357 SCRA 757 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Equal Protection Clause – Cases Before the Sandiganbayan

On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This
implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the time of the “rub out” was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They were
accused of multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic Act
No. 7975 also known as “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose
Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended”.

They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and
Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in
which Lacson’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution
of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class

The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started
as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.

Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all
cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the
Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

197 SCRA 52 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection Clause

Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – Imperium in Imperio

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted
PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.”
PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional
because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as
far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy
principle.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:

1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and
races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does
not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power
of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject
to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and
abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And
if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which
should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange
rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in February 1997.
They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of
full deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?

2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?

3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?

4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up
refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to
make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No.
8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set
determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well
settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as
meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the
exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general
standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and
the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the
time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to
be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators
wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.
The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the
prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full
deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to
invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for
the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On
the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund.
It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could
be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and
Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of
new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend
billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by
4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to
invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with
heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex
can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can
thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control
of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below
the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against
Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the
barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the
dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer Hovenkamp gives the
authoritative answer and we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will
never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to enter the
market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and
CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision
on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the law so permeated its essence that it
had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No.
8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.]

“Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others

Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned
these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum
consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy
on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to
enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed
on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.

HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as
an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only
thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of
the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the
reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of
law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest.

95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65

Judicial Review; Requisites thereof

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees
from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional.
In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign,
and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of
complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against
them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good
policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978) February 15, 2013

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of
foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to
procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the
violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e.
being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their
rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance
does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. ]

Ceniza vs COMELEC “Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering

**”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage
to the party in power.” **

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless
otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them)
from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So
when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering
motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the
entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of
Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized
as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement
that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the
approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only
with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial
distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social,
economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying
the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are
allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the
Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

Unido vs. COMELEC“Equal Protection” – Access to Media

In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the people’s approval. The
YES vote was being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC
issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for
both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26
TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has
pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request.

HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that
when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime
Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be
responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the head of state is at the
same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with
the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio
stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at
their own expense.

Nunez vs Sandiganbayan“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It
is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He
claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into
a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over
cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came
into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous
decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Sison vs. Ancheta “Equal Protection”

Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that there’d be a
higher tax impost against income derived from professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional businessman,
and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, “he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income
arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.” He characterizes
the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression of both the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is
constitutionally infirm.

HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions.
It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence.
According to the Constitution: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.” However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect
uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. Where “the differentiation” complained of “conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity” it “is not discriminatory
within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform.” There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is
required is that the tax “applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.

What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader
tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified
into different categories. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of
the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax
rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead
expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the
other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to
produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all
alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of
income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.