D.

Additional Limitations (When Exercise by Delegates)

Ermita Malate v City of Manila G.R. No. L-24693, 31 July 1967

FACTS:
- Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to
be applicable in the city of Manila.
- They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.
- There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
- The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
- It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours. There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
- The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
- The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of
Manila.

ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is valid and/or unconstitutional.
RULING:

- It is valid. Ruling is reversed.

- The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was
made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
- The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests.
- The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government.
Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process.
- It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted.
Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest
of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope
of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
Magtajas v Pryce Properties G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994

FACTS:
- PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
- PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of
a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the
same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
- Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City
of Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.
- In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted
two (2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing
business permit to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and
an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.
(ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
- Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
- Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
- Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

W/N Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:

- NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling.
As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance. As to petitioners attack
on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of gambling is
not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient.
- Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court
has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and
executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to
their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to
the courts of justice.
City of Manila v Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, 12 April 2005

FACTS:

- The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses.
It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
- March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women
are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
- June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance,
insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise
of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
- Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power.

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law.

RULING:

- It is not a valid exercise of police power.

- The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of
police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
 protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that
classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which
are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
- Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places....
Every house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt
from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure
men.
- The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality.
Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can
make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment;
it is in the hearts of men.
- The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra
vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
- All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed
and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is
therefore ultra vires null and void.
Pasong Bayabas Farmer Association v CA G.R. Nos. 142359 and 142980, 25 May 2004

FACTS:

- In January 1994, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Patrocinia G. Mercado (“MARO

Mercado”) of the Department of Agrarian Reform (“DAR”) sent a letter to Paulino Franco
(“Franco”) through Franco’s attorney-in-fact, Plaridel Seno (“Seno”). The letter
requested Franco to attend a conference to discuss the terms and conditions of
bringing under the agricultural leasehold system Franco’s land located in Babag,
Cebu City. Franco failed to attend the meeting and merely sent a letter-reply to
MARO Mercado, objecting to the placement of his land under the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657 (“RA 6657”) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.
- MARO Mercado prepared the documentation folders for Provisional Lease Rentals in favor
of the following: Juana Alforque, Francisco Navarro, Eduardo Navarro, Arsenio Gabisay,
Andres Labandero, Benedicto Gabisay, Edilberto Labandero, Lolita Dacayana, Celestino
Rama, Numeriano Navarro, Bonifacio Lastimosa, Loreta Rama, Lourdes Arda, Leonardo
Gabisay, and Normerta Bontilao (“private petitioners”).
- MARO Mercado found all the private petitioners bona fide tenants on Franco’s land. The
folders contained the corresponding orders fixing the lease rentals for each occupant. On
7 March 1994, Acting Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Buenaventura Pomida
(“PARO Pomida”) approved the Provisional Lease Rentals recommended by MARO
Mercado.
- Franco filed with the DARAB, Region VII, Cebu City a petition to nullify the orders
of MARO Mercado and PARO Pomida. The case was docketed as Reg. Case No. VI-
516-C-94. Franco alleged that the land could not be placed under the agricultural leasehold
system because Proclamation No. 2052 dated 30 January 1981 and Letter of Instruction
No. 1256 (“LOI No. 1256”) dated 14 July 1982 had already classified the land as non-
agricultural. Proclamation No. 2052 declared the Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag
and Sirao, including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and the Municipalities
of Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu, as tourist zones. Further, under Section
 12 of RA 6657, in relation to DAR Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1989, only
tenanted agricultural lands can be brought under the leasehold system. Franco alleged that
since his land is neither agricultural nor tenanted, private petitioners not having shared any
produce of the land with him, the land could not be placed under the leasehold system.
- Moreover, Franco claimed that the procedure under DAR Administrative Order No. 4
prescribing when the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer may fix provisionally the
leasehold rental even without the landowner’s participation applies only in cases where the
landowner disagrees with the amount of rental, but not when the landowner denies that his
land is agricultural and tenanted. Thus, Franco prayed for the nullification of the
Provisional Leasehold Rental Orders.
- In their answer, private petitioners asserted that the issuance of the orders was in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 6657, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No.
3844 (“RA 3844”), authorizing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer to fix the rentals
on agricultural land. Accordingly, MARO Mercado sent notices for Leasehold Conference
to Franco and private petitioners. Since Franco merely sent a letter-reply to the notice
without appearing and presenting evidence to support his claim that his land is untenanted
and is non-agricultural, MARO Mercado prepared the documentation folders for
Provisional Lease Rentals as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 4, series of
1989. PARO Pomida later approved the Provisional Lease Rentals.
- Thus, private petitioners assert that whatever acts done by MARO Mercado and
PARO Pomida on the Provisional Lease Rentals on Franco’s land were performed in
accordance with their official duties and functions. Private petitioners further alleged
that the exemption of Franco’s land from the Operation Land Transfer coverage was by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2052 and not because Franco’s land was untenanted.
Proclamation No. 2052, in placing certain barangays of Cebu City, including Barangay
Babag, within the tourism zone, did not automatically change the classification of Franco’s
land from agricultural to non-agricultural.
- On 30 June 1994, the Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (“Adjudicator”) ruled in favor of
Franco, declaring the assailed orders void. Citing Proclamation No. 2052, LOI No. 1256,
and the Order dated 16 September 1992 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao (“Secretary
Garilao”), the Adjudicator held that Franco’s land is excluded from the coverage of the
 Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law under RA 6657. The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Adjudicator reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the reasons above-cited, Decision is hereby rendered as follows, to
wit:

Declaring the challenged Orders as null and void for lack of legal and factual basis; Ordering the
recall and cancellation of the aforesaid Orders for the reasons above-indicated; No pronouncement
as to cost and damages.

- On appeal, the DARAB rendered its Decision dated 23 July 1996 affirming the decision of
the Adjudicator. The DARAB held that Franco’s land was not agricultural land at the
time the questioned orders were issued. The DARAB cited two reasons: (1) Franco’s
land is within the tourism zone pursuant to Proclamation No. 2052, promulgated on 30
January 1981, and which preceded the enactment of RA 6657 which became effective on
15 June 1988; and (2) the purpose of Proclamation No. 2052 is manifested in the issuance
of LOI No. 1256 which directed the DAR Secretary to exempt the areas situated within the
declared Tourist Zone from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer, and to suspend
or cancel all processing for coverage of these areas under the land reform program.
- In the Decision, one of the members of the DARAB, Lorenzo R. Reyes (“Reyes”), made a
handwritten note under his signature stating: “Petitioner-appellee [Franco] will still have
to apply for conversion and if granted appellants will be entitled to disturbance
compensation.” Secretary Garilao, as Chairperson of the DARAB, rendered a separate
opinion stating that: I concur, together with the Honorable DARAB Commissioners, with
the outcome of this case.
- I would like to reiterate however that the grant of exemption from coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The decision of this case should not, in any way, be
construed as a grant of exemption. Petitioner must still comply with the administrative
requirement of applying for exemption or conversion of his landholding.
- Franco filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 August 1996 on the sole ground: That
the pronouncement therein made that petitioner-appellee will still apply for conversion,
 and if granted, appellants will be entitled to disturbance compensation, is not supported by
any factual and legal basis. In a Resolution dated 11 February 1997, however, the DARAB
denied the motion for lack of merit. Franco appealed to the Court of Appeals but private
petitioners did not. In a Decision dated 20 November 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the DARAB decision with the modification that private petitioners have no right to
disturbance compensation. Hence, this petition.
- The Court of Appeals held that Franco did not have to apply for conversion of his land
from agricultural to non-agricultural. However, in accordance with Section 3(d) of DAR
Administrative Order No. 01, series of 1999, Franco should apply for an exemption
clearance with the DAR to exempt his land from the coverage of RA 6657.
- On the issue of disturbance compensation, the Court of Appeals held that private petitioners
are not entitled to any disturbance compensation absent any proof that they are tenants,
farmers, or bona fide occupants of the land. Under Section 16 of DAR Administrative
Order No. 01, series of 1999, disturbance compensation shall be paid to tenants,
farmworkers, or bona fide occupants affected by the conversion. The Court of Appeals
stated that the DARAB itself found no tenancy relationship between Franco and private
petitioners.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 2052 DECLARING THE

WHOLE BARANGAY OF SIBUGAY, MALUBOG, BABAG AND SIRAO AND THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ARGAO AND DALAGUETE [AS TOURIST ZONES] HAS
TAKEN OUTSIDE THE COVERAGE OF AGRARIAN REFORM ALL
AGRICULTURAL LANDS INCLUDED WITHIN THE PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATION OR ONLY THOSE THAT ARE ACQUIRED AND DEVELOPED
BY THE PTA FOR TOURISM PURPOSES.
2. WHETHER BARANGAY BABAG WHERE THE LAND SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS
LOCATED IS NOT ANYMORE COVERABLE UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP).
 3. WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF NON-TENANCY AS RULED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS PROPER INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN
FACTUALLY DETERMINED IN THE COURT A QUO.
4. WHETHER THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AS TO THE NON-
PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION TO PRIVATE PETITIONERS-
FARMERS IS VALID AND PROPER

As to the topic:

W/N the authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an exercise of police

power.

RULING:

Decision of CA is set aside. DARAB’s decision is reinstated. The authority of a municipality to

issue zoning classification is an exercise of the police power, not the power of eminent domain. A
zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present
and future projection of needs
Legaspi v City of Cebu G.R. 159110, 10 December 2013

FACTS:

- On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance
No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.
- On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido
Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu,
then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and
operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process
and for being contrary to law, and damages.
- Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a
paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents
from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by
a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the
CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for
the release of his car but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without
due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the
clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was
no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he
was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court
hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.
- On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of
Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code
of Cebu City, and damages.
- He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of
the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the
 anay exterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was
not obstructing the flow of traffic.
- The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664
as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
- Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi
came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were
consolidated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

RULING:

- The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

- In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the
tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
- The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
- As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
 Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
- In Metropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R.
No. 135962, March 27, 2000, the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body. (emphasis supplied)
- In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.
- The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the
legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section
458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
Section 16 of the LGC.
- The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its
exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect
and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming
part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
- Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review,
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its
conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
- The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all
the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".
 - To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
liability by simply driving away. DENIED.

Social Justice Secretary v Alfredo Lim, G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014

FACTS:

- On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies

(Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to
address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and
reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products.
- On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027
which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
- Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given six (6)
months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses. It was later
extended until 30 April 2003.
- On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court (SC)
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
- Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of
Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
- On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of
2006 and providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto.” This
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
 - On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza
to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective
of the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March
2007Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and
that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable
conflict between them. SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil
companies.
- On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was
limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium
and a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly
allowed. Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions
are as follows:

- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the

general welfare of the people;

- It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as well as

health and environment related municipal laws and international conventions and
treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes
Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child;

- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

- On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil companies contend
that:
 - The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators. They further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or threat
of injury as a result of the act complained of;

- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available;

- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only exercises
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an
ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;

- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of
zoning ordinance sought to be modified

- There is a valid exercise of police power.

- On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended the
assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are
located from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.

ISSUES:

WON there are violations of environmental laws.

WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated.

WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue.

WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals.

RULING:

1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied inSection
2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure incivil, criminal
 and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs,and the RTCs
involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other relatedlaws, rules and
regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substancesand Hazardous
Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and other existing
laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation, protection and
utilization of the environment and natural resources. Notably, the aforesaid Rules are
limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental
laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would support the other
position of the petitioners – the protection of the right to life, security and safety.

2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it
having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are
of transcendental importance warranting are laxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v.
PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375).

3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that
the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of
Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city. No
different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right. In like
manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is indisputably a right
of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of Manila, have
the required personal interest to seek relief to protect such right.
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its
7 March 2007 decision, to wit: “Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to
protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist
attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement

and Urban Development of the City of Manila which recommended the
approval of the ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly
volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel,
diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and; (4) In
case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the
neighboring communities.
- The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe.
It therefore becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.” The same
best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing
reason to persuade the Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila
are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance
No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional. For, given
that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how
remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent
 on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in
situations where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of big
neighbourhoods is at stake.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued
stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.

2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the
Pandacan area.

3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the
RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation
shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required document is submitted.