Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony:

Old Strategy and New Challenges

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
______________________

Keywords: Middle East, Persian Gulf, new strategic

environment, Iran’s geo-strategic position, nuclear
proliferation, Additional Protocol to the NPT, Iran’s military
build-up, US strategy
Abstract

Because of its special geo-strategic position in the Middle East,

Iran has always been keen to assume a pivotal role in the
region. However, as opposed to the old regime, the present
one, while pursuing the same vision, is facing unbearable
challenges in its strategy. The main argument of this paper is
that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s endeavor to buildup a
credible force structure is neither directed toward any power
projection against any particular state in the Middle East, nor
designed to threaten the presence of any extra-regional powers
deployed in the region. Rather, it is mainly devised to ensure
its very existence and to deter any potential contender to
encroach against its territorial integrity and the survival of the
revolutionary regime, and to prove the capacity of Islamic
governance to run effectively and in an efficient way the
business of a nation-state, with the requisites of the 21st
century. Iran’s nuclear undertaking, if ever directed toward
unconventional aims and objectives, should be viewed from
this perspective.


Professor Ali-Asghar Kazemi holds a Ph.D. in International Law and Relations
from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.
He is the author of many books and articles, and a legal advisor on matters
concerning the international law of the sea. Currently, he is dean of the Graduate
School of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and
Research Campus) Tehran-Iran.
 Kazemi 2

Prologue

Iran’s geo-strategic position in the Middle East and the Persian

Gulf region has always dictated its political and security
posture vis-à-vis its neighbors and outside powers.
Throughout the long history of this ancient country, from the
Old Persian empires to the present time, Iran has always
identified itself differently from other nations of the region, in
spite of religious binds, which presumably should narrow the
gap between the Persian and Arab civilizations. The
geopolitical necessities have remained almost untouched and
even more sagacious after the revolution and the Iraq-Iran war,
which lasted near a decade. The end of the cold war has
strengthen Iran’s strategic position, and as a consequence,
pushed the Islamic government in power to continue the same
path and political vision and aspiration in the region as the old
regime.

Thus, in setting up its defense and security goals and interests,

we witness that many of the old projects in various domains are
being pursued even with more fervor than before.
Once the Shah had the ambition to assume the role of
gendarme in the Persian Gulf region; but he did not survive to
achieve his dreams. Now, the Islamic Republic is putting its
feet in the same shoes, of course with a big difference. That is,
while the old regime had access almost to all and every kind of
Western weapons and technology, the new revolutionary
regime is banned from such sources and is compelled to rely on
international black markets to procure what it believes
necessary for building a credible power to be reckoned with.
Iran’s nuclear ambition, that has created lots of attention in the
past months in the world, seems to fit this grandiose objective.

The main argument of this paper is that the Islamic regime in

power in Tehran will pursue the strategy of a hegemonistic
power in the region for a dual purposes: a) to counter any
eventual threat and challenge to the very existence and survival
of the revolutionary regime and, b) to show the efficiency and

2
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 3

viability of the Islamic governance to respond to the needs of

21st century, as a successful model to be followed in the region.

Old Ambitions in a New Strategic

Environment
Almost a quarter of a century has elapsed since the Shah’s
regime has been toppled through a series of unprecedented
events, stemming from internal social unrests and, as some
prefer to believe, external political games and conspiracy that
led to the 1979 revolution. During the final years of the old
regime, Iran was on the verge of becoming a virtual
superpower of the region, thanks to the god-given oil revenues,
Shah’s ambition for power, and, of course, western
technological and political support, without which it was
impossible to think of such ostentatious venture. In those days,
the Shah was given almost a carte blanche for all kinds of state
of art weapon systems and major defense hardware to build-up
a very sophisticated and efficient military power. Ships,
aircrafts, tanks and other components of the latest production
of the West, swiftly appeared in the inventory of the Imperial
Navy, Army and the Air Force, backed by all-out logistical and
training support, from all over the world.1

With the downfall of the Shah regime and the subsequent

events that occurred in Iran, many of the weapon contracts
were cancelled and most of the well-trained and educated
cadres were purged from the armed forces or preferred
voluntary premature retirement. With the outbreak of war with
Iraq, some of them came back to do their duty for their
homeland. Many young American-trained 2pilots were among
those who fought the enemy courageously and some never
came back from their sacred mission. The Navy easily
established its sea supremacy in the Persian Gulf in initial
1
See for example, Amy Truesdell, “Iran plans Gulf trip, projecting a Powerful
Military Force.” In this paper it is suggested that “ The Iranian government's key
objective in building up its armed forces is the same now as it was before the
revolution in 1979: to secure regional military superiority.” A:\Global Defence
Review Iran plans Gulf trip.htm
2

3
 Kazemi 4

phase of the war. The Army, which suffered most from the
revolutionary wash out, had a different story. Nonetheless,
poor-equipped and disorganized army soldiers and officers
fought bravely and courageously until the end of the 8-year
war.

Iran-Iraq armed hostilities left many thousands of casualties

and extensive material and moral damages from both sides.
But the war was a blessing for the fragile revolutionary regime
to solidify itself by containing people’s demand for social and
political development. Instead, the war induced earnest
attempt to rely more than ever on indigenous initiatives and
schemes to tackle with Iraq military threats. That was the
beginning of the arduous challenge the Islamic regime faced
during the war in procuring and producing the much needed
weapon systems and equipments to sustain combat capability.

The termination of war between Iran and Iraq brought a new

sense of identity and drive for the Islamic regime to embark
upon a series of projects initiated during the hostilities.
Missile assembly line, construction of small fast boats, armored
vehicles, tanks and other light weapons for use at sea, on land
and in the air, were among the many projects which gradually
pave the way for relatively self-sufficient and autonomous
logistical support in the defense and military industrial
complex. In the field of the missile industry a very decisive
jump has taken place in recent years, which has become a
source of annoy to many in and outside the region.

Against this brief background, and with the more recent

suspicions of Iran’s nuclear project, many specialists in the
field of defense question the logic and true intention behind
Iran’s military build-up in the region.

Iran’s Military Build-up: Facts and Allegations

In the late 1990’s, military observers in the West believed that

Iran has embarked on a major modernization and buildup of
its forces; that includes selective acquisition of conventional

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 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 5

new advanced weapons as well as an ambitious nuclear

weapons program.

In the views of American military experts who follow Iran’s

development in the field of defense, the current military
buildup began in 1989, not long after the conclusion of the
1980-88 war with Iraq. Iran, with a Gross Domestic Product of
only about $80 billion in 1990, spent $3.1 billion on its military
that same year. The next year, the defense budget rose to $3.8
billion.3 It is believed that this sum has gradually augmented
with the relative increase in oil revenue in the following years.

Washington officials and nongovernmental analysts report that

Iran has been active on the arms procurement front. Statistics
show that during the period 1989-95, Iran acquired 184 new
battle tanks, eighty infantry fighting vehicles, 106 artillery
pieces, fifty-seven combat aircraft, and twelve warships.
According to this report, the purchases have expanded Iran’s
current arsenal to about 1,200 tanks, 1,000 armored personnel
carriers, 2,000 artillery pieces, 265 aircraft, and twenty-eight
warships.4

With a population of about 70 million, Iran maintains an

armed forces totaling about 513,000 active troops--including
its most elite force, the 120,000-strong Revolutionary Guard
Corps. Another 350,000 are reservists. Most of the Guards are
ground forces, but they have also developed a parallel armed
forces system alongside with the regular army, navy, and air
force; a heavy burden that the revolutionary regime has been
affording all along, due to some unknown sense of mistrust .

According to Pentagon officials, the revolutionary regime in

Iran will “be in a position to construct a crude but workable
nuclear device at the turn of the century.” In their view, “the
development of a ‘Persian bomb’ is Iran's top priority, and
Tehran receives technology and aid from both Russia and
China.” 5

3
See: Bill Gerts, “Iran’s Regional Powerhouse,” in: Air Force, Journal of Air
Force Association, Magazine Online, June 1996 Vol. 79, No.06.
4
Ibid.
5
See e.g. Bill Gerts, “Iran’s Regional Powerhouse,” ibid.

5
 Kazemi 6

The US Defense Department expert further speculated "we're

talking about something the size of a boxcar," he explained,
"but with the Iranians, a truck or a merchant ship can be a
weapon-delivery system."6

In view of the US officials, in the field of conventional power,

“Iranian military planners are taking steps to bolster their
naval forces, in particular with purchases of Chinese advanced
cruise missiles.” Moreover, Tehran has purchased new and
upgraded surface warships, including five new "Houdong"
Chinese fast-attack craft delivered to the port at Bandar
Abbas.7

The assumption is that ships, submarines and cruise missiles,

along with other recent deployments of missiles on tiny islands
in the Strait of Hormuz, form the outline of a developing
challenge to US interests in the region.

Iran appears to be using its naval forces mainly as an

instrument of defense and foreign policy. But this does not
mean that an eventual power projection against an actual or
potential hostile who might challenge Iran’s presence in the
Persian Gulf, the strait of Hormoz and the Sea of Oman, might
not trigger the operation of these forces. 8 Prior to delivery in
1995 of 10 Hudong patrol boats equipped with C-802 missiles,
Iran was without a ship-mounted ASCM capability. With the
refitting of Iran's Kaman class fast-attack boats, they will have
20 craft carrying this missile and forty C-802 missiles are
reported to have been sold. 9

6
ibid
7
Idem
8
Recent incidents ( June 2004) in the Persian Gulf, which began with the attack of
a Qatari gunship on an Iranian fishing boat, that triggered a series of retaliatory
operations by Iranian naval forces as well as harsh diplomatic protest to Qatari
government, is a vivid example of such kind.
9
To this we should add offensive mines that are believed to be deployed in the
Persian Gulf. The EM-52 rising mines are part of a 3,000-weapon stockpile of anti-
ship mines. This purchase is significant because, unlike most other mines, the EM-
52 is operational in deep water such as the Persian Gulf. When the hull of a ship
passes over the device the mine is triggered and a rocket is fired at the hull. Placed
in choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, this device could be devastating. See
Amy Truesdell, “Iran plans Gulf trip, projecting a Powerful Military Force.” Ibid.

6
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 7

It is believed that the C-802 missiles are less accurate than the
Chinese Silkworm, but the number of missile sites along the
Persian Gulf coast, especially near the Strait of Hormuz, could
pose a potential threat to whoever that might encroach the
waters under Iranian sovereignty.

Iran also processes surface-to-surface and surface-to-air

missile batteries on Qeshm and Sirri islands, and on Abu Musa;
the island whose sovereignty has long been disputed between
Iran and the United Arab Emirates.10

Observers believe that the delivery and commissioning of three

Russian Kilo-class submarines will confirm the Iranian
intention to dominate the Persian Gulf. Each submarine has
the capability of carrying 18 torpedoes and at the same time,
they can be used as mines-layers. Thus far, Iran is the only
coastal state of the Persian Gulf to possess under water
capability. Regular naval exercises that take place several times
a year by the Iranian Navy, alongside the other forces, are seen
by observers as a clear sign that Iran intends to show its
undisputable supremacy in the Persian Gulf.11

The objective of the Iranian naval buildup, in the view of the

American military experts who track the development of Iran’s
military build-up, is "to develop the capability to choke us off,
at least temporarily, at the Strait of Hormoz, or if they can't
choke us off, at least make it very difficult for us to get in. This
perception of course has led to a number of preoccupations for
the American defense planners, since many of the oil-
producing sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf region rely on

10
It is interesting to note that every time when the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation
Council has some kind of meeting, the UAE ‘s claim on the three Islands ( Lesser
and Greater Tombs and Abu Mussa) is raised and endorsed by the Arabs and
obviously rejected by Iran.
11
This view is apparently supported by the types of exercises carried by the
Iranian Navy in the Strait of Hormoz, such as: sabotaging ports and attacking oil
platforms and coastal targets. Cf. A:\Global Defence Review Iran plans Gulf
trip.htm

7
 Kazemi 8

American military protection to resist the presumed Iranian

pressure and influence in the Persian Gulf. 12

With respect to the Iranian Air Force, it is believed that while

Iran processes a relatively small number of combat aircrafts,
but it has improved its air capability with Soviet-made MiG-29
"Fulcrums" and Su-24 "Fencers" as its primary air defense
forces. With a newly installed in-flight refueling capability,
Iran's MiG-29s have been given greater range. Furthermore, it
is being speculated that Iran has the capability of air-based
delivery of a nuclear weapons (if ever acquired) with the
Fencers, supposed to be Iran's main strike aircraft. 13

As for missile capability, experts believe that Iran has been

developing its own Soviet-designed Scud B and Scud C
missiles, having ranges of about 300 kilometers and 500
kilometers, respectively. In addition to possessing some 200 to
300 Scuds, Iran also has expressed interest in purchasing No
Dong medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea.

Beside that, in the past few years, Iran has been working on
new brand of missile called “ Shihab.” According to defense
sources, Iran has already successfully test-fired the Shihab-3
missile, which has a range of 800 miles 14, and is now on the
verge of testing a more sophisticated Shihab-4, which will have
a range of some 1,250 miles and be capable of carrying a non-
conventional payload.15 It is being speculated that Shahab-5 is
the newest missile, which will enter Iranian defense inventory
in near future, with a range of about 2500 miles. It is believed
that while the Shihab-3 is based on North Korean know-how,

12
It is interesting to note that about ninety percent of Japan's oil and sixty percent
of Europe's oil pass through the strategic region. Cf. ibid.

13
Ibid.
14
See e.g. Douglas Davis, “ Iran's missile buildup seems aimed at Israel,” The
Jewish Weekly of Northern California, Friday August 7, 1998
15
According to experts,” with the Scud Bs and Cs, Iran can bring every capital in
the [Persian Gulf Cooperation Council] within range," Furthermore, one Pentagon
official suggested that Iran “ can bring debarkation ports within range, and, if they
do not already have a chemical warhead, they will probably have one very soon."
See Bill Gerts, Ibid.

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 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 9

the new missile will be based exclusively on Russian

technology.

This latter undertaking is indeed a major source of anxiety and

threat not only for the region but also for countries located far
beyond the Middle East. While Iran’s defense minister, vice
Admiral Ali Shamkhani has pledged that Iran's military power
will not be directed at any Arab state, Israeli experts
interpreted this statement as suggesting that Iran’s military
build-up is intended to confront Israel.16

As concerned the source of Iranian military acquisition, in his

interview with al-Wasat, admiral Shamkhani denied any secret
military cooperation or arms-purchase agreements between
Iran and Russia: "We cooperate with Russia in the open and
there are no secret agreements between us," he further
stressed:” We have had to turn East because of the Western
arms embargo and our need to develop our defensive
systems...But we do not seek to acquire any of the non-
conventional weapons." 17

Nevertheless, Iran's ballistic missile manufacturing program is

supposed to lack the capability to produce some parts that are
essential for the total production of some types of systems.
Presumably, Iran hopes to eventually have complete
manufacturing capabilities for its Scuds. Iran also produces
short-range missiles similar to the Soviet FROG-7.

16
In an interview with the Saudi-owned weekly al-Wasat, Shamkhani said that
Iran's military power is "part of the capabilities of the Arab and Islamic worlds." He
further said:

"It is certainly not directed against the interests of the Arab states," he added. "On
the contrary, it adds to the strength of the Islamic world in facing the enemies of the
Arab and Islamic nations."

Asked why Iran was building up its military muscle, increasing its arms
procurements, deploying three Russian-built submarines and developing its missile
program, Shamkhani replied: "You would notice that no other country has been as
bullied or threatened as Iran. Israel, for instance, menaces Iran more than it
menaces any other country." See Douglas Davis, ibid.
17
Ibid

9
 Kazemi 10

With respect to the limitations constraints faced by Iran in its

military build-up, Western observers have rightly pointed that
the process has been tempered somewhat by its economic
woes, which include a US embargo, a cash shortage because of
fluctuating oil prices worldwide, rapid population growth, and
an external debt.18 The latter problem has made it difficult for
Tehran to gain the international credit needed to finance
weapons procurement. In 1996 and 1997, Iran was expected to
spend roughly $3.4 billion on weapons. However, it is
worthwhile to remember that Iran’s total defense expenditure
lagged much behind the total arms acquisitions of the Persian
Gulf states, during the past years.19

Iran's plan for development of its conventional forces obviously

calls for creating units and force capability that are more
maneuverable at sea, on land and in the air and have more
advanced weapons for specific purposes and outside threats
emanating essentially from forward-deployed US forces in the
Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense analysts in the
West, however, seem not to be much troubled with Iran’s
conventional arms build-up, rather they have been focusing at
Iran as a source of nuclear and biological threat. 20

18
At the time the report was written, i.e. 1998, total debt of Iran amounted to an
estimated $ 35 billion. See Gerts, ibid.

19
“ In terms of the regional military balance, Iran is, in fact, lagging behind
considerably, a fact well documented by the various authoritative studies on arms
transfers, including the annual reports by the Congressional Research Service and
various editions of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. These studies
show that, for example, the total arms acquisitions by the six countries of Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) during the period 1987-1998 was in excess of 52
billion dollars, compared to 2.5 billion dollars for Iran. To give another example,
during 1995-1998 period, whereas the Saudis purchased close to 8 billion dollars of
arms, Iran’s figure stood at 1.4 billions.” See Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Iran’s Military
Modernization and the Regional Arms Race. A:\Iran’s Military Modernization and
the Regional Arms Race.htm

20
This came in the speech he made at the second session for "The Region and
Future Conference" entitled "Iran and the Future of Gulf Security." By Anthony
Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman said
that Iran's new arms agreements signed since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war
are not enough to modernize or sustain its current forces, but that this leaves the
standing issue of weapons of mass destruction. He added that in light of Iran's

10
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 11

The main assertion of American defense experts is that "Iran's

priorities [are related to] weapons of mass destruction--their
nuclear program, their chemical program, which is pretty well
advanced, their biological program, and their missile program,
which also is pretty well advanced."21

On the other hand, the IAEA’s key findings about Iran are in
reports released in March 2004 and November 2003, with the
next important one due this June 2004. In November, the
IAEA concluded that Iran's nuclear program consists of
practically everything needed to fuel a reactor or in effect to
produce materials for bombs, "including uranium mining and
milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and heavy
water production."22

These allegations are indeed so serious that needs a much

closer look. Thus, I have included below a tiny portion of two
previous papers, which I prepared for the UCLA Persian Gulf
Security Conferences, held successively in Athens- Greece
(December 2003), and in Amman-Jordan (May 2004) and
seem relevant to this analysis.23

Iran’s Nuclear Option:

How much realistic, How far Credible?

declaration of programs of these weapons, and its import of biological equipment

and chemical weapons, one has to wonder at the reasons behind acquiring them.
See; A:\IranExpert Iran's WMD critical issue to region -- Cordesman.htm Date:
06/05/2004

21
Cf. Bill Gerts, ibid

22
Cf. Iran's Nuclear Program Reaches Critical Juncture,” IEEE Spectrum online
June, 2004

23
See my papers: “Shifting U.S. Threat Perception After September 11and the Fear
of Iran’s Nuclear Threat” December 2003; and, “ Iran’s Nuclear Venture: Legal
Obligation and Political Temptation,” May 2004, both presented to the UCLA
Burkle Center for International Relations.

11
 Kazemi 12

Is Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology potentially

harmful to world order and peace? It depends on whose lens
we use to view the issue. The IAEA Board of Governor’s
decision to pass a resolution on 12 September 2003 for the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards has been interpreted
differently inside Iran from at the international level. 24
Preoccupation with the danger of Iran’s nuclear capability is
now an alarming issue throughout the world. Iran’s decision to
start negotiations for the conclusion of the Additional Protocol,
and the IAEA request that Iran should promptly and
unconditionally sign and implement it while stopping all
nuclear enrichment programs, may bring a modicum of relief
to all those who feel threatened by Iran’s undertaking. Since we
are now in the midst of this process, it is very hard to pass
judgment on the outcome of the ongoing negotiations.

Controversies between Iranian authorities and the IAEA on the

one hand and the rest of the world, especially the United States
and the EU, on the true intention of Iran’s nuclear activities,
have been at its height during the past months. The latest IAEA
resolution adopted after lengthily negotiation in mid June
2004, gives Iran one last chance to cooperate fully and in a
transparent manner with this world body in charge of nuclear
activities of member states.25

Iran claims that it is merely using the basic and inalienable

right of all NPT member states to develop atomic energy for
peaceful purposes and is ready to assure the international

24
The IAEA stated that Iran had not lived up to its reporting obligations under the
terms of its Safeguard Agreement. Iran’s IAEA Safeguard Agreement requires the
country to provide the agency with information “concerning nuclear material
subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to
safeguarding such material.” Technically, Iran is still in compliance with its Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, but as the IAEA stated, “it is the number of
failures of Iran to report the material facilities and activities in question” that is “a
matter of concern.” Going back over a ten-year period, Iran has followed a pattern
of obfuscation that raises well-founded international suspicions about Iran’s nuclear
program.
25
It is worthwhile to note that the new resolution has been prepared and sponsored
by three leading EU powers; France, Germany and the United Kingdom, who
initiated an accord with Iran last year on the issue of nuclear project. For detail see
my paper: “Iran Nuclear Venture, Legal Obligation and Political Temptation.” May
2004, Presented to the Regional Security Conference, UCLA Burkle Center for
International Relations, www. MENL.org.

12
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 13

community that it has no intention to produce nuclear

weapons. Some critics would also argue that the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 is not an
endeavor designed to protect mankind from the danger of
devastation and annihilation, but rather to preserve the
monopoly status of a handful of powers in possession of such
technology.

Iran claims that it’s undertaking is legitimate and just. We

know well that justice, equity, and fairness have never been
highest aim of dealings between states, yet they have served as
useful caveats in political discourse for the promotion of
national interests. In fact, one of the causes of war and
hostility is the frustration of the less fortunate over
unsatisfactory conditions allegedly created by the powerful
nations. To them, slogans such as rendering justice to the
powerless, saving humanity from the plague of hunger and
disease, securing the world from the threat of terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, atomic bombs and so on are wonderful
words that only tickle ears and minds. Indeed, international
norms and principles are always coated with some kind of
noble and human overtone that merely serves as ground to
promote one’s own policy or interests.

Some contend that the main objectives of owning nuclear

weapons have always been their deterrent capabilities and use
as leverage in political dealings. The argument against this is
that nuclear capability in the hands of undemocratic and
irresponsible regimes is too dangerous and should be
contained at any cost. There seems to be a consensus on this
latter point between the United States and many European
powers. Realistically looking at the matter, even if we assume
that Iran is trying to acquire a handful of nuclear weapons, it
would have little operational or deterrent value. On the
contrary, such an endeavor would increase Iran’s vulnerability
vis-à-vis its potential adversaries.26

26
This fact has been even recognized by two important personalities directly
responsible for Iran’s national defense and security. The leader of Iran, Ayatollah
Khamenei, once said to his followers that the Islamic Republic’s strength does not
lie in obtaining or the domestic manufacture of an atomic bomb, but it is “the
power of the faith that can deter our enemy” (Washington Post, 17 November
1992). More recently, Iran’s Defense minister, Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani,

13
 Kazemi 14

Digging into the intention of political leaders is a difficult task.

Iranian leaders are no excption to this.Therefore on has to
make a number of assumptions at different levels of strategic
planning and decision-making process.

On doctrinal level, it is safe to suggest that Iran’s national

interests, objectives and strategies are shaped by its regional
political aspirations, threat perceptions, and the need to
preserve its Islamic government.27 But, the problem is that
most of the time the term “national interests” is not quite lucid
and those who decide about them are not quite apt for such
vital task. Thus, in seeking to explain the behavior of a State,
such as Iran, in the international or regional scene, we have to
read into the minds of men and individuals at the higher
echellon of decision making apparatus. This indeed is not an
easy job and requires some imagination and speculation.

Assuming that men are rather deliberate and self-

conscious about what they do, thus, they should know their
own motives and give reasons for their behavior. But this
does’t seem to be often true. Because, sometimes people do not
want to confess their real motives, or at least not all of them,
and so they may knowingly lie or distort or conceal the facts.
Sometimes even, they may base their motives and behavior on
false assumptions about themselves, their true aims and
objectives, their threats, their capabilites and opportunities, or
their political and strategic enviroment. This may prove to be

recognized in a February 2002 statement: “ The existence of nuclear weapons will

turn us into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm
our relations with the countries of the region.” See the Guardian, 6 Feb. 2002. See
also George Perkovich, “Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 28 April 2003.

27
According to the analysis presented in the Global Security, “Tehran strives to be
a leader in the Islamic world and seeks to be the dominant power in the Persian
Gulf. The latter goal brings it into conflict with the United States. Tehran would
like to diminish Washington’s political and military influence in the region. Within
the framework of its national goals, Iran continues to give high priority to
expanding its NBC weapons and missile programs.” See:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/doctrine.htm - Last updated,
December 13,2002

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 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 15

very dangerous, not only for them but also for others who
interact with them.

One may argue safely that in present day Iran, we are facing
with this latter kind of decision-making, that is, we are
concened with factors affecting choice other than the entirely
conscious and rational criteria that usually come into play in
the determination of “national interests.” Political expediencies
sometimes overshadow factors related with optimum and
rational choices. Perhaps,the reason behind the very risky and
high political costs of Iran’s nuclear venture, may find its
rationale in such argument which goes beyond the regular
calculation of risk or cost-benefit analysis.

With respect to the true intention and objective of Iran’s

nuclear activities, the official answer is that this country it
merely using its basic and inalienable right of all member
States of the NPT to develop atomic energy for peaceful
purpose. To this end, Iran claims that it is ready to ensure the
international community that it have no intention to produce
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the upper echelon decision-
making ladder in Iran has rightfully and in several occasions
recognized that Iran does not consider nuclear weapon as a
viable and rational useful strategy for defense purposes. The
official reading of such statement is that nuclear option may
render the country more vulnerable to risks outside threats 28
But, most critiques and specialists in the field believe that these
claims are mere rhetoric that is neither supported by factual
evidence, nor accepted by the IAEA and the international
community as a whole. They refer to recent (February 2004)
revelations about international nuclear black market and
specific findings of the IAEA during its last inspection in Iran.29

How then shall we explain the present situation and the

earnest attempt by Iran to pursue its long-standing nuclear
policy? In fact, as we know, the project goes back to the 1980s,

28
Cf. my paper presented December 2003 to the Regional Security Conference in
Athens- Greece, on
“The Shifting U.S. Threat Perception after September 11 and Fear of Iran’s Nuclear
Threat.”
29
See my paper of last May 2004, presented to the Regional Security Conference in
Amman-Jordan.

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 Kazemi 16

that is the period in which Iran was engaged in an all out war
with its neighboring hostile State, Iraq. The optimistic view
would go along with the argument advanced by Iran about its
peaceful intention of developing nuclear technology. The
pessimists however, have more ground to argue against the
peaceful aims of such undertaking. They would eventually base
their argument on the following facts and factors:

1) Iran as an important and rich country in oil and gas, having

extensive reserves of fossil fuel inland and offshore, does not
need to embark on a more costly and risky nuclear project in
order to produce energy,

2) Enrichment facilities and related components that are being

used or developed by Iranians, do not seem to be for support of
civilian nuclear energy plants in Bushehr (considering the fact
that the Russians are supposed to supply the necessary fuel for
Bushehr plants and the Iranian party is obligated to return the
depleted uranium that could be used in nuclear bomb),

3) Iran may be enthusiastic in obtaining nuclear capability with

the objective of deterring any potential aggressor that might
threaten the very existence of the Islamic regime,

4) Iran may contend that the West is using a double-standard

policy with respect to the nuclear proliferation (Pakistan, India
and Israel are the ones who have been left out of the black list),

5) Iran might be tempted to acquire nuclear technology for the

mere sake of national pride and prestige with a view to boost its
regional position vis a vis its potential opponents and
contenders,

6) Being a nuclear power for a revolutionary Islamic State may

be an indication of the regime efficiency and viability despite
the mounting pressure from the world political environment,

Pessimists have a tendency to believe that Iran is pursuing the

North Korean tactics by lingering the legal process of ratifying
the safeguard measures related to the NPT additional Protocol.
In other words, Iran is trying to buy time for enrichment of
enough uranium to build a number of nukes before it officially

16
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 17

declares to withdraw from the NPT obligations. This will put

the IAEA and the world as a whole before a fait accompli,
For them, Iranian leaders would prefer running the risk of
being target of an eventual preemptive strike than to give up
the power altogether. Since, they believe they can capitalize on
such event to consolidate the people while tightening the rope
around the opposition neck,

Optimists and pessimists would both admit that strategic

thinking; rationality, national interests and optimum choice do
not have the same meanings among the Iranian leaders and the
Western political thought. This indeed makes a lot of difference
when the two sides face each other in a peaceful dialogue or in
a hostile confrontation.30

Iran hopes to expedite the winding up of the case before the

IAEA, using the leverage and influence of the EU members. But
the United States authorities appear not satisfied with the idea
and wish to pave the way to send the case to the UN Security
Council. We have to wait some more time before passing the
final judgment on the matter.

New Challenges in the Persian Gulf:

Iran and the US Strategy

The Persian Gulf, which has always been an area of strategic

interests for the American foreign policy since World War II,
has become the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy after the end of
cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Unions. The September
11 events, which led to the military interventions of the United
States and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and later in Iraq,
created a very vulnerable situation in the Persian Gulf. Iran, as

30
Mr. Hassan Rohani, secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, who was in
charge of nuclear issue negotiation with the three EU foreign ministers last year, in
an interview with the media, after the adoption of the new resolution in June 2004
by the IAEA, said that Iran will revise its position with respect to the uranium
enrichment, which it had voluntarily suspended upon the signing of the accord with
the EU states (France, Germany and UK). He argued that since these latter
countries have not lived up to their commitment, Iran sees itself relief of the
obligation created by the agreement.

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 Kazemi 18

the main power of the region, who has always claimed that the
security of this strategic semi-enclosed body of water should be
left to local powers, now feels encircled by the United States
and is quite apprehensive of this presence. During the past
months, the United States did not hesitate to show anger and
discontent on various occasions against Iranian authorities.
This has made the situation, already very tense between the
two countries, even more unbearable.

Iranian decision makers are quite aware of the gravity of the

situation and are contemplating ways and means to attenuate
the sensitive atmosphere overshadowing the security of the
Persian Gulf region. To understand Iranian view on the matter
of the Persian Gulf security, one should comprehend the very
basic tenure of the revolution, which has brought the present
regime into power in 1979, and circumstances that led to the
rise of fundamental differences between the two countries.

Of course, the historical background of Iran-US relations go

beyond the purpose and objective of this short comment, since
many books and articles exist on the matter. My aim here is
only to examine a tiny portion of the spectrum of problems
dealing with the future security prospects in the Persian Gulf
and the appropriate policy recommendations with a view to
project a fair and balanced solution for all the regional and
international actors.

Let’s first see what is the force arrangement in the

Persian Gulf. The United States, which historically had a low
profile military and naval presence in the region for many
years, at the beginning of the 1990’s, right after the so-called
second Persian Gulf crisis (i.e. after the occupation of Kuwait
by Iraq), started to build-up its forces in the region. Though it
was for temporary missions, yet, from that time up to now, the
U.S. presence became more visible and therefore more
annoying for Iranian authorities and other Persian Gulf States.

Whereas Iran had tried the policy of confidence building

towards littoral States of the Persian Gulf during the past 5-6
year period (i.e. during the Khatami’s administration), and to
some extent it was successful, the United States did nothing to
promote the situation, and even in some cases aggravated the

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 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 19

security environment susceptible to leading to hostilities. One

example is the seizure of an Iranian merchant ship not long
ago, under the pretext of ‘ search for hostile destination. Other
petty incidents in the Persian Gulf between Iran and U.S.
created a situation of threat and denial, which could not but
aggravate the tense relations between the two State, and
consequently to undermine Iran’s policy of confidence-building
towards other States of the Persian Gulf, presumably in line
with American presence.

The recent experience of force projection in Iraq, clarified a

number of security bottlenecks, thus far hidden behind some
sort of diplomatic shyness between the United States and the
Arab nations of the Middle East. Saudi-Arabia, as the most
important traditional ally of the U.S., expressing loudly
discontent against American intervention in Iraq, became a
vocal critique of this country, while approaching toward Iran.
As we witnessed in recent months, the United States changed
its stance towards the Saudis, (especially after the disclosure of
some kind of doubtful ties between the AlQaeda group and the
Saudi officials) and plan to evacuate their forces from there.

With respect to other U.S. allies in the region, we are not quite
sure of the trends. But one thing is certain, that is the fact that
the traditional regimes of the Persian Gulf, which once the fear
of the Islamic revolution in Iran pushed them towards the
Americans for protection, now feel much more insecure by the
policy of “forceful democratization”, which could end-up to
disaster for the internal security and their very existence.

Although the Iranian policy of rapprochement with the Persian

Gulf littoral States, has so far not reached to the point of
building a true “security community,” but based on the present
trends, it does not seem to be a far-fetched strategy that could
lead to the following plausible consequences:

a) Inhibiting more and more the U.S. presence in the

region;
b) Making the future American interventions in the region
much more difficult and costly;
c) Building an anti-American shield against the United
States policy of “forceful democratization” in the region;

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 Kazemi 20

d) Narrowing down the gap between the Iranian regime

and the conservative Arab States;
e) Pushing the Persian Gulf States, especially Iran, toward
European Community, and other world great powers, such as
Russia and China, while limiting economic interaction with the
U.S.
f) Making the strategic environment much more difficult
for the United States force deployment in crisis situations.

Based on the above plausible outcome, it would indeed be

hard for the United States to bear the consequences, unless the
American policy in the Persian Gulf changes its contents and
context. That is to say, the American objectives and therefore
ways and means to reach them should be adapted to the new
emerging environment. The new environment is not
necessarily in favor of the American military presence in the
region. Especially, the fact that the United States are leaning
toward the use of force to achieve their objectives, in spite of
world objection, heighten the tense situation among regional
States. This in turn may lead to the rise of anti-American
sentiments and further push the once hostile attitude of littoral
States towards Iran, to a more tolerant policy of
accommodation ant entente.

There are multiple ways that Iran could interact positively with
the Persian Gulf States. The followings are among the most
probable course of action that can lead to amicable relations in
the Persian Gulf, which could promote the security of the
region for the littoral States as well as third extra-regional
parties, provided that these latter abstain to intervene in the
internal affairs of the region. The most suitable areas of
cooperation seem to be the followings:

a) Regional coordination and cooperation on the matters

of maritime environment, sea pollution, through
strengthening the ROPME Convention and its relevant
protocols;
b) Mutual entente on matter of maritime boundary
delimitations (Given the fact that a number of
unresolved issues still remain to be negotiated)
c) Cooperation on matter related to sea lines of
communication and

20
 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 21

traffic separation schemes, within the purview of IMO

functions;
d) Confidence building through gradual strengthening
social, cultural, economic and strategic ties among the
regional States
e) Cooperation on matter pertaining illegitimate traffic of
narcotic substance, and other illegal trade and
contraband.

Through achieving the above objectives, the ground

would be ready to embark on more serious business of security
cooperation among regional States, with the support and
endorsement of other non-regional interested powers.

The United States, as an equal partner and the de facto

transitional Power in charge of Iraq, until this latter regains its
full sovereign rights to enter into international relations, can
help the steady progress of the above course of action. This
may expedite the long awaited security arrangement in the
Persian Gulf, provided of course, that mutual confidence and
good intention from all parts prevail. It is the humble
contention of this author that this process is capable to best
serves the interests of the United States, as well as the littoral
States of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the wider world.

Epilogue

Whatever conclusion that may be derived from this short

analysis, it can be safely stated that Iran’s endeavor to acquire
technological know-how and hardware in the field of defense
and nuclear activities, does not seem to be a threat to peace
and stability in the region. However, Iran’s recent behavior in
the Persian Gulf may be interpreted differently by outside
observers. In the wake of a number of incidents that took place
during the current month in this region, one may argue against
the above proposition.

In fact, the month of June 2004 appears to be a decisive

moment in time with regard to Iran’s assertion of sovereign

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 Kazemi 22

right in the Persian Gulf and the Shat-al-Arab waterway, which

forms Boundary River between Iran and Iraq. Few days after
the IAEA resolution was adopted in June 2004 with respect to
Iran’s nuclear activities, Iranian authorities, while voicing their
discontent with the three EU members who had sponsored the
resolution, they arrested three British gunboats and their crews
in the Shatt-al-Arab River. Though Iran categorically denied
any link between the two events, the incident was regarded in
the international media as a harsh response to UK’s role in the
IAEA Governing Council in preparing the draft resolution
along with France and Germany.31

Although the incident was rather quickly settled through

diplomatic channels32, nevertheless it can be considered as a
real indication that Iran would not hesitate to use similar
incidents as a pretext to challenge and humiliate even an
important EU power, such as the United Kingdom in the area
of its dominion in the region. Interestingly, the incident
occurred about a week after another confrontation that took
place in the Persian Gulf between Iranian Navy and the Qatari
and UAE fishing boats.33

How shall we construe such behavior at a critical time when

Iran is almost totally encircled by foreign forces, not quite
friendly to it? Does this mean that Iran is in fact using its
mussels to show its real intention of pursuing an independent
hegemonistic policy in the region? The followings are mere
speculations about the actual trend of Iran’s posture in the
region:

31
British navy personnel (two officers and six sailors) were blindfolded and
directed to the shore for further investigation. Iranian authorities claimed that they
would be prosecuted if proven that they had willfully entered Iranian internal
waters. The problem was finally settled through diplomatic channels.
32
By releasing the arrested crewmembers of the British gunboats, after three days
on June 26, Iranian authorities announced that it was found out through
investigation that they had mistakenly entered in the internal waters of Iran. But, it
seems hard to believe that a gunboat even without navigational aid could loose its
way in the rather narrow and shallow waters of the Shat-al-Arab River.
Interestingly, few days after their release, the British Navy personnel claimed that
Iranian revolutionary guard forced them to Iranian waters while they were passing
their normal route. The matter was later endorsed by the UK Defense Secretary and
protested against Iranian government.
33
See supra on the question of UAE claim on the three Iranian islands at the mouth
of the Persian Gulf and Iran’s reaction on the matter.

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 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony… 23

 Recent reemergence of hardliners in Iranian political

scene (for the time being in the Parliament), which is
the result of a serious rebuff of progressive elements, is
gradually showing its products in political arena. This
means that the conservative front is preparing to take
over almost all the elements of national power in Iran,

 The conservative faction who always had the military

instrument under its control, is using Iranian armed
forces to consolidate its political power, while shaping
Iran’s hegemonistic strategy in the region,

 The true aim of the new emerging conservative

government, which would very likely succeed the
reformist one in power, is to show that it is more
efficient, independent, and enough strong to contain
any internal unrest or opposition challenge, and to
deter any external pressure or threat that are
susceptible to change the prevailing situation in Iran,

 After the new conservative government is established

in Tehran, we may gradually witness signs of
rapprochement with the United States, if assured that
the continuity of the Islamic regime is not challenged
or threatened.

23