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MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M GREENFIELD VS RAMOS

326 SCRA428 [2000]

FACTS:
Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG) is a local
union. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer of petitioner's members. Members
of petitioner conducted a strike, which was marred by violence. Private respondent attempted
to quell the same by hiring persons for that purpose. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension; only some of them were eventually allowed to return to work.

Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the DOLE,
charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union-busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion,
violence, and oppression. Private respondent's defense was that the strike was illegal for it was
marred by violence.

ISSUE: WON the strike should be declared illegal on account of violence committed during the
strike.

HELD: No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed during the strike, the
strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot be attributed to the striking employees
only. This is an exception to the general rule that the strike shall be declared illegal where it is
marred by violence on the part of the employees.

In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be
remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that
there were violent incidents . . . resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management.
The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees
alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence
committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a
ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules


of Court, of the Resolution1 dated 30 August 2004 of the Court of
Appeals, finding petitioner Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado (Atty.
Regalado) guilty of indirect contempt and is ordered to pay a fine
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000), with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.. Likewise assailed in this petition is the Resolution2
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A


MANIFEST ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN
THE CONTEMPT CHARGES AGAINST HER.

Ruling:

Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for


indirect contempt should be commenced, thus:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect


contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be


commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
(Emphases supplied.)

As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are


unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only
in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a
verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be
complied with.

There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would


fall under paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact,
she was adjudged guilty of indirect contempt. But were the
proceedings conducted in convicting petitioner done in accordance
with law?

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated


by respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.30
It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued
a Resolution31 dated 19 November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty.
Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.
Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was
the catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual
conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to
the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior
committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act
on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could
have been initiated at all.
Regalado vs Go

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by
herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and
General Manager Jose E. Barin. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from
employment. The NLRC rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring that respondent
Go’s separation from employment was legal for it was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by EHSI,
Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals promulgated a Decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor
Arbiter adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal.

EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through registered mail on 17 July 2003 while
respondent Go received his copy on 21 July 2003.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of
their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the
approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an
Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. Acting on the motions, the appellate court
issued a Resolution annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2)
through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
requirements as outlined must be complied with.

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go through a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion. It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued a Resolution dated 19
November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in motion and
led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate
court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of
respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.

We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge without
contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which rendered the questioned resolution.

In the present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalado’s
misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct
committed by the former. Thus, the instant case was not initiated by the court motu proprio.

The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with the categorical mandate of
the Rules (a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings must be filed).
Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and
directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty.
Regalado’s compliance with the appellate court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect
contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of the
indirect contempt action.
Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a
serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the fundamental principles
enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated.

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