MANUEL C. YUHICO, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ A.C.

Y
No. 8391 November 23, 2010 uhico, with interest until full payment.
FACTS: Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non
P30,000.00 -
from Manuel Yuhico. Gutierrez then claimed that payment of
he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his just debts and likewise guilty of gross misconduct.
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed RULING: Atty. Gutierrez is guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT. He
the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very is ordered to pay the amount of P90,000.00 to th
soon, since he was expecting to coll e Yuhico
ect his attorney's fees with interest.
from a Japanese client. Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
t of our legal s
o P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two ystem. They are expected to maintain not only
loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people¶s faith
in a text message he asked for an extension of time to pay. and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must,
Later, thru a text at all times, faithfully perf
message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow orm their duties to society, to the
money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of
Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
within a Professional
month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no question as to
any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and
the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation.
message to Yuhico and requested him to give him another Neither can he justify his act of non
week to pay hi -
s debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. payment of debt
Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his by his
debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have
complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the 5
Philippines contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to
- pay.
Commission on Bar D Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of
iscipline (IBP employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of
- obtaining debts without the intention of paying them.
CBD). On Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making
January 12, 2006, the IBP promises of paying his debts,
- yet repeatedly failing to
CBD directed Gutierrez to submit deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico
his Answer on the complaint against him. In a Resolution, promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving
IBP excuses without actually making good of his promises, is
- clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate
CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non lack
- of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and
payment of just debts duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of
and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to the court. Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from
the practice of law
for gross misconduct due to non
-
payment
of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the
foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the
IBP, it cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar
Gutierrez for the second time, con
sidering that Gutierrez had
already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP
pointed out, the court does not have double or multiple
disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have
a law mandating a minimum 5year requirement for
readmissi
on, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's
infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot
disbar him anew.
GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 2015
By: Karen P. Lustica
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35
years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and
Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against
him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is
only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus,
Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the
phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued
that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith,
and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
1. WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
2. WON Sesbreño should be disbarred
HELD:
1. YES.
2. YES.
RATIO:
1. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x
x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion
or exclusion as the cases are reached.
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and
time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that
eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty.
Parcasio was granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and
political rights,” a circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did
not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
2. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction
by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in
general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED
ECRAELA V. PANGALANGAN (A.C. NO. 10676; SEPTEMBER 8, 2015)
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN. (A.C. No. 10676;
September 8, 2015).
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members
of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being
already married to Jardiolin;
3, CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin
and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing
of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
HELD: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Sunday, June 04, 2017
ECRAELA V. PANGALANGAN (A.C. NO. 10676; SEPTEMBER 8, 2015)
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN. (A.C. No. 10676;
September 8, 2015).
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members
of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being
already married to Jardiolin;
3, CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin
and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing
of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
HELD: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of

barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be
qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the
Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I
honored fraternity.
would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to
relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of
as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection

In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through would charge only three pesos for every registration.”
technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.

HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828,

providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or

through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code
IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- MALPRACTICE
of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar
Category: Legal Ethics Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a

business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or

FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
suspension.
that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in

translation, read as follows: 1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.
“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of

Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as

required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your

application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29

lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for

or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, March 23, 1929
and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
FACTS:
Atty. Tagorda, in his card written in Spanish and Ilocano, noted his capability as a lawyer such as However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.
executing a deed of sale, collection of loans, etc. Also, in his letter addressed to a lieutenant of b
arrio in his home municipality, he also advertised his profession as a lawyer and even asked a fav
or to disseminate this information to the barrio people in any of their meetings or social gatherin
gs. Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.
Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda through the card and letter is wrong and be
punished.
RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers”

RULING: Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect advertising and stirring up litigation
were violative of the Code of Ethics. Still, the most worthy and effective advertisement possible, The practice of law is a profession and not a business.
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitati
on of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standard
s of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the me The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and discountenances
mbers of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully in
his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should have known better.
clined citizens.

The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the b
ar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intima
tion that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at th
e bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. Atty. Tagorda is suspe
nded for one month.
Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot (AC L-1117, 20 March 1994) – Legal Profession/Ethics
MissIdea Uncategorized September 4, 2017 1 Minute
Facts:

AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law, who is charged with
TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage
arrangements; to wit:
A.C. No. 1261

December 29, 1983 Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the agreement
poor. Everything confidential.
lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or
commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.
 Annex B
Legal assistance service
GUAM DIVORCE
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
DON PARKINSON
Tel. 2-41-60.
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy”of the Court, promising not to repeat it and that Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
he published it only once. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
Issue and Ruling: THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
Whether Respondent’s act is in violation of the legal profession? CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement was a flagrant violation by the Respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from public.
That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain constitutes malpractice”. It is settled that it is highly unethical for lawyers to advertise his
talent and skills. LAW PROFESSION IS NOT A TRADE.
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.

*Respondent was only reprimanded.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378 of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court
on June 7, 1977.
FACTS:

Issue:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” the advertisements herein complained of.
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm Held:
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
 FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of under the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as A. Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers
defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and asking Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his
It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but purpose of using the letterhead of another law office.
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
connected with thelaw." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec.
description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the  Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in
general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
McKenzie.
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (DIGEST)
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving September 29, 2019 by CaseDigestsPh
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
G.R. No. 105938 (1996)
law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
Kapunan, J.
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
Attorney-Client Privilege
assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the PARTIES:
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell
us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Teodoro R. Regala,
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself Edgardo J. Angara,
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is Jose C. Concepcion,
Petitioners
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to Rogelio A. Vinluan,
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service Victor P. Lazatin,
and the unwholesome result of propaganda. Eduardo U. Escueta

DACANAY VS. BAKER & MC KENZIE (A.C. NO. 2131 05/10/1985)

 Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations
Respondents
Republic of the Philippines acting through the PCGG, Raul Roco in PCGG Case No. 33.

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm).
SUMMARY:
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative
Petitioners are partners of the ACCRA Law Firm. One of their clients (allegedly Eduardo
and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders.
Cojuangco) engaged them to organize corporations and serve as nominees of the client. The
More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to
PCGG filed a case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Cojuangco. The PCGG allege that the
its client documents which substantiate the client’s equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates
numerous corporations (including the ones organized by the petitioners for their unnamed
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client’s name, and a blank deed of
client) were organized to serve as conduit for ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and President
trust or assignment covering said shares.
Marcos. The PCGG impleaded the petitioners as defendants in the case against Cojuangco. They
will only be dropped as defendants if they (1) disclose the identity of their clients; (2) submit
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submit the deeds of
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
assignments that petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings. The petitioners refused to give in to the conditions invoking attorney-client
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
privilege. The SC agreed with the petitioners and held that the general rule in our jurisdiction as
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No.
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the name or identity of his client. There are three principal exceptions to the general rule: (1)
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice, (2) where disclosure would open the
Respondent Presidential PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” and “Third
client to civil liability, and (3) where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s
Amended Complaint” which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s
name is privileged. The first and third exception applies in this case.
Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominees/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
DOCTRINES:
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their Opposition with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded private respondent
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
Roco.
ambit of the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
Respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
“communication” as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a
communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
Respondent Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their
communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the
refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA lawyers may take
bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
FACTS: debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the clients? (YES)
RATIO:
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) and mandato (contract of agency). In modern
day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies
what may be considered as a “quasi-judicial office” since he is in fact an officer of the Court and
exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.Thus,
in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is
required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
LEGAL BASES OF THE PRIVILEGE
(1) Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as
currently worded provides: Rule 130, Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.—The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: x x x An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of whichhas been acquired in such capacity.
(2) Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Section 20 states: It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval.
(3) This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
(4) Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer’s fidelity to client.
(5) In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights
available to the accused, the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory.
GENERAL RULE: A LAWYER MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE AND REFUSE TO DIVULGE THE NAME
OR IDENTITY OF HIS CLIENT
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons
advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be
obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
FIRST EXCEPTION: WHERE A STRONG PROBABILITY EXISTS THAT REVEALING THE CLIENT’S NAME
WOULD IMPLICATE THAT CLIENT IN THE VERY ACTIVITY FOR WHICH HE SOUGHT THE LAWYER’S
ADVICE.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence
that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that
end. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client’s identity before a
grand jury. Reversing the lower court’s contempt orders, the state supreme court held that
under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name
of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of
the “Sandino Gang,” a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the
gang, Joe Sandino. In connection with a tax investigation, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by
Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names.
The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts
and circumstances of the case. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent.

SECOND EXCEPTION: WHERE DISCLOSURE WOULD OPEN THE CLIENT TO CIVIL LIABILITY.
In Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab
she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner
was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the
second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney
of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed
that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of
the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he
was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the
owner of the second cab. The New York Supreme Court allowed the lawyer’s claim to the effect
that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of
the court’s request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and
brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer’s refusal to divulge the
names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by
such evidence their version of the litigation.
THIRD EXCEPTION: THE NAME WOULD FURNISH THE ONLY LINK THAT WOULD FORM THE CHAIN
OF TESTIMONY NECESSARY TO CONVICT AN INDIVIDUAL OF A CRIME, THE CLIENT’S NAME IS
PRIVILEGED.
In Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had
been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for
the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a
note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird
identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Baird could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him. The court
emphasized the exception that a client’s name is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services of the client’s identity exposes him to possible investigation and
sanction by government agencies. The Court held:
The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or
interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
non-payment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the
link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.
FIRST AND THIRD EXCEPTIONS ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection with
the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-
client relationship).
The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’
ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(1) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(2) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(3) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their clients’ shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients
would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a crime.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 33.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Rule 2.03 | June 17, 1993 | Regalado, J
Nature of Case: Original Petition in the SC
Petitioner: Mauricio Ulep
Respondent: The Legal Clinic, Inc.
SUMMARY: Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements. Respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
DOCTRINE: The services offered by respondent include various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good
and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
FACTS:
• Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and
`B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law.”
• Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements.
• Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines.
• Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
• The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering.
• While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
• It is palpably clear that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
• In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore
• It is clear that services offered by respondent fall within the ambit of the
practice of law. And only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar
and who is in good and regular stading is entitled to practice law.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether
the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of – YES
The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such practice is not
allowed. Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals; the services it offers
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed
by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
RULING: The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
NOTE:
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
SEBASTISAN VS. CALIS
A.C. NO. 5118/314SCRA1;SEPTEMBER 9, 1999
J. _____
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1992, one Marilou Sebastian, herein complainant,
was referred to Atty. Dorotheo Calis, herein respondent, for the latter to process all the
documents needed for the former to travel to the United States of America with the
consideration of P150,000.00. With the respondent’s promise to return the
complainant’s money if there would be trouble with the documents for her travel. In 4
separate payments, complainant paid the entire consideration receiving, however, only
3 receipts for the payments. Respondent, Calis, provided the complainant with spurious
documents which resulted for complainant to be detained in Changi Prisons upon arrival
in Singapore and thereafter, the complainant was deported back to the Philippines.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the respondent promised to secure new travel
documents for the complainant. However, the complainant opted to demand for the
return of her money. Calis made partial payments of 15,000, 6000, and 5000 to the
complainant but was unreachable when the complainant demanded for the rest of the
payment.
Calis also failed to attend the hearings with the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) despite being issued summons and being
 required to answer or comment on the complaint. Therewith, the IBP recommended the
disbarment of herein respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Dorotheo Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which thereby constitutes his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege carrying with
it the condition of continuous good moral character. The gross misconduct of a lawyer
subjects him unfit to practice law..Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, Calis guaranteed to secure all the necessary documents for
Sebastian’s travel to the United States with the promise to return the money if anything
goes wrong with her travel. Calis’s acts of giving the complainant spurious documents
constitutes deception and unlawful conduct on his part. Adding to it is respondent’s
refusal to honor the summons of the IBP which reflects his unprofessional conduct. The
court views Calis’s conduct and continuance in service as a threat to the administration
of justice. Therefore, Calis is deemed disbarred and is ordered to immediately return the
rest of the complainant’s money.
Topic: Upholding the Constitution and the Law
Yuhico v Gutierrez
AC No 8391, Nov 23 2010
Case Digest by Celine Arat-Cabading
Facts
This is a disciplinary action against respondent Gutierrez filed by Yuhico for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of
the City Prosecutor during the hearings.
Gutierrez asked Yuhico for a cash loan of P30,000.00 and later P60,000 (totalling to P90,000.00)
to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill and later of his wife who was
also hospitalized. Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect
his attorney's fees from a Japanese client. When Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans, Gutierrez
failed to pay saying his attorney's fees release is delayed due to tax and the law on money
laundering. Again, Gutierrez attempted to borrow P70,000.00 from him again for his daughter’s
fees required to take the US Med Board licensure examination in the U.S. This time, Yuhico refused
to lend Gutierrez. Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans for numerous times, but
Gutierrez always failed to do so. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
By then, IBP already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of
his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.
Issue: WON Gutierrez gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment and WON a lawyer can be
disbarred more than once.
Held:
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the Court cannot, disbar Gutierrez for the second
time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Philippine law do not have
laws on double or multiple disbarment. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
IBP, which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED and is ORDERED
to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from
receipt of this decision with interest.
Case Digest: Atty. Ecraela v. Atty. Pangalangan
A.C. No. 10676: September 8, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members
of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.

1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to
1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
Issue:

Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

Ruling:

Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the
Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.

In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well
as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish