Communal Riots in Uttar Pradesh

Author(s): BADRI NARAYAN

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 49, No. 37 (SEPTEMBER 13, 2014), pp. 29-32
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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 COMMENTARY

consciousness" which shattered the di

Communal Riots in Uttar Pradesh chotomy between communal and caste
identity in Indian politics and society.
The bjp understood that communal
BADRI NARAYAN politics by itself would not succeed, and
it had to be linked with the desire for
After the 1990s, communal development in the minds of the common

incidents in India have spreadpressure on political parties to mobi people. It successfully combined these
India's democracy exerts constant
lise people for electoral purposes. two elements while devising a strategy
to rural areas, and they occur
Electoral mobilisation is often based on for mobilising people of all castes and
on a smaller scale, but with
evoking emotive issues such as religion, communities, including Muslims. If the
much larger frequency. In language, caste and parochialism. Deve promised development does not happen,
lopment disillusionment will set in quickly. This
this strategy, the making of a and other rational issues also
get transformed into emotional issues would limit the degree to which the bjp
communal consciousness requires
because of the unequal distribution of can succeed in communal polarisation
a string of communal moments
resources and opportunities, and the in the future, just as it did in Muzaffar
that produce and reproduce
growing expectations of the people. nagar and Moradabad.
A study of the history of electoral mo
communal polarisation directly Phenomenon of Small Riots
bilisation in India would show that reli
and indirectly. The Bharatiya
gion and caste have always been the Communal riots do not occur; they are
Janata Party, backed by themost effective issues for mobilising peo engineered, and the people engineering
cadres of the Sangh Parivar, Indian political parties have often them have motives that usually have to
holds
ple.
used the issue of caste to stop religious do with political mobilisation and elec
an advantage in this communal
mobilisation, and the issue of religion to tions CAmar Ujala 2013). If one studies
game in Uttar Pradesh, while
stop caste mobilisation. In the 1990s, the history of the forms of communal
the other parties are forcedboth
to the politics of communal hatred, riots in the post-Independence period,
play it for fear of further losingwhich emerged around the demolition one finds several changes in them over
their voter base. Post-election of the Babri masjid, and caste politics, time and space. Putting aside the riots
which emerged after the implementa that reflected communal moments at the
communal clashes in up have
tion of the Mandai Commission report, time of Partition, historians and social
occurred around constituencies scientists have always considered com
were strengthened. Since then, commu
going for assembly by-polls soon. nal politics has been used to neutralise munal riots as an urban phenomenon.
However, in post-liberalisation India,
This trend is only going to hardencaste politics, and religious politics to
defuse caste politics. Caste feelings often communal riots have been spreading to
by the time the assembly elections
remain active even after being sub villages as well.
take place in 2017. merged in the cauldron of religion, and The second change is that there used
the rise of middle- and dalit-caste identi to earlier be big communal riots at large
ties work against communal politics. intervals, but now under a new strategy
These two are not always opposed to for reaping electoral gain, different reli
each other, and work together to take a gious groups are mobilised by creating
complex form for electoral mobilisation. communal moments through small com
Thus, both caste consciousness (jati munal conflicts and riots over a long
bhav) and communal consciousness period of time. Through this, communal
(sampradayik bhav) are necessary for consciousness is made a continuous
political parties, depending on theirpresence, not a momentary one. In this
electoral compulsions. Often caste and strategy, the making of a communal
communal consciousness join with poli consciousness requires a string of com
tics to become aggressive - in its outer munal moments that produce and repro
and inner forms, in its form and content, duce communal polarisation directly and
and in its process and consequence. indirectly. Political parties try to exploit
The politics of emotive issues and these small riots or communal moments,
identity politics introduced by the and arouse and sustain a communal
Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) and Sangh consciousness through them. Through
Badri Narayan (badrinarayan.gbpssi@gma.il. parivar in the 2014 parliamentary these small riots, they also want fear to
com) is with the G B Pant Social Science elections was born of a mixture of the grow in their target oppressed group or
Institute, University of Allahabad.
"desire for development and communal opposed group. This accumulation of

Economie & Political weekly D3S3 September 13, 2014 vol xlix no 37 29

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COMMENTARY

fear takes an aggressive and vicious took place in western up. In the Terai re- Several of them were over
form at the time of elections in the name gion, 29 clashes took place; in the Awadh such as the volume of lo
of saving a community's honour or region, 53; in Bundelkhand, six; and in many as 120 of the 6oo-
avenging its humiliation. eastern up, 16 (Express Investigation incidents were triggered by clas
Bigger riots need long-term prépara- Part 12014). A further analysis of the sta- the use of loudspeakers (E
tion for the making of a communal mo- tistics shows that the regions where gation Part 11 2014).
ment. This includes collecting arms and most of the communal riots took place speakers and religious fe
ammunitions, and making pyramids of are the constituencies where assembly have any direct connectio
multiple tensions between communities, by-polls will be held very soon. For ex- use them to assert their
Given the pyramid of tensions, even ample, in western up, polls are due in "dominance of visibility". Th
playing loud music or throwing stones five seats; in the Terai region, in two High Court banned them m
may erupt into big violence. However, seats; in the Awadh region, in one seat; ago, but it has not yet be
for small riots, one does not need long- in Bundelkhand, in two seats; and in ed. Far from being an asser
term preparations, and waiting for or eastern up, in two seats. The roles of po- dorn, the use of loudspe
engineering a pyramid of tensions (Rai litical classes and parties are clearly evi- greater tendency to spread
1998: 61). They may erupt because of an dent in these riots. hurt the feelings of other communities,
immediate small issue, which is fuelled Other trivial reasons for the communal
by political forces who politicise it. In Political Economy incidents were a
the visual media and newspapers, their In western up, where polls are due in five should be serv
mobilisational impact multiplies and seats, 259 riots took place, while fewer the use of a publi
influences both the quarrelling communi- riots took place in the regions where munity; the gra
ties, sometimes across a region and state, polls are due in fewer seats. However, of a neem tre
This is further aggravated by an alert and the proportion of riots is much higher in dren riding
active communal consciousness among western up than in other regions. This cle accidents (Ex
the people. Thus the impact of small ri- implies that the socio-economic and poli- iv 2014).
ots is no less than that of big riots, but tical ground of the region is conducive
the political parties inciting them are for communal riots to occur. Political Pa
not subject to as much criticism. Western up is the most developed In this scenario of
The phenomenon of small riots needs region of the state. It reaped the maxi- and the Sangh
the eruption of a series of low-key com- mum benefits of the green revolution est position. Th
munal conflicts, and through them a and came to be known as Harit (green) such as the B
constant reproduction of communal Pradesh. However, the benefits of the Swayamsevak
consciousness. This is more suitable for green revolution were not spread evenly, more active in t
political forces to harness communally and were confined to a few castes. The parts. The
mobilised votes. A cadre of a communal region is steeped in feudalism, and pros- merce has play
organisation asked me during an inter- perity widened the gap between various the expansion
view, Agar kam mehnat, loss and invest- castes and communities. Jealousies and the rss, which i
ment mejyada fayada ho raha ho to kyon anxieties spawned by uneven develop- cultural domin
bara risk le? (If there is more profit with ment further increased existing feudal diately afte
less effort, loss and investment, why pride. The gap between Hindu Jats and Samaj was active
should we take a bigger risk?). This does the Muslim (Mulla) Jats significantly in- a very progre
not mean that small riots may not turn creased after the green revolution. The declined, the Hin
into big communal riots, but that in the percentage of Muslims in this region is The dalit comm
absence of long-term preparation, it is the highest in the state. There is no par- larly influen
difficult to transform them into big com- liamentary constituency where they are which later b
munal riots. In the past, communal less than 20% to 25%, and in some con- ing with Hind
moments used to lose their effect after a stituencies, they are more than 40%. The Sangh par
few days. But the small riots stretch com- Muslims here are not a passive commu- intellectua
munal moments over a long duration. nity, but highly active and aspiring. They spreading com
According to an investigation by the are trying hard to increase their space concept of Hind
Indian Express, police records show that and visibility in the region. enforce their log
more than 600 "communal incidents" or If we analyse the nature of the small tecting Hindu r
small religious conflicts took place in riots that took place in western up, we so-called "foreig
Uttar Pradesh (up) after the Lok Sabha find that most of them were conflicts for Since commun
elections, between 16 May and 25 July dominant visibility, that is, to establish ture for the San
2014. The largest number of riots, 259, domination over other communities, such as the
30 September 13, 2014 vol XLix no 37 GEE3 Economic & Political weekly

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 COMMENTARY

Hindu Yuva Vahini, Vidya Bharati, Bajrang when the Yadav base of the sp, the dalit road led to a violent clash
Dal, and other small Hindutva social base of the bsp, and the urban and up- people injured, even thou
reform groups are well trained in the per-caste votes of the Congress have no history of tension
game of inciting riots. They can spark off moved towards the bjp, the communal two communities (Express
a riot anytime and anywhere. The big- game is a losing one for them. At the Part hi 2014). The dalit vote
ger leaders of other parties such as the local level, it is possible that these three which was strong in wester
Samajwadi Party (sp), Bahujan Samaj political parties may gain some advan- lost. The party's politics of for
Party (bsp), and Congress have to them- tage, but that will happen only if their between dalits and Musli
selves engineer riots since they do not Hindu vote banks remain intact and crisis. If it tries to bring Mus
have trained cadres for communal poli- Muslims vote for them. Since all three its umbrella, dalits might
tics. The bjp has recently been working parties are struggling for a share of the way, and if it sides with d
on the politics of linking the desire for same set of Muslim votes, they partici- might break away. That is
development with a desire to create a pate in riots because of a compulsive is unable to take any actio
"Maha Hindu identity" through commu- fear that they may lose the remaining The inciting of com
nal mobilisation, and has reaped great Muslim votes as well. Thus there is anxi- regions where dalits are in
profit from it. ety about their political base, which is a part of the long-term Sangh parivar
For the sp, bsp and Congress, commu- under threat. strategy of converting them into foot sol
nal riots are now a no-profit game be- Like in the fable of the snake and the diers of the Hindu upper castes. Its vision
cause Hindu polarisation has cut their mongoose, the bsp is neither able to of Indian villages is one where upper
Hindu base and marginalised them. All swallow the situation nor ignore it be- caste Hindus govern, while the dalit castes
the three have to obtain a share of the cause the communal mobilisation of the are imbued with brahminical values,
remaining, mainly Muslim, votes. They Sangh parivar is creating dalit-Muslim They should willingly function as soldiers
are thus compelled to play the politics of tensions. A ninth of all communal of the upper castes and fight battles on
communal mobilisation. To reply to the incidents since 16 May 2014 were dalit- their behalf. For this, the growing chasm
bjp, the sp mobilised Muslims in up, and Muslim confrontations (Express Investi- between the upper and lower castes
the Congress also took advantage of it gation Part in 2014). One such incident should be reduced, and social harmony
when there was the possibility of linking took place between in Katauli Kala in has to be restored (Narayan 2009:42).
the caste vote bank with the Muslim Azamgarh district on 4 August 2014. A The small riots will continue to tak
vote bank. In the new political scenario, minor argument over widening a village place before the 2017 assembly elections

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Economic & Political weekly EEE3 September 13, 2014 vol xlix no 37 31

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 COMMENTARY

in up. There will also be a marked
effort to spread them to places such
as Ujala (2013): "18 sthalon par sadbhav
Amar
eastern up and Bundelkhand. If the sp
is unable to reduce the growing com
munal space in up society and politics
through its state agencies, the bjp will
have an advantage, while the others Express
will have none.
REFERENCES Express Investigation Part III (2014): "Dalit-Muslim
Divide
Deepens, Goes Rural", The Indian
bigar
Express,
hne ki ashanka", "Kaushambi ke 20 netaon ke 7 August.
pratinidhion par hai ATS ki nigah", Express Investigation Part IV (2014): "Fighting Ki
Allahabad,
Pratapgarh, 24 September. to Dhaba Bill: Takes Little to Keep Communa
Pot Simmering",
Express Investigation Part I (2014): "Over 600 The Indian Express, 8 August.
'Communal Incidents' in UP since LS Results",
Narayan, B (2009): Fascinating Hindutva: Saffro
The Indian Express, 5 August. Politics and Dalit Mobilisation (New Delhi: Sage).
Investigation Part II (2014): "MyRai, V N (1998): Combating Communal Conflic
Loudspeaker
versus Loudspeaker", The Indian Express, 6(Allahabad:
August. Anamika Prakashan).

Elementary Education data was collected from policy imple

mented at various state levels, teachers,

of the Urban Poor non-governmental organisations (ngos),

parents and children. It focuses on the
lacunae within the framework of the ssa
Policy Context, Text and Practice in Delhi
programme and highlights the problem
areas in its implementation in Delhi and
the concerns that the existing policy
MONIKA BANERJEE
gaps pose for the education develop
ment of the urban poor.
Through a two-way process
comprising text analysis of the providing free and compulsory SSA Programme in Delhi
Despiteeducation
policy framework of the Sarva
consistent
to all emphasis on
children below The ssa programme was launched in
the age of 14 years, policies and progra Delhi in 2002, almost two years later
Shiksha Abhiyan programme mmes designed to ensure universal than other states. The annual report of
and analysis of empirical data
elementary education have failed to cap ssa Delhi for 2003-04 noted that due to
ture
collected through interaction the contextual reality and specific the unique nature of Delhi being a city
with
situation of urban children in India state, with a much higher population
policy implementers, teachers,
(Ramachandran 2006). This is becausedensity than the national average, it was
students, experts, etc, this article
it is widely believed that urban areas are
not possible to apply the ssa programme
puts forth the argument that at habitation level. Hence the ssa Delhi
well-provided with educational facilities,
urban education system hasand therefore, development of primaryhad to evolve new concepts and modify
failed
education need not be a matter of major
some of the existing to make it more ap
partly because of the inability of
concern for urban education planners
plicable to the city needs.
the implementers to plan, manage
(Govinda 1995). This assumption fails to In order to achieve the defined goals,
and facilitate the programme. the Universal Elementary Education
capture the fact that urban areas present
wide disparity in terms of the socio-econo
Mission (ueem) Delhi took up the fol
mic status of its population (Govindalowing initiatives:
• Initiation of a hassle free admission
1995), and, therefore, concerns and issues
unique to an urban set-up are not taken
procedures;
into consideration when strategic inter• Direct transfer from the Municipal
ventions are planned for ensuring proviCorporation of Delhi (mcd) to Delhi gov
ernment school after Class v;
sion of quality education to the urban poor.
The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (ssa) is •aMobile schools for out of schoolchildren;
flagship programme for promoting uni
• Vidyalaya Kalyan Samitis (vks) for en
versal primary education, regarding the
couraging community participation;
• District urban resource centres (durcs)
urban poor as a "special focused group".
However, within its Framework for Im and cluster resource centres (crcs) as
This article is based on my MPhil Research
plementation
Dissertation completed in 2009 from the (2008) it prescribes norms
per ssa guidelines.
for both rural and urban areas on almost However, it has still been critiqued on
Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, various grounds. The Appraisal Note
similar lines, not giving any weightage
New Delhi.
to the fact that the sociopolitical context
(2008-09: 15) prepared by 111th Project
Monika Banerjee (banerjie77@gmail.com) is of an urban area differs greatly from
Appraisal Board Meeting noted,
with the Zakir Husain Centre for Educational that of a rural area.
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Planning and management seem to be
New Delhi.
This article is based on a study carried the weakest areas as far as ssa Delhi is
out in Delhi in 2009, for which empirical concerned. The district and sub-district
32 September 13, 2oi4 vol XLix no 37 Ü22Ü3 Economic & Political weekly

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