in
May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the
Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section
2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for
all applicants for admission to
the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the
 Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the
Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the
bar. It recommends that he be allowed to
resume the practice of law in the
Philippines, conditioned on his retaking
the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member
of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the
Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege
2
burdened with conditions. It is so
delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the
State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and
3 also produce before this Court
promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement
and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of
these conditions makes him unworthy
of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional
4
privilege.
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice
law. – Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar,
or thereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of
this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person
admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in
good and regular standing is entitled
to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain
qualifications. The Rules of Court
mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character and a
5
resident of the Philippines. He must
satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in
6
the Philippines.
Moreover, admission to the bar involves
various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral
7
and other qualifications; passing the bar
8 9
examinations; taking the lawyer’s oath
and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of
this Court a certificate of the license
10
to practice.
The second requisite for the practice of
law ― membership in good standing ―
is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and,
concomitantly, payment of annual
11
membership dues in the IBP;
payment of the annual professional
12
tax; compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education
13
requirement; faithful observance of the
rules and ethics of the legal profession
and being continually subject to judicial
14
disciplinary control.
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer
who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the
practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by
15
law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a
16
privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino
citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the
17
conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to
have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225. Although he is also deemed never
to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to
practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit
18
to engage in such practice." Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant
to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in
full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional
tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36
credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge
of Philippine laws and update him
of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s
oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will
restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney
Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant,
after which he may retake his oath as
a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October
1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION
TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the
1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he
has reached the age of majority? This is
the question sought to be resolved in the
present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente
D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of
the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen,
and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was
born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union
on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having
completed a Bachelor of Laws course
at the St. Louis University in Baguio
City, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998,
he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof
of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution,
Ching submitted on 18 November 1998,
the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9
June 1986, issued by the
Board of Accountancy of
the Professional
Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification,
dated 14 June 1997,
issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer
of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in
Tubao La Union showing
that Ching is a registered
voter of the said place;
and
3. Certification, dated 12
October 1998, also issued
by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
 showing that Ching was
elected as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tubao, La Union during
the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998
Bar Examinations were released and
Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was
scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April
1999, he was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine
citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July
1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected
1
Philippine citizenship" in strict
compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which
the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a
Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could
perfect by election upon reaching the
2
age of majority." In this regard, the
OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of
Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person
making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election
must be made upon reaching the age
3
of majority." The OSG then explains
the meaning of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching
the age of majority" has
been construed to mean a
reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority
which had been interpreted
by the Secretary of Justice
to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p.
51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940,
Feb. 27, 1940). Said
period may be extended
under certain
circumstances, as when
a (sic) person concerned
has always considered
himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355
and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,
46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held
that an election done after
over seven (7) years was
not made within a
reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that
Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case,
the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the
construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance
of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior
to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a
Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always
considered myself as a
Filipino;
2. I was registered as a
Filipino and consistently
declared myself as one
in my school records and
other official documents;
3. I am practicing a
profession (Certified Public
Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral
process[es] since the time I
was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people
of Tubao, La Union as a
member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from
1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine
citizenship on July 15,
1999 in accordance
with Commonwealth Act
No. 625;
7. My election was
expressed in a statement
signed and sworn to by
me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my
election of Philippine
citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the
Constitution and the
Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of
Philippine citizenship and
my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of
Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of
TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00)
as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected
Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999,
the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the
governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine
4
citizenship. This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five" are citizens of the
5 the age of majority." The age of majority
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January
17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
6 by basing the time period on the
age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the
1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions
on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those
7 States Government to the effect that the
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If
the citizenship of a person was subject
to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the
new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced
before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
8 majority. However, we held in Cuenco
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted
pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and
C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching
then commenced upon reaching twenty-
9
one (21) years. In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving
the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved
decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United
election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age
10
of majority. The phrase "reasonable
time" has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of
11
12
vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three
(3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said:
It is true that this clause
has been construed to
mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of
majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years
is the reasonable time to
elect Philippine citizenship
under the constitutional
provision adverted to
above, which period may
be extended under certain
circumstances, as when
the person concerned has
always considered himself
13
a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that
the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the
foregoing, petitioner was
born on February 16,
1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His
election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-
eight (28) years of age, or
over seven (7) years after
he had reached the age
of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been
made "upon reaching the
14
age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been
born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he
complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's
election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e.,
his continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special
circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot
find a refuge in the case of In re:
15
Florencio Mallare, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
And even
assuming arguendo that
Ana Mallare were (sic)
legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he
came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early
as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old),
Esteban was already
participating in the
elections and campaigning
for certain candidate[s].
These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for
16
Philippine citizenship.
Ching's reliance on Mallare is
misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from
those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban
Mallare was born before the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures
prescribed under the 1935 Constitution
and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine
citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was
an obiter since, as correctly pointed out
by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the
Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural
child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be
necessary to confer on
him all the rights and
privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship
(U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil.
543, Serra vs. Republic,
L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy
Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-
5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-
filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully
17
entitled.
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and
further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of
18
Representatives, where we held:
We have jurisprudence
that defines "election"
as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In
re: Florencio Mallare
(59 SCRA 45 [1974]),
the Court held that the
exercise of the right of
suffrage and the
participation in election
exercises constitute a
positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement
of the Court, we held:
Esteban's
exercise of
the right of
suffrage
when he
came of age
constitutes a
positive act
of Philippine
citizenship.
(p. 52:
emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar
situation of the respondent
who cannot be excepted
to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply
the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn
statement or formal
declaration is a
requirement for those who
still have to elect
citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the
time to elect came up,
there are acts of
deliberate
 choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a
profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is
a qualification, voting
during election time,
running for public office,
and other categorical
acts of similar nature are
themselves formal
manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine
citizenship presupposes
that the person electing
is an alien. Or his status
is doubtful because he is
a national of two
countries. There is no
doubt in this case about
Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-
one (21).
We repeat that any
election of Philippine
citizenship on the part of
the private respondent
would not only have
been superfluous but it
would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can
a Filipino citizen elect
19
Philippine citizenship?
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic
with the plight of Ching. However, even
if we consider the special circumstances
in the life of Ching like his having lived
in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino,
controlling statutes and jurisprudence
constrain us to disagree with the
recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the
age of majority until he finally expressed
his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered
no reason why he delayed his election
of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be
treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed
20
when convenient. One who is
privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right
to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in
this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION
TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4
February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the
death of one Raul Camaligan on 8
September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction
of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and
his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in
an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was
set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July
1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993
Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1
1993. He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a
Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to
admit him to the practice of law, averring
that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue
of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note
that his probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from the time
of the Order of Judge Santiago granting
him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since
then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and
2
certified. The essentiality of good
moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
3 lawyer. He is sought as
In Re Farmer:
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character"
prescribed by the statute,
as a condition precedent
to the applicant's right to
receive a license to
practice law in North
Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the
court, includes all the
elements necessary to
make up such a
character. It is something
more than an absence of
bad character. It is the
good name which the
applicant has acquired, or
should have acquired,
through association with
his fellows. It means that
he must have conducted
himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily
would, or should, or
does. Such character
expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following
the line of least
resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say
that this requirement of the
statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a
counsellor, and his advice
comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to
his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with
is client's
property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at
law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief
concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of
justice. . . .
4
xxx xxx xxx
In Re Application of
5
Kaufman, citing Re
Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully
said that there exists
nowhere greater
temptations to deviate
from the straight and
narrow path than in the
multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in
the practice of profession.
For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an
applicant for admission to
the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of
the court, is required to
cause a minute
examination to be made of
the moral standard of each
candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no
further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate
who presents himself for
admission to the bar. The
evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very
source, and prevented, for,
after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has
pursued his profession,
and has established
himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is
presented to the court
when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment
and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.
6 8
In Re Keenan:
The right to practice law is
not one of the inherent
rights of every citizen, as
in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business.
It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued
only to those who
demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire
to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain
it. Elaborate machinery
has been set up to test
applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate
the fit from the unfit. Only
those who pass the test
are allowed to enter the
profession, and only
those who maintain the
standards are allowed to
remain in it.
7
Re Rouss:
Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair
private and professional
character is one of them;
to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past
offense: an examination
into character, like the
examination into
learning, is merely a test
of
fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of
Superior Court:
Attorney's are licensed
because of their learning
and ability, so that they
may not only protect the
rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to
assist court in the trial of
the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or
assistance to courts could
such agents give? They
are required to be of good
moral character, so that
the agents and officers of
 the court, which they are, and to the
may not bring discredit proper
upon the due administratio
administration of the law, n of justice
and it is of the highest than legal
possible consequence learning.
that both those who have Legal
not such qualifications in learning may
the first instance, or who, be acquired
having had them, have in after
fallen therefrom, shall not years, but if
be permitted to appear in the applicant
courts to aid in the passes the
administration of justice. threshold of
the bar with
It has also been stressed that the a bad moral
requirement of good moral character character the
is, in fact, of greater importance so far chances are
as the general public and the proper that his
administration of justice are concerned, character will
than the possession of legal learning: remain
bad, and that
. . . (In re Applicants for he will
License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 become a
N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] disgrace
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187): instead of an
ornament to
The public his great
policy of our calling — a
state has curse
always been instead
to admit no of a benefit
person to the to his
practice of community
the law — a Quirk, a
unless he Gammon or
covered an a Snap,
upright moral instead of a
character. Th Davis, a
e possession Smith or a
9
of this by the Ruffin.
attorney is
more All aspects of moral character and
important, if behavior may be inquired into in respect
anything, to of those seeking admission to the Bar.
the public The scope of such inquiry is, indeed,
said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
10
Re Stepsay:
The inquiry as to the moral
character of an attorney in
a proceeding for his
admission to practice
is broader in scope than in
a disbarment proceeding.
11
Re Wells:
. . . that an applicant's
contention that upon
application for admission
to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for
want of good moral
character unless it
appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would
be cause for his
disbarment or suspension,
could not be
sustained; that the inquiry
is broader in its scope
than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court
may receive any evidence
which tends to show the
applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity,
and general
morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any
of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral
character to be satisfied by those who
would seek admission to the bar must
of necessity be more stringent than the
norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is
a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would
signal the progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts of law
12
and in our legal system as we know it.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the
deplorable "hazing" activities certainly
fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and
his co-accused had failed to discharge
their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence
in all of them that, at the very least, he
would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and
was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good
moral character.
Now that the original period of probation
granted by the trial court has expired,
the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant
A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to
this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the
community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known
Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student
to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby
DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and
mother (in default thereof, brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan),
within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be
furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19,
1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO
TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
passed the bar examinations held in
1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in
petitioner' s conviction, arose from
the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime
in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to
homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the
trial court rendered judgment
dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence
of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court
granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court
issued an order approving a report
dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending
petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed
before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through
then Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C.
Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above
resolution, petitioner submitted no
less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five
(5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter's family and the eight
(8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court
required Atty Gilbert Camaligan,
father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December
1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the
infliction of severe physical injuries
which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The
offense therefore was not only
homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and
treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's
plea of guilt to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their
knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one of
the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has
forgiven petitioner and his co-
accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had
lost a son whom he had hoped
would succeed him in his law
practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of
the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say
whether petitioner is now morally fit
for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the
sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege
granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers
who are instruments in the effective
and efficient administration o f
justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers
who have become a disgrace to the
noble profession of the law but, also
of equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer' s
oath, thereby further tarnishing the
public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us
required a weighing and re-weighing
of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to
the practice of law. The senseless
beatings inf1icted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant
and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in
this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding
that the participant [herein petitioner]
was then possessed of good moral
1
character." chanroblesvirtuallawlibra
ry
In the same resolution, however, we
stated that the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court
understands and shares the
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a
parent, a most traumatic experience.
The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes
other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of
third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief
and anger directed at the cause of
death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before
the Court manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this cases, to find
room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that
he is still not in a position to state if
petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of
this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll
of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is
a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr.
Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to
give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the
lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according
to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr.
Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now
be in a better position to render legal
and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner
Al Caparros Argosino is hereby
ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to
sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457
February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA,
Complainant, vs.
ATTY. RAUL H.
SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were
filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia)
against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio
(Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed
as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
were consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar
Confidant. The case was docketed as
A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in
1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in
Cebu. They had two children, Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he
and Virginia separated. He became a
dentist and practiced his profession in
Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that
in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the
annulment of their marriage, which was
eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was
in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an
action for support against him and his
sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria
Margarita was already 39 years old
while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The
case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia
returned from Japan. When Sesbreño
and Garcia’s children learned abouthis
return, Sesbreño filed a Second
Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreño
was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for
Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is
only on parole. Garcia alleged that
homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should
not be allowed to continue his practice
of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that
on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a
similar complaint against him before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-
2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s
complaint was motivated by resentment
and desire for revenge because he
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18
January 2010, the Court referred A.C.
No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-
2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973,
or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He
alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for
homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733, and despite the facts that he is
only on parole and that he has not fully
served his sentence. Garcia alleged
that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court by continuing
to engage in the practice of law despite
his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-
CBD, Garcia submitted his verified
complaint against Sesbreño alleging
basically the same facts he alleged in
A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint,
Sesbreño alleged that his sentence
was commuted and the phrase "with
the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law" was deleted.
Sesbreño argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve
moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by
extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing
Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No.
7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The
parties agreed on the sole issue to be
resolved: whether moral turpitude is
involved in a conviction for homicide.
The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño
guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, this Court downgraded the
crime to homicide and sentenced
Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 16 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporalas
maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreño was released from
confinement on 27 July 2001 following
his acceptance of the conditions of his
parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension.
Citing International Rice Research
Institute v. National Labor Relations
1
Commission, the IBPCBD further
ruled that homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on
the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD
reviewed the decision of this Court
convicting Sesbreño for the crime of
homicide, and found that the
circumstances leading to the death of
the victim involved moral turpitude. The
IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or
his companion Christopher Yapchangco
was shown to be a foe of respondent
and neither had the victim Luciano nor
his companion Christopher shown to
have wronged the respondent. They
simply happened to be at the wrong
place and time the early morning of
June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of
Luciano solely caused by respondent,
bear the earmarks of moral turpitude.
Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court
observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra,
the respondent, by his conduct,
displayed extreme arrogance and
feeling of self-importance. Respondent
acted like a god who deserved not to be
slighted by a couple of drunks who may
have shattered the stillness of the early
morning with their boisterous antics,
natural display of loud bravado of
drunken men who had one too many.
Respondent’s inordinate over reaction
to the ramblings of drunken men who
were not even directed at respondent
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession.
Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a
2
misplaced sense of superiority.
Following the ruling of this Court in
3
Soriano v. Atty. Dizon where the
respondent was disbarred for having
been convicted of frustrated homicide,
the IBP-CBD recommended that
Sesbreño be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19
dated 12 February 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion
for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD.
Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD
misunderstood and misapplied Soriano
v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the
attendant circumstances in Sorianoare
disparate, distinct, and different from his
case. He further alleged that there was
no condition set on the grant of
executive clemency to him; and thus, he
was restored to his full civil and political
rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that
after his wife died in an ambush, he
already stopped appearing as private
prosecutor in the case for bigamy
against Garcia and that he already
advised his clients to settle their other
cases. He alleged that Garcia already
withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XX-
2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for
reconsideration. The IBPCBD
transmitted the records of the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May
2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was
redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the
Court’s Resolution dated 30 September
2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No.
7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is
whether conviction for the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD and
approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19
dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution
No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014
of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime
4
involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general, contraryto
justice, honesty, modesty, or good
5 sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9
morals.
The question of whether conviction for
homicide involves moral turpitude was
discussed by this Court in International
6 indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Rice Research Institute v. NLRC
where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of
the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may
or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but
not always, crimes mala in seinvolve
moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning
of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the
7
cases are reached.
8
In People v. Sesbreño, the Court found
Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a
minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with
accessory penalties provided by law, to
Luciano Amparado in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
9
SO ORDERED.
We reviewed the Decision of this Court
and we agree with the IBPCBD that the
circumstances show the presence of
moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim
Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his
companion Christopher Yapchangco
(Yapchangco) were walking and just
passed by Sesbreño’s house when the
latter, without any provocation from the
former, went out of his house, aimed his
rifle, and started firing at them. According
to Yapchangco, theywere about five
meters, more or less, from the gate of
Sesbreño when they heard the
screeching sound of the gate and when
they turned around, they saw Sesbreño
aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and
Amparado ran away but Amparado was
hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes
(Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots
and opened the window of his house. He
saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his
firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in
the process. Another witness, Edwin
Parune, saw Amparado fall down after
being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the
middle of the street, carrying a long
firearm, and walking back towards the
gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly
stated that Amparado and Yapchangco
were just at the wrong place and time.
They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño
that eventually led to the death of
Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument
that the executive clemency restored
his full civil and political rights.
10
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to
bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and
11
unconditional pardon" which restored
12
his "full civil and political rights," a
circumstance not present inthese cases.
13
Here, the Order of Commutation did not
state that the pardon was absolute and
unconditional. The accessory penalties
were not mentioned when the original
sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutation and they were also not
mentioned in stating the commuted
sentence. It only states: By virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the original sentence of
prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA
convicted by the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City and Supreme Court and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16
years and 4 months imprisonment and to
pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are
hereby commuted to an indeterminate
prison term of from 7 years and 6 months
to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an
14
indemnity of ₱50,000.00.
Again, there was no mention that the
executive clemency was absolute and
unconditional and restored Sesbreño to
his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency
that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
15
judgment. In this case, the executive
clemency merely "commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of 7 years and
6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the
penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of
16
penalty. Commutation only partially
17
extinguished criminal liability. The
penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never
wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he
was released from prison. More
importantly, the Final Release and
18
Discharge stated that "[i]t is
understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been
expressly remitted herein shall subsist."
Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has
been granted pardon, there is nothing in
the records that shows that it was a full
and unconditional pardon. In addition,
the practice of law is not a right but a
19
privilege. It is granted only to those
20
possessing good moral character. A
violation of the high moral standards of
the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty
21
of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul
H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED
effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
PATRICK A.
CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD
A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY.
PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the
1
Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's
identity and falsely representing that the
former has the required educational
qualifications to take the Bar
Examinations and be admitted to the
practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are
2
siblings born to Porferio R. Caronan,
Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent
is the older of the two, having been born
on February 7, 1975, while complainant
3
was born on August 5, 1976. Both of
them completed their secondary
education at the Makati High School
where complainant graduated in
4 5
1993 and respondent in 1991. Upon
his graduation, complainant enrolled at
the University of Makati where he
obtained a degree in Business
6
Administration in 1997. He started
working thereafter as a Sales Associate
for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC),
the operator of 7-11 Convenience
7
Stores. In 2001, he married Myrna G.
Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
8
daughters. Through the years,
complainant rose from the ranks until, in
2009, he was promoted as a Store
Manager of the 7-11 Store in
9 his promotion as Store Manager,
Muntinlupa.
Meanwhile, upon graduating from
high school, respondent enrolled at
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one
(1) year before transferring to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in
10
1992. In 1993, he was discharged
from the PMA and focused on helping
their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva
Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their
11
three (3) children. Since then,
respondent never went back to school
to earn a college degree.
12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in
Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled
in a law school in Nueva
13
Vizcaya. Subsequently, in 2004, their
mother informed complainant that
respondent passed the Bar Examinations
and that he used complainant's name and
college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's
College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
14
Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.
Complainant brushed these aside as he
did not
anticipate any adverse consequences
15
to him.
In 2006, complainant was able to
confirm respondent's use of his name
and identity when he saw the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate
of Admission to the Bar displayed at the
latter's office in Taguig
16
City. Nevertheless, complainant did
not confront respondent about it since
he was pre-occupied with his job and
17
had a family to support.
Sometime in May 2009, however, after
complainant was ordered to report to
the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong
City where, upon arrival, he was
informed that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was requesting his
presence at its office in Taft Avenue,
Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point,
was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
18
Caronan." Accordingly, on May 18,
2009, complainant appeared before the
Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes
Division of the NBI where he was
interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and
respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University
of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and
respondent's driver's licenses; (4)
records from St. Mary's University
showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati
and his Birth Certificate were submitted
to St. Mary's University's College of
Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's
photograph under the name "Patrick A.
19
Caronan." Complainant later learned
that the reason why he was invited by
the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft
and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G.
Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's
20
wedding.
Realizing that respondent had been using
his name to perpetrate crimes and
commit unlawful activities, complainant
took it upon himself to inform other
people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real
name is Richard A.
21
Caronan. However, problems relating
to respondent's use of the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound
him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter
from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco
Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact
details or, in the alternative, schedule a
meeting with him to discuss certain
22
matters concerning respondent. On
the other hand, a fellow church-member
had also told him that respondent who,
using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-
23
member's) relatives. Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain
Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who
narrated how respondent tricked her
into believing that he was authorized to
sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when
24
in fact, he was not. Further, he
learned that respondent was arrested
for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
25
22.
Due to the controversies involving
respondent's use of the name "Patrick
A. Caronan," complainant developed a
fear for his own safety and
26
security. He also became the subject
of conversations among his colleagues,
which eventually forced him to resign
27
from his job at PSC. Hence,
complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged
use of the former's name and identity,
and illegal practice of
law.
28
29
In his Answer, respondent denied
all the allegations against him arid
invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no
longer be raised as an issue as it had
already been resolved in CBD Case No.
09-2362 where the IBP Board of
30
Governors dismissed the
31
administrative case filed by Agtarap
against him, and which case had
already been declared closed and
terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
32
10074. Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and
her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito
M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace,
malign, discredit, and harass him
because he filed several administrative
and criminal complaints against them
33
before the Ombudsman.
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD
conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to
34
appear. Instead, respondent moved
35
to reset the same on April 20, 2015.
On such date, however, both parties
again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
36
Order directing them to file their
respective position papers. However,
37
neither of the parties submitted any.
The IBP's Report and
Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
(Investigating Commissioner) issued
38
his Report and Recommendation,
finding respondent guilty of illegally and
falsely assuming complainant's name,
39
identity, and academic records. He
observed that respondent failed to
controvert all the allegations against
him and did not present any proof to
40
prove his identity. On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the
real "Patrick A.
41
Caronan."

Further, he noted that respondent
admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his
parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married
42
to Rosana Halili-Caronan. However,
based on the Marriage Certificate
issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married
to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.
43
The Investigating Commissioner also
drew attention to the fact that .the
photograph taken of respondent when he
was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person
as the one in the photograph in the IBP
44
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."
These, according to the Investigating
Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant's identity to
study law and take the Bar
45
Examinations. Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and
academic records of complainant and the
real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained
the bachelor of laws degree nor took the
Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and
46
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. He
also recommended that respondent and
the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted as a member of the
Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of
the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions
against respondent.
47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
48
2015-607, adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or
not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the
records, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP,
complainant has established by clear
and overwhelming evidence that he is
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent, whose real name is Richard
A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's
name, identity, and academic records to
enroll at the St. Mary's University's
College of Law, obtain a law degree,
and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent
admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that his
parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
49
and Norma Atillo. Respondent himself
also stated that he is married to Rosana
50
Halili-Caronan. This diverges from the
official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to
Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-
51
Caronan. Moreover, the photograph
taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in
the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
 52
Caronan." Meanwhile, complainant
submitted numerous documents
showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his
transcript of records from the University
53
of Makati bearing his photograph; (b)
a copy of his high school yearbook with
his photograph and the name "Patrick
54
A. Caronan" under it; and (c) NBI
clearances obtained in 2010 and
2013.
55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing
indubitably confirm that respondent
falsely used complainant's name, identity,
and school records to gain admission to
the Bar. Since complainant
- the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never
took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering
that respondent, whose real name is
"Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily
completed a pre-law course, viz.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for
admission to the bar examination shall
be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with any of
the following subject as major or field
of concentration: political science,
logic, english, Spanish, history, and
economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never
completed his college degree. While
he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left
a year later and entered the PMA
where he was discharged in 1993
56
without graduating. Clearly,
respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the
possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn
a law degree under his real name.
However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational
records renders him unfit for admission
to the Bar. The practice of law, after all,
is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to
57
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a privilege limited to citizens of good
58
moral character. In In the Matter of
the Disqualification of Bar Examinee
Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar
Examinations and for Disciplinary Action
as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar,
59
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, the Court
explained the essence of good moral
character:
Good moral character is what a person
really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which
. he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape
the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common
honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his
dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when
he assumed the name, identity, and
school records of his own brother and
dragged the latter into controversies
which eventually caused him to fear for
his safety and to resign from PSC where
he had been working for years. Good
moral character is essential in those
61
who would be lawyers. This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a
lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as
between him and the
62
court.
Finally, respondent made a mockery of
the legal profession by pretending to
have the necessary qualifications to be
a lawyer. He also tarnished the image
of lawyers with his alleged
unscrupulous activities, which resulted
in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and
his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary
duties of its members is to uphold its
63
integrity and dignity.
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard
A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" (respondent) is
found GUILTY of falsely assuming the
name, identity, and academic records of
complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant) to obtain a law degree
and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the
filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from
engaging in the practice of law or
making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being
admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificates
issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or
REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator
is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and
POST in the bulletin boards of all courts
of the country a photograph of
respondent with his real name, " Richard
A. Caronan," with a warning that he is
not a member of the Philippine Bar and
a statement of his false assumption of
the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO
ORDERED.
DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES OF A
LAWYER
A.C. No. 5305 - March 17, 2003
MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., Petitioner,
vs. FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment,
complainant Marciano Brion, Jr.,
charges the respondent, Atty. Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated
a lawful order of this Court in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel
Atienza v. Judge Francisco F.
1
Brillantes, Jr. The decretal portion of
our resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is
DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
2 respondent signing as "Accountable
SO ORDERED.
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid
case was ordered after he was found
guilty of Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety during his
incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent
violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him
from assuming any post in government
service, including any posts in
government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal
consultancy post at the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), from
1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as
6th member of the Board of Directors of
the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water
District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was
subsequently renewed as a Special
Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both
consultancy agreements contained a
proviso to the effect that nothing therein
should be construed as establishing an
employer-employee relationship
between LWUA and respondent, the
inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy
to circumvent our order barring
respondent from appointment to a
government agency. Petitioner points
out in reality, respondent enjoys the
same rights and privileges as a regular
3
employee, to wit:
1. Issuance of LWUA properties
such as a cellular phone with
accessories, as evidenced by the
covering Property Issue Slips with
4
Employee";
2. Official travel to various places
in the country as shown by Reports of
Authorized Travel kept by LWUAs
5
General Services Division and Report
of Travel accomplished by respondent
6
himself;
3. Designation as supervising
officer over other LWUA employees as
brought to light by written instructions
7
personally signed by respondent;
4.Attendance in water district
conventions and meetings held
8 reasons out that the same is not a
in various provinces;
5.Membership in several sensitive
LWUA committees such as the
Prequalification, Bids, and Awards
Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Committee, among
others, with receipt of corresponding
honoraria as borne out by various
9
Disbursement Vouchers;
6.Sitting at meetings of the LWUA
Board of Trustees as evidenced by the
10
minutes of such meetings; and
7.Receipt of Productivity
Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the
foregoing constitute deceitful conduct,
gross misconduct, and willful
disobedience to a decree of this Court,
and show that respondent is unfit to
be a member of the Bar.
11
In his comment, respondent admits
the existence of the Legal Consultancy
Contract as well as the Special
Consultancy Contract. However, he
raises the affirmative defense that under
Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1993, services rendered pursuant to a
consultancy contract shall not be
considered government services, and
therefore, are not covered by Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to
the same Memorandum Circular issued
by the Commission, consultancy
contracts do not have to be submitted
to the Commission for approval. With
respect to his designation as the 6th
Member of the Board of Directors of the
Urdaneta Water District, respondent
"reappointment", which is prohibited by
our ruling in Atienza, as said designation
is not an organic appointment to a LWUA
plantilla position. Hence, according to
respondent, the CSC need not pass
approval upon his temporary designation.
Respondent also argues that all the
members of the Urdaneta Water
District Board, especially the 6th
Member, who comes from the LWUA,
assumed such functions merely by
virtue of a designation and only in
addition to their regular duties. In any
event, says respondent, his designation
as 6th Member was revoked in April
2000 and the Special Consultancy
Contract was pre-terminated on April
30, 2000. It has never been renewed
since then. With respect to his use of
LWUA properties, respondent admits
receiving the cellular phone unit but
insists that he merely borrowed it from
one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA
Board of Trustees Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001,
we referred this case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline found that respondent
willfully violated a lawful order of this
Court and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year and fined
ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.
There is no question that the LWUA is a
government-owned and controlled
corporation, created by virtue of
12
Presidential Decree No. 198. As such,
our ruling in the Atienza case, A.M.
No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically
prohibits respondents appointment to
any position in any government-owned
and controlled corporation, clearly
encompasses and extends to LWUA
positions.
In the instant case the respondent does
13
not deny the petitioners allegations.
Instead, he offers the existence of
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate
himself from the charge against him.
However, it does not escape our
attention that the very Memorandum
Circular that respondent cites before
this Court provides that the duties
enumerated in the consultancy contract
14
are mainly advisory in nature.
Without belaboring the definition of
15
"advisory," it appears obvious to us
that the tasks and duties that
respondent performed pursuant to
the consultancy contract cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be
deemed merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory
powers over LWUA employees nor does
he issue written instructions to them. An
adviser is not entitled to a seat in such
vital LWUA committees like PBAC and
the BOT Committee. Also, respondents
continuous receipt of honoraria for sitting
as a member of certain LWUA
Committees, particularly the BOT
Committee, belies his claim that he is a
mere consultant for the LWUA. The
evidence on record clearly shows that the
LWUA Office Order implementing
National Compensation Circular No. 75-
16
95 refers to payments of honoraria to
officials/employees in consideration
of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondents
acceptance of his 1998 Productivity
Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of
Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of
17
1999, of the LWUA, which governed
the release of the PIB, limited the
entitlement to said bonus only to
"officials" and "employees" (permanent,
temporary, casual, or contractual) of
LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and
purposes, respondent performed duties
and functions of a non-advisory nature,
which pertain to a contractual employee
of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his
18
reply, there is a difference between a
consultant hired on a contractual basis
(which is governed by CSC M.C. No.
27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee
(whose appointment is governed,
among others, by the CSC Omnibus
Rules on Appointment and other
Personnel Actions). By performing
duties and functions, which clearly
pertain to a contractual employee, albeit
in the guise of an advisor or consultant,
respondent has transgressed both letter
and spirit of this Courts decree in
Atienza.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated
in the Attorneys Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal
19
processes. That duty in its irreducible
minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondents
disobedience to this Courts order
prohibiting his reappointment to any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of
government, including government
owned and controlled corporations,
cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy
contract. By performing duties and
functions of a contractual employee of
LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and
receiving compensation and perquisites
as such, he displayed acts of open
defiance of the Courts authority, and a
deliberate rejection of his oath as an
officer of the court. It is also destructive
of the harmonious relations that should
prevail between Bench and Bar, a
harmony necessary for the proper
administration of justice. Such defiance
not only erodes respect for the Court but
also corrodes public confidence in the
rule of law.
What aggravates respondents offense is
the fact that respondent is no ordinary
lawyer. Having served in the judiciary
for eight (8) years, he is very well aware
of the standards of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. His
propensity to try to "get away" with an
indiscretion becomes apparent and
inexcusable when he entered into a
legal "consultancy" contract with the
LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own
mistake, LWUA terminated said contract
with respondent, but then proceeded to
give him a "special consultancy." This
travesty could not be long hidden from
public awareness, hence the instant
complaint for disbarment filed by
petitioner. Given the factual
circumstances found by Commission on
Bar Discipline, we have no hesitance in
accepting the recommendation of the
Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, that respondent be fined
and suspended from the practice of law.
The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For violating the Code as well as
transgressing his oath as an officer
of the court, his suspension for one
(1) year and a fine of ten thousand
(P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable
for having willfully violated a lawful order
of this Court in our decision of March
29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-
706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs.
Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year and ordered to
pay a FINE of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar conduct shall be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the personal records of
respondent as well as circulated to all
courts in the Philippines. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 7815 : July 23, 2009]
DOLORES C.
BELLEZA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of the complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Dolores
C. Belleza against respondent Atty. Alan
S. Macasa for unprofessional and
unethical conduct in connection with the
handling of a criminal case involving
complainant's son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant
went to see respondent on referral of
their mutual friend, Joe Chua.
Complainant wanted to avail of
respondent's legal services in
connection with the case of her son,
Francis John Belleza, who was arrested
by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that
day for alleged violation of Republic Act
1
(RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to
handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a
partial payment of P15,000 to
respondent thru their mutual friend
Chua. On November 17, 2004, she
gave him an additional P10,000. She
paid the P5,000 balance on November
18, 2004. Both payments were also
made thru Chua. On all three occasions,
respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent
received P18,000 from complainant for
the purpose of posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of her
(complainant's) son. Again, respondent
did not issue any receipt. When
complainant went to the court the next
day, she found out that respondent did
not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the
P18,000 from respondent on several
occasions but respondent ignored
her. Moreover, respondent failed to
act on the case of complainant's son
and complainant was forced to avail
of the services of the Public Attorney's
Office for her son's defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a
2
verified complaint for disbarment
against respondent in the Negros
Occidental chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached
to the verified complaint was the
3
affidavit of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and
resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata,
Bacolod City, after having been sworn to
in accordance with law, hereby depose
and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d]
Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan
Macasa when she looked for a lawyer
to help her son in the case that the
latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first
week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual
closeness to both of them, I am the
one who facilitated the payment of Mrs.
DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan
Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received
the following amount from Mrs.
Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty.
Alan Macasa:
Date Amount
November 11, 2004 P15,000.00
A week after 10,000.00
November 18, 2004 5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts
which I supposed as Attorney's Fees
were immediately forwarded by me to
Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit
in order to attest to the truth of all the
foregoing statements.
4
xxx xxx xxx
5
In a letter dated May 23, 2005, the
IBP Negros Occidental chapter
transmitted the complaint to the IBP's
6 all money or property collected or
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
7
In an order dated July 13, 2005, the
CBD required respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt
thereof. Respondent, in an urgent
motion for extension of time to file an
8
answer dated August 10, 2005, simply
brushed aside the complaint for being
"baseless, groundless and malicious"
without, however, offering any
explanation. He also prayed that he be
given until September 4, 2005 to
submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed
9 also recommended that respondent be
urgent motions for second and third
extensions of time praying to be
given until November 4, 2005 to
submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the
mandatory conference on April 19,
2006, they were ordered to submit their
10
respective position papers.
In its report and recommendation dated
11
October 2, 2007, the CBD ruled that
respondent failed to rebut the charges
against him. He never answered the
complaint despite several chances to
do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of
Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those others kept by
him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked
good moral character and that he was
unfit and unworthy of the privileges
conferred by law on him as a member
of the bar. The CBD recommended a
suspension of six months with a stern
warning that repetition of similar acts
would merit a more severe sanction. It
ordered to return to complainant
the P18,000 intended for the
provisional liberty of the complainant's
son and the P30,000 attorney's fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent be ordered
to return to complainant only the amount
of P30,000 which he received as
12
attorney's fees.
We affirm the CBD's finding of guilt as
affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors
but we modify the IBP's
recommendation as to the liability
of respondent.
Respondent Disrespected
Legal Processes
Respondent was given more than
enough opportunity to answer the
charges against him. Yet, he showed
indifference to the orders of the CBD
for him to answer and refute the
accusations of professional misconduct
against him. In doing so, he failed to
observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBD's
directive for him to file his position
paper. His propensity to flout the orders
of the CBD showed his lack of concern
and disrespect for the proceedings of
the CBD. He disregarded the oath he
took when he was accepted to the legal
profession "to obey the laws and the
legal orders of the duly constituted
legal authorities." He displayed
insolence not only to the CBD but also
to this Court which is the source of the
CBD's authority.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of
the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted
utter disrespect for the judiciary and his
13
fellow lawyers. His conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called
upon to obey court orders and
processes and is expected to stand
foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the
14
court. Respondent should have
known that the orders of the CBD (as
the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers)
were not mere requests but directives
which should have been complied with
promptly and
15
completely.
Respondent Grossly Neglected
The Cause of His Client
Respondent undertook to defend the
criminal case against complainant's son.
Such undertaking imposed upon him the
following duties:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL
REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a
client commits to devote himself
(particularly his time, knowledge, skills
and effort) to such cause. He must be
ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him, constantly striving to be
worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full
devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill and
ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from his client, save
16
by the rules of law legally applied.
A lawyer who accepts professional
employment from a client undertakes to
serve his client with competence and
17
diligence. He must conscientiously
perform his duty arising from such
relationship. He must bear in mind that
by accepting a retainer, he impliedly
makes the following representations:
that he possesses the requisite degree
of learning, skill and ability other lawyers
similarly situated possess; that he will
exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the litigation
entrusted to him; that he will exercise
reasonable care and diligence in the
use of his skill and in the application of
his knowledge to his client's cause; and
that he will take all steps necessary to
adequately safeguard his client's
18
interest.
A lawyer's negligence in the discharge
of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may
cause delay in the administration of
justice and prejudice the rights of a
litigant, particularly his client. Thus,
from the perspective of the ethics of the
legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in
carrying out his duties to his client is
19
both unprofessional and unethical.
If his client's case is already pending in
court, a lawyer must actively represent
his client by promptly filing the
necessary pleading or motion and
assiduously attending the scheduled
hearings. This is specially significant for
a lawyer who represents an accused in
a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to
counsel under the
20
Constitution. However, this right can
only be meaningful if the accused is
accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from
the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality
that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than
just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused
is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense
and acts accordingly. The right
assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly
at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on
the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws
and existing jurisprudence.
21
'∞-○-∞'
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is
beyond question a fundamental right.
Without counsel, the right to a fair trial
itself would be of little consequence, for
it is through counsel that the accused
secures his other rights. In other
words, the right to counsel is the right
to effective assistance of counsel.
22
The right of an accused to counsel
finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity
23
to his client. Tersely put, it means an
effective, efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance, not a simply
24
perfunctory representation.
In this case, after accepting the criminal
case against complainant's son and
receiving his attorney's fees, respondent
did nothing that could be considered as
effective and efficient legal assistance.
For all intents and purposes, respondent
abandoned the cause of his client.
Indeed, on account of respondent's
continued inaction, complainant was
compelled to seek the services of the
Public Attorney's Office. Respondent's
lackadaisical attitude towards the case
of complainant's son was reprehensible.
Not only did it prejudice complainant's
son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel.
Furthermore, in failing to use the
amount entrusted to him for posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of
his client, respondent unduly impeded
the latter's constitutional right to bail.
Respondent Failed to
Return His Client's Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship
between counsel and client imposes on
a lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received
25
for or from the client.
When a lawyer collects or receives
money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and
office expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the money
was spent. If he does not use the
money for its intended purpose, he must
26
immediately return it to the client. His
failure either to render an accounting or
to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
27
Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to
deliver his client's funds or properties
28
as they fall due or upon demand. His
failure to return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by
29
the client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and
30
deserves punishment. Indeed, it may
border on the criminal as it may
constitute a prima facie case of
swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied
receiving P18,000 from complainant for
the purpose of posting a bond to secure
the provisional liberty of her son. He
never used the money for its intended
purpose yet also never returned it to the
client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to
turn over the amount to complainant
despite the latter's repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no
service that would have entitled him to
the P30,000 attorney's fees. As a rule,
the right of a lawyer to a reasonable
compensation for his services is subject
to two requisites: (1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship and (2) the
rendition by the lawyer of services to
31
the client. Thus, a lawyer who does
not render legal services is not entitled
to attorney's fees. Otherwise, not only
would he be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the client, he would also be
rewarded for his negligence and
irresponsibility.
Respondent Failed to Uphold
the Integrity and Dignity of the
Legal Profession
For his failure to comply with the
exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to obey
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by
the Canons and Rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility disrespects
the said Code and everything that it
stands for. In so doing, he disregards
the ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the
ethical standards of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Public confidence in law
and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
32
Thus, every lawyer
should act and
comport himself in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.
33
Respondent was undeserving of the
trust reposed in him. Instead of using
the money for the bond of the
complainant's son, he pocketed it. He
failed to observe candor, fairness and
34
loyalty in his dealings with his client.
He failed to live up to his fiduciary
duties. By keeping the money for
himself despite his undertaking that he
would facilitate the release of
complainant's son, respondent
showed lack of moral principles. His
transgression showed him to be a
swindler, a deceitful person and a
shame to the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S.
Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not
only of dishonesty but also of
professional misconduct for prejudicing
Francis John Belleza's right to counsel
and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2),
Article III of the Constitution, and for
violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19
and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03
and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice
of law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to
return to complainant Dolores C.
Belleza the amounts of P30,000 and
P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of promulgation of this
decision until full payment. Respondent
is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court proof of payment of the amount
within ten days from payment. Failure to
do so will subject him to criminal
prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be furnished
to the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9269, March 13, 2019
AZUCENA C. TABAO, PETITIONER, v.
ATTY. ALEXANDER R. LACABA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from
1 Prosecutor in the perjury case was
a letter filed by Azucena C. Tabao
(complainant) before the Court,
charging Atty. Alexander R. Lacaba of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice (Rules on Notarial Practice).
2 through telephone and video call via
The Facts
Complainant, with her siblings, charged
Jester Q. Repulda, Edmund C. Elcarte,
Noel Vincent P. Cinco (Noel), Paul
Michael P. Cinco (Paul), Marlin B.
Cinco (Marlin), and Marie Janice P.
Cinco (Marie) of perjury. According to
complainant, Atty. Alexander R. Lacaba
(Atty. Lacaba) notarized the two-page
3 counter-affidavit and asked her if she
Counter-Affidavit executed by Noel,
Paul, Marlin, and Marie without the
personal appearance of Marlin and
Marie. A perusal of this Counter-
Affidavit, which was filed during the
preliminary investigation before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tacloban
City, Leyte, readily shows that somebody
else signed for Marlin and Marie. The
signatures above their names read
Rosalina Aloha B. Cinco (Rosalina) and
Felicita P. Cinco (Felicita), respectively.
More, it is impossible for Marlin and Marie
to have personally appeared before Atty.
Lacaba since during the execution of the
Counter-Affidavit, Marlin was in Dubai
working, while Marie was in Cebu City.
Aside from non-compliance with the
requirements of personal appearance and
attestation of the affiants, Atty. Lacaba
also failed to indicate the document
number, page number, book number, and
corresponding series year of his notarial
register in the Counter-Affidavit, as
4
required by notarial laws.
5
In his compliance, Atty. Lacaba did not
deny complainant's charges. As defense,
however, he claimed that the Investigating
informed before the filing of the Counter-
Affidavit that two of the affiants were
"physically absent" but could be contacted
internet. According to him, the
Investigating Prosecutor offered no
objection to the same. He notarized the
Counter-Affidavit by contacting Marlin and
Marie by video call using the laptop of
Felicitas, the mother of Marie, Noel, and
Paul, in his office in Sta. Fe, Leyte. He
narrated that he contacted Marie first and
that during the video call, he "could see
her in the monitor of the laptop and after
reading to her the contents of the subject
understood the contents read to her, the
latter affirmed, and voluntarily and
knowingly AUTHORIZED her mother
[Felicitas] to
 6
sign for and in her behalf." He then
made the video call with Marlin, and in
the same manner, Marlin authorized her
mother, Rosalina, to sign for and in her
behalf. Citing the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, he alleged that the video call
conversation can be considered a
"substitute of personal presence of a
person while physically absent from the
place of the other party." Further, the
circumstances of Marlin and Marie fall
under the "physical inability"
7
contemplated under Section 1(c), Rule
IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice. He,
nonetheless, admits that not all
elements required by the said provision
were present in this case. Atty. Lacaba
8
maintained that he was in good faith.
On July 29, 2013, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
9
report, and recommendation.
Both parties filed their respective
position papers and reiterated their
10
claims. Arty. Lacaba added that during
the preliminary investigation,
complainant never questioned the
representation of Rosalina and Felicitas
even though she was furnished with a
copy of the Counter-Affidavit. The law
on agency in the Civil Code does not
prohibit a party from appointing an agent
to execute a counter-affidavit for
purposes of preliminary investigation.
The submission of a counter-affidavit is
not even compulsory under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, hence a respondent
may delegate its execution to an agent
who must appear in person before the
notary public who will administer the
11
oath.
Report and Recommendation of the
IBP
In his Report and
12
Recommendation dated June 15,
2015, Investigating Commissioner
Rodolfo R. Zabella, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner Zabella) found Atty.
Lacaba guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rules IV and VI of
the Rules on Notarial Practice on the
following grounds: 1) Atty. Lacaba never
denied having notarized the Counter-
Affidavit despite the absence of two of
the affiants; 2) Rosalina and Felicitas
were not appointed representatives of
Marlin and Marie, respectively, in
accordance with the provisions of Title X
of the Civil Code, thus, they cannot sign
for and in behalf of the latter; and 3) the
Rules on Electronic Evidence finds no
application in the circumstances
surrounding the case. He recommended
that Atty. Lacaba be suspended for a
period of three months, that his notarial
commission, if any, be revoked, and that
he be prohibited from being
commissioned as a notary public for a
13
period of two years.
On April 29, 2016, the IBP Board of
Governors, in Resolution No. XXII-2016-
14
292, resolved to adopt the findings of
fact and recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Zabella but
increased the period of suspension from
the practice of law to six months. It,
thus, directed the Director of the
Commission on Bar Discipline to
prepare an extended resolution
explaining the Board's action.
In an Extended Resolution, the IBP
Board of Governors, through
Commission on Bar Discipline Director
Ramon S. Esguerra, explained the
increase of the period of suspension
from three to six months. Citing several
cases, it expounded on the importance
15
of notarization and the rule that
notaries public should not notarize a
document without the personal
appearance of the person who executed
16
the same. Atty. Lacaba never denied
the charges against him; he merely
posited that the requirement of personal
appearance was satisfied through the
video call with Marlin and Marie and the
physical presence of their
representatives, Rosalina and Felicitas,
who signed the Counter-Affidavit.
According to the IBP Board of
Governors, Atty. Lacaba's contentions
cannot be given credit because in the
17
similar case of Bon v. Ziga, the Court
rejected the defense of substantial
compliance to the requirement of
personal appearance of the affiant, i.e.,
speaking with the affiants over the
telephone to secure their affirmation that
18
their signatures were genuine. In
addition, there is no legal basis to
support his argument that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure do not prohibit the
execution of a counter-affidavit by a
representative. On his failure to indicate
in the Counter-Affidavit the document
number, page number, book number,
and the corresponding series year of his
notarial register, such is a clear violation
of Section 2(e), Rule VI of the Rules on
Notarial Practice as these formalities
are mandatory and cannot be simply
neglected considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized
19
documents. Clearly, Atty. Lacaba
cannot escape liability for violating
notarial laws. It applied the penalty
meted by the Court in Bon, considering
the analogous circumstances in the
cases. Thus, the IBP Board of Governor
recommended the suspension of Atty.
Lacaba from the practice of law for six
months, his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for two
years, and the revocation of his
20
notarial commission, if there be any.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court upholds the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors.
There is no dispute that Atty. Lacaba
violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Both in his Compliance and Position
Paper, he never disputed the fact that
he notarized the Counter-Affidavit
without the personal appearance of all
the affiants. He also did not address his
failure to indicate in the Counter-
Affidavit the document number, page
number, book number, and the
corresponding series year of his notarial
register. He merely offered good faith
and substantial compliance as
defenses. Section 2(b), Rule IV and
Section 2(e), Rule VI of the Rules on
Notarial Practice are clear:
Rule IV
xxxx
Sec. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
xxxx
b. A person
shall not
perform a
notarial act
if the person
involved as
signatory to
the
instrument
or document
-
 therein. The purpose of this requirement
(1) is not in the is to enable the notary public to verify the
notary's presence genuineness of the signature of the
personally at the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
time of the the document is the party's free act and
21
notarization; and deed. Thus, it is undeniable that
(2) is not personally Rosalina and Felicitas could not validly
sign for and in behalf of Marlin and Marie
for the simple reason that they do not
known to the notary have personal knowledge of the
public or otherwise allegations in the Counter-Affidavit, and
identified by the therefore, could not attest to the
notary public through truthfulness thereof.
competent evidence
of identity as defined It cannot be overemphasized that
by these Rules. "notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest.
xxxx
Notarization converts a private
document into a public document,
Rule VI making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
xxxx notarized document is, by law, entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. It is
Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. for this reason that a notary public must
-xxx observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his
xxxx notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized
22
e. The notary public shall give to each document would be undermined."
instrument or document executed, Atty. Lacaba cannot, therefore,
sworn to, or acknowledged before frivolously bend the rules to his benefit.
him a number corresponding to the
one in his register, and shall also The Court likewise adopts the
state on the instrument or recommended penalty of the IBP Board
document the page/s of his of Governors. The penalty of
register on which the same is suspension from the practice of law for
recorded. No blank line shall be left the period of six months, disqualification
between entries. (Emphasis from being commissioned as a notary
supplied.) public for a period of two years, and
revocation of his notarial commission, if
A notary public is not allowed to notarize any, is commensurate and in accord
a document unless the persons who 23
signed the same are the very same with existing jurisprudence.
persons who executed and personally
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
appeared before him to attest to the
Alexander R. Lacaba is
contents and truth of what are stated
ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months effective
from the date of finality of this Decision.
His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for two
years. He is also sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. Atty. Lacaba
is directed to inform the Court of the date
of his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.
LAWYER AND THE SOCIETY
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ,
ISABELO ONGTENGCO,
ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND
ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER,
complainants, vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M.
GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña
& Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for
respondent Benjamin Grecia.
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against
Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed
on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto
Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and
Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's
Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's"
for brevity) where they are accredited
medical practitioners. The respondent is
charged with dishonesty and grave
misconduct in connection with the theft
of some pages from a medical chart
which was material evidence in a
damage suit filed by his clients against
the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are
in a class by themselves. As we observed
in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600,
they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. "Public interests is the primary
objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such." The purpose is
"to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court" (In
Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577,
588), or to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney (Ledesma vs.
Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to
respondent Grecia. On November 12,
1987, he was disbarred for his immoral
complicity or "unholy alliance" with a
judge in Quezon City to rip off banks
and Chinese business firms which had
the misfortune to be sued in the latter's
court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose
P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia
[Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18,
1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for
compassions and his promise to mend
his ways, reinstated him in the
profession. Only eight (8) months later,
on August 20, 1991, he was back before
the court facing another charge of
dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary
action that the Court took against him
did not effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against
Attorney Grecia was referred by the
Court to Deputy Court of Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad for investigation,
report and recommendation. The
following are Judge Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7)
months pregnant when she was admitted
as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on
December 20, 1990. She complained of
dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal
pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr.
Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE
Department of St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco,
Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a
urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and
diagnosed her problem as mild pre-
eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five
(5) days later, on Christmas day,
December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was
discharged from the hospital, to
celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the
hospital the next day, December 26,
1990. On December 27, 1990, she
died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for
his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B.
Aves, along with his three (3) minor
children, brought an action for damages
against the hospital and the attending
physicians of his wife. Their counsel,
respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia,
filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's
Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez,
Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles
Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and
assigned to Branch 172, presided over
by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of
Fe Linda Aves were produced in court
by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney
Grecia. The records were entrusted to
the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o'
clock in the morning, upon arriving in
court for another hearing of the case,
Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs.
Robles the folder containing the
medical records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia
surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of
the medical records. The respondent's
act was notified by Mrs. Robles and
Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw
Grecia crumple the papers and place
them inside the right pocket of his coat.
He immediately returned the folder to
Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily
rendered speechless by his audacious
act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart
and found pages "72" and "73" missing.
She ordered Sandico to follow the
respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the
canteen at the end of the building,
calling a man (presumably his driver)
who was leaning against a parked car
(presumably Grecia's car). When the
man approached, Grecia gave him the
crumpled papers which he took from
his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the
office and reported what she had seen
to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn
reported it to Judge Capulong. The
three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles
and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs.
Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong
the man to whom Grecia had given the
papers which he had filched from
medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge
Capulong told Sandico to bring the man
to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the
plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St.
Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie
Limson. She requested them to come to
her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and
Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and
a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted
the man and ordered him to give her the
papers which Grecia had passed on to
him. The man at first denied that he had
the papers in his possession. However,
when Sandico declared that she saw
Grecia hand over the papers to him, the
man sheepishly took them from his
pants pocket and gave them to Judge
Capulong. When the crumpled pages
"72" and "73" of the medical folder were
shown to Sandico, she identified them
as the same papers that she saw Grecia
hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and
Robles went back to their office. Mrs.
Robles collapsed in a dead faint and
was rushed to the Fatima Hospital
where she later regained
consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion
of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one
thought of ascertaining the identity of
the man from whom they were
recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly
realized this, so she directed the
Valenzuela Police to find out who he
was. She also ordered Sandico to
submit a formal report of the theft of the
exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold
Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of
Grecia's driver who was known only as
"SID." He located Grecia's house in
Quezon City. Although he was not
allowed to enter the premises, he was
able to talk with a house maid. He
pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and
asked for the latter. The housemaid
informed him that "SID" was sent home
to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the
latter denied that he had a driver named
"SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of
Grecia's neighbors across the street.
The neighbor confirmed that Grecia's
driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous
emotional strain to the personnel of
Judge Capulong's court, so much so
that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles, was hospitalized.
Because of the incident, Judge
Capulong inhibited herself from
conducting the trial of Civil Case No.
3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed
this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by
Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves,
the surviving spouse of the late Fe
Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No.
3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu
Castro, counsel of the defendants in
said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted
two pages from the medical folder which
lay among some papers on top of the
table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court
Robles. When he allegedly went outside
the courthouse to wait for Attorney
Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney
Castro come out of the building and
walk toward a man in the parking lot to
whom he handed a piece of paper.
Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered
the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any
knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in
the Aves case. He alleged that the
person who was caught in possession
of the detached pages of the medical
record was actually "planted" by his
adversaries to discredit him and destroy
his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He
alleged that his car was out of order on
July 16, 1991, so he was fetched by the
driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's
"Maxima" car. He arrived in the
courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the
morning and went straight to the
courtroom on the second floor of the
building. He did not leave the place until
his case was called at 9:40. Since it
was allegedly a very warm day, he wore
a dark blue barong tagalog, not a
business suit. He branded the testimony
of Ms. Sandico as an absolute
falsehood. He alleged that he would not
have done the act imputed to him,
because the medical chart was the very
foundation of the civil case which he
filed against St. Luke's and its doctors.
He wondered why the man, alleged to
be his driver, to whom he supposedly
gave the detached pages of the medical
chart, was neither held nor arrested. His
identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of
Police Investigator Alabastro as a
fabrication for he had never seen
him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the
lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of
the court personnel, accosted him about
the purloined pages of the medical
record and he alleged that the
unidentified man remained in the
courtroom even after the confrontation
in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the
witnesses, Judge Bernad found the
court employee, Maria Arnie Sandico,
and Acting branch Clerk of Court
Avelina Robles entirely credible and
"without any noticeable guile nor attempt
at fabrication, remaining constant even
under pressure of cross examination" (p.
11, Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer,
and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not
promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing
Grecia tear off two pages of the medical
record, was understandable for they
hesitated to confront a man of his
stature. Nevertheless, they had the
presence of mind to immediately report
the matter to their Judge who forthwith
took appropriate steps to recover the
exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3
Alabastro had absolutely no motive to
testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame
for failing to ascertain the identity of
Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift
action in summoning and confronting
him led to the recovery of the stolen
pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by
Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro
into identity of the man was fruitless
for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St.
Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not
Grecia, who stole the pages from the
medical folder and slipped them to an
unidentified man, is an incredible
fabrication. Not only is it directly
contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms.
Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney
Aves failed to mention it during the
confrontation with the man inside Judge
Capulong's chamber where he
(Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the
man inside the courtroom afterwards, is
not credible for he would have called
the attention of Judge Capulong who,
he knew, had been looking for the man
to ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his
counsel, Aves' testimony was properly
disregarded by the investigator, Judge
Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and
candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge
Bernad noted that while Grecia was
punctilious when testifying on the hour
of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July
16, 1991, and he even remembered
that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no
pockets), his memory was not sharp
when he was cross-examined regarding
more recent events. For instance, he
insisted that Judge Bernad was absent
on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that
a hearing was held on that date as
shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits
"A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an
issue of the absence of a court order to
deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in
court. He forgot that it was he who
asked that the chart be left with the clerk
of court.
His allegation that he would be the last
person to remove pages 72 and 73 of
the medical chart for the entries therein
are favorable to his client's cause is
specious. As a matter of fact, the
entries show that after Mrs. Aves was
readmitted to the hospital on December
26, 1990, the doctors were able to
stabilize her blood pressure with a
normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented
before Judge Bernad, the Court is
convinced that the charge against
Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true.
By stealing two pages from Linda Aves'
medical chart and passing them on to
his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon
1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7
thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer
shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful
conduct.
 Canon 7. A lawyer shall at
all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and
support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is
"like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice"
(People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60
A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible
practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia
would be ill-suited to discharge the role
of "an instrument to advance the ends
of justice."
The importance of integrity and
good moral character as part of a
lawyer's equipment in the practice of
his profession has been stressed by
this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should
maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do
honor to the legal
profession by faithfully
performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients.
To this end, nothing
should be done by any
member of the legal
fraternity which might tend
to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the
public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of
the profession. (Marcelo
vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No.
3248, September 18,
1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the
office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a
person of good moral
character. This
qualification is not only a
condition precedent to
admission to the practice
of law; its continued
possession is also
essential for remaining in
the practice of law, in the
exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar.
Gross misconduct on the
part of a lawyer, although
not related to the
discharge of professional
duties as a member of the
bar, which puts his moral
character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of
law. (Melendrez vs.
Decena, 176 SCRA 662,
676.)
. . . public policy demands
that legal work in
representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted
only to those possessing
tested qualifications and
who are sworn to observe
the rules and the ethics of
the profession, a s well as
being subject for judicial
disciplinary control for the
protection of court, clients
and the public. (Phil.
Association of Free Labor
Unions [PAFLU] vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar
Company, 42 SCRA 302,
305.)
By descending to the level of a common
thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned
and disgraced the legal profession. He
has demonstrated his moral unfitness to
continue as a member of the honorable
fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited
his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may
be disbarred or suspended
for any misconduct,
whether in his professional
or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of
the court, or an unfit or
unsafe person to enjoy the
privileges and to manage
the business of others in
the capacity of an
attorney, or for conduct
which tends to bring
reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in
the favorable opinion of
the public. (Marcelo vs.
Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248,
September 18, 1992, p.
15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney
Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly
unethical behavior as a lawyer.
Considering that this is his second
offense against the canons of the
profession, the Court resolved to
impose upon him once more the
supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His
license to practice law in the Philippines
is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED
Adm. Case No. 4680 August
29, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR., complainant, vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and
LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment
against respondents Antonio M. Llorente
and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross
misconduct, serious breach of trust, and
violation of the lawyer's oath in
connection with the discharge of their
duties as members of the Pasig City
Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer
of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), was designated chairman
of said Board, while Llorente, who was
then City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as
1
provided by law. Complainant, now a
senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of
2
R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), respondents
tampered with the votes received by
him, with the result that, as shown in
the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and
Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining
to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1)
senatorial candidates Juan Ponce
Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng,
Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan,
Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were
credited with votes which were above the
number of votes they actually received
while, on the other hand, petitioner's votes
were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts,
Enrile's votes were in excess of the total
number of voters who actually voted
therein; and (3) the votes from 22
precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs.
Complainant maintains that, by signing
the SoVs and CoC despite respondents'
knowledge that some of the entries
therein were false, the latter committed a
serious breach of public trust and of their
lawyers' oath.
Respondents denied the allegations
against them. They alleged that the
preparation of the SoVs was made by
the 12 canvassing committees which
the Board had constituted to assist in
the canvassing. They claimed that the
errors pointed out by complainant could
be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant
counters that respondents should be
held responsible for the illegal padding
of the votes considering the nature and
extent of the irregularities and the fact
that the canvassing of the election
returns was done under their control
and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, to which this
matter had been referred pursuant to
Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of
the Rules of Court, recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of
3 question of whether a motion for
merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but
his motion was denied in a resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors dated April
22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this
petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed
criminal charges against respondents
before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No.
96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646,
§27(b). In its resolution dated January 8,
1998, the COMELEC dismissed
complainant's charges for insufficiency
of evidence. However, on a petition for
4
certiorari filed by complainant, this
Court set aside the resolution and
directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against
respondents. Reconsideration was
denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we
hold that respondents are guilty of
misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the
dismissal of the present petition on the
ground that it was filed late. He
contends that a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
5
under Rule 139-B, §12(c) and,
therefore, the filing of such motion
before the IBP Board of Governors did
not toll the running of the period of
appeal. Respondent further contends
that, assuming such motion can be
filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to
indicate the date of his receipt of the
April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP
denying his motion for reconsideration
so that it cannot be ascertained whether
his petition was filed within the 15-day
period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).
The contention has no merit. The
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has
been settled in Halimao v.
6
Villanueva, in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, §12(C)
makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text
or in its history suggests that
such motion is prohibited. It may
therefore be filed within 15 days
from notice to a party. Indeed, the
filing of such motion should be
encouraged before resort is
made to this Court as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency
rendering the judgment an
opportunity to correct any error it
may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the
evidenced.
7 good citizens may have in the proper
On the question whether petitioner's
present petition was filed within the 15-
day period provided under Rule 139-B,
§12(c), although the records show that it
was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent
has not shown when petitioner received
a copy of the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors denying his motion
for reconsideration. It would appear,
however, that the petition was filed on
time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the
Bar Confidant of this Court was received
by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of
IBP resolutions are sent to the parties
by mail, it is possible that the copy sent
to petitioner was received by him later
than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be
assumed that his present petition was
filed within 15 days from his receipt of
the IBP resolution. In any event, the
burden was on respondent, as the
moving party, to show that the petition in
this case was filed beyond the 15-
day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received
the IBP resolution in question on May
18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy
of the same was received by the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the delay would
8
only be two days. The delay may be
overlooked, considering the merit of this
case. Disbarment proceedings are
undertaken solely for public welfare. The
sole question for determination is
whether a member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not.
The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the Court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all
9
administration of justice. For this
reason, laws dealing with double
10 11
jeopardy or prescription or with
12
procedure like verification of pleadings
13
and prejudicial questions have no
application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period
for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the
interest of justice and equity where the
appealed case is clearly meritorious.
Thus, we have given due course to
appeals even though filed
14 15 16
six, four, and three days late. In this
case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the
basis of the following: (1) respondents
had no involvement in the tabulation of
the election returns, because when the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to
them, such had already been
accomplished and only needed their
respective signatures; (2) the canvassing
was done in the presence of watchers,
representatives of the political parties, the
media, and the general public so that
respondents would not have risked the
commission of any irregularity; and (3)
the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646,
§27(b) are mala in
se and not mala prohibita, and
petitioner failed to establish criminal
17
intent on the part of respondents.
The recommendation is unacceptable.
In disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar, only clear
preponderance of evidence is required
18
to establish liability. As long as the
evidence presented by complainant or
1
that taken judicial notice of by the Court
9 is more convincing and worthy of
belief than that which is offered in
20
opposition thereto, the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified..
In this case, respondents do not
dispute the fact that massive
irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The
only explanation they could offer for
such irregularities is that the same
could be due to honest mistake, human
error, and/or fatigue on the part of the
members of the canvassing committees
who prepared the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made in
Pimentel v. Commission on
21
Elections. In rejecting this
allegation and ordering respondents
prosecuted for violation of R.A. No.
6646, §27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, we believe, to
what can be construed as an
honest mistake or oversight due
to fatigue, in the performance of
official duty. The sheer
magnitude of she error, not only
in the total number of votes
garnered by the aforementioned
candidates as reflected in the
CoC and the SoVs, which did not
tally with that reflected in the
election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for
senatorial candidate Enrile which
exceeded the total number of
voters who actually voted in
those precincts during the May 8,
1995 elections, renders the
defense of honest mistake or
oversight due to fatigue, as
incredible and simply
unacceptable.
22
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a
case of mathematical error in the
tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of the erroneous figures
23
in one or two SoVs but a systematic
scheme to pad the votes of certain
senatorial candidates at the expense of
petitioner in complete disregard of the
tabulation in the election returns. A
cursory look at the evidence submitted by
petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs
involving 101 precincts, the votes for
candidate Enrile exceeded the number of
voters who actually voted in the said
precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from
22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In
addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel,
the total number of votes credited to each
of the seven senatorial candidates in
question, as reflected in the CoC,
markedly differ from those indicated in the
24
SoVs.
Despite the fact that these
discrepancies, especially the double
recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the
tabulation of votes as reflected in the
SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the
face of these documents and that the
variation involves substantial number
of votes, respondents nevertheless
certified the SoVs as true and correct.
Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorente's contention that
he merely certified the genuineness and
due execution of the SoVs but not their
correctness is belied by the certification
which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the
foregoing Statement of Votes by .
. . [p]recinct is true and correct.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we
sign these presents at the
City/Municipality of ___________
Province of ________ this
_______ day of May, 1995.
(Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing
was open to the public and observed
by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which
respondents are liable. The fact is that
only they had access to the SoVs and
CoC and thus had the opportunity to
compare them and detect the
discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government
position may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government
25
official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the
lawyer's oath or is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part,
such individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for
26
such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct
the SoVs in question, respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." By
express provision of Canon 6, this is
made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they
likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to "do no falsehood."
Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to
observe honesty both in their private
and in their public dealings better
27
expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag
in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest
involved in requiring lawyers to
behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor it
is important that the common
caricature that lawyers by and
large do not feel compelled to
speak the truth and to act
honestly, should not become a
28
common reality . . .
It may be added that, as lawyers in the
government service, respondents were
under greater obligation to observe this
basic tenet of the profession because a
public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents' participation in the
irregularities herein reflects on the legal
profession, in general, and on lawyers in
government in particular. Such conduct
in the performance of their official
duties, involving no less than the
ascertainment of the popular will as
expressed through the ballot, would
have merited for them suspension were
it not for the fact that this is their first
administrative transgression and, in the
case of Salayon, after a long public
29
service. Under the circumstances, a
penalty of fine in the amount of
P10,000.00 for each of the respondents
should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds
respondents Antonio M. Llorente and
Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of
them a FINE in the amount of
P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 2029. December 7, 1993.]
LUIS G.
CONSTANTINO, Complainant, v.
ATTY. PRUDENCIO G.
SALUDARES, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS;
ATTORNEYS; CHARACTER AND
CONDUCT REQUIRED. — A lawyer’s
professional and personal conduct must
at all times be kept beyond reproach and
above suspicion. He must perform his
duties to the Bar, to the courts, to his
clients, and to society with honor and
dignity (Marcelo v. Javier, 214 SCRA 1
[1992]) . . . Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly
provides that a lawyer must not engage
in unlawful, immoral or deceitful
conduct. A member of the Bar must act
with integrity, honesty and professional
decorum. He must comport himself in a
manner which will secure and preserve
respect and confidence of the public.
Both his professional and personal
conduct must be kept beyond reproach
and above suspicion. He is required not
only in fact to be possessed of good
moral character, but must also be
perceived to be leading a life in
accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. His
conduct should be characterized by
candor, competence and fairness
(Roque v. Clemencio, 212 SCRA 618
[1992]) It bears stressing that a lawyer
can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than
truthfulness and candor. (Fellner v. Bar
Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d
729 as cited in Tan v. Sabandal, 206
SCRA 473 [1992]). To this end nothing
should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession (Lyons v. Hall
[LQ App] 90 So2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003
as cited in Marcelo v. Javier, supra).
2. ID.; ID.; UNWARRANTED REFUSAL
TO PAY VALID AND JUST DEBT, A
CASE OF. — There is no doubt that
respondent, borrowed P1,000.00 from
Luis Constantino, Jr. purportedly for an
urgent personal need, promising to pay
it back the following day. As a matter of
fact, the respondent admits said
indebtedness but has not given any just
and valid reason for his refusal to pay
this debt . . . Granting arguendo that he
failed to meet Luis, Jr. at the appointed
place of payment, respondent does not
deny the fact that he has refused and still
refuses to repay the P1,000.00 loan
despite repeated demands by
complainant who was duly authorized to
collect the same. Had respondent
intended to settle his indebtedness, he
could have done so in the several
instances repayment was demanded of
him. It is clear from the records that after
Luis, Jr. left the country, complainant and
his wife took turns in trying to recover the
debt from respondent, only to be
repeatedly turned away empty-handed.
This prompted Luis, Jr. to write
respondent a letter dated February 3,
1978 reminding the latter of the
P1,000.00 loan extended to him and at
the same time demanding payment
thereof. This however, like the other
demands, was left unheeded. The
foregoing factual antecedents compel
Us to conclude that from the very
beginning, respondent had no intention
to honor and/or pay his just debt.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. — We cannot
simply close our eyes to the unwarranted
obstinacy displayed by respondent in
evading payment of a debt validly
incurred. Such a conduct, to say the least,
is unbecoming and does not speak well of
a member of the Bar . .
. The facts and evidence obtaining in
this case indubitably establish
respondent’s failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with
the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
thereby degrading not only his person
but his profession as well . . . In the
case at bar, it is clear to the Court that
the conduct of respondent Saludares in
failing to honor his just debt to
complainant’s son constituted dishonest
and immoral conduct. This dishonest
conduct was compounded by
respondent’s act of interjecting paltry
excuses for his unwarranted refusal to
pay a valid and just debt . . . While it is
true that there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and
complainant, it is well-settled that an
attorney may be removed or otherwise
disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with
his professional duties, showing him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him (Lizaso v. Amante,
198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED
WHEN INTEGRITY CHALLENGED BY
EVIDENCE; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
OVERCOME EVIDENCE. — It has
been held that when a lawyer’s integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges
against him, he must meet the issues
and overcome the evidence for the
relator and show proof that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity which is at all times
expected of him (Quingwa v. Puno, 19
SCRA 439 [1967]). By his failure to
present convincing evidence to justify
his non-payment of the debt, not to
mention his seeming indifference to the
complaint brought against him made
apparent by his unreasonable absence
from the proceedings before the
Solicitor General, respondent failed to
demonstrate that he still possessed the
integrity and morality demanded of a
member of the Bar.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21,
1978, complainant Luis G. Constantino
charges respondent Atty. Prudencio S.
Saludares with conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan
which the latter obtained from
complainant’s son Luis Constantino, Jr.
It appears that sometime in August
1977, respondent borrowed money in
the amount of P1,000.00 from
complainant’s son Luis, Jr.
Respondent procured the loan
purportedly for an urgent personal
obligation promising to pay it back
promptly the following day.
Respondent failed to comply with his
promise. Subsequent demands for
payment were then made by Luis, Jr.
but to no avail.
In the interim, Luis, Jr. left the country
and afterwards wrote his father,
authorizing the latter to collect the sum of
money owed by Respondent. Despite
complainant’s repeated demands
however, respondent persistently refused
to pay back the said amount, prompting
the former to seek assistance from the
Civil Relations Office of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through
an affidavit-complaint. The Civil Relations
Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-
complaint to this Court on April 24, 1978.
(Rollo, p. 4)
The complaint alleges that respondent
lawyer, by abusing the trust and
confidence of complainant’s son, was
able to obtain a loan in the amount of
P1,000.00 which he unjustifiably refused
and still refuses to pay despite repeated
demands. This act, complainant
alleges, constitutes conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court and
is a clear violation of respondent’s oath
of office.
In compliance with this Court’s
resolution date May 25, 1979,
respondent filed his comment on the
affidavit-complaint alleging among
other things that the complaint was
without basis and malicious in nature.
He however, categorically admits
having borrowed money from
complainant’s son, Luis, Jr. He reasons
out that he was unable to repay the
loan because Luis, Jr. failed to appear
at the appointed place of payment.
Respondent further cites the fact of
Luis Jr.’s absence from the country to
justify such act of non-payment.
Complainant, in his reply, challenged
the veracity of respondent’s contentions
and reiterated his previous allegation of
respondent’s unjustified refusal to settle
his indebtedness despite repeated
demands.
On October 15, 1979, the case was duly
referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation pursuant to Section 3
of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and
was assigned to the office of Solicitor
Jesus G. Bersamira. After the
investigation conducted by the said
Solicitor, wherein respondent failed to
appear despite due notice, the case was
deemed submitted for report and
recommendation. Solicitor Bersamira,
however, was appointed to the Bench
and no report nor recommendation was
made by him. On November 8, 1984 the
case was re-assigned to another
Solicitor.
On March 12, 1990, the
Solicitor General rendered its
report, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Prudencio S.
Saludares be charged with violation of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of Philippines and his Lawyer’s
Oath and that he be suspended for 1
year from the practice of law.
Attached is a copy of the complaint
for suspension."
(Solicitor General’s Report
and Recommendation, p.3)
The Solicitor General found that
respondent’s unjustified refusal to settle
his debt was apparent from the
averments in the affidavit-complaint
and this fact was sufficiently
established during the proceedings
before the investigating Solicitor. The
Solicitor General further adds that
respondent’s refusal to pay the debt
constitutes a violation of his lawyer’s
oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and is therefore a
proper subject for disciplinary action.
There is no doubt that respondent,
borrowed P1,000.00 from Luis
Constantino, Jr. purportedly for an
urgent personal need, promising to pay
it back the following day. As a matter of
fact, the respondent admits said
indebtedness but has not given any just
and valid reason for his refusal to pay
this debt.
It has been held that when a lawyer’s
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he denied the charges
against him, he must meet the issues
and overcome the evidence for the
relator and show proof that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity which is at all times
expected of him (Quingwa v. Puno, 19
SCRA 439 [1967]).
By his failure to present convincing
evidence to justify his non-payment of
the debt, not to mention his seeming
indifference to the complaint brought
against him made apparent by his
unreasonable absence from the
proceedings before the Solicitor
General, respondent failed to
demonstrate that he still possessed
the integrity and morality demanded of
a member of the Bar.
Granting arguendo that he failed to
meet Luis, Jr. at the appointed place of
payment, respondent does not deny the
fact that he has refused and still refuses
to repay the P1,000.00 loan despite
repeated demands by complainant who
was duly authorized to collect the same.
Had respondent intended to settle his
indebtedness, he could have done so in
the several instances repayment was
demanded of him.
It is clear from the records that after
Luis, Jr. left the country, complainant
and his wife took turns in trying to
recover the debt from respondent, only
to be repeatedly turned away empty-
handed. This prompted Luis, Jr. to write
respondent a letter dated February 3,
1978 reminding the latter of the
P1,000.00 loan extended to him and
at the same time demanding payment
thereof. (Rollo, p. 19) This however, like
the other demands, was left unheeded.
The foregoing factual antecedents
compel Us to conclude that from the
very beginning, respondent had no
intention to honor and/or pay his just
debt. We cannot simply close our eyes
to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed
by respondent in evading payment of a
debt validly incurred. Such a conduct, to
say the least, is unbecoming and does
not speak well of a member of the Bar.
A lawyer’s professional and personal
conduct must at all times be kept
beyond reproach and above suspicion.
He must perform his duties to the Bar,
to the courts, to his clients, and to
society with honor and dignity (Marcelo
v. Javier, 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).
The facts and evidence obtaining in this
case indubitably establish respondent’s
failure to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures
of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
degrading not only his person but his
profession as well.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provides that a
lawyer must not engage in unlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. A member
of the Bar must act with integrity,
honesty and professional decorum. He
must comport himself in a manner which
will secure and preserve respect and
confidence of the public. Both his
professional and personal conduct must
be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion. He is required not only in fact
to be possessed of good moral
character, but must also be perceived to
be leading a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the
community. His conduct should be
characterized by candor, competence
and fairness (Roque v. Clemencio,
212 SCRA 618 [1992])
It bears stressing that a lawyer can do
honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. No
moral qualification for bar membership
is more important than truthfulness and
candor. (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729 as cited in
Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473
[1992]). To this end nothing should be
done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public
in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the profession (Lyons v. Hall [LQ App]
90 So2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited
in Marcelo v. Javier, supra).
While it is true that there was no
attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant, it is well-
settled that an attorney may be removed
or otherwise disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in the
profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, showing him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him (Lizaso v. Amante, 198
SCRA 1 [1991]).
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court
that the conduct of respondent
Saludares in failing to honor his just
debt to complainant’s son constituted
dishonest and immoral conduct. This
dishonest conduct was compounded by
respondent’s act of interjecting paltry
excuses for his unwarranted refusal to
pay a valid and just debt.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney
Prudencio S. Saludares from the
practice of law for a period of three (3)
months from notice, with the warning
that a repetition of the same or any
other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this resolution
be spread on the records of said
respondent, with copies thereof
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and duly circularized to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4369. November 28, 1997]
PIKE P.
ARRIETA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JOEL A. LLOSA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays
for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A.
Llosa for certifying under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that
respondent notarized a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 24,
1 proceedings.
1993 making it appear that some
of the vendors in said Deed namely,
Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla
and Leonardo P. Toledano were
parties and signatories thereto when
in truth and in fact, all three were
already dead prior to the execution of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale.
Jesus T. Bonilla died on August 22,
2
1992 while Leonardo P. Toledano
3
died on November 1, 1992. Edelina
T. Bonilla allegedly died on or about
June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted
having notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale. But before affixing his
notarial seal, he first ascertained the
authenticity of the signatures,
verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the
voluntariness of its execution.
Satisfied with all of the above, it was
only then that he certified the
document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996,
complainant had a complete turn-
around and moved for the
dismissal of his complaint. He
alleged that the instant case is only
a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and
is now convinced that everything is
in order.
The designated Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The
Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted the
above recommendation and
resolved to dismiss the instant case
after finding no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No.
2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be
made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to
him and that he is the same person
who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing
that the party acknowledging must
appear before the notary public or
any person authorized to take
acknowledgment of instruments or
4 of Sale as they had already passed
documents. Aside from being
required to appear before the Notary
Public, it is similarly incumbent upon
the person acknowledging the
instrument to declare before the
same Notary Public that the
execution of the instrument was
done by him of his own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of
Sale, respondent certified: BEFORE
ME, this 24th day of March, 1993 at
Dumaguete City, Philippines,
personally appeared x x x Jesus
Bonilla; x x x Leonardo Toledano; x x
5 same persons who executed the
x. Respondent claims that as a
Notary Public, he asked the
signatories whether the signatures
appearing above their respective
names were theirs, and whether they
voluntarily executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In order to ascertain
their identities, respondent asked for
their respective residence
certificates.
Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose
alleged death was not evidenced by
a death certificate, respondent
certified in the acknowledgment that
Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P.
Toledano personally appeared before
him. Respondents acts require the
presence of the vendors to be able to
verify the authenticity of their
signatures, the identities of the
signatories and the voluntariness of
the execution of the Deed. It defies
imagination and belief how these
could have happened. It would have
been impossible, both physically and
legally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and
Leonardo P. Toledano to have
personally subscribed and sworn
before respondent as to the
authenticity and validity of the Deed
on to the Great Beyond prior to the
execution of the said documents.
Yet, respondent certified to this
effect. By affixing his notarial seal
on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a
private document into a public
document. By certifying the Deed,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to
the world (1) that all the parties
therein personally appeared before
him; (2) that they are all personally
known to him; (3) that they were the
instruments; (4) that he inquired into
the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (5) they
acknowledged personally before him
that they voluntarily and
freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with
substantial public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document
into a public one making it
admissible in court without further
6
proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must
observe with the utmost care the
basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be
7 TIMES, to promote respect to his
undermined. chanroblesvirtuallawlibr
ary
As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, respondent is
mandated to discharge his sacred
duties which are dictated by public
policy and, as such, impressed with
public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct.
8 from non-observance of the same.
It is for the above reason that this
Court is most concerned about the
explanation given by complainant
for withdrawing his complaint
against respondent. In his Motion to
Dismiss dated September 9, 1996,
complainant declares:
xxx xxx xxx
That he is now fully convinced that
everything was in order, and that
nobody was ever prejudiced by
the acts of the respondent. Herein
complainant has realized that he
himself, or any other legal
practitioner, would have done
similarly as the respondent, if
confronted with such an urgent
voluntary transaction in an
emergency situation; x x x.
That respondent acted the way he did
because he was confronted with an
alleged urgent situation is no excuse
at all. As an individual, and even
more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the
laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to
refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold
the integrity of his profession AT ALL
profession AT ALL TIMES, and to act
with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how
respondent so cavalierly disregarded
the requirements and solemnities of
the Notarial Law simply to
accomodate his clients. Not only did
he commit an illegal act but also did
so without thinking of the possible
damage or prejudice that might result
As a lawyer, respondent breached
his professional responsibility by
certifying under oath an instrument
fully knowing that some of the
signatories thereto were long dead.
This Court cannot countenance this
practice, especially coming, as it
does, from respondent who formerly
served as president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Negros
Oriental Chapter, President of the
Dumaguete Lions Club and City
Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed
respondent had taken steps to
verify the identities of the
signatories, he would have easily
known that the signatures were fake
as they purported to be those of his
former clients.
It is worth stressing that the
practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such
9
privilege. [M]embership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions.
There being no lifetime guaranty, a
lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good
behavior and can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared
by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been
afforded
10
him. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is
primarily required of lawyers to obey
the Constitution and laws of the
11
land. They must refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful
12
conduct. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in
his professional or private
13
capacity.
Respondents act of certifying
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, they being his
former clients, constitutes
misconduct. But this being his first
administrative offense, such should
not warrant the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds
respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty
of misconduct. Consequently, he is
ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning
that another infraction would be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished all the courts of the land
as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6792 January 25,
2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
 DECISION
PER CURIAM:
1
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit for
the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,
filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with
the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional
2
Responsibility; and constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
3 prominent member of the Baguio
Rules of Court.
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to
submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20,
2004, informing him that he was in
default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11,
4
2004. After that hearing, complainant
manifested that he was submitting the
case on the basis of the Complaint
5
and its attachments. Accordingly, the
CBD directed him to file his Position
Paper, which he did on July 27,
6
2004. Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner
Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report
and Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-
2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano
alleged that respondent had violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the
conviction of the latter for
7
frustrated homicide, which
involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s
conviction were summarized by Branch
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown
Toyota Corolla and was on his way home
after gassing up in preparation for his trip
to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along
Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the
car driven by the accused not knowing
that the driver of the car he had overtaken
is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
community who was under the influence
of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the
taxi driver until the latter stopped to make
a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his
car, berated the taxi driver and held him
by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the
taxi driver forced open his door causing
the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been
drinking because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who looked
elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now
enraged, stood up immediately and was
about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow
when the latter boxed him on the chest
instead. The accused fell down a second
time, got up again and was about to box
the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist
and turned his arm around. The taxi
driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him.
The accused went back to his car and got
his revolver making sure that the handle
was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi
driver was on his way back to his
vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses
of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them
to the accused. But as he was handing
the same to the accused, he was met by
the barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of
the accused so the latter pushed him
out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case,
8
Roberto Soriano."
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio
Billanes, who came to the aid of
Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left
9 taxi, had overtaken him;
side of his neck, complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he
had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.
Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury,
which caused paralysis on the left part
of his body and disabled him for his job
as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its
Decision dated November 29, 2001.
On January 18, 2002, respondent filed
an application for probation, which was
granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction
of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the]
court in favor of the offended party,
10
Roberto Soriano."
According to the unrefuted statements
of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet
to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil
11
liability to the Court of Appeals.
In her Report and Recommendation,
Commissioner Herbosa recommended
that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The commissioner found that
respondent had not only been convicted
of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral
character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence
of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and
attempted to assault Complainant
only because the latter, driving a
"3. Complainant having been able
to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same
with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on
him, Respondent simply pushed
him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive
identification and overwhelming
evidence, Respondent denied
that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial,
Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and
two unidentified persons; and,
 "7. Although he has been placed
on probation, Respondent has[,]
to date[,] not yet satisfied his
12
civil liabilities to Complainant."
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court
received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and
recommendations of Commissioner
Herbosa, as approved and adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have
become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no
longer possessed of good moral
13
character. In the instant case,
respondent has been found guilty; and
he stands convicted, by final judgment,
of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established
and is no longer open to question, the
only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether
his crime of frustrated homicide
involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as
"everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
14
modesty, or good morals."
The question of whether the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude has
been discussed in International Rice
15
Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, a
labor case concerning an employee who
was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the
particular circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime, this Court
rejected the employer’s contention and
held that homicide in that case did not
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the
crime would have been violative of the
IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations
and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The
Court explained that, having
disregarded the attendant
circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate.
Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained
thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on
the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude
is not involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. x
16
x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of
homicide did not involve moral turpitude,
the Court appreciated the presence of
incomplete self-defense and total
absence of aggravating circumstances.
For a better understanding of that
Decision, the circumstances of the
crime are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that
Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when
the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's
face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the
attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he
drew a fan knife from the left pocket of
his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa
only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person.
The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense
and voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not
17
inherently vile, immoral or unjust."
The present case is totally different. As
the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor,
as he pursued and shot complainant
when the latter least expected it. The
act of aggression shown by respondent
will not be mitigated by the fact that he
was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances,
those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding
of treachery as a further indication of the
skewed morals of respondent. He shot
the victim when the latter was not in a
position to defend himself. In fact, under
the impression that the assault was
already over, the unarmed complainant
was merely returning the eyeglasses of
Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the
handle of his gun with a handkerchief
so as not to leave fingerprints. In so
doing, he betrayed his sly intention to
escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably
bears the earmarks of moral turpitude.
By his conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. As it were, he acted like a
god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted.
Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a
simple traffic incident reflected poorly on
his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any
individual, more so in a lawyer. In the
tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence
of a person who has been grievously
wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying
to assert a false sense of superiority
and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent
seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
through his illegal possession of an
18
unlicensed firearm and his unjust
19
refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He
has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the
courts. We remind him that, both in his
20
attorney’s oath and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound
himself to "obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through
this incident that he is wanting in even a
basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted
him probation. And yet, it has been four
21
years since he was ordered to settle
his civil liabilities to complainant. To
date, respondent remains adamant in
refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as
shown by his violent reaction to a simple
traffic altercation, he has taken away the
earning capacity, good health, and
youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty.
Dizon begrudges complainant the
measly amount that could never even
fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude may relate, not to the exercise
of the profession of lawyers, but
certainly to their good moral
22
character. Where their misconduct
outside of their professional dealings is
so gross as to show them morally unfit
for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing them
23
from that office.
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that
respondent displayed an utter lack of
good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law. Good
moral character includes at least
24
common honesty.
In the case at bar, respondent
consistently displayed dishonest and
duplicitous behavior. As found by the
trial court, he had sought, with the aid of
Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-
court settlement with complainant’s
25
family. But when this effort failed,
respondent concocted a complete lie by
making it appear that it was
complainant’s family that had sought
a conference with him to obtain his
26
referral to a neurosurgeon.
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there.
He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled
by complainant and two other
27
persons. The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by
no less than three (3) doctors who
examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support
his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that
it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he
said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the
contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed
28
the accused on the chest. x x x."
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No
moral qualification for bar membership
is more important than
29
truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of the
profession places a premium on honesty
and condemns duplicitous
30
behavior. Hence, lawyers must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they
are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather
than enhance public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute moral
turpitude for which he should be
disbarred. "Law is a noble profession,
and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law
and the legal system, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves, especially
in their dealings with their clients and
the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond
31
reproach."
The foregoing abhorrent acts of
respondent are not merely
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw. Considering the depravity of the
offense he committed, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP
proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for
disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important
function be competent, honorable and
reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
32
clients may repose confidence. Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate
and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet
fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate
to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and that disbarment should
never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the
Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably
and wantonly disregarded his duties to
society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser
penalty would be irreconcilable with our
lofty aspiration for the legal profession --
that every lawyer be a shining exemplar
of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the
legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but
also as a continuing requirement for
the practice of law. Sadly, herein
respondent has fallen short of the
exacting standards expected of him as
a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of
frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances – not the mere fact of
their conviction – would demonstrate
their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the
appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and
brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT
MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in his record as a member of
the Bar; and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 4515 : July 14, 2008]
CECILIA A.
AGNO, Complainant, v. Atty.
 MARCIANO J. However, during the pendency of the
CAGATAN, Respondent. aforementioned appeal with the Office
of the President, particularly on August
DECISION 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a
4
Memorandum of Agreement with a
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national,
5
Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, the husband of
This is a complaint for disbarment filed
herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno.
by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent The Memorandum of Agreement is
Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation quoted in toto hereunder:
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
The record shows that respondent was
the President of International Services
Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE
corporation engaged in the recruitment PRESENTS:
of Filipino workers for overseas
employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRC's
recruitment license was cancelled by the That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) for violation of labor law HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and
provisions and subsequently, on August Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino
9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from
1 citizen, have entered into this
participating in overseas recruitment.
On Sepetember 19, 1988, the Memorandum of Agreement this 9th
respondent appealed the DOLE's
day of August 1992, at Manila,
cancellation of ISRC's license with the
Office of the President. The appeal was Philippines, concerning the joint
resolved by the said office in
respondent's favor in the Resolution ownership and operation of
2
dated March 30, 1993 which set aside
INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND
the order of cancellation and directed
both the DOLE and the Philippine RECRUITMENT CORPORATION
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
to renew the recruitment license of (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in
ISRC subject to the payment of a
guarantee bond which was double the connection therewith, as follows:
amount required by law.
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by
Since ISRC's recruitment license had
already expired on September 17, the herein parties on a 50-50 basis
1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an
application for renewal of its recruitment and accordingly, immediate steps shall
3
license with the POEA. be taken to submit the necessary
documents to the Securities and
Exchange Commission to legalize the
arrangement and to cause the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of stocks
to Mr. Khalifa and his group;
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits
shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after
deducting all the pertinent expenses that
the officers of the corporation shall be:
Chairman of the Board of Directors - Mr.
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and
General Manager, Mr. MARCIANO J.
CAGATAN or his designated
representative, Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia
Agno all of whom shall be members of
the Board of Trustees together with two
others;
3. That for and in consideration of the
above joint ownership of the
corporation, Mr. KHALIFA undertakes
as his contribution to the stock
ownership thereof, the following:
(a) To pay the amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P250,000.00) initially on or
before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount
to be used to have the license of ISRC
reinstated;
(b) Upon the release of the license, to
pay the additional amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P250,000.00) to start the business
operations of the corporation and to
liquidate pending government and other
obligations, if any;
4. The management of the corporation
shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and
his group while the legal and
government liaisonship shall be the
responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN; mutual
consideration with each other in the
course of the business operations shall
be maintained in order to avoid
problem with the government, the
workers and the employers;
5. There shall be a regular accounting of
the business every month, with the
assistance of a qualified accountant and
each of the herein parties shall be
furnished copy thereof; the share of the
parties may be released to each of them
as often as the parties agree, however,

advances against the share of each
may be agreed upon by the parties;
6. Any claim of workers or other parties
against the ISRC before the signing of
this agreement shall be the sole
responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr.
KHALIFA or his 50% ownership shall be
free from such claims.
Manila, August 9, 1992.
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA :
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
CECILIA AGNO
WITNESSES:
_______________ :
_________________
On December 26, 1995, which was
more than three (3) years after the
execution of the aforesaid agreement, a
6 respondent failed to settle his obligation
Complaint-Affidavit for disbarment was
filed with this Court by the complainant
against the respondent claiming that the
latter used fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation, in enticing her
husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and
invest therein the amount
of P500,000.00 and that although the
respondent received the aforesaid
amount, the complainant learned from
her inquiries with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
POEA that the respondent failed to
comply with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement. The
complainant found out that the said
Memorandum of Agreement could not
be validated without the approval of the
Board of Directors of ISRC. While
respondent even had the complainant
sign an affidavit stating that she was
then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her
appointment as Treasurer was not
submitted to the SEC. The records of
the SEC showed that the Board of
Directors, officers and stockholders of
ISRC remained unchanged and her
name and that of her husband did not
appear as officers and/or stockholders
thereof. From the POEA, on the other
hand, the complainant learned that
ISRC's recruitment license was yet to
be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that
respondent used for his own personal
benefit the P500,000.00 that she and
her husband invested in ISRC. When
she demanded that respondent return
the said sum of money, respondent
issued a bank check dated March 30,
7
1994 in favor of the complainant in the
amount of P500,000.00 which was
dishonored for being drawn against a
closed account. Despite repeated
demands by complainant, the
or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against the respondent. An information
was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the
respondent with the said offense and a
warrant of arrest was issued against
respondent after the latter failed several
times to attend his arraignment. The
complainant prayed for the disbarment
of the respondent for issuing a bouncing
check and for his act of dishonesty in
assuring her and her husband that the
Memorandum of Agreement would
suffice to install them as stockholders
and officers of ISRC which induced
them to invest in said corporation the
amount of P500,000.00.
8 inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a
In his Comment, respondent denied the
charges against him and averred that
while ISRC's recruitment license was
cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such
cancellation was lifted by the Office of the
President on March 30, 1993, on appeal.
During the pendency of the said appeal,
he and complainant's husband Khalifa
entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement because the latter offered to
buy shares of stock of ISRC in order to
finance the then pending appeal for the
reinstatement of the ISRC license and for
Khalifa and the complainant to undertake
the full management and operation of the
corporation. The respondent further
alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the
complainant, paid on various dates the
total amount
of P500,000.00, which respondent
claimed he used to reimburse borrowed
sums of money to pursue the appeal
with the Office of the President.
According to the respondent, while there
were still legal procedures to be
observed before the sale of shares of
ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and
complainant were in a hurry to start the
business operation of ISRC.
Consequently, respondent sold and
assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC
for P500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced
9 11
by a Deed of Assignment dated April
26, 1993. The respondent, in turn,
issued a check in the amount
of P500,000.00, which was not intended
to be encashed but only to guarantee
the reimbursement of the money to
Khalifa and the complainant in case the
appeal would be decided adversely
against ISRC. Conversely, the check
would be returned to respondent if the
appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The
respondent denied employing fraud or
misrepresentation since allegedly,
Khalifa and the complainant decided to
buy his shares after being told, upon
good case. The respondent averred
that complainant was motivated by bad
faith and malice in allegedly fabricating
criminal charges against him instead of
seeking rescission of the Deed of
Assignment and refund of the
consideration for the sale of the shares
of stock. The respondent surmised that
they decided not to proceed with the
Memorandum of Agreement when
complainant had secured her own
license after she had received the Deed
of Assignment and assumed the
position of acting treasurer of the ISRC.
The respondent justified the non-
submission of copies of the
Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of
Assignment and complainant's
appointment as Acting Treasurer with
the SEC because of the cancellation of
ISRC's license to recruit and the
pendency of the appeal for
reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a
copy of the Deed of Assignment in favor
of the complainant and her husband
Khalifa regarding the five hundred
shares of stock, respondent also
presented in support of his allegations
10
copies of 1) his Letter dated April 12,
1994 to the POEA requesting the
renewal of ISRC's license, and 2) a
Letter dated May 24, 1994 from the
Licensing and Regulation Office of the
POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an
escrow agreement with a reputable
commercial banking corporation in the
amount of P400,000.00 to answer for
any valid and legal claim of recruited
workers; cash bond deposit
of P200,000.00; and surety bond
of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear
ISRC's pending cases with said
agency before respondent's request for
reinstatement of ISRC's license as a
land based agency.
12
In a Resolution dated May 22,
1996, this Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan,
held several hearings, the last of which
was on November 13, 2003. During
those hearings, the complainant
presented her evidence. For his part,
the respondent, instead of presenting
his defense before the CBD in open
court, opted to present a position paper
which was allowed by the Order dated
13
April 20, 2004 of Commissioner San
Juan. However, in lieu of said position
paper, the respondent submitted a
14
Memorandum after the complainant
had filed her formal offer of evidence.
Eventually, on October 12, 2004,
Commissioner San Juan submitted her
15
Report and Recommendation. Said
the Commissioner in her report:
There is no question that the
Memorandum of Agreement between the
parties was executed on 9 [August] 1992.
In said Memorandum, no mention was
made of the assignment of shares of
stock in favor of the complainant and her
husband. The conditions stated therein
was that the amount to be contributed by
the complainant shall be used for the
reinstatement of the license of the ISRC.
No mention was made
regarding the assignment of shares in
favor of the complainant and her
husband. Respondent presented a
Deed of Assignment of shares of stock
in favor of the complainant and her
husband worth P500,000.00 dated 26
April 1993, however, it is noted that
there is a super imposed date of 24
November 1994 in a notarial series of
1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public,
which raises doubt as to the date it was
executed. Apparently, the Deed of
Assignment was executed when the
complainant started her investigation
regarding the true condition of the
corporation. Anent the reinstatement of
the license of the company there is no
showing that the respondent used the
amount he received from the
complainant in compliance with the
respondent's undertakings in the
Memorandum of Agreement. The
accusation of enticement employed by
respondent is supported by the fact that
complainant was made to appear that
she will be appointed as treasurer of the
corporation, however there was no
action on the part of the respondent to
change the composition of the Board of
Directors and the treasurer in the
records of the corporation on file with
the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The respondent did not
fully reveal the true condition of the
corporation regarding the reinstatement
of the corporation's license to operate.
Likewise the issuance of a check in
favor of the complainant on 30 March
1994 against a closed account shows
the respondent had no desire to return
the money entrusted to him for the
reinstatement of the license of the
corporation. The letter of the POEA
dated 24 May 1994 xxx clearly show
that the payment of surety bond will not
suffice to reinstate the license of the
corporation in view of several cases of
violations of recruitment pending before
the POEA against said corporation. This
fact was not disclosed to complainant
when the Memorandum of Agreement
was entered into by the parties.
Thus, the Commissioner's
recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted
that respondent manifested lack of
candor, when he knowingly failed to
provide the complainant with accurate
and complete information due her under
the circumstances. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law in
the maximum period prescribed by law
and to return the money received from
the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of
Governors of the IBP passed Resolution
16
No. XVII-2005-102 adopting and
approving, with modification, the afore-
quoted report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding, the Recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent's lack of candor
when he knowingly failed to provide
complainant with the accurate and
complete information due her, Atty.
Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and Restitution of the
money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24,
2005, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline transmitted to this Court the
Notice of Resolution together with the
records of Administrative Case No.
17
4515.
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a
18
Motion for Reconsideration of the
Investigating Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline. In IBP
19
Resolution No. XVII-2006-83 dated
January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors denied respondent's motion
on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction to consider and resolve a
matter already endorsed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12
(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
After this Court noted the
aforementioned IBP Resolution on
June 28, 2006, a Motion for
20
Reinvestigation was filed by the
respondent on September 12, 2006.
Subsequently, on November 15, 2006,
the parties were required to manifest
within ten (10) days from notice, if
they were willing to submit this case
for resolution based on the pleadings
21
filed.
22
In our Resolution dated March 5,
2007, we noted without action
respondent's motion for reinvestigation
in view of respondent' subsequent
compliance and Manifestation dated
December 27, 2006. In the same
resolution, the Court noted (1) the said
respondent's compliance and
manifestation of December 27, 2006
relative to the aforementioned
November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2)
complainant's Manifestation dated
December 19, 2006, stating that she
was willing to submit the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed
and the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors; (3) respondent's Comment
on Complainant's Manifestation dated
January 4, 2007; and (4) complainant's
Manifestation dated January 10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve
respondent's challenge as to
complainant's personality to file this
complaint. In his Motion for
23
Reconsideration of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation of October 12,
2004, respondent contends that
complainant, not being a party-in-
interest in the agreement between
respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,
has no legal standing to file the
instant complaint.
Respondent's argument lacks merit.
24
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that
proceedings for disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the IBP upon the verified complaint of
any person. Accordingly, we held in
25
Navarro v. Meneses III, as reiterated
26
in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, that:
The argument of respondent that
complainant has no legal personality to
sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court provides
that proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The right to
institute a disbarment proceeding is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary
that the person complaining suffered
injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof
of the charges. The evidence submitted
by complainant before the Commission
on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its
resolution and recommended sanctions.
(Emphasis ours)
The rationale was explained by us in
27
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, viz:
[The] rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. (Word in
brackets ours)
Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore,
immaterial whether or not complainant
herein was a party to the subject
transaction. In any event, complainant
is actually a party-in-interest thereto
because she is mentioned as the
treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum
28
of Agreement; as well as one of the
assignees in the Deed of Assignment of
shares of ISRC stocks which
29
respondent alleged to have executed;
and as the payee in the bank check
issued by the respondent for the amount
30
of P500,000.00.
We shall now proceed to the merits of
the case.
The pivotal issue herein is whether
respondent employed fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation when he entered into
the Memorandum of Agreement with
Khalifa and received from the latter a
sum of money in the amount of
P500,000.00.
We rule in the affirmative.
The complainant contends that
pursuant to their agreement, she gave
the amount of P500,000.00 to the
respondent to be used for the
reinstatement of ISRC's recruitment
license as well as to start the business
operation of the corporation. The
respondent, however, claims that
complainant misinterpreted their
agreement because the P500,000.00
the latter gave him was in payment of
his personal shares of ISRC stock, as
evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.
We are constrained to give credence to
the complainant's contention. The due
execution and authenticity of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
between the parties are undisputed.
Moreover, the terms thereof are clear
and explicit that for and in consideration
of the joint ownership of ISRC, the
husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa
Juma, would pay the amount
of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of which
would be used for the reinstatement
of ISRC's license, while the
other P250,000.00 was for the start of
the operation of the corporation and to
liquidate pending government and
31
other obligations, if any. Nowhere in
said MOA is the alleged assignment of
shares mentioned. The testimony of the
32
complainant on this score is more
credible than that of the respondent
because it conforms with the written
stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the
respondent's explanations with respect
to the P500,000.00 in question had
been inconsistent. The respondent
averred in his Comment that
the P500,000.00 was given to him
initially for the purpose of pursuing the
appeal with the Office of the President
and that he used the same to pay loans
or to "reimburse borrowed money" spent
for the said purpose. However,
respondent also alleged that since the
complainant was in a hurry to start the
business operation of ISRC, the money
was used to buy his own shareholdings
in the corporation for which he executed
a Deed of Assignment in complainant's
favor, which respondent claimed he
could validly do without the approval of
ISRC's Board of Directors. His
33
subsequent Memorandum submitted
to the IBP contained new allegations
that aside from the P500,000.00 paid by
the complainant for his personal shares
of ISRC stocks, an
additional P500,000.00 should have been
given to him as fresh capital of the
corporation and because of this failure of
complainant to put up the alleged fresh
capital, ISRC was not able to put up the
deposits required by the POEA resulting
in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC
up to the present.
Indeed, the deceit and
misrepresentation employed by the
respondent was seemingly evident right
at the outset when he entered into the
MOA concerning the joint ownership

and operation of ISRC with the
complainant's husband, knowing fully
well that he could not do so without the
consent of and/or authority from the
corporation's Board of Directors. The
unilateral execution by respondent of
the Deed of Assignment is a lame
excuse offered by the respondent. We
agree with the observation of
Commissioner San Juan that the said
deed, which was not at all mentioned
in the MOA, was executed by the
respondent after the complainant had
conducted her investigation of the true
condition of the corporation. The so-
called "guarantee check" appears to
have also been issued by respondent
for the same reason.
Moreover, while the respondent made it
appear in the MOA that the complainant
would be appointed treasurer and her
husband Chairman of the Board of
ISRC, the respondent had not complied
with the said undertaking as per the
34
Certification dated October 13, 1995
of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The respondent
could not justify his non-compliance with
the terms of the MOA by citing ISRC's
inability to comply with other
governmental requirements for the
reinstatement of its license for various
reasons, since the respondent failed to
disclose the same to the complainant
and her husband.
Particularly, the respondent failed to
apprise the complainant as to the true
state of ISRC's affairs that the
reinstatement of the corporation's
recruitment license would require not
only a favorable action by the Office of
the President on ISRC's appeal and
the payment of a surety bond, but also
ISRC's clearance or exoneration in its
other cases for recruitment violations
35
pending with the POEA. The
respondent could not pass the blame
to the complainant because of his
belated excuse that complainant failed
to infuse an additional amount of
P500,000.00. This new defense is
clearly an afterthought and not
supported by evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds
that respondent has violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility as well as
his attorney's oath.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically mandates the following :
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
The afore-cited canons emphasize the
high standard of honesty and fairness
expected of a lawyer not only in the
practice of the legal profession but in
36
his personal dealings as well. A
lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be
beyond reproach anywhere and at all
 37
times. For, as officers of the courts
and keepers of the public's faith, they
are burdened with the highest degree of
social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and
38
honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers
swear to impresses upon them the duty
of exhibiting the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor in their
39
relationships with others. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or
in their private capacity, if such conduct
renders them unfit to continue to be
40
officers of the court.
Hence, in this case, we are in accord
with the findings of the IBP
Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP
Board of Governors. What is more,
we find respondent to be guilty of
gross misconduct for issuing a
worthless check.
41
In Sanchez v. Somoso, the Court
ruled that a lawyer who paid another
with a personal check from a bank
account which he knew has already
been closed exhibited an extremely low
regard to his commitment to the oath he
took when he joined his peers, thereby
seriously tarnishing the image of the
profession which he should hold in high
42
esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, we
held that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, as
the effect transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large.
Respondent herein admitted having
issued a check but claimed that it was
only to guarantee the reimbursement
of the P500,000.00 given to him by the
complainant in case of an adverse
decision in ISRC's appeal with the Office
of the President. We note, however, that
said check was issued on March 30,
1994 or one year after the appeal
adverted to had already been favorably
acted upon on March 30, 1993. Hence,
our conclusion is that the check was
issued only after the complainant
demanded the return of
their P500,000.00 investment in ISRC.
In any event, respondent's act of issuing
a guarantee check for P500,000.00,
when he was presumably aware that at
the time of his issuance thereof his
bank account against which the check
was drawn was already closed, clearly
constitutes gross misconduct for which
he should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was
received by the respondent for the
reinstatement of the license, but there is
no showing that it was used for such
purpose, as the respondent failed to
give any credible accounting or
explanation as to the disbursement of
the said amount in accordance with the
stipulations in the MOA. Respondent
failed to disclose all the existing
hindrances to the renewal of ISRC's
recruitment license, which enticed
complainant and her husband to part
with the aforesaid sum of money. He
also admittedly issued a check drawn
against a closed account, which
evinced his lack of intention to return
the money to the complainant pursuant
to his supposed guarantee. It is thus
proper for the Court to order its
restitution as recommended by the IBP.
We find the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law
for two (2) years by the IBP Board of
Governors to be too harsh considering
that this is respondent's first
administrative offense. It is settled that
the appropriate penalty which the Court Acting on the Memorandum dated
may impose on an errant lawyer depends January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C.
on the exercise of sound judicial Corona re: Comment of the Integrated
discretion based on the surrounding Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested
43 Revisions to the Proposed Rule of
facts. Accordingly, for employing deceit
and misrepresentation in his personal Mandatory Legal Aid Service for
dealings as well as for issuing a Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved
worthless check, we rule and so hold that to APPROVE the same.
the penalty of suspension for one (1)
year and one (1) month from the practice This Resolution shall take effect on July
of law is sufficient to be meted out to 1, 2009 following publication of the said
respondent. Rule and its implementing regulations in
at least two (2) newpapers of general
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. circulation.
Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED
FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) February 10, 2009
MONTH from the practice of law with
warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will merit a more severe
penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE
the amount of P500,000.00 to the REYNATO S. PUNO
complainant. Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIA
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Associate Justice
all courts, the Integrated Bar of theANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTI
Philippines, the Office of the BarAssociate Justice Associate Justice
Confidant and spread in respondent's
personal records. RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
B.M. No. 2012 February 10, Associate Justice Associate Justice
2009

PROPOSED RULE ON
MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID
FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS SERVICE
RESOLUTION SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall
be known as "The Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service."
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule
seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to
society as agents of social change and
to the courts as officers thereof by
helping improve access to justice by
the less privileged members of society
and expedite the resolution of cases
involving them. Mandatory free legal
service by members of the bar and their
active support thereof will aid the
efficient and effective administration of
justice especially in cases involving
indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall
govern the mandatory requirement for
practicing lawyers to render free legal
aid services in all cases (whether, civil,
criminal or administrative) involving
indigent and pauper litigants where the
assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall
also govern the duty of other members
of the legal profession to support the
legal aid program of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. -
For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are
members of the Philippine Bar
who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-
judicial agencies, including but
not limited to the National Labor
Relations Commission, National
Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board and National
Commission for Indigenous
Peoples. The term "practicing
lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government
employees and incumbent
elective officials not
allowed by law to practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law
are not allowed to
appear in court;
(iii) Supervising lawyers of
students enrolled in law
student practice in duly
accredited legal clinics of
law schools and lawyers of
non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and
peoples’ organizations
(POs) like the Free Legal
Assistance Group who by
the nature of their work
already render free legal
aid to indigent and pauper
litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered
under subparagraphs (i) to
(iii) including those who
are employed in the
private sector but do not
appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and
quasi-judicial agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper
litigants are those defined under
Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules
of Court and Algura v. The Local
Government Unit of the City of
Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30
October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those
actions, disputes, and
controversies that are criminal,
civil and administrative in nature
in whatever stage wherein
indigent and pauper litigants
need legal representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to
appearance in court or quasi-
judicial body for and in behalf of
an indigent or pauper litigant and
the preparation of pleadings or
motions. It shall also cover
assistance by a practicing lawyer
to indigent or poor litigants in
court-annexed mediation and in
other modes of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR).
Services rendered when a
practicing lawyer is appointed
counsel de oficio shall also be
considered as free legal aid
services and credited as
compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is the official
national organization of
lawyers in the country;
(f) National Committee on
Legal Aid (NCLA) is the
committee of the IBP which is
specifically tasked with
handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) is the committee
of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with disciplining members
of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those
chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of
the country as defined in Rule
139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of
Court of the court where the
practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of
quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to
an officer holding an equivalent
or similar position.
The term shall also include an
officer holding a similar
position in agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions, or a
responsible officer of an
accredited PO or NGO, or an
accredited mediator who
conducted the court-annexed
mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -
(a) Every practicing lawyer is
required to render a minimum of
sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a
year. Said 60 hours shall be
spread within a period of twelve
(12) months, with a minimum of
five (5) hours of free legal aid
services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the
practicing lawyer to render legal
aid service for more than five (5)
hours in one month, the excess
hours may be credited to the
said lawyer for the succeeding
periods.
For this purpose, a practicing
lawyer shall coordinate with the
Clerk of Court for cases where he
may render free legal aid service.
He may also coordinate with the
IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the
IBP Chapter to inquire about
cases where he may render free
legal aid service. In this
connection, the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
shall regularly and actively
coordinate with the Clerk of
Court.
The practicing lawyer shall
report compliance with the
requirement within ten (10) days
of the last month of each quarter
of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be
required to secure and obtain a
certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of
hours spent rendering free legal
aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain
the following information:
(i) The case or cases
where the legal aid
service was rendered, the
party or parties in the said
case(s) for whom the
service was rendered, the
docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s)
the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours
actually spent attending a
hearing or conducting
trial on a particular case
in the court or quasi-
judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours
actually spent attending
mediation, conciliation or
any other mode of ADR
on a particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a
motion for extension of
time to file a pleading or
for postponement of
hearing or conference) or
pleading filed on a
particular case shall be
considered as one (1) hour
of service.
The Clerk of Court shall
issue the certificate in
triplicate, one (1) copy to
be retained by the
practicing lawyer, one (1)
copy to be retained by the
Clerk of Court and one (1)
copy to be attached to the
lawyer's compliance
report.
(c) Said compliance report shall
be submitted to the Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the court’s jurisdiction. The
Legal Aid Chairperson shall
then be tasked with immediately
verifying the contents of the
certificate with the issuing Clerk
of Court by comparing the copy
of the certificate attached to the
compliance report with the copy
retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after
verification, issue a compliance
certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall
also submit the compliance
reports to the IBP’s NCLA for
recording and documentation.
The submission shall be made
within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of
compliance reports by the
practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall
indicate in all pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of
issue of their certificate of
compliance for the immediately
preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from
the records.
(f) Before the end of a particular
year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form
prepared by the NCLA which
states that, during that year, they
are employed with the
government or incumbent
elective officials not allowed by
law to practice or lawyers who
by law are not allowed to appear
in court.
The form shall be sworn to and
submitted to the IBP Chapter or
IBP National Office together with
the payment of an annual
contribution of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution
shall accrue to a special fund of
the IBP for the support of its legal
aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular
year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(iii)
shall secure a certification from the
director of the legal clinic or of the
concerned NGO or PO to the
effect that, during that year, they
have served as supervising
lawyers in a legal clinic or actively
participated in the NGO’s or PO’s
free legal aid activities. The
certification shall be submitted
to the IBP Chapter or IBP
National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular
year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(iv)
shall fill up a form prepared by the
NCLA which states that, during
that year, they are neither
practicing lawyers nor covered by
Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form
shall be sworn to and submitted to
the IBP Chapter or IBP National
Office together with the payment of
an annual contribution of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way
of support for the efforts of
practicing lawyers who render
mandatory free legal aid services.
Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the
support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual
contribution shall subject the
lawyer to a penalty of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for that
year which amount shall also
accrue to the special fund for the
legal aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate
with the various legal aid
committees of the IBP local
chapters for the proper handling
and accounting of legal aid
cases which practicing lawyers
can represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the
activities of the Chapter of the
 Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of
Court on legal aid cases and the
collation of certificates
submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the
national repository of records
in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the
following forms: certificate to be
issued by the Clerk of Court
and forms mentioned in Section
5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust,
manage and utilize the
contributions and penalties that
will be paid by lawyers pursuant
to this Rule to effectively carry
out the provisions of this Rule.
For this purpose, it shall
annually submit an accounting to
the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included
by the IBP in its report to the
Supreme Court in connection
with its request for the release of
the subsidy for its legal aid
program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. -
(a) At the end of every calendar
year, any practicing lawyer who
fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid
service each year shall be
required by the IBP, through the
NCLA, to explain why he was
unable to render the minimum
prescribed number of hours. If no
explanation has been given or if
the NCLA finds the explanation
unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and
recommendation to the IBP
Board of Governors that the
erring lawyer be declared a
member of the IBP who is not in
good standing. Upon approval of
the NCLA’s recommendation, the
IBP Board of Governors shall
declare the erring lawyer as a
member not in good standing.
Notice thereof shall be furnished
the erring lawyer and the IBP
Chapter which submitted the
lawyer’s compliance report or the
IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not
submit a compliance report. The
notice to the lawyer shall include
a directive to pay Four Thousand
Pesos (P4,000) penalty which
shall accrue to the special fund
for the legal aid program of the
IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing"
declaration shall be effective for a
period of three (3) months from
the receipt of the erring lawyer of
the notice from the IBP Board of
Governors. During the said
period, the lawyer cannot appear
in court or any quasi-judicial body
as counsel. Provided, however,
that the "not in good standing"
status shall subsist even after the
lapse of the three-month period
until and unless the penalty shall
have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to
comply with his duties under this
Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the
subject of disciplinary
proceedings to be instituted
motu
 proprio by the CBD. The said
proceedings shall afford the
erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the
CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court. If found administratively
liable, the penalty of suspension
in the practice of law for one (1)
year shall be imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a
certificate or any form required to
be submitted under this Rule or
any contents thereof shall be
administratively charged with
falsification and dishonesty and
shall be subject to disciplinary
action by the CBD. This is without
prejudice to the filing of criminal
charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a
certificate or any contents thereof
by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid
Committee of the IBP local
chapter where the case is
pending or by the Director of a
legal clinic or responsible officer
of an NGO or PO shall be a
ground for an administrative case
against the said Clerk of Court or
Chairperson. This is without
prejudice to the filing of the
criminal and administrative
charges against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
- A lawyer who renders mandatory legal
aid service for the required number of
hours in a year for the three year-period
covered by a compliance period under
the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the
following: two (2) credit units for legal
ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and
pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for
alternative dispute resolution, four (4)
credit units for legal writing and oral
advocacy, four (4) credit units for
substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and six (6) credit units
for such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee under Section
2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal
aid service for the required number of
hours in a year for at least two
consecutive years within the three year-
period covered by a compliance period
under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: one (1) credit unit
for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for
trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit
for alternative dispute resolution, two (2)
credit units for legal writing and oral
advocacy, two (2) credit units for
substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and three (3) credit units
for such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee under Section
2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. -
The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby
given authority to recommend
implementing regulations in
determining who are "practicing
lawyers," what constitute "legal aid
cases" and what administrative
procedures and financial safeguards
which may be necessary and proper in
the implementation of this rule may be
prescribed. It shall coordinate with the
various legal chapters in the crafting of
the proposed implementing regulations
and, upon approval by the IBP Board of
Governors, the said implementing
regulations shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule
and its implementing rules shall take
effect on July 1,2009 after they have
been published in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.