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SC A2
STUDY COMMITEE REPORT
Transformer reliability surveys
J . A . L A P W O RT H ( U N I T E D K I N G D O M )
Summary
This paper summarises the conclusions of a SC A2
Reliability Advisory Group set up to recommend a way
forward on collecting reliability data for transformers in
view of difficulties experienced in repeating a 1983 anal-
ysis. Practical difficulties with failure definitions and
statistics are discussed. Three important directions are
identified: the reliability of new transformers, perfor-
mance over their operating life and risk management
at end of life – all requiring different data. It is recom-
mended that any future transformer survey should be
coordinated with the new A3/B3 reliability initiative.
A2 Reliability Advisory Group
The SC A2 Reliability Advisory Group has comprised
the following regular members:
John Lapworth (UK) Leader
Sam Hall (UK)
Peter Austin (Australia)
Greg Polovick (Canada)
Luiz Cheim (Brazil)
The agreed objectives of the group were to:
• survey existing reliability databases and initiatives
• investigate experiences and difficulties
• review applications of reliability data
• agree outstanding needs for reliability data
• identify how CIGRE SC A2 can contribute
Discussions have been held during CIGRE SC A2
Committee meetings and at the following special events:
• CIGRE SC A2 Colloquium, Dublin, June 2001: Reli-
ability Workshop
• Brazilian Regional CIGRE Conference, Florianop-
olis, November 2003: Workspot III
• Greece Regional CIGRE SC A2 Colloquium,
Athens, November 2004: Reliability Tutorial
10 N° 227 - Août 2006
• CIGRE SC A2 Colloquium, Moscow, June 2005:
Preferential Subject 1: Reliability
Failure definitions
The IEC definition of failure is:
The termination of the ability of an item to perform
a required function.
Notes on this definition state:
1- After failure the item has a fault.
2- “Failure” is an event, as distinguished from “fault”,
which is a state.
This definition of failure is clearly very wide. The
failure definition used by WG 12.05 was more restrictive,
considering only problems requiring the unit to be
removed from service to be repaired.
A further level of discrimination was provided by the
definitions of failure with forced outage, following IEEE
[2]: ‘Failure of a transformer that requires its immediate
removal from service. This is accomplished either auto-
matically or as soon as switching operations can be per-
formed.’ (usually assumed to be within 30 minutes), and
failure with scheduled outage and defect when the imper-
fection or partial lack of performance can be corrected either
in service or during a normally scheduled outage, i.e. with-
out taking the transformer out of service to correct this spe-
cific problem.
Despite concentrating on the availability or other-
wise of the transformer for service and the seriousness
of the problem, these definitions could still include
some problems that might not be recognised as fail-
ures by everyone. For instance, should a transformer
oil leak be considered a failure or would it depend on
the consequences ? Certainly if the oil leak resulted in
a Buchholz alarm, the transformer would normally be
switched out of service as soon as possible for inves-
tigations, and this could have a significant impact on
the network.
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While the network operator is interested primarily
in the impact on the system, plant specialists tend to rank
failure in terms of what remedial action is required to
restore the equipment functionality. If a suspect trans-
former was replaced during a planned outage then this
would not have an impact on system reliability, and the
network operator would not register this as a failure,
whereas the asset owner clearly would.
Transformer dielectric failure
with tank rupture but no fire
For the plant specialist a more logical definition of a
major failure would be one that requires the replacement
of the transformer, irrespective of whether during a
forced or planned outage, or significant remedial work.
Lesser problems, which could still require some reme-
dial work, maybe a tap-changer repair or bushing replace-
ment, are often referred to by some other term, e.g.‘trou-
ble’.
Note that in the above fault is intimately related to
failure. In fact, the IEC definition of fault is: the state of
an item characterised by its inability to perform a required
function, excluding the inability during preventive main-
tenance or other planned actions, or due to lack of external
resources.
This 1:1 relationship between failure and fault implies
that if there has been no failure then the equipment has
no fault, which seems unnecessarily restrictive and does
not provide for the description of a deteriorated state
which is expected to lead to a failure. A more intuitive
definition which better reflects common usage of the
term and fits in with the basic transformer failure model
proposed by CIGRE Working Group A2.18 (Life Man-
agement) [3] would be along the lines of: any damage or
deterioration beyond normal wear or ageing likely to have
an impact on reliability.
A localised hotspot caused by a design deficiency
resulting in excessive local insulation ageing would be
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STUDY COMMITEE REPORT
considered a fault, but aged insulation resulting from
normal service loading would not. Any discharge activ-
ity inside the transformer would also be considered a
fault. A fault would normally only become apparent
once it had developed to the point that it caused some
abnormal change in measured parameters e.g. increases
in dissolved gases.
Obviously, the existence of a fault is expected to
increase the probability of a failure, and many failures
are expected to occur as the result of the development of
a fault. However, according to the proposal here, and
contrary to the IEC definition, a fault can also occur with-
out a failure and vice versa (e.g. if a transformer failed as
a result of conditions for which it was not designed).
It is possible to consider developing further defini-
tions of terms such as ‘defect’ or ‘non-conformance’ to
cover other situations, e.g. to differentiate between dete-
riorated states which can or cannot be remedied, but
such refinements are outside the scope of the present
considerations and are probably too confusing and
counter-productive to be used in failure surveys.
To conclude on this subject, it is clear that failure def-
initions can be confusing and applied inconsistently,
being sometimes contrary to common usage of the terms
and dependent on the interests of the user.
Reliability statistics
Usually, whenever reliability surveys have been car-
ried out, the information on the number of failures is
collated with information on population and service lives
to derive a ‘headline’ figure for reliability in terms of an
average failure rate given by:
Failure rate = number of failures / (number of trans-
formers x number of years)
However, such a figure can be very misleading, as the
following example illustrates.
Suppose all transformers in a population operated
perfectly until they failed after about 25 years, obviously
an exaggeration of common experience. The average
failure rate as derived above would then be 4% p.a. How-
ever, this failure rate figure does not represent a reason-
able estimate of the probability of failure of the trans-
formers during their operating lives, as they were
perfectly reliable until they failed. If the probabil-
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ity of failure at every point in their life (hazard rate) had
been assumed to be 4% p.a., then the estimated number
of failures would have been as shown in the probability
distributions of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Failure distributions for a constant
4% p.a. hazard rate
Although the average life time is reasonably accu-
rately reproduced (a constant 4% p.a. hazard rate corre-
sponds to a mean time to failure (MTTF) of about 18
years), the number of failures up until this time is not, it
being estimated that 50% have failed before 18 years, and
in fact 25% within 7 years.
The resolution of the above apparent paradox is that
a far more realistic representation of the likelihood of
failure would be given by distributions of the form of
Figure 2, in which an almost perfect reliability is assumed
until some ‘onset of unreliability’.
Figure 2: Failure distributions for an onset
of unreliability at 20 years
This is of course the familiar ‘bath tub’ curve. It is
usually assumed that the increasing probability of fail-
ure after a particular age is due to the effects of compo-
nent ageing, i.e. oil or paper ageing for transformers, but
for transformers a more likely cause of the onset of unre-
liability is probably damage caused by unusual system
events, e.g. short circuits, lightning strikes or switching
transients, particularly when transformers have design
12 N° 227 - Août 2006
or manufacturing weaknesses. With this more realistic
failure model the key parameters to be determined are
the age for onset of unreliability and the mean survival
time thereafter.
Since transformer failures are so dependent on ran-
dom external events and internal weaknesses it is debat-
able how relevant a statistical evaluation of transformer
failures will be. It is argued here that a more useful
approach would be to determine likely onset of unrelia-
bility on an individual basis, using information on sys-
tem events or condition assessments.
Existing reliability databases
and initiatives
A number of established databases on transformer
failures are in existence, e.g.:
• Australian/NZ reliability survey
• Brazilian reliability database
• Canadian CEA database
• CIGRE WG B4.04 Reliability surveys of HVDC sys-
tems
• Doble Failure and Troubles database
• German VDEW reliability database
• Japan Electric Technology Research Association
Most of these are long standing country based pro-
cedures for recording failure statistics for various equip-
ment types, and require detailed information about fault
outages together with relevant population information.
It is doubtful whether such detail could be obtained on
a world-wide basis. The B4.04 surveys have been suc-
cessful because they serve a limited HVDC community
with real concerns. The Doble database is different to
the others in that it collects information on individual
faults and failures and does not attempt to derive failure
rates. In its latest form data entry is by Internet access
and open to all.
Clearly, the challenge is to find a simplified and
acceptable form of survey that still provides meaningful
results.
Uses of reliability data
It is considered that the main uses to which relia-
bility data will be put are:
• Check on new manufacturers and designs
• Optimise maintenance
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• Benchmark against other utilities/service providers
• Manage network reliability
• Justify spares holding
• Estimate end of life
• Manage risk
In consideration of this wide range of uses of relia-
bility data a number of general questions arise:
• Are someone else’s experiences relevant?
• Can one database serve all uses ?
• How detailed / complete must the data be?
• What is the minimum data required ?
• What about confidentiality ?
• Which uses really require shared data ?
• Would a common approach be enough ?
Mechanical failure of tap winding of 40 year old
transformer caused by tap-changer flashover.
Check on new manufacturers
and designs
The interest here is on the reliability of new trans-
formers and is of increasing relevance today as a result
of structural changes in the industry: globalisation of
manufacturers and restructuring of utilities, so that there
is often no longer a close relationship between a local
supplier and an informed customer: today transformer
procurement is increasingly competitive with pressures
to reduce first cost, often involving new foreign suppli-
ers, and for customers with less experience, with a poten-
tial impact on reliability.
The intention would be to collect in-service reliabil-
ity data on new transformers, for the first 5 years or so,
to identify poor performers and therefore it would be
necessary to identify manufacturer. However, the sur-
vey should also take into account different practices
regarding specifications, design reviews, factory test lev-
els, factory inspections and witnessing and any special
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STUDY COMMITEE REPORT
quality assurance measures employed in an attempt to
‘build in’ quality and reliability, to identify best practice.
This would appear to be a suitable area of activity for
CIGRE SC A2, building on existing initiatives regard-
ing Specification [4] and Design Review [5].
Optimising maintenance
The interest here is in determining appropriate main-
tenance standards which minimise costs for an accept-
able reliability, using techniques such as Reliability Cen-
tred Maintenance (RCM). This use will be equipment
and utility specific, possibly seeking to allocate resources
within a population, and will inevitably focus mainly on
the reliability of components.
In view of the equipment and local specific aspects,
there would seem to be little justification for a worldwide
approach to such activities, save as to advise on method-
ologies.
Benchmarking
The interest here is in using reliability data to assess
the relative performance of different utilities or service
providers. It is clearly important to establish a ‘level play-
ing field’ for such assessments, with performance indi-
cators which will be simple to operate and yet take into
account different practices. Instead of reliability, eco-
nomics is probably a better yardstick.
This topic is obviously very complicated, involving
business as well as technical issues, and not primarily
concerned with reliability or plant performance, so this
is not considered to be a priority activity for CIGRE
SC A2.
Managing network reliability
The interest here is in obtaining authoritative world-
wide data on the reliability of various plant items so that
appropriate asset management decisions can be made to
safeguard an acceptable system performance, e.g. replace-
ment of specific equipment or network re-inforcement.
Ideally, this would collect detailed information on all out-
ages, planned as well as unplanned, on all equipment,
and include minor problems as well as major failures,
but in practice will probably have to make do with
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simpler data on major failures. It would be useful to col-
lect information on the consequences of problems, but
less detail is required on the causes of the problem. There
would be an interest in collecting information on the
impact of age on equipment reliability.
This use of reliability data is clearly focussed more
on the wider aspects of network rather than plant reli-
ability, and will inevitably be influenced by local prac-
tices. Nevertheless, if the necessarily comprehensive data
collection facilities are in place, there are obvious pos-
sibilities for obtaining technical information about the
causes of unreliability and maybe improving operational
practices. Any CIGRE SC A2 activity on this topic should
be restricted to an advisory capacity, and be undertaken
on a joint equipment basis, i.e. in concert with the new
A3/B3 reliability initiative, and should include all trans-
formers, i.e. not only those less than 20 years old.
Justifying spares holdings
The interest here is in collecting data about the
expected reliability of certain types of equipment so as
to justify a spares holding. The data required for this will
be of a similar complexity to that for managing network
reliability, but will be more focussed on transformers and
ideally would take into account both family type and
functionality.
Beyond advising on methodologies, there would
appear to be little benefit to be gained by CIGRE SC A2
getting involved in this activity, since it will undoubtedly
be too utility specific.
End of life assessment
and risk management
The interest here is not so much in the likelihood
of experiencing a problem with a typical transformer,
but in assessing the likely consequences and risks involved
in continuing to operate a transformer which is suspected
of being faulty. As such, the information required relates
specifically to faulty transformers, not to the general pop-
ulation and should aim to quantify the expected conse-
quences of particular symptoms, e.g. time to failure, costs
of failure.
This activity is a natural activity for CIGRE SC A2 as
a logical follow-on from previous Working Groups, e.g.
A2.18 [3] and A2.20 [6].
14 N° 227 - Août 2006
Recommendations
It is concluded that the traditional approach of send-
ing out a reliability questionnaire which attempts to col-
lect comprehensive failure information for a wide range
of uses is unlikely to be an efficient and sufficiently accu-
rate way of meeting all expectations.
Instead, CIGRE A2 should concentrate on 3 key
directions in any future activities regarding reliability
with different targets and objectives:
• Reliability of new transformers
✓ specific data collection on a sub-set of problems
• Reliability during mid-life
✓ minimise data collection on major problems
✓ coordinate with other plant groups, e.g. A3/B3 sur-
vey of HV substations
• Risk Management at end of life
✓ identify and classify suspect units
✓ assess risk of continued operation
Any general purpose CIGRE reliability survey doc-
ument should also provide a means by which new trends
or observations can be communicated between experts,
e.g. transformer failures due to corrosive sulphur.
Bibliography
[1] Bossi, A.,“An international survey on failures in
large power transformers in service”, Final Report of
CIGRE Working Group 12.05: Reliability, Electra No.88,
pp. 20-48, May 1983.
[2] “IEEE Guide for Reporting Failure Data for Power
Transformers and Shunt Reactors on Electric Utility
Power Systems”, ANSI/IEEE C57.117-1986.
[3] CIGRE Working Group A2.18,“Life Management
of Transformers”, CIGRE Technical Brochure No. 227,
2003.
[4] CIGRE Working Group A2.15, “Guide for Cus-
tomers Specifications for Transformers 100 MVA and
123 kV and above”, CIGRE Technical Brochure No. 156,
2000.
[5] CIGRE Working Group A2.21,“Design Reviews”,
CIGRE Technical Brochure No. 204, 2002.
[6] CIGRE Working Group A2.20, “Economics of
Transformer Management”, CIGRE Technical Brochure
No. 248, 2004. ■
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