G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily
restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents
that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on
that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates
dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because
there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty
bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death
Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period
given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated
upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the
law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable
Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events
transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing
death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a.
any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are
against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public
respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No.
7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen
(113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . .
is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by
this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did
not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from
the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the
Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and
considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern
matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death
penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction
by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No.
132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by
petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999
merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray
dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated
January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the
case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly
represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and
hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no
longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important
that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its
final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and
bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and
bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the
above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional;
but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which
are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval
of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to
interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our
Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of
the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that
became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations
to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight
clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the
same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows:2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute
and enforce it. There is a difference between the
3
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The
former continues even after the judgment has become
final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the
latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. . . .
4
For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible. 5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by
this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this
Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge
of First Instance, viz:
6
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same
cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the
cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the
court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed
completely to the Executive. The particulars of the
execution itself, which are certainly not always included in
the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to
pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at
bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of
the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on
this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof
on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can
be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three
ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that
show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has
performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a
circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution,
and there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing
the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has
jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect
of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court
7
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section
8
6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to
the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court
restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress. 1âwphi1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of
petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since
the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded
the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the
rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental
power to control and supervise the process of execution of their
decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of
judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases.
It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
9
Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by
the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to xxx xxx xxx
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the following powers.
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice xxx xxx xxx
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may or modify substantive rights.
appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its
10

power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered
11

independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to

as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations.
This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court.
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it
is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive xxx xxx xxx
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department
would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore,
12

that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter
is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If
the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents
do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution
of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since
time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its
decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November
6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice
recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true
copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow
(him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the
execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested."
The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the
Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate
relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation
however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and
Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of
execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for
the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information
of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the
appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of
supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the
discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the
execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about
the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of
executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For
instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the
execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110
[1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of
such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of
the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable
statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be
earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date
of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7,
Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley,
A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without
need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot
be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter."
(Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of
execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due
process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as
counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the
ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of
execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the
Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution
of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this
Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this
Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . ..
By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function." Public respondents cite as their
14
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source
of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts
to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. As observed
15
by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will
prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a
person who is insane at the time of execution." The suspension of such
16
a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the
same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time
amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered
as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary
to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in
various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and
their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe
upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously
distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December
28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b)
that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency
and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1)
that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be
granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has
been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared
they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul
Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4)
Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999.
Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special
Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's
17
Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve
petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the
Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death
Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there
were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss
petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted
that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were
widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than
one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore
different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A.
No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the
Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual
bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his
execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the
Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious
stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The
suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless
it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is
going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for
all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's
majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner
as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable
considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life
of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired
result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed
to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor
General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility
that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names
these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he
will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are
against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law
only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659
which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate,
the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House
of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all
means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law."
The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11,
1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the
morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez
resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed
the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not
request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its
legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the
question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless
discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
punishment." In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be
19
unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no
more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when
the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the
especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is
the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights
— to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary
political majorities." Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice
20
than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.
The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage
of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in
rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by
society.21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in
its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew
the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the
strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the
Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the
affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial
Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the
above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because,
among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that
Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out
of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the
Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of
the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes
final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its
compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end
to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the
case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of
the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to
carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that
the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this
1
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his
station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement
in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, should be
2
instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has
elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment,
as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo,
according to the classical phrase. When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates
by having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not
always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out
the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at
bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of
the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on
this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof
on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can
be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three
ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that
show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of
First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part
is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to
delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to
investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final
judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or
reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that
could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one
another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised
within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution
issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from
exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure
that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its
expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present
regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal
or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as
of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have)
transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing
death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet
expect any chance for a timely re-examination by Congress of the death
3
penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the
Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to
undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law
not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the
imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, in urging, with all
4
due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death
penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty
lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions
that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there
must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the
death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must
involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental
law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
 death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in
the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it.
The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that
there must first be a marked change in the milieu from
that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the
1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at
the enactment of the statute prescribing the death
penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the
death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that
would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and
make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death
penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the
law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the
circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of
murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the
Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating
death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is
callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without
consciously meaning to, stringent standards for
conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally
be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in
undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of
victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the
Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to
disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in
accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and
inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and,
like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court
even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound
by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has
jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write
only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death
penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June
15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or
amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now.
However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend
the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital
penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. *
This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death
cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on
this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a
copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would
mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions
thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion,
RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it
merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law)
is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will
abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are
constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
 SEPARATE OPINION Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional emphasized, "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
7

provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated August 22, 1996
1 in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the
filed by his newly-retained counsel, the accused raises for the first time
2 death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution
a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights."
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an
Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, this
3 exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in
transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against
by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.
4 the State and liberally in favor of the people. In this light, RA 7659 enjoys
8

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the
death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress
to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose
it on condition that it (Congress) finds "compelling reasons, involving
9

be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied) heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" ): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
10

Rather, it is strictly limited:

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had
not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom
Constitution." They proscribe the imposition of the death penalty "unless
5 1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for
it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future
imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed
capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not
merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely
abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the
effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the
clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-
Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what
crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative
to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that
Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and
courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain
11

claimed, "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
6 provisions of the Revised Penal Code; (2) by incorporating a new article
12

penalty." therein; and (3) by amending certain special laws.

13 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes
stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the
penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble,
which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the
more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually
for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which
the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the
Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital
offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by
aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed
the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It
reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred
on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or
characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already
stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it
prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware
of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a
paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as
follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this
Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It
simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without
adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable,
clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is
not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being
crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with
thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights
and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation,
much less prevail over its text. In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
15
source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe
death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the
presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were
already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery, no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses
17
punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code and by special laws.
18
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659,
Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly
said:19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code,
Mr. President, and from existing special laws which,
before abolition of the death penalty, had already death
as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which
were already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity,
Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional
duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress
to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it
did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal
laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to
stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the
Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In
explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm.
Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape
victim". Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
20
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape
victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the
available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements
of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then;
or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or
old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that
the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder
for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for
the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 made some attempt at meeting this requirement.
22
But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I
believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of
heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and
every crime, individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in
the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise
which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the
situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission)
might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659,
Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now,
Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order
condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the
distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an
anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death
penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order
situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other
compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr.
Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice
was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished
the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a
supervening circumstances after 1987.
 MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21
again and again that if one lives in an organized society percent.
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished
and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in
when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons 1988?
to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to
reasons which would supervene or come after the MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that
justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987
the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when
to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the
the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the
very year after the abolition of the death penalty was
people ratified it?
reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying
that now, under present conditions, because of the
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
the statistics supplied by the PC.
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be
meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know
xxx xxx xxx
from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery
in 1987?
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of
"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I
that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of
will confirm it.
state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even
non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the
crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when question.
the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was
enacted. Witness the following debate also between Representatives
24 MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the
Garcia and Lagman: crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu
inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in
1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the
abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us
the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree
with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases
 declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent
to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I
understand we are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987
was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in
1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading
from the same document and I would not want to say that
the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have
here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some
figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related
offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug
Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases
were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy
of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it
increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202
in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far
as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure
continued a downward trend, and there was no death
penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the
death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective
deterrent against heinous crimes." However no statistical data, no
26
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with
any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission
thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, in the same
27
manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is
the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit
without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. This debate can
28
last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not
lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing
power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death
penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any
other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, and 29
any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. Here the issue is not just crimes — but
30
capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at
Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." This primary right of the people to
31
enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only
reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, expressly prohibits any form of torture which is arguably a
32 33
lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving
protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
34
ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for
people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs
well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival
of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against
its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech.
assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of
these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their
enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact
that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the
marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the
Free Legal Assistance Group highlights this sad fact:
36
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
persons have been sentenced to death. At the end of
37
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7)
convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June
1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72,
an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the
monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly;
while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above
P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%)
earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn
between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between
P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%).
Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all,
while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence
wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable
income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know
how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112
of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26)
earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly,
indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1)
earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable
income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis;
fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their
monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at
all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent
(21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport
and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction
workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers
(delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper)
with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%)
are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen
(14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers
(butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour
guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and
four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk)
About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six
(6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
employee and executives comprise only three percent
(3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of
communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly
less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six
percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand
Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense
and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and
speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27)
graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of
high school, with more than half of them graduating from
 high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational
education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against
the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the
legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation,
investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example
to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the
crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings
in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance
Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and
written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial
proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The
net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not
upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
— unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal
balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in
particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be
misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the
DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out
or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To
put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law
would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible
language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether
the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it
seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people
in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational
attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to
living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst
less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the
law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot
substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help
improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that
exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the
underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater
degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and
from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic
postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately
wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to
any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people
and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the
greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and
so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the
better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and
constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute
books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right
against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature
denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny
equal justice to the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never
be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent
requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime
and itself. Congress must explain why and how these
 circumstances define or characterize the crime as
"heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear
and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of
the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It
bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable.
They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must
flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and
compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not
just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as
well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in
Almighty God. While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of
38
our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to
prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
39
Vitae (A Hymn to Life), "punishment must be carefully evaluated and
40
decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it
would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very
rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church
indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life.
Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even
the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him.
The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving
crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-
existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting
RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the
existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined
"heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute
therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the
strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the
Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the
affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial
Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the
above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because,
among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that
Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out
of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the
Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of
the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes
final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its
compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end
to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the
case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of
the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to
carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that
the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this
1
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his
station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement
in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, should be
2
instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has
elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment,
as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo,
according to the classical phrase. When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates
by having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not
always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out
the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at
bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of
the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on
this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof
on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can
be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three
ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that
show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of
First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part
is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to
delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to
investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final
judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or
reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that
could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one
another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised
within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution
issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from
exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure
that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its
expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present
regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal
or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as
of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have)
transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing
death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet
expect any chance for a timely re-examination by Congress of the death
3
penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the
Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to
undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law
not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the
imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, in urging, with all
4
due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death
penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty
lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions
 that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there
must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the
death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must
involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental
law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in
the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it.
The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that
there must first be a marked change in the milieu from
that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the
1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at
the enactment of the statute prescribing the death
penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the
death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that
would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and
make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death
penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the
law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the
circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of
murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the
Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating
death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is
callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without
consciously meaning to, stringent standards for
conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally
be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in
undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of
victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the
Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to
disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in
accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and
inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and,
like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court
even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound
by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has
jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write
only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death
penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June
15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or
amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now.
However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend
the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital
penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. *
This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death
cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on
this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a
copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would
mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions
thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion,
RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it
merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law)
is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will
abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are
constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated August 22, 1996
1
filed by his newly-retained counsel, the accused raises for the first time
2
a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original
Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, this
3
transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon
by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.
4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had
not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom
Constitution." They proscribe the imposition of the death penalty "unless
5
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for
it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future
imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed
capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not
merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely
abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the
effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the
clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-
claimed, "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
6
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
emphasized, "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
7
provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had
in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the
death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution
when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights."
With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an
exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in
derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against
the State and liberally in favor of the people. In this light, RA 7659 enjoys
8
no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the
death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress
to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose
it on condition that it (Congress) finds "compelling reasons, involving
9
heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" ): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
10
Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what
crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative
to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that
Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and
courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain
11
provisions of the Revised Penal Code; (2) by incorporating a new article
12
therein; and (3) by amending certain special laws.
13 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes
stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the
penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble,
which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the
more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually
for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which
the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the
Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital
offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by
aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed
the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It
reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred
on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or
characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already
stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it
prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware
of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a
paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as
follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this
Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It
simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without
adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable,
clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is
not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being
crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with
thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights
and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation,
much less prevail over its text. In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
15
source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe
death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the
presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were
already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery, no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses
17
punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code and by special laws.
18
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659,
Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly
said:19
 So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code,
Mr. President, and from existing special laws which,
before abolition of the death penalty, had already death
as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which
were already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity,
Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional
duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress
to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it
did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal
laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to
stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the
Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In
explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm.
Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape
victim". Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
20
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape
victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the
available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements
of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then;
or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new
or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that
the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder
for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for
the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 made some attempt at meeting this requirement.
22
But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I
believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of
heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and
every crime, individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in
the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise
which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the
situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission)
might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659,
Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now,
Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order
condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the
distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an
anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death
penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order
situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other
compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
 MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker. offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when
the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was
MR. LAGMAN. Justice. enacted. Witness the following debate also between Representatives
24

Garcia and Lagman:

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr.
Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice
was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished
the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a
supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu
inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in
1987 is 12,305.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21
again and again that if one lives in an organized society percent.
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished
and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in
when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons 1988?
to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to
reasons which would supervene or come after the MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that
justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987
the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when
to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the
the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the
very year after the abolition of the death penalty was
people ratified it?
reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying
that now, under present conditions, because of the
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
the statistics supplied by the PC.
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be
meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know
xxx xxx xxx
from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery
in 1987?
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of
"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I
that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of
will confirm it.
state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even
non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the
crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
 MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the
question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the
crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the
abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us
the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree
with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases
declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent
to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I
understand we are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987
was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in
1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading
from the same document and I would not want to say that
the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have
here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some
figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related
offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug
Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases
were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy
of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it
increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202
in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far
as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure
continued a downward trend, and there was no death
penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the
death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective
deterrent against heinous crimes." However no statistical data, no
26
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with
any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission
thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, in the same
27
manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is
the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit
without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. This debate can
28
last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not
lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing
power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death
penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any
other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, and 29
any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. Here the issue is not just crimes — but
30
capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at
Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." This primary right of the people to
31
enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only
reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, expressly prohibits any form of torture which is arguably a
32 33
lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving
protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
34
ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for
people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs
well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival
of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against
its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech.
assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of
these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their
enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact
that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the
marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the
Free Legal Assistance Group highlights this sad fact:
36
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
persons have been sentenced to death. At the end of
37
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7)
convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June
1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72,
an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the
monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly;
while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above
P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%)
earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn
between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between
P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%).
Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all,
while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence
wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable
income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know
how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112
of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26)
earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly,
indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1)
earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable
income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis;
fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their
monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at
all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent
(21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport
and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction
workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers
(delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper)
with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%)
are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen
(14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers
(butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour
guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and
four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk)
About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six
(6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
employee and executives comprise only three percent
(3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of
communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly
 less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six
percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand
Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense
and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and
speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27)
graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of
high school, with more than half of them graduating from
high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational
education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against
the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the
legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation,
investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example
to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the
crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings
in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance
Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and
written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial
proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The
net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not
upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
— unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal
balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in
particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be
misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the
DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out
or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To
put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law
would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible
language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether
the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it
seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people
in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational
attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to
living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst
less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the
law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot
substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help
improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that
exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the
underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater
degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and
from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic
postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately
wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to
any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people
and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the
greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and
so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the
better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and
constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
1. The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our
statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
2. The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right
against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to
life.
3. Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because
such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic
right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
 4. Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should
never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
5. Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent
requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime
and itself. Congress must explain why and how these
circumstances define or characterize the crime as
"heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling
the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense.
grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving
crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-
existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting
RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the
existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined
"heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute
therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.

1. In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and

compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime,
and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as Clerk of

well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in
Almighty God. While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of
38 By: (SGD) TERES
our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to
prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
39

Vitae (A Hymn to Life), "punishment must be carefully evaluated and

40

decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the

offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it
would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very
rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church
indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life.
Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even
the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him.
The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s
ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition
of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court
finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant
with the requirements for its imposition.
Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA
7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The
Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177
and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection
Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary
of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution,
contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void.
The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the
parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status
quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the
RA in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his
contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as
Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing
applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the
death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a
reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of
international treaty and obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of
legislative powers.
RULING :
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of
"cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA
8177 and its implementing rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental
in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a
limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. The Constitution, however, does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the
International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified
by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individual’s right to life, it also
particularly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right
to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has
gone astray since dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE
DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and
each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is :
potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized
exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on
the subject of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
Leo Echegaray was a sick man who raped his own daughter Rodessa Echegaray.
The Secretary of Justice at the time of this case was Serafin Cuevas.
Facts:
On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the Supreme Court not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction over the case when the
decision became final and executory.
Whether or not the Supreme Court, by granting the TRO, has in effect granted
reprieve, thereby encroaching upon the functions of the executive.
Held:
First of all, the Supreme Court is not modifying or amending anything in the original
decision. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become
final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when
the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution
vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is
the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the
same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 (Death
Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of
such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the
imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there
is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States,
laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend
execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that
they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
Case No. 257 | GR No. 132601 | January 19, 1999 | Puno, J.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon
him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No.
8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations
under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power
to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health
and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course
to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do
not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2)
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render
said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons
discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly
left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court"
will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of
notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The
procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation,
and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution,
Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall
be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory,
without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers
at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor
wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This
is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations
in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in
prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained
prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting
cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out
the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious
crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy,
mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be
served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the
exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate
the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit
of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional
for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to
legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.
Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three
years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any
person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as
well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules
omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found
under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year
reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission
is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement. G.R. No. 130685 March 21, 2000

FELIX UY, ROMAN CAGATIN, JAMES ENGUITO, EMMIE HURBODA

FRANCISCO OLAER, LEONCIO BUSTAMANTE, FRANCISCO
RANARIO, JOE OSIN, JORGE PEDIDA, JOSE BATISTING, LUCIO
BATISTING, SEGUNDINO BOLOTAOLO, HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO
RANARIO Represented by FRANCISCO RANARIO, HEIRS OF LOPE
NAKILA, BONIFACIO BUSCAGAN, MARIANO CAPA, JUAN
MORALES, GODOFREDO RACHO, ELIZABETH AMARILLO,
BENIGNO ACAMPADO, PEDRO AREGLO, SERVITO BATAO,
ELEODORO BATISTING, ROGELIO DE CLARO, SILFORO LIBANDO,
HILARIO MARINAS, ALEJANDRO NOJA, HEIRS OF PEDRITA OLAER
Represented by surviving spouse Francisco Olaer, HEIRS OF
SILFORO MORALES Represented by EVANGELINA MORALES,
ANTONIO RETUERTO, STELLA FILIPINAS, TEODOLO FILIPINAS,
HEIRS OF MANSUETO NATAD Represented by NATIVIDAD NATAD,
AMADO MAGSIGAY, TIMOTEO GOLORAN, GREGORIO SEQUILLA,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO CANOY, APOLINARIO PLAZA, JESUS
GUDELASAO, HEIRS OF APOLONIO ANTIPASADO, TERESO
CAGADAS, LUCIO BARONG, LEONARDO LAPIZ, FRANCISCO
PAIGAN, ARTURO ESCOBIDO, BONIFACIO BUNOL, HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO PATAYAN Represented by NORMA PATAYAN,
SALVADOR CENA, BASILIO PAJE, DOMINADOR DAGONDON,
FAUSTINO LASTIMADO, EMPERATRIZ MORAN, EUGENIO MIRA,
ANGELO PLAZA, DEMETRIA ABAY-ABAY, ROLANDO GASCON,
DOROTEO GASCON, RIZALINO CUBILLAS, HEIRS OF FAUSTINO
MAGLAHUS Represented by LUISA MAGLAHUS, and JOEL
PLAZA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Represented by its Chairman, CELSO D.
GANGAN and by its Commissioners, SOFRONIO B. URSAL and
RAUL C. FLORES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the
Provincial Engineering Office, Province of Agusan del Sur, who were
dismissed from the service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
when the latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of
the said office.1 On July 11, 1988, a petition for reinstatement was filed by
petitioners before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), docketed
as MSPB Case No. 91-1739, alleging that Governor Paredes was
motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed them and hired new
employees to replace them. It appears that during the pendency of the
petition for reinstatement, Governor Paredes issued Memorandum Order
No. 3-A dated March 20, 1989 providing for the hiring of casual
employees to replace the dismissed employees, allegedly due to
exigency of service.
1âwphi1.nêt
The MSPB required Governor Paredes to comment on the petition. On
February 1, 1989, the governor specifically denied the allegations of
petitioners that their dismissal was illegal. Subsequently, an amended
petition and an amended answer were filed by the parties. Hearings were
conducted by the Civil Service Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro
City, where both parties were represented by their respective counsels.
The last hearing was held on June 29, 1990, after which the parties
submitted their respective memorandum together with their evidence.
On January 29, 1993, the MSPB rendered a decision holding that the
reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service
rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. 2 The
pertinent portions of said decision state, viz:
The focal point of controversy is whether or not Administrative
Order No. 88-01 streamlining the personnel complement of the
PEO is in accordance with Civil Service Laws, Rules and
Regulations.
The law applicable in the case at bar, which is hereby quoted as
follows are Section 29 of E.O. 292 and Section 14 of the Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies, thus:
Sec. 29. Reduction in Force. — Whenever it becomes
necessary for lack of work or funds or due to change in
the scope or nature of an agency's program or as a result
of reorganization, to reduce the staff of any department or
agency, those in the same group or class of positions in
one or more agencies within the particular department or
agency wherein the reduction is to be effected, shall be
reasonably compared in terms of relative fitness,
efficiency and length of service, and those found to be
least qualified for the remaining position shall be laid
off. (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 14. The names of permanent employees laid off
shall be entered in a reemployment list for the appropriate
occupation. The list, arranged in the order of the
employees' retention credit, shall be kept by the
Department or agency where the reduction took place,
and a copy thereof shall be furnished the Commission.
The Commission shall certify for purposes of
reemployment from such list as the opportunity for
reemployment arises.
 It has been conceded that reduction in force due to lack of funds
is a valid ground for terminating the services of an employee. But
this, of course, is subject to some limitations.
While the Governor of the Province of Agusan del Sur may take
measures to retrench or
At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It
crystallized the issue on whether the Congeress is disposed
to review capital punishment or not. Supervening events
like the (1) pronouncement of then President Estrada that
it will veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the
resolkution of the Congressmen that they are against the
repeal of the law; and (3) that current actions undertaken
by Senators Roco and Pimentel are
he held . . . .
Premises considered, This Commission sees no further legal
impediment to the payment of the claims of Ms. Emmie
Hurboda et al., of the Provincial Engineering Office, Province of
Agusan del Sur, for back salaries and other monetary benefits in
the total amount of P3,322,896.06 which has become the
personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it appearing that
the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith as clearly shown in the
herein records.
As a result, the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur, through its
Acting Provincial Treasurer, refused to release petitioners' remaining
back salaries and other monetary benefits. A motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners was denied by respondent COA in its Decision No. 97-
497 dated August 28, 1997. 10
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners raise the following
assignment of errors:
(A) The Honorable Commission on Audit committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Decision No. 97-497 on August 28, 1997 denying
their motion for reconsideration and affirming its Decision No. 96-
351, dated July 2, 1996 by ruling that payment of their back
salaries and other money benefits became the personal liability of
former Governor Ceferino Paredes Jr. and not of the Provincial
Government of Agusan del Sur, after the Merit Systems
Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission declared its
decisions final and executory;
(B) The Honorable Commission on Audit has no appellate
authority to revise, amend and modify the final and partially
executed decisions/orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board
and the Civil Service Commission, being the same constitutional
commission and co-equal with each other;
(C) The decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board and the
Civil Service Commission have already been partially executed
by the local government unit of the Province of Agusan del Sur by
reinstating petitioners to their former positions in 1993 and
partially paying their back wages in the amount of Two Million
Two Hundred Ninety One Four Hundred Twenty Three and Thirty
Four (P2,291,423.34) Pesos on December 12, 1995; and
(D) The jurisprudence cited by public respondent in the case
of Dumlao vs. CA, 114 SCRA 251; Salcedo vs. CA, 81 SCRA
408; and Correa vs. CFI of Bulacan, 92 SCRA 312 are not
applicable in this case.
The hinge issue is whether respondent COA, in the exercise of its power
to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed
employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has
been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service
Commission.
We hold that respondent COA is bereft of power to disallow the payment
of petitioners' back wages.
FIRST. The ruling of the respondent COA is based on its finding that bad
faith attended the dismissal of petitioners. In arriving at this conclusion,
respondent COA relied solely on the MSPB decision of January 29, 1993
holding that the dismissal was illegal because first, it was made in
violation of Section 29 of EO 292 and Section 14 of the Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies, and second, new casual employees were
hired under the guise of exigency of the public service. A careful perusal
of said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical
finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and
hence, is personally liable for the payment of petitioners' back wages.
Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would
have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural
infirmities in its implementation. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part
of Governor Paredes it would have categorically decreed his personal
liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure, even the
petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the
personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that
bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus
of proving it. 11 In the case at bar, the decision of the MSPB by itself does
not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption
of good faith.
SECOND. The case at bar brings to the fore the parameters of the power
of the respondent COA to decide administrative cases involving
expenditure of public funds. 12 Undoubtedly, the exercise of this power
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit. As statutorily
envisioned, this pertains to the "examination, audit, and settlement of all
debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities". 13 The process of
government audit is adjudicative in nature. The decisions of COA
presuppose an adjudicatory process involving the determination and
resolution of opposing claims. Its work as adjudicator of money claims for
or against the government means the exercise of judicial discretion. It
includes the investigation, weighing of evidence, and resolving whether
items should or should not be included, or as applied to claim, whether it
should be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part. Its conclusions are
not mere opinions but are decisions which may be elevated to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. 14
Accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process
cannot be violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar,
1âwphi1
former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice
of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical
procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic
demands of due process. 15 Notice to enable the other party to be heard
and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in
any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due
process. 16 It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes
personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of
pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are
personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith
are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and
personal capacities. 17
THIRD. There is a further impediment in the exercise of the audit power
of the respondent COA. The MSPB decision of January 29, 1993 became
final and executory when the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur
failed to appeal within the reglementary period. To be sure, the decision
has already been partially executed as the Acting Provincial Treasurer
had paid petitioners some of their backwages. Again, our undeviating
jurisprudence is that final judgments may no longer be reviewed or in any
way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 18 Administrative decisions must end sometime as public
policy demands that finality be written on controversies. 19 In the case at
bar, the action taken by COA in disallowing the further payment by the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur of backwages due the
petitioners amended the final decision of the MSPB. The jurisdiction of
the MSPB to render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot
be categorized as void. Thus, we cannot allow the COA to set it aside in
the exercise of its broad powers of audit. The audit authority of COA is
intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties. 20 Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government
employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable. This is the reason why the Acting
Provincial Treasurer, despite the pendency of his query with the COA,
proceeded to release government funds in partial payment of the claims
of petitioners.
It cannot likewise be said that the MSPB gravely abused its discretion in
failing to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable. In the first
place, it is not clear whether the petitioners sued former Governor
Paredes in his personal capacity. Indeed, they did not appeal the ruling of
the MSPB which did not hold Governor Paredes personally liable for the
payment of their back salaries. Moreover, jurisprudence exists that under
exceptional circumstances public officials who acted in bad faith in the
performance of their official duties were not held personally liable. 21
We are not unaware of our ruling in Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan, 22 that
the conclusive effect of the finality of the COA's decision on the executive
branch of the government relates solely to the administrative aspect of
the matter. However, in the case at bar, the disallowance of the payment
of backwages radically alters the MSPB decision which held the
provincial government, not the provincial governor, personally liable. The
COA decision affects not only the procedural, but more importantly the
substantive rights of the parties.
FOURTH. We subscribe to the time-honored doctrine that estoppel will
not lie against the State. In the case of CIR v. CA, et al., 23 however, we
held that "admittedly the government is not estopped from collecting
taxes legally due because of mistakes or errors of its agents. But like
other principles of law, this admits of exceptions in the interest of justice
Be that as it may, the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur is not
without remedy against Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., if he indeed
acted in bad faith. Subject to the usual defenses, the proper suit may be
filed to recover whatever damages may have been suffered by the
provincial government.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the respondent Commission on Audit dated
July 2, 1996 and August 28, 1997 are SET ASIDE. 1âwphi1.nêt

and fair play, as where injustice will result to the taxpayer." In the case at
bar, a stringent application of the rule exempting the state from the SO ORDERED.
equitable principle of estoppel will prejudice petitioners who are lowly
employees of government. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago
Petitioners' sufferings started way back in 1988 when they were and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
unceremoniously dismissed from the service. It took five years for the Vitug, J., in the result.
MSPB to decide in their favor. Still, they were not reinstated until the
following year, and this only after several motions filed and orders issued
to compel the concerned public officials to reinstate them. Then again,
despite an Order issued as early as April 19, 1993 by the MSPB, the
provincial government was able to pay petitioners, and even only partially
Uy vs. CA
at that, a good two and a half years after or on December 12, 1995. Now,
after more than a decade, respondent COA holds that petitioners should GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
run after Governor Paredes in his personal capacity to collect their
claims. Worse, petitioners stand in danger of being made to reimburse FACTS:
what has been paid to them. Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
have more in law. 24 Rightly, we have stressed that social justice conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the
be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot
Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least
4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda
inconvenience. 25 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. 26 Social justice proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
would be a meaningless term if an element of rigidity would be affixed to
the procedural precepts. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely,
what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle
expressly so declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the
community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged. For under
existing conditions, without such succor and support, they might not,
unaided, be able to secure justice for themselves. To make them suffer,
even inadvertently, from the effect of a judicial ruling, which perhaps they
could not have anticipated when such deplorable result could be avoided,
would be to disregard what the social justice concept stands for. 27
No Waiver of RISE can be made DURING the marriage
>except: in case of judicial separation of property (JSP)

Waiver takes place upon
1. JSP
2. Marriage – dissolved/annulled
- Shall
 Appear in a public instrument
 Recorded as provided in Art. 77
- Creditors of spouse who waivered may petition court to rescind the
waiver
>limit: to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of
their credits (Art. 89
Co-ownership provisions apply in all Conjugal partnership – governed by
matters not provided for in FC
ALL property owned by the
spouses –
 @ the time of the celebration of
the marriage
 /acquired thereafter
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the
person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance
with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled
governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural
due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact
Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of
disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
rules on CONTRACT OF
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son
PARTNERSHIP in
 all that is not in conflict with what in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
is expressly determined in this
Chapter or ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular
 by the spouses in their marriage accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume
settlements (Art. 108) sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land
with improvements.
 proceeds, products, fruits, and
income from the SEPARATE
properties of the spouses HELD:
 those acquired by either/both
spouses by SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to
 their efforts cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
 /chance consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was
 Damages because of an accident
in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the
(loss of expected
salary/hospitalization expenses) proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to
PROPERTY (Section 3) sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
1. Property acquired DURING procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the
the marriage (Art. 116) summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the
a. Contracted/registered in
trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of
name of one/both
spouses lack of due process.
b. Whether acquisition be
for the partnership or for
ONLY ONE of the
spouses
2. The ff are CPP (Art. 117)
a. Acquired by onerous title
during the marriage @
expense of COMMON
fund
b. Obtained from LIW/P
c. Fruits, (nat, industrial,
/civil) due/received
DURING the marriage