Pakistan: The Campaign before the Storm

Author(s): Lawrence Ziring

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 7 (Jul., 1977), pp. 581-598
Published by: University of California Press
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 PAKISTAN:THE CAMPAIGNBEFORE
THE STORM

Lawrence Ziring

THE ELECTIONS FOR Pakistan'snational and provincial

assemblieswhich Prime MinisterZulfikarAli Bhutto announced on
January7, 1977wereexpected,so the newssurprisedno one. Moreover,
the governmentshowed no inclination toward releasing those many
leaders of the political opposition who were either secretedaway in
remote Azad Kashmir prisons or standing trial in criminal courts.
Prime MinisterBhuttonoted that the overridingreason forcalling for
electionsat this time was the government'sdesire to obtain a "fresh
mandate" fromthe people. The fact that the opposition was seriously
constrainedor disillusionedsuggestedthat the Prime Ministerwas not
so much interestedin a truetestof his popularityas he was in reinforc-
ing his controlover thecountry.
ZulfikarAli Bhuttois no ordinaryPrime Minister.He is addressed
as the Qaid-i-Awam(Leader of the People), in the traditionof the
Qaid-i-Azam (The Great Leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah) and the
Qaid-i-Millat (Leader of the Nation, Liaquat Ali Khan). He is the
founderand Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and is
engagedin a broad, long-rangeprogramwhich he claims is aimed at
transforming Pakistani societyfroma tradition-bound,fatalisticcon-
geriesof disparateand impoverishedpeoples into a modern,disciplined,
unified,and nationally motivatednation. Economic developmentis
inextricablyintertwinedwith thisprogrambut therecan be no mistak-
ing its psycho-culturaland ideological emphasis.Nor can one ignore
the amount of time required to generatesuch a change process.It is
reasonable to assume thatPrime MinisterBhutto anticipateddominat-
ing the Pakistanscene forsome time to come. The elections,therefore,
mustbe examined againsta backgroundof rigidif not quite totalcon-
trol.The political systemthat Bhutto is erectingis supposed to assure
his longevity.The symbolsemployedspeak to the question of organized
mass mobilization;and the capacityto succeed in such an endeavoris
dependenton the loyaltyand efficiency of the state apparatus,particu-
larlythePPP and the civil-policeand militarybureaucracies.
581

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582 LAWRENCEZIRING

The Pakistan Scene: Circa 1977

It is almostthirtyyearssince Pakistangained its independencebut
the countrycontinues to be burdened by crisis and uncertainty.It
would not be exaggeratingto suggestthat Pakistan has reached still
anothercrossroadand thatits futureremainscloudy.Despite an enorm-
ous amount of governmentalrhetoricand numerous "reforms,"the
ambiancein Pakistanwas somethingless thandynamicpriorto the elec-
tion campaign; therewas little if any spontaneousexcitement.What
passed for activitywas essentiallycontrivedby the government,but
even this seemed to lack real directionand the ranks of the skeptics
swelled.
These conditionsdo not mean thatthe nation is about to collapse,
but theydo point to a general absence of popular confidenceand en-
thusiasm.The attentivepublic and intelligentsiain particulargo about
theirtaskswith somewhatless exhuberancethan governmentdeclara-
tionswould suggest.This atmosphereis the resultof a multiplicityof
events,not all of whichcan be linkedwith the Bhuttoyears.Pakistanis
have long been in a stateof confusion,theirquest foridentityimpeded
by repeatedcrises.But in the more than fiveyearsthatBhuttohas held
supreme power, the Pakistani's sense of well-beingand purpose has
been put to stillnew tests.
Bhuttoassumedthe leadershipof Pakistanat a timeof momentous
tragedy.The countrywas at war withits major rival,and its mostpop-
ulous province had declared its independence from Islamabad. The
governmentstructurehad been deeply underminedand popular con-
fidencein officialdomwas virtuallynonexistent.The weakness and
despairthatgrippedthe countryalso set the scene forthe emergenceof
a strong,determined,and energeticleader. In a countrywhose political
culturealmostguaranteestheriseof a singleleader,ZulfikarAli Bhutto
was a notable choice. Hence it is not withoutconsiderablejustification
that he was proclaimedthe Qaid-i-Awam.Bhutto was the leader of a
broad coalition of peasants and workers,landlords and industrialists,
professionalclasses and youth.' In a moment of extreme need, the
nation looked to him for encouragementand direction-and he re-
sponded. In calling for the reconstruction of Pakistan,Bhutto empha-
sized new formsand methods,new conceptsand ideologies,and there
was littleif any oppositionto his rule in his firstyearin power.
The firstsignificantchallenge to Bhutto's approach to Pakistan's
problems(not necessarilyto his authority)came not fromthe external
opposition but fromwithin his own PPP ranks. With the 1971 crisis
well behind them,themoreradical elementsin the PPP began to ques-
tion Bhutto's promise to eliminate the traditionalelites. These ele-
mentsalso voiced theirdissatisfactionwith Bhutto'sdear intentionto
1 See Shahid Javed Burki, "Economic
Decision-Makingin Pakistan," in Lawrence
Ziring,Ralph Braibanti, Howard Wriggins,eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham:
Duke UniversityPress, 1977).

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 583

concentrate power in his own hands. Thus a process was set in motion
which pitted ZulfikarAli Bhutto against any individual or group which
sought to limit his authority or personal inclinations.
- It would not be misreading Pakistan's last four years to say that
Bhutto gave maximum attention to the consolidation of his power.
Although he has often spoken of the need to develop popular govern-
ment institutions,2both the constitution that he gave the country in
1973 and his PPP organization did far more to enhance his personal role
than to increase popular awareness and participation. The litany of
this struggle is long and includes the arrest or intimidation of former
confidants and aides such as J. A. Rahim, Mahmood Ali Kasuri,
Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Mukhtar Rana, Hanif Ramay, Khurshid
Hasan Meer, and Mustafa Khar; the forceful ouster of opposition gov-
ernments in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier provinces and
the incarceration of their principal leaders, i.e., Abdul Wali Khan,
Khair Baksh Marri, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo, and Sardar Ataullah Khan
Mengal; the banning of the National Awami Party, the only serious
organizational threat to the PPP, and the imprisonment of most of its
local officials; the strenuous effortto counter an insurgent movement
in Baluchistan; and the continuing campaign to harass and limit the
appeal of the remaining opposition leaders.3 Moreover, an elaborate
police bureaucracy has been created to both protect the country's lead-
ers and to strike out against the regime's real or imagined enemies. A
notable critic of the current Pakistani scene, Malik Ghulam Jilani, re-
cently summed up the situation in the following manner:

Justiceis no longer a matterof right.It is a matterof accident

notwithstanding the elaborate judicial farce.
All yourrightsare suspended and thereis no hope that the rulers
are likelyever to revive them.
All laws are meant only for the convenienceof the rulers and to
mislead the world.Any law whicha citizencan invoke in his defenceor
forhis protectionis quicklychanged.
The so-calledConstitutionfindsitselfamended and mutilated the
momentany courtof law appears likelyto grantreliefto a citizenunder
its provisionsand the courtsaccept amendmentswith obvious satisfac-
tion.The Pressworksas an elaborate device for circulatingthe printed
word. Expression is stifledand dissent is frownedupon. The Press
dances to the music of its chains.4

These words, written after the announcement for the holding of

the March 1977 elections, address themselves to the malaise that affects
large segments of the general population as well as members of the in-

2 See my article, "Pakistan in Political Perspective,"Asian Survey,XV:7, July

1975.
3 For a discussionof political violence and intimidation,see Anwar Syed's "The
Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two" in Ziring,Pakistan: The Long View,
pp. 106-116.
4 Malik Ghulam Jilani, "Time Always Passes," (unpublished essay).

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584 LAWRENCEZIRING

tellectual community.Bhutto's coalition has come undone and his

tenurecannot be attributedto popular demand or the successof his
use of the civil and police
partyorganization,but ratherto the effective
bureaucraciesand the armed forces.All those who work for the gov-
ernment,notes Jilani:

have learnt to theirutterconfusion,like Pavlov's dogs, that thereis no

knowingwhen the hand that bringsto them the sweetsand the meats
can also deliver a stingingsmack on the cheek or a box on the ear.
Bewildered and confounded,theyhave surrenderedthemselvesto the
whimsof the One who feeds them,and to accept the blows as part of
the game, in the hope that next time, or else the next, it will be
sweets.
It seems to me that piqued and peeved by the criticismlevelled at
his Martial Law administration,during the few months that it was
allowed at all, and, above all, nettledby the frequentreferencesmade
to the Courts during the same period [in 1972], my friendBhutto de-
cided to take it out not only on the countryand the Courts,but on the
entire ParliamentaryGovernment.He sniffedwith that lovable curva-
ture of his lips. "Verywell. Here you are. Here is your Parliament,and
here is the Prime Minister at your service, and yon there, on that
cornicein the niche is ensconcedthe buffoonof a President,the replica
of Royal Prerogative.Now see what I make of them."5

The Purpose of the 1977 Election Campaign

Prime MinisterBhutto did not expect to be upset by his political
opposition. Given the patternof his rule over thesepast fiveyears,it
was unlikelythathe would willinglyrisk a transferof authorityto his
adversaries.But Bhuttoexpectedto derivemorefromthe electionsthan
a bland victory.The "mandate" thathe called forwould permithim to
restaffthe PPP, thus ridding himselfof troublesomeor embarrassing
individualswhile forgingnew alliances with those who mightbetter
of a new National Assemblywould
facilitatehisrule. The establishment
also make it possible for the Prime Ministerto initiate still more in-
novativepolicies in both the domesticand foreignarenas. On the na-
tional scene,Bhuttomust build a new coalition to promotethe socio-
economicprogramsthatwill cater to his preeminence.On the external
front,Pakistan is in need of a new set of foreignpolicies. The Prime
Minister'scall fora Third World Summit6is related to his frustrations
with theWesternindustrializedstates,and especiallythe United States
and Canada. Strainsin theirrelationswithPakistancenteron the ques-
tion of nuclearenergyand Bhutto'sdesire to providethe militarywith
atomicweapons. China has also showna growingindifference to Pakis-
5 Ibid., p. 4.
6 ZulfikarAli Bhutto, "The Third World: The Imperative of Unity," United
Nations General AssemblyA/31/208, September 9, 1976.

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 685

tan and is clearlypreoccupiedwithits own internalproblems.India is

no morewillingtodayto resolvetheKashmirdisputethanit was almost
threedecades ago and, although formalrelationshave been restored,
relationsbetweenthe two countriesare stagnant.7The Arab stateshave
neverbeen veryexpressiveof Pakistanineeds and Libya, Saudi Arabia,
and the Persian Gulf stateshave indicatedthat theyshould not be ex-
pected to coverPakistan'seconomiclosses.Turkey and Iran, bound to
Pakistan in the Regional Cooperation for Developmentand allied in
CENTO, are similarlylittle disposed to match Bhutto'srhetoricwith
dramaticpolicies of genuinecooperation.8
All this suggeststhat Bhutto's grip was in need of strengthening
and he expectedan overwhelmingvote for the PPP would bring into
his partyindividualswho would be more subservientto his will and
less likely to ask embarrassingquestions. Pakistan continues to go
deeper into financialdebt and its economyhas been severelywrenched
by the nationalizationof privateenterprisesin the industrial,commer-
cial, and financialsectors.Capital has fled the country,as have many
importantentrepreneurs, engineers,scientists,and other technically
qualified people. Low industrialproductioncan be traced to the in-
ability of officialsto manage governmententerprisesas well as to a
breakdownin disciplineamong factoryworkers.The resultingscarcity
of goods has also increasedthe cost of manufactureditems to the con-
sumer.Inflation,which the governmentassertshas been controlledat
the 5-6% level,is alleged by the political opposition,as well as govern-
ment informants, to be closer to 22%0per annum. Furthermore,ever-
expandinggovernmentcontroland managementof the economyneces-
sitates increases in bureaucratic personnel. The opposition party,
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal,has examined the cost of recruitingmore administra-
torsand offersthe followingstatisticsto show the growingcost of gov-
ernment,listedunderthe headingof nonproductiveexpenditures:9

Nonproductive
Budget of United Defence Civil
Pakistan/Central Expenditure Expenditure
Year Government Portion Portion
1970-71 656.08 320.15 335.93
1972-73 908.59 443.96 464.63
1973-74 1280.71 423.30 853.414
1974-75 1318.58 557.90 760.6811

7 See the White Paper issued by the Governmentof Pakistan on the Jammu and
Kashmir Dispute at the outset of the electoral campaign. A summaryof the text is
found in The Pakistan Timnes,January 16, 1977.
8 See ZulfikarAli Bhutto, RCD: Challenge and Response, Ministryof Foreign
Affairs,Governmentof Pakistan, April 19, 1976.
9 Causes of the Present High Cost of Basic Necessities of the Comnon Man
and their Remedies, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Central Planning Board, Pamphlet No. 1,
May 7, 1975, p. 7.

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586 LAWRENCEZIRING

Apartfromthecostof operatingthesevastnew bureaucracies,there

is also the related problem of increasingcorruption.Those who are
given responsibilityfor managing the now hundreds of government
enterprisescan be expected to engage in black-marketeering or other
corruptactivities.Farmers,forexample,mustnow take theirwheat or
cottonto governmentstationswhere it is purchasedat prices that are
oftenarrangedby the bureaucratin charge.The farmerwho has no
otheroutletforhis crop is victimizedby theseunscrupulousofficials.10
The knowledgethat such officials are oftenlinked with the PPP helps
to explain the techniques available to the administration;given its
monopolisticcontrolof the country'sinfrastructure,personseithersup-
port the PPP or face the consequences.Citing the futilityin opposing
thePPP at thepolls,Malik Ghulam Jilaniarguesthe following:

takingan over-allview, the elections are more a part of the internal

re-organisationof the People's Party than an open referenceto the
people fora renewalof themandate.The lattercan be takenforgranted
destroyedduringthe past
since all oppositionto it has been successfully
fiveyears.... However fairthe electionsare made out to be, the people
have nothingto choose from.There is in realityonly one choice to go
by and this choice will be made. . . . For all practical purposes, there-
fore,we have to accept and reconcileourselvesto the factof a one-party
state,in which the law is an instrumentof the partyin power and of
the legislatureit dominates."

The 1977 Campaign

Prime MinisterBhutto began laying the foundationfor his elec-
tion campaignas earlyas the winterof 1974 when he directedsome of
his closestadvisorsto preparea new partymanifesto.In February1975
he banned the principal opposition partyand arrestedits leaders. A
stateof emergency was imposedon the countrywhich was neverlifted.
When the actual ballotingbegan on March 7, 1977, that stateof emer-
gencywas stillin effect.In addition,Section 144 of the CriminalCode
had been imposedonce the campaignwas over and this preventedthe
assemblyof fouror more personsforany public purpose.It was appar-
ent earlyin the campaign that the Bhutto administrationwished to
stand above the contest,and the PPP in spite of its weaknesseswas
projected as the only meaningfulchoice of the Pakistani populace.
Pakistanishave experiencedveryfewelectionsand only the 1970 cam-
paignwas a trulygeneralone. Nevertheless,the partyin power and the
media supportingit have traditionallydescribedthe opposition as less
than loyal. Indeed, when the opposition parties announced that they
10 The New York Times, March 8, 1977.
11 Jilani,"Time Always Passes," p. 7.

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 587

would coalesceas one organizationforthe purposeof fightingthe elec-

tion, the government-controlled Pakistan Times editorializedthat this
was nothingmorethanan "opportunisticalliance" and thatthe elector-
ate is fullyaware of theirconspiracyagainst"the new order." The na-
tion, it was stressed,"will reject the anti-democraticand anti-people
elementswho are now makinga desperatelast-ditchattemptto stop the
marchof history."''2
There was a considerableamountof truthin thisstatement.Given
PrimeMinisterBhutto'sperformanceover the last fiveyears,therewas
littledoubt thatthepolitical oppositionwas being given its last oppor-
tunityto put itscase beforethepublic. Once the electionshad run their
course and the administrationhad demonstratedits extremeprowess
(of course interpretedas popular approval), the out-politicalparties
would have even less hope of presentingan alternativeposition, let
alone being freeto criticizesharplyBhutto or his regime.To that ex-
tenttheMarchelectionswere "a desperatelast-ditchattemptto stop the
marchof history."That "march"led directlyover the prostratebodies
of the oppositionand opened clear vistasto the partyin power. It was
with thisin view that the Pakistan National Alliance (an organization
of nine oppositionparties)chose to fightthe electionsusingone central
theme-namely,that the PPP governmentwas dictatorialand that its
continuationwould mean the end of Pakistan's democraticdream.
Prime MinisterBhutto was judged to be both the symbolof govern-
ment and the PPP, and the opposition attackswere almost exclusively
directedagainsthim,his personallife-style, and his family.
When the campaign was announced, Bhutto was supremely
confidentthathis partywould carrythe election.But the surprisealli-
ance of the oppositionparties and theirconcertedpersonal attackson
him began to raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the decision.
The PrimeMinisterhad planned on playingthe role of the unworried
statesmanwho is sure of his support,but when the opposition demon-
strateda capacity to arouse popular enthusiasm,he shed his calm
demeanorand adopted his traditionalfieryposture. Bhutto ran un-
opposed in his own constituencyand spoke out forcefully against the
opposition'sclaim to betterrepresentthe people. In one of his major
addressesBhutto commentedthat the Alliance had adopted the plow
as its electionsymboland then proceeded to excoriateits membership
for making the cultivators"the puppets of jagirdars (extensiveland-
holders)and capitalists."Noting the greaterrelevanceof the PPP sym-
bol, he remarked:"We have adopted the swordas our electionsymbol
because we used this sword to eliminateexploitation,and to control
capitalism.The sword had cut down the chains and freed the poor
people."'3
12 The Pakistan Times, January 13, 1977.
13 The Pakistan Times, January 31, 1977.

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588 LAWRENCEZIRING

In numerousspeechesBhutto expressedthe opinion that the op-

positionhad been opposed to the creationof Pakistan and to its great
leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He reiteratedthat theywere still de-
terminedto destroythe countryand he oftencited theirresponsibility
for the currentseparatistmovementin Baluchistan. In an emotional
outbursthe called upon his listenersto vote forthe oppositionAlliance
"if you want to grievouslyhurt Pakistan.You should vote for them if
you want disruptionand crisis or parochialism.. .. If you want a
constitutionalGovernmentand rule of law, if you believe in the
solidarityof Pakistanand if you want to raise the dignityof Pakistan,
thenit is our rightto get yourvotes."14
Bhutto'sexpressedopinion thatthe oppositionwas opposed to the
PakistanMovement,had facilitatedthe dismemberment of the country,
and was still determinedto break the countryinto several separate
stateswas counteredby the opposition,whichchargedhim with central
responsibilityfor the loss of East Pakistan. If he were not guilty,his
detractorsexplained, then why did he not put Yahya Khan on trial
and release the Hamoodur Rahman Report which examined the
tragedyin considerabledepth. Bhutto was pressuredto reply to this
accusation,and in his defenseinsistedthat he had saved the country
fromcompletedisintegrationby not acceptingMujibur Rahman's Six
Point Program.He also argued that the Hamoodur Rahman Report
could not be released without harmingthe country'ssecurity."I am
prepared to undergo personal harm but I cannot allow any harm to
the country,"he said.15Althougha principal actor in the drama that
producedthe Bangladeshaffair,16 Bhutto steadfastlydefendedthe posi-
tion that it was Yahya and Mujib who caused the secession.It was he
who saved Pakistanfroma worsefate.It was his destiny,and the coun-
try'sgood fortune,that he was on the scene to help pick up the pieces
and restorethe nation's equilibrium.
AlthoughBhutto continued to accuse the political opposition of
plotting the furtherdismembermentof the country,his detractors
vehementlypressed the view that Bhutto had already caused the bi-
furcationof Pakistanand, what is more,had done so forpersonalgain.
Bhutto could never win the support of the East Pakistanis,and the
separationof thatprovincefromgreaterPakistannot onlydestroyedthe
prevailingmilitarygovernment, but lefthim the only dominantpoliti-
cal personalityin West Pakistan. Ultimately,it was his public image,
his generalpopularityin the Punjab and Sind, a broad-gaugecoalition,
a growingideological organization,and his rapportwith senior mem-
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 See G. W. Choudhury, The Lost Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1974), and Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An
Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment-Pakistan Under General Yahya
Khan, 196-1971," in W. Howard Wriggins,ed., Pakistan in Transition (Islamabad:
Islamabad UniversityPress, 1975).

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 589

bers of the militaryestablishmentthat brought him to power. As

Bhuttohimselfwas to comment,manyof thosewho now opposed him
wereat thattimemembersof his coalition and long had regardedhim
as "the standardbearer of democracy."The electiondebate was emo-
tionallychargedthroughout,and passions once aroused oftenresulted
in violentexplosions.Meetingsweredisrupted,processionsstoned,and,
on numerousoccasions,disturbancescaused the deathsof partyworkers
and politiciansalike. Officesof the contestingparties were assaulted
and a numberof themdestroyed.The Pakistan National Alliance suf-
feredthe largerlosses,given the police protection(and ofteninvolve-
ment)whichthegovernment partyenjoyed.Up until the verylastweek
of the campaignthe government-controlled newspapersavoided giving
equal coverageto the opposition and while Prime Minister Bhutto's
pictureswerepublisheddaily, the Alliance leaders were nowhereto be
seen.

The Pakistan National Alliance

On January7, 1977,ZulfikarAli Bhuttoannounced that elections
would be held fornew national and provincial assemblies,and a few
days later virtuallyall the operativepolitical parties opposed to PPP
rule declared theirintentionto fightthe electionsas a unifiedopposi-
tion organization.Only Abdul Qayyum Khan's Muslim League and
the Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (Hazarvi group) refused to join the Alli-
ance. Qayyum Khan, and his colleague, Yusuf Khattak, resigned
ministerialpositionsin the Bhutto cabinet in order to fightthe elec-
tions,and especiallythe PakistanNational Alliance in the NorthWest
FrontierProvince.There had been a number of prior reports indi-
catingthat some of the oppositionpartieswould boycottthe election.
Few believed that a coalition of them all was possible. Nevertheless,
thereis reason to believe that the decision to contestthe election,and
to do so as a unitedparty,had been takenat least a monthand possibly
six weeksbeforeBhutto'sannouncement.Be that as it may, the oppo-
sitionwas convincedthat the opportunityshould not be lost to bring
theircase,and thecase againstBhutto,beforethe nation.None among
themgenuinelybelieved that theyhad a chance to beat Bhutto,but
thiswas not because theybelievedhim to be the popular choice.
Simply put, the stakes were too high for Bhutto to risk losing
controlof the Pakistangovernment.While the leader of the Tehrik-i-
Istiqlal, AsgharKhan, publiclydeclared thathe would lead a "revolu-
tion" against the Bhutto regimeif the elections were not conducted
fairly,no one in the opposition believed that in a tightstrugglethe
civil-policeand militarybureaucracieswould not guarantee the PPP's
successat thepolls.While corruptpracticesat the pollingplaces cannot
be ruledout on both sides,it is doubtfulthatBhutto'sforcescould have
been beaten even in the most unblemishedelection. Justificationfor

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590 LAWRENCEZIRING

thispositioncan be drawn froman analysisof the Pakistan National

Alliance.
The Punjab remainsthe key to Bhutto'ssurvival.Afterneutraliz-
ing old Muslim Leaguers like Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Bhutto allied
himselfwithMustafaKhar and throughthe latter'sefforts consolidated
his hold on the province.When the break with Khar came, Bhutto
turnedto the Punjabi leader's urbane detractor,Hanif Ramay. When
Raamaycould no longer satisfyBhutto's needs, he was dropped, and
Khar was momentarily resurrected,only to be sackedagain. Later when
both Khar and Ramay were implicatedin a plot to overthrowBhutto,
Ramay was arrestedand Khar isolated. Ramay was eventuallydeclared
a candidatefromhis prison cell and managed to release several state-
mentsduringthe campaign condemningthe Bhutto regime,but Khar
was encouragedto travelabroad where he passed his time in idleness.
This leftthefieldto lesserpolitical personalities,and indeed as Bhutto
had himselfremarked,most of them were local leaders without any
chance of developing national attention.In fact, only Asghar Khan
could fillthisrole but he lacked a base constituency.
The followingorganizationswere prominentin the Pakistan Na-
tionalAlliance: Tehriq-i-Istiqlal(AsgharKhan); Jamaat-i-Islami (Mian
Tufail Mohammad);Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (MuftiMahmud); United
Democratic Front (Sardar Sherbaz Mazari); Pagaro Muslim League
(Pir Sahib Pagaro); DemocraticParty(Nawabzada Nasrullah); Jamiatul-
Ulema-e-Pakistan (Rafiq Bajwa and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani).
None of these organizationswere representativeof Punjabi poli-
tics.The majoritywereeitherreligiousin theirorientationor identified
withprovincialinterests,especiallyin Sind and the North West Fron-
ter.Apart fromAsgharKhan, it is doubtfulthat any of the opposition
leaders seriouslyentertainedhopes of assumingthe leadership of the
Pakistannation. It is also noteworthythat previouseffortsat drawing
the oppositioninto a unifiedorganizationhad failed because Asghar
Khan had refusedto link his Tehrik-i-Istiqlalwith theirefforts. Deep
ideologicalcleavagesdivided the oppositionand for thisreason it was
a difficulttaskforthemto draftan electionplatformupon which they
could all run. Their delay in producing such a documentwas seized
upon by the governmentpartywhich early in the election campaign
had issued its own Manifesto. When the opposition program was
finallyreleasedit provedto be a catch-allfortime-wornsloganssuch as
the need to establish an Islamic state governedboth by sacred and
seculardemocraticlaw, the terminationof corruptionand repression,
stabilizationof the economy in favor of the poor, prohibitionson
gamblingand the consumptionof alcoholic beverages,and Pakistan's
withdrawalfromthe Central Treaty Organization.
Clearly,the platformof the Alliance was not meant to generate
much attention.What the opposition wished to focus their attention
upon, and what theyproceededto do in the month-longelection cam-

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 591
paign, was to publicize theirtotal dissatisfaction
with Prime Minister
Bhutto'sone-man,authoritarianrule. Commentingon the PNA elec-
tionmanifesto,A. T. Chaudhrinoted thaton

constitutionalissues the PNA stands on firmerground. While the PPP

holds that its five-yearrule has provided a stimulusto the growthof
crediblepolitical institutionsand stepped up the processof democratic
evolution,the PNA is highly critical of the amendmentswhich have
disturbedthe originalbalance betweenthe Judiciaryand the Executive.
It has pledged to annul the "undemocratic"amendmentswhich
have reduced the power of the judiciary, made the Executive all-
powerful,taken away civil liberties and Fundamental Rights of citi-
zens and enabled the Chief Executivesat the Centre and in the prov-
inces to don a "protective"mantle.
The PNA has also lashed out at the long spell of the State of
Emergencyand the indiscriminateuse of the DPR and promised to
reorganiseinstitutionsof democraticrulership,withdrawthe obnoxious
Press and Publications Ordinance and other black laws, disband the
National PressTrust,restorea sense of securityin the Civil Serviceand
arm the Election Commissionwith adequate constitutionalpowers to
ensurefairand freeelections.This part of the Manifesto. . . is indeed,
the chiefelectionplatformof the PNA.17 [italics added]

For the leadersof the Alliance, the PPP was no more coherenta
politicalorganizationthan theirrag-taggroups.Real power in Pakistan
did not residein a political organization,but ratherin the personality
of ZulfikarAli Bhuttoand his capacityto use the apparatusof national
governmentto enhance his status. Thus the brief campaign was re-
duced to its essentialswith Bhutto being made the targetof vociferous
criticism,and the latterdefendinghimselfas a humble servantof the
Pakistanination.

Bhutto'sStrategicSuccess
Bhutto had carefullyprepared himselffor the March 1977 elec-
tions.The timingsof the electionswere in his hands as was themakeup
of theorganizationwhichwould conductthem.He not onlydominated
the governmentand the PPP, but his ability to formnew coalitions
was onlymatchedby the ease with which he could disassociatehimself
from his erstwhilesupportersand confidants.The Prime Minister
caught the imaginationof the Pakistani nation in the 1970 elections
with his slogan Roti, Kapra, Makan (Food, Clothing, Shelter). By
1977 he could claim that he had fulfilledthe promisesmade to the
public and that his administrationwas now launching Pakistan on a
new programof growthand prosperity.His confidencewas written
large in his speechesand behavior during the last half of 1976. The

17 A. T. Chaudhri, "The Battle of Manifestos-I,"Dawn, February 14, 1977.

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592 LAWRENCEZIRING

100th birth anniversaryof Qaid-i-AzamMohammad Ali Jinnah pro-

vided an exceptionalplatformfromwhich to proclaim his legitimacy.
Governmentpropagandists,with the full cooperation of the media,
wasted no time in explaining the connectionbetween the Qaid and
Prime Minister Bhutto, the Qaid-i-Awam. It was Bhutto who had
saved Pakistan and preservedthe dream of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
The two men were inextricablyinterlinkedand the futureof Pakistan
restedon the ability of the Qaid-i-Awamto revivethe Jinnah legacy
of Faith, Unityand Discipline.
The year-longcelebrationscommemoratingthe birth of Moham-
mad Ali Jinnahdrew to a close amid gala celebrationsthat culminated
with the holding of an internationalcongressto which 44 countries
sent delegations-some of them scholarly,but the majoritymade up
Prior to thiseventthe Pakistanipublic was
of political representatives.
exposed to week-longfestivals,the firstemphasizingthe work of the
governmentadministratorand the other the upliftmentof the peasan-
try.The latterculminatedwith the announcementof new land reforms
whichwould furtherreduce the size of so-calledfeudalholdingsas well
as transferstate-ownedlands to theircultivators.At the conclusionof
"peasant's week," the Prime Minister issued a "Peasant's Charter"
in which he exclaimed "All power to the peasants. May Allah bless
themand theirchildren."''8In January1977 the governmentincreased
all pensions and other benefitsfor civil and militarypersonnel,thus
gaining even more completeinfluenceover formerand currentState
employees.In a similargesture,Prime MinisterBhuttoannounced that
his administration would raise pay scalesforall workersin government-
controlledindustries.Clearly, these were powers that the PNA could
not match. These announcementsfollowed a Bhutto declaration on
December21, 1976,thathigh-gradeoil depositshad been discoveredat
Dhodak in the Dera Ghazi Khan districtof the Punjab. Bhutto imme-
diatelypromisedthat all income fromthe projectwould be "ploughed
back into thecountry'ssoil and would be available to the Third World
for common battle against poverty."'9It was only later Bhutto cau-
tioned his people not to expect significantchangesin the near future
as the findwas still a limited one and furtherdevelopmentwas re-
quired. This thenwas the public strategy, but what can be said about
the private,behind-the-scenes maneuvering?
No Pakistanifigure,save perhapsJinnahhimself,wielded as much
power as Bhutto. Even Ayub Khan who governedPakistan for more
than a decade did not monopolizepower in the fashionof the current
Prime Minister.Ayub delegatedconsiderableresponsibilityto his aides
and associates.Bhuttois intimatelyinvolvedin all departmentsof gov-
ernmentand at manylevelsof decision-making. He is a tirelessworker

18 The Pakistan Times, December 19, 1976.

19 The Pakistan Times, December 23, 1976.

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 593

and a difficulttaskmaster.Any decision judged to be of significance

to thePrime Minister(and thismaymean selectingpersonsforroutine
assignments)is referredto him forfinalapproval. So centralizedis this
decision-makingrole that governmentadministratorsare generally
reluctantto take the initiativeon any matterwherethe PrimeMinister
mighteven be remotelyconcerned.The resultantdelaysin government
action are judged to be a lesserconcernwhen measuredalongside the
possibilityof drawingthe Prime Minister'sanger. Thereforeit would
not be an exaggerationto say that those within government,whether
membersof the bureaucracyor the PPP, are substantiallyintimidated
by the Prime Ministerand theywould not want to do anythingthat
could jeopardize theirpositions.This being the case it is not surprising
thatBhuttohas succeededin drawingoftenrecalcitrantmembersfrom
otherwalks of lifeinto his fold.A concertedcampaignhad been under-
way eversince late 1974 to ween away membersof the oppositionpoli-
tical parties,and to give them standingwithin the reorganizedPPP.
Appeals have been made to the intelligentsia,religious leaders, labor
unions, studentgroups,and even the still powerfullandlords to sup-
port the Qaid-i-Awamand the PPP that he dominates.
Although Prime Minister Bhutto's principal opposition still ap-
pears to stem fromamong the religiouslyoriented parties,his 1977
performance was significantlymore impressive than that of
1970. In the lattercase a large numberof maulvis (religious leaders)
went to the extent of issuing a fatwa (religious order) denouncing
Bhutto's socialistprogram.In 1977 a still larger number of maulvis
publiclydeclaredtheirsupportforthe PPP and commendedthe Prime
Ministerforhis innovativepolicies.Bhutto has assuredthemthathe is
no foe of Islam. Similar joint statementsemanated fromintellectual
circlesthatwere particularlypleased with the Prime Minister'sforeign
policy.The penetrationof political oppositionranks,the demonstrated
capacity to defusereligious questions (for instance,the 1974 decision
to placate the orthodoxcommunityby gettingthe National Assembly
to declare the Ahmediyasect as non-Muslim),and the calming of the
intelligentsiawho have long been concernedwith the Indian problem,
had also enabled Bhutto to consolidate his control over those large
landlords,especiallyin thePunjab, who spurnedhis offerto join him in
1970. In that earlierelection Bhutto was forcedto obtain the help of
thosewho wished to see the large Punjabi landlordsreined in, hence
his extremeleftistprogramand the excitementthat it aroused among
thechange-oriented urbanitesand peasant population.But even though
successfulin thePunjab, he had yetto break thehold of the traditional
ruralpowerstructure.Once in power,however,Bhuttowas determined
to correctthissituation.
One importanttactic was the implementationof land reforms.
Another has been the recent seizure and nationalizationof all rice-
husking,flour,and cotton-ginning mills. Together the large landlords

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594 LAWRENCEZIRING

have been immobilizedand made dependenton the government,their

statusdeterminedby theirproximityto Prime MinisterBhutto. The
alacritywithwhich the landlordshave now joined the PPP, and their
scrambleforPPP ticketsto the National and provincialassemblieswas
ample testimony to the successof theBhuttostrategy. The factthat the
Prime Minister'sradical criticsaccused him of hobnobbing with the
"feudals"(whichseems to demonstratethat he has not yet alteredhis
own feudal legacy) does not disturb him. As one commentatorhas
noted: What the PPP leftists"fail to understandis that these feudals
have not got PPP ticketsas victorsbut as vanquished and dethroned
warriorswho have surrenderedand, willinglyor unwillingly,put them-
selvesat themercyof Mr. Bhutto."20The same observerwas of theview
thattheinclusionof the largelandlordsin the PPP would help Bhutto
to restorehis party'starnishedimage in the Punjab. Several years of
strong-armtactics and corruption had lost the party much of its
formerpopularityand new (or is it old) blood was needed in the repre-
sentativeorgansof government, particularlyin the assemblies.

Mr. Bhuttomighthave easilycalculatedthatbringingforward theold

wealthy mightbe a goodidea. MlianSalahuddin,SardarAhmad
families
Ali,Sajjad Qureshi,AbdullahRokari,Hamid Raza Gillani,theNoons
and Qureshisof Sargodha,etc.,-theyare not corruptin the ordinary
sense,theyare notgoondasand,politically docile,theywillbe as loyal
to theregimeas theywereto Ayuband theirfathersand forefathers
wereto the government of the day. It is sheerpragmatism thathas
dictatedMr. Bhutto'schoice.21

TheNewPPP Manifesto
in PoliticalPerspective
Seldom in Pakistan's political historyhas power been so stacked
againstan effectiveopposition challenge.Prime MinisterBhutto held
all the cardsand his detractorswere reduced to general attackson the
natureof authoritarianrule and theirpersonal criticismof the Qaid-
i-Awam.This cartelizationof power, even more than the diversity
represented in thePakistanNational Alliance,preventedtheopposition
frommakinga concertedand substantiveeffort.Moreover,the opposi-
tion'sweaknesstended to exaggeratethe importanceof the PPP Mani-
festowhich was made public in mid-January.The PPP Manifesto
focusedon thepurposeand raison d'etreof the Pakistannation-hence
it was an expressionof nationalismin its more ideological as well as
practicalaspects.The PPP insistedthat it is the only partythat is con-
cernedwith the needs of the masses. All the earlier parties,it is in-
timated,servedspecial interests,and as such, were exploitiveand un-
20 Abdullah Malik, "Elections 77: What Will Be the Bhutto Strategy,"Viewpoint
(Lahore), February4, 1977,p. 16.
21 Ibid.

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 595

progressive.According to PPP ideologues, the present opposition

parties are no different,
except that a number of them are holdovers
frompreindependencedays, and thus still unreconciled to the exis-
tenceof a separatehomelandforSouth Asian Muslims.Over and over
duringthecampaignthePPP and itssupportersin thepresscondemned
the leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami,
the Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam, the Na-
tional Democratic Party (a rump stand-infor the banned National
Awami Party), and the Pakistan Democratic Party (which was con-
sidered a throwbackto the anti-PakistanAhrarsand Khaksarsof 1947)
for theirlong-timeantagonismto the two nation theoryand/or their
championingof separatistmovements-e.g.,the Six Point Programof
Mujibur Rahman.
The PPP wanted it known that the remainingopposition parties
in Pakistan are therepositoriesforwhateverpolitical evil still remains
in the country.The agents of class exploitation,callous bureaucrats,
and corruptand unscrupulouspoliticians as well as "traitors"to the
Pakistan idea and realitytook refugein theseparties.It is the dutyof
the PPP to expose their insidious activities,and if it be the will of
the masses,to destroythemaltogether.As one PPP stalwartstated:
The onlypartywhichresistedthisplan (Mujib's Six Points) forre-
gional and provincialautonomyof dissolutionof Pakistanwas the
PPP, and if we are stillcitizensof Pakistan,howsoevertruncated,we
owe it to therefusalof Mr. Bhuttoto be a partyto theschemeof the
AwamiLeagueforthetotaldisintegration and dissolution
ofPakistan.22
If the oppositionhad had theirway, it was inferred,Pakistan would
have been dividedinto fivestatesin 1971. The PPP alone rose to meet
the challengeand thwarteda conspiracythatinvolvedforeignpowersas
well. "It was Mr. Bhuttowho triedto save Pakistan,while the present
opposition leaderswere going all the way to help Sheikh Mujib stick
to his Six-Pointformulaand Six-Pointconstitution.... The stormwas
still raging.The forcesinimical to Pakistan were still surroundinga
beleaguered,shattered,dishonoured,dismemberedPakistan.... It was
in thathour thatMr. Bhuttoassumedtheresponsibility of Government
-a responsibility which only a deeply committedand totallydevoted
personwould agree to assumeunder thoseimpossiblecircumstances."23
Evidence of the opposition's continuingthreat to the unity of
Pakistanwas thevisitmade by leadersof theAlliance to theimprisoned
Wali Khan, leader of the NAP, in his prison cell in Hyderabad. Al-
thoughWali Khan was preventedfromplaying an active role in the
election campaign,Alliance leaders like M/iuftiMahmud and Sardar
Sherbaz Mazari were accused of followinghis commands.Compared
with thesefigures,the disciplesof Maulana MAaudoodi, or personalities
22 Safdar Mir, "On PPP Manifesto-I: Context and Background," The Pakistan
Times, January27, 1977.
23 Ibid.

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696 LAWRENCEZIRING

like AsgharKhan and Pir Sahib Pagaro were mere opportunists.Ac-

cordingto PPP leadership,none of themcan be allowed to stand in the
way of Pakistan'srenaissance.
The new manifestoof the People's Party thereforewas aimed at
consolidatingthe gains made in the last fiveyears, and a PPP vic-
toryat the polls would put the opposition on notice that theirantics
mustcease,or theyshould be prepared to face the consequences.

It is the people who will determine the fate of the enemies of

Pakistan,of the Father of the Nation, and of the people-whatever the
new masksand symbolsthat theywear to hide theirugly intentions.
They were defeatedin 1947.
They were defeatedin 1971.
They shall be eliminated in 1977.24

The PPP Manifestoin itsmoreexplicitaspectswas a comprehensive

socioeconomicprogramwhich outlined the party'sgoals for the period
ahead. The documentemphasizesthe continuingcommitmentto social-
ist objectivesand the ultimate desire to build an egalitarian society.
Bhuttohad remarkedthatthe coursethatthe PPP has takenis dictated
by the forcesof historyand cannot be reversed.Public sector domi-
nance is demanded by popular need and the heretoforeprivileged
classesare doomed to extinction.State ownershipand managementof
all significantresourcesis now a fact and the countrycan expect a
period of consolidationin which the changes that have been wrought
are institutionalizedand techniques developed for their productive
utilization.The trainingof personneland generationof financialre-
sourcesare primaryconcernsof the PPP administrationin this next
phase of theirrule. The Manifestoset as its goal a 50% increase in
national productionover the next five-year period. Major concernwill
be in theagriculturalsectorwherea new agrariantax structureis being
developedin which all cultivatorsowning 25 acres or less would pay
nothing.This would represent95% of the cultivatorpopulation. It is
estimated,however,that approximately35,000 landownerswould have
to surrendertheirlands to the government.The PPP administration
statesthat it has already distributed1,400,000acres of the 3,300,000
that were resumedunder the 1972 reform.Moreover,under the Pea-
sant's Charter,announced in December 1976, it is expected that ap-
proximately25 million acres of tillable state land will be distributed
among 2,500,000peasant families.25The governmentindicated its in-
tentionto increasethe availabilityof seed,fertilizer,
and tractorsto the
smallpeasant farmers,and this coupled with betterutilizationof irri-
gationwaterand the full use of the new Tarbela facilityshould make
it possible for the countryto increase dramaticallyits agricultural
yields.The Manifestomakes it clear that Pakistan should become the
24 Safdar Mir, "On PPP Manifesto-II: Redeemed pledges, future prospects,"
The Pakistan Times, January28, 1977.
25 Pakistan Affairs,February 1, 1977, p. 2.

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 THE PAKISTANCAMPAIGN 597

granaryof thearea, especiallyin wheat,rice,cotton,and sugarcane.

The industrialsectoris also given prominencein the Manifesto,
but thereis no mistakingthegovernment's more long-termprojections
forthissegmentof the economy.Prime MinisterBhutto sees Pakistan
as fundamentallyan agrarian society.Industryis seen assistingthe
agriculturalprogramand emphasisis on the manufactureof tractors,
the productionof fertilizer, as well as sugar refiningand cementpro-
duction.Effortswill be made to achieve self-sufficiency in steel, and
heavy engineeringand electricalmachineryare forecastfor develop-
ment,but thelatterare of a lower priority.
The PPP Manifesto also gave prominence to improvementin
transportand communications. A super-highway is to be built linking
all the major citiesfromKarachi throughLahore and Islamabad and
on to Peshawar.Anotheris scheduled to be built fromKarachi along
the coast and into the settlementsin the Mekrani sectionof Baluchis-
tan. Togethertheseprojectsaim at promotinga senseof national unity
and thereis no question that theywill bringsome of the more remote
regionsinto the mainstreamof Pakistani life.
The Manifestodid not neglect the health and education sectors.
Dispensariesare planned within walking distance of everyvillage in
Pakistan and enrollmentin basic educational institutionsis to be in-
creasedso as to put Pakistan withinreach of universalprimaryeduca-
tionforboysby 1983 and forgirlsby 1987.
In general the themeof the Manifestowas more securityforPak-
istan'scommoncitizen.The PPP government,as the largestemployer
in thecountry, has made itselfresponsibleforabsorbingthe 3.7 million
new entrantsinto the labor marketby 1980. In addition,a livingwage
has been pledged as well as social securitybenefitsfor those who are
no longerable to earn.
This ambitious program envisagesthe mobilization of virtually
all thecountry'shuman and naturalresources.It also means the ability
to manage theseresourcesin the most efficient manner possible. The
lattertaskputs the burden of responsibilityon the PPP and the civil
bureaucracy, but thereis littlein therecordthusfarthatwould suggest
thattheyare capable of performing on such a grandscale.26

Summary
The Pakistani political scene has always been dominated by a
single personalitywho with the help of the civil-policeand military
bureaucracieshas managed to cope with the basic problems of na-
tional survival.Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam
Mohammad,Iskander Mirza,Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and now Zul-
fikarAli Blhuttoare thoseleaders,and althoughtheycame fromdiffer-
ent backgroundsand publicizeddifferent ideological and philosophical
positions,theydid verylittleto alterthe nation'sdependenceon strong
26 See "Governmentand the Services," Viewpoint,December 3, 1976, p. 5.

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598 LAWRENCE ZIRING

one-mangovernment.Political partieshave come and gone. From the

the original Muslim League to the Republican Party, the Awami
League, the National Awami Party,the ConventionistMuslim League,
and on to the Pakistan People's Party,much effortand considerable
enthusiasmhas been shown in the developmentof party structures,
but littlehas been achievedthatcan be judged positive.The old Muslim
League argued that it had a birthrightto governPakistan and coun-
selled against supportingother organizations.Like the Pakistan Peo-
ple's Partyof today,it also saw the opposition as inimical to the best
interestsof the Pakistan nation. But in time the Muslim League lost
popular support and faded into insignificance.Those parties which
were organized to contestthe power of the League found that their
negativeposturewas hardlyconducive to purposefulgovernmentin a
united Pakistan and theirinherentinconsistenciesled to an extended
period of martial law followed by an exceptional display of bureau-
craticgovernmentunder Ayub Khan. Ayub's failurewas writtenlarge
in the policies of Yahya Khan and the resultantpolitical deficiencies
ultimatelyled to the tragedyof 1971 and the dismemberment of the
country.ZulfikarAli Bhuttowas called upon to filla vacuum thatwas
in considerablemeasure of his own making.As an active participant
in Pakistan's political life for almost twentyyears,he bears some re-
sponsibilityfor,and has also gatheredconsiderableexperience from,
a whole series of epoch-makingevents. Bhutto is bright,energetic,
quick-witted, and not withoutcunning.All his learningand experience
informshim thatPakistancan only be governedby a determinedand,
if need be, ruthlessleader. Anythingless would be easy preyfor those
numerouselementswho are primarilyconcernedwith promotingtheir
own welfare.Accordingto the PakistaniPrime Minister,theremay be
otherviewson how Pakistan should be governed,but thereis nothing
in therecordthatsuggeststheywould be betteror more successfulthan
his own.
In AugustPakistanwill have enteredits thirtiethyear of indepen-
dence. As an historicyardstick,thirtyyearsis still a veryshortperiod
in the life of a nation. But for Pakistan it is already somethingof a
milestone.The countryhas passed throughseveralsequenceswhereits
existenceas an independententityhas been seriouslyquestioned. Its
primarydilemma lays within itselfand essentiallyon its inability to
develop sound representativepolitical institutions.Bureaucraticgov-
ernmentmeans placing the administrativestate over the political na-
tion. Political institutionshave been allowed to atrophyto a point
where national political leaders, let alone national political parties,
have little chance of developing.This is the meaning of ZulfikarAli
Bhutto's preeminence;it is also all the commentaryneeded on Pak-
istan'srecentparliamentaryelections.

LAWRENCE ZIRING is Professorof Political Science at Western Michigan Uni-

versity,Kalamazoo.

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